No More Learning

97. Vydkhyd: prdjuaptika iti prdjnaptau bhavah prdjnaptikah samvrtisann api pudgalo ndstiti kascid grhniydd ity ato ndstiti ndvocat.
98. The Vydkhyd has the last pdda: omitted by Hsiian-tsang.
Paramartha: 3. This person is not capable of understanding the correct teaching of real
emptiness; thus, when he asked if, yes or no, there is a soul, the Buddha did not say there was no soul. 4. And since he takes into consideration the intention of the questioner, if the soul existed, why did he not say that it existed? So too, on the question of his non-existence after Nirvana, he said nothing because then the questioner would have fallen into difficulties.
99. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 246b2: Vatsa asks, "By reason of the consciousness of which dharma are you not of the opinion, you do not say that the world is eternal. . . that the Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death? " "By reason of the consciousness of ? ? ? ? , vedand, etc. "
100. Vydkhyd: nirgranthasrdvakacatakavad iti / nirgranthasrdvakena catakam jivantam grhitvd bhagavdn prspah kim ayam catako jivati na veti / tasydyam abhiprdyah /yadi /ramano gautama ddisej jivatiti sa tam nipidanena mdrayitvd darsayet / yadi punar bhagavdn evam ddisen mrta iti sa tam jivantam eva darsayet / katham namdyam ajna iti loko jdniydd iti tasydbhinivesah / bhagavatd tv asydsayam jrtdtvd na vydkrtam / tvaccittapratibaddham evaitaj jivati vd na veti. . . ndbhihitam / tadvad etan na vydkrtam. Perhaps according to Tokyo, xxiv, 9, J. As. 1925, i. 38.
101. The catuska (group of four questions): "Is the world infinite (anantavdn)? etc. " has the same meaning as the catuska: "Is the world eternal (sdsvata)? . . . "
If this is the case, how are there fourteen separate points, namely three catuskas and one dvika (Is the vital principle the body? . . . )? To this question the Vydkhyd answers: parydyarupatvavyavasthdne'pi caturdasatvam bhavatity adosah.
102. kun tu rgyu smra byed kyis. Chinese transcription: U-ti-chia ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Stcher- batski: Vatsa. The Tibetan version guarantees Uktika.
This is the Paribbajaka Uttiya of the Anguttara, v. 193-195 (perhaps different from the Uttiya of the Samyutta, v. 22,166) who interrogates the Bhagavat on fourteen points (beginning with the eternity of the world); the Bhagavat answers, "This is not explained by me . . . "; Uttiya asks, "What do you explain? "; the Bhagavat answers, "I explain the Dhamma . . . for Nirvana". Thereupon Uttiya asks, "Does the whole world, half the world, or a third of the world attain to Nirvana through this Dhamma? " The Bhagavat keeps silent. Ananda then intervenes and explains to Uttiya that he is asking that which has already been asked (To ask if the whole world attains to Nirvana is to ask if the world is eternal). The Bhagavat teaches how one attains to Nirvana: all those who have attained to it, are now attaining to it, and who shall attain to it, do so by the Path.
In Samyukta, TD 2, p. 247cl8, Uktika's first question concerns the infinity of the world.
Do all beings attain to Nirvana? Digha, ii. 147 (yes), Mahdvastu, i. 126 (yes), Milinda, 69 (no). Here we have the correct answer.
The redactor of the Brahmajdla understands the "infinity of the world" in the sense of "infinite in space" (Digha, i. 23: horizontal infinity, not towards the zenith or the nadir; on this point Kosa, iii. 3d, to the end); it varies its formulas: it examines whether the self and the world are eternal, whether the world is infinite.
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103. Uktika asks: kim tu sarvo loko'nena mdrgena nirydsyati / dhosvid ekadeio lokasya.
In the Pali recension: sabbo ca tena (dhammena) loko niyyissati upaddho vd tibhdgo vd.
