In the second place we must
consider
its inclination to act; and in
this way it regards the powers of the soul.
this way it regards the powers of the soul.
Summa Theologica
Nor is it necessary to says
that original sin is a habit "infused," or a habit "acquired" (except
by the act of our first parent, but not by our own act): but it is a
habit "inborn" due to our corrupt origin.
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Whether there are several original sins in one man?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are many original sins in one
man. For it is written (Ps. 1:7): "Behold I was conceived in
iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me. " But the sin in
which a man is conceived is original sin. Therefore there are several
original sins in man.
Objection 2: Further, one and the same habit does not incline its
subject to contraries: since the inclination of habit is like that of
nature which tends to one thing. Now original sin, even in one man,
inclines to various and contrary sins. Therefore original sin is not
one habit; but several.
Objection 3: Further, original sin infects every part of the soul. Now
the different parts of the soul are different subjects of sin, as shown
above ([1832]Q[74]). Since then one sin cannot be in different
subjects, it seems that original sin is not one but several.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:29): "Behold the Lamb of God,
behold Him Who taketh away the sin of the world": and the reason for
the employment of the singular is that the "sin of the world" is
original sin, as a gloss expounds this passage.
I answer that, In one man there is one original sin. Two reasons may be
assigned for this. The first is on the part of the cause of original
sin. For it has been stated ([1833]Q[81], A[2]), that the first sin
alone of our first parent was transmitted to his posterity. Wherefore
in one man original sin is one in number; and in all men, it is one in
proportion, i. e. in relation to its first principle. The second reason
may be taken from the very essence of original sin. Because in every
inordinate disposition, unity of species depends on the cause, while
the unity of number is derived from the subject. For example, take
bodily sickness: various species of sickness proceed from different
causes, e. g. from excessive heat or cold, or from a lesion in the lung
or liver; while one specific sickness in one man will be one in number.
Now the cause of this corrupt disposition that is called original sin,
is one only, viz. the privation of original justice, removing the
subjection of man's mind to God. Consequently original sin is
specifically one, and, in one man, can be only one in number; while, in
different men, it is one in species and in proportion, but is
numerically many.
Reply to Objection 1: The employment of the plural---"in sins"---may be
explained by the custom of the Divine Scriptures in the frequent use of
the plural for the singular, e. g. "They are dead that sought the life
of the child"; or by the fact that all actual sins virtually pre-exist
in original sin, as in a principle so that it is virtually many; or by
the fact of there being many deformities in the sin of our first
parent, viz. pride, disobedience, gluttony, and so forth; or by several
parts of the soul being infected by original sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Of itself and directly, i. e. by its own form, one
habit cannot incline its subject to contraries. But there is no reason
why it should not do so, indirectly and accidentally, i. e. by the
removal of an obstacle: thus, when the harmony of a mixed body is
destroyed, the elements have contrary local tendencies. In like manner,
when the harmony of original justice is destroyed, the various powers
of the soul have various opposite tendencies.
Reply to Objection 3: Original sin infects the different parts of the
soul, in so far as they are the parts of one whole; even as original
justice held all the soul's parts together in one. Consequently there
is but one original sin: just as there is but one fever in one man,
although the various parts of the body are affected.
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Whether original sin is concupiscence?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not concupiscence. For
every sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth.
ii, 4,30). But concupiscence is in accordance with nature, since it is
the proper act of the concupiscible faculty which is a natural power.
Therefore concupiscence is not original sin.
Objection 2: Further, through original sin "the passions of sins" are
in us, according to the Apostle (Rom. 7:5). Now there are several other
passions besides concupiscence, as stated above ([1834]Q[23], A[4]).
Therefore original sin is not concupiscence any more than another
passion.
Objection 3: Further, by original sin, all the parts of the soul are
disordered, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[3]). But the intellect is the
highest of the soul's parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7).
Therefore original sin is ignorance rather than concupiscence.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 15): "Concupiscence is the
guilt of original sin. "
I answer that, Everything takes its species from its form: and it has
been stated [1835](A[2]) that the species of original sin is taken from
its cause. Consequently the formal element of original sin must be
considered in respect of the cause of original sin. But contraries have
contrary causes. Therefore the cause of original sin must be considered
with respect to the cause of original justice, which is opposed to it.
Now the whole order of original justice consists in man's will being
subject to God: which subjection, first and chiefly, was in the will,
whose function it is to move all the other parts to the end, as stated
above (Q[9], A[1] ), so that the will being turned away from God, all
the other powers of the soul become inordinate. Accordingly the
privation of original justice, whereby the will was made subject to
God, is the formal element in original sin; while every other disorder
of the soul's powers, is a kind of material element in respect of
original sin. Now the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul
consists chiefly in their turning inordinately to mutable good; which
inordinateness may be called by the general name of concupiscence.
Hence original sin is concupiscence, materially, but privation of
original justice, formally.
Reply to Objection 1: Since, in man, the concupiscible power is
naturally governed by reason, the act of concupiscence is so far
natural to man, as it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in
so far as it trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man,
contrary to reason. Such is the concupiscence of original sin.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1836]Q[25], A[1]), all the
irascible passions are reducible to concupiscible passions, as holding
the principle place: and of these, concupiscence is the most impetuous
in moving, and is felt most, as stated above ([1837]Q[25], A[2], ad 1).
Therefore original sin is ascribed to concupiscence, as being the chief
passion, and as including all the others, in a fashion.
Reply to Objection 3: As, in good things, the intellect and reason
stand first, so conversely in evil things, the lower part of the soul
is found to take precedence, for it clouds and draws the reason, as
stated above ([1838]Q[77], AA[1],2;[1839] Q[80], A[2]). Hence original
sin is called concupiscence rather than ignorance, although ignorance
is comprised among the material defects of original sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether original sin is equally in all?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not equally in all.
Because original sin is inordinate concupiscence, as stated above
[1840](A[3]). Now all are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence.
Therefore original sin is not equally in all.
Objection 2: Further, original sin is an inordinate disposition of the
soul, just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body. But
sickness is subject to degrees. Therefore original sin is subject to
degrees.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Nup. et Concep. i, 23) that
"lust transmits original sin to the child. " But the act of generation
may be more lustful in one than in another. Therefore original sin may
be greater in one than in another.
On the contrary, Original sin is the sin of nature, as stated above
([1841]Q[81], A[1]). But nature is equally in all. Therefore original
sin is too.
I answer that, There are two things in original sin: one is the
privation of original justice; the other is the relation of this
privation to the sin of our first parent, from whom it is transmitted
to man through his corrupt origin. As to the first, original sin has no
degrees, since the gift of original justice is taken away entirely; and
privations that remove something entirely, such as death and darkness,
cannot be more or less, as stated above ([1842]Q[73], A[2]). In like
manner, neither is this possible, as to the second: since all are
related equally to the first principle of our corrupt origin, from
which principle original sin takes the nature of guilt; for relations
cannot be more or less. Consequently it is evident that original sin
cannot be more in one than in another.
Reply to Objection 1: Through the bond of original justice being
broken, which held together all the powers of the soul in a certain
order, each power of the soul tends to its own proper movement, and the
more impetuously, as it is stronger. Now it happens that some of the
soul's powers are stronger in one man than in another, on account of
the different bodily temperaments. Consequently if one man is more
prone than another to acts of concupiscence, this is not due to
original sin, because the bond of original justice is equally broken in
all, and the lower parts of the soul are, in all, left to themselves
equally; but it is due to the various dispositions of the powers, as
stated.
Reply to Objection 2: Sickness of the body, even sickness of the same
species, has not an equal cause in all; for instance if a fever be
caused by corruption of the bile, the corruption may be greater or
less, and nearer to, or further from a vital principle. But the cause
of original sin is equal to all, so that there is not comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not the actual lust that transmits original
sin: for, supposing God were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate
lust in the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin; we
must understand this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive
appetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original
justice. This lust is equally in all.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subject of original sin, under which head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the
soul?
(2) If it be the soul, whether this be through its essence, or through
its powers?
(3) Whether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of
original sin?
