1859); the Jena mathematician, Erhard VVeigel, the teacher of Leibniz and
Puffendorf
; Walther von Tschirn- hausen (1661-1708 ; Medicina Mentis sive Artis Inveniendi Prcecepta Generalia, Amsterdam, 1087), and Samuel Puffendorf (1032-1694; under the pseudonym Severinus a Monzambano, De Statu Bei publico: Germanicce, 1667, German by H.
Windelband - History of Philosophy
Thomas, Lond.
, 4th ed.
, 1892J ; K.
Lasswitz, Gesch.
der Atomistik, 2 vols.
(Hamburg and Leips.
1890).
Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, Viscount of St. Albans, was born in 1561, studied in Cambridge, had a brilliant career under the reigns of Elizabeth and James I. , until, as the result of political opposition, he was proceeded against, convicted of venality, and deposed from the position of Lord High Chancellor. He died 1626. The latest edition of his works is that by Spedding and Heath (Lond. 1857 ff. ). Aside from the Essays (Sermones Fideles) the main writings are De Dignilate et Augmentis Scientiarum (1623 ; originally published under the title, The Two Books of Frattis Bacon on the Proftrience and Advancementof Learning, Divine and Human, 1605) and Novum Organon Scientiarum (1620; originally under the title, Cogitata et Visa, 1012). ' Cf. Ch. de Remusat, Bacon, Sa vie, son temps, sa philosophic et son influence
jusqu'a nos jours (Paris, 1864) ; H. Heussler, Fr. B. und seine geschichtlichf Stellung (Breslau, 1889) ; [Bacon, by J. Nichol, in Blackwood's series, Edin. 1888 : Ed. of the Novum Organum by Fowler, Oxford, 1878].
Rene Descartes (Cartesius), born 1596, in Touraine, and educated in the Jesuit school at La Fleche, was originally destined for a soldier and took part in the campaigns of 1618-1621 in the service of various leaders, but then betook himself for the first time to Paris, and later, withdrew for many years, at differ ent places in the Netherlands, into a scientific solitude, which he kept in the most diligent and careful manner. After controversies in which his doctrine had become involved at the universities in that country had rendered this place of residence disagreeable, he accepted, in 1649, an invitation of Queen Christine of Sweden to Stockholm, where he died the following year. His works have been collected in Latin in the Amsterdam editions (1650, etc. ), and in French by V. Cousin (11 vols. , Paris, 1824 ff. ) ; the important writings have been trans lated into German by Kuno Fischer (Mannheim, 1863) [Eng. tr. of the Method,
Meditations and Selections from the Principles by J. Veitch, Edin. and Lond. , 1st ed. , 1850-62, 10th ed. , 1890 ; of the Meditations by Lowndes, Lond. 1878, also in Jour. Spec. Phil. , Vol. IV. , 1870, by W. R. Walker; and of the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, with selections from the Med. 's, The World, The Passions of the Soul, etc. , by H. A. P. Torrey, N. Y. 1892]. The main works are Le Monde ou Traiti de la Lumiere (posthumously printed, 1654) ; Fssays, 16:17, among them the Discours de la Methode and the Dioptrics ; Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, 1641, supplemented by the objections of various savants and Descartes' replies ; Principia Philosophia;, 1644 ; Passions de VAme, 1650. Cf. F. Bouillier, Histoire de la Philosophic Cartisienne (Paris, 1854) ; X. Schmid-
1 It is well known that very recently much noise has been made over the discovery that Lord Bacon wrote Shakspere's works also, in his leisure hours. To fuse two great literary phenomena into one may have something alluring in it, but in any case a mistake has been made in the person. For it would be much more probable that Shakspere had incidentally composed the Baconian philosophy. [The Germans seem to take this "noise" much more seriously than Shakspere's countrymen. — Tr. ]
Chap. 2. ]
schwarzenberg, It. D. nnd seine Reform der Philosophic (Nordlingen, 1850) ; G. Glogau in Zeifehr. f. Philos. , 1878, pp. 209 S. ; P. Natorp, D. 's Erkenntniss- theorie (Marburg, 1882). [Descartes by J. P. Mahaffy in Blackwood's series, K. liii. and l'liila . 1881 ; W. Wallace, Art. Descartes in Ene. Brit. ; H. Sidgwick in Mind, Vol. VII. ; Rhodes in Jour. Spec. Phil. , XVII.
Natural Science Period. 381
Between these two leaders of modern philosophy stands Thomas Hobbea, born 1688, educated at Oxford, who was early drawn over to France by his studies, and frequently afterwards returned thither, was personally acquainted with Bacon, Gassendi, Campanella, and the Cartesian circle, and died 1879. Complete edition of his works, English and Latin by Molesworth, I. ond. 1830 ff. His first treatise, Elements of Late, Natural and Political (1639), was pub lished by his friends in 1660, in two parte, Human Nature and De Corpore Politico. He published previously Elementa Philosophic de Cive, 1642 and 1647, and further Leviathan or The Matter, Form, and Authority of Government, 1661. A comprehensive statement is given in the Elementa PhUosuphice, De Cor
pore, II. , De Homine, 1668 (both previously in English in 1666 and 1668. Cf. K. Touniea in Vierteljahrschr. w. Philos. , 1879 S. [Hobbes, by G. C. Robert son in Blackwood's series, Edin. and Phil. 1886, also Art Hobbes, In Ene. Bra. by same author. F. Tonnies. Hobbes (Stuttgart, 1896).
Of the Cartesian School (cf. Bouillier, op. cit. ) are to be noted the Jansen- ists of Port-Royal, from whose circles came the Logique ou Vart depenser (1662), ed. by Anton Arnauld (1612-1694), and Pierre Nicole (1626-1696) also the Mystics, Blaise Pascal (1623-1662 Penseis sur la Religion cf. the monographs by J. G. Dreydorff, Leips. 1870 and 1875), and Pierre Polret (1646-1719; De Eruditione Triplici, Solida Superjiciaria et Falsa.
