621
only the form in which it is represented in idea alters.
only the form in which it is represented in idea alters.
Windelband - History of Philosophy
above, p.
694 f.
), found its most vigorous opponent in Herbart's Eleaticism (cf.
41, f.
).
This old antithesis constitutes the essential element in the relation of the two branches of German idealism (cf.
above, p.
584, note)-
§§
7
8.
' 1i it is'
of
in in
it is
a
it [a
a
:
*
is a
it,
Chap. 2, § 42. ] Syttem of Reason : Hegel. 618
undoubted data, but not -to give any account of empirical reality. So Hegel gave as aesthetics a historical structure built up of the aesthetic ideals of mankind. Following Schiller's method, and attach ing himself also materially to Schiller's results, he displayed all the fundamental systematic conceptions of this science in the well- arranged series of the symbolic, the classic, and the romantic, and likewise divided the system of the arts into architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry. So, too, from the fundamental concep tion of religion as being the relation of the finite to the absolute Spirit in the form of imaginative representation (Vorstellung) his
philosophy of religion develops the stages of its positive realisation in the natural religion of magic, fire worship, and animal symbolism, in the religion of spiritual individuality of the sublime, the beautiful, and the intellectual, and finally in the absolute religion which repre sents God as what he the triune Spirit Here, with deep-going knowledge of his material, Hegel has everywhere drawn the main lines in which the empirical treatment of these same subjects later moved, and set up the philosophical categories for the general con sideration of historical facts as whole.
The same true, also, of his treatment of universal history. Hegel understood by Objective Spirit the active and influential living body of individuals, which not created by these, but rather forms
the source from which they proceed as regards their spiritual life. The abstract form of this body called Right;' the Objective Spirit " in itself. " The subjection of the subjective disposition of the individual to the commands of the common consciousness the philosopher calls "morality," while he retains the name of "Sittlich- keit " [social morality or the moral order] for the realisation of the common consciousness in the State. In the immanent living activity of the human reason the state the highest beyond this are only- art, religion, and science, which press forward to the Absolute Spirit. The state the realisation of the ethical Idea; the spirit of the people become visible in its Idea the living work of art, in which the inwardness of the human reason comes forth into outer manifestation. But this Idea, from which the system of the forms and functions of political life derives, appears in the actual world only in the individual structures of the states which arise and pass away. Its only true and full realisation universal history, in which the peoples enter successively, to live out their spirit in the work of state formation, and then retire from the stage.
Hence Hegel treau the doctrine of Objective Spirit under the title Philoso phy of Right RtchUrphilotophie).
(
1
is
a
;. it is
is
it is
is
is
is
a
;
it is
is
is,
614 Germany: Development of Idealism. [Part VL
So every epoch is characterised by the spiritual predominance of a definite people, which imprints the sign of its peculiar character upon all the activities of civilisation. And if it is the task of his tory as a whole to understand this connected order, then politics, too, must not suppose that it can construct and decree a political life from abstract requirements; it must, rather, seek in the quiet development of the national spirit the motives of its political move ment. So in Hegel, the "Philosopher of the Restoration," the historical Weltanschauung turns against the revolutionary doctrinair- ism of the Enlightenment.
Hegel is less successful in the treatment of questions of natural philosophy and psychology ; the energy of his thought lies in the domain of history. The external scheme of his system, as a whole, is in large the following: the Spirit in itself (Geist an sich), i. e. in its absolute content, is the realm of the categories ; this is treated by the Logic as the doctrine of Being, of Essence, and of Concep tion or Notion. Spirit for itself (Geist fur sich), i. e. in its otherness and self-estrangement or externalisation, is Nature, the forms of which are treated in Mechanics, Physics, and Organics. The third main part treats, as Philosophy of Spirit, the Spirit in and for itself (mi und fur sich), i. e. in its conscious life as returning to itself; here three stages are distinguished, viz. the Subjective
(individual) Spirit ; the Objective Spirit as Right, Morality, State, and History ;
finally, the Absolute Spirit as pure perception (Anschauung) in Art, as imaginative representation ( Vorstellung) in Religion, as conception (Begriff) in the History of Philosophy.
He repeats, in all these parts of his philosophy, not only the formal dialectic of the construction of his conceptions, but also the material which constitutes the contents of the successive con ceptions. So the Logic in its second and third parts develops already the fundamental categories of the Philosophy of Nature and of Spirit ; so the development of the aesthetic ideals constantly points toward that of the religious Vorstellungen ; and so the whole course of the Logic is parallel to his History of Philosophy. Just this relation belongs to the essential nature of the system of reason, which here embraces not only, as with Kant, the Forms, but also
the content, and aims to unfold before its view this content in the variety of the " forms of the actual world of reality," although this content is ultimately everywhere the same with itself. The course of development is always the same, viz. that the " Idea," by dif ferentiating and becoming at variance with itself, " comes to itself. " Hence the categories progress from the Being which has no content to the inner Essence, and from there to the Idea which understands
Chat. 2, { 43. ] Metaphyrice of the Irrational. 615
itself; hence the forms of the empirical world ascend from matter to the imponderables, then to the organism, consciousness, self- consciousness, reason, right, morality, and the social morality of the state, successively, to apprehend the Absolute Spirit in art, religion, and science; hence the history of philosophy begins with the cate gories of material existence, and becomes complete after all its fortunes in the doctrine of the self-comprehending Idea ; hence,
finally, the entrance into this " system of the reason," also, will best be found by making it clear to one's self how the human mind begins with the sensuous consciousness, and by the contradictions of this is driven to an ever higher and deeper apprehension of itself, until it finds its rest in philosophical knowledge, in the science of the conception. The iuter-relation of all these developments Hegel
has set forth with obscure language and many mysterious and thoughtful intimations, in his Phenomenology.
In this system of reason every particular has its truth and reality only in its being a moment in the development of the whole. Only as such is it real in concreto, and only as such is it comprehended by philosophy. But if we take it abstractly, if we think it in its isolation, in which it exists not realiter, but only according to the subjective apprehension of the understanding, then it loses that connection with the whole, in which its truth and actual reality consists: then it appears as accidental and without reason. Hut as such, it exists only in the limited thinking of the individual subject. For philosophical knowledge, the principle holds, that
what is reasonable is real, and what is real is reasonable. ' The System of Reason is the sole reality.
§ 43. The Metaphysics of the Irrational.
The " dialectic of history " willed it that the System of Reason should also change into its opposite, and that the insight into the insurmountability of the barriers which the attempt to deduce all phenomena from one fundamental principle necessarily encounters, caused other theories to arise close Inside the idealistic doctrines already treated; and these other theories found themselves thereby
forced to maintain the unreaxon of thr World-ground. The first to pass through this process was the. many-sided agent of the main development, the Proteus of idealism, Schilling. The new in this movement is not the knowledge that the rational consciousness always has ultimately something for its content, which it simply
>Vomde tur Bechttphilo$. . W, VIII. 17.
616 Germany : Development of Idealism. [Fart VI
finds present within itself, without being able to give any account of it : snch limiting conceptions were the transcendental X as thing- in-itself, with Kant ; as differential of consciousness, with Maimon; as a free act without rational ground, in Fichte. The new was, that this which could not be comprehended by the reason, and which resisted its work, was now also to be thought as something irrational.
1. Schelling was forced upon the path of irrationalism, remarka bly enough, by taking up the religious motif into his absolute ideal ism (§ 42, 9). If "the Absolute" was thought no longer merely in Spinozistic fashion, as the universal, indifferent essence of all phenomena, if the divine and the natural principle of things were distinguished, so that the eternal Ideas as the Forms of the divine self-perception were assigned a separate existence beside finite things, then the transmutation of God into the world must again become a
This was really Hegel's problem also, and the latter was right when he taught later that, in his view, philosophy has the same task as theology. He aided himself with the dialectical method which aimed to show in the form of a higher logic, how the Idea agreeably to its own conceptional essence releases itself to " other ness" (Anderssein) , i. e. to Nature, to finite phenomenal appearance.