(4) Whether certain powers of the soul are specially infected, viz. the
generative power, the concupiscible part, and the sense of touch?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is more in the flesh than
in the soul. Because the rebellion of the flesh against the mind arises
from the corruption of original sin. Now the root of this rebellion is
seated in the flesh: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): "I see another
law in my members fighting against the law of my mind. " Therefore
original sin is seated chiefly in the flesh.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is more in its cause than in its effect:
thus heat is in the heating fire more than in the hot water. Now the
soul is infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal
semen. Therefore original sin is in the flesh rather than in the soul.
Objection 3: Further, we contract original sin from our first parent,
in so far as we were in him by reason of seminal virtue. Now our souls
were not in him thus, but only our flesh. Therefore original sin is not
in the soul, but in the flesh.
Objection 4: Further, the rational soul created by God is infused into
the body. If therefore the soul were infected with original sin, it
would follow that it is corrupted in its creation or infusion: and thus
God would be the cause of sin, since He is the author of the soul's
creation and fusion.
Objection 5: Further, no wise man pours a precious liquid into a
vessel, knowing that the vessel will corrupt the liquid. But the
rational soul is more precious than any liquid. If therefore the soul,
by being united with the body, could be corrupted with the infection of
original sin, God, Who is wisdom itself, would never infuse the soul
into such a body. And yet He does; wherefore it is not corrupted by the
flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul but in the flesh.
On the contrary, The same is the subject of a virtue and of the vice or
sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh cannot be the subject of
virtue: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7:18): "I know that there dwelleth
not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good. " Therefore
the flesh cannot be the subject of original sin, but only the soul.
I answer that, One thing can be in another in two ways. First, as in
its cause, either principal, or instrumental; secondly, as in its
subject. Accordingly the original sin of all men was in Adam indeed, as
in its principal cause, according to the words of the Apostle (Rom.
5:12): "In whom all have sinned": whereas it is in the bodily semen, as
in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active power of the semen
that original sin together with human nature is transmitted to the
child. But original sin can nowise be in the flesh as its subject, but
only in the soul.
The reason for this is that, as stated above ([1843]Q[81], A[1]),
original sin is transmitted from the will of our first parent to this
posterity by a certain movement of generation, in the same way as
actual sin is transmitted from any man's will to his other parts. Now
in this transmission it is to be observed, that whatever accrues from
the motion of the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can
in any way share in that guilt, either as its subject or as its
instrument, has the character of sin. Thus from the will consenting to
gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues to the concupiscible faculty,
and partaking of food accrues to the hand and the mouth, which, in so
far as they are moved by the will to sin, are the instruments of sin.
But that further action is evoked in the nutritive power and the
internal members, which have no natural aptitude for being moved by the
will, does not bear the character of guilt.
Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, while the
flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt; whatever accrues to
the soul from the corruption of the first sin, has the character of
guilt, while whatever accrues to the flesh, has the character, not of
guilt but of punishment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject of
original sin, and not the flesh.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 27) [*Cf. QQ.
lxxxiii, qu. 66], the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man
already redeemed, who is delivered from guilt, but is still liable to
punishment, by reason of which sin is stated to dwell "in the flesh. "
Consequently it follows that the flesh is the subject, not of guilt,
but of punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: Original sin is caused by the semen as
instrumental cause. Now there is no need for anything to be more in the
instrumental cause than in the effect; but only in the principal cause:
and, in this way, original sin was in Adam more fully, since in him it
had the nature of actual sin.
Reply to Objection 3: The soul of any individual man was in Adam, in
respect of his seminal power, not indeed as in its effective principle,
but as in a dispositive principle: because the bodily semen, which is
transmitted from Adam, does not of its own power produce the rational
soul, but disposes the matter for it.
Reply to Objection 4: The corruption of original sin is nowise caused
by God, but by the sin alone of our first parent through carnal
generation. And so, since creation implies a relation in the soul to
God alone, it cannot be said that the soul is tainted through being
created. On the other hand, infusion implies relation both to God
infusing and to the flesh into which the soul is infused. And so, with
regard to God infusing, it cannot be said that the soul is stained
through being infused; but only with regard to the body into which it
is infused.
Reply to Objection 5: The common good takes precedence of private good.
Wherefore God, according to His wisdom, does not overlook the general
order of things (which is that such a soul be infused into such a
body), lest this soul contract a singular corruption: all the more that
the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist prior to its
infusion into the body, as stated in the [1844]FP, Q[90], A[4];
[1845]FP, Q[118], A[3]. And it is better for the soul to be thus,
according to its nature, than not to be at all, especially since it can
avoid damnation, by means of grace.
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Whether original sin is in the essence of the soul rather than in the
powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not in the essence of
the soul rather than in the powers. For the soul is naturally apt to be
the subject of sin, in respect of those parts which can be moved by the
will. Now the soul is moved by the will, not as to its essence but only
as to the powers. Therefore original sin is in the soul, not according
to its essence, but only according to the powers.
Objection 2: Further, original sin is opposed to original justice. Now
original justice was in a power of the soul, because power is the
subject of virtue. Therefore original sin also is in a power of the
soul, rather than in its essence.
Objection 3: Further, just as original sin is derived from the soul as
from the flesh, so is it derived by the powers from the essence. But
original sin is more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is
more in the powers than in the essence of the soul.
Objection 4: Further, original sin is said to be concupiscence, as
stated ([1846]Q[82], A[3]). But concupiscence is in the powers of the
soul. Therefore original sin is also.
On the contrary, Original sin is called the sin of nature, as stated
above (Q[81], A[1]). Now the soul is the form and nature of the body,
in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers, as stated
in the [1847]FP, Q[76], A[6]. Therefore the soul is the subject of
original sin chiefly in respect of its essence.
I answer that, The subject of a sin is chiefly that part of the soul to
which the motive cause of that sin primarily pertains: thus if the
motive cause of a sin is sensual pleasure, which regards the
concupiscible power through being its proper object, it follows that
the concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is
evident that original sin is caused through our origin. Consequently
that part of the soul which is first reached by man's origin, is the
primary subject of original sin. Now the origin reaches the soul as the
term of generation, according as it is the form of the body: and this
belongs to the soul in respect of its essence, as was proved in the
[1848]FP, Q[76], A[6]. Therefore the soul, in respect of its essence,
is the primary subject of original sin.
Reply to Objection 1: As the motion of the will of an individual
reaches to the soul's powers and not to its essence, so the motion of
the will of the first generator, through the channel of generation,
reaches first of all to the essence of the soul, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: Even original justice pertained radically to the
essence of the soul, because it was God's gift to human nature, to
which the essence of the soul is related before the powers. For the
powers seem to regard the person, in as much as they are the principles
of personal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of actual sins,
which are the sins of the person.
Reply to Objection 3: The body is related to the soul as matter to
form, which though it comes second in order of generation, nevertheless
comes first in the order of perfection and nature. But the essence of
the soul is related to the powers, as a subject to its proper
accidents, which follow their subject both in the order of generation
and in that of perfection. Consequently the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 4: Concupiscence, in relation to original sin, holds
the position of matter and effect, as stated above ([1849]Q[82], A[3]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether original sin infects the will before the other powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin does not infect the will
before the other powers. For every sin belongs chiefly to that power by
whose act it was caused. Now original sin is caused by an act of the
generative power. Therefore it seems to belong to the generative power
more than to the others.
Objection 2: Further, original sin is transmitted through the carnal
semen. But the other powers of the soul are more akin to the flesh than
the will is, as is evident with regard to all the sensitive powers,
which use a bodily organ. Therefore original sin is in them more than
in the will.
Objection 3: Further, the intellect precedes the will, for the object
of the will is only the good understood. If therefore original sin
infects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it must first of all
infect the intellect, as preceding the others.
On the contrary, Original justice has a prior relation to the will,
because it is "rectitude of the will," as Anselm states (De Concep.
Virg. iii). Therefore original sin, which is opposed to it, also has a
prior relation to the will.