The development to Occasionalism proceeds gradually in Louis de la Forge Trail* de Esprit llumain. 1666;, Clauberg( 1622-1665 De Conjunctione Corpo
ris et Animae in Homine), Cordemoy (f. e Discernement du Corps et de I'Ame, Irttlti), but finds its complete development independently of these thinkers in Arnold Oeullncz (1626-1669; university teacher in Loeweti and Leyden). His main works are the Ethics (1666; 2d ed. with notes, 1676); Logic, 1662, and Methodus, 1663. New ed. of his works by J. P. N. Land vols. , The Hague, 1891-3). Cf. E. Pfleiderer, A. G. als Hauptvertrrter der orr. Metaphysik
nnd Ethik (TUbingen, 1882) V. van der Hasghen, G. Etude sur sa Vie, sa Philosophic et set Ouvrages (LOttich, 1886).
From the Oratorlum founded by Cardinal Berulle, friend of Descartes, to which Oibieuf also belonged (De Libertate Dei et Creatura, Paris, 1630), went forth Nicole Malebranche (1638-1716). His main work, De la Recherche de la
X'rrite, appeared 1675, the Entretiens sur la Alitaphysique et sur la Religion in 1088. Coll. works by J. Simon (Paris, 1871).
Baruch (Benedict de) Spinosa, born in 1632 at Amsterdam in the commu nity of Portuguese Jews, and later expelled from this community on account of his opinions, lived in noble simplicity and solitude at various places in Hol land, and died at The Hague 1677. He had published an exposition of the Cartesian philosophy with an Independent metaphysical appendix (1663) and the Tract at us Theologieo-politieus (anonymously in 1670). After his death appeared in his Opera Posthuma (1677), his main work, Ethica More Geometrico
Demonstrate, the Traetatus Politicus, and the fragment De Intellecius Emenda- linne. His correspondence and his recently discovered youthful work, Traetatus ihrevis) de Den et Homine ejusque Felicitate, also come into consideration. <>n the latter cf. Chr. Sigwart (Tubingen, 1870). The best edition of his works to that by Van Vloten and Land vols. . Amsterdam, 1882 f. ). Cf. T. Camerer. Die Lehrt Sp. 's (Stuttgart, 1877). [Spinous, by J. Caird, Edin. 1888; Spinoza by Martineau, Lond. 1883 also in Types of Ethical Theory, Oxford, 1886 F. Pollock. Spinoza. His Life and Phil. , Lond. 1880; Seth, Art. Spinoza, in Ene. Brit. Arts, in Jour. Spec. Phil. , Vols. 11 and 16, by Morris and Dewey Eng. \x. of prin. works by F. lwes, Bonn Lib. , 1884, of the Ethics by White, Lond. 1883, and of Selections by Fullerton, NY. 1892. ]
Of philosophical writers in Germany who attached themselves to the train of the movement among the two civilised peoples of the West are to be mentioned Joachim Jung (1587-1667 Logica Hamburgiensis, 1638); cf. G. E. Guhrauer.
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382 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IV.
J. J. und sein Zeitalter (Stuttg. and Tfib.
1859); the Jena mathematician, Erhard VVeigel, the teacher of Leibniz and Puffendorf ; Walther von Tschirn- hausen (1661-1708 ; Medicina Mentis sive Artis Inveniendi Prcecepta Generalia, Amsterdam, 1087), and Samuel Puffendorf (1032-1694; under the pseudonym Severinus a Monzambano, De Statu Bei publico: Germanicce, 1667, German by H. Bresslau, Berlin, 1870 ; De Jure Naturae et Gentium, London, 1672).
Leibniz belongs in this period, not only in point of time, but also as regards the origination and the motives of his metaphysics, while with other interests of his incredibly many-sided nature, he ranges on into the age of the Enlighten ment ; cf. on this, Part V. Here, therefore, we have to consider principally his methodological and metaphysical writings : De Principio Individui, 1663 ; De Arte Combinatoria, 1666 ; Nova Methodus pro Maximis et Minimis, 1684 ; De Scientia Universali seu Calculo Philosophico, 1684 (cf. A. Trendelenburg, Hist. Beitrage zur Philos. , III. 1 ff. ); De Prima: Philosophies Emendatione, 1694; Systeme Nouveau de la Nature, 1695, with the three Eclaircissements connected with it, 1696 ; also the Monadologie, 1714, the Principes de la Nature et de la Grace, 1714, and a great part of his extended correspondence. Among the editions of his philosophical writings the excellent edition by J. E. Erdmann (^Berlin, 1840) has now been surpassed by that of C. J. Gerhardt (7 vols. , Ber lin, 1875-91). — On the system as a whole cf. L. Feuerbach, Darstellung, Ent- vricklnng und Kritik der Leibnizischen Philos. (Ansbach, 1837), A. Nourisson, La Philos. de L. (Paris, 1860); E. Wendt, Die Entwicklung der LSschen Mo- nadenlehre bis 1695 (Berlin, 1886). [E. Dillmann, Sine neue Darst. der L. 'schen Monadenlehre, Leips. 1891. See also the lit. on p. 444. ]
On the historical and systematic relation of the systems to one another : H. C. W. Sigwart, Ueber den Zusammenhang des Spinozismus mit der cartes. Philos. (Tub. 1816) and Die Leibniz'sche Lehre von der prastabilirten Harmonie in ihrem Zusammenhang mit fruheren Philosophemen (ib. 1822) ; C. Schaar- schmidt, Descartes und Spinoza (Bonn, 1860) ; A. Foucher de Careil, Leibniz, Descartes et Spinoza (Paris, 1863) ; E. Pfleiderer, L. und Geulincx (Tub. 1884); E. Zeller, Sitz. -Ber. d. Berliner Akad, 1884, pp. 673 ff. ; F. Tonnies, Leibniz und Hobbes in Philos. Monatsh; 1887, pp. 357 ft*. ; L. Stein, Leibniz und Spinoza (Berlin, 1890). [E. Caird, Art Cartesianism, in Enc. Brit. , reprinted in Vol. 2 of his Essays, Lond. and N. Y. 1892 ; Saisset's Modern Pantheism. ]
To the founders of the philosophy of law (cf. C. v. Kaltenborn, Die Vorlaufer des Hugo Grotius, Leips. 1848 ; and B. v. Mohl, Gesch. und Litteratur der Staatswissenschaften, Erlangen, 1866-68) belong Nicolo Macchiavelli (1469- 1627 ; H Principe, Discorsi sulla prima decade di Tito Livio ; [Works, tr. by C. E. Detmold, Boston, 1883. ] Thomas More (1480-1636 ; De Optimo Bei publico- Statu sive de Nova Insula Utopia, 1516) ; Jean Bodin (1530-1697) ; Six Livres de la Bipublique, 1577; an extract from the Heptaplomeres has been given by Guhrauer, Berlin, 1841) ; Albericus Oentilis (1551-1611 ; De Jure Belli, 1688) ; Johannes Althus (1557-1638 ; Politico, Groningen, 1610, cf. O. Gierke, Unters. z. deutsch. Staats- u. Bechtsgesch. , Breslau, 1880); Hugo de Groot (1583-1645 ; De Jure Belli et Pacis, 1646; cf. H. Luden, H. G. , Berlin, 1806).
