It also follows that
pleasure
and desire would not occur either.
Aryadeva - Four Hundred Verses
2]
\ 237.
\ At times one sees potential consciousness,
\ At others consciousness itself.
\ Because of being like molten iron
\ The person undergoes change.
.
(i. e. The simple fact that it becomes conscious of something proves that it is impermanent. All functional phenomenon are impermanent as stated before; they are both cause and effect. )
.
(-- If the person is claimed to be potentially conscious, the self and consciousness could not be a permanent indifferentiable entity, for then the person but no consciousness would exist before an object is experienced. Any transition from the potential consciousness to actual consciousness indicates that the person is not permanent.
-- Assertion: Although there is no consciousness prior to experiencing objects, its potential and thus the person exists. -- Answer: On occasions other than when objects are being experienced one sees potential consciousness, and when objects are being experienced, consciousness itself. In that case, like molten iron which later becomes a solid mass, former potential consciousness later becomes actual consciousness. It therefore follows that the person undergoes change because consciousness and the person are accepted as one entity. )
.
L4: [C. Refuting the self imputed by Naiyayikas]
L5: [1. Refuting that a part of the self possessing a mere particle of mind perceives objects]
.
\ ###
\ 238.
\ Merely [a small part with] mind is conscious
\ But the person is as vast as space.
\ Therefore it would seem as though
\ Its nature is not to be conscious.
.
(-- The Naiyayika assertion that there is a vast permanent partless self which is present in each being is next shown to be illogical, for then that which is one person's self should also be another's.
-- Naiyayika assertion: Our person is not a conscious entity. Since a part of the self the mere size of a particle has mind, there is consciousness of objects. It depends on just this part with mind. A person that is conscious and not separate from mind is produced through this association. The person is permanent and very extensive like space.
-- Answer: Since except for a part as small as a particle the rest of this permanent and extensive self is not associated with consciousness, that self's nature does not seem to have consciousness of objects. Just as it cannot be said that water of the Ganges is salty because of contact with a grain of salt, it is inappropriate to assert that which is not conscious as the person. )
.
L5: [2. Refuting belief in a permanent omnipresent self]
.
\ ###
\ 239.
\ If the self is in everyone then why
\ Does another not think of this one as "I"?
\ It is unacceptable to say that
\ It is obscured by itself. .
( -- If there is a partless permanent self which is omnipresent like space and in each individual sentient being, why would another person not think "I" in relation to my own self? It follows that they should think of it as "I" because the two selves are one. It cannot be omnipresent if the object of someone else's conception of the self is not my own self. -- Assertion: It is not perceived because it has been obscured by the other's self.
-- Answer: It is unacceptable to say that the self obscures itself for there is no duality of that which obscures and that which is obscured. )
.
L4: [D. Explaining other refutation like that of the attributes and so forth]
L5: [1. Asserting that though the principal is matter it is the creator of everything amounts to madness]
.
\ ###
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\ 240.
\ There is no difference between
\ The insane and those from whom
\ The attributes are the creator
\ But are never conscious.
.
(-- This is followed by an examination of the Samkhya belief that the creative force is unconscious matter with the capacity to produce virtue and non-virtue but with no capacity to experience their effects.
-- Samkhya assertion: The great one, a synonym for the intellect, evolves from the principal which is matter and a balance of pleasure, pain and equanimity. The three I-principles evolve from the great one. Eleven faculties evolve from the I-principle associated with lightness: five mental faculties for action and the speculative faculty. From the I- principle associated with motility come the five mere objects from which the five elements evolve. The I-principle of darkness acts as the basis for the other to I-principles.
-- Answer: It follows that it is contradictory to assert, as do the Samkhyas, that the principal which is a balance of the three attributes is the creator of all manifestations but is never conscious. There is not the least difference between those who assert the like and the insane whose perception is distorted. )
.
L5: [2. Contradiction of asserting that it creates virtue and non-virtue but does not experience their maturation]
.
\ ###
\ 241.
\ What is more illogical
\ Than that the attributes should always
\ Know how to construct homes and so forth
\ But not know how to experience them? .
( -- Since such a contention contradicts reason and conflicts with worldly convention, it is utterly incorrect. What is more illogical than to claim that the attributes whose nature is pleasure, pain and equanimity know how to construct homes and so forth but do not know how to experience these amenities? It contradicts both reason and convention. ) .
L5: [3. Refuting that a permanent self is the agent of actions and experiencer of their maturation]
.
\ ###
\ 242.
\ The active is not permanent.
\ (i. e. A cause cannot be permanent, thus the self cannot be permanent)
\ The ubiquitous is actionless.
\ (i. e. Something omnipresent does not need to act, thus the self cannot be omnipresent)
\ The actionless is like the non-existent.
\ (i. e. An actionless self, non-functional, is as non-existent)
\ Why do you not prefer selflessness?
\ (i. e. Conclude that there is no real self; it is more useful)
.
(-- On the other hand if, as the Vaisesikas claim, the self is the doer of actions and experiencer of their results, how can it be permanent, for this necessarily entails transformation from a previous state to a subsequent one.
-- Vaisesika assertion: The self alone is the doer of actions and the experiencer of their maturation.
-- Answer ab: If that is so, the self cannot be permanent.
-- If the self is an agent it must be accepted as causing action. If it does not perform actions it is unsuitable as an agent. That which performs actions like coming and going is not permanent since one must admit that it differs from before. Something the whole of which is everywhere all the time does not perform activities such as coming and going since there is no place or time it does not occupy.
-- Assertion: Well then, an actionless self exist.
-- Answer cd: Since an actionless self is as non-existent as a sky flower, why do you not prefer selflessness? It is worth doing so, for understanding it frees one from all fears. )
.