I answer that, Two things must be considered in the infection of
original sin. First, its inherence to its subject; and in this respect
it regards first the essence of the soul, as stated above [1850](A[2]).
In the second place we must consider its inclination to act; and in
this way it regards the powers of the soul. It must therefore regard
first of all that power in which is seated the first inclination to
commit a sin, and this is the will, as stated above (Q[74], AA[1],2).
Therefore original sin regards first of all the will.
Reply to Objection 1: Original sin, in man, is not caused by the
generative power of the child, but by the act of the parental
generative power. Consequently, it does not follow that the child's
generative power is the subject of original sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Original sin spreads in two ways; from the flesh
to the soul, and from the essence of the soul to the powers. The former
follows the order of generation, the latter follows the order of
perfection. Therefore, although the other, viz. the sensitive powers,
are more akin to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the higher
power, is more akin to the essence of the soul, the infection of
original sin reaches it first.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellect precedes the will, in one way, by
proposing its object to it. In another way, the will precedes the
intellect, in the order of motion to act, which motion pertains to sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the aforesaid powers are more infected than the others?
Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid powers are not more
infected than the others. For the infection of original sin seems to
pertain more to that part of the soul which can be first the subject of
sin. Now this is the rational part, and chiefly the will. Therefore
that power is most infected by original sin.
Objection 2: Further, no power of the soul is infected by guilt, except
in so far as it can obey reason. Now the generative power cannot obey
reason, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the generative power is
not the most infected by original sin.
Objection 3: Further, of all the senses the sight is the most spiritual
and the nearest to reason, in so far "as it shows us how a number of
things differ" (Metaph. i). But the infection of guilt is first of all
in the reason. Therefore the sight is more infected than touch.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16, seqq. , 24) that
the infection of original sin is most apparent in the movements of the
members of generation, which are not subject to reason. Now those
members serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes, wherein
there is the delectation of touch, which is the most powerful incentive
to concupiscence. Therefore the infection of original sin regards these
three chiefly, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible faculty and
the sense of touch.
I answer that, Those corruptions especially are said to be infectious,
which are of such a nature as to be transmitted from one subject to
another: hence contagious diseases, such as leprosy and murrain and the
like, are said to be infectious. Now the corruption of original sin is
transmitted by the act of generation, as stated above ([1851]Q[81],
A[1]). Therefore the powers which concur in this act, are chiefly said
to be infected. Now this act serves the generative power, in as much as
it is directed to generation; and it includes delectation of the touch,
which is the most powerful object of the concupiscible faculty.
Consequently, while all the parts of the soul are said to be corrupted
by original sin, these three are said specially to be corrupted and
infected.
Reply to Objection 1: Original sin, in so far as it inclines to actual
sins, belongs chiefly to the will, as stated above [1852](A[3]). But in
so far as it is transmitted to the offspring, it belongs to the
aforesaid powers proximately, and to the will, remotely.
Reply to Objection 2: The infection of actual sin belongs only to the
powers which are moved by the will of the sinner. But the infection of
original sin is not derived from the will of the contractor, but
through his natural origin, which is effected by the generative power.
Hence it is this power that is infected by original sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Sight is not related to the act of generation
except in respect of remote disposition, in so far as the concupiscible
species is seen through the sight. But the delectation is completed in
the touch. Wherefore the aforesaid infection is ascribed to the touch
rather than to the sight.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER (FOUR
ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of sin, in so far as one sin can be the
cause of another. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?
(2) Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?
(3) Whether other special sins should be called capital vices, besides
pride and covetousness?
(4) How many capital vices there are, and which are they?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that covetousness is not the root of all
sins. For covetousness, which is immoderate desire for riches, is
opposed to the virtue of liberality. But liberality is not the root of
all virtues. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins.
Objection 2: Further, the desire for the means proceeds from desire for
the end. Now riches, the desire for which is called covetousness, are
not desired except as being useful for some end, as stated in Ethic. i,
5. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins, but proceeds
from some deeper root.
Objection 3: Further, it often happens that avarice, which is another
name for covetousness, arises from other sins; as when a man desires
money through ambition, or in order to sate his gluttony. Therefore it
is not the root of all sins.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:10): "The desire of money
is the root of all evil. "
I answer that, According to some, covetousness may be understood in
different ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire for riches: and
thus it is a special sin. Secondly, as denoting inordinate desire for
any temporal good: and thus it is a genus comprising all sins, because
every sin includes an inordinate turning to a mutable good, as stated
above ([1853]Q[72], A[2]). Thirdly, as denoting an inclination of a
corrupt nature to desire corruptible goods inordinately: and they say
that in this sense covetousness is the root of all sins, comparing it
to the root of a tree, which draws its sustenance from earth, just as
every sin grows out of the love of temporal things.
Now, though all this is true, it does not seem to explain the mind of
the Apostle when he states that covetousness is the root of all sins.
For in that passage he clearly speaks against those who, because they
"will become rich, fall into temptation, and into the snare of the
devil . . . for covetousness is the root of all evils. " Hence it is
evident that he is speaking of covetousness as denoting the inordinate
desire for riches. Accordingly, we must say that covetousness, as
denoting a special sin, is called the root of all sins, in likeness to
the root of a tree, in furnishing sustenance to the whole tree. For we
see that by riches man acquires the means of committing any sin
whatever, and of sating his desire for any sin whatever, since money
helps man to obtain all manner of temporal goods, according to Eccles.
10:19: "All things obey money": so that in this desire for riches is
the root of all sins.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue and sin do not arise from the same source.
For sin arises from the desire of mutable good; and consequently the
desire of that good which helps one to obtain all temporal goods, is
called the root of all sins. But virtue arises from the desire for the
immutable God; and consequently charity, which is the love of God, is
called the root of the virtues, according to Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and
founded in charity. "
Reply to Objection 2: The desire of money is said to be the root of
sins, not as though riches were sought for their own sake, as being the
last end; but because they are much sought after as useful for any
temporal end. And since a universal good is more desirable than a
particular good, they move the appetite more than any individual goods,
which along with many others can be procured by means of money.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as in natural things we do not ask what
always happens, but what happens most frequently, for the reason that
the nature of corruptible things can be hindered, so as not always to
act in the same way; so also in moral matters, we consider what happens
in the majority of cases, not what happens invariably, for the reason
that the will does not act of necessity. So when we say that
covetousness is the root of all evils, we do not assert that no other
evil can be its root, but that other evils more frequently arise
therefrom, for the reason given.
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Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the beginning of every
sin. For the root is a beginning of a tree, so that the beginning of a
sin seems to be the same as the root of sin. Now covetousness is the
root of every sin, as stated above [1854](A[1]). Therefore it is also
the beginning of every sin, and not pride.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): "The beginning of
the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from God. " But
apostasy from God is a sin. Therefore another sin is the beginning of
pride, so that the latter is not the beginning of every sin.
Objection 3: Further, the beginning of every sin would seem to be that
which causes all sins. Now this is inordinate self-love, which,
according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), "builds up the city of
Babylon. " Therefore self-love and not pride, is the beginning of every
sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning
of all sin. "
I answer that, Some say pride is to be taken in three ways. First, as
denoting inordinate desire to excel; and thus it is a special sin.
Secondly, as denoting actual contempt of God, to the effect of not
being subject to His commandment; and thus, they say, it is a generic
sin. Thirdly, as denoting an inclination to this contempt, owing to the
corruption of nature; and in this sense they say that it is the
beginning of every sin, and that it differs from covetousness, because
covetousness regards sin as turning towards the mutable good by which
sin is, as it were, nourished and fostered, for which reason
covetousness is called the "root"; whereas pride regards sin as turning
away from God, to Whose commandment man refuses to be subject, for
which reason it is called the "beginning," because the beginning of
evil consists in turning away from God.