Of the Protestants who treat of the philosophy of law may be named, be sides Melancthon, J. Oldendorf (Elementaris Introductio, 1539), Nic. Hemming
(De Lege Natural, 1562), Ben Winkler (Principia Juris, 1615) ; of the Catho lics besides Suarez, Rob. Bellarmin (1642-1621 ; De Potentate Pontijicis in
Temporalibus) and Mariana (1537-1624 ; De Bege et Begis Institutione).
Natural religion and natural morals in the seventeenth century found in England their main supporters in Herbert of Cnerbury (1581-1648 ; Tractatus de Veritate, 1624 ; De Beligione Gentilium Errorumque apud eos Causis, 1663 ; on him Ch. de Remusat, Paris, 1873), and Richard Cumberland (De Legibu* Natural Disquisitio Philosophica, Lond. 1672). Among the Platonists or Neo-
Platonists of England at the same time are prominent Ralph Cudworth (1617— 1688 ; The Intellectual System of the Universe, Lond. 1678, Latin, Jena, 1783) and Henry More (1614-1687 ; Encheiridion Metaphysicum. His correspondence with Descartes is printed in the latter's works, Vol. X. , Cousin's ed. ). [Pfcrt. of Cudworth, by C. E. Lowrey, with bibliog. , N. Y. 1884; Tulloch's Rational Theol. and Christian Phil, in Eng. in ^^th Cent. ] Theophilus Gale and his son, Thomas Gale, may be added to the authors above.
Chap. 2, $ 30. ] Problem of Method : Bacon. 383
§ 30. The Problem of Method.
All beginnings of modern philosophy have in common an impul sive opposition against "Scholasticism," and at the same time a naive lack of understanding for the common attitude of dependence upon some one of its traditions, which they nevertheless all occupy. This fundamental oppositional character brings with it the conse quence, that in all cases where it is not merely wants of the feelings, or fanciful views that are set over against the old doctrines, reflec tion on new methods of knowledge stands in the foreground. Out of the insight into the unfruitfulness of the " syllogism," which could merely set forth in proof or refutation that which was already known, or apply the same to a particular case, arises the demand for an ars inveniendi, a method of investigation, a sure way to the discovery of the new.
1. If now nothing was to be accomplished with the help of rhetoric, the nearest expedient was to attack the matter by the reverse method, proceeding from the particular, from the facts. This had been commended by Vives and Sanchez, and practised by Telesio and Campanella. But they had neither gained full confi dence in experience nor known afterwards how to make any right beginning with their facts. In both lines Bacon believed that he could point out new paths for science, and in this spirit he set up his " New Organon " as over against the Aristotelian.
Every -day perception — he confesses, admitting the well-known sceptical arguments — offers, indeed, no sure basis for a true knowl edge of Nature ; in order to become an experience that can be used by science it must first be purified from all the erroneous additions which have grown together with it in our involuntary way of regard ing things. These perversions or falsifications of pure experience Bacon calls idols, and presents his doctrine of these fallacious images in analog}' with the doctrine of the fallacious conclusions in the old dialectic. 1 There are first the "idols of the tribe" (idola tribus), the illusions that are given in connection with human nature in general, following which we are always suspecting an order and an end in things, making ourselves the measure of the outer world, blindly retaining a mode of thought which has once been excited by impressions, and the like; then the "idols of the cave" (idola specus), by reason of which every individual by his natural disposi tion, and his situation in life, finds himself shut into his cave;*
• Nov. Org. I. 39 fl.
* Bacon'* utrotigly rhetorical language, rich in imagery, aims by this term let Dt Auf/m. V. ch. 4) to recall Plato'* well-known parable of the Cave (Xtp-
384 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IA .
then the "idols of the market" (idola fori), the errors which axe everywhere brought about by intercourse among men, especially by language, and by adherence to the word which we substitute for the idea; finally, the "idols of the theatre" (idola theatri), the illusory
of theories which we credulously receive from human history and repeat without subjecting them to any judgment of our own. In this connection Bacon finds opportunity to direct a most violent polemic against the word-wisdom of Scholasticism, against the rule of authority, against the anthropomorphism of earlier philosophy, and to demand a personal examination of things them selves, an unprejudiced reception of reality. Nevertheless he does not get beyond this demand ; for the statements as to how the mera experientia is to be gained and separated from the enveloping husks of the idols are extremely meagre, and while Bacon teaches that one must not limit himself to accidental perceptions, but must set about his observation methodically, and supplement ix bv experiment ' which he thinks out and makes for himself, this also is but a general designation of the task, and a theoretical insight into the essential nature of experiment is still wanting.
