No More Learning

To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to Honour him; signe of
opinion of his vertue and power. To distrust, or not believe, is to
Dishonour.

To hearken to a mans counsell, or discourse of what kind soever, is to
Honour; as a signe we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty. To sleep,
or go forth, or talk the while, is to Dishonour.

To do those things to another, which he takes for signes of Honour, or
which the Law or Custome makes so, is to Honour; because in approving
the Honour done by others, he acknowledgeth the power which others
acknowledge. To refuse to do them, is to Dishonour.

To agree with in opinion, is to Honour; as being a signe of approving
his judgement, and wisdome. To dissent, is Dishonour; and an upbraiding
of errour; and (if the dissent be in many things) of folly.

To imitate, is to Honour; for it is vehemently to approve. To imitate
ones Enemy, is to Dishonour.

To honour those another honours, is to Honour him; as a signe of
approbation of his judgement. To honour his Enemies, is to Dishonour
him.

To employ in counsell, or in actions of difficulty, is to Honour; as a
signe of opinion of his wisdome, or other power. To deny employment in
the same cases, to those that seek it, is to Dishonour.

All these wayes of Honouring, are naturall; and as well within, as
without Common-wealths. But in Common-wealths, where he, or they that
have the supreme Authority, can make whatsoever they please, to stand
for signes of Honour, there be other Honours.

A Soveraigne doth Honour a Subject, with whatsoever Title, or Office, or
Employment, or Action, that he himselfe will have taken for a signe of
his will to Honour him.

The King of Persia, Honoured Mordecay, when he appointed he should be
conducted through the streets in the Kings Garment, upon one of the
Kings Horses, with a Crown on his head, and a Prince before him,
proclayming, "Thus shall it be done to him that the King will honour. "
And yet another King of Persia, or the same another time, to one that
demanded for some great service, to weare one of the Kings robes, gave
him leave so to do; but with his addition, that he should weare it as
the Kings foole; and then it was Dishonour. So that of Civill Honour;
such as are Magistracy, Offices, Titles; and in some places Coats, and
Scutchions painted: and men Honour such as have them, as having so many
signes of favour in the Common-wealth; which favour is Power.

Honourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument
and signe of Power.

And therefore To be Honoured, loved, or feared of many, is Honourable;
as arguments of Power. To be Honoured of few or none, Dishonourable.

Good fortune (if lasting,) Honourable; as a signe of the favour of God.
Ill fortune, and losses, Dishonourable. Riches, are Honourable; for
they are Power. Poverty, Dishonourable. Magnanimity, Liberality,
Hope, Courage, Confidence, are Honourable; for they proceed from the
conscience of Power. Pusillanimity, Parsimony, Fear, Diffidence, are
Dishonourable.

Timely Resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is
Honourable; as being the contempt of small difficulties, and dangers.
And Irresolution, Dishonourable; as a signe of too much valuing of
little impediments, and little advantages: For when a man has weighed
things as long as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference
of weight is but little; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues
little things, which is Pusillanimity.

All Actions, and Speeches, that proceed, or seem to proceed from much
Experience, Science, Discretion, or Wit, are Honourable; For all these
are Powers. Actions, or Words that proceed from Errour, Ignorance, or
Folly, Dishonourable.

Gravity, as farre forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on
some thing else, is Honourable; because employment is a signe of
Power. But if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is
Dishonourable. For the gravity of the Former, is like the steddinesse of
a Ship laden with Merchandise; but of the later, like the steddinesse of
a Ship ballasted with Sand, and other trash.

To be Conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for Wealth, Office,
great Actions, or any eminent Good, is Honourable; as a signe of the
power for which he is conspicuous. On the contrary, Obscurity, is
Dishonourable.

To be descended from conspicuous Parents, is Honourable; because they
the more easily attain the aydes, and friends of their Ancestors. On the
contrary, to be descended from obscure Parentage, is Dishonourable.

Actions proceeding from Equity, joyned with losse, are Honourable;
as signes of Magnanimity: for Magnanimity is a signe of Power. On the
contrary, Craft, Shifting, neglect of Equity, is Dishonourable.

Nor does it alter the case of Honour, whether an action (so it be great
and difficult, and consequently a signe of much power,) be just or
unjust: for Honour consisteth onely in the opinion of Power. Therefore
the ancient Heathen did not thinke they Dishonoured, but greatly
Honoured the Gods, when they introduced them in their Poems, committing
Rapes, Thefts, and other great, but unjust, or unclean acts: In so much
as nothing is so much celebrated in Jupiter, as his Adulteries; nor
in Mercury, as his Frauds, and Thefts: of whose praises, in a hymne
of Homer, the greatest is this, that being born in the morning, he had
invented Musique at noon, and before night, stolen away the Cattell of
Appollo, from his Herdsmen.

Also amongst men, till there were constituted great Common-wealths,
it was thought no dishonour to be a Pyrate, or a High-way Theefe; but
rather a lawfull Trade, not onely amongst the Greeks, but also amongst
all other Nations; as is manifest by the Histories of antient time. And
at this day, in this part of the world, private Duels are, and alwayes
will be Honourable, though unlawfull, till such time as there shall be
Honour ordained for them that refuse, and Ignominy for them that make
the Challenge. For Duels also are many times effects of Courage; and the
ground of Courage is alwayes Strength or Skill, which are Power; though
for the most part they be effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of
Dishonour, in one, or both the Combatants; who engaged by rashnesse, are
driven into the Lists to avoyd disgrace.

Scutchions, and coats of Armes haereditary, where they have any eminent
Priviledges, are Honourable; otherwise not: for their Power consisteth
either in such Priviledges, or in Riches, or some such thing as is
equally honoured in other men. This kind of Honour, commonly called
Gentry, has been derived from the Antient Germans. For there never was
any such thing known, where the German Customes were unknown. Nor is it
now any where in use, where the Germans have not inhabited. The antient
Greek Commanders, when they went to war, had their Shields painted with
such Devises as they pleased; insomuch as an unpainted Buckler was a
signe of Poverty, and of a common Souldier: but they transmitted not the
Inheritance of them. The Romans transmitted the Marks of their Families:
but they were the Images, not the Devises of their Ancestors. Amongst
the people of Asia, Afrique, and America, there is not, nor was ever,
any such thing. The Germans onely had that custome; from whom it has
been derived into England, France, Spain, and Italy, when in great
numbers they either ayded the Romans, or made their own Conquests in
these Westerne parts of the world.

For Germany, being antiently, as all other Countries, in their
beginnings, divided amongst an infinite number of little Lords, or
Masters of Families, that continually had wars one with another; those
Masters, or Lords, principally to the end they might, when they were
Covered with Arms, be known by their followers; and partly for ornament,
both painted their Armor, or their Scutchion, or Coat, with the picture
of some Beast, or other thing; and also put some eminent and visible
mark upon the Crest of their Helmets. And his ornament both of the
Armes, and Crest, descended by inheritance to their Children; to the
eldest pure, and to the rest with some note of diversity, such as the
Old master, that is to say in Dutch, the Here-alt thought fit. But when
many such Families, joyned together, made a greater Monarchy, this duty
of the Herealt, to distinguish Scutchions, was made a private Office
a part. And the issue of these Lords, is the great and antient Gentry;
which for the most part bear living creatures, noted for courage, and
rapine; or Castles, Battlements, Belts, Weapons, Bars, Palisadoes, and
other notes of War; nothing being then in honour, but vertue military.
Afterwards, not onely Kings, but popular Common-wealths, gave divers
manners of Scutchions, to such as went forth to the War, or returned
from it, for encouragement, or recompence to their service. All which,
by an observing Reader, may be found in such ancient Histories, Greek
and Latine, as make mention of the German Nation, and Manners, in their
times.




Titles of Honour

Titles of Honour, such as are Duke, Count, Marquis, and Baron, are
Honourable; as signifying the value set upon them by the Soveraigne
Power of the Common-wealth: Which Titles, were in old time titles
of Office, and Command, derived some from the Romans, some from the
Germans, and French. Dukes, in Latine Duces, being Generalls in War:
Counts, Comites, such as bare the Generall company out of friendship;
and were left to govern and defend places conquered, and pacified:
Marquises, Marchiones, were Counts that governed the Marches, or bounds
of the Empire. Which titles of Duke, Count, and Marquis, came into the
Empire, about the time of Constantine the Great, from the customes of
the German Militia. But Baron, seems to have been a Title of the Gaules,
and signifies a Great man; such as were the Kings, or Princes men, whom
they employed in war about their persons; and seems to be derived from
Vir, to Ber, and Bar, that signified the same in the Language of the
Gaules, that Vir in Latine; and thence to Bero, and Baro: so that such
men were called Berones, and after Barones; and (in Spanish) Varones.
But he that would know more particularly the originall of Titles of
Honour, may find it, as I have done this, in Mr. Seldens most excellent
Treatise of that subject. In processe of time these offices of Honour,
by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of good and peacable government,
were turned into meer Titles; serving for the most part, to distinguish
the precedence, place, and order of subjects in the Common-wealth: and
men were made Dukes, Counts, Marquises, and Barons of Places, wherein
they had neither possession, nor command: and other Titles also, were
devised to the same end.




