Objection 2: Further, whatever can be done by an
inferior
power, can be
done by a superior power.
done by a superior power.
Summa Theologica
The difference of glory will also ever remain in them
according to the difference of preceding merit. As to the execution of
the angelic offices, it will to a certain degree remain after the Day
of Judgment, and to a certain degree will cease. It will cease
accordingly as their offices are directed towards leading others to
their end; but it will remain, accordingly as it agrees with the
attainment of the end. Thus also the various ranks of soldiers have
different duties to perform in battle and in triumph.
Reply to Objection 1: The principalities and powers will come to an end
in that final consummation as regards their office of leading others to
their end; because when the end is attained, it is no longer necessary
to tend towards the end. This is clear from the words of the Apostle,
"When He shall have delivered up the kingdom of God and the Father,"
i. e. when He shall have led the faithful to the enjoyment of God
Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: The actions of angels over the other angels are
to be considered according to a likeness to our own intellectual
actions. In ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are
ordered according to the order of cause and effect; as when we
gradually arrive at one conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is
manifest that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the
preceding middle terms not only in the new acquisition of knowledge,
but also as regards the keeping of the knowledge acquired. A proof of
this is that when anyone forgets any of the preceding middle terms he
can have opinion or belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge; as
he is ignorant of the order of the causes. So, since the inferior
angels know the types of the Divine works by the light of the superior
angels, their knowledge depends on the light of the superior angels not
only as regards the acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the
preserving of the knowledge possessed. So, although after the Judgment
the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of some things,
still this will not prevent their being enlightened by the superior
angels.
Reply to Objection 3: Although after the Day of Judgment men will not
be led any more to salvation by the ministry of the angels, still those
who are already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry.
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Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?
Objection 1: It would seem that men are not taken up into the orders of
the angels. For the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest
heavenly hierarchy, as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the
middle beneath the first. But the angels of the lowest hierarchy are
never transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither are
men transferred to the angelic orders.
Objection 2: Further, certain offices belong to the orders of the
angels, as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the
like; which do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints.
Therefore they are not transferred to the angelic orders.
Objection 3: Further, as the good angels lead on to good, so do the
demons to what is evil. But it is erroneous to say that the souls of
bad men are changed into demons; for Chrysostom rejects this (Hom.
xxviii in Matt. ). Therefore it does not seem that the souls of the
saints will be transferred to the orders of angels.
On the contrary, The Lord says of the saints that, "they will be as the
angels of God" (Mat. 22:30). I answer that, As above explained
([879]AA[4],7), the orders of the angels are distinguished according to
the conditions of nature and according to the gifts of grace.
Considered only as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be
assumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction will
always remain. In view of this distinction, some asserted that men can
in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels; but this is
erroneous, contradicting as it does the promise of Christ saying that
the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven
(Lk. 20:36). For whatever belongs to nature is the material part of an
order; whilst that which perfects is from grace which depends on the
liberality of God, and not on the order of nature. Therefore by the
gift of grace men can merit glory in such a degree as to be equal to
the angels, in each of the angelic grades; and this implies that men
are taken up into the orders of the angels. Some, however, say that not
all who are saved are assumed into the angelic orders, but only virgins
or the perfect; and that the other will constitute their own order, as
it were, corresponding to the whole society of the angels. But this is
against what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), that "there will not
be two societies of men and angels, but only one; because the beatitude
of all is to cleave to God alone. "
Reply to Objection 1: Grace is given to the angels in proportion to
their natural gifts. This, however, does not apply to men, as above
explained [880](A[4]; [881]Q[62], A[6]). So, as the inferior angels
cannot be transferred to the natural grade of the superior, neither can
they be transferred to the superior grade of grace; whereas men can
ascend to the grade of grace, but not of nature.
Reply to Objection 2: The angels according to the order of nature are
between us and God; and therefore according to the common law not only
human affairs are administered by them, but also all corporeal matters.
But holy men even after this life are of the same nature with
ourselves; and hence according to the common law they do not administer
human affairs, "nor do they interfere in the things of the living," as
Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xiii, xvi). Still, by a certain
special dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to
exercise these offices; by working miracles, by coercing the demons, or
by doing something of that kind, as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis
xvi).
Reply to Objection 3: It is not erroneous to say that men are
transferred to the penalty of demons; but some erroneously stated that
the demons are nothing but souls of the dead; and it is this that
Chrysostom rejects.
__________________________________________________________________
THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider the ordering of the bad angels; concerning which there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are orders among the demons?
(2) Whether among them there is precedence?
(3) Whether one enlightens another?
(4) Whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are orders among the demons?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are no orders among the demons.
For order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as Augustine says
(De Nat. Boni iii); and on the contrary, disorder belongs to evil. But
there is nothing disorderly in the good angels. Therefore in the bad
angels there are no orders.
Objection 2: Further, the angelic orders are contained under a
hierarchy. But the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a
holy principality; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among
the demons there are no orders.
Objection 3: Further, the demons fell from every one of the angelic
orders; as is commonly supposed. Therefore, if some demons are said to
belong to an order, as falling from that order, it would seem necessary
to give them the names of each of those orders. But we never find that
they are called "Seraphim," or "Thrones," or "Dominations. " Therefore
on the same ground they are not to be placed in any other order.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): "Our wrestling . . . is
against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of
this darkness. "
I answer that, As explained above ([882]Q[108], AA[4],7,8), order in
the angels is considered both according to the grade of nature; and
according to that of grace. Now grace has a twofold state, the
imperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of
consummate glory.
If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the
perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic orders, and
never were. But if we consider them in relation to imperfect grace, in
that view the demons were at the time in the orders of angels, but fell
away from them, according to what was said above ([883]Q[62], A[3]),
that all the angels were created in grace. But if we consider them in
the light of nature, in that view they are still in those orders;
because they have not lost their natural gifts; as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv).
Reply to Objection 1: Good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot
exist without good ([884]Q[49], A[3]); so there is order in the demons,
as possessing a good nature.
Reply to Objection 2: If we consider the ordering of the demons on the
part of God Who orders them, it is sacred; for He uses the demons for
Himself; but on the part of the demons' will it is not a sacred thing,
because they abuse their nature for evil.
Reply to Objection 3: The name "Seraphim" is given from the ardor of
charity; and the name "Thrones" from the Divine indwelling; and the
name "Dominations" imports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed
to sin; and therefore these names are not given to the angels who
sinned.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether among the demons there is precedence?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no precedence among the
demons. For every precedence is according to some order of justice. But
the demons are wholly fallen from justice. Therefore there is no
precedence among them.
Objection 2: Further, there is no precedence where obedience and
subjection do not exist. But these cannot be without concord; which is
not to be found among the demons, according to the text, "Among the
proud there are always contentions" (Prov. 13:10). Therefore there is
no precedence among the demons.
Objection 3: If there be precedence among them it is either according
to nature, or according to their sin or punishment. But it is not
according to their nature, for subjection and service do not come from
nature but from subsequent sin; neither is it according to sin or
punishment, because in that case the superior demons who have sinned
the most grievously, would be subject to the inferior. Therefore there
is no precedence among the demons.
