Through sublime imperatives and abstract
universalizations
of salvific promise, they kept the paths to equal symbolic immune
opportunities open for all.
opportunities open for all.
Sloterdijk - You Must Change Your Life
It offered therapies on the first track, social reforms on the second, and emergences into creativity on the third.
Do we still need to point out that these main directions of world improvement and self-improvement are simultaneously the modes that helped us to resolve most of the misunderstandings concentrated in the concept of 'religion'?
When it comes to correcting the disproportion between humans and the world, the most powerful mediators are medicine, the arts and democracy (better described as the politics of friendship).
And when the concern is to redirect the forces of escapism towards a
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RETROSPECTIVE
on beyond.
But regardless of whether modernity sought to adapt humans to the demands of the conditions or vice versa, its aim was always to bring back those who had voluntarily become estranged from the world in their secession from the 'country home of the self' to 'reality'. Its ambition was to imprint on them a single citizenship that gives and takes everything: being-in-the-world. It binds us to a communal life that knows no more emigration. Since living there we all have the same passport, issued by the United States of Ordinariness. We are guaranteed all human rights - except for the right to exit from factic- ity. Hence the meditative enclaves gradually become invisible, and the residential communities of unworldliness disband. The beneficial deserts are abandoned, the monasteries empty out, holidaymakers replace monks and holidays replace escapism. The demi-mondes of relaxation give both heaven and Nirvana an empirical meaning.
The re-secularization of the ascetically withdrawn subject (which is erroneously elevated to a substance) is undoubtedly one of the ten- dencies in modernity that merits close philosophical attention. In fact, it initiated a change that can be followed with sympathy, as it held out the prospect of nothing less than a reconciliation of humans and the world after an era of radical alienation. The 'age of balance' made the negation of ancient oppositions its mission - the spirit and life wanted to come together again, while ethics and the everyday wanted to form a new alliance. Millennia had passed in which the individuals resolved to embark on secession split the totality of the world into inner and outer, own and non-own parts; now they would be re- embedded in the milieu of a multi-dimensional whole, each one in its place and grasping itself as the 'worldling in the middle', to draw once again on Goethe's cheerful self-description. When the Enlightenment drove forward the disenchantment of metaphysics, it did so not least with the aim of freeing those indoctrinated with notions of the beyond from their extravagant immersion in worldless fictions. What made the critics of the religious illusion so sure of their cause was the conviction that the alienated human race could only achieve eman- cipation and true happiness by renouncing all imaginary happiness.
Taken together, these efforts form the complex of forms of the practising life I have outlined here under the classification 'exercises of the moderns'. Their key figures were the technical, artistic and discur- sive virtuosos who, in extensive practice cycles, managed to produce
437
THE EXERCISES OF THE l\10DERNS
ro(:os:m:>. as -pe,rS()fl<UltleS aocUlnentt~d individuals sure of experiencing the wide world inside their own person. All of them still profited from a metaphysical reinsurance that made the turn to worldliness appear as a gain on the account of the heightened and spared ego. For them, experience was synonymous with development. They could still enjoy the glowing isolation that guaranteed the sepa- rated subject a seemingly inalienable right of domicile in the realms of the soul and the mind; from there, they organized their journeys into the open - conquistadors and beautiful souls in one. It was at them that Goethe directed his pronouncement: 'No time there is, no power,
can decompose I The minted form that lives and living growS. '194
The rest is quickly told, for it is untellable: the radicalized enlighten- ment of the twentieth century broke open the enclosures of 'person- alities' immunized as figures or with reference to the beyond. Along with the soul that it posited for itself, it simultaneously drove out its daimon, the eerie companion from which Goethe borrowed the confidence that every individual life follows its inner primal form, in accordance with 'the law presiding at your birth'. 195 This expul- sion too initially occurred for the sake of inner-worldly bliss, which was entitled to demand the sacrifice of various illusions. A particular concern was to end the priority of the soul, which had become a prison for the body. 196
The true price of the epochal operation is revealed by the aberrances of the last century. If one were to compress this era into a film script, its title would have to be 'The Secularization of the Inner World', or 'The Revenge of the World on Those Who Thought that They Could Remain Untouched by It'. It would demonstrate that humans are destined for mass consumption as soon as one views them as a mere factor in the game of world improvement. The plot would be centred on the symmetrically interrelated primary ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which advanced the re-translation of humans from world-flight into world-belonging: naturalism and socialism - one could, because of their close kinship, also say social natural- ism and natural socialism. Both systems strove to reclaim humans, along with their physical foundations, entirely for the 'ensemble of social relations' and to prevent their flight into supposed inner worlds or counter-worlds - to say nothing of religious backworlds. Both approaches are inseparable from an elemental pragmatism which states that a thing is only real if it can be treated in social actions
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RETR0 SPECTIVE
It is
indeed an towards moral-demonic excess: if humans can
no longer succeed in distancing themselves spiritually from worldly conditions, then countless people at least do everything they deem necessary so that, under the given conditions, they can count them- selves among the good, the morally superior.
The decisive blow to the mere possibility of an existence capable of world-flight did not come from the pragmatic side, however, but from the renewed 'revolution in the way of thinking' in the early twentieth century associated with the young Heidegger. He turned the clock of philosophical reflection back more than two and a half millennia when he decided, in his principal work Being and Time (1927), to let philosophical thought begin anew in the situation of Dasein as being- in-the-world. He thus reversed the step into the aloof realm of theory, and with it the securing of the self in a distant observing position, the step that - reusing Heraclitean images - I described as stepping out of the river of life and conquering the shore. 197 On the shore, we saw the appearance of the observer whose gaze transformed the world into a spectacle - an undignified one, of course, from which the ethically motivated intelligence must turn away.
Through this new approach in the midst of the comprehensive situation that is being-in-the-world, the greenhouses of the inner- world illusion were shattered and the lodges of pure observation sank in the flood. The separated subject found itself demoted to Dasein and stripped of its theoretical privilege, namely its similar- ity to the observer gods. It was immersed anew in the sea of moods that open up and colour pre-logically the whole in which we reside. This brought to light once more how far the human being, as an 'organ' of existence, is disposed towards being-outside-oneself. Its mode of being is self-forfeiting, as it always already occurs as being- among-things and being-with others. In its spontaneous quality, the human being is a marionette of the collective and a hostage of situations. Only at the 'second reading', after the event and excep- tionally, does Dasein return to itself and its possible mandate of self-being, and all attempts to elevate this later discovery to a first substance, a primal form, a world axis rising from the ego, show traces of subtle forgeries. Just as Proudhon declared, 'Whoever says "God" seeks to deceive', we can conclude from Heidegger: 'Whoever says "I" seeks to deceive themselves. ' Through their symptomatic prematurity, these over-elevations of the self betray an interest in rescue from the torrential flow of time. Is it necessary to emphasize
439
THE EXERCISES niE MODERNS rescue not in prove
The consequences of the shift are as unforeseeable as the conditions of the coming age, which, whatever else it might be, can only be referred to as the age 'after' this one. One observation, at least, does suggest itself: the re-secularization of the withdrawn subject did not fulfil the expectation that abstaining from imagined bliss directly contributes to physical or actual happiness. The reason for this can be found in Heidegger's description of the Dasein re-embedded in the worldly situation. The price for the new beginning of a thinking orientation from the position of being-in-the-world is inevitably a loss of distance, whose main symptom is the handing over of humans to concern and their immersion in the lived situation. Whoever turns the 'subject' back into 'Dasein' replaces the withdrawn with the included, the collected with the scattered, the immortalized with the de-immortalized,198 the redeemed with the un-saved. What Heidegger calls concern {Sorge] is the concession of humans to the world that they cannot seal themselves off against its infiltration. The shore on which the observer wanted to establish themselves is not a genuine rescue. Factical existing is 'always also absorbed in the world of its concern'. 199 However it might attempt to protect and isolate itself - as atman, as the noetic psyche, as Homo interior, as an inhabitant of the inner citadel, as a soul spark, as an underlying subject, as a present ego, as a personality, as an intersection of archetypes, as a floating point of irony, as a critic of the context of delusion and as an observer of observers - its constitutive being-outside-itself in fact means that it is always already in the grip of concern; only the gods, and fools with them, are without concern in themselves. Dasein is colonized by
worldlinesses from the start. Because it is always already absorbed in concern, it must draw up lists of priorities and work through them as if this were its innermost aim. Attempts to gain distance can never be more than secondary modifications of a self-delivering that anticipates everything else. The externalities Marcus Aurelius claimed stand outside our doors have, in reality, occupied the house. Its sup- posed master is possessed by the guests, and he can count himself lucky if they allow him a corner to which he can retreat.
Thus everything suggests that after three millennia of spiritual eva- sions, human existence has been taken back to the point where the secessions began, and is little the wiser for it - or at least, barely faces less difficulty. This impression is simultaneously correct and incor- rect: correct in so far as the exuberance of surreal ascents, hungry for
rescue?
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RETROSPECTIVE
a world beyond, has neither stood the test of time nor stood up to analysis; and incorrect because the treasuries of practice knowledge are overflowing, despite being rarely frequented in recent times.