Worthinesse Fitnesse

WORTHINESSE, is a thing different from the worth, or value of a man; and
also from his merit, or desert; and consisteth in a particular power,
or ability for that, whereof he is said to be worthy: which particular
ability, is usually named FITNESSE, or Aptitude.

For he is Worthiest to be a Commander, to be a Judge, or to have any
other charge, that is best fitted, with the qualities required to the
well discharging of it; and Worthiest of Riches, that has the qualities
most requisite for the well using of them: any of which qualities being
absent, one may neverthelesse be a Worthy man, and valuable for
some thing else. Again, a man may be Worthy of Riches, Office, and
Employment, that neverthelesse, can plead no right to have it before
another; and therefore cannot be said to merit or deserve it. For Merit,
praesupposeth a right, and that the thing deserved is due by promise: Of
which I shall say more hereafter, when I shall speak of Contracts.




CHAPTER XI. OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS




What Is Here Meant By Manners

By MANNERS, I mean not here, Decency of behaviour; as how one man should
salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth
before company, and such other points of the Small Morals; But those
qualities of man-kind, that concern their living together in Peace, and
Unity. To which end we are to consider, that the Felicity of this life,
consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such
Finis Ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest good,) as is
spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers. Nor can a man
any more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and
Imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continuall progresse of the
desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being
still but the way to the later. The cause whereof is, That the object
of mans desire, is not to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time;
but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the
voluntary actions, and inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the
procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life; and differ
onely in the way: which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions,
in divers men; and partly from the difference of the knowledge, or
opinion each one has of the causes, which produce the effect desired.




A Restlesse Desire Of Power, In All Men

So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all
mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that
ceaseth onely in Death. And the cause of this, is not alwayes that a man
hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or
that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot
assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without
the acquisition of more. And from hence it is, that Kings, whose power
is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it a home by Lawes,
or abroad by Wars: and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire;
in some, of Fame from new Conquest; in others, of ease and sensuall
pleasure; in others, of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in
some art, or other ability of the mind.




Love Of Contention From Competition

Competition of Riches, Honour, command, or other power, enclineth to
Contention, Enmity, and War: because the way of one Competitor, to the
attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repell the
other. Particularly, competition of praise, enclineth to a reverence of
Antiquity. For men contend with the living, not with the dead; to these
ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other.




Civil Obedience From Love Of Ease

Desire of Ease, and sensuall Delight, disposeth men to obey a common
Power: because by such Desires, a man doth abandon the protection might
be hoped for from his own Industry, and labour.




From Feare Of Death Or Wounds

Fear of Death, and Wounds, disposeth to the same; and for the same
reason. On the contrary, needy men, and hardy, not contented with their
present condition; as also, all men that are ambitious of Military
command, are enclined to continue the causes of warre; and to stirre up
trouble and sedition: for there is no honour Military but by warre; nor
any such hope to mend an ill game, as by causing a new shuffle.




And From Love Of Arts

Desire of Knowledge, and Arts of Peace, enclineth men to obey a common
Power: For such Desire, containeth a desire of leasure; and consequently
protection from some other Power than their own.




Love Of Vertue, From Love Of Praise

Desire of Praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as please them
whose judgement they value; for of these men whom we contemn, we contemn
also the Praises. Desire of Fame after death does the same. And though
after death, there be no sense of the praise given us on Earth, as being
joyes, that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable joyes of Heaven,
or extinguished in the extreme torments of Hell: yet is not such Fame
vain; because men have a present delight therein, from the foresight
of it, and of the benefit that may rebound thereby to their posterity:
which though they now see not, yet they imagine; and any thing that is
pleasure in the sense, the same also is pleasure in the imagination.




Hate, From Difficulty Of Requiting Great Benefits

To have received from one, to whom we think our selves equall, greater
benefits than there is hope to Requite, disposeth to counterfiet love;
but really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate
debtor, that in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitely wishes
him there, where he might never see him more. For benefits oblige; and
obligation is thraldome; which is to ones equall, hateful. But to have
received benefits from one, whom we acknowledge our superiour, enclines
to love; because the obligation is no new depession: and cheerfull
acceptation, (which men call Gratitude,) is such an honour done to
the obliger, as is taken generally for retribution. Also to receive
benefits, though from an equall, or inferiour, as long as there is hope
of requitall, disposeth to love: for in the intention of the receiver,
the obligation is of ayd, and service mutuall; from whence proceedeth
an Emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting; the most noble and
profitable contention possible; wherein the victor is pleased with his
victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.




And From Conscience Of Deserving To Be Hated

To have done more hurt to a man, than he can, or is willing to expiate,
enclineth the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must expect revenge, or
forgivenesse; both which are hatefull.




Promptnesse To Hurt, From Fear

Feare of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipate, or to seek ayd by
society: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life
and liberty.




And From Distrust Of Their Own Wit

Men that distrust their own subtilty, are in tumult, and sedition,
better disposed for victory, than they that suppose themselves wise,
or crafty. For these love to consult, the other (fearing to be
circumvented,) to strike first. And in sedition, men being alwayes in
the procincts of Battell, to hold together, and use all advantages of
force, is a better stratagem, than any that can proceed from subtilty of
Wit.




Vain Undertaking From Vain-glory

Vain-glorious men, such as without being conscious to themselves of
great sufficiency, delight in supposing themselves gallant men, are
enclined onely to ostentation; but not to attempt: Because when
danger or difficulty appears, they look for nothing but to have their
insufficiency discovered.

Vain-glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by the flattery
of other men, or the fortune of some precedent action, without assured
ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves, are enclined to
rash engaging; and in the approach of danger, or difficulty, to retire
if they can: because not seeing the way of safety, they will rather
hazard their honour, which may be salved with an excuse; than their
lives, for which no salve is sufficient.




Ambition, From Opinion Of Sufficiency

Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdome in matter of
government, are disposed to Ambition. Because without publique
Employment in counsell or magistracy, the honour of their wisdome is
lost. And therefore Eloquent speakers are enclined to Ambition; for
Eloquence seemeth wisdome, both to themselves and others




Irresolution, From Too Great Valuing Of Small Matters

Pusillanimity disposeth men to Irresolution, and consequently to lose
the occasions, and fittest opportunities of action. For after men have
been in deliberation till the time of action approach, if it be not
then manifest what is best to be done, tis a signe, the difference of
Motives, the one way and the other, are not great: Therefore not to
resolve then, is to lose the occasion by weighing of trifles; which is
pusillanimity.

Frugality,(though in poor men a Vertue,) maketh a man unapt to atchieve
such actions, as require the strength of many men at once: For it
weakeneth their Endeavour, which is to be nourished and kept in vigor by
Reward.

Confidence In Others From Ignorance Of The Marks Of Wisdome and
Kindnesse Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them
that have it; because the former is seeming Wisdome, the later seeming
Kindnesse. Adde to them Military reputation, and it disposeth men to
adhaere, and subject themselves to those men that have them. The two
former, having given them caution against danger from him; the later
gives them caution against danger from others.




And From The Ignorance Of Naturall Causes

Want of Science, that is, Ignorance of causes, disposeth, or rather
constraineth a man to rely on the advise, and authority of others. For
all men whom the truth concernes, if they rely not on their own,
must rely on the opinion of some other, whom they think wiser than
themselves, and see not why he should deceive them.




And From Want Of Understanding

Ignorance of the signification of words; which is, want of
understanding, disposeth men to take on trust, not onely the truth they
know not; but also the errors; and which is more, the non-sense of them
they trust: For neither Error, nor non-sense, can without a perfect
understanding of words, be detected.

From the same it proceedeth, that men give different names, to one and
the same thing, from the difference of their own passions: As they that
approve a private opinion, call it Opinion; but they that mislike it,
Haeresie: and yet haeresie signifies no more than private opinion; but
has onely a greater tincture of choler.

From the same also it proceedeth, that men cannot distinguish, without
study and great understanding, between one action of many men, and many
actions of one multitude; as for example, between the one action of
all the Senators of Rome in killing Catiline, and the many actions of a
number of Senators in killing Caesar; and therefore are disposed to take
for the action of the people, that which is a multitude of actions done
by a multitude of men, led perhaps by the perswasion of one.

Adhaerence To Custome, From Ignorance Of The Nature Of Right And Wrong
Ignorance of the causes, and originall constitution of Right, Equity,
Law, and Justice, disposeth a man to make Custome and Example the rule
of his actions; in such manner, as to think that Unjust which it
hath been the custome to punish; and that Just, of the impunity and
approbation whereof they can produce an Example, or (as the Lawyers
which onely use the false measure of Justice barbarously call it) a
Precedent; like little children, that have no other rule of good and
evill manners, but the correction they receive from their Parents, and
Masters; save that children are constant to their rule, whereas men are
not so; because grown strong, and stubborn, they appeale from custome
to reason, and from reason to custome, as it serves their turn; receding
from custome when their interest requires it, and setting themselves
against reason, as oft as reason is against them: Which is the cause,
that the doctrine of Right and Wrong, is perpetually disputed, both by
the Pen and the Sword: whereas the doctrine of Lines, and Figures, is
not so; because men care not, in that subject what be truth, as a thing
that crosses no mans ambition, profit, or lust. For I doubt not, but if
it had been a thing contrary to any mans right of dominion, or to the
interest of men that have dominion, That The Three Angles Of A Triangle
Should Be Equall To Two Angles Of A Square; that doctrine should have
been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of Geometry,
suppressed, as farre as he whom it concerned was able.