104. On Maitreya, see Peri,BEFEO; xi. 455, Przyluski,/4*o/k*, 169,171,332. Madhyama, TD 1, p. 510? 9 (66th Sutra: he will come at a period when human life is 80,000 years long), Dirgha, 6th Sutra, TD 1, p. 4lc29 and Digha, iii. 76, SdlistambasMra (see Koia, iii. 28a-b). We are reminded of Ajita and Tissametteya of the Suttanipdta, 1032, 1040. Milinda, 159; Andgatavamsa in Warren, 482; Mrs. Rhys Davids, Hastings, i. 414. Ajita Maitreya and Mithra Invictus?
105. Saeki quotes the Samyukta, TD 2, p. 244al4, "Gautama, is the vital principal the body? This has not been explained. Is the vital principal something else? Is the body something else? This has not been explained. It is strange that the monk Gautama explains, on the subject of a deceased disciple, that 'Such a one is reborn in such a place . . . ' and that the monk Gautama does not explain that the vital principle is something else, and that the body something else again. "
Samyukta, TD 2, p. 213a27, sermon to Nanda: The disciple endowed with an unmoveable faith who desires long life and beautiful rilpa, shall obtain them. The disciple endowed with the avetyaprasddas, is, at the end of his life, reborn among the devas and obtains ten qualities {Samyukta, TD 2, p. 2, p. 215? ? , c9 and following, Madhyama, TD 1, p. 545bl5 and following).
106. satyatah sthititah. Hsiian-tsang: ti ku chu ku . Gloss of the Japanese editor: chu ku- neng chu ku ? &. ? : "capable of lasting. " Paramartha: i-shih i-chu $ c | | $ c t t
107. astfty apt drstisthdnam uktam. Hstian-tsang: ? chien ch'u ? ? ? ? -kudrstisthdna. This discussion is based on the Sdmmitiyanikdyas'dstra.
108. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 255cl3: The Bhagavat says, "You say that there is cause: I say so also; you say that there is no fruit: this is a foolish doctrine. " There are two doctrines, in all two extremes: the Bhagavat avoids the extreme of annihilation and the extreme of permanence, and he teaches the Middle Way. He also says, "I am not in contradiction with the world; but the world is in contradiction with me. "
Vibhdsd,77. 17". . . hewhosaysthat(thejiva) isdifferentfromthebody,isnotthebody, enters into the opinion of permanence. He is not of non-Buddhist doctrines (bdhya mdrga), he is not of evil opinions (kudrstigata) who does not enter into the opinions of annihilation or of permanence. All the Tathagatas, in order to oppose this, teach the path between the two, namely: rupa and the mind are not annihilated, are not permanent. " See above note 93.
109. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 42b3. Only Paramartha quotes the Sutra in full; Hstian-tsang and the Tibetan do not have the first phrase. Compare Samyutta, ii. 78, iii. 149: anamataggdyam samsdro pubbakopi na pannayati avijjdnivarandnam sat tan am tanhdsamyojandnam samdhdvatam samsaratam.
The same argument in the Sdmmitiyanikdyas'dstra.
From the point of view of the Madhyamikas, neither the permanent nor the impermanent can transmigrate: nityasya samsrtir ndsti naivdnityasya samsrtih / svapnavat samsrtir proktd tvaya tattvaviddm vara (Catustava, quoting Bodhicarydvatdrapafijikd, ix. 108).
110. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 424cl5. Sunetro ndma idsteti saptasuryodayasutre'yam eva bhagavdn fsih sunetro ndma babhuveti.
The Saptasuryasutra of the Anguttara, iv. 103, does not identify Sunetra with the Bhagavat: bhutapubbam bhikkhave Sunetto ndma satthd ahosi titthakaro kdmesu vitardgo . .
. (Compare Anguttara, iii. 371,373). We also find some details in the Vibhdsd on the rebirth of Sunetra's disciples and on the rebirth of Sunetra (TD 27, p. 424cl5 and following). There is no mention of Sunetra in the fragments of the Saptasurya of the Siksdsamuccaya, p. 247 and the Karmaprajnapti, Mdo. 62, fol. 66a. In the Saundarananda, xi. 57, we only see that Sunetra is the Bhagavat.
? 111. Vydkbyd: ? a ekesdm pudgalagrdha iti vdtsiputriydndm / ekesdm sarvandstigrdba iti madbyamakacittdndm. This is the only reference to the Madhyamaka system that the work of Vasubandhu contains.