Schelling sought to solve the same problem by the method of theoxophy, i. e. by a mystico-speculative doctrine, which transposed philosophical conceptions into religious intuitions. His happening upon this method was due to the fact that the problem met him in the form of an attempt to limit philosophy by religion. He obligated himself, in a vigorous reaction against this in the name of philoso phy, to solve the religious problem also. This, indeed, could only be done if philosophy passed over into theosophical speculations.
A disciple of the System of Identity, Eschenmayer,1 showed that philosophical knowledge can indeed point out the reasonableness of the world, and its agreement with the divine reason, but cannot show how this world attains the self-subsistent existence with reference to the deity, which it has in finite things. Here philosophy ceases and religion begins. In order to vindicate this domain also for
problem.
and restore the old unity between philosophy and relig ion, Schelling lays claim to specifically religious intuitions as philo sophical conceptions, and so re-shapes them in accordance with this claim that they appear usable for both disciplines : in doing which he makes a copious use of Kant's philosophy of religion.
1 Eschenmayer (1770-1852), Die Philosophie in ihrem Uebergange znr . VicA*
philosophy,
philosophie
(1803).
Chap. 2, § 43. ] Metaphysics of the Irrational : Schelliny. 617
In fact,1 there is no continuous transition from the Absolute to the concrete reality ; the origin of the world of sense from God is thinkable only by a leap (Sprung), a breaking off from the condition of absoluteness. A ground for this — Schelling still teaches here — is to be found neither in the Absolute nor in the Ideas : but in the nature of the latter the possibility at least is given. For to the Ideas as the " antitype " or counterpart of the Absolute, in which it beholds itself, the self-subsistence of the archetype communicates itself, — the freedom of that which is in itself (" In-skh-selbst-seins "). In this lies the possibility of the falling away of the Ideas from, Ood, of their assuming metaphysical independence, by which they become actual and empirical, i. e. finite. But this falling away is not neces sary and not comprehensible: it is a fact without rational around; not, however, a single event, but as timeless and eternal as the Abso lute and the Ideas. We see that the religious colouring of this doc* trine comes from Kant's theory of the radical evil as a deed of ihe intelligible character, while the philosophical, on the contrary, comes from Fichte's conception of the free acts of the ego, which have no rationale. On this apostasy, therefore, rests the actualisation of the
Ideas in the world. Hence the content of the actual reality is rational and divine; for it is God's Ideas that are actual in it: their being actual, however, is apostasy, sin, and unreason. This reality of the Ideas external to God is Nature. But its divine essence strives back to the original ground and archetype, and this return of things into
Ood is history, the epic composed in the mind of God, whose Iliad is the farther and farther departure of man from God, and whose Odyssey is his return to God. Its final purpose is the reconciliation of the apostasy, the reuniting of the Ideas with God, the cessation of their self-subsistence. Individuality also experiences this change of fortunes : its selfness (Ichheit) is intelligible freedom, self-deter mination — breaking loose from the Absolute: its deliverance is a submergence in the Absolute.
In similar manner Frederick Schlegel * made the "triplicity" of the infinite, the finite, and the return of the finite to the infinite, the principle of his later theory, which professed to maintain the contradictions of the actual as a fact, to explain them from the fall, and to reconcile them through subjection to divine revelation ; but merely concealed, with great pains, the philosophical impotence of its author under the exposition employed.
' Schilling, Ueligion und Philoiophit, W. , I. 6, pp. 38 ff.
« In the Philotnphitrhe Vorltrungtn, edited by Windischmann (1804-1806), and IlkewUe later in the Phttotophie det Ltbtn* and the Philoiophit diet
UtsckickU (1828-1829).
618 Germany: Development of Idealism. [Part VI.
2. The subtlety of Schilling, on the contrary, could not free itself from the once-discovered problem. The monism, which had always controlled his thought, forced him to the question, whether the ground of the falling away was not ultimately to be found in the Absolute itself: and this could be affirmed only if the irrational was transferred to the essence of the Absolute itself. From the point of view of this thought, Schelling became friendly to the mysticism of Jacob Boehme (cf. p. 374 f. ). This was brought near to him by his intercourse with Franz von Baader. The latter himself had received his stimulus both from Boehme and from Boehme's French prophet St. Martin,1 and, holding fast to the Catholic faith, had elaborated his mysticism with obscure fantastic genius and un methodical appropriation of Kantian and Fichtean thoughts. The original idea that stirred within him was, that the course of the life of man, who is the image of God, and who can know of himself only so much as God knows of him, must be parallel to the self- development of God. Since, now, man's life is determined by the fall as its beginning and redemption as its goal, the eternal aeif generation of God must consist in God's unfolding himself out of his dark, irrational, primitive essence, through self-revelation and self-knowledge, to absolute reason.
Under such influences Schelling also began in his treatise * on freedom (1809) to speak of an Urgrund, Ungrttnd, or Abgrund [pri mordial ground, unreason, or abyss] in the divine nature, which is depicted as mere Being, and absolute primordial accident (" Urxu- fall"), as a dark striving, an infinite impulse. It is the uncon scious will, and all actual reality is in the last instance will. This will, directed only toward itself, creates as its self-revelation the Ideas, the image in which the will beholds itself — the reason. Out of the interaction of the ever dark and blind urgency and its ideal self-beholding proceeds the world, which as Nature permits us to recognise the conflict between purposive formation and irra tional impulse, and as historical process has for its content the victory of the universal will revealed in reason, over the natural
1 St. Martin (1743-1803), "Le philosophe inconnu," the stern opponent of the Enlightenment and of the Revolution, was seized through and through by Boehme's teachings, and translated his Aurora. Of his writings, the most important are VHomme de Desir (1790), Le Souvel Homme (1796), and De VEsprit det Chose* (1801) ; the most interesting perhaps is the strange work. Le Crocodile, ou guerre du 61V11 rt du mat arrivte sous la regne de f. ouis XV. .
poeme (picomagique (1799). Cf. A. Franck, La Philosophic Mystique en Fraaet (Paris, 1866) ; also v. Osten-Sacken, Fr. Baader und St. Martin (Leips. I860).
4 This later doctrine of Schelling's is accordingly usually called the Doctrine of Freedom, as the earlier is called the System of Identity. Schelling, f/a iibtr Jit Frtihtit, W. , I. 7, 376.
Chap. 2, § 4a. ] Metaphysial of the Irrational: Schelling. 619
unreason of the particular will. In this way the development of the actual leads from the unreason of the primordial will (deu$ implicittit) to the self-knowledge and self-determination of reason
(dens explicitus). 1
3. Thus at last religion became for Schelling the "organon of phil
osophy," as art had been earlier. Since the process of God's self- development goes on in the revelations, with which in the human mind he beholds himself, all momenta of the divine nature must appear in the succession of ideas which man in his historical development has had of God. Hence in the Philosophy of Mythol ogy and Revelation, the work of Schelling's old age, the knowledge of God it gained from the history of all religions : in the progress from the natural religions up to Christianity and its different forms
the self-revelation of God makes its way from dark primordial will to the spirit of reason and of love. God develops or evolves in and by revealing himself to men. '
In its methodical form this principle reminds us strongly of Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy, in which " the Idea comes to itself," and the happy combination and fineness of feeling with which Schelling has grouped and mastered the bulky material of the history of religions in these lectures shows itself throughout akin and equal in rank to the Hegelian treatment. But the funda mental philosophical conception is yet entirely different. Schelling terms the standpoint of this his latest teaching, metaphysical em piricism. His own earlier system and that of Hegel he now calls negative philosophy: this philosophy may indeed show that if God once reveals himself, he does it in the forms of natural and historical reality which are capable of dialectical a priori construction. But that he reveals himself and thus transmutes himself into the world, dialectic is not able to deduce. This cannot be deduced at all ; it is
only to be experienced, and experienced from the way tn which Ood reveals himself in the religious life of mankind. To understand from this process God and his self-evolution into the world is the task of positive philosophy.
Those who both immediately and later derided Schelling's Phil osophy of Mythology and Revelation as " Gnosticism " scarcely knew, perhaps, how well founded the comparison was. They had in mind only the fantastic amalgamation of mythical ideas with philosophical conceptions, and the arbitrariness of cosmogonic and theogonic constructions. The true resemblance, however, consists
• Ct. above, p. 290 f.