On the contrary, On 1 Cor. 15:24 the gloss says: "While the world
lasts, angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over
demons. "
I answer that, Since action follows the nature of a thing, where
natures are subordinate, actions also must be subordinate to each
other. Thus it is in corporeal things, for as the inferior bodies by
natural order are below the heavenly bodies, their actions and
movements are subject to the actions and movements of the heavenly
bodies. Now it is plain from what we have said [885](A[1]), that the
demons are by natural order subject to others; and hence their actions
are subject to the action of those above them, and this is what we mean
by precedence---that the action of the subject should be under the
action of the prelate. So the very natural disposition of the demons
requires that there should be authority among them. This agrees too
with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate, which "reacheth
from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1).
Reply to Objection 1: The authority of the demons is not founded on
their justice, but on the justice of God ordering all things.
Reply to Objection 2: The concord of the demons, whereby some obey
others, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common
wickedness whereby they hate men, and fight against God's justice. For
it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those whom they
see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness.
Reply to Objection 3: The demons are not equal in nature; and so among
them there exists a natural precedence; which is not the case with men,
who are naturally equal. That the inferior are subject to the superior,
is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather to their detriment;
because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to
unhappiness, it follows that to preside in evil is to be more unhappy.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is enlightenment in the demons?
Objection 1: It would seem that enlightenment is in the demons. For
enlightenment means the manifestation of the truth. But one demon can
manifest truth to another, because the superior excel in natural
knowledge. Therefore the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.
Objection 2: Further, a body abounding in light can enlighten a body
deficient in light, as the sun enlightens the moon. But the superior
demons abound in the participation of natural light. Therefore it seems
that the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.
On the contrary, Enlightenment is not without cleansing and perfecting,
as stated above ([886]Q[106], A[1]). But to cleanse does not befit the
demons, according to the words: "What can be made clean by the
unclean? " (Ecclus. 34:4). Therefore neither can they enlighten.
I answer that, There can be no enlightenment properly speaking among
the demons. For, as above explained ([887]Q[107], A[2]), enlightenment
properly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to
God, Who enlightens every intellect. Another kind of manifestation of
the truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to
another. Now the demon's perversity does not lead one to order another
to God, but rather to lead away from the Divine order; and so one demon
does not enlighten another; but one can make known his mental concept
to another by way of speech.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every kind of manifestation of the truth is
enlightenment, but only that which is above described.
Reply to Objection 2: According to what belongs to natural knowledge,
there is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels,
or in the demons, because, as above explained ([888]Q[55], A[2];
[889]Q[58], A[2]; [890]Q[79], A[2]), they know from the first all that
belongs to their natural knowledge. So the greater fulness of natural
light in the superior demons does not prove that they can enlighten
others.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the good angels have precedence over the bad angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that the good angels have no precedence over
the bad angels. For the angels' precedence is especially connected with
enlightenment. But the bad angels, being darkness, are not enlightened
by the good angels. Therefore the good angels do not rule over the bad.
Objection 2: Further, superiors are responsible as regards negligence
for the evil deeds of their subjects. But the demons do much evil.
Therefore if they are subject to the good angels, it seems that
negligence is to be charged to the good angels; which cannot be
admitted.
Objection 3: Further, the angels' precedence follows upon the order of
nature, as above explained [891](A[2]). But if the demons fell from
every order, as is commonly said, many of the demons are superior to
many good angels in the natural order. Therefore the good angels have
no precedence over all the bad angels.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii), that "the treacherous
and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational, pious, and just
spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv) that "the Powers are the
angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile powers. "
I answer that, The whole order of precedence is first and originally in
God; and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they are the nearer
to God. For those creatures, which are more perfect and nearer to God,
have the power to act on others. Now the greatest perfection and that
which brings them nearest to God belongs to the creatures who enjoy
God, as the holy angels; of which perfection the demons are deprived;
and therefore the good angels have precedence over the bad, and these
are ruled by them.
Reply to Objection 1: Many things concerning Divine mysteries are made
known by the holy angels to the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice
requires the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil; or
for the trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge's assessors
make known his sentence to the executioners. This revelation, if
compared to the angelic revealers, can be called an enlightenment,
forasmuch as they direct it to God; but it is not an enlightenment on
the part of the demons, for these do not direct it to God; but to the
fulfilment of their own wickedness.
Reply to Objection 2: The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine
wisdom. Hence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad
angels or men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the good
angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm.
Reply to Objection 3: An angel who is inferior in the natural order
presides over demons, although these may be naturally superior; because
the power of Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is
stronger than the natural power of the angels. Hence likewise among
men, "the spiritual man judgeth all things" (1 Cor. 2:15), and the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 4; x, 5) that "the virtuous man is the
rule and measure of all human acts. "
__________________________________________________________________
HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?
(2) Whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels?
(3) Whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies
locally?
(4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that the corporeal creature is not governed
by angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of action, needs
not to be governed by any superior power; for we require to be governed
lest we do what we ought not. But corporeal things have their actions
determined by the nature divinely bestowed upon them. Therefore they do
not need the government of angels.
Objection 2: Further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. But
some corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior. Therefore
they need not be governed by the angels.
Objection 3: Further, the different orders of the angels are
distinguished by different offices. But if corporeal creatures were
ruled by the angels, there would be as many angelic offices as there
are species of things. So also there would be as many orders of angels
as there are species of things; which is against what is laid down
above ([892]Q[108], A[2]). Therefore the corporeal creature is not
governed by angels.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "all bodies are
ruled by the rational spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Dial. iv, 6),
that "in this visible world nothing takes place without the agency of
the invisible creature. "
I answer that, It is generally found both in human affairs and in
natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by the
universal power; as, for example, the bailiff's power is governed by
the power of the king. Among the angels also, as explained above
([893]Q[55], A[3] ; [894]Q[108], A[1]), the superior angels who preside
over the inferior possess a more universal knowledge. Now it is
manifest that the power of any individual body is more particular than
the power of any spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a
form individualized by matter, and determined to the "here and now";
whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as
the inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are ruled by the
superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels. This is not
only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all philosophers who
admit the existence of incorporeal substances.
Reply to Objection 1: Corporeal things have determinate actions; but
they exercise such actions only according as they are moved; because it
belongs to a body not to act unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature
must be moved by a spiritual creature.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason alleged is according to the opinion of
Aristotle who laid down (Metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are
moved by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to
assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly
bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances
with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps human
souls; and this was because he did not consider that any operations
were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which
the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed. But because we assert
that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the natural
corporeal actions, for which the movements of the heavenly bodies are
not sufficient; therefore in our opinion we must assert that the angels
possess an immediate presidency not only over the heavenly bodies, but
also over the inferior bodies.