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L3: [II. General refutation]
L4: [A. Erroneousness of thinking a personal self exist]
.
\ ###
\ 243.
\ Some see it as ubiquitous and for some
\ The person is the mere [size of the] body.
\ Some see it as a mere particle.
\ The wise see it as non-existent.
.
(i. e. There is no inherently existing self. Since it doesn't exist those who assert its existence cannot agree among themselves. )
.
( -- It follows that the conception of a personal self is erroneous. Since the self, if it existed, would do so by way of its own entity, it should appear without differences.
-- Some such as Vaisesikas and Samkhyas see the self as existing in each body and as being ubiquitous like space. Others such as Nirgranthas see that which has a body as proportionate to the size of that body, such as an ant's or an elephant's.
Nirgranthas assert the life force is large or small like the size of the body.
Others, unable to accept this, see it as a mere particle.
Those with the wisdom that perceives the suchness of functional things without distortion see the self as non-existent. Indeed, if the self existed by way of its own entity, the Forders' view would not differ. )
.
L4: [B. Impossibility of liberation from cyclic existence for a permanent self]
.
\ ###
\ 244.
\ How can what is permanent be harmed,
\ Or the unharmed be liberated?
\ Liberation is irrelevant
\ For one whose self is permanent.
.
(i. e. A permanent self would not seek protection and liberation. The path would be useless for a permanent self. )
.
(-- A permanent self would be invulnerable to suffering of cyclic existence and would therefore not need to seek release.
-- For an opponent who asserts a permanent self, attaining liberation is irrelevant. How can that which is permanent be harmed by dangers and so forth in cyclic existence, and how can that which is unharmed in cyclic existence be liberated by subsequent mediation on the paths? It cannot for these very reasons. )
.
L4: [C. Inappropriateness of asserting the existence of a self during liberation]
.
\ ###
\ 245.
\ If the self exists it is inappropriate
\ To think there is no self
\ And false to claim one attains nirvana
\ Through certain knowledge of reality.
.
(i. e. There is no individual Liberation - no self in Nirvana: To say that a permanent self is liberated by abandoning the belief in a self is contradictory. There is no self being liberated, or attaining Nirvana. )
.
(-- Moreover, if the self were truly existent, how could giving up conceptions of a self be the means to attain liberation, as is claimed?
-- If the self exists by way of its own entity, it follows that thinking there is no self is inappropriate and that attainment of liberation is not feasible, since the basis for conceptions of a self is intact. Moreover the contention of these amazing people [who assert that the self exists but claim] that though ascertaining knowledge of suchness one abandons conceptions of a self and thereby attains nirvana would be false. Therefore those who seek liberation should accept
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selflessness. ) .
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
L4: [D. Refuting a substantially established liberated [person] without a self]
.
\ ###
\ 246.
\ If it exists at liberation
\ It should not be non-existent before.
\ It is explained that what is seen
\ Without anything is its nature.
.
(i. e. Nothing permanent heving rebirths - no self in samsara: And if there is no individual liberation there is also no real individuality taking rebirths in samsara. )
.
(-- Fearing the absurd consequence that conceptions of a self would occur in the liberated state if the self exists, one might assert that though there is no self, there is a truly existent liberated person.
-- It follows that there must be such a truly existent liberated person previously too during cyclic existence, because its entity, isolated from any associated factors, as perceived by unmistaken awareness, is said to be its nature. If there is no self during liberation, it should not be asserted as existing during the cycle of rebirths either. )
.
L3: [III. Eliminating any fault of annihilation with regard to selflessness]
L4: [A. Although there is no self, there is no danger of the composite and transitory discontinuing]
.
\ ###
\ 247.
\ If the impermanent discontinues
\ How could there be grass at present?
\ If, indeed, this were true,
\ No one would have ignorance either.
.
(i. e. No-self doesn't mean no possible continuity of karma or Liberation: There is no need for a permanent self, to support karma and rebirth, to explain bondage and continuity, and the possibility of Liberation. There is a flow of interdependence without any inherently existing entities in it. There is continuity in the endless chain of causes and effects without the need to postulate any inherently existing cause or effect. - This is the same as saying that emptiness doesn't deny dependent origination, or that the Two Truths are not contradictory, but inseparable. . . )
.
(Nothing has origination, duration, cessation; nothing is impermanent; this model would not explain continuity and bounding; there is just the flow without anything inherently existent in it. Reality should not be seen as real impermanent things changing from one moment to another through discrete steps. Nothing really originate or discontinue. There is no real cause and effect. Just the continuum. The model consisting of "moments" (ksana) is not consistent, it cannot explain continuity, nor the dependence in samsara. See Karikas 19-21. There is no need for permanence to have continuity, and the illusion of duration; on the contrary, permanent cause and effect would inhibit any change. Bondage is explained with the continuous flow of cause & effect, without the necessity for a permanent self to be the holder of karma.
-- All these views are based on a failure to understand that impermanence does not necessitate discontinuation. Nothing impermanent can be produced from a permanent cause. Therefore a permanent self is not feasible as an initiating cause of activity. Products which undergo change moment by moment are neither permanent nor do they discontinue. This become clear when we correctly understand the nature of dependent arising, for though the cause ceases an effect has arisen from it and thus there is continuity.
-- Assertion: if there is no self, composite things whose nature is to disintegrate moment by moment would discontinue because of disintegration as soon as they are produced.
-- Answer: Understanding impermanence to mean discontinuation is unacceptable. If it did, how could there today be fields and grass whose continuity is beginningless? There should not be any, for if impermanence meant discontinuation, then whatever is impermanent would have the defect of discontinuing. If the view that whatever is impermanent discontinues were true, it follows that no one would have ignorance because it is impermanent.