» Cf. Coiuuotin Frantz, Sf lulling' $ Positive Philosophis (Cotton, 1879 L).
620 Germany : Development of Idealism. [Part VL
in this, that as the Gnostics gave to the warfare of religions, in the midst of which they were standing, the significance of a history of the universe and the divine powers ruling in so now Schelling set forth the development of human ideas of God as the develop ment of God himself.
Irrationalism came to its full development in Schopenhauer by the removal of the religious element. The dark urgency or instinct directed only toward itself appears with him under the name of the will to live, as the essence of all things, as the thing-in-itseff
(cf. 41, 9). In its conception, this will, directed only towards itself, has formal resemblance to Fichte's "infinite doing," just as was the case with Schlegel's irony (cf. 42, but in both cases the real difference all the greater. The activity directed solely toward itself with Fichte the autonomy of ethical self-determina tion, with Schlegel the arbitrary play of fancy, with Schopenhauer the absolute unreason of an objectless will. Since this will only creates itself perpetually, the never satisfied, the unhappy will and since the world nothing but the self-knowledge (self-revelation —objectification) of this will, must be world of misery and suffering.
Pessimism, thus grounded metaphysically, now strengthened by Schopenhauer by means of the hedonistic estimate of life itself. All human life flows on continually between willing and attaining. But to will pain, the ache of the "not-yet-satisfied. " Hence
pain is the positive feeling, and pleasure consists only in the removal of pain. Hence pain must preponderate in the life of will under all circumstances, and actual life confirms this conclusion. Compare the pleasure of the beast that devours with the torture of the one that being devoured — and you will be able to estimate with approximate correctness the proportion of pleasure and pain in the world in general. Hence man's life always ends in the complaint, that the best lot never to be born at all.
If life suffering, then only sympathy can be the fundamental ethical feeling (cf. 41, 9). The individual will immoral increases the hurt of another, or also merely indifferent toward moral feels another's hurt as its own and seeks to alleviate it. From the standpoint of sympathy Schopenhauer gave his psychological explanation of the ethical life. But this alleviation of the hurt only palliative does not abolish the will, and with the will its unhappiness persists. " The sun burns perpetual noon. " The misery of life remains always the same;
World as Will and Idea, 56 ft II. ch. 46 P<trer(/n, IT. oh. 11
1a
4.
it ;
is
it is
is
§
§ is a
is
'
is if
1. it it
§§ ;
is
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if it
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it,
:
Chap. 2, $ 43. ] Metaphysice of the Irrational : Schopenhauer.
621
only the form in which it is represented in idea alters. The special shapes change, but the content is always the same. Hence there can be no mention of a progress in history ; intellectual perfecting alters nothing in the will which constitutes the essential nature of man. History shows only the endless sorrow of the will to live,
which with an ever-new cast of characters constantly presents the same tragi-comedy before itself. 1 On this ground the philosophy of Schopenhauer has no interest in history ; history teaches only indi
vidual facts ; there is no rational science of it.
A deliverance from the wretchedness of the will would be possible
only through the negation or denial of the will itself. But this is a mystery. For the will, the tv «<u -ray — the one and all — the only Real, is indeed in its very nature self-affirmation ; how shall it deny itself ? But the Idea of this deliverance is present in the mystical asceticism, in the mortification of self, in the contempt of life and all its goods, and in the peace of soul that belongs to an absence of wishes. This, Schopenhauer held, is the import of the Indian
religion and philosophy, which began to be known in Europe about his time. He greeted this identity of his teaching with the oldest wisdom of the human race as a welcome confirmation, and now called the world of idea the veil of Maia, and the negation of the
will to live the entrance into Nirvana. But the unreasonable will to live would not let the philosopher go. At the close of his work he intimates that what would remain after the annihilation of the will, and with that, of the world also, would be for all those who are still full of will, certainly nothing ; but consideration of the life of the saints teaches, that while the world with all its suns and milky ways is nothing to them, they have attained blessedness and
" In thy nothing I hope to find the all. "
If an absolute deliverance is accordingly impossible, — were it
ever possible, then in view of the ideality of time there could be no world whatever of the affirmation of the will, — there is yet a rela tive deliverance from sorrow in those intellectual states in which the pure willess subject of knowing is active, viz. in disinterested contemplation and disinterested thought The object for both of these states he finds not in particular phenomena, but in the eternal
1 Hence the thought of grafting the optimism of the Hegelian development system on this will-irrationallstn of Schopenhauer's after the pattern of Spel ling's Dortrine of Frtrdum waa as mistaken aa the hope of reaching speculative result* by the method of inductive natural science. And with the organic combination of the two impossibilities, even a thinker so intelligent and so deep and many-sided in bis subtle investigations as Edward con Hartmann, could have only the success of a meteor that dazzles for a brief period (Die Philo$o- pkie dt» Unbevmutrn, Berlin, 1800) [Eng. tr. The Philotophy of the Vnconaciout, by B. C. Coupland, Lond. 1884].
peace.
622 Germany: Development of Idealism. [Part VI.
Forms of the objectification of the will — the Ideas. This Platonic (and Schellingian) element, however (as is the case also with the assumption of the intelligible character), fits with extreme difficulty into Schopenhauer's metaphysical system, according to which all particularising of the will is thought as only an idea in space and time ; but it gives the philosopher opportunity to employ Schiller's principle of disinterested contemplation in the happiest manner to complete his theory of life. The will becomes free from itself
when it is able to represent to itself in thought its objectification without any ulterior purpose. The misery of the irrational World- will is mitigated by morality ; in art and science it is overcome.
PART VII.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.
M. J. Monrad, Denkrichtungen der neueren Zeit. Bonn, 1879.
A. Franck, Philosophes Modernes, Strangers el Francais. Paris, 1873.
R. Eucken, Geschichte und Kritik der Orundbegtiffe der Gegenwart. Leips
187a 2d ed. 181)2.
E. v. Hartmann, Kritische Wanderung durch die Philosophie der Gegenwart.
Leips. 1890.
W. Dilthey, Archiv fur Geschichle der Philosophie. Vol. XI. pp. 651 ff.
H. Siebert, Geschichle der neueren deulschen Philosophie seit Hegel. Got-
tingen. 1898.
Ph. Damiron, Essai sur VHistoire de la Philosophie en France au 19* Siecle.
Paris, 1834.
H. Taine, Les Philosophes Classiques Francais au 191 SiMe. Paris, 1867.
F. Ravaisson, La Philosophie en France au 194 Siecle. Paris, 1868.
L. Ferraz, Histoire de la Philosophie en France au 19" Siecle, 3 vols. Paris,
1880-1889.
P. Janet, Les Maitres de la Pensee Moderne. Paris, 1883.
E. l)e Roberty, La Philosophie dn Siecle. Paris, 1891.
C"h. Adam, La Philosophie en France, pr. Moitie du Ifr Siicle.
1. . Liard, Les Logiciens Anglais Contemporains. Paris, 1878.
Th. Ribot, La Psychologie Anglaise Contemporaine. Paris, 1870.
D. Masson, Recent English Philosophy. 3d ed. Lond. 1877.
liar. Hoffding, Einleititug in die englische Philosophie der Gegenwart.
1890.
L. Ferri, Essai sur VHistoire de la Philosophie en Italic au J9* Siecle.
1869.
K. Werner, Die italienische Philosophie des 19. Jahrhunderts. Vienna, 1884 [O. Pfleiderer, The Dnelopment of Rational Theology since Kant. Lond. and
N. Y. 1891. ]
[L. Stephen, The English Utilitarians, vols. Lond. and N. Y. 1900. ]
[J. T. Merz, History of European Thought in the 19th Century, Vol. 1896. ]
The history ofphilosophical principles closed with the develop ment of the German systems at the boundary between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. survey of the succeeding development in which we are still standing to-day has far more of literary-his torical than of properly philosophical interest. For nothing essen tially and valuably new has since appeared. The nineteenth century
far from being philosophical one in this respect perhaps, 623
Paris, 1894.