Adhaerence To Private Men, From Ignorance Of The Causes Of Peace
Ignorance of remote causes, disposeth men to attribute all events, to
the causes immediate, and Instrumentall: For these are all the causes
they perceive. And hence it comes to passe, that in all places, men that
are grieved with payments to the Publique, discharge their anger upon
the Publicans, that is to say, Farmers, Collectors, and other Officers
of the publique Revenue; and adhaere to such as find fault with the
publike Government; and thereby, when they have engaged themselves
beyond hope of justification, fall also upon the Supreme Authority, for
feare of punishment, or shame of receiving pardon.




Credulity From Ignorance Of Nature

Ignorance of naturall causes disposeth a man to Credulity, so as
to believe many times impossibilities: for such know nothing to
the contrary, but that they may be true; being unable to detect the
Impossibility. And Credulity, because men love to be hearkened unto in
company, disposeth them to lying: so that Ignorance it selfe without
Malice, is able to make a man bothe to believe lyes, and tell them; and
sometimes also to invent them.




Curiosity To Know, From Care Of Future Time

Anxiety for the future time, disposeth men to enquire into the causes
of things: because the knowledge of them, maketh men the better able to
order the present to their best advantage.




Naturall Religion, From The Same

Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from
consideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of
that cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that
there is some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternall;
which is it men call God. So that it is impossible to make any profound
enquiry into naturall causes, without being enclined thereby to believe
there is one God Eternall; though they cannot have any Idea of him in
their mind, answerable to his nature. For as a man that is born blind,
hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought
to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himselfe,
there is somewhat there, which men call Fire, and is the cause of the
heat he feeles; but cannot imagine what it is like; nor have an Idea of
it in his mind, such as they have that see it: so also, by the visible
things of this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive
there is a cause of them, which men call God; and yet not have an Idea,
or Image of him in his mind.

And they that make little, or no enquiry into the naturall causes of
things, yet from the feare that proceeds from the ignorance it selfe,
of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm, are
enclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, severall kinds of Powers
Invisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations; and in time
of distresse to invoke them; as also in the time of an expected good
successe, to give them thanks; making the creatures of their own
fancy, their Gods. By which means it hath come to passe, that from the
innumerable variety of Fancy, men have created in the world innumerable
sorts of Gods. And this Feare of things invisible, is the naturall Seed
of that, which every one in himself calleth Religion; and in them that
worship, or feare that Power otherwise than they do, Superstition.

And this seed of Religion, having been observed by many; some of those
that have observed it, have been enclined thereby to nourish, dresse,
and forme it into Lawes; and to adde to it of their own invention,
any opinion of the causes of future events, by which they thought they
should best be able to govern others, and make unto themselves the
greatest use of their Powers.



CHAPTER XII. OF RELIGION




Religion, In Man Onely

Seeing there are no signes, nor fruit of Religion, but in Man onely;
there is no cause to doubt, but that the seed of Religion, is also onely
in Man; and consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in some
eminent degree thereof, not to be found in other Living creatures.




First, From His Desire Of Knowing Causes

And first, it is peculiar to the nature of Man, to be inquisitive into
the Causes of the Events they see, some more, some lesse; but all men so
much, as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and
evill fortune.




From The Consideration Of The Beginning Of Things

Secondly, upon the sight of any thing that hath a Beginning, to think
also it had a cause, which determined the same to begin, then when it
did, rather than sooner or later.




From His Observation Of The Sequell Of Things

Thirdly, whereas there is no other Felicity of Beasts, but the enjoying
of their quotidian Food, Ease, and Lusts; as having little, or no
foresight of the time to come, for want of observation, and memory
of the order, consequence, and dependance of the things they see; Man
observeth how one Event hath been produced by another; and remembreth in
them Antecedence and Consequence; And when he cannot assure himselfe of
the true causes of things, (for the causes of good and evill fortune for
the most part are invisible,) he supposes causes of them, either such
as his own fancy suggesteth; or trusteth to the Authority of other men,
such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himselfe.

The Naturall Cause Of Religion, The Anxiety Of The Time To Come The
two first, make Anxiety. For being assured that there be causes of all
things that have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter; it is
impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth to secure himselfe
against the evill he feares, and procure the good he desireth, not to
be in a perpetuall solicitude of the time to come; So that every man,
especially those that are over provident, are in an estate like to that
of Prometheus. For as Prometheus, (which interpreted, is, The Prudent
Man,) was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large prospect, where,
an Eagle feeding on his liver, devoured in the day, as much as was
repayred in the night: So that man, which looks too far before him, in
the care of future time, hath his heart all the day long, gnawed on by
feare of death, poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause
of his anxiety, but in sleep.




Which Makes Them Fear The Power Of Invisible Things

This perpetuall feare, alwayes accompanying mankind in the ignorance of
causes, as it were in the Dark, must needs have for object something.
And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to
accuse, either of their good, or evill fortune, but some Power, or Agent
Invisible: In which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old Poets
said, that the Gods were at first created by humane Feare: which spoken
of the Gods, (that is to say, of the many Gods of the Gentiles) is
very true. But the acknowledging of one God Eternall, Infinite, and
Omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to
know the causes of naturall bodies, and their severall vertues, and
operations; than from the feare of what was to befall them in time to
come. For he that from any effect hee seeth come to passe, should reason
to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause
of that cause, and plonge himselfe profoundly in the pursuit of causes;
shall at last come to this, that there must be (as even the Heathen
Philosophers confessed) one First Mover; that is, a First, and an
Eternall cause of all things; which is that which men mean by the name
of God: And all this without thought of their fortune; the solicitude
whereof, both enclines to fear, and hinders them from the search of the
causes of other things; and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as
many Gods, as there be men that feigne them.




And Suppose Them Incorporeall

And for the matter, or substance of the Invisible Agents, so fancyed;
they could not by naturall cogitation, fall upon any other conceipt, but
that it was the same with that of the Soule of man; and that the Soule
of man, was of the same substance, with that which appeareth in a Dream,
to one that sleepeth; or in a Looking-glasse, to one that is awake;
which, men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but
creatures of the Fancy, think to be reall, and externall Substances;
and therefore call them Ghosts; as the Latines called them Imagines,
and Umbrae; and thought them Spirits, that is, thin aereall bodies; and
those Invisible Agents, which they feared, to bee like them; save that
they appear, and vanish when they please. But the opinion that such
Spirits were Incorporeall, or Immateriall, could never enter into the
mind of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words of
contradictory signification, as Spirit, and Incorporeall; yet they
can never have the imagination of any thing answering to them:
And therefore, men that by their own meditation, arrive to the
acknowledgement of one Infinite, Omnipotent, and Eternall God,
choose rather to confesse he is Incomprehensible, and above their
understanding; than to define his Nature By Spirit Incorporeall, and
then Confesse their definition to be unintelligible: or if they give him
such a title, it is not Dogmatically, with intention to make the Divine
Nature understood; but Piously, to honour him with attributes, of
significations, as remote as they can from the grossenesse of Bodies
Visible.




But Know Not The Way How They Effect Anything

Then, for the way by which they think these Invisible Agents wrought
their effects; that is to say, what immediate causes they used, in
bringing things to passe, men that know not what it is that we call
Causing, (that is, almost all men) have no other rule to guesse by, but
by observing, and remembring what they have seen to precede the like
effect at some other time, or times before, without seeing between the
antecedent and subsequent Event, any dependance or connexion at all:
And therefore from the like things past, they expect the like things to
come; and hope for good or evill luck, superstitiously, from things that
have no part at all in the causing of it: As the Athenians did for their
war at Lepanto, demand another Phormio; the Pompeian faction for their
warre in Afrique, another Scipio; and others have done in divers other
occasions since. In like manner they attribute their fortune to a
stander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to words spoken, especially
if the name of God be amongst them; as Charming, and Conjuring (the
Leiturgy of Witches;) insomuch as to believe, they have power to turn a
stone into bread, bread into a man, or any thing, into any thing.




But Honour Them As They Honour Men

Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibite to Powers
invisible, it can be no other, but such expressions of their reverence,
as they would use towards men; Gifts, Petitions, Thanks, Submission
of Body, Considerate Addresses, sober Behaviour, premeditated Words,
Swearing (that is, assuring one another of their promises,) by invoking
them. Beyond that reason suggesteth nothing; but leaves them either to
rest there; or for further ceremonies, to rely on those they believe to
be wiser than themselves.




And Attribute To Them All Extraordinary Events

Lastly, concerning how these Invisible Powers declare to men the things
which shall hereafter come to passe, especially concerning their good
or evill fortune in generall, or good or ill successe in any particular
undertaking, men are naturally at a stand; save that using to conjecture
of the time to come, by the time past, they are very apt, not onely to
take casuall things, after one or two encounters, for Prognostiques
of the like encounter ever after, but also to believe the like
Prognostiques from other men, of whom they have once conceived a good
opinion.