Now though all this is true, nevertheless it does not explain the mind
of the wise man who said (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning of
all sin. " For it is evident that he is speaking of pride as denoting
inordinate desire to excel, as is clear from what follows (verse 17):
"God hath overturned the thrones of proud princes"; indeed this is the
point of nearly the whole chapter. We must therefore say that pride,
even as denoting a special sin, is the beginning of every sin. For we
must take note that, in voluntary actions, such as sins, there is a
twofold order, of intention, and of execution. In the former order, the
principle is the end, as we have stated many times before (Q[1], A[1],
ad 1; Q[18], A[7], ad 2; Q[15], A[1], ad 2; Q[25], A[2]). Now man's end
in acquiring all temporal goods is that, through their means, he may
have some perfection and excellence. Therefore, from this point of
view, pride, which is the desire to excel, is said to be the
"beginning" of every sin. On the other hand, in the order of execution,
the first place belongs to that which by furnishing the opportunity of
fulfilling all desires of sin, has the character of a root, and such
are riches; so that, from this point of view, covetousness is said to
be the "root" of all evils, as stated above [1855](A[1]).
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Apostasy from God is stated to be the beginning
of pride, in so far as it denotes a turning away from God, because from
the fact that man wishes not to be subject to God, it follows that he
desires inordinately his own excellence in temporal things. Wherefore,
in the passage quoted, apostasy from God does not denote the special
sin, but rather that general condition of every sin, consisting in its
turning away from God. It may also be said that apostasy from God is
said to be the beginning of pride, because it is the first species of
pride. For it is characteristic of pride to be unwilling to be subject
to any superior, and especially to God; the result being that a man is
unduly lifted up, in respect of the other species of pride.
Reply to Objection 3: In desiring to excel, man loves himself, for to
love oneself is the same as to desire some good for oneself.
Consequently it amounts to the same whether we reckon pride or
self-love as the beginning of every evil.
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Whether any other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called
capital?
Objection 1: It would seem that no other special sins, besides pride
and avarice, should be called capital. Because "the head seems to be to
an animal, what the root is to a plant," as stated in De Anima ii,
text. 38: for the roots are like a mouth. If therefore covetousness is
called the "root of all evils," it seems that it alone, and no other
sin, should be called a capital vice.
Objection 2: Further, the head bears a certain relation of order to the
other members, in so far as sensation and movement follow from the
head. But sin implies privation of order. Therefore sin has not the
character of head: so that no sins should be called capital.
Objection 3: Further, capital crimes are those which receive capital
punishment. But every kind of sin comprises some that are punished
thus. Therefore the capital sins are not certain specific sins.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) enumerates certain special
vices under the name of capital.
I answer that, The word capital is derived from "caput" [a head]. Now
the head, properly speaking, is that part of an animal's body, which is
the principle and director of the whole animal. Hence, metaphorically
speaking, every principle is called a head, and even men who direct and
govern others are called heads. Accordingly a capital vice is so
called, in the first place, from "head" taken in the proper sense, and
thus the name "capital" is given to a sin for which capital punishment
is inflicted. It is not in this sense that we are now speaking of
capital sins, but in another sense, in which the term "capital" is
derived from head, taken metaphorically for a principle or director of
others. In this way a capital vice is one from which other vices arise,
chiefly by being their final cause, which origin is formal, as stated
above ([1856]Q[72], A[6]). Wherefore a capital vice is not only the
principle of others, but is also their director and, in a way, their
leader: because the art or habit, to which the end belongs, is always
the principle and the commander in matters concerning the means. Hence
Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) compares these capital vices to the "leaders
of an army. "
Reply to Objection 1: The term "capital" is taken from "caput" and
applied to something connected with, or partaking of the head, as
having some property thereof, but not as being the head taken
literally. And therefore the capital vices are not only those which
have the character of primary origin, as covetousness which is called
the "root," and pride which is called the beginning, but also those
which have the character of proximate origin in respect of several
sins.
Reply to Objection 2: Sin lacks order in so far as it turns away from
God, for in this respect it is an evil, and evil, according to
Augustine (De Natura Boni iv), is "the privation of mode, species and
order. " But in so far as sin implies a turning to something, it regards
some good: wherefore, in this respect, there can be order in sin.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers capital sin as so called
from the punishment it deserves, in which sense we are not taking it
here.
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Whether the seven capital vices are suitably reckoned?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital
vices, viz. vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony,
lust. For sins are opposed to virtues. But there are four principal
virtues, as stated above ([1857]Q[61], A[2]). Therefore there are only
four principal or capital vices.
Objection 2: Further, the passions of the soul are causes of sin, as
stated above ([1858]Q[77]). But there are four principal passions of
the soul; two of which, viz. hope and fear, are not mentioned among the
above sins, whereas certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and
sadness belong, since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, and
sadness to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins are unfittingly
enumerated.
Objection 3: Further, anger is not a principal passion. Therefore it
should not be placed among the principal vices.
Objection 4: Further, just as covetousness or avarice is the root of
sin, so is pride the beginning of sin, as stated above [1859](A[2]).
But avarice is reckoned to be one of the capital vices. Therefore pride
also should be placed among the capital vices.
Objection 5: Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused
through any of these: as, for instance, when one sins through
ignorance, or when one commits a sin with a good intention, e. g. steals
in order to give an alms. Therefore the capital vices are
insufficiently enumerated.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates them in
this way (Moral. xxxi, 17).
I answer that, As stated above [1860](A[3]), the capital vices are
those which give rise to others, especially by way of final cause. Now
this kind of origin may take place in two ways. First, on account of
the condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong
inclination for one particular end, the result being that he frequently
goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does not come under
the consideration of art, because man's particular dispositions are
infinite in number. Secondly, on account of a natural relationship of
the ends to one another: and it is in this way that most frequently one
vice arises from another, so that this kind of origin can come under
the consideration of art.
Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, whose ends have
certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite; and it is in
respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are
differentiated. Now a thing moves the appetite in two ways. First,
directly and of its very nature: thus good moves the appetite to seek
it, while evil, for the same reason, moves the appetite to avoid it.
Secondly, indirectly and on account of something else, as it were: thus
one seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a good
on account of some attendant evil.
Again, man's good is threefold. For, in the first place, there is a
certain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of appetibility,
merely through being apprehended, viz. the excellence of honor and
praise, and this good is sought inordinately by "vainglory. " Secondly,
there is the good of the body, and this regards either the preservation
of the individual, e. g. meat and drink, which good is pursued
inordinately by "gluttony," or the preservation of the species, e. g.
sexual intercourse, which good is sought inordinately by "lust. "
Thirdly, there is external good, viz. riches, to which "covetousness"
is referred. These same four vices avoid inordinately the contrary
evils.
Or again, good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some
property of happiness, which all men seek naturally. Now in the first
place happiness implies perfection, since happiness is a perfect good,
to which belongs excellence or renown, which is desired by "pride" or
"vainglory. " Secondly, it implies satiety, which "covetousness" seeks
in riches that give promise thereof. Thirdly, it implies pleasure,
without which happiness is impossible, as stated in Ethic. i, 7; x,
6,7,[8] and this "gluttony" and "lust" pursue.
On the other hand, avoidance of good on account of an attendant evil
occurs in two ways. For this happens either in respect of one's own
good, and thus we have "sloth," which is sadness about one's spiritual
good, on account of the attendant bodily labor: or else it happens in
respect of another's good, and this, if it be without recrimination,
belongs to "envy," which is sadness about another's good as being a
hindrance to one's own excellence, while if it be with recrimination
with a view to vengeance, it is "anger. " Again, these same vices seek
the contrary evils.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue and vice do not originate in the same way:
since virtue is caused by the subordination of the appetite to reason,
or to the immutable good, which is God, whereas vice arises from the
appetite for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need for the principal
vices to be contrary to the principal virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: Fear and hope are irascible passions. Now all the
passions of the irascible part arise from passions of the concupiscible
part; and these are all, in a way, directed to pleasure or sorrow.
Hence pleasure and sorrow have a prominent place among the capital
sins, as being the most important of the passions, as stated above
([1861]Q[25], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 3: Although anger is not a principal passion, yet it
has a distinct place among the capital vices, because it implies a
special kind of movement in the appetite, in so far as recrimination
against another's good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i. e. of the
right to vengeance.
that original sin is a habit "infused," or a habit "acquired" (except
by the act of our first parent, but not by our own act): but it is a
habit "inborn" due to our corrupt origin.