Quite similar is the case with the method of Induction, which Bacon proclaimed as the only correct mode of elaborating facts. With its aid we are to proceed to general cognitions (axioms), in order that we may ultimately from these explain other phenomena. In this activity the human mind, among whose constitutional errors is over-hasty generalisation, is to be restrained as much as possible; it is to ascend quite gradually the scale of the more general, up to the most general. Healthy and valuable as these prescriptions are, we are the more surprised to find that with Bacon their more de tailed carrying out is completed in conceptions and modes of view which are entirely scholastic*
All knowledge of Nature has for its end to understand the causes of things. Causes, however, are — according to the old Aristotelian scheme — formal, material, efficient, or final. Of these only the " formal " causes come into consideration ; for all that takes place has its grounds in the " Forms," in the " natures " of things. Hence when Bacon's Induction searches for the "Form" of phenomena, e. g. for the Form of heat, Form is here understood quite in the sense of Scotism as the abiding essence or nature of phenomena. The Form of that which is given in perception is composed out of
phantoms
614), which is the more unfortunate as, in the Platonic passage, it is precisely the general limited nature of knowledge by the senses that is dealt with.
> Nov. Org. I. 82.
1 Cf. the circumstantial exposition in the second book of the Nov. Org
Chap. 2, § 30. ] Problem of Method : Bacon. 385
simpler " Forms " and their " differences," and these it is important to discover. To this end as many cases as possible in which the phenomenon in question appears, are brought together into a tabula prvesentios, and in like manner, those in which the phenomenon is lacking are brought together into a tabula absentia;; to these is added, in the third place, a tabula graduum, in which the varying intensity with which the phenomenon appears is compared with the varying intensity of other phenomena. The problem is then to be solved by a progressive process of exclusion (exclusio). The Form of heat, for example, is to be that which is everywhere present where heat is found, which is nowhere where heat is lacking, and which is present in greater degree where there is more heat, and in lesser degree where there is less heat. 1 What Bacon presents accordingly as Induction is certainly no simple enumeration, hut an involved process of abstraction, which rests upon the meta physical assumptions of the scholastic Formalism1 (cf. § 27, 3); the presage of the new is still quite embedded in the old habits of thought
2. It is accordingly comprehensible that Bacon was not the marr to bring to the study of Nature itself methodical or material
furtherance : but this derogates nothing from his philosophical importance,3 which consists just in this, that he demanded the gen eral application of a principle, to which he yet was unable to give any useful or fruitful form in the case of the most immediate object for its use : namely, the knowledge of the corporeal world. He had understood that the new science must turn from the endless discussion of conceptions back to things themselves, that it can build only upon direct perception, and that it must rise from this only cautiously and gradually to the more abstract, * and he had understood no less clearly that in the case of this Induction, the point at issue was nothing other than the discovery of the simple
1 In which case it turns out that the Form of heat is motion, and, indeed, a motion which is expansive, and thus divided by inhibition and communicated to the smaller parts of the body [motut ezpanrivui, cohibitus et nitent per parte*
minora].
« Cf. Cbr. Sigwart, Logilc, II. 5 93, 8.
» Cf. Chr. Sigwart in the Preuts. Jahrb. , 1863, 93 ff.
• The pedagogiral consequences of the Baconian doctrine aa contrasted with Humanism, with which, in general, the movement of natural science came in conflict in tliis respect, were drawn principally by Amos Comeniui (1692-1871). Ilia Didafticn Magna presents the course of instruction an a graded ascent fr the concrete and perceptive to the more abstract ; his Orbit Pictus aims to (five for the Mchool a perceptional basis for instruction about things ; his Janva Lin- guarurn Jteterrata, finally, aims to have the learning of foreign languages arranged so as to be taught only as it is requisite as a means for acquiring knowledge about things. The pedagogical views of Kattich are similar (1571- 1836).
386 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part I V.
elements of reality, from the " nature " of which, in their regular relation and connection, the whole compass of what we perceive is to be explained. Induction, he thought, will find the Forms by which Nature must be interpreted. But while in his cosmology he did not get far beyond an adherence to the traditional atomism, and even shut himself up against the great achievement of the Copernican theory, he demanded that his empirical principle should be applied also to knowledge of man. Not only the bodily existence in its normal and abnormal vital processes, but also the movement of ideas and of activities of the will, especially also the social and political system, — all these should be examined as to their mov ing forces ("Forms") by the method of natural science, and ex plained without prejudice. The anthropological and social naturalism which Bacon announces in the encyclopaedic remarks of his work De Augmentis Scientiarum, contains examples of programmes ' for many branches of knowledge, and proceeds everywhere from the fundamental purpose to understand man and all the activities of his life as a product of the same simple elements of reality which also lie at the basis of external Nature.
Still another element comes to light in this anthropological inter est. To understand man is not, for Bacon, an end in itself, any more than it is such to understand Nature. His entire thought is rather subordinated to a practical end, and this he conceives in the grandest form. All human knowledge has ultimately for its sole task to procure for man dominion over the world by his knowledge of the world. Knowledge is power, and is the only lasting power. While therefore magic with fantastic arts sought to make itself master of the working forces of Nature, this blind endeavour became clarified with Bacon to the insight that man can owe his mastery over things only to a sober investigation of their true essence. For him, therefore, the interpretatio natural is only the means of subjecting nature to the human mind, and his great work for the " Renovation of the Sciences "— Instauratio Magna, " Temporis Par tus Maximus " — bears also the title De Regno Hominis.
In this, Bacon expressed what was moving the heart of thousands at his time, under the impress of great events. With that series of discoveries beyond the seas, where through mistakes, adventures, and crimes, man had at last for the first time taken complete pos session of his planet, with inventions such as those of the mariner's compass, of gunpowder, and of the art of printing,* a mighty
1 If we could therefore regard as accomplished all that Bacon sets before him in prospect, we might find with him the entire natural science of to-day.
a Cf. O. Peschel, Oesch. des Zeitalters der Entdeckunyen, 2d ed. , Leips. 1879.