It also follows that pleasure and desire would not occur either. )
.
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L4: [B. Even if a self exists, it is unsuitable as the cause that starts and stops [production]]
.
\ ###
\ 248.
\ Even if the self exists
\ Form is seen to arise from other [causes],
\ To continue by virtue of others
\ And to disintegrate through others.
.
(i. e. The self is not a primary cause: As we have seen in the previous chapter, a permanent cause cannot explain the effect. The effect is always dependent on an infinity of other causes and conditions, never on only one absolute cause. This cause would itself need to be triggered and stopped. So the self should not be seen as a permanent cause, independent of any other causes and conditions. )
.
(If the self is a permanent cause, all its effects should not be also dependent on other causes and conditions. But that is not what is seen. The self is not a primary permanent absolute cause of everything that is attributed to it. Another way to see this: Seems to point to the fact that "it is not completely mind fabrications"; there are other causes and conditions beside the mind; things are not "non-existent" at all. There is a flow out there, although the chunks are created by our own mind.
-- It follows that even if the self exists, it is not acceptable as the initiating cause of things which are seen to arise exclusively from other causes. Fire arises from the contact between sunlight and a fire-crystal, water from the contact between moonlight and a water-crystal, the sprout from the seed, and forms such as the sense organs from an earlier stage of the fetus. They continue because of other factors: fire keeps burning because of fuel and so forth and just as it does not burn when there is insufficient fuel, they disintegrate through other factors. The self cannot exist for if it did, it alone should produce all effects. )
.
L4: [C. Producers and that which is produced exist in relation only to impermanent things]
.
\ ###
\ 249.
\ Just as the sprout which is a product
\ Is produced from a product, the seed,
\ Similarly all that is impermanent
\ Comes from the impermanent.
.
(i. e. No permanent self, just an endless chain of interdependence / karma: The actual self is an impermanent self that is the result of an endless chain of causes and effects. The five aggregates produce karma; karma conditions the production of the next five aggregates; and both are interdependent endlessly, until one can transcend the whole cycle by seeing through its real nature. There is no need for a permanent self here; there has never been any permanent self; there is no self Liberation. )
.
(-- An effect cannot arise from something permanent and thus, just as the sprout, a product, arises from the seed which is a product, all that is impermanent comes from impermanent causes. Therefore composite things, undergoing production and disintegration moment by moment, can never be permanent nor discontinue. The thunderbolts of permanence and annihilation which strike and destroy the relationship of cause and effect between composite things are
driven off to a distance by the wise with the mantra of dependent arising. ) .
L4: [D. Showing briefly how permanence and annihilation are avoided in terms of the conventional]
.
\ ###
\ 250.
\ SINCE FUNCTIONAL THINGS ARISE
\ THERE IS NO DISCONTINUATION
\ AND BECAUSE THEY CEASE
\ THERE IS NO PERMANENCE.
.
(i. e. The Two Truths: dependent origination and emptiness, or karma and no-self. We need both method and wisdom together (the two accumulations) to stay away from all extremes. Dependent origination or karma is the antidote to
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nihilism or discontinuity, and emptiness or no-self is the antidote to inherent existence or permanence. Merit is accumulated using methods based on dependent origination, the explanation of the Wheel of Life, the law of karma . . . Wisdom is accumulated by gradually combining the realization of the emptiness of inherent existence of all dharmas (including the self) with the various methods until we can transcend it all. Dependent origination and emptiness (or karma and no-self) do not contradict each other; one implies the other. )
.
(-- Since resultant things like sprouts arise and are produced, the cause's continuum is not in danger of being annihilated. Since the seed ceases once the sprout has been produced, the cause is not in danger of being permanent. The "Fundamental [Treatise Called] Wisdom" says:
~ Whatever has arisen depending on something
~ Is firstly not [one with] it
and so .
.
\
\
\
\
\
.
\
\
self.
.
This concludes the commentary on the tenth chapter, showing how to meditate on refuting the self, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".
.
forth. In brief this shows how permanence and annihilation are avoided in relation to the conventional. ) L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
###
Through familiarity with meditating on
The impermanence, suffering and uncleanness of cyclic existence, Abandon the limitless views of the self,
Both innate and those imputed by tenets.
###
This is the tenth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on refuting the
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L2: [Chapter 11 - Refuting Truly Existent Time - There is no truly existing absolute time, duration or impermanence - P. 227]
.
(i. e. SHOWING HOW TO MEDITATE ON REFUTING TIME.
Individual refutation of truly existent functional phenomena: Refuting truly existent time.
-- Refuting time as a truly existent functional thing / that past, present and future things are all existent (now)
-- If the future and the past exist now, they are not past and future.
-- If the past and present continue to exist, the future already exist, the present permanent, then nothing really originate or ceased, nothing is impermanent, nothing is produced through causality -- but that is not what is seen.
-- If the future already exist, is there another production?
-- If the future already exist, there is no need to work on it.
-- Directly seeing the future, or past lives: bull-. . .
-- On the other hand: past, present, future, they are not non-existent at all either; otherwise there would be no causality at all, no bounding, and no possibility for liberation.
-- Avoiding both extremes: it is not existing, nor non-existing. In both case morality would be useless.
-- Actual change, production, origination or cessation, . . . is not seen. So there is no clear present.
-- Nothing last the same even a moment; everything is continually changing. Nothing last long enough to "be existent". So nothing could be used as an objective absolute time comparator.
-- Time, duration, is not directly perceptible; so it is not a true functional thing.
-- Time and duration: not two separate thing, nor either one. One cannot be used to prove the other.