Now it is time to call to mind anew all those forms of the practising life that continue to release salutogenic energies, even where the over- elevations to metaphysical revolutions in which they were initially bound up have crumbled. Old forms must be tested for reusability and new forms invented. Another cycle of secessions may begin in order to lead humans out once again - if not out of the world, then at least out of dullness, dejection and obsession, but above all out of banality, which Isaac Babel termed the counter-revolution.
441
OUTLOOK
The Absolute Imperative
See what large letters I use as I write to you with my own hand! Galatians 6:11
Who Is Allowed to Say It?
'You must change your life! ' The voice Rilke heard speaking to him at the Louvre has meanwhile left its point of origin. Within a century, it has become part of the general zeitgeist - in fact, it has become the last content of all the communications whirring around the globe. At present, there is no information in the world ether that cannot be connected to this absolute imperative in its deep structure. It is the call that can never be neutralized into a mere statement of fact; it is the imperative whose effects are unhindered by any indicatives. It articulates the motto that arranges the innumerable chaotic particles of information into a concise moral form. It expresses concern for the whole. It cannot be denied: the only fact of universal ethical signifi- cance in the current world is the diffusely and ubiquitously growing realization that things cannot continue in this way.
Once again, we have reason to recall Nietzsche. It was he who first understood in which mode the ethical imperative must be conveyed in modern times: it speaks to us in the form of a command that sets up an unconditional overtaxing. In so doing, he opposed the pragmatic consensus that one can only demand of people what they are capable of achieving in the status quo. Nietzsche set the original axiom of the practising life against it in the form established since the irruption of ethical difference into conventional life forms: humans can only advance as long as they follow the impossible. The moderate decrees,
442
OUTLOOK
m cases, their fulfilment presupposes a that stems from an unrealizable and inescapable demand. What is the human being if not an animal of which too much is demanded? Only those who set up the first commandment can subsequently present Ten Commandments In the first, the impossible itself speaks to me: thou shalt have no other standards next to me. Whoever has not been seized by the oversized does not belong to the species of Homo sapiens. The first hunter in the savannah was already a member; he raised his head and under- stood that the horizon is not a protective boundary, but rather the
gate for the gods and the dangers to enter.
In order to articulate the current overtaxing in keeping with the
state of the world, Nietzsche took the risk of presenting the public with 'a book for everyone and nobody' - a prophetic eruption, six thousand feet beyond mankind and time, spoken with no considera- tion for any listeners, and yet allied in an invasive fashion with each individual's knowledge of his intimate design for the not-yet. One cannot simply let the Obermensch programme rest if one knows that it stands for vertical tension in general. Its proclamation became necessary once there was no longer sufficient faith in the hypothesis of God to guarantee the anchoring of upwards-pulling tension in a transcendent pole. But even without God or the Obermensch, it is sufficient to note that every individual, even the most successful, the most creative and the most generous, must, if they examine them- selves in earnest, admit that they have become less than their poten- tiality of being would have required - except for those moments in which they could say that they fulfilled their duty to be a good animal. As average Ober-animals, tickled by ambitions and haunted by exces- sive symbols, humans fall short of what is demanded of them, even when they wear the winner's jersey or the cardinal's robe.
The statement 'You must change your life! ' provides the basic form for the call to everyone and nobody. Although it is unmistakably directed at a particular addressee, it speaks to all others too. Whoever hears the call without defences will experience the sublime in a per- sonally addressed form. The sublime is that which, by calling to mind the overwhelming, shows the observer the possibility of their engulf- ment by the oversized - which, however, is suspended until further notice. The sublime whose tip points to me is as personal as death and as unfathomable as the world. For Rilke, it was the Dionysian dimen- sion of art that spoke to him from the disfigured statue of Apollo and gave him the feeling of encountering something infinitely superior.
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THE EXERCISES OF THE
in art. Nor the or councils possess any commanding authority, let alone the councils wise men, assuming one can still use this phrase without irony.
The only authority that is still in a position to say 'You must change your life! ' is the global crisis, which, as everyone has been noticing for some time, has begun to send out its apostles. Its authority is real because it is based on something unimaginable of which it is the har- binger: the global catastrophe. One need not be religiously musical to understand why the Great Catastrophe had to become the goddess of the century. As it possesses the aura of the monstrous, it bears the primary traits that were previously ascribed to the transcend- ent powers: it remains concealed, but makes itself known in signs; it is on the way, yet already authentically present in its portents; it reveals itself to individual intelligences in penetrating visions, yet also surpasses human understanding; it takes certain individuals into its service and makes prophets of them; its delegates turn to the people around them in its name, but are fended off as nuisances by most. On the whole, its fate is much like that of the God of monotheism when He entered the stage scarcely three thousand years ago: His mere message was already too great for the world, and only the few were prepared to begin a different life for His sake. In both cases, however, the refusal of the many increases the tension affecting the human col- lective. Since the global catastrophe began its partial unveiling, a new manifestation of the absolute imperative has come into the world, one that directs itself at everyone and nobody in the form of a sharp
admonition: 'Change your life! Otherwise its complete disclosure will demonstrate to you, sooner or later, what you failed to do during the time of portents! '
Against this background, we can explain the origin of the unease in today's ethical debate, both in its academic and in its publicistic vari- eties. It stems from the discrepancy between the monstrosities that have been in the air since the Cold War era after 1945 and the para- lysing harmlessness of all current discourses, whether their arguments draw on the ethics of attitude, responsibility, discourse or situations - to say nothing of the helpless reanimation of doctrines of value and virtue. Nor is the oft-cited return of 'religion' much more than the symptom of an unease that awaits its resolution in a lucid formula- tion. In reality, ethics can only be based on the experience of the sublime, today as much as since the beginning of the developments that led to the first ethical secessions. Driven by its call, the human
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OUTLOOK
setting up the to head for impossible. What people called 'religion' was only ever significant as a vehicle of the absolute imperative in its different place- and time-based versions. The rest is the chatter of which Wittgenstein
rightly said that it should be brought to an end.
For the theologically interested, this means that the one God and the catastrophe have more in common than was previously registered - not least their trouble with humans, who cannot rouse themselves to believe in either. There is not only what Coleridge called the 'willing suspension of disbelief' in the fiction whose absence would render aes- thetic behaviour impossible. An even more effective approach is the willing suspension of belief in the real whose absence would prevent any practical accommodation with the given situation. Individuals barely ever cope with reality without an additional element of de- realization. Incredulous de-realization, furthermore, makes little dis- tinction between the past and the future: whether the catastrophe is a past one from which one should have learned or an imminent one that could be averted by the right measures, the reluctance to believe always knows how to arrange things in such a way as to achieve the desired degree of de-realization.
Who Can Hear It?
When it comes to man-made catastrophes, the twentieth century was the most instructive period in world history. It demonstrated: the greatest disaster complexes came about in the form of projects that were meant to gain control of the course of history from a single centre of action. They were the most advanced manifestations of what philosophers, following Aristotle and Marx, called 'praxis'. In contemporary pronouncements, the great projects were described as manifestations of the final battle for world domination. Nothing happened to the humans of the age of praxis except what they or their fellow humans had instigated. Hence one could say: there is nothing in hell that has not previously appeared in programmes. The sorcerer's apprentices of planetary design were forced to learn that the unpredictable is an entire dimension ahead of any strategic calculus. Small wonder, then, if those good intentions did not rec- ognize themselves in the bad results. The rest was in line with psy- chological probability: the militant world-improvers withdrew from
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THE EXERCISES OF THE MODERNS
them to fate. The most convincing
behavioural pattern was penned by a sceptical philosopher: after fatal undertakings, the failed protagonists indulge in 'the art of not having been the one'.
Analogous patterns are at work in the run-up to the announced catastrophe: before fatal developments, the actors on the political stage demonstrate the art of not having understood the signs of the times. Western people have long been well rehearsed in this behaviour - one could call it universal procrastination - through deep-seated cultural practices: ever since the Enlightenment demoted God to a moral background radiation in the cosmos, or declared Him an out- right fiction, the moderns have shifted the experience of the sublime from ethics to aesthetics. In accordance with the rules of the mass culture existing since the early nineteenth century, they internal- ized the belief that one survives merely imagined horrors completely
unharmed. In their eyes, shipwrecks only ever occur for the viewers, and disasters only so that they can enjoy the pleasant feeling of having escaped. They conclude from this that all threats are simply part of the entertainment, and warnings an element of the show.
The return of the sublime in the shape of an ethical imperative that is not to be taken lightly catches the Western world - to leave aside all others - unawares. Its citizens have become accustomed to viewing all indications of imminent disaster presented in the tone of reality as a form of documentary horror genre, and its intellectuals are doing justice to their reputation as 'detached cosmopolitan spectators' by deconstructing even the most serious warnings as a discursive genre and portraying their authors as busybodies. But even if it were not an aesthetic genre, they would remain pragmatic in the belief that they could take their time taking the information seriously. Furthermore, surely someone who wished to take the signs on the horizon person- ally would immediately collapse under such worries?