Chap. 2, § 30.
Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, Viscount of St. Albans, was born in 1561, studied in Cambridge, had a brilliant career under the reigns of Elizabeth and James I. , until, as the result of political opposition, he was proceeded against, convicted of venality, and deposed from the position of Lord High Chancellor. He died 1626. The latest edition of his works is that by Spedding and Heath (Lond. 1857 ff. ). Aside from the Essays (Sermones Fideles) the main writings are De Dignilate et Augmentis Scientiarum (1623 ; originally published under the title, The Two Books of Frattis Bacon on the Proftrience and Advancementof Learning, Divine and Human, 1605) and Novum Organon Scientiarum (1620; originally under the title, Cogitata et Visa, 1012). ' Cf. Ch. de Remusat, Bacon, Sa vie, son temps, sa philosophic et son influence
jusqu'a nos jours (Paris, 1864) ; H. Heussler, Fr. B. und seine geschichtlichf Stellung (Breslau, 1889) ; [Bacon, by J. Nichol, in Blackwood's series, Edin. 1888 : Ed. of the Novum Organum by Fowler, Oxford, 1878].
Rene Descartes (Cartesius), born 1596, in Touraine, and educated in the Jesuit school at La Fleche, was originally destined for a soldier and took part in the campaigns of 1618-1621 in the service of various leaders, but then betook himself for the first time to Paris, and later, withdrew for many years, at differ ent places in the Netherlands, into a scientific solitude, which he kept in the most diligent and careful manner. After controversies in which his doctrine had become involved at the universities in that country had rendered this place of residence disagreeable, he accepted, in 1649, an invitation of Queen Christine of Sweden to Stockholm, where he died the following year. His works have been collected in Latin in the Amsterdam editions (1650, etc. ), and in French by V. Cousin (11 vols. , Paris, 1824 ff. ) ; the important writings have been trans lated into German by Kuno Fischer (Mannheim, 1863) [Eng. tr. of the Method,
Meditations and Selections from the Principles by J. Veitch, Edin. and Lond. , 1st ed. , 1850-62, 10th ed. , 1890 ; of the Meditations by Lowndes, Lond. 1878, also in Jour. Spec. Phil. , Vol. IV. , 1870, by W. R. Walker; and of the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, with selections from the Med. 's, The World, The Passions of the Soul, etc. , by H. A. P. Torrey, N. Y. 1892]. The main works are Le Monde ou Traiti de la Lumiere (posthumously printed, 1654) ; Fssays, 16:17, among them the Discours de la Methode and the Dioptrics ; Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, 1641, supplemented by the objections of various savants and Descartes' replies ; Principia Philosophia;, 1644 ; Passions de VAme, 1650. Cf. F. Bouillier, Histoire de la Philosophic Cartisienne (Paris, 1854) ; X. Schmid-
1 It is well known that very recently much noise has been made over the discovery that Lord Bacon wrote Shakspere's works also, in his leisure hours. To fuse two great literary phenomena into one may have something alluring in it, but in any case a mistake has been made in the person. For it would be much more probable that Shakspere had incidentally composed the Baconian philosophy. [The Germans seem to take this "noise" much more seriously than Shakspere's countrymen. — Tr. ]
Chap. 2. ]
schwarzenberg, It. D. nnd seine Reform der Philosophic (Nordlingen, 1850) ; G. Glogau in Zeifehr. f. Philos. , 1878, pp. 209 S. ; P. Natorp, D. 's Erkenntniss- theorie (Marburg, 1882). [Descartes by J. P. Mahaffy in Blackwood's series, K. liii. and l'liila . 1881 ; W. Wallace, Art. Descartes in Ene. Brit. ; H. Sidgwick in Mind, Vol. VII. ; Rhodes in Jour. Spec. Phil. , XVII.
Natural Science Period. 381
Between these two leaders of modern philosophy stands Thomas Hobbea, born 1688, educated at Oxford, who was early drawn over to France by his studies, and frequently afterwards returned thither, was personally acquainted with Bacon, Gassendi, Campanella, and the Cartesian circle, and died 1879. Complete edition of his works, English and Latin by Molesworth, I. ond. 1830 ff. His first treatise, Elements of Late, Natural and Political (1639), was pub lished by his friends in 1660, in two parte, Human Nature and De Corpore Politico. He published previously Elementa Philosophic de Cive, 1642 and 1647, and further Leviathan or The Matter, Form, and Authority of Government, 1661. A comprehensive statement is given in the Elementa PhUosuphice, De Cor
pore, II. , De Homine, 1668 (both previously in English in 1666 and 1668. Cf. K. Touniea in Vierteljahrschr. w. Philos. , 1879 S. [Hobbes, by G. C. Robert son in Blackwood's series, Edin. and Phil. 1886, also Art Hobbes, In Ene. Bra. by same author. F. Tonnies. Hobbes (Stuttgart, 1896).
Of the Cartesian School (cf. Bouillier, op. cit. ) are to be noted the Jansen- ists of Port-Royal, from whose circles came the Logique ou Vart depenser (1662), ed. by Anton Arnauld (1612-1694), and Pierre Nicole (1626-1696) also the Mystics, Blaise Pascal (1623-1662 Penseis sur la Religion cf. the monographs by J. G. Dreydorff, Leips. 1870 and 1875), and Pierre Polret (1646-1719; De Eruditione Triplici, Solida Superjiciaria et Falsa.