The translation is according to Hsuan-tsang. Paramartha: "Thus, without cause or reason, one introduces the malady of opinion into the Good Law of the Tathagatas: there are some scholars who deny nairdtmya and produce a belief in the existence of an atman; there are, furthermore, some masters who deny the existence and affirm the non-existence of everything; the non-Buddhists believe in an dtman conceived as a separate thing. In the Good Law, some masters produce a belief in an dtman and a belief in universal non-existence. None of these masters obtain deliverance, because they do not differ from one another. "
112. Saeki quotes a Vijnaptimatra commentary: If the self is not real, who remembers, who recognizes things, who recites and retains books, who repeats texts, who loves some and hates others, who loves what is good and hates the rest? . . . The Vatsiputrlyas have a reasoning: "(In the system of our adversaries) beings (sattvas) do not remember because they are not selves, like space. "
For eight different explanations of the cause of memory, see Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 55al8: There are some masters who maintain that the self is by its nature real, namely the Vatsiputrlyas who say, "We say that there is a self that remembers what has been done; first oneself experiences, and then it is oneself that remembers. If there were no self, how could one remember what has been done? . . . " Again there are some masters who say, "The previous mind goes and says to the later mind: I did this; you, retain it and remember i t . . . It is thus that one remembers what has been done. "
Vibhdsd, p. 56a7, teaches the "right" doctrine of the Sarvastivadins.
For an explanation of memory in the Madhyamaka school, see notably Bodhicarydvatdra, ix. 24 (against the Vijfianavada), 73 (against the Pudgalavada), 101.
Milinda, 78-80; Demieville, 161, Compendium, Introduction, p. 42 (according to the Patthdna).
On memory, see Kosa, i. 33 (p. 97), ii. 24 (p. 190), 24a (p. 194), vi. 15, p. 927.
113. Vydkbyd: smrtivisayasamjndnvaydc cittaviiesdd iti / smrtivisayo'nubhuto'rthah / tatra samjUa sdnvayo hetur asyeti smrtivisayasamjndnvayah / cittavisesah kimcid eva cittam na sarvam ity art bah / tasmdt smaranam bhavati pratyabhijHdnam vd / / evam ubh ayavis e sane kfte prcchati kidrsdc cittaviiesdd iti / aha / taddbhoga iti vistarab / yasmin smartavya dbhogas taddbbogah / sa ca tena sadridh sambandhinaf ca sarnjfiddayo ye te vidyante 'syeti taddbhogasadrsasambandhisamjtiddimdmi cittavifesah / ddigrahanena pranidhdnaniband- bdbhydsddigrabanam / dfrayavifesaf ca /okas ca vydksepai cddir esdm iti dfrayavifesafoka- vydksepddini / tair anupahataprabbdvaf cittaviiesah sa evam anena pradarfito bhavati / tasmdd tdfidc cittavihsdt smrtir bhavati /
tad idam uktam bhavati / taddbhogavatab : yadi tatrdbhogab kriyate / sadrfasamjnddi- matah : yatra sddrfydt smrtir bhavati / sambandhisamjnddimatab : yatrdntarendpi sddrfyam dhUmddidarsandt smrtir bhavati / pranidbdnanibandbdbbydsddimata/ ca : yatra pranidhdnam atra kale smartavyam abhydso vdsya smarane / / dsrayavisesddibhir anupahataprabhavad iti / vyddhilaksanena dSrayaviiesena fokena vydksepena anyatra kdye / ddisabdagrhitais ca karmavidyddibhih /
tddrso 'piti vistarab / taddbbogavdn (tatsadrsa) samjn~ddimdn anupahataprabhdvo'pity arthah / atadanvaya ity asmrtivisayasamjndnvaya ity arthab / bhdvayitum utpddayitum // anyadrsa ity ataddbhogaydvatsamjnddimdn upahataprabhdvo vd.
The commentators on Hsuan-tsang debate this. P'u-kuang (TD 41, p. 447a22-bl0) has three explanations of smrtivisayasamjfianvaya, three explanations of resemblance (sadr/a) (that Fa-pao rejects, TD 41, p. 809al 1 and following), two of necessary conjunction (sambandkin), etc. (see Saeki, xxx, fol. 7a, 8b-9a).