-- Impermanence and things: not separate, not one. In both case there would be no duration possible. So they cannot be used to prove duration, or time.
-- The unclear opposition of two characteristics of things: impermanence and duration
-- Past, present and future: they are not the same, they are not different / separate real existent entities, they are dependent on each other, they are fabrications of the mind because the mind does not understand how continuity really works
-- Not knowing how to posit continuity and transitoriness, They say time is permanent and the three times exist substantially.
.
-- see also
-- Chapter 9 verses: 107- About Refuting permanent time
-- even time, like seasons, is dependent, an effect, thus not an absolute permanent cause
-- because there is no cause without having causes and conditions itself
-- the cause itself change from being non active, to being active, depending on other conditions, thus it is not permanent -- If a permanent cause cannot be the real cause, then there would be no cause at all.
-- how can permanence cause impermanence? )
.
L3: [I. Refuting that time is substantially established by nature] L4: [A. Refuting the past and the future]
L5: [1. Refuting a substantially established future]
L6: [a. Showing the fallacies if the future is truly existent]
.
\ ###
\ 251.
\ The present pot and the past one
\ Do not exist in the future pot.
\ Since both would be future,
\ The future would not exist.
.
(i. e. Past, present and future cannot exist simultaneously - like cause and effect cannot exist simultaneously: Some think time is a primary cause, without being an effect - like with the seasons. Permanent time would mean that the past and present would still exist in the future - or that the future exist in the present. But, the causes, past and present, are not the same as the effect, future, otherwise there would be no need for production of the future. They are not different or consecutive either, otherwise there would be no continuity or causality. )
.
(-- Assertion by Vaidantikas and other proponents of permanent time: Though it is correct to admit a permanent self
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does not exist since it is not established by either direct or inferential cognition, permanent functional things are not non-existent since there is permanent time. Though water, manure, seeds and so forth are present, one observes that sprout, flowers and the like are not produced at certain times but are produced at others. From this one can infer the presence of another cause which is time. Though it is a permanent entity different from the functional things which exist in the three times, it is revealed in terms of instants, moments, brief spans, and so forth.
-- Answer: This is unacceptable, for if time were an entity different from functional things it should be perceived but it is not perceived. That has already been refuted. In this context the refutation is made taking a future pot to represent future time. The same should be understood with respect to the other two times.
-- It follows that the present pot does not exist in the future pot, nor does the past pot exist at that time, for if they both existed at that time, time would be disrupted, since things which are to occur later would already exist at an earlier time. Also at any one time another cannot exist. For these reasons, since both the past and present would be future if they existed at the time of the future pot, they do not already exist at that time. If the future of the future existed by way of its own entity, it should be future. In that case since all three times would have to be future, there could not be any past or present. If that were so, the future itself would not exist, since it could not be posited as future in relation to anything. )
.
L6: [b. Refuting the rejoinder]
.
\ ###
\ 252.
\ If a disintegrated thing exists as
\ A future entity in the future,
\ How can what is future in nature
\ Become that which is past?
.
(i. e. No permanent future: The future becomes the present and then the past. So there is no permanent future, no inherently existing future. )
.
(-- Assertion: The past pot is not altogether non-existent in the future pot. Since there is a part of it which has not yet come into existence as an entity that has occurred, there is no error.
-- Answer: If at the time of the future pot, the disintegrated pot existed in the future as an entity which had not yet come into existence, it would follow that the pot was future because of being, by way of its own entity, that which had not yet occurred at the time of the future pot. If this is accepted, it follows that there would be no past. This would necessarily be so, for how could anything that truly existed as future in nature become past? It is contradictory. Moreover by virtue of this reasoning, if the future relation to the pot is asserted as truly existent it must be accepted as being only future, which undermines the contention. )
.
L6: [c. Consequence that it is present if substantially established]
.
\ ###
\ 253.
\ Because of being future in nature
\ A future functional thing
\ Is thus present
\ And cannot be future.
.
(i. e. A truly existing future would not be the future: If the future is truly existing, it exist now, and is not the future. So there is no truly existent future. )
.
(If, according to proponents of permanent time, future things exist, it follows that the future pot is present because of already being in the nature of a future substantially existent thing. If something exists as a substantially established entity, it must be present since it has been produced and has not disintegrated. If this is accepted, it follows that it cannot be future. )
.
L6: [d. Consequence that impermanence is impossible if all three times are substantially existent]
.
\ ###
\ 254.
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.
\ ###
\ 257.
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
\ If the future, past and present exist,
\ What does not exist?
\ How can there be impermanence
\ For one for whom all times exist?
.
(i. e. Truly existing past, present and future would mean nothing is impermanent: If the past continue to exist, the future already exist, as the present, then nothing originate or disintegrate, nothing is impermanent. Thus the tree times cannot truly exist, be permanent. )
.
(-- If it were truly existent, things could undergo no change and there would be nothing impermanent.
-- If, as asserted by Vaisesikas, Vaibhasikas and so forth, things existent by way of their own character exist in the future, exist in the past and exist in the present, what part of a thing could ever not exist? How could there be impermanence for a proponent of substantially existent time? It follows that there cannot be any impermanent things, for if all three times are substantially existent, whatever exist at an earlier time must be accepted as existing later and whatever exists at a later time must be accepted as existing earlier. )
.
L5: [2. Refuting a substantially established past]
.
\ ###
\ 255.
\ If it has passed beyond the past
\ Why is it the past?
\ If it has not passed beyond the past
\ Why is it the past?
.
(i. e. A truly existing past would not be the past: If the past exist, it exist now, and is not the past. Thus the past is not a real existing functional independent thing. )
.
(-- The future is not substantially existent since future time cannot exist in the future. Similarly has the past passed beyond its own nature as the past or not?