The development to Occasionalism proceeds gradually in Louis de la Forge Trail* de Esprit llumain. 1666;, Clauberg( 1622-1665 De Conjunctione Corpo
ris et Animae in Homine), Cordemoy (f. e Discernement du Corps et de I'Ame, Irttlti), but finds its complete development independently of these thinkers in Arnold Oeullncz (1626-1669; university teacher in Loeweti and Leyden). His main works are the Ethics (1666; 2d ed. with notes, 1676); Logic, 1662, and Methodus, 1663. New ed. of his works by J. P. N. Land vols. , The Hague, 1891-3). Cf. E. Pfleiderer, A. G. als Hauptvertrrter der orr. Metaphysik
nnd Ethik (TUbingen, 1882) V. van der Hasghen, G. Etude sur sa Vie, sa Philosophic et set Ouvrages (LOttich, 1886).
From the Oratorlum founded by Cardinal Berulle, friend of Descartes, to which Oibieuf also belonged (De Libertate Dei et Creatura, Paris, 1630), went forth Nicole Malebranche (1638-1716). His main work, De la Recherche de la
X'rrite, appeared 1675, the Entretiens sur la Alitaphysique et sur la Religion in 1088. Coll. works by J. Simon (Paris, 1871).
Baruch (Benedict de) Spinosa, born in 1632 at Amsterdam in the commu nity of Portuguese Jews, and later expelled from this community on account of his opinions, lived in noble simplicity and solitude at various places in Hol land, and died at The Hague 1677. He had published an exposition of the Cartesian philosophy with an Independent metaphysical appendix (1663) and the Tract at us Theologieo-politieus (anonymously in 1670). After his death appeared in his Opera Posthuma (1677), his main work, Ethica More Geometrico
Demonstrate, the Traetatus Politicus, and the fragment De Intellecius Emenda- linne. His correspondence and his recently discovered youthful work, Traetatus ihrevis) de Den et Homine ejusque Felicitate, also come into consideration. <>n the latter cf. Chr. Sigwart (Tubingen, 1870). The best edition of his works to that by Van Vloten and Land vols. . Amsterdam, 1882 f. ). Cf. T. Camerer. Die Lehrt Sp. 's (Stuttgart, 1877). [Spinous, by J. Caird, Edin. 1888; Spinoza by Martineau, Lond. 1883 also in Types of Ethical Theory, Oxford, 1886 F. Pollock. Spinoza. His Life and Phil. , Lond. 1880; Seth, Art. Spinoza, in Ene. Brit. Arts, in Jour. Spec. Phil. , Vols. 11 and 16, by Morris and Dewey Eng. \x. of prin. works by F. lwes, Bonn Lib. , 1884, of the Ethics by White, Lond. 1883, and of Selections by Fullerton, NY. 1892. ]
Of philosophical writers in Germany who attached themselves to the train of the movement among the two civilised peoples of the West are to be mentioned Joachim Jung (1587-1667 Logica Hamburgiensis, 1638); cf. G. E. Guhrauer.
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382 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IV.
J. J. und sein Zeitalter (Stuttg. and Tfib.
1859); the Jena mathematician, Erhard VVeigel, the teacher of Leibniz and Puffendorf ; Walther von Tschirn- hausen (1661-1708 ; Medicina Mentis sive Artis Inveniendi Prcecepta Generalia, Amsterdam, 1087), and Samuel Puffendorf (1032-1694; under the pseudonym Severinus a Monzambano, De Statu Bei publico: Germanicce, 1667, German by H. Bresslau, Berlin, 1870 ; De Jure Naturae et Gentium, London, 1672).
Leibniz belongs in this period, not only in point of time, but also as regards the origination and the motives of his metaphysics, while with other interests of his incredibly many-sided nature, he ranges on into the age of the Enlighten ment ; cf. on this, Part V. Here, therefore, we have to consider principally his methodological and metaphysical writings : De Principio Individui, 1663 ; De Arte Combinatoria, 1666 ; Nova Methodus pro Maximis et Minimis, 1684 ; De Scientia Universali seu Calculo Philosophico, 1684 (cf. A. Trendelenburg, Hist. Beitrage zur Philos. , III. 1 ff. ); De Prima: Philosophies Emendatione, 1694; Systeme Nouveau de la Nature, 1695, with the three Eclaircissements connected with it, 1696 ; also the Monadologie, 1714, the Principes de la Nature et de la Grace, 1714, and a great part of his extended correspondence. Among the editions of his philosophical writings the excellent edition by J. E. Erdmann (^Berlin, 1840) has now been surpassed by that of C. J. Gerhardt (7 vols. , Ber lin, 1875-91). — On the system as a whole cf. L. Feuerbach, Darstellung, Ent- vricklnng und Kritik der Leibnizischen Philos. (Ansbach, 1837), A. Nourisson, La Philos. de L. (Paris, 1860); E. Wendt, Die Entwicklung der LSschen Mo- nadenlehre bis 1695 (Berlin, 1886). [E. Dillmann, Sine neue Darst. der L. 'schen Monadenlehre, Leips. 1891. See also the lit. on p. 444. ]
On the historical and systematic relation of the systems to one another : H. C. W. Sigwart, Ueber den Zusammenhang des Spinozismus mit der cartes. Philos. (Tub. 1816) and Die Leibniz'sche Lehre von der prastabilirten Harmonie in ihrem Zusammenhang mit fruheren Philosophemen (ib. 1822) ; C. Schaar- schmidt, Descartes und Spinoza (Bonn, 1860) ; A. Foucher de Careil, Leibniz, Descartes et Spinoza (Paris, 1863) ; E. Pfleiderer, L. und Geulincx (Tub. 1884); E. Zeller, Sitz. -Ber. d. Berliner Akad, 1884, pp. 673 ff. ; F. Tonnies, Leibniz und Hobbes in Philos. Monatsh; 1887, pp. 357 ft*. ; L. Stein, Leibniz und Spinoza (Berlin, 1890). [E. Caird, Art Cartesianism, in Enc. Brit. , reprinted in Vol. 2 of his Essays, Lond. and N. Y. 1892 ; Saisset's Modern Pantheism. ]
To the founders of the philosophy of law (cf. C. v. Kaltenborn, Die Vorlaufer des Hugo Grotius, Leips. 1848 ; and B. v. Mohl, Gesch. und Litteratur der Staatswissenschaften, Erlangen, 1866-68) belong Nicolo Macchiavelli (1469- 1627 ; H Principe, Discorsi sulla prima decade di Tito Livio ; [Works, tr. by C. E. Detmold, Boston, 1883. ] Thomas More (1480-1636 ; De Optimo Bei publico- Statu sive de Nova Insula Utopia, 1516) ; Jean Bodin (1530-1697) ; Six Livres de la Bipublique, 1577; an extract from the Heptaplomeres has been given by Guhrauer, Berlin, 1841) ; Albericus Oentilis (1551-1611 ; De Jure Belli, 1688) ; Johannes Althus (1557-1638 ; Politico, Groningen, 1610, cf. O. Gierke, Unters. z. deutsch. Staats- u. Bechtsgesch. , Breslau, 1880); Hugo de Groot (1583-1645 ; De Jure Belli et Pacis, 1646; cf. H. Luden, H. G. , Berlin, 1806).