Leips. Paris,
is
a
; it is,
is
A
A
I.
ff.
3
624 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VII.
to be compared with the third and second centuries b. c. or the four teenth and fifteenth a. d. To speak in Hegel's language, one might say that the Weltgeist of our time, so busy with the concrete reaJity and drawn toward the outer, is kept from turning inward and to itself, and from enjoying itself in its own peculiar home. 1 The philosophical literature of the nineteenth century is, indeed, exten sive enough, and gives a variegated play of all the colours ; the seed of Ideas, which has been wafted over to ns from the days of the flower of the intellectual life, has grown luxuriantly in all spheres of science and public life, of poetry and of art ; the germinant thoughts of history have been combined in an almost immeasurable wealth of changing combinations into many structures of personally impressive detail, but even men like Hamilton and Comte, like Rosmini and Lotze, have their ultimate significance only in the energy of thought and fineness of feeling with which they have surveyed the typical con ceptions and principles of the past, and shaped them to new life and vigour. And the general course of thought, as indicated by the problems which interest and the conceptions that are formed in our century,* moves along the lines of antitheses that have been trans mitted to us through history, and have at most been given a new form in their empirical expression.
For the decisive factor in the philosophical movement of the nineteenth century is doubtless the question as to the degree of importance which the natural-science conception of phenomena may claim for our view of the world and life as a whole. The influence which this special science had gained over philosophy and the intellectual life as a whole was checked and repressed at the begin ning of the nineteenth century, to grow again afterwards with all the greater power. The metaphysics of the seventeenth, and there fore the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, were in the main under the dominance of the thinking of natural science. The con ception of the universal conformity to law on the part of all the actual world, the search for the simplest elements and forms of occurrence and cosmic processes, the insight into the invariable necessity which lies at the basis of all change, — these determined theoretical investigation. The " natural " was thus made a general standard for measuring the value of every particular event or expe-
1 Hegel, Berliner Antrittsrede, W. , VI. , XXXV.
* To the literary-historical interest in this field, which is so hard to master on account of its multiplicity, the author has been devoting the labor of many years. The product of this he is now permitted to hope soon to present as special parts of the third (supplementary) volume of his GetchiclUe der neturen Philosophie (2d ed. Leips. 1899). In this can be carried out in detail and proved what here can only be briefly sketched.
Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. 625
rience. The spread of this mechanical way of regarding the world was met by the German Philosophy with the fundamental thought, that all that is known in this way is but the phenomenal form and vehicle of a purposefully developing inner world, and that the true comprehension of the particular has to determine the significance that belongs to it in a purposeful connected whole of life. The historical Weltanschauung was the result of the work of thought which the System of Reason desired to trace out.
These two forces contend with each other in the intellectual life of our century. And in the warfare between them all arguments from the earlier periods of the history of philosophy have been pre sented in the most manifold combinations, but without bringing any new principles into the field. If the victory seems gradually to incline toward the side of the principles of Demoeritus, there are two main motifs favourable to this in our decades. The first is of essentially intellectual nature, and is the same that was operative in the times of intellectual life of previous centuries: it is the simplicity and clearness to jterception or imagination
(anschauliche Einfucldteit), the certainty and definiteness of the natural-science knowledge. Formulated mathematically and always demonstrable
in ex]>erii'nee, this promises to exclude all doubt and opinions, and all trouble of interpretative thought. But far more efficient in our »lay is the evident utiliti/ of natural science. The mighty trans formation in the external relations of life, which is taking place with rapid progress before our eyes, subjects the intellect of the average man irresistibly to the control of the forms of thought to which he owes such great things, and on this account we live under the sign of Baconianism (cf. above, p. 386 f. ).
(>n the other hand, the heightened culture of our day has kept alive and vital all questions relating to the value which the social and historical life has for the individual. The more the political and social development of European humanity has entered upon the epoch when the influences of masses make themselves felt in an increasing degree, and the more pronounced the power with which the collective body asserts its influence upon the individual, even in his mental and spiritual life, the more does the individual make
his struggle against the supremacy of society, and this also finds expression in the philosophic reflections of the century. The con test between the views of the world and of life which spring respec tively from history and from natural science, has gone on most violently at the point where the question will ultimately 1*> decided, in what degree the individual owes what makes his life worth living to himself, and in what degree he is indebted to the influences of the
626 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VJL
environing whole. Universalism and individualism, as in the tune of the Renaissance, have once more clashed in violent opposition.
If we are to bring out from the philosophical literature of this century and emphasise those movements in which the above charac teristic antithesis has found its most important manifestation, we have to do primarily with the question, in what sense the psychical life can be subjected to the methods and concepts of natural science ; for it is in connection with this point that the question must first be decided of the right of these methods and concepts to absolute sov ereignty in philosophy. For this reason the question as to the task, the method, and the systematic significance of psyclwlogy has never been more vigorously contested than in the nineteenth century, and the limitation of this science to a purely empirical treatment has appeared to be the only possible way out of the difficulties. Thus psychology, as the latest among the special disciplines, has com pleted its separation from philosophy, at least as regards the funda mental principles of its problem and method.
This procedure had more general presuppositions. In reaction against the highly strained idealism of the German philosophy, a broad stream of materialistic Weltanschauung flows through the nine teenth century. This spoke out about the middle of the period, not indeed with any new reasons or information, but with all the more passionate emphasis. Since then it has been much more modest in its claims to scientific value, but is all the more effective in the garb of sceptical and positivist caution.
To the most significant ramifications of this line of thought belongs without doubt the endeavour to regard the social life, the historical development, and the relations of mental and spiritual exist ence, from the points of view of natural science. Introduced by the unfortunate name of Sociology, this tendency has sought to develop a peculiar kind of the philosophy of history, which aims to extend upon a broader basis of fact the thoughts which were suggested toward the close of the philosophy of the Enlightenment (see § 37).
But on the other hand, the historical view of the world has not failed to exercise its powerful influence upon natural science. The idea of a history of the organic world, which was postulated in the philosophy of nature, early in the century, has found a highly impressive realization in empirical investigation. The methodical principles, which had led to the philosophy of Nature, extended as if spontaneously to other fields, and in the theories of evolution the historical and the scientific views of the world seem to approximate as closely as is possible without a new philosophic idea, which shall reshape and reconstruct.
Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. 627
From the side of the individual, finally, the suggestions which were inherent in the problem of civilization as this was treated by the eighteenth century, temporarily brought the question as to the worth of life into the centre of philosophic interest. A pessimistic temper had to be overcome in order that from these discussions the deeper and clearer question as to the nature and content of values in general should be separated and brought to clear recognition. And so it was that philosophy, though by a remarkably devious path, was enabled to return to Kant's fundamental problem of values which are universally valid.
From the philosophical literature of the nineteenth century the following main points may be emphasized : —
In Franca Ideology divided into a more physiological and a more psycho logical branch. In the line of Cabanis worked principally the Paris physicians, such as Ph. Pinel (1745-1820; Xosographic Philosophiquc, 171*), F. J. V. Brouaaala (1772-1838; Traiti de Physiologic, 1822 f. ; Traiti de VIrritation rt de In Folic, 1828), and the founder of Phrenology, Fr. Jos. Oall (1768-1828 : Rrrherrhes fur le Systeme Xerreux en general et sur celui du Verrrau en parti- rulirr. 18011, which was edited in conjunction with Spurzhelm — 'I lit- an tithesis to this, physiologically, was formed by the school of Montpellier : Barthes (17. 'U-180o ; Xouceaux Elements de la Science de V Homme, 2d ed. ,
Associated with this school were M. F. X. Bichat (1771-1802; Rcherches Phyniologiques tur la Vie et la Mori. 1800). Bertrand (17H6-1881 ; Traiti du Somnamliulinme, 1823), and Buiaaon (17(10-1806; De la Division la plut Xaturelle dt* Phinominet l'hyniologiques, 1802). Corresponding to this was the development of Ideology with Daube (Ennui d" ldtologic, lM'-'i). and especially with I'ierre Iiaromiguiere (17&rt-18:! 7 ; Leconn de Philosophic, 1816-1818) and his disciple*, Fr. Thurot (1708-1832; De V Enlendement et de la Rainon. 18:10) and J. J. Cardalilao (1700-1845; Etudes Elimtntairtt de Philonophie, 1830).