Nonetheless, these contemporaries will ascertain sooner or later that there is no human right to non-overtaxing - any more than there is a right to encounter only such problems as one can overcome with on-board resources. It is a misunderstanding of the nature of the problematic if one only puts such matters in that category as have a prospect of being solved during the current term of office. And it shows an even greater misjudgement of the nature of vertical tensions in human existence if one assumes a symmetry between challenge and response. Overtaxing on one side, surpluses on the other - and no guarantee that the two go together like a problem and its solution.
446
OUTLOOK Who Will Do It?
Whatever is undertaken in the future to confront the dangers identi- fied, it is subject to the law of increasing improbability that dominates our overheated evolution. We can deduce from this observation why the socially conservative propaganda circulating between Rome, Washington and Fulda does not provide any suitable answer to the current world crisis - aside from possible constructive effects in smaller circles. For how should timeless 'values', which have already proved powerless and inadequate in the face of comparatively small problems, suddenly gain the necessary power to bring about a turn for the better when confronted with greater difficulties?
If the answer to the current challenges were genuinely to be found in the classic virtues, it would be sufficient to follow the maxim for- mulated by Goethe in his Divan poem 'The Bequest of the Ancient Persian Faith': 'Solemn duty's daily observation I More than this, it needs no revelation. ' Even if one is willing to admit that this - beneath the oriental mask - is the greatest utterance of the European bour- geoisie before its historic failure, it is clear that we cannot be helped merely by a rule of preservation. Next to the indispensable concern for taking established traditions with us, after all, what impresses us most is the novelty of situations that demands bold answers. Even in Goethe's Weimar home, there would be more talk today of solemn duty's daily invention, before doing away with the adjective 'solemn' - firstly because it goes against the taste of the time, and secondly because something that is invented daily is not suitable for a solemn sense of duty. After further reflection, one would also remove the preceding noun and speak of tasks rather than duty. Finally, one would issue a statement with the impenetrable suggestion that the well-intentioned people in the Harmonious Society find a fruitful way of combining the old and the new. If one studies the instructions from Rome, one will note that they consist of equally inscrutable formulas.
The law of increasing improbability opens up the perspective of two overtaxings in one: what is happening on the earth at this moment is, on the one side, an actual integration disaster in progress - that of globalization, launched by Columbus' voyage in 1492, set moving by the Spanish conquest of the Aztec empire in 1521, accelerated by world trade between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, and driven along to the point of an effective synchronization of world events thanks to the quick media of the twentieth century. These synchronize the previously scattered factions of humanity - what we
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THE THE ,\10DERNS
an torn transaction and collision. On the other side, a
disaster is in progress, heading for a crash whose time is uncertain, but which cannot be delayed indefinitely. Of these two monstrosi- ties, the second is far more probable, as it is located on the line of processes that are already under way. It is furthered above all by the conditions of production and consumption in the world's wealthy regions and developing zones, in so far as they are based on a blind overexploitation of finite resources. The reason of nations still extends no further than preserving jobs on the Titanic. The crash solution is also probable because it offers a large psychoeconomic price advan- tage: it would save us from the chronic tensions affecting us as a result of global evolution. Only happy minds experience the piling up of Mount Improbable to the heights of an operatively integrated world 'society' as a project that vitalizes its participants. They alone experi- ence existence in the present as a stimulating privilege and would not want to have lived at any other time. Those with less cheerful natures have the impression that being-in-the-world has never been so tiring. What, then, could be more logical than the principle of mass culture: making entertainment the top priority, and accepting that as far as everything else is concerned, things will happen as they must?
It was the philosopher Hans Jonas who proved that the owl of Minerva does not always begin its flight at twilight. Through his remoulding of the categorical imperative into an ecological one, he demonstrated the possibility of a forward-looking philosophy for our times: 'Act in such a way that the effects of your actions can be reconciled with the permanence of true human life on earth. ' Thus the metanoetic imperative for the present, which raises the categorical to the absolute, takes on sufficiently distinct contours for the present. It makes the harsh demand of embracing the monstrosity of the univer- sal in its concretized form. It demands of us a permanent stay in the overtaxing-field of enormous improbabilities. Because it addresses everyone personally, I must relate its appeal to myself as if I were its only addressee. It demands that I act as if I could immediately know what I must achieve as soon as I consider myself an agent in the network of networks. At every moment, I am to estimate the effects of my actions on the ecology of the global society. It even seems that I am expected to make a fool of myself by identifying myself as a member of a seven-billion-person people - although my own nation is already too much for me. I am meant to stand my ground as a citizen of the world, even if I barely know my neighbours and neglect my
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OUTLOOK
most my new
me, 'mankind' is nor a
that can be encountered, I nonetheless have the mission of taking its real presence into consideration at every operation of my own. I am to develop into a fakir of coexistence with everyone and everything, and reduce my footprint in the environment to the trail of a feather.
The situation of overtaxing is fulfilled by these mandates as much as by the Old European imitatio Christi or the Indian mok~a ideal. As there is no escaping this demand - except by fleeing into narcosis - one faces the question of whether one can describe a sensible motif with whose aid the gulf between the sublime imperative and the practical exercise can be bridged. Such a motif - if one leaves aside the phantoms of abstract universalism - can only be gained from a consideration of General Immunology. Immune systems are embod- ied or institutionalized expectations of injury and damage based on the distinction between the own and the foreign. While biological immunity applies to the level of the individual organism, the two social immune systems concern the supra-organismic, that is to say the co-operative, transactional, convivial dimensions of human existence: the solidaristic system guarantees legal security, provision for existence and feelings of kinship beyond one's own family; the symbolic system provides security of worldview, compensation for the certainty of death, and cross-generational constancy of norms. At this level too, the definition applies that 'life' is the success phase of an immune system. Like biological immune systems, the solidaristic and symbolic systems can also pass through phases of weakness, even near-failure. These express themselves in human self-experience and world-experience as an instability of value consciousness and an uncertainty as to the resilience of our solidarities. Their collapse is tantamount to collective death.
The strong hallmark of systems of this type is that they no longer define the own in terms of organismic egotism, but rather place themselves in the service of an ethnic or multi-ethnic, institutionally and intergenerationally expanded self-concept. This enables us to understand why evolutionary approaches to an animal-like altru- ism, which manifest themselves in the natural readiness for species to procreate and care for one's brood, develop among humans into cultural altruisms. The rationale for this development lies in the magnification of the own: what seems altruistic from the individual's perspective is actually egotism at the level of the larger unit; to the
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THE EXERCISES OF THE MODERNS
extent to act as
serve the own making concessions in the narrower
own. This implicit immunological calculus forms the basis of
fiees and taxes, manners and services, asceticisms and virtuosities. All substantial cultural phenomena are part of the competitions between supra-biological immunitary units.
This reflection necessitates an expansion of the concept of immu- nity: as soon as one is dealing with life forms in which the zoon politik6n man participates, one must reckon with the primacy of supra-individual immunity alliances. Under such conditions, individ- ual immunity is only possible as co-immunity. All social organizations in history, from the primal hordes to the world empires, can, from a systemic perspective, be explained as structures of co-immunity. One finds, however, that the distribution of concrete immune advantages in large layered 'societies' has always shown considerable inequali- ties. The inequality of access to immune chances was already felt early on as the deepest manifestation of 'injustice'. It was either external- ized as an obscure fate or internalized as a consequence of dark guilt. During the last millennia, such feelings could only be balanced out through supra-ethnic mental practice systems, vulgo the higher 'reli- gions'.
Through sublime imperatives and abstract universalizations of salvific promise, they kept the paths to equal symbolic immune
opportunities open for all.
The current state of the world is characterized by the absence of
an efficient co-immunity structure for the members of the 'global society'. At the highest level, 'solidarity' is still an empty word. Here, then as now, the dictum of a controversial constitutional law theorist applies: 'Whoever says "humanity" seeks to deceive. '20o The reason for this is plain to see: the effective co-immunitary units, today as in ancient times, are formatted tribally, nationally and imperially, and recently also in regional strategic alliances, and function - assuming they do - according to the respective formats of the own-foreign dif- ference. Successful survival alliances, therefore, are particular for the time being - in keeping with the nature of things, even 'world reli- gions' cannot be more than large-scale provincialisms. Even 'world' is an ideological term in this context, as it hypostatizes the macro- egotism of the West and other major powers and does not describe the concrete co-immunitary structure of all survival candidates on the global stage. The subsystems still exist in mutual rivalry, following a logic that repeatedly turns the immune gains of some into the immune losses of others. Humanity does not constitute a super-organism, as some systems theorists prematurely claim; it is, for the time being,
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OUTLOOK
no means order.
All history is the history of immune system battles. It is identical to the history of protectionism and externalization. Protection always refers to a local self, and externalization to an anonymous environ- ment for which no one takes responsibility. This history spans the period of human evolution in which the victories of the own could only be bought with the defeat of the foreign; it was dominated by the holy egotisms of nations and enterprises. Because 'global society' has reached its limit, however, and shown once and for all that the earth, with its fragile atmospheric and biospheric systems, is the limited shared site of human operations, the praxis of externalization comes up against an absolute boundary. From there on, a protection- ism of the whole becomes the directive of immunitary reason. Global immunitary reason is one step higher than all those things that its anticipations in philosophical idealism and religious monotheism were capable of attaining. For this reason, General Immunology is the legitimate successor of metaphysics and the real theory of 'religions'. It demands that one transcend all previous distinctions between own and foreign; thus the classical distinctions of friend and foe collapse. Whoever continues along the line of previous separations between the own and the foreign produces immune losses not only for others, but also for themselves.