Reply to Objection 3: Philosophers have held different opinions about
immaterial substances. For Plato laid down that immaterial substances
were types and species of sensible bodies; and that some were more
universal than others; and so he held that immaterial substances
preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and different ones over
different bodies. But Aristotle held that immaterial substances are not
the species of sensible bodies, but something higher and more
universal; and so he did not attribute to them any immediate presiding
over single bodies, but only over the universal agents, the heavenly
bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he agreed with Plato in
supposing some spiritual substance to preside immediately in the sphere
of active and passive elements; because, as Plato also said, he held
that the forms of these sensible things are derived from immaterial
substances. But he differed from Plato because he supposed only one
immaterial substance to preside over all inferior bodies, which he
called the "active intelligence. "
The holy doctors held with the Platonists that different spiritual
substances were placed over corporeal things. For Augustine says (QQ.
83, qu. 79): "Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power
placed over it"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4): "The devil
was one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial order";
and Origen says on the text, "When the ass saw the angel" (Num. 22:23),
that "the world has need of angels who preside over beasts, and over
the birth of animals, and trees, and plants, and over the increase of
all other things" (Hom. xiv in Num. ). The reason of this, however, is
not that an angel is more fitted by his nature to preside over animals
than over plants; because each angel, even the least, has a higher and
more universal power than any kind of corporeal things: the reason is
to be sought in the order of Divine wisdom, Who places different rulers
over different things. Nor does it follow that there are more than nine
orders of angels, because, as above expounded ([895]Q[108], A[2]), the
orders are distinguished by their general offices. Hence as according
to Gregory all the angels whose proper office it is to preside over the
demons are of the order of the "powers"; so to the order of the
"virtues" do those angels seem to belong who preside over purely
corporeal creatures; for by their ministration miracles are sometimes
performed.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will of
an angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul. But
corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of man is
changed by a conception of the soul as regards heat and cold, and
sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much more is
corporeal matter changed by a conception of an angel.
Objection 2: Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be
done by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior to
corporeal power. But a body by its power is able to transform corporeal
matter; as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore much more
efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal matter.
Objection 3: Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic
administration, as appears above [896](A[1]), and thus it appears that
bodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is
essentially a mover moved. Now in effects there is something that is
due to the power of their principal agents, and which cannot be due to
the power of the instrument; and this it is that takes the principal
place in the effect. For example, digestion is due to the force of
natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul: but that
living flesh is thus generated is due to the power of the soul. Again
the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but that it assumes the length
the form of a bed is from the design of the [joiner's] art. Therefore
the substantial form which takes the principal place in the corporeal
effects, is due to the angelic power. Therefore matter obeys the angels
in receiving its form.
On the contrary, Augustine says "It is not to be thought, that this
visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys God alone. "
I answer that, The Platonists [*Phaedo. xlix: Tim. (Did. ) vol. ii, p.
218] asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by
immaterial forms, because they said that the material forms are
participations of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this
opinion to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in matter
proceed from the concept of the "intellect"; and that corporeal agents
only dispose [matter] for the forms. They seem to have been deceived on
this point, through supposing a form to be something made "per se," so
that it would be the effect of a formal principle. But, as the
Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), what is made, properly
speaking, is the "composite": for this properly speaking, is, as it
were, what subsists. Whereas the form is called a being, not as that
which is, but as that by which something is; and consequently neither
is a form, properly speaking, made; for that is made which is; since to
be is nothing but the way to existence.
Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch as
every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural things, has a
likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself, as
when fire begets fire, or because the whole "composite" as to both
matter and form is within its power; and this belongs to God alone.
Therefore every informing of matter is either immediately from God, or
form some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel.
Reply to Objection 1: Our soul is united to the body as the form; and
so it is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the
soul's concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite,
which is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject to the
command of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection with
natural bodies; and hence the argument does not hold.
Reply to Objection 2: Whatever an inferior power can do, that a
superior power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent
way; for example, the intellect knows sensible things in a more
excellent way than sense knows them. So an angel can change corporeal
matter in a more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by
moving the corporeal agents themselves, as being the superior cause.
Reply to Objection 3: There is nothing to prevent some natural effect
taking place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents
would not suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel's will (as
neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating
the fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish
that the fire could not have produced by itself); since to reduce
matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the power of
a corporeal agent; for it is natural for like to make like.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether bodies obey the angels as regards local motion?
Objection 1: It would seem that bodies do not obey the angels in local
motion. For the local motion of natural bodies follows on their forms.
But the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated
above [897](A[2]). Therefore neither can they cause in them local
motion.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 7) proves that local
motion is the first of all movements. But the angels cannot cause other
movements by a formal change of the matter. Therefore neither can they
cause local motion.
Objection 3: Further, the corporeal members obey the concept of the
soul as regards local movement, as having in themselves some principle
of life. In natural bodies, however, there is not vital principle.
Therefore they do not obey the angels in local motion.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9) that the angels use
corporeal seed to produce certain effects. But they cannot do this
without causing local movement. Therefore bodies obey them in local
motion.
I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "Divine wisdom has
joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second. " Hence it
is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in
conjunction with superior nature. Now corporeal nature is below the
spiritual nature. But among all corporeal movements the most perfect is
local motion, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). The reason of
this is that what is moved locally is not as such in potentiality to
anything intrinsic, but only to something extrinsic---that is, to
place. Therefore the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be
moved immediately by the spiritual nature as regards place. Hence also
the philosophers asserted that the supreme bodies are moved locally by
the spiritual substances; whence we see that the soul moves the body
first and chiefly by a local motion.
Reply to Objection 1: There are in bodies other local movements besides
those which result from the forms; for instance, the ebb and flow of
the sea does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but
from the influence of the moon; and much more can local movements
result from the power of spiritual substances.
Reply to Objection 2: The angels, by causing local motion, as the first
motion, can thereby cause other movements; that is, by employing
corporeal agents to produce these effects, as a workman employs fire to
soften iron.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of an angel is not so limited as is the
power of the soul. Hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the
body united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move
other things. But an angel's power is not limited to any body; hence it
can move locally bodies not joined to it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether angels can work miracles?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels can work miracles. For
Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang. ): "Those spirits are called virtues
by whom signs and miracles are usually done. "
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79) that "magicians
work miracles by private contracts; good Christians by public justice,
bad Christians by the signs of public justice. " But magicians work
miracles because they are "heard by the demons," as he says elsewhere
in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent. , sent. 4: among the
supposititious works of St. Augustine]. Therefore the demons can work
miracles. Therefore much more can the good angels.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi,
Sentent. , sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]
that "it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen may
be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in our atmosphere. " But
when an effect of natural causes is produced outside the order of the
natural cause, we call it a miracle, as, for instance, when anyone is
cured of a fever without the operation of nature. Therefore the angels
and demons can work miracles.
Objection 4: Further, superior power is not subject to the order of an
inferior cause. But corporeal nature is inferior to an angel. Therefore
an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents; which is to
work miracles.
On the contrary, It is written of God (Ps. 135:4): "Who alone doth
great wonders. "
I answer that, A miracle properly so called is when something is done
outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for a miracle if
something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for
otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards,
as such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature. So for a
miracle is required that it be against the order of the whole created
nature. But God alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or any
other creature does by its own power, is according to the order of
created nature; and thus it is not a miracle. Hence God alone can work
miracles.
Reply to Objection 1: Some angels are said to work miracles; either
because God works miracles at their request, in the same way as holy
men are said to work miracles; or because they exercise a kind of
ministry in the miracles which take place; as in collecting the dust in
the general resurrection, or by doing something of that kind.