§§
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Chap. 2, § 42. ] Syttem of Reason : Hegel. 618
undoubted data, but not -to give any account of empirical reality. So Hegel gave as aesthetics a historical structure built up of the aesthetic ideals of mankind. Following Schiller's method, and attach ing himself also materially to Schiller's results, he displayed all the fundamental systematic conceptions of this science in the well- arranged series of the symbolic, the classic, and the romantic, and likewise divided the system of the arts into architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry. So, too, from the fundamental concep tion of religion as being the relation of the finite to the absolute Spirit in the form of imaginative representation (Vorstellung) his
philosophy of religion develops the stages of its positive realisation in the natural religion of magic, fire worship, and animal symbolism, in the religion of spiritual individuality of the sublime, the beautiful, and the intellectual, and finally in the absolute religion which repre sents God as what he the triune Spirit Here, with deep-going knowledge of his material, Hegel has everywhere drawn the main lines in which the empirical treatment of these same subjects later moved, and set up the philosophical categories for the general con sideration of historical facts as whole.
The same true, also, of his treatment of universal history. Hegel understood by Objective Spirit the active and influential living body of individuals, which not created by these, but rather forms
the source from which they proceed as regards their spiritual life. The abstract form of this body called Right;' the Objective Spirit " in itself. " The subjection of the subjective disposition of the individual to the commands of the common consciousness the philosopher calls "morality," while he retains the name of "Sittlich- keit " [social morality or the moral order] for the realisation of the common consciousness in the State. In the immanent living activity of the human reason the state the highest beyond this are only- art, religion, and science, which press forward to the Absolute Spirit. The state the realisation of the ethical Idea; the spirit of the people become visible in its Idea the living work of art, in which the inwardness of the human reason comes forth into outer manifestation. But this Idea, from which the system of the forms and functions of political life derives, appears in the actual world only in the individual structures of the states which arise and pass away. Its only true and full realisation universal history, in which the peoples enter successively, to live out their spirit in the work of state formation, and then retire from the stage.
Hence Hegel treau the doctrine of Objective Spirit under the title Philoso phy of Right RtchUrphilotophie).
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614 Germany: Development of Idealism. [Part VL
So every epoch is characterised by the spiritual predominance of a definite people, which imprints the sign of its peculiar character upon all the activities of civilisation. And if it is the task of his tory as a whole to understand this connected order, then politics, too, must not suppose that it can construct and decree a political life from abstract requirements; it must, rather, seek in the quiet development of the national spirit the motives of its political move ment. So in Hegel, the "Philosopher of the Restoration," the historical Weltanschauung turns against the revolutionary doctrinair- ism of the Enlightenment.
Hegel is less successful in the treatment of questions of natural philosophy and psychology ; the energy of his thought lies in the domain of history. The external scheme of his system, as a whole, is in large the following: the Spirit in itself (Geist an sich), i. e. in its absolute content, is the realm of the categories ; this is treated by the Logic as the doctrine of Being, of Essence, and of Concep tion or Notion. Spirit for itself (Geist fur sich), i. e. in its otherness and self-estrangement or externalisation, is Nature, the forms of which are treated in Mechanics, Physics, and Organics. The third main part treats, as Philosophy of Spirit, the Spirit in and for itself (mi und fur sich), i. e. in its conscious life as returning to itself; here three stages are distinguished, viz. the Subjective
(individual) Spirit ; the Objective Spirit as Right, Morality, State, and History ;
finally, the Absolute Spirit as pure perception (Anschauung) in Art, as imaginative representation ( Vorstellung) in Religion, as conception (Begriff) in the History of Philosophy.
He repeats, in all these parts of his philosophy, not only the formal dialectic of the construction of his conceptions, but also the material which constitutes the contents of the successive con ceptions. So the Logic in its second and third parts develops already the fundamental categories of the Philosophy of Nature and of Spirit ; so the development of the aesthetic ideals constantly points toward that of the religious Vorstellungen ; and so the whole course of the Logic is parallel to his History of Philosophy. Just this relation belongs to the essential nature of the system of reason, which here embraces not only, as with Kant, the Forms, but also
the content, and aims to unfold before its view this content in the variety of the " forms of the actual world of reality," although this content is ultimately everywhere the same with itself. The course of development is always the same, viz. that the " Idea," by dif ferentiating and becoming at variance with itself, " comes to itself. " Hence the categories progress from the Being which has no content to the inner Essence, and from there to the Idea which understands
Chat. 2, { 43. ] Metaphyrice of the Irrational. 615
itself; hence the forms of the empirical world ascend from matter to the imponderables, then to the organism, consciousness, self- consciousness, reason, right, morality, and the social morality of the state, successively, to apprehend the Absolute Spirit in art, religion, and science; hence the history of philosophy begins with the cate gories of material existence, and becomes complete after all its fortunes in the doctrine of the self-comprehending Idea ; hence,
finally, the entrance into this " system of the reason," also, will best be found by making it clear to one's self how the human mind begins with the sensuous consciousness, and by the contradictions of this is driven to an ever higher and deeper apprehension of itself, until it finds its rest in philosophical knowledge, in the science of the conception. The iuter-relation of all these developments Hegel
has set forth with obscure language and many mysterious and thoughtful intimations, in his Phenomenology.
In this system of reason every particular has its truth and reality only in its being a moment in the development of the whole. Only as such is it real in concreto, and only as such is it comprehended by philosophy. But if we take it abstractly, if we think it in its isolation, in which it exists not realiter, but only according to the subjective apprehension of the understanding, then it loses that connection with the whole, in which its truth and actual reality consists: then it appears as accidental and without reason. Hut as such, it exists only in the limited thinking of the individual subject. For philosophical knowledge, the principle holds, that
what is reasonable is real, and what is real is reasonable. ' The System of Reason is the sole reality.
§ 43. The Metaphysics of the Irrational.
The " dialectic of history " willed it that the System of Reason should also change into its opposite, and that the insight into the insurmountability of the barriers which the attempt to deduce all phenomena from one fundamental principle necessarily encounters, caused other theories to arise close Inside the idealistic doctrines already treated; and these other theories found themselves thereby
forced to maintain the unreaxon of thr World-ground. The first to pass through this process was the. many-sided agent of the main development, the Proteus of idealism, Schilling. The new in this movement is not the knowledge that the rational consciousness always has ultimately something for its content, which it simply
>Vomde tur Bechttphilo$. . W, VIII. 17.
616 Germany : Development of Idealism. [Fart VI
finds present within itself, without being able to give any account of it : snch limiting conceptions were the transcendental X as thing- in-itself, with Kant ; as differential of consciousness, with Maimon; as a free act without rational ground, in Fichte. The new was, that this which could not be comprehended by the reason, and which resisted its work, was now also to be thought as something irrational.
1. Schelling was forced upon the path of irrationalism, remarka bly enough, by taking up the religious motif into his absolute ideal ism (§ 42, 9). If "the Absolute" was thought no longer merely in Spinozistic fashion, as the universal, indifferent essence of all phenomena, if the divine and the natural principle of things were distinguished, so that the eternal Ideas as the Forms of the divine self-perception were assigned a separate existence beside finite things, then the transmutation of God into the world must again become a
This was really Hegel's problem also, and the latter was right when he taught later that, in his view, philosophy has the same task as theology. He aided himself with the dialectical method which aimed to show in the form of a higher logic, how the Idea agreeably to its own conceptional essence releases itself to " other ness" (Anderssein) , i. e. to Nature, to finite phenomenal appearance.
Schelling sought to solve the same problem by the method of theoxophy, i. e. by a mystico-speculative doctrine, which transposed philosophical conceptions into religious intuitions. His happening upon this method was due to the fact that the problem met him in the form of an attempt to limit philosophy by religion. He obligated himself, in a vigorous reaction against this in the name of philoso phy, to solve the religious problem also. This, indeed, could only be done if philosophy passed over into theosophical speculations.