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114. The Vydkhyd explains (below p. 1342) the discussion relative to the question, "In the absence of a soul, what knows? " evarh ko- vijdndtiti vistarah. It suffices to replace vijdndti with smarati, vijndna with smarana.
115. Paramartha, "Not different from memory, for the memory grasps"; Hsuan-tsang, "No difference of memory, only (grasping) comes from the agent,"
116. According to the commentators of Hsiian-tsang, these masters are the Samkhyas; according to the Vydkhyd, this formula is that of the Grammarians; for Stcherbatski, Vasubandhu here continues his controversy with the Vatsiputriyas: and in fact the Vydkhyd says that this argument tends to prove the existence of the pudgala. See Kos'a, iiiJ28a, for a discussion of pratityasamutpdda, and a refutation of the vaiydkaranacodya (objection of the Grammarians), "There is no action (kriyd) without an agent (akartrkd). " The bhuti is not different from the bhavitar.
117. Vydkhyd: gacchatigamandbhidhdnavad iti / yathd jv did gacchati sabdo gacchatiti gacchatiiabddbhidhdnam / yathd jvdldydlp iabdasya vd gamanam evarh devadatto gacchati devadattasya gamanam / anena drstdntena vijdndti devadatta iti sidhyati.
It is the opinion of the Sarvastivadins that gati (or gamana) is impossible, iv. 2b, English trans, p. 552-4.
118. Vydkhyd: parispandam akurvad aptty arthah /
119. Vydkhyd: kdranasddrsyena kdrydtmaldbhdt.
"Response to a seed," "to reproduce the seed," Hsuan-tsang: ch'ou ? =to make
parallel, respond to.
The Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 480al4, explains that one cannot attribute the action of
samyoga, samanvdgama {ch 'eng chiu ffljjjt ), Rosenberg, 204; see above, p. 1346, samyoga (= ho -Q* ) neither to a pudgala nor to the dharmas: the first does not exist, the second are bare of any activity. No dharma is either the agent or the object of an action of samyoga. But, as there is cause-result, defilement-purity, bond-deliverence, process-ceas- ing, so too the quality of being sarhyukta or asamyukta exists.
120. The consciousness of blue has a blue "aspect. "
121. Vydkhyd: kdranam kartfbhutam iti krtvd / tad yathd nddasya kdranam ghanta iti
ghanto rautity ucyate.
122. Vydkhyd:yathdcabhaviturilpasyabhdvdjjaniturjdteh sthdtuhsthiteranarathdntarat- vam evarh vijh"dne'pi sydd vijHdtur vijHdnasya vijHdndd bhdvdd anarthdntaratvam. (See the opinion of the Sarvastivadins on jdti, ii, English trans, p. 242).
"Theexistent,"Paramartha,neng-yu ? ^ ;Hsuan-tsang,yu. . . che. ""? ? ? ^
Paramartha: As the world says, "physical matter exists, arises, lasts. " Now the existing thing (bhavitr), etc. , does not differ from existence (bhdva), and yet nevertheless one employs two words. So too one employs two words for vijndna.
123. According to Saeki. The VaiSesikas, according to the Vydkhyd: vaisesikamatdnusdrdd vd
124. Why does one successively have gobuddhi, stribuddhi, mahisabuddhi, the idea of cow, woman, and buffalo? Why does not the mahisabuddhi follow gobuddhi?
The Japanese editor understands, "Why is not the latter mind parallel to the former mind, good, defiled, etc. . . . ? "