Reply to Objection 2: Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are
those things which are done outside the order of the whole created
nature. But as we do not know all the power of created nature, it
follows that when anything is done outside the order of created nature
by a power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves.
So when the demons do anything of their own natural power, these things
are called "miracles" not in an absolute sense, but in reference to
ourselves. In this way the magicians work miracles through the demons;
and these are said to be done by "private contracts," forasmuch as
every power of the creature, in the universe, may be compared to the
power of a private person in a city. Hence when a magician does
anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it were by private
contract. On the other hand, the Divine justice is in the whole
universe as the public law is in the city. Therefore good Christians,
so far as they work miracles by Divine justice, are said to work
miracles by "public justice": but bad Christians by the "signs of
public justice," as by invoking the name of Christ, or by making use of
other sacred signs.
Reply to Objection 3: Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever
happens in this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local
movement.
Reply to Objection 4: Although the angels can do something which is
outside the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything
outside the whole created order, which is essential to a miracle, as
above explained.
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THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire: (1) How
far they can change them by their own natural power; (2) How they are
sent by God to the ministry of men; (3) How they guard and protect men.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect?
(2) Whether he can change man's will?
(3) Whether he can change man's imagination?
(4) Whether he can change man's senses?
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Whether an angel can enlighten man?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man. For man
is enlightened by faith; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii) attributes
enlightenment to baptism, as "the sacrament of faith. " But faith is
immediately from God, according to Eph. 2:8: "By grace you are saved
through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God. "
Therefore man is not enlightened by an angel; but immediately by God.
Objection 2: Further, on the words, "God hath manifested it to them"
(Rom. 1:19), the gloss observes that "not only natural reason availed
for the manifestation of Divine truths to men, but God also revealed
them by His work," that is, by His creature. But both are immediately
from God---that is, natural reason and the creature. Therefore God
enlightens man immediately.
Objection 3: Further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being
enlightened. But man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels.
Therefore he is not enlightened by them.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that the revelation of
Divine things reaches men through the ministry of the angels. But such
revelation is an enlightenment as we have stated ([898]Q[106], A[1];
[899]Q[107], A[2]). Therefore men are enlightened by the angels.
I answer that, Since the order of Divine Providence disposes that lower
things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above
([900]Q[109], A[2]); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the
superior, so men, who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by
them.
The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way alike
and in another way unlike. For, as was shown above ([901]Q[106], A[1]),
the enlightenment which consists in making known Divine truth has two
functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect is strengthened
by the action of the superior intellect, and according as the
intelligible species which are in the superior intellect are proposed
to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby. This takes place in the
angels when the superior angel divides his universal concept of the
truth according to the capacity of the inferior angel, as explained
above ([902]Q[106], A[1]).
The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself
unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand by turning to
the phantasms, as above explained ([903]Q[84], A[7]). So the angels
propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of sensible
things, according to what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), that, "It is
impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise than shrouded
by the variety of the sacred veils. " On the other hand, the human
intellect as the inferior, is strengthened by the action of the angelic
intellect. And in these two ways man is enlightened by an angel.
Reply to Objection 1: Two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith;
first, the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the
will tending to Divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of
faith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded by the will;
hence Augustine says, "No one believes except willingly. " In this
respect faith comes from God alone. Secondly, faith requires that what
is to be believed be proposed to the believer; which is accomplished by
man, according to Rom. 10:17, "Faith cometh by hearing"; principally,
however, by the angels, by whom Divine things are revealed to men.
Hence the angels have some part in the enlightenment of faith.
Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels not only concerning what is
to be believed; but also as regards what is to be done.
Reply to Objection 2: Natural reason, which is immediately from God,
can be strengthened by an angel, as we have said above. Again, the more
the human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible
truth can be elicited from the species derived from creatures. Thus man
is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more
perfect knowledge of God.
Reply to Objection 3: Intellectual operation and enlightenment can be
understood in two ways. First, on the part of the object understood;
thus whoever understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands
or is enlightened, because he knows that the object is made known to
him. Secondly, on the part of the principle; and thus it does not
follow that whoever understands a truth, knows what the intellect is,
which is the principle of the intellectual operation. In like manner
not everyone who is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is
enlightened by him.
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Whether the angels can change the will of man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels can change the will of man.
For, upon the text, "Who maketh His angels spirits and His ministers a
flame of fire" (Heb. 1:7), the gloss notes that "they are fire, as
being spiritually fervent, and as burning away our vices. " This could
not be, however, unless they changed the will. Therefore the angels can
change the will.
Objection 2: Further, Bede says (Super Matth. xv, 11), that, "the devil
does not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them. " Damascene, however,
says that he also sends them; for he remarks that "every malicious act
and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and put into men" (De
Fide Orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good angels introduce and
kindle good thoughts. But this could only be if they changed the will.
Therefore the will is changed by them.
Objection 3: Further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the
human intellect by means of the phantasms. But as the imagination which
serves the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive
appetite which serves the will, because it also is a faculty using a
corporeal organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can he
change the will.
On the contrary, To change the will belongs to God alone, according to
Prov. 21:1: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord,
whithersoever He will He shall turn it. "
I answer that, The will can be changed in two ways. First, from within;
in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but the
inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus change
the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination to the
intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God alone
Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the will is from God alone,
Who causes the will.
Secondly, the will is moved from without. As regards an angel, this can
be only in one way---by the good apprehended by the intellect. Hence in
as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended as an
appetible good, so far does he move the will. In this way also God
alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move the
will by way of persuasion, as above explained ([904]Q[106], A[2]).
In addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in
another way; namely, by the passion residing in the sensitive appetite:
thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will something.
In this manner the angels, as being able to rouse these passions, can
move the will, not however by necessity, for the will ever remains free
to consent to, or to resist, the passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Those who act as God's ministers, either men or
angels, are said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of
persuasion.
Reply to Objection 2: The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by
causing them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is
subject to the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of
thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of the
things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions.
Damascene calls this kindling "a putting in" because such a work is
accomplished within. But good thoughts are attributed to a higher
principle, namely, God, though they may be procured by the ministry of
the angels.
Reply to Objection 3: The human intellect in its present state can
understand only by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can
will something following the judgment of reason rather than the passion
of the sensitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold.
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Whether an angel can change man's imagination?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot change man's
imagination. For the phantasy, as is said De Anima iii, is "a motion
caused by the sense in act. " But if this motion were caused by an
angel, it would not be caused by the sense in act. Therefore it is
contrary to the nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the
imaginative faculty, to be changed by an angel.
Objection 2: Further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual,
they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But an
angel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter ([905]Q[110], A[2]).
Therefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he cannot
change it.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): "One
spirit by intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to
the other spirit by these images, so that the latter either understands
it himself, or accepts it as understood by the other. " But it does not
seem that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, nor that
the imagination can receive the knowledge of an angel. Therefore it
seems that an angel cannot change the imagination.