A disciple of the System of Identity, Eschenmayer,1 showed that philosophical knowledge can indeed point out the reasonableness of the world, and its agreement with the divine reason, but cannot show how this world attains the self-subsistent existence with reference to the deity, which it has in finite things. Here philosophy ceases and religion begins. In order to vindicate this domain also for
problem.
and restore the old unity between philosophy and relig ion, Schelling lays claim to specifically religious intuitions as philo sophical conceptions, and so re-shapes them in accordance with this claim that they appear usable for both disciplines : in doing which he makes a copious use of Kant's philosophy of religion.
1 Eschenmayer (1770-1852), Die Philosophie in ihrem Uebergange znr . VicA*
philosophy,
philosophie
(1803).
Chap. 2, § 43. ] Metaphysics of the Irrational : Schelliny. 617
In fact,1 there is no continuous transition from the Absolute to the concrete reality ; the origin of the world of sense from God is thinkable only by a leap (Sprung), a breaking off from the condition of absoluteness. A ground for this — Schelling still teaches here — is to be found neither in the Absolute nor in the Ideas : but in the nature of the latter the possibility at least is given. For to the Ideas as the " antitype " or counterpart of the Absolute, in which it beholds itself, the self-subsistence of the archetype communicates itself, — the freedom of that which is in itself (" In-skh-selbst-seins "). In this lies the possibility of the falling away of the Ideas from, Ood, of their assuming metaphysical independence, by which they become actual and empirical, i. e. finite. But this falling away is not neces sary and not comprehensible: it is a fact without rational around; not, however, a single event, but as timeless and eternal as the Abso lute and the Ideas. We see that the religious colouring of this doc* trine comes from Kant's theory of the radical evil as a deed of ihe intelligible character, while the philosophical, on the contrary, comes from Fichte's conception of the free acts of the ego, which have no rationale. On this apostasy, therefore, rests the actualisation of the
Ideas in the world. Hence the content of the actual reality is rational and divine; for it is God's Ideas that are actual in it: their being actual, however, is apostasy, sin, and unreason. This reality of the Ideas external to God is Nature. But its divine essence strives back to the original ground and archetype, and this return of things into
Ood is history, the epic composed in the mind of God, whose Iliad is the farther and farther departure of man from God, and whose Odyssey is his return to God. Its final purpose is the reconciliation of the apostasy, the reuniting of the Ideas with God, the cessation of their self-subsistence. Individuality also experiences this change of fortunes : its selfness (Ichheit) is intelligible freedom, self-deter mination — breaking loose from the Absolute: its deliverance is a submergence in the Absolute.
In similar manner Frederick Schlegel * made the "triplicity" of the infinite, the finite, and the return of the finite to the infinite, the principle of his later theory, which professed to maintain the contradictions of the actual as a fact, to explain them from the fall, and to reconcile them through subjection to divine revelation ; but merely concealed, with great pains, the philosophical impotence of its author under the exposition employed.
' Schilling, Ueligion und Philoiophit, W. , I. 6, pp. 38 ff.
« In the Philotnphitrhe Vorltrungtn, edited by Windischmann (1804-1806), and IlkewUe later in the Phttotophie det Ltbtn* and the Philoiophit diet
UtsckickU (1828-1829).
618 Germany: Development of Idealism. [Part VI.
2. The subtlety of Schilling, on the contrary, could not free itself from the once-discovered problem. The monism, which had always controlled his thought, forced him to the question, whether the ground of the falling away was not ultimately to be found in the Absolute itself: and this could be affirmed only if the irrational was transferred to the essence of the Absolute itself. From the point of view of this thought, Schelling became friendly to the mysticism of Jacob Boehme (cf. p. 374 f. ). This was brought near to him by his intercourse with Franz von Baader. The latter himself had received his stimulus both from Boehme and from Boehme's French prophet St. Martin,1 and, holding fast to the Catholic faith, had elaborated his mysticism with obscure fantastic genius and un methodical appropriation of Kantian and Fichtean thoughts. The original idea that stirred within him was, that the course of the life of man, who is the image of God, and who can know of himself only so much as God knows of him, must be parallel to the self- development of God. Since, now, man's life is determined by the fall as its beginning and redemption as its goal, the eternal aeif generation of God must consist in God's unfolding himself out of his dark, irrational, primitive essence, through self-revelation and self-knowledge, to absolute reason.
Under such influences Schelling also began in his treatise * on freedom (1809) to speak of an Urgrund, Ungrttnd, or Abgrund [pri mordial ground, unreason, or abyss] in the divine nature, which is depicted as mere Being, and absolute primordial accident (" Urxu- fall"), as a dark striving, an infinite impulse. It is the uncon scious will, and all actual reality is in the last instance will. This will, directed only toward itself, creates as its self-revelation the Ideas, the image in which the will beholds itself — the reason. Out of the interaction of the ever dark and blind urgency and its ideal self-beholding proceeds the world, which as Nature permits us to recognise the conflict between purposive formation and irra tional impulse, and as historical process has for its content the victory of the universal will revealed in reason, over the natural
1 St. Martin (1743-1803), "Le philosophe inconnu," the stern opponent of the Enlightenment and of the Revolution, was seized through and through by Boehme's teachings, and translated his Aurora. Of his writings, the most important are VHomme de Desir (1790), Le Souvel Homme (1796), and De VEsprit det Chose* (1801) ; the most interesting perhaps is the strange work. Le Crocodile, ou guerre du 61V11 rt du mat arrivte sous la regne de f. ouis XV. .
poeme (picomagique (1799). Cf. A. Franck, La Philosophic Mystique en Fraaet (Paris, 1866) ; also v. Osten-Sacken, Fr. Baader und St. Martin (Leips. I860).
4 This later doctrine of Schelling's is accordingly usually called the Doctrine of Freedom, as the earlier is called the System of Identity. Schelling, f/a iibtr Jit Frtihtit, W. , I. 7, 376.
Chap. 2, § 4a. ] Metaphysial of the Irrational: Schelling. 619
unreason of the particular will. In this way the development of the actual leads from the unreason of the primordial will (deu$ implicittit) to the self-knowledge and self-determination of reason
(dens explicitus). 1
3. Thus at last religion became for Schelling the "organon of phil
osophy," as art had been earlier. Since the process of God's self- development goes on in the revelations, with which in the human mind he beholds himself, all momenta of the divine nature must appear in the succession of ideas which man in his historical development has had of God. Hence in the Philosophy of Mythol ogy and Revelation, the work of Schelling's old age, the knowledge of God it gained from the history of all religions : in the progress from the natural religions up to Christianity and its different forms
the self-revelation of God makes its way from dark primordial will to the spirit of reason and of love. God develops or evolves in and by revealing himself to men. '
In its methodical form this principle reminds us strongly of Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy, in which " the Idea comes to itself," and the happy combination and fineness of feeling with which Schelling has grouped and mastered the bulky material of the history of religions in these lectures shows itself throughout akin and equal in rank to the Hegelian treatment. But the funda mental philosophical conception is yet entirely different. Schelling terms the standpoint of this his latest teaching, metaphysical em piricism. His own earlier system and that of Hegel he now calls negative philosophy: this philosophy may indeed show that if God once reveals himself, he does it in the forms of natural and historical reality which are capable of dialectical a priori construction. But that he reveals himself and thus transmutes himself into the world, dialectic is not able to deduce. This cannot be deduced at all ; it is
only to be experienced, and experienced from the way tn which Ood reveals himself in the religious life of mankind. To understand from this process God and his self-evolution into the world is the task of positive philosophy.
Those who both immediately and later derided Schelling's Phil osophy of Mythology and Revelation as " Gnosticism " scarcely knew, perhaps, how well founded the comparison was. They had in mind only the fantastic amalgamation of mythical ideas with philosophical conceptions, and the arbitrariness of cosmogonic and theogonic constructions. The true resemblance, however, consists
• Ct. above, p. 290 f.