125. Vydkhyd: nikdmena parydptena samdptena dhyanena samdhitdndm . . .
126. See, for example, Kosa, ii. 71b.
127. Vydkhyd: gotravisesdd iti bhdvandvi/esdt. Below gotra is explained as bija, "seed. " The
? Footnotes 1375 gloss bhdvandvifesdt gives a translation, "by reason of the particular manner in which they
perfume the series. "
128. Vydkhyd: stricittad iti vis tarah / stricittat (- strydlambandc cittdd) anant aram tatkdyavidusandcittam (= tasydh striydh kdyasya vidusandyai yadi parivrdjakasya anyasya vd sddhos cittam utpannam bhavati) tatpatiputrddicittam vd (= tasydh patiputrddayah / ddiiabdena duhitrddayo grhyante / taddlambanam cittam tatpatiputrddicittam). Hsuan- tsang, " . . . the mind of an impure body. "
129. See ii. 36, English trans, p. 211.
130. Vydkhyd: tat pas'cad utpannam stricittam samartham bhavati tatkdyavidusandcittotpd- dane tatpatiputracittotpddane vd / kasmdt / tatgotratvdd iti / tatkdyavidusandcittam tatpatiputrddicittam vd gotram bijam asyeti tadgotram . . . anyathety atadgotram.
131. Vydkhyd: atha punah parydyeneti vistarah / parydyena ayugapat / stricittat tatkdyavidusandcittam / tatas tatpaticittam / tatas tatputracittam / tata eva ca tadduhitrcittam / tata eva ca tadupakaranddicittam utpannam bhavati / tatah stricittdd anantarotpannebhyai cittebhyo yad bahutaram pravdhatah patutaram faktita dsannataram vdsyotpddyasya cittasya tad eva cittam utpadyate / tadbhdvanabalapatutvdt (MS. - balam yastvdt) tasya bahutarasya patutarasydsannatarasya vd bhdvandyd balavattaratvdt /
On bhdvand (hsiu j ^ , hsiu-hsi ^? ) or vdsand, see iv. 27d, 123c, vii. 28c, 30c, 32d, viii. 3d.
132. Vydkhyd: evan hy dhur iti sthavirardhulah. See also Vydkhyd (Petrograd edition, 1918), p. 6: sarvdkdram kdranam ekasya mayuracandrakasydpi /
ndsarvajfiair jHeyam sarvajnajndnabalam hi tat //
133. An observation that one reads in the Atthasdlini, 142, Milinda, 87, Ko/a, ii. 24, English trans, p. 190.
134. Vydkhyd: the VaiSesika.
135. The version of Hsuan-tsang strays from the original on many points: "If they say that the variety of the vijndnas (consciousnesses) depends (apeksa) on the variety of the conjunction (of the soul) with the manas, we answer: No; 1. because the conjunction of the soul with another thing is not proved; 2. because the conjunction of two things is delimited (fen-hsien frffi, ) (that is to say two things can be joined on only one side). They themselves define conjunction: "possession succeeding upon non-possession": the conjunction of the soul and the manas should be delimited; 3. because, if the manas changes {i-ch'uan ? ? ), the soul should also change; 4. or rather the soul should perish with the manas. If they say that conjunction is partial, we answer: No. For there are not diverse parts in one soul. To suppose that there is conjunction if the soul is permanent and if the manas is not modified (pieh-i ? ? ? ), how can conjunction be diverse? If they answer that (this diversity) depends on the diversity of buddhi, the difficulty is the same (as when they explain that variety depends on the manas): we then ask how buddhi is diverse. If they say that, through dependence on the samskdras, the conjunction of the soul and the manas is diverse (jo tai hsing pieh wo i ho che 1^? ^? ? ? ^^ ), it means that a single mind, through dependence on a variety of samskdras, produces the variety of the vijndnas. What then would be the purpose of the soul? "
136. Vydkhyd: na / anyasamyogdsiddheh / naitad evam / kasmdt / tdbhydm dtmananob- hydm anyasya samyogasydsiddheh / na hi samyogo ndma bhdvah kalcidasmdkam siddho'sti.
A Buddhist does not admit the existence of an entity called samyoga.
137. This is the definition of the Dasapadarthl, H. Ui, The Vaisesika Philosophy, 1917, p. 271. Stcherbatski quotes the Pras'astapdda: aprdptayoh prdptih samyogah, and observes that the Vai/esikasutra, vii. 2, 9, differs.
? 1376 Chapter Nine
138. Vydkhyd: paricchinnade/atvaprasangah /yatrdtmana tatra manahyatra mano na tatrdtmeti. (Where the soul is, there is no manas).