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Whether there are several original sins in one man?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are many original sins in one
man. For it is written (Ps. 1:7): "Behold I was conceived in
iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me. " But the sin in
which a man is conceived is original sin. Therefore there are several
original sins in man.
Objection 2: Further, one and the same habit does not incline its
subject to contraries: since the inclination of habit is like that of
nature which tends to one thing. Now original sin, even in one man,
inclines to various and contrary sins. Therefore original sin is not
one habit; but several.
Objection 3: Further, original sin infects every part of the soul. Now
the different parts of the soul are different subjects of sin, as shown
above ([1832]Q[74]). Since then one sin cannot be in different
subjects, it seems that original sin is not one but several.
On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:29): "Behold the Lamb of God,
behold Him Who taketh away the sin of the world": and the reason for
the employment of the singular is that the "sin of the world" is
original sin, as a gloss expounds this passage.
I answer that, In one man there is one original sin. Two reasons may be
assigned for this. The first is on the part of the cause of original
sin. For it has been stated ([1833]Q[81], A[2]), that the first sin
alone of our first parent was transmitted to his posterity. Wherefore
in one man original sin is one in number; and in all men, it is one in
proportion, i. e. in relation to its first principle. The second reason
may be taken from the very essence of original sin. Because in every
inordinate disposition, unity of species depends on the cause, while
the unity of number is derived from the subject. For example, take
bodily sickness: various species of sickness proceed from different
causes, e. g. from excessive heat or cold, or from a lesion in the lung
or liver; while one specific sickness in one man will be one in number.
Now the cause of this corrupt disposition that is called original sin,
is one only, viz. the privation of original justice, removing the
subjection of man's mind to God. Consequently original sin is
specifically one, and, in one man, can be only one in number; while, in
different men, it is one in species and in proportion, but is
numerically many.
Reply to Objection 1: The employment of the plural---"in sins"---may be
explained by the custom of the Divine Scriptures in the frequent use of
the plural for the singular, e. g. "They are dead that sought the life
of the child"; or by the fact that all actual sins virtually pre-exist
in original sin, as in a principle so that it is virtually many; or by
the fact of there being many deformities in the sin of our first
parent, viz. pride, disobedience, gluttony, and so forth; or by several
parts of the soul being infected by original sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Of itself and directly, i. e. by its own form, one
habit cannot incline its subject to contraries. But there is no reason
why it should not do so, indirectly and accidentally, i. e. by the
removal of an obstacle: thus, when the harmony of a mixed body is
destroyed, the elements have contrary local tendencies. In like manner,
when the harmony of original justice is destroyed, the various powers
of the soul have various opposite tendencies.
Reply to Objection 3: Original sin infects the different parts of the
soul, in so far as they are the parts of one whole; even as original
justice held all the soul's parts together in one. Consequently there
is but one original sin: just as there is but one fever in one man,
although the various parts of the body are affected.
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Whether original sin is concupiscence?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not concupiscence. For
every sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth.
ii, 4,30). But concupiscence is in accordance with nature, since it is
the proper act of the concupiscible faculty which is a natural power.
Therefore concupiscence is not original sin.
Objection 2: Further, through original sin "the passions of sins" are
in us, according to the Apostle (Rom. 7:5). Now there are several other
passions besides concupiscence, as stated above ([1834]Q[23], A[4]).
Therefore original sin is not concupiscence any more than another
passion.
Objection 3: Further, by original sin, all the parts of the soul are
disordered, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[3]). But the intellect is the
highest of the soul's parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7).
Therefore original sin is ignorance rather than concupiscence.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 15): "Concupiscence is the
guilt of original sin. "
I answer that, Everything takes its species from its form: and it has
been stated [1835](A[2]) that the species of original sin is taken from
its cause. Consequently the formal element of original sin must be
considered in respect of the cause of original sin. But contraries have
contrary causes. Therefore the cause of original sin must be considered
with respect to the cause of original justice, which is opposed to it.
Now the whole order of original justice consists in man's will being
subject to God: which subjection, first and chiefly, was in the will,
whose function it is to move all the other parts to the end, as stated
above (Q[9], A[1] ), so that the will being turned away from God, all
the other powers of the soul become inordinate. Accordingly the
privation of original justice, whereby the will was made subject to
God, is the formal element in original sin; while every other disorder
of the soul's powers, is a kind of material element in respect of
original sin. Now the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul
consists chiefly in their turning inordinately to mutable good; which
inordinateness may be called by the general name of concupiscence.
Hence original sin is concupiscence, materially, but privation of
original justice, formally.
Reply to Objection 1: Since, in man, the concupiscible power is
naturally governed by reason, the act of concupiscence is so far
natural to man, as it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in
so far as it trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man,
contrary to reason. Such is the concupiscence of original sin.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1836]Q[25], A[1]), all the
irascible passions are reducible to concupiscible passions, as holding
the principle place: and of these, concupiscence is the most impetuous
in moving, and is felt most, as stated above ([1837]Q[25], A[2], ad 1).
Therefore original sin is ascribed to concupiscence, as being the chief
passion, and as including all the others, in a fashion.
Reply to Objection 3: As, in good things, the intellect and reason
stand first, so conversely in evil things, the lower part of the soul
is found to take precedence, for it clouds and draws the reason, as
stated above ([1838]Q[77], AA[1],2;[1839] Q[80], A[2]). Hence original
sin is called concupiscence rather than ignorance, although ignorance
is comprised among the material defects of original sin.
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Whether original sin is equally in all?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not equally in all.
Because original sin is inordinate concupiscence, as stated above
[1840](A[3]). Now all are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence.
Therefore original sin is not equally in all.
Objection 2: Further, original sin is an inordinate disposition of the
soul, just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body. But
sickness is subject to degrees. Therefore original sin is subject to
degrees.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Nup. et Concep. i, 23) that
"lust transmits original sin to the child. " But the act of generation
may be more lustful in one than in another. Therefore original sin may
be greater in one than in another.
On the contrary, Original sin is the sin of nature, as stated above
([1841]Q[81], A[1]). But nature is equally in all. Therefore original
sin is too.
I answer that, There are two things in original sin: one is the
privation of original justice; the other is the relation of this
privation to the sin of our first parent, from whom it is transmitted
to man through his corrupt origin. As to the first, original sin has no
degrees, since the gift of original justice is taken away entirely; and
privations that remove something entirely, such as death and darkness,
cannot be more or less, as stated above ([1842]Q[73], A[2]). In like
manner, neither is this possible, as to the second: since all are
related equally to the first principle of our corrupt origin, from
which principle original sin takes the nature of guilt; for relations
cannot be more or less. Consequently it is evident that original sin
cannot be more in one than in another.
Reply to Objection 1: Through the bond of original justice being
broken, which held together all the powers of the soul in a certain
order, each power of the soul tends to its own proper movement, and the
more impetuously, as it is stronger. Now it happens that some of the
soul's powers are stronger in one man than in another, on account of
the different bodily temperaments. Consequently if one man is more
prone than another to acts of concupiscence, this is not due to
original sin, because the bond of original justice is equally broken in
all, and the lower parts of the soul are, in all, left to themselves
equally; but it is due to the various dispositions of the powers, as
stated.
Reply to Objection 2: Sickness of the body, even sickness of the same
species, has not an equal cause in all; for instance if a fever be
caused by corruption of the bile, the corruption may be greater or
less, and nearer to, or further from a vital principle. But the cause
of original sin is equal to all, so that there is not comparison.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not the actual lust that transmits original
sin: for, supposing God were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate
lust in the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin; we
must understand this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive
appetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original
justice. This lust is equally in all.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subject of original sin, under which head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the
soul?
(2) If it be the soul, whether this be through its essence, or through
its powers?
(3) Whether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of
original sin?
(4) Whether certain powers of the soul are specially infected, viz. the
generative power, the concupiscible part, and the sense of touch?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is more in the flesh than
in the soul. Because the rebellion of the flesh against the mind arises
from the corruption of original sin. Now the root of this rebellion is
seated in the flesh: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): "I see another
law in my members fighting against the law of my mind. " Therefore
original sin is seated chiefly in the flesh.