Foure Things, Naturall Seeds Of Religion

And in these foure things, Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second
causes, Devotion towards what men fear, and Taking of things Casuall for
Prognostiques, consisteth the Naturall seed of Religion; which by reason
of the different Fancies, Judgements, and Passions of severall men, hath
grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one
man, are for the most part ridiculous to another.




Made Different By Culture

For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. One sort
have been they, that have nourished, and ordered them, according to
their own invention. The other, have done it, by Gods commandement, and
direction: but both sorts have done it, with a purpose to make those men
that relyed on them, the more apt to Obedience, Lawes, Peace, Charity,
and civill Society. So that the Religion of the former sort, is a part
of humane Politiques; and teacheth part of the duty which Earthly Kings
require of their Subjects. And the Religion of the later sort is
Divine Politiques; and containeth Precepts to those that have yeelded
themselves subjects in the Kingdome of God. Of the former sort, were all
the Founders of Common-wealths, and the Law-givers of the Gentiles: Of
the later sort, were Abraham, Moses, and our Blessed Saviour; by whom
have been derived unto us the Lawes of the Kingdome of God.




The Absurd Opinion Of Gentilisme

And for that part of Religion, which consisteth in opinions concerning
the nature of Powers Invisible, there is almost nothing that has a
name, that has not been esteemed amongst the Gentiles, in one place or
another, a God, or Divell; or by their Poets feigned to be inanimated,
inhabited, or possessed by some Spirit or other.

The unformed matter of the World, was a God, by the name of Chaos.

The Heaven, the Ocean, the Planets, the Fire, the Earth, the Winds, were
so many Gods.

Men, Women, a Bird, a Crocodile, a Calf, a Dogge, a Snake, an Onion,
a Leeke, Deified. Besides, that they filled almost all places, with
spirits called Daemons; the plains, with Pan, and Panises, or Satyres;
the Woods, with Fawnes, and Nymphs; the Sea, with Tritons, and other
Nymphs; every River, and Fountayn, with a Ghost of his name, and with
Nymphs; every house, with it Lares, or Familiars; every man, with his
Genius; Hell, with Ghosts, and spirituall Officers, as Charon, Cerberus,
and the Furies; and in the night time, all places with Larvae, Lemures,
Ghosts of men deceased, and a whole kingdome of Fayries, and Bugbears.
They have also ascribed Divinity, and built Temples to meer Accidents,
and Qualities; such as are Time, Night, Day, Peace, Concord, Love,
Contention, Vertue, Honour, Health, Rust, Fever, and the like; which
when they prayed for, or against, they prayed to, as if there were
Ghosts of those names hanging over their heads, and letting fall, or
withholding that Good, or Evill, for, or against which they prayed. They
invoked also their own Wit, by the name of Muses; their own Ignorance,
by the name of Fortune; their own Lust, by the name of Cupid; their
own Rage, by the name Furies; their own privy members by the name of
Priapus; and attributed their pollutions, to Incubi, and Succubae:
insomuch as there was nothing, which a Poet could introduce as a person
in his Poem, which they did not make either a God, or a Divel.

The same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, observing the second
ground for Religion, which is mens Ignorance of causes; and thereby
their aptnesse to attribute their fortune to causes, on which there
was no dependence at all apparent, took occasion to obtrude on their
ignorance, in stead of second causes, a kind of second and ministeriall
Gods; ascribing the cause of Foecundity, to Venus; the cause of Arts, to
Apollo; of Subtilty and Craft, to Mercury; of Tempests and stormes,
to Aeolus; and of other effects, to other Gods: insomuch as there was
amongst the Heathen almost as great variety of Gods, as of businesse.

And to the Worship, which naturally men conceived fit to bee used
towards their Gods, namely Oblations, Prayers, Thanks, and the rest
formerly named; the same Legislators of the Gentiles have added their
Images, both in Picture, and Sculpture; that the more ignorant sort,
(that is to say, the most part, or generality of the people,) thinking
the Gods for whose representation they were made, were really included,
and as it were housed within them, might so much the more stand in feare
of them: And endowed them with lands, and houses, and officers, and
revenues, set apart from all other humane uses; that is, consecrated,
and made holy to those their Idols; as Caverns, Groves, Woods,
Mountains, and whole Ilands; and have attributed to them, not onely
the shapes, some of Men, some of Beasts, some of Monsters; but also the
Faculties, and Passions of men and beasts; as Sense, Speech, Sex, Lust,
Generation, (and this not onely by mixing one with another, to propagate
the kind of Gods; but also by mixing with men, and women, to beget
mongrill Gods, and but inmates of Heaven, as Bacchus, Hercules,
and others;) besides, Anger, Revenge, and other passions of living
creatures, and the actions proceeding from them, as Fraud, Theft,
Adultery, Sodomie, and any vice that may be taken for an effect of
Power, or a cause of Pleasure; and all such Vices, as amongst men are
taken to be against Law, rather than against Honour.

Lastly, to the Prognostiques of time to come; which are naturally, but
Conjectures upon the Experience of time past; and supernaturall, divine
Revelation; the same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, partly
upon pretended Experience, partly upon pretended Revelation, have
added innumerable other superstitious wayes of Divination; and made men
believe they should find their fortunes, sometimes in the ambiguous
or senslesse answers of the priests at Delphi, Delos, Ammon, and other
famous Oracles; which answers, were made ambiguous by designe, to own
the event both wayes; or absurd by the intoxicating vapour of the place,
which is very frequent in sulphurous Cavernes: Sometimes in the leaves
of the Sibills; of whose Prophecyes (like those perhaps of Nostradamus;
for the fragments now extant seem to be the invention of later times)
there were some books in reputation in the time of the Roman Republique:
Sometimes in the insignificant Speeches of Mad-men, supposed to
be possessed with a divine Spirit; which Possession they called
Enthusiasme; and these kinds of foretelling events, were accounted
Theomancy, or Prophecy; Sometimes in the aspect of the Starres at their
Nativity; which was called Horoscopy, and esteemed a part of judiciary
Astrology: Sometimes in their own hopes and feares, called Thumomancy,
or Presage: Sometimes in the Prediction of Witches, that pretended
conference with the dead; which is called Necromancy, Conjuring, and
Witchcraft; and is but juggling and confederate knavery: Sometimes in
the Casuall flight, or feeding of birds; called Augury: Sometimes in
the Entrayles of a sacrificed beast; which was Aruspicina: Sometimes
in Dreams: Sometimes in Croaking of Ravens, or chattering of Birds:
Sometimes in the Lineaments of the face; which was called Metoposcopy;
or by Palmistry in the lines of the hand; in casuall words, called
Omina: Sometimes in Monsters, or unusuall accidents; as Ecclipses,
Comets, rare Meteors, Earthquakes, Inundations, uncouth Births, and the
like, which they called Portenta and Ostenta, because they thought them
to portend, or foreshew some great Calamity to come; Sometimes, in meer
Lottery, as Crosse and Pile; counting holes in a sive; dipping of Verses
in Homer, and Virgil; and innumerable other such vaine conceipts. So
easie are men to be drawn to believe any thing, from such men as have
gotten credit with them; and can with gentlenesse, and dexterity, take
hold of their fear, and ignorance.

The Designes Of The Authors Of The Religion Of The Heathen And therefore
the first Founders, and Legislators of Common-wealths amongst the
Gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience, and
peace, have in all places taken care; First, to imprint in their minds a
beliefe, that those precepts which they gave concerning Religion, might
not be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates
of some God, or other Spirit; or else that they themselves were of a
higher nature than mere mortalls, that their Lawes might the more easily
be received: So Numa Pompilius pretended to receive the Ceremonies he
instituted amongst the Romans, from the Nymph Egeria: and the first King
and founder of the Kingdome of Peru, pretended himselfe and his wife to
be the children of the Sunne: and Mahomet, to set up his new Religion,
pretended to have conferences with the Holy Ghost, in forme of a Dove.
Secondly, they have had a care, to make it believed, that the same
things were displeasing to the Gods, which were forbidden by the
Lawes. Thirdly, to prescribe Ceremonies, Supplications, Sacrifices, and
Festivalls, by which they were to believe, the anger of the Gods might
be appeased; and that ill success in War, great contagions of Sicknesse,
Earthquakes, and each mans private Misery, came from the Anger of
the Gods; and their Anger from the Neglect of their Worship, or the
forgetting, or mistaking some point of the Ceremonies required. And
though amongst the antient Romans, men were not forbidden to deny, that
which in the Poets is written of the paines, and pleasures after this
life; which divers of great authority, and gravity in that state have
in their Harangues openly derided; yet that beliefe was alwaies more
cherished, than the contrary.

And by these, and such other Institutions, they obtayned in order to
their end, (which was the peace of the Commonwealth,) that the common
people in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect, or errour in
their Ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the lawes, were the
lesse apt to mutiny against their Governors. And being entertained with
the pomp, and pastime of Festivalls, and publike Gomes, made in
honour of the Gods, needed nothing else but bread, to keep them from
discontent, murmuring, and commotion against the State. And therefore
the Romans, that had conquered the greatest part of the then known
World, made no scruple of tollerating any Religion whatsoever in the
City of Rome it selfe; unlesse it had somthing in it, that could not
consist with their Civill Government; nor do we read, that any Religion
was there forbidden, but that of the Jewes; who (being the peculiar
Kingdome of God) thought it unlawfull to acknowledge subjection to any
mortall King or State whatsoever. And thus you see how the Religion of
the Gentiles was a part of their Policy.