» Cf. Coiuuotin Frantz, Sf lulling' $ Positive Philosophis (Cotton, 1879 L).
620 Germany : Development of Idealism. [Part VL
in this, that as the Gnostics gave to the warfare of religions, in the midst of which they were standing, the significance of a history of the universe and the divine powers ruling in so now Schelling set forth the development of human ideas of God as the develop ment of God himself.
Irrationalism came to its full development in Schopenhauer by the removal of the religious element. The dark urgency or instinct directed only toward itself appears with him under the name of the will to live, as the essence of all things, as the thing-in-itseff
(cf. 41, 9). In its conception, this will, directed only towards itself, has formal resemblance to Fichte's "infinite doing," just as was the case with Schlegel's irony (cf. 42, but in both cases the real difference all the greater. The activity directed solely toward itself with Fichte the autonomy of ethical self-determina tion, with Schlegel the arbitrary play of fancy, with Schopenhauer the absolute unreason of an objectless will. Since this will only creates itself perpetually, the never satisfied, the unhappy will and since the world nothing but the self-knowledge (self-revelation —objectification) of this will, must be world of misery and suffering.
Pessimism, thus grounded metaphysically, now strengthened by Schopenhauer by means of the hedonistic estimate of life itself. All human life flows on continually between willing and attaining. But to will pain, the ache of the "not-yet-satisfied. " Hence
pain is the positive feeling, and pleasure consists only in the removal of pain. Hence pain must preponderate in the life of will under all circumstances, and actual life confirms this conclusion. Compare the pleasure of the beast that devours with the torture of the one that being devoured — and you will be able to estimate with approximate correctness the proportion of pleasure and pain in the world in general. Hence man's life always ends in the complaint, that the best lot never to be born at all.
If life suffering, then only sympathy can be the fundamental ethical feeling (cf. 41, 9). The individual will immoral increases the hurt of another, or also merely indifferent toward moral feels another's hurt as its own and seeks to alleviate it. From the standpoint of sympathy Schopenhauer gave his psychological explanation of the ethical life. But this alleviation of the hurt only palliative does not abolish the will, and with the will its unhappiness persists. " The sun burns perpetual noon. " The misery of life remains always the same;
World as Will and Idea, 56 ft II. ch. 46 P<trer(/n, IT. oh. 11
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Chap. 2, $ 43. ] Metaphysice of the Irrational : Schopenhauer.
621
only the form in which it is represented in idea alters. The special shapes change, but the content is always the same. Hence there can be no mention of a progress in history ; intellectual perfecting alters nothing in the will which constitutes the essential nature of man. History shows only the endless sorrow of the will to live,
which with an ever-new cast of characters constantly presents the same tragi-comedy before itself. 1 On this ground the philosophy of Schopenhauer has no interest in history ; history teaches only indi
vidual facts ; there is no rational science of it.
A deliverance from the wretchedness of the will would be possible
only through the negation or denial of the will itself. But this is a mystery. For the will, the tv «<u -ray — the one and all — the only Real, is indeed in its very nature self-affirmation ; how shall it deny itself ? But the Idea of this deliverance is present in the mystical asceticism, in the mortification of self, in the contempt of life and all its goods, and in the peace of soul that belongs to an absence of wishes. This, Schopenhauer held, is the import of the Indian
religion and philosophy, which began to be known in Europe about his time. He greeted this identity of his teaching with the oldest wisdom of the human race as a welcome confirmation, and now called the world of idea the veil of Maia, and the negation of the
will to live the entrance into Nirvana. But the unreasonable will to live would not let the philosopher go. At the close of his work he intimates that what would remain after the annihilation of the will, and with that, of the world also, would be for all those who are still full of will, certainly nothing ; but consideration of the life of the saints teaches, that while the world with all its suns and milky ways is nothing to them, they have attained blessedness and
" In thy nothing I hope to find the all. "
If an absolute deliverance is accordingly impossible, — were it
ever possible, then in view of the ideality of time there could be no world whatever of the affirmation of the will, — there is yet a rela tive deliverance from sorrow in those intellectual states in which the pure willess subject of knowing is active, viz. in disinterested contemplation and disinterested thought The object for both of these states he finds not in particular phenomena, but in the eternal
1 Hence the thought of grafting the optimism of the Hegelian development system on this will-irrationallstn of Schopenhauer's after the pattern of Spel ling's Dortrine of Frtrdum waa as mistaken aa the hope of reaching speculative result* by the method of inductive natural science. And with the organic combination of the two impossibilities, even a thinker so intelligent and so deep and many-sided in bis subtle investigations as Edward con Hartmann, could have only the success of a meteor that dazzles for a brief period (Die Philo$o- pkie dt» Unbevmutrn, Berlin, 1800) [Eng. tr. The Philotophy of the Vnconaciout, by B. C. Coupland, Lond. 1884].
peace.
622 Germany: Development of Idealism. [Part VI.
Forms of the objectification of the will — the Ideas. This Platonic (and Schellingian) element, however (as is the case also with the assumption of the intelligible character), fits with extreme difficulty into Schopenhauer's metaphysical system, according to which all particularising of the will is thought as only an idea in space and time ; but it gives the philosopher opportunity to employ Schiller's principle of disinterested contemplation in the happiest manner to complete his theory of life. The will becomes free from itself
when it is able to represent to itself in thought its objectification without any ulterior purpose. The misery of the irrational World- will is mitigated by morality ; in art and science it is overcome.
PART VII.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.
M. J. Monrad, Denkrichtungen der neueren Zeit. Bonn, 1879.
A. Franck, Philosophes Modernes, Strangers el Francais. Paris, 1873.
R. Eucken, Geschichte und Kritik der Orundbegtiffe der Gegenwart. Leips
187a 2d ed. 181)2.
E. v. Hartmann, Kritische Wanderung durch die Philosophie der Gegenwart.
Leips. 1890.
W. Dilthey, Archiv fur Geschichle der Philosophie. Vol. XI. pp. 651 ff.
H. Siebert, Geschichle der neueren deulschen Philosophie seit Hegel. Got-
tingen. 1898.
Ph. Damiron, Essai sur VHistoire de la Philosophie en France au 19* Siecle.
Paris, 1834.
H. Taine, Les Philosophes Classiques Francais au 191 SiMe. Paris, 1867.
F. Ravaisson, La Philosophie en France au 194 Siecle. Paris, 1868.
L. Ferraz, Histoire de la Philosophie en France au 19" Siecle, 3 vols. Paris,
1880-1889.
P. Janet, Les Maitres de la Pensee Moderne. Paris, 1883.
E. l)e Roberty, La Philosophie dn Siecle. Paris, 1891.
C"h. Adam, La Philosophie en France, pr. Moitie du Ifr Siicle.
1. . Liard, Les Logiciens Anglais Contemporains. Paris, 1878.
Th. Ribot, La Psychologie Anglaise Contemporaine. Paris, 1870.
D. Masson, Recent English Philosophy. 3d ed. Lond. 1877.
liar. Hoffding, Einleititug in die englische Philosophie der Gegenwart.
1890.
L. Ferri, Essai sur VHistoire de la Philosophie en Italic au J9* Siecle.
1869.
K. Werner, Die italienische Philosophie des 19. Jahrhunderts. Vienna, 1884 [O. Pfleiderer, The Dnelopment of Rational Theology since Kant. Lond. and
N. Y. 1891. ]
[L. Stephen, The English Utilitarians, vols. Lond. and N. Y. 1900. ]
[J. T. Merz, History of European Thought in the 19th Century, Vol. 1896. ]
The history ofphilosophical principles closed with the develop ment of the German systems at the boundary between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. survey of the succeeding development in which we are still standing to-day has far more of literary-his torical than of properly philosophical interest. For nothing essen tially and valuably new has since appeared. The nineteenth century
far from being philosophical one in this respect perhaps, 623
Paris, 1894.
Leips. Paris,
is
a
; it is,
is
A
A
I.
ff.