Objection 2: Further, a thing is more in its cause than in its effect:
thus heat is in the heating fire more than in the hot water. Now the
soul is infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal
semen. Therefore original sin is in the flesh rather than in the soul.
Objection 3: Further, we contract original sin from our first parent,
in so far as we were in him by reason of seminal virtue. Now our souls
were not in him thus, but only our flesh. Therefore original sin is not
in the soul, but in the flesh.
Objection 4: Further, the rational soul created by God is infused into
the body. If therefore the soul were infected with original sin, it
would follow that it is corrupted in its creation or infusion: and thus
God would be the cause of sin, since He is the author of the soul's
creation and fusion.
Objection 5: Further, no wise man pours a precious liquid into a
vessel, knowing that the vessel will corrupt the liquid. But the
rational soul is more precious than any liquid. If therefore the soul,
by being united with the body, could be corrupted with the infection of
original sin, God, Who is wisdom itself, would never infuse the soul
into such a body. And yet He does; wherefore it is not corrupted by the
flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul but in the flesh.
On the contrary, The same is the subject of a virtue and of the vice or
sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh cannot be the subject of
virtue: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7:18): "I know that there dwelleth
not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good. " Therefore
the flesh cannot be the subject of original sin, but only the soul.
I answer that, One thing can be in another in two ways. First, as in
its cause, either principal, or instrumental; secondly, as in its
subject. Accordingly the original sin of all men was in Adam indeed, as
in its principal cause, according to the words of the Apostle (Rom.
5:12): "In whom all have sinned": whereas it is in the bodily semen, as
in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active power of the semen
that original sin together with human nature is transmitted to the
child. But original sin can nowise be in the flesh as its subject, but
only in the soul.
The reason for this is that, as stated above ([1843]Q[81], A[1]),
original sin is transmitted from the will of our first parent to this
posterity by a certain movement of generation, in the same way as
actual sin is transmitted from any man's will to his other parts. Now
in this transmission it is to be observed, that whatever accrues from
the motion of the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can
in any way share in that guilt, either as its subject or as its
instrument, has the character of sin. Thus from the will consenting to
gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues to the concupiscible faculty,
and partaking of food accrues to the hand and the mouth, which, in so
far as they are moved by the will to sin, are the instruments of sin.
But that further action is evoked in the nutritive power and the
internal members, which have no natural aptitude for being moved by the
will, does not bear the character of guilt.
Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, while the
flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt; whatever accrues to
the soul from the corruption of the first sin, has the character of
guilt, while whatever accrues to the flesh, has the character, not of
guilt but of punishment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject of
original sin, and not the flesh.
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 27) [*Cf. QQ.
lxxxiii, qu. 66], the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man
already redeemed, who is delivered from guilt, but is still liable to
punishment, by reason of which sin is stated to dwell "in the flesh. "
Consequently it follows that the flesh is the subject, not of guilt,
but of punishment.
Reply to Objection 2: Original sin is caused by the semen as
instrumental cause. Now there is no need for anything to be more in the
instrumental cause than in the effect; but only in the principal cause:
and, in this way, original sin was in Adam more fully, since in him it
had the nature of actual sin.
Reply to Objection 3: The soul of any individual man was in Adam, in
respect of his seminal power, not indeed as in its effective principle,
but as in a dispositive principle: because the bodily semen, which is
transmitted from Adam, does not of its own power produce the rational
soul, but disposes the matter for it.
Reply to Objection 4: The corruption of original sin is nowise caused
by God, but by the sin alone of our first parent through carnal
generation. And so, since creation implies a relation in the soul to
God alone, it cannot be said that the soul is tainted through being
created. On the other hand, infusion implies relation both to God
infusing and to the flesh into which the soul is infused. And so, with
regard to God infusing, it cannot be said that the soul is stained
through being infused; but only with regard to the body into which it
is infused.
Reply to Objection 5: The common good takes precedence of private good.
Wherefore God, according to His wisdom, does not overlook the general
order of things (which is that such a soul be infused into such a
body), lest this soul contract a singular corruption: all the more that
the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist prior to its
infusion into the body, as stated in the [1844]FP, Q[90], A[4];
[1845]FP, Q[118], A[3]. And it is better for the soul to be thus,
according to its nature, than not to be at all, especially since it can
avoid damnation, by means of grace.
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Whether original sin is in the essence of the soul rather than in the
powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not in the essence of
the soul rather than in the powers. For the soul is naturally apt to be
the subject of sin, in respect of those parts which can be moved by the
will. Now the soul is moved by the will, not as to its essence but only
as to the powers. Therefore original sin is in the soul, not according
to its essence, but only according to the powers.
Objection 2: Further, original sin is opposed to original justice. Now
original justice was in a power of the soul, because power is the
subject of virtue. Therefore original sin also is in a power of the
soul, rather than in its essence.
Objection 3: Further, just as original sin is derived from the soul as
from the flesh, so is it derived by the powers from the essence. But
original sin is more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is
more in the powers than in the essence of the soul.
Objection 4: Further, original sin is said to be concupiscence, as
stated ([1846]Q[82], A[3]). But concupiscence is in the powers of the
soul. Therefore original sin is also.
On the contrary, Original sin is called the sin of nature, as stated
above (Q[81], A[1]). Now the soul is the form and nature of the body,
in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers, as stated
in the [1847]FP, Q[76], A[6]. Therefore the soul is the subject of
original sin chiefly in respect of its essence.
I answer that, The subject of a sin is chiefly that part of the soul to
which the motive cause of that sin primarily pertains: thus if the
motive cause of a sin is sensual pleasure, which regards the
concupiscible power through being its proper object, it follows that
the concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is
evident that original sin is caused through our origin. Consequently
that part of the soul which is first reached by man's origin, is the
primary subject of original sin. Now the origin reaches the soul as the
term of generation, according as it is the form of the body: and this
belongs to the soul in respect of its essence, as was proved in the
[1848]FP, Q[76], A[6]. Therefore the soul, in respect of its essence,
is the primary subject of original sin.
Reply to Objection 1: As the motion of the will of an individual
reaches to the soul's powers and not to its essence, so the motion of
the will of the first generator, through the channel of generation,
reaches first of all to the essence of the soul, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2: Even original justice pertained radically to the
essence of the soul, because it was God's gift to human nature, to
which the essence of the soul is related before the powers. For the
powers seem to regard the person, in as much as they are the principles
of personal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of actual sins,
which are the sins of the person.
Reply to Objection 3: The body is related to the soul as matter to
form, which though it comes second in order of generation, nevertheless
comes first in the order of perfection and nature. But the essence of
the soul is related to the powers, as a subject to its proper
accidents, which follow their subject both in the order of generation
and in that of perfection. Consequently the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 4: Concupiscence, in relation to original sin, holds
the position of matter and effect, as stated above ([1849]Q[82], A[3]).
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Whether original sin infects the will before the other powers?
Objection 1: It would seem that original sin does not infect the will
before the other powers. For every sin belongs chiefly to that power by
whose act it was caused. Now original sin is caused by an act of the
generative power. Therefore it seems to belong to the generative power
more than to the others.
Objection 2: Further, original sin is transmitted through the carnal
semen. But the other powers of the soul are more akin to the flesh than
the will is, as is evident with regard to all the sensitive powers,
which use a bodily organ. Therefore original sin is in them more than
in the will.
Objection 3: Further, the intellect precedes the will, for the object
of the will is only the good understood. If therefore original sin
infects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it must first of all
infect the intellect, as preceding the others.
On the contrary, Original justice has a prior relation to the will,
because it is "rectitude of the will," as Anselm states (De Concep.
Virg. iii). Therefore original sin, which is opposed to it, also has a
prior relation to the will.
I answer that, Two things must be considered in the infection of
original sin. First, its inherence to its subject; and in this respect
it regards first the essence of the soul, as stated above [1850](A[2]).