Objection 4: Further, in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the
similitudes of the things as to the things themselves. But in this
there is deception.
according to the difference of preceding merit. As to the execution of
the angelic offices, it will to a certain degree remain after the Day
of Judgment, and to a certain degree will cease. It will cease
accordingly as their offices are directed towards leading others to
their end; but it will remain, accordingly as it agrees with the
attainment of the end. Thus also the various ranks of soldiers have
different duties to perform in battle and in triumph.
Reply to Objection 1: The principalities and powers will come to an end
in that final consummation as regards their office of leading others to
their end; because when the end is attained, it is no longer necessary
to tend towards the end. This is clear from the words of the Apostle,
"When He shall have delivered up the kingdom of God and the Father,"
i. e. when He shall have led the faithful to the enjoyment of God
Himself.
Reply to Objection 2: The actions of angels over the other angels are
to be considered according to a likeness to our own intellectual
actions. In ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are
ordered according to the order of cause and effect; as when we
gradually arrive at one conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is
manifest that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the
preceding middle terms not only in the new acquisition of knowledge,
but also as regards the keeping of the knowledge acquired. A proof of
this is that when anyone forgets any of the preceding middle terms he
can have opinion or belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge; as
he is ignorant of the order of the causes. So, since the inferior
angels know the types of the Divine works by the light of the superior
angels, their knowledge depends on the light of the superior angels not
only as regards the acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the
preserving of the knowledge possessed. So, although after the Judgment
the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of some things,
still this will not prevent their being enlightened by the superior
angels.
Reply to Objection 3: Although after the Day of Judgment men will not
be led any more to salvation by the ministry of the angels, still those
who are already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry.
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Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?
Objection 1: It would seem that men are not taken up into the orders of
the angels. For the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest
heavenly hierarchy, as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the
middle beneath the first. But the angels of the lowest hierarchy are
never transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither are
men transferred to the angelic orders.
Objection 2: Further, certain offices belong to the orders of the
angels, as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the
like; which do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints.
Therefore they are not transferred to the angelic orders.
Objection 3: Further, as the good angels lead on to good, so do the
demons to what is evil. But it is erroneous to say that the souls of
bad men are changed into demons; for Chrysostom rejects this (Hom.
xxviii in Matt. ). Therefore it does not seem that the souls of the
saints will be transferred to the orders of angels.
On the contrary, The Lord says of the saints that, "they will be as the
angels of God" (Mat. 22:30). I answer that, As above explained
([879]AA[4],7), the orders of the angels are distinguished according to
the conditions of nature and according to the gifts of grace.
Considered only as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be
assumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction will
always remain. In view of this distinction, some asserted that men can
in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels; but this is
erroneous, contradicting as it does the promise of Christ saying that
the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven
(Lk. 20:36). For whatever belongs to nature is the material part of an
order; whilst that which perfects is from grace which depends on the
liberality of God, and not on the order of nature. Therefore by the
gift of grace men can merit glory in such a degree as to be equal to
the angels, in each of the angelic grades; and this implies that men
are taken up into the orders of the angels. Some, however, say that not
all who are saved are assumed into the angelic orders, but only virgins
or the perfect; and that the other will constitute their own order, as
it were, corresponding to the whole society of the angels. But this is
against what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), that "there will not
be two societies of men and angels, but only one; because the beatitude
of all is to cleave to God alone. "
Reply to Objection 1: Grace is given to the angels in proportion to
their natural gifts. This, however, does not apply to men, as above
explained [880](A[4]; [881]Q[62], A[6]). So, as the inferior angels
cannot be transferred to the natural grade of the superior, neither can
they be transferred to the superior grade of grace; whereas men can
ascend to the grade of grace, but not of nature.
Reply to Objection 2: The angels according to the order of nature are
between us and God; and therefore according to the common law not only
human affairs are administered by them, but also all corporeal matters.
But holy men even after this life are of the same nature with
ourselves; and hence according to the common law they do not administer
human affairs, "nor do they interfere in the things of the living," as
Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xiii, xvi). Still, by a certain
special dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to
exercise these offices; by working miracles, by coercing the demons, or
by doing something of that kind, as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis
xvi).
Reply to Objection 3: It is not erroneous to say that men are
transferred to the penalty of demons; but some erroneously stated that
the demons are nothing but souls of the dead; and it is this that
Chrysostom rejects.
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THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider the ordering of the bad angels; concerning which there
are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are orders among the demons?
(2) Whether among them there is precedence?
(3) Whether one enlightens another?
(4) Whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels?
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Whether there are orders among the demons?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are no orders among the demons.
For order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as Augustine says
(De Nat. Boni iii); and on the contrary, disorder belongs to evil. But
there is nothing disorderly in the good angels. Therefore in the bad
angels there are no orders.
Objection 2: Further, the angelic orders are contained under a
hierarchy. But the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a
holy principality; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among
the demons there are no orders.
Objection 3: Further, the demons fell from every one of the angelic
orders; as is commonly supposed. Therefore, if some demons are said to
belong to an order, as falling from that order, it would seem necessary
to give them the names of each of those orders. But we never find that
they are called "Seraphim," or "Thrones," or "Dominations. " Therefore
on the same ground they are not to be placed in any other order.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): "Our wrestling . . . is
against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of
this darkness. "
I answer that, As explained above ([882]Q[108], AA[4],7,8), order in
the angels is considered both according to the grade of nature; and
according to that of grace. Now grace has a twofold state, the
imperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of
consummate glory.
If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the
perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic orders, and
never were. But if we consider them in relation to imperfect grace, in
that view the demons were at the time in the orders of angels, but fell
away from them, according to what was said above ([883]Q[62], A[3]),
that all the angels were created in grace. But if we consider them in
the light of nature, in that view they are still in those orders;
because they have not lost their natural gifts; as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv).
Reply to Objection 1: Good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot
exist without good ([884]Q[49], A[3]); so there is order in the demons,
as possessing a good nature.
Reply to Objection 2: If we consider the ordering of the demons on the
part of God Who orders them, it is sacred; for He uses the demons for
Himself; but on the part of the demons' will it is not a sacred thing,
because they abuse their nature for evil.
Reply to Objection 3: The name "Seraphim" is given from the ardor of
charity; and the name "Thrones" from the Divine indwelling; and the
name "Dominations" imports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed
to sin; and therefore these names are not given to the angels who
sinned.
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Whether among the demons there is precedence?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no precedence among the
demons. For every precedence is according to some order of justice. But
the demons are wholly fallen from justice. Therefore there is no
precedence among them.
Objection 2: Further, there is no precedence where obedience and
subjection do not exist. But these cannot be without concord; which is
not to be found among the demons, according to the text, "Among the
proud there are always contentions" (Prov. 13:10). Therefore there is
no precedence among the demons.
Objection 3: If there be precedence among them it is either according
to nature, or according to their sin or punishment. But it is not
according to their nature, for subjection and service do not come from
nature but from subsequent sin; neither is it according to sin or
punishment, because in that case the superior demons who have sinned
the most grievously, would be subject to the inferior. Therefore there
is no precedence among the demons.