The history of the own that is grasped on too small a scale and the foreign that is treated too badly reaches an end at the moment when a global co-immunity structure is born, with a respectful inclusion of individual cultures, particular interests and local solidarities. This structure would take on planetary dimensions at the moment when the earth, spanned by networks and built over by foams, was con- ceived as the own, and the previously dominant exploitative excess as the foreign. With this turn, the concretely universal would become operational. The helpless whole is transformed into a unity capable of being protected. A romanticism of brotherliness is replaced by a co- operative logic. Humanity becomes a political concept. Its members are no longer travellers on the ship of fools that is abstract universal- ism, but workers on the consistently concrete and discrete project of a global immune design. Although communism was a conglomeration of a few correct ideas and many wrong ones, its reasonable part - the understanding that shared life interests of the highest order can only
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THE EXERCISES OF THE MODERNS
asceticisms to assert anew sooner or later. It presses a mac-
rostructure of global immunizations: co-immunism.
Civilization is one such structure. Its monastic rules must be drawn
up now or never; they will encode the forms of anthropotechnics that befit existence in the context of all contexts. Wanting to live by them would mean making a decision: to take on the good habits of shared survival in daily exercises.
452
NOTES
INTRODUCTION: ON THE ANTHROPOTECHNIC TURN
1 Incende quod adorasti et adora quod incendisti: according to the chronicle of Gregory of Tours, the bishop of Reims, Remigiu5, spoke these words while Clovis I, king of the Franks, convinced of Christ's hand in his victory, stepped into the baptismal font 'like another Constantine' after the Battle of Tolbiac.
2 Translator's note (henceforth: TN): the reference is to Thomas Mann, in Tanio Kroger (Death in Venice, Tonia Kroger and Other Writings, ed. Frederick Alfred Lubich [New York: Continuum, 1999], p. 12).
3 Reflections on the concept of practice can be found below in the sections on the discovery of pedagogy (pp. 197££), the formation of habit (pp. 182ff), the circulus virtuosus (pp. 320ff), and in the first three sections of ch. 12 (pp. 404-11).
4 TN: this phrase refers to the apocryphal fourteenth-century Austrian bailiff (Landvogt) Albrecht Gessler, who ruled the town of Altdort in a tyrannical fashion. It is said that he raised a pole in the market square, and all who passed it were obliged to bow before it (William Tell's legendary archery task was a result of his refusal to do so). In contemporary German usage, it denotes an arbitrary postulate that is blindly obeyed.
5 Edward Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648), author of De Veritate (1624), De Religione Gentilium and De Religione Laici (1645), can be considered the founding father of what was later termed 'philosophy of religion'.
6 A typical example is Oswald Spengler, who claims in The Decline of the West that Nietzsche's turn towards an awareness of life as art was sympto- matic of a 'Climacteric of the Culture'. He saw in it an example of the deca- dence that characterizes the 'civilisatory' phase of cultures: during this, the sublime metaphysical worldviews degenerate into mere guides for individu- als in their everyday and digestive worries. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (New York: Knopf, 1939), p. 359.
7 TN: the phrase 'life form' refers throughout the text to a form or way of life, not a living creature. The latter are usually termed 'organisms' here.
453
8
9
10 11
12
13
14 15
16 17
18
19
20 21
Concerning the legal system 'as society's immune system', see Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems, trans. John Bednarz Jr. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 374f.
Problems of this type are the domain of the new science of psychoneuroim- munology, which deals with the interplay of several systems of messenger substances (nervous system, hormone system, immune system).
Concerning the significance of cultural science for survival in the global context, see the section 'Outlook' below, pp. 442f.
See Peter Sloterdijk, 'Rules for the Human Zoo', trans. Mary Varney Rorty, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 27 (1), pp. 12-28. The term was, incidentally, already in use during the heroic years of the Russian Revolution; it can be looked up in the third volume of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia of 1926, where it refers especially to speculatively anticipated possibilities of biotechnical manipulations of human genes.
The underlying dichotomy of self-improvement and world improvement is explained in ch. 3, where I discuss the increasing externalization of the metanoetic imperative in modernity.
TN: the word for 'humanities', Geisteswissenschaften, literally means 'sci- ences of the spirit'; hence the author implying that they are merely so-called, not genuine, sciences.
Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker, Der Garten des Menschlichen: Beitriige zur geschichtlichen Anthropologie (Munich: Hanser, 1978).
Concerning extended parliamentarianism, see Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel (eds. ), Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), as well as Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). On the general pro- gramme of civilizing cultures, see Bazon Brock, Der Barbar als Kulturheld (Cologne: DuMont, 2002).
See also below, pp. 164f.
See Thomas Macho, 'Neue Askese? Zur Frage nach der Aktualitat des Verzichts', Merkur 54 (1994), pp. 583-93, in which, with reference to the culture-historically powerful alternative of satiation and hunger, the central distinction of full versus empty is examined.
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, trans. Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 75.
The best example being Heinz-Theo Homann, Das funktionale Argument: Konzepte und Kritik funktionslogischer Religionsbegrnndung (Paderborn: SchOningh, 1997).
See Detlef Linke, Religion als Risiko: Geist, Glaube und Gehirn (Reinbek: Rowohlt,2003).
See Dean Hamer, The God Gene: How Faith Is Hard-Wired into Our Genes (New York: Anchor, 2005).
THE PLANET OF THE PRACTISlNG
NOTES TO PP. 9-19
1 Paul Celan, in Gesammelte Werke, vol. 3 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983), p. 181.
454
NOTES
2 Von Rodin KUllst
Cantz, 2001
3 Trans. 111 Art of the ed. Stephen Burt and David
Mikics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 230.
4 'People did not speak to him. Stones spoke', Rilke had already written in his essay on Rodin. Rainer Maria Rilke, Werke, vol. 3 [2]: Prosa (Frankfurt:
insel, 1980), p. 369.
5 Ibid. , p. 359.
6 Written in February 1921, published posthumously in 1933.
7 See Beat Wyss, Yom Bild zum Kunstsystem, 2 vols. (Cologne: Walther
Konig, 2006).
8 TN: the word Reformhaus refers to a health food shop.
9 See Aaron Antonovsky, Unraveling the Mystery of Health (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1987).
10 Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Horace Barnett Samuel
(Mineola, NY: Dover, 2003), p. 84 (translation modified).
11 Ibid. , p. 90.
12 Ibid. , p. 100. These notes acted as a stimulus for Alfred Adler's individual- psychological approach to psychotherapy, where neurosis is defined as a costly means of securing the inferior's illusion of superiority.
13 A reminder: under pressure from the politically correct zeitgeist, the well- known initiative of the German disability society, 'Aktion Sorgenkind' [Operation Problem Child], founded in 1964, was renamed 'Aktion Mensch' [Operation Human Being1 in March 2000.
14 Carl Hermann Unthan, Das Pediskript: Aufzeichnungen aus dem Leben eines Armlosen, mit 30 Bildern (Stuttgart: Lutz' Memoirenbibliothek, 1925), p. 73.
15 Ibid. , p. 147.
16 Ibid. , p. 97.
17 Ibid. , p. 306.
18 Ibid. , p. 307.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 TN: another reference to Tonia Kroger, where the narrator characterizes
gypsies as living 'in a green caravan' (p. 17).
23 Unthan, Das Pediskript, p. 72.
24 Nor is Wurtz mentioned in the most significant recent study on the subject:
Klaus E. Muller, Der Kruppel: Ethnologia Passionis Humanae (Munich:
C. H. Beck, 1996).
25 H. Wurtz, Zerbrecht die Krucken: Kruppel-Probleme der Menschheit.
Schicksalsstiefkinder aller Zeiten in Wort und Bild (Leipzig: Leopold Voss,
1932), p. 101.
26 Ibid. , p. 88.
27 Ibid. , p. 97.
28 Ibid. , p. 31.
29 Ibid. , p. 4.
30 Ibid. , p. 49.
31 Ibid. , p. 11.
32 Ibid. , p. 18.
455
PP.
known in
and Hermann
34 Ibid. , p. 67.
35 Ibid. , p. 37.
36 Thus the title [Siegreiche Lebenskiimpfer] of an earlier book by Hans Wurtz from 1919, when the problem of born cripples was somewhat overshad- owed by that of war cripples.
37 Otto Perl, Kriippeltum und Gesellschaft im Wandel der Zeit (Gotha: Leopold Klotz, 1926).
38 Concerning the problematics of masters and trainers, see ch. 8, pp. 291£.
39 TN: the football coach Giovanni Trapattoni became particularly well
known in Germany during the 1990s, as coach of Bayern Munich.
40 Wurtz, Zerbrecht die Kriicken, p. 50.
41 Ibid. , p. 63.
42 Ibid. , p. 34.
43 Ibid. , p. 36.
44 These ideas are developed into a general theory of existence in insulated
spaces in the third volume of my Sphiiren project. See Sphiiren III. Schiiume:
Plurale Sphiirologie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2004), pp. 309-500.