The True Religion, And The Lawes Of Gods Kingdome The Same But where God
himselfe, by supernaturall Revelation, planted Religion; there he
also made to himselfe a peculiar Kingdome; and gave Lawes, not only of
behaviour towards himselfe; but also towards one another; and thereby
in the Kingdome of God, the Policy, and lawes Civill, are a part of
Religion; and therefore the distinction of Temporall, and Spirituall
Domination, hath there no place. It is true, that God is King of all the
Earth: Yet may he be King of a peculiar, and chosen Nation. For there is
no more incongruity therein, than that he that hath the generall command
of the whole Army, should have withall a peculiar Regiment, or Company
of his own. God is King of all the Earth by his Power: but of his
chosen people, he is King by Covenant. But to speake more largly of the
Kingdome of God, both by Nature, and Covenant, I have in the following
discourse assigned an other place.




The Causes Of Change In Religion

From the propagation of Religion, it is not hard to understand
the causes of the resolution of the same into its first seeds, or
principles; which are only an opinion of a Deity, and Powers invisible,
and supernaturall; that can never be so abolished out of humane nature,
but that new Religions may againe be made to spring out of them, by the
culture of such men, as for such purpose are in reputation.

For seeing all formed Religion, is founded at first, upon the faith
which a multitude hath in some one person, whom they believe not only to
be a wise man, and to labour to procure their happiness, but also to
be a holy man, to whom God himselfe vouchsafeth to declare his will
supernaturally; It followeth necessarily, when they that have the
Goverment of Religion, shall come to have either the wisedome of those
men, their sincerity, or their love suspected; or that they shall
be unable to shew any probable token of divine Revelation; that the
Religion which they desire to uphold, must be suspected likewise; and
(without the feare of the Civill Sword) contradicted and rejected.




Injoyning Beleefe Of Impossibilities

That which taketh away the reputation of Wisedome, in him that formeth
a Religion, or addeth to it when it is allready formed, is the enjoyning
of a beliefe of contradictories: For both parts of a contradiction
cannot possibly be true: and therefore to enjoyne the beliefe of them,
is an argument of ignorance; which detects the Author in that; and
discredits him in all things else he shall propound as from revelation
supernaturall: which revelation a man may indeed have of many things
above, but of nothing against naturall reason.




Doing Contrary To The Religion They Establish

That which taketh away the reputation of Sincerity, is the doing, or
saying of such things, as appeare to be signes, that what they require
other men to believe, is not believed by themselves; all which doings,
or sayings are therefore called Scandalous, because they be stumbling
blocks, that make men to fall in the way of Religion: as Injustice,
Cruelty, Prophanesse, Avarice, and Luxury. For who can believe, that he
that doth ordinarily such actions, as proceed from any of these
rootes, believeth there is any such Invisible Power to be feared, as he
affrighteth other men withall, for lesser faults?

That which taketh away the reputation of Love, is the being detected of
private ends: as when the beliefe they require of others, conduceth or
seemeth to conduce to the acquiring of Dominion, Riches, Dignity, or
secure Pleasure, to themselves onely, or specially. For that which men
reap benefit by to themselves, they are thought to do for their own
sakes, and not for love of others




Want Of The Testimony Of Miracles

Lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine Calling, can be no
other, than the operation of Miracles; or true Prophecy, (which also is
a Miracle;) or extraordinary Felicity. And therefore, to those points
of Religion, which have been received from them that did such Miracles;
those that are added by such, as approve not their Calling by some
Miracle, obtain no greater beliefe, than what the Custome, and Lawes of
the places, in which they be educated, have wrought into them. For as
in naturall things, men of judgement require naturall signes,
and arguments; so in supernaturall things, they require signes
supernaturall, (which are Miracles,) before they consent inwardly, and
from their hearts.

All which causes of the weakening of mens faith, do manifestly appear
in the Examples following. First, we have the Example of the children
of Israel; who when Moses, that had approved his Calling to them by
Miracles, and by the happy conduct of them out of Egypt, was absent but
40 dayes, revolted from the worship of the true God, recommended to
them by him; and setting up (Exod. 32 1,2) a Golden Calfe for their God,
relapsed into the Idolatry of the Egyptians; from whom they had been
so lately delivered. And again, after Moses, Aaron, Joshua, and that
generation which had seen the great works of God in Israel, (Judges
2 11) were dead; another generation arose, and served Baal. So that
Miracles fayling, Faith also failed.

Again, when the sons of Samuel, (1 Sam. 8. 3) being constituted by their
father Judges in Bersabee, received bribes, and judged unjustly, the
people of Israel refused any more to have God to be their King, in other
manner than he was King of other people; and therefore cryed out to
Samuel, to choose them a King after the manner of the Nations. So that
Justice Fayling, Faith also fayled: Insomuch, as they deposed their God,
from reigning over them.
And whereas in the planting of Christian Religion, the Oracles ceased
in all parts of the Roman Empire, and the number of Christians encreased
wonderfully every day, and in every place, by the preaching of the
Apostles, and Evangelists; a great part of that successe, may reasonably
be attributed, to the contempt, into which the Priests of the Gentiles
of that time, had brought themselves, by their uncleannesse, avarice,
and jugling between Princes. Also the Religion of the Church of Rome,
was partly, for the same cause abolished in England, and many other
parts of Christendome; insomuch, as the fayling of Vertue in the
Pastors, maketh Faith faile in the People: and partly from bringing
of the Philosophy, and doctrine of Aristotle into Religion, by the
Schoole-men; from whence there arose so many contradictions, and
absurdities, as brought the Clergy into a reputation both of Ignorance,
and of Fraudulent intention; and enclined people to revolt from them,
either against the will of their own Princes, as in France, and Holland;
or with their will, as in England.

Lastly, amongst the points by the Church of Rome declared necessary for
Salvation, there be so many, manifestly to the advantage of the Pope,
and of his spirituall subjects, residing in the territories of other
Christian Princes, that were it not for the mutuall emulation of those
Princes, they might without warre, or trouble, exclude all forraign
Authority, as easily as it has been excluded in England. For who is
there that does not see, to whose benefit it conduceth, to have it
believed, that a King hath not his Authority from Christ, unlesse a
Bishop crown him? That a King, if he be a Priest, cannot Marry? That
whether a Prince be born in lawfull Marriage, or not, must be judged by
Authority from Rome? That Subjects may be freed from their Alleageance,
if by the Court of Rome, the King be judged an Heretique? That a King
(as Chilperique of France) may be deposed by a Pope (as Pope Zachary,)
for no cause; and his Kingdome given to one of his Subjects? That the
Clergy, and Regulars, in what Country soever, shall be exempt from the
Jurisdiction of their King, in cases criminall? Or who does not see, to
whose profit redound the Fees of private Masses, and Vales of Purgatory;
with other signes of private interest, enough to mortifie the most
lively Faith, if (as I sayd) the civill Magistrate, and Custome did not
more sustain it, than any opinion they have of the Sanctity, Wisdome,
or Probity of their Teachers? So that I may attribute all the changes
of Religion in the world, to one and the some cause; and that is,
unpleasing Priests; and those not onely amongst Catholiques, but even in
that Church that hath presumed most of Reformation.



CHAPTER XIII. OF THE NATURALL CONDITION OF MANKIND,

AS CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY, AND MISERY


Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as
that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger
in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned
together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable,
as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which
another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body,
the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret
machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger
with himselfe.

And as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded
upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon generall, and
infallible rules, called Science; which very few have, and but in few
things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained,
(as Prudence,) while we look after somewhat els,) I find yet a greater
equality amongst men, than that of strength. For Prudence, is but
Experience; which equall time, equally bestowes on all men, in those
things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make
such equality incredible, is but a vain conceipt of ones owne wisdome,
which almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the
Vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by
Fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the
nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be
more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; Yet they will hardly
believe there be many so wise as themselves: For they see their own wit
at hand, and other mens at a distance. But this proveth rather that men
are in that point equall, than unequall. For there is not ordinarily a
greater signe of the equall distribution of any thing, than that every
man is contented with his share.




From Equality Proceeds Diffidence

From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining
of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which
neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the
way to their End, (which is principally their owne conservation, and
sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one
an other. And from hence it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath
no more to feare, than an other mans single power; if one plant, sow,
build, or possesse a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to
come prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not
only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And
the Invader again is in the like danger of another.




From Diffidence Warre

And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to
secure himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force, or
wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no
other power great enough to endanger him: And this is no more than his
own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there
be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in
the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security
requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within
modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would
not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist.
And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men, being
necessary to a mans conservation, it ought to be allowed him.

Againe, men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of
griefe) in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe
them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at
the same rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt,
or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst
them that have no common power, to keep them in quiet, is far enough
to make them destroy each other,) to extort a greater value from his
contemners, by dommage; and from others, by the example.