\ 237.
\ At times one sees potential consciousness,
\ At others consciousness itself.
\ Because of being like molten iron
\ The person undergoes change.
.
(i. e. The simple fact that it becomes conscious of something proves that it is impermanent. All functional phenomenon are impermanent as stated before; they are both cause and effect. )
.
(-- If the person is claimed to be potentially conscious, the self and consciousness could not be a permanent indifferentiable entity, for then the person but no consciousness would exist before an object is experienced. Any transition from the potential consciousness to actual consciousness indicates that the person is not permanent.
-- Assertion: Although there is no consciousness prior to experiencing objects, its potential and thus the person exists. -- Answer: On occasions other than when objects are being experienced one sees potential consciousness, and when objects are being experienced, consciousness itself. In that case, like molten iron which later becomes a solid mass, former potential consciousness later becomes actual consciousness. It therefore follows that the person undergoes change because consciousness and the person are accepted as one entity. )
.
L4: [C. Refuting the self imputed by Naiyayikas]
L5: [1. Refuting that a part of the self possessing a mere particle of mind perceives objects]
.
\ ###
\ 238.
\ Merely [a small part with] mind is conscious
\ But the person is as vast as space.
\ Therefore it would seem as though
\ Its nature is not to be conscious.
.
(-- The Naiyayika assertion that there is a vast permanent partless self which is present in each being is next shown to be illogical, for then that which is one person's self should also be another's.
-- Naiyayika assertion: Our person is not a conscious entity. Since a part of the self the mere size of a particle has mind, there is consciousness of objects. It depends on just this part with mind. A person that is conscious and not separate from mind is produced through this association. The person is permanent and very extensive like space.
-- Answer: Since except for a part as small as a particle the rest of this permanent and extensive self is not associated with consciousness, that self's nature does not seem to have consciousness of objects. Just as it cannot be said that water of the Ganges is salty because of contact with a grain of salt, it is inappropriate to assert that which is not conscious as the person. )
.
L5: [2. Refuting belief in a permanent omnipresent self]
.
\ ###
\ 239.
\ If the self is in everyone then why
\ Does another not think of this one as "I"?
\ It is unacceptable to say that
\ It is obscured by itself. .
( -- If there is a partless permanent self which is omnipresent like space and in each individual sentient being, why would another person not think "I" in relation to my own self? It follows that they should think of it as "I" because the two selves are one. It cannot be omnipresent if the object of someone else's conception of the self is not my own self. -- Assertion: It is not perceived because it has been obscured by the other's self.
-- Answer: It is unacceptable to say that the self obscures itself for there is no duality of that which obscures and that which is obscured. )
.
L4: [D. Explaining other refutation like that of the attributes and so forth]
L5: [1. Asserting that though the principal is matter it is the creator of everything amounts to madness]
.
\ ###
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\ 240.
\ There is no difference between
\ The insane and those from whom
\ The attributes are the creator
\ But are never conscious.
.
(-- This is followed by an examination of the Samkhya belief that the creative force is unconscious matter with the capacity to produce virtue and non-virtue but with no capacity to experience their effects.
-- Samkhya assertion: The great one, a synonym for the intellect, evolves from the principal which is matter and a balance of pleasure, pain and equanimity. The three I-principles evolve from the great one. Eleven faculties evolve from the I-principle associated with lightness: five mental faculties for action and the speculative faculty. From the I- principle associated with motility come the five mere objects from which the five elements evolve. The I-principle of darkness acts as the basis for the other to I-principles.
-- Answer: It follows that it is contradictory to assert, as do the Samkhyas, that the principal which is a balance of the three attributes is the creator of all manifestations but is never conscious. There is not the least difference between those who assert the like and the insane whose perception is distorted. )
.
L5: [2. Contradiction of asserting that it creates virtue and non-virtue but does not experience their maturation]
.
\ ###
\ 241.
\ What is more illogical
\ Than that the attributes should always
\ Know how to construct homes and so forth
\ But not know how to experience them? .
( -- Since such a contention contradicts reason and conflicts with worldly convention, it is utterly incorrect. What is more illogical than to claim that the attributes whose nature is pleasure, pain and equanimity know how to construct homes and so forth but do not know how to experience these amenities? It contradicts both reason and convention. ) .
L5: [3. Refuting that a permanent self is the agent of actions and experiencer of their maturation]
.
\ ###
\ 242.
\ The active is not permanent.
\ (i. e. A cause cannot be permanent, thus the self cannot be permanent)
\ The ubiquitous is actionless.
\ (i. e. Something omnipresent does not need to act, thus the self cannot be omnipresent)
\ The actionless is like the non-existent.
\ (i. e. An actionless self, non-functional, is as non-existent)
\ Why do you not prefer selflessness?
\ (i. e. Conclude that there is no real self; it is more useful)
.
(-- On the other hand if, as the Vaisesikas claim, the self is the doer of actions and experiencer of their results, how can it be permanent, for this necessarily entails transformation from a previous state to a subsequent one.
-- Vaisesika assertion: The self alone is the doer of actions and the experiencer of their maturation.
-- Answer ab: If that is so, the self cannot be permanent.
-- If the self is an agent it must be accepted as causing action. If it does not perform actions it is unsuitable as an agent. That which performs actions like coming and going is not permanent since one must admit that it differs from before. Something the whole of which is everywhere all the time does not perform activities such as coming and going since there is no place or time it does not occupy.
-- Assertion: Well then, an actionless self exist.
-- Answer cd: Since an actionless self is as non-existent as a sky flower, why do you not prefer selflessness? It is worth doing so, for understanding it frees one from all fears. )
.