45 Peter Schneider, Erhinken und erfliegen: Psychoanalytische Zweifel an der
Vernunft (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001).
46 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1970).
47 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and Nobody,
trans. Graham Parkes (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,
2005), p. 18.
48 Ibid.
49 See Reiner Stach, Kafka: The Decisive Years, trans. Shelley Frisch (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2005).
436
RETROSPECTIVE
on beyond.
But regardless of whether modernity sought to adapt humans to the demands of the conditions or vice versa, its aim was always to bring back those who had voluntarily become estranged from the world in their secession from the 'country home of the self' to 'reality'. Its ambition was to imprint on them a single citizenship that gives and takes everything: being-in-the-world. It binds us to a communal life that knows no more emigration. Since living there we all have the same passport, issued by the United States of Ordinariness. We are guaranteed all human rights - except for the right to exit from factic- ity. Hence the meditative enclaves gradually become invisible, and the residential communities of unworldliness disband. The beneficial deserts are abandoned, the monasteries empty out, holidaymakers replace monks and holidays replace escapism. The demi-mondes of relaxation give both heaven and Nirvana an empirical meaning.
The re-secularization of the ascetically withdrawn subject (which is erroneously elevated to a substance) is undoubtedly one of the ten- dencies in modernity that merits close philosophical attention. In fact, it initiated a change that can be followed with sympathy, as it held out the prospect of nothing less than a reconciliation of humans and the world after an era of radical alienation. The 'age of balance' made the negation of ancient oppositions its mission - the spirit and life wanted to come together again, while ethics and the everyday wanted to form a new alliance. Millennia had passed in which the individuals resolved to embark on secession split the totality of the world into inner and outer, own and non-own parts; now they would be re- embedded in the milieu of a multi-dimensional whole, each one in its place and grasping itself as the 'worldling in the middle', to draw once again on Goethe's cheerful self-description. When the Enlightenment drove forward the disenchantment of metaphysics, it did so not least with the aim of freeing those indoctrinated with notions of the beyond from their extravagant immersion in worldless fictions. What made the critics of the religious illusion so sure of their cause was the conviction that the alienated human race could only achieve eman- cipation and true happiness by renouncing all imaginary happiness.
Taken together, these efforts form the complex of forms of the practising life I have outlined here under the classification 'exercises of the moderns'. Their key figures were the technical, artistic and discur- sive virtuosos who, in extensive practice cycles, managed to produce
437
THE EXERCISES OF THE l\10DERNS
ro(:os:m:>. as -pe,rS()fl<UltleS aocUlnentt~d individuals sure of experiencing the wide world inside their own person. All of them still profited from a metaphysical reinsurance that made the turn to worldliness appear as a gain on the account of the heightened and spared ego. For them, experience was synonymous with development. They could still enjoy the glowing isolation that guaranteed the sepa- rated subject a seemingly inalienable right of domicile in the realms of the soul and the mind; from there, they organized their journeys into the open - conquistadors and beautiful souls in one. It was at them that Goethe directed his pronouncement: 'No time there is, no power,
can decompose I The minted form that lives and living growS. '194
The rest is quickly told, for it is untellable: the radicalized enlighten- ment of the twentieth century broke open the enclosures of 'person- alities' immunized as figures or with reference to the beyond. Along with the soul that it posited for itself, it simultaneously drove out its daimon, the eerie companion from which Goethe borrowed the confidence that every individual life follows its inner primal form, in accordance with 'the law presiding at your birth'. 195 This expul- sion too initially occurred for the sake of inner-worldly bliss, which was entitled to demand the sacrifice of various illusions. A particular concern was to end the priority of the soul, which had become a prison for the body. 196
The true price of the epochal operation is revealed by the aberrances of the last century. If one were to compress this era into a film script, its title would have to be 'The Secularization of the Inner World', or 'The Revenge of the World on Those Who Thought that They Could Remain Untouched by It'. It would demonstrate that humans are destined for mass consumption as soon as one views them as a mere factor in the game of world improvement. The plot would be centred on the symmetrically interrelated primary ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which advanced the re-translation of humans from world-flight into world-belonging: naturalism and socialism - one could, because of their close kinship, also say social natural- ism and natural socialism. Both systems strove to reclaim humans, along with their physical foundations, entirely for the 'ensemble of social relations' and to prevent their flight into supposed inner worlds or counter-worlds - to say nothing of religious backworlds. Both approaches are inseparable from an elemental pragmatism which states that a thing is only real if it can be treated in social actions
438
RETR0 SPECTIVE
It is
indeed an towards moral-demonic excess: if humans can
no longer succeed in distancing themselves spiritually from worldly conditions, then countless people at least do everything they deem necessary so that, under the given conditions, they can count them- selves among the good, the morally superior.
The decisive blow to the mere possibility of an existence capable of world-flight did not come from the pragmatic side, however, but from the renewed 'revolution in the way of thinking' in the early twentieth century associated with the young Heidegger. He turned the clock of philosophical reflection back more than two and a half millennia when he decided, in his principal work Being and Time (1927), to let philosophical thought begin anew in the situation of Dasein as being- in-the-world. He thus reversed the step into the aloof realm of theory, and with it the securing of the self in a distant observing position, the step that - reusing Heraclitean images - I described as stepping out of the river of life and conquering the shore. 197 On the shore, we saw the appearance of the observer whose gaze transformed the world into a spectacle - an undignified one, of course, from which the ethically motivated intelligence must turn away.
Through this new approach in the midst of the comprehensive situation that is being-in-the-world, the greenhouses of the inner- world illusion were shattered and the lodges of pure observation sank in the flood. The separated subject found itself demoted to Dasein and stripped of its theoretical privilege, namely its similar- ity to the observer gods. It was immersed anew in the sea of moods that open up and colour pre-logically the whole in which we reside. This brought to light once more how far the human being, as an 'organ' of existence, is disposed towards being-outside-oneself. Its mode of being is self-forfeiting, as it always already occurs as being- among-things and being-with others. In its spontaneous quality, the human being is a marionette of the collective and a hostage of situations. Only at the 'second reading', after the event and excep- tionally, does Dasein return to itself and its possible mandate of self-being, and all attempts to elevate this later discovery to a first substance, a primal form, a world axis rising from the ego, show traces of subtle forgeries. Just as Proudhon declared, 'Whoever says "God" seeks to deceive', we can conclude from Heidegger: 'Whoever says "I" seeks to deceive themselves. ' Through their symptomatic prematurity, these over-elevations of the self betray an interest in rescue from the torrential flow of time. Is it necessary to emphasize
439
THE EXERCISES niE MODERNS rescue not in prove
The consequences of the shift are as unforeseeable as the conditions of the coming age, which, whatever else it might be, can only be referred to as the age 'after' this one. One observation, at least, does suggest itself: the re-secularization of the withdrawn subject did not fulfil the expectation that abstaining from imagined bliss directly contributes to physical or actual happiness. The reason for this can be found in Heidegger's description of the Dasein re-embedded in the worldly situation. The price for the new beginning of a thinking orientation from the position of being-in-the-world is inevitably a loss of distance, whose main symptom is the handing over of humans to concern and their immersion in the lived situation. Whoever turns the 'subject' back into 'Dasein' replaces the withdrawn with the included, the collected with the scattered, the immortalized with the de-immortalized,198 the redeemed with the un-saved. What Heidegger calls concern {Sorge] is the concession of humans to the world that they cannot seal themselves off against its infiltration. The shore on which the observer wanted to establish themselves is not a genuine rescue. Factical existing is 'always also absorbed in the world of its concern'. 199 However it might attempt to protect and isolate itself - as atman, as the noetic psyche, as Homo interior, as an inhabitant of the inner citadel, as a soul spark, as an underlying subject, as a present ego, as a personality, as an intersection of archetypes, as a floating point of irony, as a critic of the context of delusion and as an observer of observers - its constitutive being-outside-itself in fact means that it is always already in the grip of concern; only the gods, and fools with them, are without concern in themselves. Dasein is colonized by
worldlinesses from the start. Because it is always already absorbed in concern, it must draw up lists of priorities and work through them as if this were its innermost aim. Attempts to gain distance can never be more than secondary modifications of a self-delivering that anticipates everything else. The externalities Marcus Aurelius claimed stand outside our doors have, in reality, occupied the house. Its sup- posed master is possessed by the guests, and he can count himself lucky if they allow him a corner to which he can retreat.
Thus everything suggests that after three millennia of spiritual eva- sions, human existence has been taken back to the point where the secessions began, and is little the wiser for it - or at least, barely faces less difficulty. This impression is simultaneously correct and incor- rect: correct in so far as the exuberance of surreal ascents, hungry for
rescue?
440
RETROSPECTIVE
a world beyond, has neither stood the test of time nor stood up to analysis; and incorrect because the treasuries of practice knowledge are overflowing, despite being rarely frequented in recent times.
Now it is time to call to mind anew all those forms of the practising life that continue to release salutogenic energies, even where the over- elevations to metaphysical revolutions in which they were initially bound up have crumbled. Old forms must be tested for reusability and new forms invented. Another cycle of secessions may begin in order to lead humans out once again - if not out of the world, then at least out of dullness, dejection and obsession, but above all out of banality, which Isaac Babel termed the counter-revolution.