In the second place we must consider its inclination to act; and in
this way it regards the powers of the soul. It must therefore regard
first of all that power in which is seated the first inclination to
commit a sin, and this is the will, as stated above (Q[74], AA[1],2).
Therefore original sin regards first of all the will.
Reply to Objection 1: Original sin, in man, is not caused by the
generative power of the child, but by the act of the parental
generative power. Consequently, it does not follow that the child's
generative power is the subject of original sin.
Reply to Objection 2: Original sin spreads in two ways; from the flesh
to the soul, and from the essence of the soul to the powers. The former
follows the order of generation, the latter follows the order of
perfection. Therefore, although the other, viz. the sensitive powers,
are more akin to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the higher
power, is more akin to the essence of the soul, the infection of
original sin reaches it first.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellect precedes the will, in one way, by
proposing its object to it. In another way, the will precedes the
intellect, in the order of motion to act, which motion pertains to sin.
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Whether the aforesaid powers are more infected than the others?
Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid powers are not more
infected than the others. For the infection of original sin seems to
pertain more to that part of the soul which can be first the subject of
sin. Now this is the rational part, and chiefly the will. Therefore
that power is most infected by original sin.
Objection 2: Further, no power of the soul is infected by guilt, except
in so far as it can obey reason. Now the generative power cannot obey
reason, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the generative power is
not the most infected by original sin.
Objection 3: Further, of all the senses the sight is the most spiritual
and the nearest to reason, in so far "as it shows us how a number of
things differ" (Metaph. i). But the infection of guilt is first of all
in the reason. Therefore the sight is more infected than touch.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16, seqq. , 24) that
the infection of original sin is most apparent in the movements of the
members of generation, which are not subject to reason. Now those
members serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes, wherein
there is the delectation of touch, which is the most powerful incentive
to concupiscence. Therefore the infection of original sin regards these
three chiefly, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible faculty and
the sense of touch.
I answer that, Those corruptions especially are said to be infectious,
which are of such a nature as to be transmitted from one subject to
another: hence contagious diseases, such as leprosy and murrain and the
like, are said to be infectious. Now the corruption of original sin is
transmitted by the act of generation, as stated above ([1851]Q[81],
A[1]). Therefore the powers which concur in this act, are chiefly said
to be infected. Now this act serves the generative power, in as much as
it is directed to generation; and it includes delectation of the touch,
which is the most powerful object of the concupiscible faculty.
Consequently, while all the parts of the soul are said to be corrupted
by original sin, these three are said specially to be corrupted and
infected.
Reply to Objection 1: Original sin, in so far as it inclines to actual
sins, belongs chiefly to the will, as stated above [1852](A[3]). But in
so far as it is transmitted to the offspring, it belongs to the
aforesaid powers proximately, and to the will, remotely.
Reply to Objection 2: The infection of actual sin belongs only to the
powers which are moved by the will of the sinner. But the infection of
original sin is not derived from the will of the contractor, but
through his natural origin, which is effected by the generative power.
Hence it is this power that is infected by original sin.
Reply to Objection 3: Sight is not related to the act of generation
except in respect of remote disposition, in so far as the concupiscible
species is seen through the sight. But the delectation is completed in
the touch. Wherefore the aforesaid infection is ascribed to the touch
rather than to the sight.
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OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER (FOUR
ARTICLES)
We must now consider the cause of sin, in so far as one sin can be the
cause of another. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?
(2) Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?
(3) Whether other special sins should be called capital vices, besides
pride and covetousness?
(4) How many capital vices there are, and which are they?
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Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that covetousness is not the root of all
sins. For covetousness, which is immoderate desire for riches, is
opposed to the virtue of liberality. But liberality is not the root of
all virtues. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins.
Objection 2: Further, the desire for the means proceeds from desire for
the end. Now riches, the desire for which is called covetousness, are
not desired except as being useful for some end, as stated in Ethic. i,
5. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins, but proceeds
from some deeper root.
Objection 3: Further, it often happens that avarice, which is another
name for covetousness, arises from other sins; as when a man desires
money through ambition, or in order to sate his gluttony. Therefore it
is not the root of all sins.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:10): "The desire of money
is the root of all evil. "
I answer that, According to some, covetousness may be understood in
different ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire for riches: and
thus it is a special sin. Secondly, as denoting inordinate desire for
any temporal good: and thus it is a genus comprising all sins, because
every sin includes an inordinate turning to a mutable good, as stated
above ([1853]Q[72], A[2]). Thirdly, as denoting an inclination of a
corrupt nature to desire corruptible goods inordinately: and they say
that in this sense covetousness is the root of all sins, comparing it
to the root of a tree, which draws its sustenance from earth, just as
every sin grows out of the love of temporal things.
Now, though all this is true, it does not seem to explain the mind of
the Apostle when he states that covetousness is the root of all sins.
For in that passage he clearly speaks against those who, because they
"will become rich, fall into temptation, and into the snare of the
devil . . . for covetousness is the root of all evils. " Hence it is
evident that he is speaking of covetousness as denoting the inordinate
desire for riches. Accordingly, we must say that covetousness, as
denoting a special sin, is called the root of all sins, in likeness to
the root of a tree, in furnishing sustenance to the whole tree. For we
see that by riches man acquires the means of committing any sin
whatever, and of sating his desire for any sin whatever, since money
helps man to obtain all manner of temporal goods, according to Eccles.
10:19: "All things obey money": so that in this desire for riches is
the root of all sins.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue and sin do not arise from the same source.
For sin arises from the desire of mutable good; and consequently the
desire of that good which helps one to obtain all temporal goods, is
called the root of all sins. But virtue arises from the desire for the
immutable God; and consequently charity, which is the love of God, is
called the root of the virtues, according to Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and
founded in charity. "
Reply to Objection 2: The desire of money is said to be the root of
sins, not as though riches were sought for their own sake, as being the
last end; but because they are much sought after as useful for any
temporal end. And since a universal good is more desirable than a
particular good, they move the appetite more than any individual goods,
which along with many others can be procured by means of money.
Reply to Objection 3: Just as in natural things we do not ask what
always happens, but what happens most frequently, for the reason that
the nature of corruptible things can be hindered, so as not always to
act in the same way; so also in moral matters, we consider what happens
in the majority of cases, not what happens invariably, for the reason
that the will does not act of necessity. So when we say that
covetousness is the root of all evils, we do not assert that no other
evil can be its root, but that other evils more frequently arise
therefrom, for the reason given.
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Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the beginning of every
sin. For the root is a beginning of a tree, so that the beginning of a
sin seems to be the same as the root of sin. Now covetousness is the
root of every sin, as stated above [1854](A[1]). Therefore it is also
the beginning of every sin, and not pride.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): "The beginning of
the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from God. " But
apostasy from God is a sin. Therefore another sin is the beginning of
pride, so that the latter is not the beginning of every sin.
Objection 3: Further, the beginning of every sin would seem to be that
which causes all sins. Now this is inordinate self-love, which,
according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), "builds up the city of
Babylon. " Therefore self-love and not pride, is the beginning of every
sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning
of all sin. "
I answer that, Some say pride is to be taken in three ways. First, as
denoting inordinate desire to excel; and thus it is a special sin.
Secondly, as denoting actual contempt of God, to the effect of not
being subject to His commandment; and thus, they say, it is a generic
sin. Thirdly, as denoting an inclination to this contempt, owing to the
corruption of nature; and in this sense they say that it is the
beginning of every sin, and that it differs from covetousness, because
covetousness regards sin as turning towards the mutable good by which
sin is, as it were, nourished and fostered, for which reason
covetousness is called the "root"; whereas pride regards sin as turning
away from God, to Whose commandment man refuses to be subject, for
which reason it is called the "beginning," because the beginning of
evil consists in turning away from God.