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L3: [II. General refutation]
L4: [A. Erroneousness of thinking a personal self exist]
.
\ ###
\ 243.
\ Some see it as ubiquitous and for some
\ The person is the mere [size of the] body.
\ Some see it as a mere particle.
\ The wise see it as non-existent.
.
(i. e. There is no inherently existing self. Since it doesn't exist those who assert its existence cannot agree among themselves. )
.
( -- It follows that the conception of a personal self is erroneous. Since the self, if it existed, would do so by way of its own entity, it should appear without differences.
-- Some such as Vaisesikas and Samkhyas see the self as existing in each body and as being ubiquitous like space. Others such as Nirgranthas see that which has a body as proportionate to the size of that body, such as an ant's or an elephant's.
Nirgranthas assert the life force is large or small like the size of the body.
Others, unable to accept this, see it as a mere particle.
Those with the wisdom that perceives the suchness of functional things without distortion see the self as non-existent. Indeed, if the self existed by way of its own entity, the Forders' view would not differ. )
.
L4: [B. Impossibility of liberation from cyclic existence for a permanent self]
.
\ ###
\ 244.
\ How can what is permanent be harmed,
\ Or the unharmed be liberated?
\ Liberation is irrelevant
\ For one whose self is permanent.
.
(i. e. A permanent self would not seek protection and liberation. The path would be useless for a permanent self. )
.
(-- A permanent self would be invulnerable to suffering of cyclic existence and would therefore not need to seek release.
-- For an opponent who asserts a permanent self, attaining liberation is irrelevant. How can that which is permanent be harmed by dangers and so forth in cyclic existence, and how can that which is unharmed in cyclic existence be liberated by subsequent mediation on the paths? It cannot for these very reasons. )
.
L4: [C. Inappropriateness of asserting the existence of a self during liberation]
.
\ ###
\ 245.
\ If the self exists it is inappropriate
\ To think there is no self
\ And false to claim one attains nirvana
\ Through certain knowledge of reality.
.
(i. e. There is no individual Liberation - no self in Nirvana: To say that a permanent self is liberated by abandoning the belief in a self is contradictory. There is no self being liberated, or attaining Nirvana. )
.
(-- Moreover, if the self were truly existent, how could giving up conceptions of a self be the means to attain liberation, as is claimed?
-- If the self exists by way of its own entity, it follows that thinking there is no self is inappropriate and that attainment of liberation is not feasible, since the basis for conceptions of a self is intact. Moreover the contention of these amazing people [who assert that the self exists but claim] that though ascertaining knowledge of suchness one abandons conceptions of a self and thereby attains nirvana would be false. Therefore those who seek liberation should accept
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selflessness. ) .
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L4: [D. Refuting a substantially established liberated [person] without a self]
.
\ ###
\ 246.
\ If it exists at liberation
\ It should not be non-existent before.
\ It is explained that what is seen
\ Without anything is its nature.
.
(i. e. Nothing permanent heving rebirths - no self in samsara: And if there is no individual liberation there is also no real individuality taking rebirths in samsara. )
.
(-- Fearing the absurd consequence that conceptions of a self would occur in the liberated state if the self exists, one might assert that though there is no self, there is a truly existent liberated person.
-- It follows that there must be such a truly existent liberated person previously too during cyclic existence, because its entity, isolated from any associated factors, as perceived by unmistaken awareness, is said to be its nature. If there is no self during liberation, it should not be asserted as existing during the cycle of rebirths either. )
.
L3: [III. Eliminating any fault of annihilation with regard to selflessness]
L4: [A. Although there is no self, there is no danger of the composite and transitory discontinuing]
.
\ ###
\ 247.
\ If the impermanent discontinues
\ How could there be grass at present?
\ If, indeed, this were true,
\ No one would have ignorance either.
.
(i. e. No-self doesn't mean no possible continuity of karma or Liberation: There is no need for a permanent self, to support karma and rebirth, to explain bondage and continuity, and the possibility of Liberation. There is a flow of interdependence without any inherently existing entities in it. There is continuity in the endless chain of causes and effects without the need to postulate any inherently existing cause or effect. - This is the same as saying that emptiness doesn't deny dependent origination, or that the Two Truths are not contradictory, but inseparable. . . )
.
(Nothing has origination, duration, cessation; nothing is impermanent; this model would not explain continuity and bounding; there is just the flow without anything inherently existent in it. Reality should not be seen as real impermanent things changing from one moment to another through discrete steps. Nothing really originate or discontinue. There is no real cause and effect. Just the continuum. The model consisting of "moments" (ksana) is not consistent, it cannot explain continuity, nor the dependence in samsara. See Karikas 19-21. There is no need for permanence to have continuity, and the illusion of duration; on the contrary, permanent cause and effect would inhibit any change. Bondage is explained with the continuous flow of cause & effect, without the necessity for a permanent self to be the holder of karma.
-- All these views are based on a failure to understand that impermanence does not necessitate discontinuation. Nothing impermanent can be produced from a permanent cause. Therefore a permanent self is not feasible as an initiating cause of activity. Products which undergo change moment by moment are neither permanent nor do they discontinue. This become clear when we correctly understand the nature of dependent arising, for though the cause ceases an effect has arisen from it and thus there is continuity.
-- Assertion: if there is no self, composite things whose nature is to disintegrate moment by moment would discontinue because of disintegration as soon as they are produced.
-- Answer: Understanding impermanence to mean discontinuation is unacceptable. If it did, how could there today be fields and grass whose continuity is beginningless? There should not be any, for if impermanence meant discontinuation, then whatever is impermanent would have the defect of discontinuing. If the view that whatever is impermanent discontinues were true, it follows that no one would have ignorance because it is impermanent.