139. An addition of Paramartha.
140. Vydkhyd: tato laksandd aprdptipurvikd prdptih samyoga iti manahsamcdrddyam yam sariradefam manah samcarati tatas tata dtmd samcaraty apaititi prasajyate / todyatha yam yam prthivipradeiam purusah samcarati tatas tata dtapo'pasarpati / tathd ca satmiskriyat-
vam asya bddhitam bhavatiti sa eva pratijnadosah.
vindfasya vd / prasanga iti vartate / dtmana iti ca // yatra yatra manah samcarati tatra
tatrdtmd vinafyatiti sa eva cdtra pratijnodosa dtmano nityatvanivrtteh.
141. Vydkhyd: pradeiasamyoga iti cet / sydn matam dtmana pradehna samyogo manasah / dtmana va pradesena manasa saha samyogah / yasmin fartrapradefe mano'vasthitam bhavati tadgatendtmapradefena mano na samyujyate / pradeiantarena tu partvatah (MS -ntapdlvatah) samyujyate / tasmdd aprdptipurvakatve'pi samyogasya aprdptenaiva dtmapradeSena manah samyujyata iti // tan na / tasyaiva tatpradeiatvdyogdt / na hy dtmano'nyapradeidvidyante/ nacaivdtmaivadtmanahprade? oyujyate.
One can suppose that the manas, when it occupies a certain part of the body, is not in conjunction with the part of the soul which is found in this part of the body, but rather with the other parts of the soul. Conjunction follows non-conjunction: the manas, being displaced, is found in conjunction with a part of the soul with which it was not in conjunction, namely that which occupies the part of the body that the manas has just quit.
142. Vydkhyd: astu vd samyoga iti vistarah / abhyupetydpi samyogam tathdpi nirvikdratvdd avi/isfe manasi katham samyogavifesah katham visisfah samyogo bhavatiyata evam uktam manahsamyogaviiesdpeksatvdd iti / buddhaviiesdpeksatvdd iti cet sa evopari codyate katham buddhivihsa iti katham na nityam idrfam evotpadyate cittam avi/ispe dtmaniti / kdranaviiesdd hi kdryaviiesa isyate sankhapatahddi/abdavat / samskdravis'esdpeksdd dtmamanahsamyogdd iti cet / sydn matam nityam avifispe'py dtmani manasi ca samskdravis'esdpeksdd dtmamanasoh samyogad buddhivisesa iti / tad uktam bhavati samskdraviSesdd bhdvandvihsalaksandd dtmamanahsamyogavisesas tad (viiesdd buddhi) visesah / atra briimah cittdd evdstv iti vistarah /
143. Paramartha: If there is no "earth" by itself independent of the quality of smell, etc. , why does one say that earth has four qualities? In order to distinguish: in order that others may know that smells, tastes, etc. , receive the name of "earth," etc. , that there is not, separately, earth, etc. In the same way one says: "the reflection of wood. "
144. On samskdra, bhdvandvisesa, see H. Ui, p. 162.
145. On the paddrthas, gunas, and dravyas, see H. Ui, p. 93 and foil. Discussion of the gunin
and the guna, Koia, iii. lOOa-b.
146. Hsiian-tsang: But the object of the notion of "I" is not of this sort. The text has na tv
ahamkdrah; the Vydkhyd: na tv aham ity evamdkdrah pratyaya ity arthal? .
147. See above, p. 1341, line 2. ).
148. Vydkhyd: yathd tathoktam iti / yathd krtvdhayah saddyatanam tathoktam tadvikdravi- kdritvdd dsrayas caksurddaya ity arthah (i. 45a) / Paricaskandhakam bhavdn uddharatity adhikrtam.
Vasubandhu is referring to his work, the Pancaskandhaka.
149- According to Hsiian-tsang and to the Tibetan (Stcherbatski). Paramartha: "Kartar is one who creates that which did not exist; upabhoktar is one who presently obtains the result of a former action. "
150. Stcherbatski: the Logicians; Hsiian-tsang and Paramartha: "Those who explain
? the dharmalaksanas. " But Stcherbatski states that the definition of these masters is that of Pdnini, i. 4, 54: svatantrah kartd.