On the contrary, On 1 Cor. 15:24 the gloss says: "While the world
lasts, angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over
demons. "
I answer that, Since action follows the nature of a thing, where
natures are subordinate, actions also must be subordinate to each
other. Thus it is in corporeal things, for as the inferior bodies by
natural order are below the heavenly bodies, their actions and
movements are subject to the actions and movements of the heavenly
bodies. Now it is plain from what we have said [885](A[1]), that the
demons are by natural order subject to others; and hence their actions
are subject to the action of those above them, and this is what we mean
by precedence---that the action of the subject should be under the
action of the prelate. So the very natural disposition of the demons
requires that there should be authority among them. This agrees too
with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate, which "reacheth
from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1).
Reply to Objection 1: The authority of the demons is not founded on
their justice, but on the justice of God ordering all things.
Reply to Objection 2: The concord of the demons, whereby some obey
others, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common
wickedness whereby they hate men, and fight against God's justice. For
it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those whom they
see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness.
Reply to Objection 3: The demons are not equal in nature; and so among
them there exists a natural precedence; which is not the case with men,
who are naturally equal. That the inferior are subject to the superior,
is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather to their detriment;
because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to
unhappiness, it follows that to preside in evil is to be more unhappy.
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Whether there is enlightenment in the demons?
Objection 1: It would seem that enlightenment is in the demons. For
enlightenment means the manifestation of the truth. But one demon can
manifest truth to another, because the superior excel in natural
knowledge. Therefore the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.
Objection 2: Further, a body abounding in light can enlighten a body
deficient in light, as the sun enlightens the moon. But the superior
demons abound in the participation of natural light. Therefore it seems
that the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.
On the contrary, Enlightenment is not without cleansing and perfecting,
as stated above ([886]Q[106], A[1]). But to cleanse does not befit the
demons, according to the words: "What can be made clean by the
unclean? " (Ecclus. 34:4). Therefore neither can they enlighten.
I answer that, There can be no enlightenment properly speaking among
the demons. For, as above explained ([887]Q[107], A[2]), enlightenment
properly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to
God, Who enlightens every intellect. Another kind of manifestation of
the truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to
another. Now the demon's perversity does not lead one to order another
to God, but rather to lead away from the Divine order; and so one demon
does not enlighten another; but one can make known his mental concept
to another by way of speech.
Reply to Objection 1: Not every kind of manifestation of the truth is
enlightenment, but only that which is above described.
Reply to Objection 2: According to what belongs to natural knowledge,
there is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels,
or in the demons, because, as above explained ([888]Q[55], A[2];
[889]Q[58], A[2]; [890]Q[79], A[2]), they know from the first all that
belongs to their natural knowledge. So the greater fulness of natural
light in the superior demons does not prove that they can enlighten
others.
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Whether the good angels have precedence over the bad angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that the good angels have no precedence over
the bad angels. For the angels' precedence is especially connected with
enlightenment. But the bad angels, being darkness, are not enlightened
by the good angels. Therefore the good angels do not rule over the bad.
Objection 2: Further, superiors are responsible as regards negligence
for the evil deeds of their subjects. But the demons do much evil.
Therefore if they are subject to the good angels, it seems that
negligence is to be charged to the good angels; which cannot be
admitted.
Objection 3: Further, the angels' precedence follows upon the order of
nature, as above explained [891](A[2]). But if the demons fell from
every order, as is commonly said, many of the demons are superior to
many good angels in the natural order. Therefore the good angels have
no precedence over all the bad angels.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii), that "the treacherous
and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational, pious, and just
spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv) that "the Powers are the
angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile powers. "
I answer that, The whole order of precedence is first and originally in
God; and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they are the nearer
to God. For those creatures, which are more perfect and nearer to God,
have the power to act on others. Now the greatest perfection and that
which brings them nearest to God belongs to the creatures who enjoy
God, as the holy angels; of which perfection the demons are deprived;
and therefore the good angels have precedence over the bad, and these
are ruled by them.
Reply to Objection 1: Many things concerning Divine mysteries are made
known by the holy angels to the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice
requires the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil; or
for the trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge's assessors
make known his sentence to the executioners. This revelation, if
compared to the angelic revealers, can be called an enlightenment,
forasmuch as they direct it to God; but it is not an enlightenment on
the part of the demons, for these do not direct it to God; but to the
fulfilment of their own wickedness.
Reply to Objection 2: The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine
wisdom. Hence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad
angels or men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the good
angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm.
Reply to Objection 3: An angel who is inferior in the natural order
presides over demons, although these may be naturally superior; because
the power of Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is
stronger than the natural power of the angels. Hence likewise among
men, "the spiritual man judgeth all things" (1 Cor. 2:15), and the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 4; x, 5) that "the virtuous man is the
rule and measure of all human acts. "
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HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?
(2) Whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels?
(3) Whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies
locally?
(4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles?
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Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that the corporeal creature is not governed
by angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of action, needs
not to be governed by any superior power; for we require to be governed
lest we do what we ought not. But corporeal things have their actions
determined by the nature divinely bestowed upon them. Therefore they do
not need the government of angels.
Objection 2: Further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. But
some corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior. Therefore
they need not be governed by the angels.
Objection 3: Further, the different orders of the angels are
distinguished by different offices. But if corporeal creatures were
ruled by the angels, there would be as many angelic offices as there
are species of things. So also there would be as many orders of angels
as there are species of things; which is against what is laid down
above ([892]Q[108], A[2]). Therefore the corporeal creature is not
governed by angels.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "all bodies are
ruled by the rational spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Dial. iv, 6),
that "in this visible world nothing takes place without the agency of
the invisible creature. "
I answer that, It is generally found both in human affairs and in
natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by the
universal power; as, for example, the bailiff's power is governed by
the power of the king. Among the angels also, as explained above
([893]Q[55], A[3] ; [894]Q[108], A[1]), the superior angels who preside
over the inferior possess a more universal knowledge. Now it is
manifest that the power of any individual body is more particular than
the power of any spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a
form individualized by matter, and determined to the "here and now";
whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as
the inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are ruled by the
superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels. This is not
only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all philosophers who
admit the existence of incorporeal substances.
Reply to Objection 1: Corporeal things have determinate actions; but
they exercise such actions only according as they are moved; because it
belongs to a body not to act unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature
must be moved by a spiritual creature.
Reply to Objection 2: The reason alleged is according to the opinion of
Aristotle who laid down (Metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are
moved by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to
assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly
bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances
with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps human
souls; and this was because he did not consider that any operations
were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which
the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed. But because we assert
that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the natural
corporeal actions, for which the movements of the heavenly bodies are
not sufficient; therefore in our opinion we must assert that the angels
possess an immediate presidency not only over the heavenly bodies, but
also over the inferior bodies.
Reply to Objection 3: Philosophers have held different opinions about
immaterial substances. For Plato laid down that immaterial substances
were types and species of sensible bodies; and that some were more
universal than others; and so he held that immaterial substances
preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and different ones over
different bodies. But Aristotle held that immaterial substances are not
the species of sensible bodies, but something higher and more
universal; and so he did not attribute to them any immediate presiding
over single bodies, but only over the universal agents, the heavenly
bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he agreed with Plato in
supposing some spiritual substance to preside immediately in the sphere
of active and passive elements; because, as Plato also said, he held
that the forms of these sensible things are derived from immaterial
substances. But he differed from Plato because he supposed only one
immaterial substance to preside over all inferior bodies, which he
called the "active intelligence. "
The holy doctors held with the Platonists that different spiritual
substances were placed over corporeal things. For Augustine says (QQ.