It also follows that pleasure and desire would not occur either. )
.
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L4: [B. Even if a self exists, it is unsuitable as the cause that starts and stops [production]]
.
\ ###
\ 248.
\ Even if the self exists
\ Form is seen to arise from other [causes],
\ To continue by virtue of others
\ And to disintegrate through others.
.
(i. e. The self is not a primary cause: As we have seen in the previous chapter, a permanent cause cannot explain the effect. The effect is always dependent on an infinity of other causes and conditions, never on only one absolute cause. This cause would itself need to be triggered and stopped. So the self should not be seen as a permanent cause, independent of any other causes and conditions. )
.
(If the self is a permanent cause, all its effects should not be also dependent on other causes and conditions. But that is not what is seen. The self is not a primary permanent absolute cause of everything that is attributed to it. Another way to see this: Seems to point to the fact that "it is not completely mind fabrications"; there are other causes and conditions beside the mind; things are not "non-existent" at all. There is a flow out there, although the chunks are created by our own mind.
-- It follows that even if the self exists, it is not acceptable as the initiating cause of things which are seen to arise exclusively from other causes. Fire arises from the contact between sunlight and a fire-crystal, water from the contact between moonlight and a water-crystal, the sprout from the seed, and forms such as the sense organs from an earlier stage of the fetus. They continue because of other factors: fire keeps burning because of fuel and so forth and just as it does not burn when there is insufficient fuel, they disintegrate through other factors. The self cannot exist for if it did, it alone should produce all effects. )
.
L4: [C. Producers and that which is produced exist in relation only to impermanent things]
.
\ ###
\ 249.
\ Just as the sprout which is a product
\ Is produced from a product, the seed,
\ Similarly all that is impermanent
\ Comes from the impermanent.
.
(i. e. No permanent self, just an endless chain of interdependence / karma: The actual self is an impermanent self that is the result of an endless chain of causes and effects. The five aggregates produce karma; karma conditions the production of the next five aggregates; and both are interdependent endlessly, until one can transcend the whole cycle by seeing through its real nature. There is no need for a permanent self here; there has never been any permanent self; there is no self Liberation. )
.
(-- An effect cannot arise from something permanent and thus, just as the sprout, a product, arises from the seed which is a product, all that is impermanent comes from impermanent causes. Therefore composite things, undergoing production and disintegration moment by moment, can never be permanent nor discontinue. The thunderbolts of permanence and annihilation which strike and destroy the relationship of cause and effect between composite things are
driven off to a distance by the wise with the mantra of dependent arising. ) .
L4: [D. Showing briefly how permanence and annihilation are avoided in terms of the conventional]
.
\ ###
\ 250.
\ SINCE FUNCTIONAL THINGS ARISE
\ THERE IS NO DISCONTINUATION
\ AND BECAUSE THEY CEASE
\ THERE IS NO PERMANENCE.
.
(i. e. The Two Truths: dependent origination and emptiness, or karma and no-self. We need both method and wisdom together (the two accumulations) to stay away from all extremes. Dependent origination or karma is the antidote to
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nihilism or discontinuity, and emptiness or no-self is the antidote to inherent existence or permanence. Merit is accumulated using methods based on dependent origination, the explanation of the Wheel of Life, the law of karma . . . Wisdom is accumulated by gradually combining the realization of the emptiness of inherent existence of all dharmas (including the self) with the various methods until we can transcend it all. Dependent origination and emptiness (or karma and no-self) do not contradict each other; one implies the other. )
.
(-- Since resultant things like sprouts arise and are produced, the cause's continuum is not in danger of being annihilated. Since the seed ceases once the sprout has been produced, the cause is not in danger of being permanent. The "Fundamental [Treatise Called] Wisdom" says:
~ Whatever has arisen depending on something
~ Is firstly not [one with] it
and so .
.
\
\
\
\
\
.
\
\
self.
.
This concludes the commentary on the tenth chapter, showing how to meditate on refuting the self, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".
.
forth. In brief this shows how permanence and annihilation are avoided in relation to the conventional. ) L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
###
Through familiarity with meditating on
The impermanence, suffering and uncleanness of cyclic existence, Abandon the limitless views of the self,
Both innate and those imputed by tenets.
###
This is the tenth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on refuting the
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L2: [Chapter 11 - Refuting Truly Existent Time - There is no truly existing absolute time, duration or impermanence - P. 227]
.
(i. e. SHOWING HOW TO MEDITATE ON REFUTING TIME.
Individual refutation of truly existent functional phenomena: Refuting truly existent time.
-- Refuting time as a truly existent functional thing / that past, present and future things are all existent (now)
-- If the future and the past exist now, they are not past and future.
-- If the past and present continue to exist, the future already exist, the present permanent, then nothing really originate or ceased, nothing is impermanent, nothing is produced through causality -- but that is not what is seen.
-- If the future already exist, is there another production?
-- If the future already exist, there is no need to work on it.
-- Directly seeing the future, or past lives: bull-. . .
-- On the other hand: past, present, future, they are not non-existent at all either; otherwise there would be no causality at all, no bounding, and no possibility for liberation.
-- Avoiding both extremes: it is not existing, nor non-existing. In both case morality would be useless.
-- Actual change, production, origination or cessation, . . . is not seen. So there is no clear present.
-- Nothing last the same even a moment; everything is continually changing. Nothing last long enough to "be existent". So nothing could be used as an objective absolute time comparator.
-- Time, duration, is not directly perceptible; so it is not a true functional thing.
-- Time and duration: not two separate thing, nor either one. One cannot be used to prove the other.
-- Impermanence and things: not separate, not one. In both case there would be no duration possible. So they cannot be used to prove duration, or time.