Of the Protestants who treat of the philosophy of law may be named, be sides Melancthon, J. Oldendorf (Elementaris Introductio, 1539), Nic. Hemming
(De Lege Natural, 1562), Ben Winkler (Principia Juris, 1615) ; of the Catho lics besides Suarez, Rob. Bellarmin (1642-1621 ; De Potentate Pontijicis in
Temporalibus) and Mariana (1537-1624 ; De Bege et Begis Institutione).
Natural religion and natural morals in the seventeenth century found in England their main supporters in Herbert of Cnerbury (1581-1648 ; Tractatus de Veritate, 1624 ; De Beligione Gentilium Errorumque apud eos Causis, 1663 ; on him Ch. de Remusat, Paris, 1873), and Richard Cumberland (De Legibu* Natural Disquisitio Philosophica, Lond. 1672). Among the Platonists or Neo-
Platonists of England at the same time are prominent Ralph Cudworth (1617— 1688 ; The Intellectual System of the Universe, Lond. 1678, Latin, Jena, 1783) and Henry More (1614-1687 ; Encheiridion Metaphysicum. His correspondence with Descartes is printed in the latter's works, Vol. X. , Cousin's ed. ). [Pfcrt. of Cudworth, by C. E. Lowrey, with bibliog. , N. Y. 1884; Tulloch's Rational Theol. and Christian Phil, in Eng. in ^^th Cent. ] Theophilus Gale and his son, Thomas Gale, may be added to the authors above.
Chap. 2, $ 30. ] Problem of Method : Bacon. 383
§ 30. The Problem of Method.
All beginnings of modern philosophy have in common an impul sive opposition against "Scholasticism," and at the same time a naive lack of understanding for the common attitude of dependence upon some one of its traditions, which they nevertheless all occupy. This fundamental oppositional character brings with it the conse quence, that in all cases where it is not merely wants of the feelings, or fanciful views that are set over against the old doctrines, reflec tion on new methods of knowledge stands in the foreground. Out of the insight into the unfruitfulness of the " syllogism," which could merely set forth in proof or refutation that which was already known, or apply the same to a particular case, arises the demand for an ars inveniendi, a method of investigation, a sure way to the discovery of the new.
1. If now nothing was to be accomplished with the help of rhetoric, the nearest expedient was to attack the matter by the reverse method, proceeding from the particular, from the facts. This had been commended by Vives and Sanchez, and practised by Telesio and Campanella. But they had neither gained full confi dence in experience nor known afterwards how to make any right beginning with their facts. In both lines Bacon believed that he could point out new paths for science, and in this spirit he set up his " New Organon " as over against the Aristotelian.
Every -day perception — he confesses, admitting the well-known sceptical arguments — offers, indeed, no sure basis for a true knowl edge of Nature ; in order to become an experience that can be used by science it must first be purified from all the erroneous additions which have grown together with it in our involuntary way of regard ing things. These perversions or falsifications of pure experience Bacon calls idols, and presents his doctrine of these fallacious images in analog}' with the doctrine of the fallacious conclusions in the old dialectic. 1 There are first the "idols of the tribe" (idola tribus), the illusions that are given in connection with human nature in general, following which we are always suspecting an order and an end in things, making ourselves the measure of the outer world, blindly retaining a mode of thought which has once been excited by impressions, and the like; then the "idols of the cave" (idola specus), by reason of which every individual by his natural disposi tion, and his situation in life, finds himself shut into his cave;*
• Nov. Org. I. 39 fl.
* Bacon'* utrotigly rhetorical language, rich in imagery, aims by this term let Dt Auf/m. V. ch. 4) to recall Plato'* well-known parable of the Cave (Xtp-
384 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part IA .
then the "idols of the market" (idola fori), the errors which axe everywhere brought about by intercourse among men, especially by language, and by adherence to the word which we substitute for the idea; finally, the "idols of the theatre" (idola theatri), the illusory
of theories which we credulously receive from human history and repeat without subjecting them to any judgment of our own. In this connection Bacon finds opportunity to direct a most violent polemic against the word-wisdom of Scholasticism, against the rule of authority, against the anthropomorphism of earlier philosophy, and to demand a personal examination of things them selves, an unprejudiced reception of reality. Nevertheless he does not get beyond this demand ; for the statements as to how the mera experientia is to be gained and separated from the enveloping husks of the idols are extremely meagre, and while Bacon teaches that one must not limit himself to accidental perceptions, but must set about his observation methodically, and supplement ix bv experiment ' which he thinks out and makes for himself, this also is but a general designation of the task, and a theoretical insight into the essential nature of experiment is still wanting.