So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of
quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.

The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and
the third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves
Masters of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell; the second,
to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different
opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct in their
Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation,
their Profession, or their Name.




Out Of Civil States,

There Is Alwayes Warre Of Every One Against Every One Hereby it is
manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep
them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre;
and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. For WARRE,
consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract
of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known:
and therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of
Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule
weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination
thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in
actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the
time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.




The Incommodites Of Such A War

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man
is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men
live without other security, than what their own strength, and their
own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is
no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and
consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the
commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no
Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force;
no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no
Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and
danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty,
brutish, and short.

It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things;
that Nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade,
and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this
Inference, made from the Passions, desire perhaps to have the same
confirmed by Experience. Let him therefore consider with himselfe, when
taking a journey, he armes himselfe, and seeks to go well accompanied;
when going to sleep, he locks his dores; when even in his house he
locks his chests; and this when he knows there bee Lawes, and publike
Officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall bee done him; what
opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his
fellow Citizens, when he locks his dores; and of his children, and
servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse
mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse
mans nature in it. The Desires, and other Passions of man, are in
themselves no Sin. No more are the Actions, that proceed from those
Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them; which till Lawes be
made they cannot know: nor can any Law be made, till they have agreed
upon the Person that shall make it.

It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor
condition of warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so,
over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now.
For the savage people in many places of America, except the government
of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust, have
no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as
I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there
would be, where there were no common Power to feare; by the manner of
life, which men that have formerly lived under a peacefull government,
use to degenerate into, in a civill Warre.

But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in
a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and
persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are
in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators;
having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another;
that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their
Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a
posture of War. But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their
Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies
the Liberty of particular men.




In Such A Warre, Nothing Is Unjust

To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent;
that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and
Injustice have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is
no Law: where no Law, no Injustice. Force, and Fraud, are in warre the
two Cardinall vertues. Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties
neither of the Body, nor Mind. If they were, they might be in a man that
were alone in the world, as well as his Senses, and Passions. They
are Qualities, that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude. It is
consequent also to the same condition, that there be no Propriety, no
Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but onely that to be every mans
that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much
for the ill condition, which man by meer Nature is actually placed in;
though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the
Passions, partly in his Reason.




The Passions That Incline Men To Peace

The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of
such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their
Industry to obtain them. And Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of
Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These Articles, are
they, which otherwise are called the Lawes of Nature: whereof I shall
speak more particularly, in the two following Chapters.



CHAPTER XIV. OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURALL LAWES, AND OF CONTRACTS




Right Of Nature What

The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the
Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for
the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life;
and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and
Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.




Liberty What

By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the
word, the absence of externall Impediments: which Impediments, may oft
take away part of a mans power to do what hee would; but cannot hinder
him from using the power left him, according as his judgement, and
reason shall dictate to him.




A Law Of Nature What

A LAW OF NATURE, (Lex Naturalis,) is a Precept, or generall Rule,
found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which
is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the
same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.
For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound Jus, and
Lex, Right and Law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT,
consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbeare; Whereas LAW, determineth,
and bindeth to one of them: so that Law, and Right, differ as much,
as Obligation, and Liberty; which in one and the same matter are
inconsistent.




Naturally Every Man Has Right To Everything

And because the condition of Man, (as hath been declared in the
precedent Chapter) is a condition of Warre of every one against every
one; in which case every one is governed by his own Reason; and there
is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in
preserving his life against his enemyes; It followeth, that in such a
condition, every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers
body. And therefore, as long as this naturall Right of every man to
every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong
or wise soever he be,) of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily
alloweth men to live.




The Fundamental Law Of Nature

And consequently it is a precept, or generall rule of Reason, "That
every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of
obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use,
all helps, and advantages of Warre. " The first branch, of which Rule,
containeth the first, and Fundamentall Law of Nature; which is, "To seek
Peace, and follow it. " The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature;
which is, "By all means we can, to defend our selves. "




The Second Law Of Nature

From this Fundamentall Law of Nature, by which men are commanded to
endeavour Peace, is derived this second Law; "That a man be willing,
when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of
himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all
things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as
he would allow other men against himselfe. " For as long as every man
holdeth this Right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long are all men in
the condition of Warre. But if other men will not lay down their Right,
as well as he; then there is no Reason for any one, to devest himselfe
of his: For that were to expose himselfe to Prey, (which no man is bound
to) rather than to dispose himselfe to Peace. This is that Law of the
Gospell; "Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do
ye to them. " And that Law of all men, "Quod tibi feiri non vis, alteri
ne feceris. "




What it is to lay down a Right

To Lay Downe a mans Right to any thing, is to Devest himselfe of the
Liberty, of hindring another of the benefit of his own Right to the
same. For he that renounceth, or passeth away his Right, giveth not to
any other man a Right which he had not before; because there is nothing
to which every man had not Right by Nature: but onely standeth out of
his way, that he may enjoy his own originall Right, without hindrance
from him; not without hindrance from another. So that the effect which
redoundeth to one man, by another mans defect of Right, is but so much
diminution of impediments to the use of his own Right originall.




Renouncing (or) Transferring Right What; Obligation Duty Justice

Right is layd aside, either by simply Renouncing it; or by Transferring
it to another. By Simply RENOUNCING; when he cares not to whom the
benefit thereof redoundeth. By TRANSFERRING; when he intendeth the
benefit thereof to some certain person, or persons. And when a man hath
in either manner abandoned, or granted away his Right; then is he said
to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such Right is
granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he Ought, and it
his DUTY, not to make voyd that voluntary act of his own: and that such
hindrance is INJUSTICE, and INJURY, as being Sine Jure; the Right being
before renounced, or transferred. So that Injury, or Injustice, in
the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that, which in the
disputations of Scholers is called Absurdity. For as it is there called
an Absurdity, to contradict what one maintained in the Beginning: so in
the world, it is called Injustice, and Injury, voluntarily to undo that,
which from the beginning he had voluntarily done. The way by which a man
either simply Renounceth, or Transferreth his Right, is a Declaration,
or Signification, by some voluntary and sufficient signe, or signes,
that he doth so Renounce, or Transferre; or hath so Renounced, or
Transferred the same, to him that accepteth it. And these Signes are
either Words onely, or Actions onely; or (as it happeneth most often)
both Words and Actions. And the same are the BONDS, by which men are
bound, and obliged: Bonds, that have their strength, not from their own
Nature, (for nothing is more easily broken then a mans word,) but from
Feare of some evill consequence upon the rupture.




Not All Rights Are Alienable

Whensoever a man Transferreth his Right, or Renounceth it; it is either
in consideration of some Right reciprocally transferred to himselfe; or
for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act:
and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some Good To
Himselfe. And therefore there be some Rights, which no man can be
understood by any words, or other signes, to have abandoned, or
transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them,
that assault him by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be
understood to ayme thereby, at any Good to himselfe. The same may be
sayd of Wounds, and Chayns, and Imprisonment; both because there is
no benefit consequent to such patience; as there is to the patience of
suffering another to be wounded, or imprisoned: as also because a man
cannot tell, when he seeth men proceed against him by violence, whether
they intend his death or not. And lastly the motive, and end for which
this renouncing, and transferring or Right is introduced, is nothing
else but the security of a mans person, in his life, and in the means of
so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a man by
words, or other signes, seem to despoyle himselfe of the End, for which
those signes were intended; he is not to be understood as if he meant
it, or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such words
and actions were to be interpreted.




Contract What

The mutuall transferring of Right, is that which men call CONTRACT.

There is difference, between transferring of Right to the Thing; and
transferring, or tradition, that is, delivery of the Thing it selfe. For
the Thing may be delivered together with the Translation of the Right;
as in buying and selling with ready mony; or exchange of goods, or
lands: and it may be delivered some time after.




Covenant What

Again, one of the Contractors, may deliver the Thing contracted for on
his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate
time after, and in the mean time be trusted; and then the Contract on
his part, is called PACT, or COVENANT: Or both parts may contract now,
to performe hereafter: in which cases, he that is to performe in time
to come, being trusted, his performance is called Keeping Of Promise, or
Faith; and the fayling of performance (if it be voluntary) Violation Of
Faith.




Free-gift

When the transferring of Right, is not mutuall; but one of the parties
transferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from
another, or from his friends; or in hope to gain the reputation of
Charity, or Magnanimity; or to deliver his mind from the pain of
compassion; or in hope of reward in heaven; This is not Contract, but
GIFT, FREEGIFT, GRACE: which words signifie one and the same thing.




Signes Of Contract Expresse

Signes of Contract, are either Expresse, or By Inference. Expresse, are
words spoken with understanding of what they signifie; And such words
are either of the time Present, or Past; as, I Give, I Grant, I Have
Given, I Have Granted, I Will That This Be Yours: Or of the future;
as, I Will Give, I Will Grant; which words of the future, are called
Promise.




Signes Of Contract By Inference

Signes by Inference, are sometimes the consequence of Words; sometimes
the consequence of Silence; sometimes the consequence of Actions;
sometimes the consequence of Forbearing an Action: and generally a signe
by Inference, of any Contract, is whatsoever sufficiently argues the
will of the Contractor.