83, qu. 79): "Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power
placed over it"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4): "The devil
was one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial order";
and Origen says on the text, "When the ass saw the angel" (Num. 22:23),
that "the world has need of angels who preside over beasts, and over
the birth of animals, and trees, and plants, and over the increase of
all other things" (Hom. xiv in Num. ). The reason of this, however, is
not that an angel is more fitted by his nature to preside over animals
than over plants; because each angel, even the least, has a higher and
more universal power than any kind of corporeal things: the reason is
to be sought in the order of Divine wisdom, Who places different rulers
over different things. Nor does it follow that there are more than nine
orders of angels, because, as above expounded ([895]Q[108], A[2]), the
orders are distinguished by their general offices. Hence as according
to Gregory all the angels whose proper office it is to preside over the
demons are of the order of the "powers"; so to the order of the
"virtues" do those angels seem to belong who preside over purely
corporeal creatures; for by their ministration miracles are sometimes
performed.
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Whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel?
Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will of
an angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul. But
corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of man is
changed by a conception of the soul as regards heat and cold, and
sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much more is
corporeal matter changed by a conception of an angel.
Objection 2: Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be
done by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior to
corporeal power. But a body by its power is able to transform corporeal
matter; as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore much more
efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal matter.
Objection 3: Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic
administration, as appears above [896](A[1]), and thus it appears that
bodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is
essentially a mover moved. Now in effects there is something that is
due to the power of their principal agents, and which cannot be due to
the power of the instrument; and this it is that takes the principal
place in the effect. For example, digestion is due to the force of
natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul: but that
living flesh is thus generated is due to the power of the soul. Again
the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but that it assumes the length
the form of a bed is from the design of the [joiner's] art. Therefore
the substantial form which takes the principal place in the corporeal
effects, is due to the angelic power. Therefore matter obeys the angels
in receiving its form.
On the contrary, Augustine says "It is not to be thought, that this
visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys God alone. "
I answer that, The Platonists [*Phaedo. xlix: Tim. (Did. ) vol. ii, p.
218] asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by
immaterial forms, because they said that the material forms are
participations of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this
opinion to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in matter
proceed from the concept of the "intellect"; and that corporeal agents
only dispose [matter] for the forms. They seem to have been deceived on
this point, through supposing a form to be something made "per se," so
that it would be the effect of a formal principle. But, as the
Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), what is made, properly
speaking, is the "composite": for this properly speaking, is, as it
were, what subsists. Whereas the form is called a being, not as that
which is, but as that by which something is; and consequently neither
is a form, properly speaking, made; for that is made which is; since to
be is nothing but the way to existence.
Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch as
every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural things, has a
likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself, as
when fire begets fire, or because the whole "composite" as to both
matter and form is within its power; and this belongs to God alone.
Therefore every informing of matter is either immediately from God, or
form some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel.
Reply to Objection 1: Our soul is united to the body as the form; and
so it is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the
soul's concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite,
which is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject to the
command of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection with
natural bodies; and hence the argument does not hold.
Reply to Objection 2: Whatever an inferior power can do, that a
superior power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent
way; for example, the intellect knows sensible things in a more
excellent way than sense knows them. So an angel can change corporeal
matter in a more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by
moving the corporeal agents themselves, as being the superior cause.
Reply to Objection 3: There is nothing to prevent some natural effect
taking place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents
would not suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel's will (as
neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating
the fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish
that the fire could not have produced by itself); since to reduce
matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the power of
a corporeal agent; for it is natural for like to make like.
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Whether bodies obey the angels as regards local motion?
Objection 1: It would seem that bodies do not obey the angels in local
motion. For the local motion of natural bodies follows on their forms.
But the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated
above [897](A[2]). Therefore neither can they cause in them local
motion.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 7) proves that local
motion is the first of all movements. But the angels cannot cause other
movements by a formal change of the matter. Therefore neither can they
cause local motion.
Objection 3: Further, the corporeal members obey the concept of the
soul as regards local movement, as having in themselves some principle
of life. In natural bodies, however, there is not vital principle.
Therefore they do not obey the angels in local motion.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9) that the angels use
corporeal seed to produce certain effects. But they cannot do this
without causing local movement. Therefore bodies obey them in local
motion.
I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "Divine wisdom has
joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second. " Hence it
is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in
conjunction with superior nature. Now corporeal nature is below the
spiritual nature. But among all corporeal movements the most perfect is
local motion, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). The reason of
this is that what is moved locally is not as such in potentiality to
anything intrinsic, but only to something extrinsic---that is, to
place. Therefore the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be
moved immediately by the spiritual nature as regards place. Hence also
the philosophers asserted that the supreme bodies are moved locally by
the spiritual substances; whence we see that the soul moves the body
first and chiefly by a local motion.
Reply to Objection 1: There are in bodies other local movements besides
those which result from the forms; for instance, the ebb and flow of
the sea does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but
from the influence of the moon; and much more can local movements
result from the power of spiritual substances.
Reply to Objection 2: The angels, by causing local motion, as the first
motion, can thereby cause other movements; that is, by employing
corporeal agents to produce these effects, as a workman employs fire to
soften iron.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of an angel is not so limited as is the
power of the soul. Hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the
body united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move
other things. But an angel's power is not limited to any body; hence it
can move locally bodies not joined to it.
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Whether angels can work miracles?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels can work miracles. For
Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang. ): "Those spirits are called virtues
by whom signs and miracles are usually done. "
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79) that "magicians
work miracles by private contracts; good Christians by public justice,
bad Christians by the signs of public justice. " But magicians work
miracles because they are "heard by the demons," as he says elsewhere
in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent. , sent. 4: among the
supposititious works of St. Augustine]. Therefore the demons can work
miracles. Therefore much more can the good angels.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi,
Sentent. , sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]
that "it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen may
be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in our atmosphere. " But
when an effect of natural causes is produced outside the order of the
natural cause, we call it a miracle, as, for instance, when anyone is
cured of a fever without the operation of nature. Therefore the angels
and demons can work miracles.
Objection 4: Further, superior power is not subject to the order of an
inferior cause. But corporeal nature is inferior to an angel. Therefore
an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents; which is to
work miracles.
On the contrary, It is written of God (Ps. 135:4): "Who alone doth
great wonders. "
I answer that, A miracle properly so called is when something is done
outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for a miracle if
something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for
otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards,
as such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature. So for a
miracle is required that it be against the order of the whole created
nature. But God alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or any
other creature does by its own power, is according to the order of
created nature; and thus it is not a miracle. Hence God alone can work
miracles.
Reply to Objection 1: Some angels are said to work miracles; either
because God works miracles at their request, in the same way as holy
men are said to work miracles; or because they exercise a kind of
ministry in the miracles which take place; as in collecting the dust in
the general resurrection, or by doing something of that kind.