Now though all this is true, nevertheless it does not explain the mind
of the wise man who said (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning of
all sin. " For it is evident that he is speaking of pride as denoting
inordinate desire to excel, as is clear from what follows (verse 17):
"God hath overturned the thrones of proud princes"; indeed this is the
point of nearly the whole chapter. We must therefore say that pride,
even as denoting a special sin, is the beginning of every sin. For we
must take note that, in voluntary actions, such as sins, there is a
twofold order, of intention, and of execution. In the former order, the
principle is the end, as we have stated many times before (Q[1], A[1],
ad 1; Q[18], A[7], ad 2; Q[15], A[1], ad 2; Q[25], A[2]). Now man's end
in acquiring all temporal goods is that, through their means, he may
have some perfection and excellence. Therefore, from this point of
view, pride, which is the desire to excel, is said to be the
"beginning" of every sin. On the other hand, in the order of execution,
the first place belongs to that which by furnishing the opportunity of
fulfilling all desires of sin, has the character of a root, and such
are riches; so that, from this point of view, covetousness is said to
be the "root" of all evils, as stated above [1855](A[1]).
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Apostasy from God is stated to be the beginning
of pride, in so far as it denotes a turning away from God, because from
the fact that man wishes not to be subject to God, it follows that he
desires inordinately his own excellence in temporal things. Wherefore,
in the passage quoted, apostasy from God does not denote the special
sin, but rather that general condition of every sin, consisting in its
turning away from God. It may also be said that apostasy from God is
said to be the beginning of pride, because it is the first species of
pride. For it is characteristic of pride to be unwilling to be subject
to any superior, and especially to God; the result being that a man is
unduly lifted up, in respect of the other species of pride.
Reply to Objection 3: In desiring to excel, man loves himself, for to
love oneself is the same as to desire some good for oneself.
Consequently it amounts to the same whether we reckon pride or
self-love as the beginning of every evil.
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Whether any other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called
capital?
Objection 1: It would seem that no other special sins, besides pride
and avarice, should be called capital. Because "the head seems to be to
an animal, what the root is to a plant," as stated in De Anima ii,
text. 38: for the roots are like a mouth. If therefore covetousness is
called the "root of all evils," it seems that it alone, and no other
sin, should be called a capital vice.
Objection 2: Further, the head bears a certain relation of order to the
other members, in so far as sensation and movement follow from the
head. But sin implies privation of order. Therefore sin has not the
character of head: so that no sins should be called capital.
Objection 3: Further, capital crimes are those which receive capital
punishment. But every kind of sin comprises some that are punished
thus. Therefore the capital sins are not certain specific sins.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) enumerates certain special
vices under the name of capital.
I answer that, The word capital is derived from "caput" [a head]. Now
the head, properly speaking, is that part of an animal's body, which is
the principle and director of the whole animal. Hence, metaphorically
speaking, every principle is called a head, and even men who direct and
govern others are called heads. Accordingly a capital vice is so
called, in the first place, from "head" taken in the proper sense, and
thus the name "capital" is given to a sin for which capital punishment
is inflicted. It is not in this sense that we are now speaking of
capital sins, but in another sense, in which the term "capital" is
derived from head, taken metaphorically for a principle or director of
others. In this way a capital vice is one from which other vices arise,
chiefly by being their final cause, which origin is formal, as stated
above ([1856]Q[72], A[6]). Wherefore a capital vice is not only the
principle of others, but is also their director and, in a way, their
leader: because the art or habit, to which the end belongs, is always
the principle and the commander in matters concerning the means. Hence
Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) compares these capital vices to the "leaders
of an army. "
Reply to Objection 1: The term "capital" is taken from "caput" and
applied to something connected with, or partaking of the head, as
having some property thereof, but not as being the head taken
literally. And therefore the capital vices are not only those which
have the character of primary origin, as covetousness which is called
the "root," and pride which is called the beginning, but also those
which have the character of proximate origin in respect of several
sins.
Reply to Objection 2: Sin lacks order in so far as it turns away from
God, for in this respect it is an evil, and evil, according to
Augustine (De Natura Boni iv), is "the privation of mode, species and
order. " But in so far as sin implies a turning to something, it regards
some good: wherefore, in this respect, there can be order in sin.
Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers capital sin as so called
from the punishment it deserves, in which sense we are not taking it
here.
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Whether the seven capital vices are suitably reckoned?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital
vices, viz. vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony,
lust. For sins are opposed to virtues. But there are four principal
virtues, as stated above ([1857]Q[61], A[2]). Therefore there are only
four principal or capital vices.
Objection 2: Further, the passions of the soul are causes of sin, as
stated above ([1858]Q[77]). But there are four principal passions of
the soul; two of which, viz. hope and fear, are not mentioned among the
above sins, whereas certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and
sadness belong, since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, and
sadness to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins are unfittingly
enumerated.
Objection 3: Further, anger is not a principal passion. Therefore it
should not be placed among the principal vices.
Objection 4: Further, just as covetousness or avarice is the root of
sin, so is pride the beginning of sin, as stated above [1859](A[2]).
But avarice is reckoned to be one of the capital vices. Therefore pride
also should be placed among the capital vices.
Objection 5: Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused
through any of these: as, for instance, when one sins through
ignorance, or when one commits a sin with a good intention, e. g. steals
in order to give an alms. Therefore the capital vices are
insufficiently enumerated.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates them in
this way (Moral. xxxi, 17).
I answer that, As stated above [1860](A[3]), the capital vices are
those which give rise to others, especially by way of final cause. Now
this kind of origin may take place in two ways. First, on account of
the condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong
inclination for one particular end, the result being that he frequently
goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does not come under
the consideration of art, because man's particular dispositions are
infinite in number. Secondly, on account of a natural relationship of
the ends to one another: and it is in this way that most frequently one
vice arises from another, so that this kind of origin can come under
the consideration of art.
Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, whose ends have
certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite; and it is in
respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are
differentiated. Now a thing moves the appetite in two ways. First,
directly and of its very nature: thus good moves the appetite to seek
it, while evil, for the same reason, moves the appetite to avoid it.
Secondly, indirectly and on account of something else, as it were: thus
one seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a good
on account of some attendant evil.
Again, man's good is threefold. For, in the first place, there is a
certain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of appetibility,
merely through being apprehended, viz. the excellence of honor and
praise, and this good is sought inordinately by "vainglory. " Secondly,
there is the good of the body, and this regards either the preservation
of the individual, e. g. meat and drink, which good is pursued
inordinately by "gluttony," or the preservation of the species, e. g.
sexual intercourse, which good is sought inordinately by "lust. "
Thirdly, there is external good, viz. riches, to which "covetousness"
is referred. These same four vices avoid inordinately the contrary
evils.
Or again, good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some
property of happiness, which all men seek naturally. Now in the first
place happiness implies perfection, since happiness is a perfect good,
to which belongs excellence or renown, which is desired by "pride" or
"vainglory. " Secondly, it implies satiety, which "covetousness" seeks
in riches that give promise thereof. Thirdly, it implies pleasure,
without which happiness is impossible, as stated in Ethic. i, 7; x,
6,7,[8] and this "gluttony" and "lust" pursue.
On the other hand, avoidance of good on account of an attendant evil
occurs in two ways. For this happens either in respect of one's own
good, and thus we have "sloth," which is sadness about one's spiritual
good, on account of the attendant bodily labor: or else it happens in
respect of another's good, and this, if it be without recrimination,
belongs to "envy," which is sadness about another's good as being a
hindrance to one's own excellence, while if it be with recrimination
with a view to vengeance, it is "anger. " Again, these same vices seek
the contrary evils.
Reply to Objection 1: Virtue and vice do not originate in the same way:
since virtue is caused by the subordination of the appetite to reason,
or to the immutable good, which is God, whereas vice arises from the
appetite for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need for the principal
vices to be contrary to the principal virtues.
Reply to Objection 2: Fear and hope are irascible passions. Now all the
passions of the irascible part arise from passions of the concupiscible
part; and these are all, in a way, directed to pleasure or sorrow.
Hence pleasure and sorrow have a prominent place among the capital
sins, as being the most important of the passions, as stated above
([1861]Q[25], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 3: Although anger is not a principal passion, yet it
has a distinct place among the capital vices, because it implies a
special kind of movement in the appetite, in so far as recrimination
against another's good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i. e. of the
right to vengeance.