Quite similar is the case with the method of Induction, which Bacon proclaimed as the only correct mode of elaborating facts. With its aid we are to proceed to general cognitions (axioms), in order that we may ultimately from these explain other phenomena. In this activity the human mind, among whose constitutional errors is over-hasty generalisation, is to be restrained as much as possible; it is to ascend quite gradually the scale of the more general, up to the most general. Healthy and valuable as these prescriptions are, we are the more surprised to find that with Bacon their more de tailed carrying out is completed in conceptions and modes of view which are entirely scholastic*
All knowledge of Nature has for its end to understand the causes of things. Causes, however, are — according to the old Aristotelian scheme — formal, material, efficient, or final. Of these only the " formal " causes come into consideration ; for all that takes place has its grounds in the " Forms," in the " natures " of things. Hence when Bacon's Induction searches for the "Form" of phenomena, e. g. for the Form of heat, Form is here understood quite in the sense of Scotism as the abiding essence or nature of phenomena. The Form of that which is given in perception is composed out of
phantoms
614), which is the more unfortunate as, in the Platonic passage, it is precisely the general limited nature of knowledge by the senses that is dealt with.
> Nov. Org. I. 82.
1 Cf. the circumstantial exposition in the second book of the Nov. Org
Chap. 2, § 30. ] Problem of Method : Bacon. 385
simpler " Forms " and their " differences," and these it is important to discover. To this end as many cases as possible in which the phenomenon in question appears, are brought together into a tabula prvesentios, and in like manner, those in which the phenomenon is lacking are brought together into a tabula absentia;; to these is added, in the third place, a tabula graduum, in which the varying intensity with which the phenomenon appears is compared with the varying intensity of other phenomena. The problem is then to be solved by a progressive process of exclusion (exclusio). The Form of heat, for example, is to be that which is everywhere present where heat is found, which is nowhere where heat is lacking, and which is present in greater degree where there is more heat, and in lesser degree where there is less heat. 1 What Bacon presents accordingly as Induction is certainly no simple enumeration, hut an involved process of abstraction, which rests upon the meta physical assumptions of the scholastic Formalism1 (cf. § 27, 3); the presage of the new is still quite embedded in the old habits of thought
2. It is accordingly comprehensible that Bacon was not the marr to bring to the study of Nature itself methodical or material
furtherance : but this derogates nothing from his philosophical importance,3 which consists just in this, that he demanded the gen eral application of a principle, to which he yet was unable to give any useful or fruitful form in the case of the most immediate object for its use : namely, the knowledge of the corporeal world. He had understood that the new science must turn from the endless discussion of conceptions back to things themselves, that it can build only upon direct perception, and that it must rise from this only cautiously and gradually to the more abstract, * and he had understood no less clearly that in the case of this Induction, the point at issue was nothing other than the discovery of the simple
1 In which case it turns out that the Form of heat is motion, and, indeed, a motion which is expansive, and thus divided by inhibition and communicated to the smaller parts of the body [motut ezpanrivui, cohibitus et nitent per parte*
minora].
« Cf. Cbr. Sigwart, Logilc, II. 5 93, 8.
» Cf. Chr. Sigwart in the Preuts. Jahrb. , 1863, 93 ff.
• The pedagogiral consequences of the Baconian doctrine aa contrasted with Humanism, with which, in general, the movement of natural science came in conflict in tliis respect, were drawn principally by Amos Comeniui (1692-1871). Ilia Didafticn Magna presents the course of instruction an a graded ascent fr the concrete and perceptive to the more abstract ; his Orbit Pictus aims to (five for the Mchool a perceptional basis for instruction about things ; his Janva Lin- guarurn Jteterrata, finally, aims to have the learning of foreign languages arranged so as to be taught only as it is requisite as a means for acquiring knowledge about things. The pedagogical views of Kattich are similar (1571- 1836).
386 The Renaissance : Natural Science Period. [Part I V.
elements of reality, from the " nature " of which, in their regular relation and connection, the whole compass of what we perceive is to be explained. Induction, he thought, will find the Forms by which Nature must be interpreted. But while in his cosmology he did not get far beyond an adherence to the traditional atomism, and even shut himself up against the great achievement of the Copernican theory, he demanded that his empirical principle should be applied also to knowledge of man. Not only the bodily existence in its normal and abnormal vital processes, but also the movement of ideas and of activities of the will, especially also the social and political system, — all these should be examined as to their mov ing forces ("Forms") by the method of natural science, and ex plained without prejudice. The anthropological and social naturalism which Bacon announces in the encyclopaedic remarks of his work De Augmentis Scientiarum, contains examples of programmes ' for many branches of knowledge, and proceeds everywhere from the fundamental purpose to understand man and all the activities of his life as a product of the same simple elements of reality which also lie at the basis of external Nature.
Still another element comes to light in this anthropological inter est. To understand man is not, for Bacon, an end in itself, any more than it is such to understand Nature. His entire thought is rather subordinated to a practical end, and this he conceives in the grandest form. All human knowledge has ultimately for its sole task to procure for man dominion over the world by his knowledge of the world. Knowledge is power, and is the only lasting power. While therefore magic with fantastic arts sought to make itself master of the working forces of Nature, this blind endeavour became clarified with Bacon to the insight that man can owe his mastery over things only to a sober investigation of their true essence. For him, therefore, the interpretatio natural is only the means of subjecting nature to the human mind, and his great work for the " Renovation of the Sciences "— Instauratio Magna, " Temporis Par tus Maximus " — bears also the title De Regno Hominis.
In this, Bacon expressed what was moving the heart of thousands at his time, under the impress of great events. With that series of discoveries beyond the seas, where through mistakes, adventures, and crimes, man had at last for the first time taken complete pos session of his planet, with inventions such as those of the mariner's compass, of gunpowder, and of the art of printing,* a mighty
1 If we could therefore regard as accomplished all that Bacon sets before him in prospect, we might find with him the entire natural science of to-day.
a Cf. O. Peschel, Oesch. des Zeitalters der Entdeckunyen, 2d ed. , Leips. 1879.
Chap. 2, § 30.