441
OUTLOOK
The Absolute Imperative
See what large letters I use as I write to you with my own hand! Galatians 6:11
Who Is Allowed to Say It?
'You must change your life! ' The voice Rilke heard speaking to him at the Louvre has meanwhile left its point of origin. Within a century, it has become part of the general zeitgeist - in fact, it has become the last content of all the communications whirring around the globe. At present, there is no information in the world ether that cannot be connected to this absolute imperative in its deep structure. It is the call that can never be neutralized into a mere statement of fact; it is the imperative whose effects are unhindered by any indicatives. It articulates the motto that arranges the innumerable chaotic particles of information into a concise moral form. It expresses concern for the whole. It cannot be denied: the only fact of universal ethical signifi- cance in the current world is the diffusely and ubiquitously growing realization that things cannot continue in this way.
Once again, we have reason to recall Nietzsche. It was he who first understood in which mode the ethical imperative must be conveyed in modern times: it speaks to us in the form of a command that sets up an unconditional overtaxing. In so doing, he opposed the pragmatic consensus that one can only demand of people what they are capable of achieving in the status quo. Nietzsche set the original axiom of the practising life against it in the form established since the irruption of ethical difference into conventional life forms: humans can only advance as long as they follow the impossible. The moderate decrees,
442
OUTLOOK
m cases, their fulfilment presupposes a that stems from an unrealizable and inescapable demand. What is the human being if not an animal of which too much is demanded? Only those who set up the first commandment can subsequently present Ten Commandments In the first, the impossible itself speaks to me: thou shalt have no other standards next to me. Whoever has not been seized by the oversized does not belong to the species of Homo sapiens. The first hunter in the savannah was already a member; he raised his head and under- stood that the horizon is not a protective boundary, but rather the
gate for the gods and the dangers to enter.
In order to articulate the current overtaxing in keeping with the
state of the world, Nietzsche took the risk of presenting the public with 'a book for everyone and nobody' - a prophetic eruption, six thousand feet beyond mankind and time, spoken with no considera- tion for any listeners, and yet allied in an invasive fashion with each individual's knowledge of his intimate design for the not-yet. One cannot simply let the Obermensch programme rest if one knows that it stands for vertical tension in general. Its proclamation became necessary once there was no longer sufficient faith in the hypothesis of God to guarantee the anchoring of upwards-pulling tension in a transcendent pole. But even without God or the Obermensch, it is sufficient to note that every individual, even the most successful, the most creative and the most generous, must, if they examine them- selves in earnest, admit that they have become less than their poten- tiality of being would have required - except for those moments in which they could say that they fulfilled their duty to be a good animal. As average Ober-animals, tickled by ambitions and haunted by exces- sive symbols, humans fall short of what is demanded of them, even when they wear the winner's jersey or the cardinal's robe.
The statement 'You must change your life! ' provides the basic form for the call to everyone and nobody. Although it is unmistakably directed at a particular addressee, it speaks to all others too. Whoever hears the call without defences will experience the sublime in a per- sonally addressed form. The sublime is that which, by calling to mind the overwhelming, shows the observer the possibility of their engulf- ment by the oversized - which, however, is suspended until further notice. The sublime whose tip points to me is as personal as death and as unfathomable as the world. For Rilke, it was the Dionysian dimen- sion of art that spoke to him from the disfigured statue of Apollo and gave him the feeling of encountering something infinitely superior.
443
THE EXERCISES OF THE
in art. Nor the or councils possess any commanding authority, let alone the councils wise men, assuming one can still use this phrase without irony.
The only authority that is still in a position to say 'You must change your life! ' is the global crisis, which, as everyone has been noticing for some time, has begun to send out its apostles. Its authority is real because it is based on something unimaginable of which it is the har- binger: the global catastrophe. One need not be religiously musical to understand why the Great Catastrophe had to become the goddess of the century. As it possesses the aura of the monstrous, it bears the primary traits that were previously ascribed to the transcend- ent powers: it remains concealed, but makes itself known in signs; it is on the way, yet already authentically present in its portents; it reveals itself to individual intelligences in penetrating visions, yet also surpasses human understanding; it takes certain individuals into its service and makes prophets of them; its delegates turn to the people around them in its name, but are fended off as nuisances by most. On the whole, its fate is much like that of the God of monotheism when He entered the stage scarcely three thousand years ago: His mere message was already too great for the world, and only the few were prepared to begin a different life for His sake. In both cases, however, the refusal of the many increases the tension affecting the human col- lective. Since the global catastrophe began its partial unveiling, a new manifestation of the absolute imperative has come into the world, one that directs itself at everyone and nobody in the form of a sharp
admonition: 'Change your life! Otherwise its complete disclosure will demonstrate to you, sooner or later, what you failed to do during the time of portents! '
Against this background, we can explain the origin of the unease in today's ethical debate, both in its academic and in its publicistic vari- eties. It stems from the discrepancy between the monstrosities that have been in the air since the Cold War era after 1945 and the para- lysing harmlessness of all current discourses, whether their arguments draw on the ethics of attitude, responsibility, discourse or situations - to say nothing of the helpless reanimation of doctrines of value and virtue. Nor is the oft-cited return of 'religion' much more than the symptom of an unease that awaits its resolution in a lucid formula- tion. In reality, ethics can only be based on the experience of the sublime, today as much as since the beginning of the developments that led to the first ethical secessions. Driven by its call, the human
444
OUTLOOK
setting up the to head for impossible. What people called 'religion' was only ever significant as a vehicle of the absolute imperative in its different place- and time-based versions. The rest is the chatter of which Wittgenstein
rightly said that it should be brought to an end.
For the theologically interested, this means that the one God and the catastrophe have more in common than was previously registered - not least their trouble with humans, who cannot rouse themselves to believe in either. There is not only what Coleridge called the 'willing suspension of disbelief' in the fiction whose absence would render aes- thetic behaviour impossible. An even more effective approach is the willing suspension of belief in the real whose absence would prevent any practical accommodation with the given situation. Individuals barely ever cope with reality without an additional element of de- realization. Incredulous de-realization, furthermore, makes little dis- tinction between the past and the future: whether the catastrophe is a past one from which one should have learned or an imminent one that could be averted by the right measures, the reluctance to believe always knows how to arrange things in such a way as to achieve the desired degree of de-realization.
Who Can Hear It?
When it comes to man-made catastrophes, the twentieth century was the most instructive period in world history. It demonstrated: the greatest disaster complexes came about in the form of projects that were meant to gain control of the course of history from a single centre of action. They were the most advanced manifestations of what philosophers, following Aristotle and Marx, called 'praxis'. In contemporary pronouncements, the great projects were described as manifestations of the final battle for world domination. Nothing happened to the humans of the age of praxis except what they or their fellow humans had instigated. Hence one could say: there is nothing in hell that has not previously appeared in programmes. The sorcerer's apprentices of planetary design were forced to learn that the unpredictable is an entire dimension ahead of any strategic calculus. Small wonder, then, if those good intentions did not rec- ognize themselves in the bad results. The rest was in line with psy- chological probability: the militant world-improvers withdrew from
445
THE EXERCISES OF THE MODERNS
them to fate. The most convincing
behavioural pattern was penned by a sceptical philosopher: after fatal undertakings, the failed protagonists indulge in 'the art of not having been the one'.
Analogous patterns are at work in the run-up to the announced catastrophe: before fatal developments, the actors on the political stage demonstrate the art of not having understood the signs of the times. Western people have long been well rehearsed in this behaviour - one could call it universal procrastination - through deep-seated cultural practices: ever since the Enlightenment demoted God to a moral background radiation in the cosmos, or declared Him an out- right fiction, the moderns have shifted the experience of the sublime from ethics to aesthetics. In accordance with the rules of the mass culture existing since the early nineteenth century, they internal- ized the belief that one survives merely imagined horrors completely
unharmed. In their eyes, shipwrecks only ever occur for the viewers, and disasters only so that they can enjoy the pleasant feeling of having escaped. They conclude from this that all threats are simply part of the entertainment, and warnings an element of the show.
The return of the sublime in the shape of an ethical imperative that is not to be taken lightly catches the Western world - to leave aside all others - unawares. Its citizens have become accustomed to viewing all indications of imminent disaster presented in the tone of reality as a form of documentary horror genre, and its intellectuals are doing justice to their reputation as 'detached cosmopolitan spectators' by deconstructing even the most serious warnings as a discursive genre and portraying their authors as busybodies. But even if it were not an aesthetic genre, they would remain pragmatic in the belief that they could take their time taking the information seriously. Furthermore, surely someone who wished to take the signs on the horizon person- ally would immediately collapse under such worries?
Nonetheless, these contemporaries will ascertain sooner or later that there is no human right to non-overtaxing - any more than there is a right to encounter only such problems as one can overcome with on-board resources. It is a misunderstanding of the nature of the problematic if one only puts such matters in that category as have a prospect of being solved during the current term of office. And it shows an even greater misjudgement of the nature of vertical tensions in human existence if one assumes a symmetry between challenge and response. Overtaxing on one side, surpluses on the other - and no guarantee that the two go together like a problem and its solution.
446
OUTLOOK Who Will Do It?