Free Gift Passeth By Words Of The Present Or Past

Words alone, if they be of the time to come, and contain a bare promise,
are an insufficient signe of a Free-gift and therefore not obligatory.
For if they be of the time to Come, as, To Morrow I Will Give, they
are a signe I have not given yet, and consequently that my right is not
transferred, but remaineth till I transferre it by some other Act. But
if the words be of the time Present, or Past, as, "I have given, or do
give to be delivered to morrow," then is my to morrows Right given away
to day; and that by the vertue of the words, though there were no
other argument of my will. And there is a great difference in the
signification of these words, Volos Hoc Tuum Esse Cras, and Cros Dabo;
that is between "I will that this be thine to morrow," and, "I will
give it to thee to morrow:" For the word I Will, in the former manner
of speech, signifies an act of the will Present; but in the later, it
signifies a promise of an act of the will to Come: and therefore the
former words, being of the Present, transferre a future right; the
later, that be of the Future, transferre nothing. But if there be other
signes of the Will to transferre a Right, besides Words; then, though
the gift be Free, yet may the Right be understood to passe by words of
the future: as if a man propound a Prize to him that comes first to the
end of a race, The gift is Free; and though the words be of the
Future, yet the Right passeth: for if he would not have his words so be
understood, he should not have let them runne.

Signes Of Contract Are Words Both Of The Past, Present, and Future In
Contracts, the right passeth, not onely where the words are of the time
Present, or Past; but also where they are of the Future; because all
Contract is mutuall translation, or change of Right; and therefore he
that promiseth onely, because he hath already received the benefit for
which he promiseth, is to be understood as if he intended the Right
should passe: for unlesse he had been content to have his words so
understood, the other would not have performed his part first. And
for that cause, in buying, and selling, and other acts of Contract, A
Promise is equivalent to a Covenant; and therefore obligatory.




Merit What

He that performeth first in the case of a Contract, is said to MERIT
that which he is to receive by the performance of the other; and he hath
it as Due. Also when a Prize is propounded to many, which is to be given
to him onely that winneth; or mony is thrown amongst many, to be enjoyed
by them that catch it; though this be a Free Gift; yet so to Win, or
so to Catch, is to Merit, and to have it as DUE. For the Right is
transferred in the Propounding of the Prize, and in throwing down the
mony; though it be not determined to whom, but by the Event of the
contention. But there is between these two sorts of Merit, this
difference, that In Contract, I Merit by vertue of my own power, and the
Contractors need; but in this case of Free Gift, I am enabled to
Merit onely by the benignity of the Giver; In Contract, I merit at The
Contractors hand that hee should depart with his right; In this case of
gift, I Merit not that the giver should part with his right; but that
when he has parted with it, it should be mine, rather than anothers.
And this I think to be the meaning of that distinction of the Schooles,
between Meritum Congrui, and Meritum Condigni. For God Almighty, having
promised Paradise to those men (hoodwinkt with carnall desires,) that
can walk through this world according to the Precepts, and Limits
prescribed by him; they say, he that shall so walk, shall Merit Paradise
Ex Congruo. But because no man can demand a right to it, by his own
Righteousnesse, or any other power in himselfe, but by the Free Grace of
God onely; they say, no man can Merit Paradise Ex Condigno. This I say,
I think is the meaning of that distinction; but because Disputers do not
agree upon the signification of their own termes of Art, longer than it
serves their turn; I will not affirme any thing of their meaning:
onely this I say; when a gift is given indefinitely, as a prize to be
contended for, he that winneth Meriteth, and may claime the Prize as
Due.




Covenants Of Mutuall Trust, When Invalid

If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties performe
presently, but trust one another; in the condition of meer Nature,
(which is a condition of Warre of every man against every man,) upon
any reasonable suspition, it is Voyd; But if there be a common Power set
over them bothe, with right and force sufficient to compell performance;
it is not Voyd. For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other
will performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle
mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the feare of
some coerceive Power; which in the condition of meer Nature, where all
men are equall, and judges of the justnesse of their own fears cannot
possibly be supposed. And therefore he which performeth first, does
but betray himselfe to his enemy; contrary to the Right (he can never
abandon) of defending his life, and means of living.

But in a civill estate, where there is a Power set up to constrain
those that would otherwise violate their faith, that feare is no more
reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the Covenant is to perform
first, is obliged so to do.

The cause of Feare, which maketh such a Covenant invalid, must be
alwayes something arising after the Covenant made; as some new fact,
or other signe of the Will not to performe; else it cannot make the
Covenant Voyd. For that which could not hinder a man from promising,
ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing.




Right To The End, Containeth Right To The Means

He that transferreth any Right, transferreth the Means of enjoying it,
as farre as lyeth in his power. As he that selleth Land, is understood
to transferre the Herbage, and whatsoever growes upon it; Nor can he
that sells a Mill turn away the Stream that drives it. And they that
give to a man The Right of government in Soveraignty, are understood
to give him the right of levying mony to maintain Souldiers; and of
appointing Magistrates for the administration of Justice.




No Covenant With Beasts

To make Covenant with bruit Beasts, is impossible; because not
understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any
translation of Right; nor can translate any Right to another; and
without mutuall acceptation, there is no Covenant.




Nor With God Without Speciall Revelation

To make Covenant with God, is impossible, but by Mediation of such
as God speaketh to, either by Revelation supernaturall, or by his
Lieutenants that govern under him, and in his Name; For otherwise we
know not whether our Covenants be accepted, or not. And therefore they
that Vow any thing contrary to any law of Nature, Vow in vain; as being
a thing unjust to pay such Vow. And if it be a thing commanded by the
Law of Nature, it is not the Vow, but the Law that binds them.




No Covenant, But Of Possible And Future

The matter, or subject of a Covenant, is alwayes something that falleth
under deliberation; (For to Covenant, is an act of the Will; that is to
say an act, and the last act, of deliberation;) and is therefore alwayes
understood to be something to come; and which is judged Possible for him
that Covenanteth, to performe.

And therefore, to promise that which is known to be Impossible, is no
Covenant. But if that prove impossible afterwards, which before was
thought possible, the Covenant is valid, and bindeth, (though not to the
thing it selfe,) yet to the value; or, if that also be impossible, to
the unfeigned endeavour of performing as much as is possible; for to
more no man can be obliged.




Covenants How Made Voyd

Men are freed of their Covenants two wayes; by Performing; or by being
Forgiven. For Performance, is the naturall end of obligation; and
Forgivenesse, the restitution of liberty; as being a retransferring of
that Right, in which the obligation consisted.




Covenants Extorted By Feare Are Valide

Covenants entred into by fear, in the condition of meer Nature, are
obligatory. For example, if I Covenant to pay a ransome, or service for
my life, to an enemy; I am bound by it. For it is a Contract, wherein
one receiveth the benefit of life; the other is to receive mony,
or service for it; and consequently, where no other Law (as in the
condition, of meer Nature) forbiddeth the performance, the Covenant
is valid. Therefore Prisoners of warre, if trusted with the payment of
their Ransome, are obliged to pay it; And if a weaker Prince, make a
disadvantageous peace with a stronger, for feare; he is bound to keep
it; unlesse (as hath been sayd before) there ariseth some new, and just
cause of feare, to renew the war. And even in Common-wealths, if I be
forced to redeem my selfe from a Theefe by promising him mony, I am
bound to pay it, till the Civill Law discharge me. For whatsoever I may
lawfully do without Obligation, the same I may lawfully Covenant to do
through feare: and what I lawfully Covenant, I cannot lawfully break.




The Former Covenant To One, Makes Voyd The Later To Another

A former Covenant, makes voyd a later. For a man that hath passed away
his Right to one man to day, hath it not to passe to morrow to another:
and therefore the later promise passeth no Right, but is null.




A Mans Covenant Not To Defend Himselfe, Is Voyd

A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by force, is alwayes voyd.
For (as I have shewed before) no man can transferre, or lay down his
Right to save himselfe from Death, Wounds, and Imprisonment, (the
avoyding whereof is the onely End of laying down any Right,)
and therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no Covenant
transferreth any right; nor is obliging. For though a man may Covenant
thus, "Unlesse I do so, or so, kill me;" he cannot Covenant thus "Unless
I do so, or so, I will not resist you, when you come to kill me. " For
man by nature chooseth the lesser evill, which is danger of death in
resisting; rather than the greater, which is certain and present death
in not resisting. And this is granted to be true by all men, in
that they lead Criminals to Execution, and Prison, with armed men,
notwithstanding that such Criminals have consented to the Law, by which
they are condemned.




No Man Obliged To Accuse Himselfe

A Covenant to accuse ones Selfe, without assurance of pardon, is
likewise invalide. For in the condition of Nature, where every man is
Judge, there is no place for Accusation: and in the Civill State, the
Accusation is followed with Punishment; which being Force, a man is
not obliged not to resist. The same is also true, of the Accusation of
those, by whose Condemnation a man falls into misery; as of a Father,
Wife, or Benefactor. For the Testimony of such an Accuser, if it be not
willingly given, is praesumed to be corrupted by Nature; and therefore
not to be received: and where a mans Testimony is not to be credited,
his not bound to give it. Also Accusations upon Torture, are not to
be reputed as Testimonies. For Torture is to be used but as means of
conjecture, and light, in the further examination, and search of truth;
and what is in that case confessed, tendeth to the ease of him that is
Tortured; not to the informing of the Torturers: and therefore ought
not to have the credit of a sufficient Testimony: for whether he deliver
himselfe by true, or false Accusation, he does it by the Right of
preserving his own life.