3
624 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VII.
to be compared with the third and second centuries b. c. or the four teenth and fifteenth a. d. To speak in Hegel's language, one might say that the Weltgeist of our time, so busy with the concrete reaJity and drawn toward the outer, is kept from turning inward and to itself, and from enjoying itself in its own peculiar home. 1 The philosophical literature of the nineteenth century is, indeed, exten sive enough, and gives a variegated play of all the colours ; the seed of Ideas, which has been wafted over to ns from the days of the flower of the intellectual life, has grown luxuriantly in all spheres of science and public life, of poetry and of art ; the germinant thoughts of history have been combined in an almost immeasurable wealth of changing combinations into many structures of personally impressive detail, but even men like Hamilton and Comte, like Rosmini and Lotze, have their ultimate significance only in the energy of thought and fineness of feeling with which they have surveyed the typical con ceptions and principles of the past, and shaped them to new life and vigour. And the general course of thought, as indicated by the problems which interest and the conceptions that are formed in our century,* moves along the lines of antitheses that have been trans mitted to us through history, and have at most been given a new form in their empirical expression.
For the decisive factor in the philosophical movement of the nineteenth century is doubtless the question as to the degree of importance which the natural-science conception of phenomena may claim for our view of the world and life as a whole. The influence which this special science had gained over philosophy and the intellectual life as a whole was checked and repressed at the begin ning of the nineteenth century, to grow again afterwards with all the greater power. The metaphysics of the seventeenth, and there fore the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, were in the main under the dominance of the thinking of natural science. The con ception of the universal conformity to law on the part of all the actual world, the search for the simplest elements and forms of occurrence and cosmic processes, the insight into the invariable necessity which lies at the basis of all change, — these determined theoretical investigation. The " natural " was thus made a general standard for measuring the value of every particular event or expe-
1 Hegel, Berliner Antrittsrede, W. , VI. , XXXV.
* To the literary-historical interest in this field, which is so hard to master on account of its multiplicity, the author has been devoting the labor of many years. The product of this he is now permitted to hope soon to present as special parts of the third (supplementary) volume of his GetchiclUe der neturen Philosophie (2d ed. Leips. 1899). In this can be carried out in detail and proved what here can only be briefly sketched.
Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. 625
rience. The spread of this mechanical way of regarding the world was met by the German Philosophy with the fundamental thought, that all that is known in this way is but the phenomenal form and vehicle of a purposefully developing inner world, and that the true comprehension of the particular has to determine the significance that belongs to it in a purposeful connected whole of life. The historical Weltanschauung was the result of the work of thought which the System of Reason desired to trace out.
These two forces contend with each other in the intellectual life of our century. And in the warfare between them all arguments from the earlier periods of the history of philosophy have been pre sented in the most manifold combinations, but without bringing any new principles into the field. If the victory seems gradually to incline toward the side of the principles of Demoeritus, there are two main motifs favourable to this in our decades. The first is of essentially intellectual nature, and is the same that was operative in the times of intellectual life of previous centuries: it is the simplicity and clearness to jterception or imagination
(anschauliche Einfucldteit), the certainty and definiteness of the natural-science knowledge. Formulated mathematically and always demonstrable
in ex]>erii'nee, this promises to exclude all doubt and opinions, and all trouble of interpretative thought. But far more efficient in our »lay is the evident utiliti/ of natural science. The mighty trans formation in the external relations of life, which is taking place with rapid progress before our eyes, subjects the intellect of the average man irresistibly to the control of the forms of thought to which he owes such great things, and on this account we live under the sign of Baconianism (cf. above, p. 386 f. ).
(>n the other hand, the heightened culture of our day has kept alive and vital all questions relating to the value which the social and historical life has for the individual. The more the political and social development of European humanity has entered upon the epoch when the influences of masses make themselves felt in an increasing degree, and the more pronounced the power with which the collective body asserts its influence upon the individual, even in his mental and spiritual life, the more does the individual make
his struggle against the supremacy of society, and this also finds expression in the philosophic reflections of the century. The con test between the views of the world and of life which spring respec tively from history and from natural science, has gone on most violently at the point where the question will ultimately 1*> decided, in what degree the individual owes what makes his life worth living to himself, and in what degree he is indebted to the influences of the
626 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VJL
environing whole. Universalism and individualism, as in the tune of the Renaissance, have once more clashed in violent opposition.
If we are to bring out from the philosophical literature of this century and emphasise those movements in which the above charac teristic antithesis has found its most important manifestation, we have to do primarily with the question, in what sense the psychical life can be subjected to the methods and concepts of natural science ; for it is in connection with this point that the question must first be decided of the right of these methods and concepts to absolute sov ereignty in philosophy. For this reason the question as to the task, the method, and the systematic significance of psyclwlogy has never been more vigorously contested than in the nineteenth century, and the limitation of this science to a purely empirical treatment has appeared to be the only possible way out of the difficulties. Thus psychology, as the latest among the special disciplines, has com pleted its separation from philosophy, at least as regards the funda mental principles of its problem and method.
This procedure had more general presuppositions. In reaction against the highly strained idealism of the German philosophy, a broad stream of materialistic Weltanschauung flows through the nine teenth century. This spoke out about the middle of the period, not indeed with any new reasons or information, but with all the more passionate emphasis. Since then it has been much more modest in its claims to scientific value, but is all the more effective in the garb of sceptical and positivist caution.
To the most significant ramifications of this line of thought belongs without doubt the endeavour to regard the social life, the historical development, and the relations of mental and spiritual exist ence, from the points of view of natural science. Introduced by the unfortunate name of Sociology, this tendency has sought to develop a peculiar kind of the philosophy of history, which aims to extend upon a broader basis of fact the thoughts which were suggested toward the close of the philosophy of the Enlightenment (see § 37).
But on the other hand, the historical view of the world has not failed to exercise its powerful influence upon natural science. The idea of a history of the organic world, which was postulated in the philosophy of nature, early in the century, has found a highly impressive realization in empirical investigation. The methodical principles, which had led to the philosophy of Nature, extended as if spontaneously to other fields, and in the theories of evolution the historical and the scientific views of the world seem to approximate as closely as is possible without a new philosophic idea, which shall reshape and reconstruct.
Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. 627
From the side of the individual, finally, the suggestions which were inherent in the problem of civilization as this was treated by the eighteenth century, temporarily brought the question as to the worth of life into the centre of philosophic interest. A pessimistic temper had to be overcome in order that from these discussions the deeper and clearer question as to the nature and content of values in general should be separated and brought to clear recognition. And so it was that philosophy, though by a remarkably devious path, was enabled to return to Kant's fundamental problem of values which are universally valid.
From the philosophical literature of the nineteenth century the following main points may be emphasized : —
In Franca Ideology divided into a more physiological and a more psycho logical branch. In the line of Cabanis worked principally the Paris physicians, such as Ph. Pinel (1745-1820; Xosographic Philosophiquc, 171*), F. J. V. Brouaaala (1772-1838; Traiti de Physiologic, 1822 f. ; Traiti de VIrritation rt de In Folic, 1828), and the founder of Phrenology, Fr. Jos. Oall (1768-1828 : Rrrherrhes fur le Systeme Xerreux en general et sur celui du Verrrau en parti- rulirr. 18011, which was edited in conjunction with Spurzhelm — 'I lit- an tithesis to this, physiologically, was formed by the school of Montpellier : Barthes (17. 'U-180o ; Xouceaux Elements de la Science de V Homme, 2d ed. ,
Associated with this school were M. F. X. Bichat (1771-1802; Rcherches Phyniologiques tur la Vie et la Mori. 1800). Bertrand (17H6-1881 ; Traiti du Somnamliulinme, 1823), and Buiaaon (17(10-1806; De la Division la plut Xaturelle dt* Phinominet l'hyniologiques, 1802). Corresponding to this was the development of Ideology with Daube (Ennui d" ldtologic, lM'-'i). and especially with I'ierre Iiaromiguiere (17&rt-18:! 7 ; Leconn de Philosophic, 1816-1818) and his disciple*, Fr. Thurot (1708-1832; De V Enlendement et de la Rainon. 18:10) and J. J. Cardalilao (1700-1845; Etudes Elimtntairtt de Philonophie, 1830).