Whatever is undertaken in the future to confront the dangers identi- fied, it is subject to the law of increasing improbability that dominates our overheated evolution. We can deduce from this observation why the socially conservative propaganda circulating between Rome, Washington and Fulda does not provide any suitable answer to the current world crisis - aside from possible constructive effects in smaller circles. For how should timeless 'values', which have already proved powerless and inadequate in the face of comparatively small problems, suddenly gain the necessary power to bring about a turn for the better when confronted with greater difficulties?
If the answer to the current challenges were genuinely to be found in the classic virtues, it would be sufficient to follow the maxim for- mulated by Goethe in his Divan poem 'The Bequest of the Ancient Persian Faith': 'Solemn duty's daily observation I More than this, it needs no revelation. ' Even if one is willing to admit that this - beneath the oriental mask - is the greatest utterance of the European bour- geoisie before its historic failure, it is clear that we cannot be helped merely by a rule of preservation. Next to the indispensable concern for taking established traditions with us, after all, what impresses us most is the novelty of situations that demands bold answers. Even in Goethe's Weimar home, there would be more talk today of solemn duty's daily invention, before doing away with the adjective 'solemn' - firstly because it goes against the taste of the time, and secondly because something that is invented daily is not suitable for a solemn sense of duty. After further reflection, one would also remove the preceding noun and speak of tasks rather than duty. Finally, one would issue a statement with the impenetrable suggestion that the well-intentioned people in the Harmonious Society find a fruitful way of combining the old and the new. If one studies the instructions from Rome, one will note that they consist of equally inscrutable formulas.
The law of increasing improbability opens up the perspective of two overtaxings in one: what is happening on the earth at this moment is, on the one side, an actual integration disaster in progress - that of globalization, launched by Columbus' voyage in 1492, set moving by the Spanish conquest of the Aztec empire in 1521, accelerated by world trade between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, and driven along to the point of an effective synchronization of world events thanks to the quick media of the twentieth century. These synchronize the previously scattered factions of humanity - what we
447
THE THE ,\10DERNS
an torn transaction and collision. On the other side, a
disaster is in progress, heading for a crash whose time is uncertain, but which cannot be delayed indefinitely. Of these two monstrosi- ties, the second is far more probable, as it is located on the line of processes that are already under way. It is furthered above all by the conditions of production and consumption in the world's wealthy regions and developing zones, in so far as they are based on a blind overexploitation of finite resources. The reason of nations still extends no further than preserving jobs on the Titanic. The crash solution is also probable because it offers a large psychoeconomic price advan- tage: it would save us from the chronic tensions affecting us as a result of global evolution. Only happy minds experience the piling up of Mount Improbable to the heights of an operatively integrated world 'society' as a project that vitalizes its participants. They alone experi- ence existence in the present as a stimulating privilege and would not want to have lived at any other time. Those with less cheerful natures have the impression that being-in-the-world has never been so tiring. What, then, could be more logical than the principle of mass culture: making entertainment the top priority, and accepting that as far as everything else is concerned, things will happen as they must?
It was the philosopher Hans Jonas who proved that the owl of Minerva does not always begin its flight at twilight. Through his remoulding of the categorical imperative into an ecological one, he demonstrated the possibility of a forward-looking philosophy for our times: 'Act in such a way that the effects of your actions can be reconciled with the permanence of true human life on earth. ' Thus the metanoetic imperative for the present, which raises the categorical to the absolute, takes on sufficiently distinct contours for the present. It makes the harsh demand of embracing the monstrosity of the univer- sal in its concretized form. It demands of us a permanent stay in the overtaxing-field of enormous improbabilities. Because it addresses everyone personally, I must relate its appeal to myself as if I were its only addressee. It demands that I act as if I could immediately know what I must achieve as soon as I consider myself an agent in the network of networks. At every moment, I am to estimate the effects of my actions on the ecology of the global society. It even seems that I am expected to make a fool of myself by identifying myself as a member of a seven-billion-person people - although my own nation is already too much for me. I am meant to stand my ground as a citizen of the world, even if I barely know my neighbours and neglect my
448
OUTLOOK
most my new
me, 'mankind' is nor a
that can be encountered, I nonetheless have the mission of taking its real presence into consideration at every operation of my own. I am to develop into a fakir of coexistence with everyone and everything, and reduce my footprint in the environment to the trail of a feather.
The situation of overtaxing is fulfilled by these mandates as much as by the Old European imitatio Christi or the Indian mok~a ideal. As there is no escaping this demand - except by fleeing into narcosis - one faces the question of whether one can describe a sensible motif with whose aid the gulf between the sublime imperative and the practical exercise can be bridged. Such a motif - if one leaves aside the phantoms of abstract universalism - can only be gained from a consideration of General Immunology. Immune systems are embod- ied or institutionalized expectations of injury and damage based on the distinction between the own and the foreign. While biological immunity applies to the level of the individual organism, the two social immune systems concern the supra-organismic, that is to say the co-operative, transactional, convivial dimensions of human existence: the solidaristic system guarantees legal security, provision for existence and feelings of kinship beyond one's own family; the symbolic system provides security of worldview, compensation for the certainty of death, and cross-generational constancy of norms. At this level too, the definition applies that 'life' is the success phase of an immune system. Like biological immune systems, the solidaristic and symbolic systems can also pass through phases of weakness, even near-failure. These express themselves in human self-experience and world-experience as an instability of value consciousness and an uncertainty as to the resilience of our solidarities. Their collapse is tantamount to collective death.
The strong hallmark of systems of this type is that they no longer define the own in terms of organismic egotism, but rather place themselves in the service of an ethnic or multi-ethnic, institutionally and intergenerationally expanded self-concept. This enables us to understand why evolutionary approaches to an animal-like altru- ism, which manifest themselves in the natural readiness for species to procreate and care for one's brood, develop among humans into cultural altruisms. The rationale for this development lies in the magnification of the own: what seems altruistic from the individual's perspective is actually egotism at the level of the larger unit; to the
449
THE EXERCISES OF THE MODERNS
extent to act as
serve the own making concessions in the narrower
own. This implicit immunological calculus forms the basis of
fiees and taxes, manners and services, asceticisms and virtuosities. All substantial cultural phenomena are part of the competitions between supra-biological immunitary units.
This reflection necessitates an expansion of the concept of immu- nity: as soon as one is dealing with life forms in which the zoon politik6n man participates, one must reckon with the primacy of supra-individual immunity alliances. Under such conditions, individ- ual immunity is only possible as co-immunity. All social organizations in history, from the primal hordes to the world empires, can, from a systemic perspective, be explained as structures of co-immunity. One finds, however, that the distribution of concrete immune advantages in large layered 'societies' has always shown considerable inequali- ties. The inequality of access to immune chances was already felt early on as the deepest manifestation of 'injustice'. It was either external- ized as an obscure fate or internalized as a consequence of dark guilt. During the last millennia, such feelings could only be balanced out through supra-ethnic mental practice systems, vulgo the higher 'reli- gions'.
Through sublime imperatives and abstract universalizations of salvific promise, they kept the paths to equal symbolic immune
opportunities open for all.
The current state of the world is characterized by the absence of
an efficient co-immunity structure for the members of the 'global society'. At the highest level, 'solidarity' is still an empty word. Here, then as now, the dictum of a controversial constitutional law theorist applies: 'Whoever says "humanity" seeks to deceive. '20o The reason for this is plain to see: the effective co-immunitary units, today as in ancient times, are formatted tribally, nationally and imperially, and recently also in regional strategic alliances, and function - assuming they do - according to the respective formats of the own-foreign dif- ference. Successful survival alliances, therefore, are particular for the time being - in keeping with the nature of things, even 'world reli- gions' cannot be more than large-scale provincialisms. Even 'world' is an ideological term in this context, as it hypostatizes the macro- egotism of the West and other major powers and does not describe the concrete co-immunitary structure of all survival candidates on the global stage. The subsystems still exist in mutual rivalry, following a logic that repeatedly turns the immune gains of some into the immune losses of others. Humanity does not constitute a super-organism, as some systems theorists prematurely claim; it is, for the time being,
450
OUTLOOK
no means order.
All history is the history of immune system battles. It is identical to the history of protectionism and externalization. Protection always refers to a local self, and externalization to an anonymous environ- ment for which no one takes responsibility. This history spans the period of human evolution in which the victories of the own could only be bought with the defeat of the foreign; it was dominated by the holy egotisms of nations and enterprises. Because 'global society' has reached its limit, however, and shown once and for all that the earth, with its fragile atmospheric and biospheric systems, is the limited shared site of human operations, the praxis of externalization comes up against an absolute boundary. From there on, a protection- ism of the whole becomes the directive of immunitary reason. Global immunitary reason is one step higher than all those things that its anticipations in philosophical idealism and religious monotheism were capable of attaining. For this reason, General Immunology is the legitimate successor of metaphysics and the real theory of 'religions'. It demands that one transcend all previous distinctions between own and foreign; thus the classical distinctions of friend and foe collapse. Whoever continues along the line of previous separations between the own and the foreign produces immune losses not only for others, but also for themselves.