The End Of An Oath; The Forme Of As Oath

The force of Words, being (as I have formerly noted) too weak to hold
men to the performance of their Covenants; there are in mans nature, but
two imaginable helps to strengthen it. And those are either a Feare
of the consequence of breaking their word; or a Glory, or Pride in
appearing not to need to breake it. This later is a Generosity too
rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers of Wealth,
Command, or sensuall Pleasure; which are the greatest part of Mankind.
The Passion to be reckoned upon, is Fear; whereof there be two very
generall Objects: one, the Power of Spirits Invisible; the other, the
Power of those men they shall therein Offend. Of these two, though the
former be the greater Power, yet the feare of the later is commonly
the greater Feare. The Feare of the former is in every man, his own
Religion: which hath place in the nature of man before Civill Society.
The later hath not so; at least not place enough, to keep men to their
promises; because in the condition of meer Nature, the inequality of
Power is not discerned, but by the event of Battell. So that before the
time of Civill Society, or in the interruption thereof by Warre, there
is nothing can strengthen a Covenant of Peace agreed on, against the
temptations of Avarice, Ambition, Lust, or other strong desire, but the
feare of that Invisible Power, which they every one Worship as God; and
Feare as a Revenger of their perfidy. All therefore that can be done
between two men not subject to Civill Power, is to put one another
to swear by the God he feareth: Which Swearing or OATH, is a Forme Of
Speech, Added To A Promise; By Which He That Promiseth, Signifieth, That
Unlesse He Performe, He Renounceth The Mercy Of His God, Or Calleth To
Him For Vengeance On Himselfe. Such was the Heathen Forme, "Let Jupiter
kill me else, as I kill this Beast. " So is our Forme, "I shall do thus,
and thus, so help me God. " And this, with the Rites and Ceremonies,
which every one useth in his own Religion, that the feare of breaking
faith might be the greater.




No Oath, But By God

By this it appears, that an Oath taken according to any other Forme, or
Rite, then his, that sweareth, is in vain; and no Oath: And there is no
Swearing by any thing which the Swearer thinks not God. For though men
have sometimes used to swear by their Kings, for feare, or flattery; yet
they would have it thereby understood, they attributed to them Divine
honour. And that Swearing unnecessarily by God, is but prophaning of his
name: and Swearing by other things, as men do in common discourse, is
not Swearing, but an impious Custome, gotten by too much vehemence of
talking.




An Oath Addes Nothing To The Obligation

It appears also, that the Oath addes nothing to the Obligation. For a
Covenant, if lawfull, binds in the sight of God, without the Oath,
as much as with it; if unlawfull, bindeth not at all; though it be
confirmed with an Oath.



CHAPTER XV. OF OTHER LAWES OF NATURE




The Third Law Of Nature, Justice

From that law of Nature, by which we are obliged to transferre to
another, such Rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of Mankind,
there followeth a Third; which is this, That Men Performe Their
Covenants Made: without which, Covenants are in vain, and but Empty
words; and the Right of all men to all things remaining, wee are still
in the condition of Warre.




Justice And Injustice What

And in this law of Nature, consisteth the Fountain and Originall of
JUSTICE. For where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no Right been
transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently,
no action can be Unjust. But when a Covenant is made, then to break it
is Unjust: And the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than The Not
Performance Of Covenant. And whatsoever is not Unjust, is Just.

Justice And Propriety Begin With The Constitution of Common-wealth
But because Covenants of mutuall trust, where there is a feare of not
performance on either part, (as hath been said in the former Chapter,)
are invalid; though the Originall of Justice be the making of Covenants;
yet Injustice actually there can be none, till the cause of such feare
be taken away; which while men are in the naturall condition of Warre,
cannot be done. Therefore before the names of Just, and Unjust can have
place, there must be some coercive Power, to compell men equally to
the performance of their Covenants, by the terrour of some punishment,
greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their Covenant;
and to make good that Propriety, which by mutuall Contract men acquire,
in recompence of the universall Right they abandon: and such power there
is none before the erection of a Common-wealth. And this is also to be
gathered out of the ordinary definition of Justice in the Schooles: For
they say, that "Justice is the constant Will of giving to every man his
own. " And therefore where there is no Own, that is, no Propriety, there
is no Injustice; and where there is no coerceive Power erected, that is,
where there is no Common-wealth, there is no Propriety; all men having
Right to all things: Therefore where there is no Common-wealth, there
nothing is Unjust. So that the nature of Justice, consisteth in keeping
of valid Covenants: but the Validity of Covenants begins not but with
the Constitution of a Civill Power, sufficient to compell men to keep
them: And then it is also that Propriety begins.




Justice Not Contrary To Reason

The Foole hath sayd in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice;
and sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleaging, that every mans
conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care, there
could be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought conduced
thereunto; and therefore also to make, or not make; keep, or not keep
Covenants, was not against Reason, when it conduced to ones benefit.
He does not therein deny, that there be Covenants; and that they are
sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such breach of them may
be called Injustice, and the observance of them Justice: but he
questioneth, whether Injustice, taking away the feare of God, (for the
same Foole hath said in his heart there is no God,) may not sometimes
stand with that Reason, which dictateth to every man his own good; and
particularly then, when it conduceth to such a benefit, as shall put a
man in a condition, to neglect not onely the dispraise, and revilings,
but also the power of other men. The Kingdome of God is gotten by
violence; but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence? were it
against Reason so to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by
it? and if it be not against Reason, it is not against Justice; or else
Justice is not to be approved for good. From such reasoning as this,
Succesfull wickednesse hath obtained the Name of Vertue; and some that
in all other things have disallowed the violation of Faith; yet have
allowed it, when it is for the getting of a Kingdome. And the Heathen
that believed, that Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter, believed
neverthelesse the same Jupiter to be the avenger of Injustice: Somewhat
like to a piece of Law in Cokes Commentaries on Litleton; where he
sayes, If the right Heire of the Crown be attainted of Treason; yet the
Crown shall descend to him, and Eo Instante the Atteynder be voyd; From
which instances a man will be very prone to inferre; that when the Heire
apparent of a Kingdome, shall kill him that is in possession, though his
father; you may call it Injustice, or by what other name you will; yet
it can never be against Reason, seeing all the voluntary actions of
men tend to the benefit of themselves; and those actions are most
Reasonable, that conduce most to their ends. This specious reasoning is
nevertheless false.

For the question is not of promises mutuall, where there is no security
of performance on either side; as when there is no Civill Power erected
over the parties promising; for such promises are no Covenants: But
either where one of the parties has performed already; or where there
is a Power to make him performe; there is the question whether it be
against reason, that is, against the benefit of the other to performe,
or not. And I say it is not against reason. For the manifestation
whereof, we are to consider; First, that when a man doth a thing, which
notwithstanding any thing can be foreseen, and reckoned on, tendeth to
his own destruction, howsoever some accident which he could not expect,
arriving may turne it to his benefit; yet such events do not make it
reasonably or wisely done. Secondly, that in a condition of Warre,
wherein every man to every man, for want of a common Power to keep them
all in awe, is an Enemy, there is no man can hope by his own strength,
or wit, to defend himselfe from destruction, without the help
of Confederates; where every one expects the same defence by the
Confederation, that any one else does: and therefore he which declares
he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect
no other means of safety, than what can be had from his own single
Power. He therefore that breaketh his Covenant, and consequently
declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received
into any Society, that unite themselves for Peace and defence, but
by the errour of them that receive him; nor when he is received, be
retayned in it, without seeing the danger of their errour; which errours
a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security; and
therefore if he be left, or cast out of Society, he perisheth; and if he
live in Society, it is by the errours of other men, which he could not
foresee, nor reckon upon; and consequently against the reason of his
preservation; and so, as all men that contribute not to his destruction,
forbear him onely out of ignorance of what is good for themselves.

As for the Instance of gaining the secure and perpetuall felicity of
Heaven, by any way; it is frivolous: there being but one way imaginable;
and that is not breaking, but keeping of Covenant.

And for the other Instance of attaining Soveraignty by Rebellion; it is
manifest, that though the event follow, yet because it cannot reasonably
be expected, but rather the contrary; and because by gaining it so,
others are taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof
is against reason. Justice therefore, that is to say, Keeping of
Covenant, is a Rule of Reason, by which we are forbidden to do any thing
destructive to our life; and consequently a Law of Nature.

There be some that proceed further; and will not have the Law of Nature,
to be those Rules which conduce to the preservation of mans life on
earth; but to the attaining of an eternall felicity after death; to
which they think the breach of Covenant may conduce; and consequently
be just and reasonable; (such are they that think it a work of merit
to kill, or depose, or rebell against, the Soveraigne Power constituted
over them by their own consent.