-- The unclear opposition of two characteristics of things: impermanence and duration
-- Past, present and future: they are not the same, they are not different / separate real existent entities, they are dependent on each other, they are fabrications of the mind because the mind does not understand how continuity really works
-- Not knowing how to posit continuity and transitoriness, They say time is permanent and the three times exist substantially.
.
-- see also
-- Chapter 9 verses: 107- About Refuting permanent time
-- even time, like seasons, is dependent, an effect, thus not an absolute permanent cause
-- because there is no cause without having causes and conditions itself
-- the cause itself change from being non active, to being active, depending on other conditions, thus it is not permanent -- If a permanent cause cannot be the real cause, then there would be no cause at all.
-- how can permanence cause impermanence? )
.
L3: [I. Refuting that time is substantially established by nature] L4: [A. Refuting the past and the future]
L5: [1. Refuting a substantially established future]
L6: [a. Showing the fallacies if the future is truly existent]
.
\ ###
\ 251.
\ The present pot and the past one
\ Do not exist in the future pot.
\ Since both would be future,
\ The future would not exist.
.
(i. e. Past, present and future cannot exist simultaneously - like cause and effect cannot exist simultaneously: Some think time is a primary cause, without being an effect - like with the seasons. Permanent time would mean that the past and present would still exist in the future - or that the future exist in the present. But, the causes, past and present, are not the same as the effect, future, otherwise there would be no need for production of the future. They are not different or consecutive either, otherwise there would be no continuity or causality. )
.
(-- Assertion by Vaidantikas and other proponents of permanent time: Though it is correct to admit a permanent self
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does not exist since it is not established by either direct or inferential cognition, permanent functional things are not non-existent since there is permanent time. Though water, manure, seeds and so forth are present, one observes that sprout, flowers and the like are not produced at certain times but are produced at others. From this one can infer the presence of another cause which is time. Though it is a permanent entity different from the functional things which exist in the three times, it is revealed in terms of instants, moments, brief spans, and so forth.
-- Answer: This is unacceptable, for if time were an entity different from functional things it should be perceived but it is not perceived. That has already been refuted. In this context the refutation is made taking a future pot to represent future time. The same should be understood with respect to the other two times.
-- It follows that the present pot does not exist in the future pot, nor does the past pot exist at that time, for if they both existed at that time, time would be disrupted, since things which are to occur later would already exist at an earlier time. Also at any one time another cannot exist. For these reasons, since both the past and present would be future if they existed at the time of the future pot, they do not already exist at that time. If the future of the future existed by way of its own entity, it should be future. In that case since all three times would have to be future, there could not be any past or present. If that were so, the future itself would not exist, since it could not be posited as future in relation to anything. )
.
L6: [b. Refuting the rejoinder]
.
\ ###
\ 252.
\ If a disintegrated thing exists as
\ A future entity in the future,
\ How can what is future in nature
\ Become that which is past?
.
(i. e. No permanent future: The future becomes the present and then the past. So there is no permanent future, no inherently existing future. )
.
(-- Assertion: The past pot is not altogether non-existent in the future pot. Since there is a part of it which has not yet come into existence as an entity that has occurred, there is no error.
-- Answer: If at the time of the future pot, the disintegrated pot existed in the future as an entity which had not yet come into existence, it would follow that the pot was future because of being, by way of its own entity, that which had not yet occurred at the time of the future pot. If this is accepted, it follows that there would be no past. This would necessarily be so, for how could anything that truly existed as future in nature become past? It is contradictory. Moreover by virtue of this reasoning, if the future relation to the pot is asserted as truly existent it must be accepted as being only future, which undermines the contention. )
.
L6: [c. Consequence that it is present if substantially established]
.
\ ###
\ 253.
\ Because of being future in nature
\ A future functional thing
\ Is thus present
\ And cannot be future.
.
(i. e. A truly existing future would not be the future: If the future is truly existing, it exist now, and is not the future. So there is no truly existent future. )
.
(If, according to proponents of permanent time, future things exist, it follows that the future pot is present because of already being in the nature of a future substantially existent thing. If something exists as a substantially established entity, it must be present since it has been produced and has not disintegrated. If this is accepted, it follows that it cannot be future. )
.
L6: [d. Consequence that impermanence is impossible if all three times are substantially existent]
.
\ ###
\ 254.
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.
\ ###
\ 257.
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
\ If the future, past and present exist,
\ What does not exist?
\ How can there be impermanence
\ For one for whom all times exist?
.
(i. e. Truly existing past, present and future would mean nothing is impermanent: If the past continue to exist, the future already exist, as the present, then nothing originate or disintegrate, nothing is impermanent. Thus the tree times cannot truly exist, be permanent. )
.
(-- If it were truly existent, things could undergo no change and there would be nothing impermanent.
-- If, as asserted by Vaisesikas, Vaibhasikas and so forth, things existent by way of their own character exist in the future, exist in the past and exist in the present, what part of a thing could ever not exist? How could there be impermanence for a proponent of substantially existent time? It follows that there cannot be any impermanent things, for if all three times are substantially existent, whatever exist at an earlier time must be accepted as existing later and whatever exists at a later time must be accepted as existing earlier. )
.
L5: [2. Refuting a substantially established past]
.
\ ###
\ 255.
\ If it has passed beyond the past
\ Why is it the past?
\ If it has not passed beyond the past
\ Why is it the past?
.
(i. e. A truly existing past would not be the past: If the past exist, it exist now, and is not the past. Thus the past is not a real existing functional independent thing. )
.
(-- The future is not substantially existent since future time cannot exist in the future. Similarly has the past passed beyond its own nature as the past or not?