The history of the own that is grasped on too small a scale and the foreign that is treated too badly reaches an end at the moment when a global co-immunity structure is born, with a respectful inclusion of individual cultures, particular interests and local solidarities. This structure would take on planetary dimensions at the moment when the earth, spanned by networks and built over by foams, was con- ceived as the own, and the previously dominant exploitative excess as the foreign. With this turn, the concretely universal would become operational. The helpless whole is transformed into a unity capable of being protected. A romanticism of brotherliness is replaced by a co- operative logic. Humanity becomes a political concept. Its members are no longer travellers on the ship of fools that is abstract universal- ism, but workers on the consistently concrete and discrete project of a global immune design. Although communism was a conglomeration of a few correct ideas and many wrong ones, its reasonable part - the understanding that shared life interests of the highest order can only
451
THE EXERCISES OF THE MODERNS
asceticisms to assert anew sooner or later. It presses a mac-
rostructure of global immunizations: co-immunism.
Civilization is one such structure. Its monastic rules must be drawn
up now or never; they will encode the forms of anthropotechnics that befit existence in the context of all contexts. Wanting to live by them would mean making a decision: to take on the good habits of shared survival in daily exercises.
452
NOTES
INTRODUCTION: ON THE ANTHROPOTECHNIC TURN
1 Incende quod adorasti et adora quod incendisti: according to the chronicle of Gregory of Tours, the bishop of Reims, Remigiu5, spoke these words while Clovis I, king of the Franks, convinced of Christ's hand in his victory, stepped into the baptismal font 'like another Constantine' after the Battle of Tolbiac.
2 Translator's note (henceforth: TN): the reference is to Thomas Mann, in Tanio Kroger (Death in Venice, Tonia Kroger and Other Writings, ed. Frederick Alfred Lubich [New York: Continuum, 1999], p. 12).
3 Reflections on the concept of practice can be found below in the sections on the discovery of pedagogy (pp. 197££), the formation of habit (pp. 182ff), the circulus virtuosus (pp. 320ff), and in the first three sections of ch. 12 (pp. 404-11).
4 TN: this phrase refers to the apocryphal fourteenth-century Austrian bailiff (Landvogt) Albrecht Gessler, who ruled the town of Altdort in a tyrannical fashion. It is said that he raised a pole in the market square, and all who passed it were obliged to bow before it (William Tell's legendary archery task was a result of his refusal to do so). In contemporary German usage, it denotes an arbitrary postulate that is blindly obeyed.
5 Edward Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648), author of De Veritate (1624), De Religione Gentilium and De Religione Laici (1645), can be considered the founding father of what was later termed 'philosophy of religion'.
6 A typical example is Oswald Spengler, who claims in The Decline of the West that Nietzsche's turn towards an awareness of life as art was sympto- matic of a 'Climacteric of the Culture'. He saw in it an example of the deca- dence that characterizes the 'civilisatory' phase of cultures: during this, the sublime metaphysical worldviews degenerate into mere guides for individu- als in their everyday and digestive worries. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (New York: Knopf, 1939), p. 359.
7 TN: the phrase 'life form' refers throughout the text to a form or way of life, not a living creature. The latter are usually termed 'organisms' here.
453
8
9
10 11
12
13
14 15
16 17
18
19
20 21
Concerning the legal system 'as society's immune system', see Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems, trans. John Bednarz Jr. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 374f.
Problems of this type are the domain of the new science of psychoneuroim- munology, which deals with the interplay of several systems of messenger substances (nervous system, hormone system, immune system).
Concerning the significance of cultural science for survival in the global context, see the section 'Outlook' below, pp. 442f.
See Peter Sloterdijk, 'Rules for the Human Zoo', trans. Mary Varney Rorty, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 27 (1), pp. 12-28. The term was, incidentally, already in use during the heroic years of the Russian Revolution; it can be looked up in the third volume of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia of 1926, where it refers especially to speculatively anticipated possibilities of biotechnical manipulations of human genes.
The underlying dichotomy of self-improvement and world improvement is explained in ch. 3, where I discuss the increasing externalization of the metanoetic imperative in modernity.
TN: the word for 'humanities', Geisteswissenschaften, literally means 'sci- ences of the spirit'; hence the author implying that they are merely so-called, not genuine, sciences.
Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker, Der Garten des Menschlichen: Beitriige zur geschichtlichen Anthropologie (Munich: Hanser, 1978).
Concerning extended parliamentarianism, see Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel (eds. ), Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), as well as Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). On the general pro- gramme of civilizing cultures, see Bazon Brock, Der Barbar als Kulturheld (Cologne: DuMont, 2002).
See also below, pp. 164f.
See Thomas Macho, 'Neue Askese? Zur Frage nach der Aktualitat des Verzichts', Merkur 54 (1994), pp. 583-93, in which, with reference to the culture-historically powerful alternative of satiation and hunger, the central distinction of full versus empty is examined.
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, trans. Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 75.
The best example being Heinz-Theo Homann, Das funktionale Argument: Konzepte und Kritik funktionslogischer Religionsbegrnndung (Paderborn: SchOningh, 1997).
See Detlef Linke, Religion als Risiko: Geist, Glaube und Gehirn (Reinbek: Rowohlt,2003).
See Dean Hamer, The God Gene: How Faith Is Hard-Wired into Our Genes (New York: Anchor, 2005).
THE PLANET OF THE PRACTISlNG
NOTES TO PP. 9-19
1 Paul Celan, in Gesammelte Werke, vol. 3 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983), p. 181.
454
NOTES
2 Von Rodin KUllst
Cantz, 2001
3 Trans. 111 Art of the ed. Stephen Burt and David
Mikics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 230.
4 'People did not speak to him. Stones spoke', Rilke had already written in his essay on Rodin. Rainer Maria Rilke, Werke, vol. 3 [2]: Prosa (Frankfurt:
insel, 1980), p. 369.
5 Ibid. , p. 359.
6 Written in February 1921, published posthumously in 1933.
7 See Beat Wyss, Yom Bild zum Kunstsystem, 2 vols. (Cologne: Walther
Konig, 2006).
8 TN: the word Reformhaus refers to a health food shop.
9 See Aaron Antonovsky, Unraveling the Mystery of Health (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1987).
10 Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Horace Barnett Samuel
(Mineola, NY: Dover, 2003), p. 84 (translation modified).
11 Ibid. , p. 90.
12 Ibid. , p. 100. These notes acted as a stimulus for Alfred Adler's individual- psychological approach to psychotherapy, where neurosis is defined as a costly means of securing the inferior's illusion of superiority.
13 A reminder: under pressure from the politically correct zeitgeist, the well- known initiative of the German disability society, 'Aktion Sorgenkind' [Operation Problem Child], founded in 1964, was renamed 'Aktion Mensch' [Operation Human Being1 in March 2000.
14 Carl Hermann Unthan, Das Pediskript: Aufzeichnungen aus dem Leben eines Armlosen, mit 30 Bildern (Stuttgart: Lutz' Memoirenbibliothek, 1925), p. 73.
15 Ibid. , p. 147.
16 Ibid. , p. 97.
17 Ibid. , p. 306.
18 Ibid. , p. 307.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 TN: another reference to Tonia Kroger, where the narrator characterizes
gypsies as living 'in a green caravan' (p. 17).
23 Unthan, Das Pediskript, p. 72.
24 Nor is Wurtz mentioned in the most significant recent study on the subject:
Klaus E. Muller, Der Kruppel: Ethnologia Passionis Humanae (Munich:
C. H. Beck, 1996).
25 H. Wurtz, Zerbrecht die Krucken: Kruppel-Probleme der Menschheit.
Schicksalsstiefkinder aller Zeiten in Wort und Bild (Leipzig: Leopold Voss,
1932), p. 101.
26 Ibid. , p. 88.
27 Ibid. , p. 97.
28 Ibid. , p. 31.
29 Ibid. , p. 4.
30 Ibid. , p. 49.
31 Ibid. , p. 11.
32 Ibid. , p. 18.
455
PP.
known in
and Hermann
34 Ibid. , p. 67.
35 Ibid. , p. 37.
36 Thus the title [Siegreiche Lebenskiimpfer] of an earlier book by Hans Wurtz from 1919, when the problem of born cripples was somewhat overshad- owed by that of war cripples.
37 Otto Perl, Kriippeltum und Gesellschaft im Wandel der Zeit (Gotha: Leopold Klotz, 1926).
38 Concerning the problematics of masters and trainers, see ch. 8, pp. 291£.
39 TN: the football coach Giovanni Trapattoni became particularly well
known in Germany during the 1990s, as coach of Bayern Munich.
40 Wurtz, Zerbrecht die Kriicken, p. 50.
41 Ibid. , p. 63.
42 Ibid. , p. 34.
43 Ibid. , p. 36.
44 These ideas are developed into a general theory of existence in insulated
spaces in the third volume of my Sphiiren project. See Sphiiren III. Schiiume:
Plurale Sphiirologie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2004), pp. 309-500.
45 Peter Schneider, Erhinken und erfliegen: Psychoanalytische Zweifel an der
Vernunft (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001).
46 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1970).
47 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and Nobody,
trans. Graham Parkes (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,
2005), p. 18.
48 Ibid.
49 See Reiner Stach, Kafka: The Decisive Years, trans. Shelley Frisch (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2005).