Reply to Objection 2: Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are
those things which are done outside the order of the whole created
nature. But as we do not know all the power of created nature, it
follows that when anything is done outside the order of created nature
by a power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves.
So when the demons do anything of their own natural power, these things
are called "miracles" not in an absolute sense, but in reference to
ourselves. In this way the magicians work miracles through the demons;
and these are said to be done by "private contracts," forasmuch as
every power of the creature, in the universe, may be compared to the
power of a private person in a city. Hence when a magician does
anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it were by private
contract. On the other hand, the Divine justice is in the whole
universe as the public law is in the city. Therefore good Christians,
so far as they work miracles by Divine justice, are said to work
miracles by "public justice": but bad Christians by the "signs of
public justice," as by invoking the name of Christ, or by making use of
other sacred signs.
Reply to Objection 3: Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever
happens in this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local
movement.
Reply to Objection 4: Although the angels can do something which is
outside the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything
outside the whole created order, which is essential to a miracle, as
above explained.
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THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire: (1) How
far they can change them by their own natural power; (2) How they are
sent by God to the ministry of men; (3) How they guard and protect men.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect?
(2) Whether he can change man's will?
(3) Whether he can change man's imagination?
(4) Whether he can change man's senses?
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Whether an angel can enlighten man?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man. For man
is enlightened by faith; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii) attributes
enlightenment to baptism, as "the sacrament of faith. " But faith is
immediately from God, according to Eph. 2:8: "By grace you are saved
through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God. "
Therefore man is not enlightened by an angel; but immediately by God.
Objection 2: Further, on the words, "God hath manifested it to them"
(Rom. 1:19), the gloss observes that "not only natural reason availed
for the manifestation of Divine truths to men, but God also revealed
them by His work," that is, by His creature. But both are immediately
from God---that is, natural reason and the creature. Therefore God
enlightens man immediately.
Objection 3: Further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being
enlightened. But man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels.
Therefore he is not enlightened by them.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that the revelation of
Divine things reaches men through the ministry of the angels. But such
revelation is an enlightenment as we have stated ([898]Q[106], A[1];
[899]Q[107], A[2]). Therefore men are enlightened by the angels.
I answer that, Since the order of Divine Providence disposes that lower
things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above
([900]Q[109], A[2]); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the
superior, so men, who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by
them.
The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way alike
and in another way unlike. For, as was shown above ([901]Q[106], A[1]),
the enlightenment which consists in making known Divine truth has two
functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect is strengthened
by the action of the superior intellect, and according as the
intelligible species which are in the superior intellect are proposed
to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby. This takes place in the
angels when the superior angel divides his universal concept of the
truth according to the capacity of the inferior angel, as explained
above ([902]Q[106], A[1]).
The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself
unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand by turning to
the phantasms, as above explained ([903]Q[84], A[7]). So the angels
propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of sensible
things, according to what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), that, "It is
impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise than shrouded
by the variety of the sacred veils. " On the other hand, the human
intellect as the inferior, is strengthened by the action of the angelic
intellect. And in these two ways man is enlightened by an angel.
Reply to Objection 1: Two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith;
first, the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the
will tending to Divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of
faith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded by the will;
hence Augustine says, "No one believes except willingly. " In this
respect faith comes from God alone. Secondly, faith requires that what
is to be believed be proposed to the believer; which is accomplished by
man, according to Rom. 10:17, "Faith cometh by hearing"; principally,
however, by the angels, by whom Divine things are revealed to men.
Hence the angels have some part in the enlightenment of faith.
Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels not only concerning what is
to be believed; but also as regards what is to be done.
Reply to Objection 2: Natural reason, which is immediately from God,
can be strengthened by an angel, as we have said above. Again, the more
the human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible
truth can be elicited from the species derived from creatures. Thus man
is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more
perfect knowledge of God.
Reply to Objection 3: Intellectual operation and enlightenment can be
understood in two ways. First, on the part of the object understood;
thus whoever understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands
or is enlightened, because he knows that the object is made known to
him. Secondly, on the part of the principle; and thus it does not
follow that whoever understands a truth, knows what the intellect is,
which is the principle of the intellectual operation. In like manner
not everyone who is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is
enlightened by him.
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Whether the angels can change the will of man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels can change the will of man.
For, upon the text, "Who maketh His angels spirits and His ministers a
flame of fire" (Heb. 1:7), the gloss notes that "they are fire, as
being spiritually fervent, and as burning away our vices. " This could
not be, however, unless they changed the will. Therefore the angels can
change the will.
Objection 2: Further, Bede says (Super Matth. xv, 11), that, "the devil
does not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them. " Damascene, however,
says that he also sends them; for he remarks that "every malicious act
and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and put into men" (De
Fide Orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good angels introduce and
kindle good thoughts. But this could only be if they changed the will.
Therefore the will is changed by them.
Objection 3: Further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the
human intellect by means of the phantasms. But as the imagination which
serves the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive
appetite which serves the will, because it also is a faculty using a
corporeal organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can he
change the will.
On the contrary, To change the will belongs to God alone, according to
Prov. 21:1: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord,
whithersoever He will He shall turn it. "
I answer that, The will can be changed in two ways. First, from within;
in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but the
inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus change
the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination to the
intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God alone
Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the will is from God alone,
Who causes the will.
Secondly, the will is moved from without. As regards an angel, this can
be only in one way---by the good apprehended by the intellect. Hence in
as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended as an
appetible good, so far does he move the will. In this way also God
alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move the
will by way of persuasion, as above explained ([904]Q[106], A[2]).
In addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in
another way; namely, by the passion residing in the sensitive appetite:
thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will something.
In this manner the angels, as being able to rouse these passions, can
move the will, not however by necessity, for the will ever remains free
to consent to, or to resist, the passion.
Reply to Objection 1: Those who act as God's ministers, either men or
angels, are said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of
persuasion.
Reply to Objection 2: The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by
causing them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is
subject to the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of
thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of the
things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions.
Damascene calls this kindling "a putting in" because such a work is
accomplished within. But good thoughts are attributed to a higher
principle, namely, God, though they may be procured by the ministry of
the angels.
Reply to Objection 3: The human intellect in its present state can
understand only by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can
will something following the judgment of reason rather than the passion
of the sensitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold.
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Whether an angel can change man's imagination?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot change man's
imagination. For the phantasy, as is said De Anima iii, is "a motion
caused by the sense in act. " But if this motion were caused by an
angel, it would not be caused by the sense in act. Therefore it is
contrary to the nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the
imaginative faculty, to be changed by an angel.
Objection 2: Further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual,
they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But an
angel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter ([905]Q[110], A[2]).
Therefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he cannot
change it.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): "One
spirit by intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to
the other spirit by these images, so that the latter either understands
it himself, or accepts it as understood by the other. " But it does not
seem that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, nor that
the imagination can receive the knowledge of an angel. Therefore it
seems that an angel cannot change the imagination.
Objection 4: Further, in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the
similitudes of the things as to the things themselves. But in this
there is deception.
