Secondly, by his
own act, for instance when he raises B's child from the sacred font,
and thus spiritual relationship passes to the wife if he has already
had carnal knowledge of her, but not if the marriage be not yet
consummated, since they are not as yet made one flesh: and this is by
way of a kind of affinity; wherefore it would seem on the same grounds
to pass to a woman of whom he has carnal knowledge, though she be not
his wife.
own act, for instance when he raises B's child from the sacred font,
and thus spiritual relationship passes to the wife if he has already
had carnal knowledge of her, but not if the marriage be not yet
consummated, since they are not as yet made one flesh: and this is by
way of a kind of affinity; wherefore it would seem on the same grounds
to pass to a woman of whom he has carnal knowledge, though she be not
his wife.
Summa Theologica
But this is not required when a matrimonial
separation is at issue. Therefore accusation has no place then.
Objection 2: Further, in a matrimonial lawsuit only the relatives are
heard, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 41). But in accusations even
strangers are heard. Therefore in a suit for matrimonial separation the
process is not by way of accusation.
Objection 3: Further, if a marriage ought to be denounced this should
be done especially where it is least difficult to sever the tie. Now
this is when only the betrothal has been contracted, and then it is not
the marriage that is denounced. Therefore accusation should never take
place at any other time.
Objection 4: Further, a man is not prevented from accusing by the fact
that he does not accuse at once. But this happens in marriage, for if
he was silent at first when the marriage was being contracted, he
cannot denounce the marriage afterwards without laying himself open to
suspicion. Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, Whatever is unlawful can be denounced. But the
marriage of relatives by affinity and consanguinity is unlawful.
Therefore it can be denounced.
I answer that, Accusation is instituted lest the guilty be tolerated as
though they were innocent. Now just as it happens through ignorance of
fact that a guilty man is reputed innocent, so it happens through
ignorance of a circumstance that a certain fact is deemed lawful
whereas it is unlawful. Wherefore just as a man is sometimes accused,
so is a fact sometimes an object of accusation. It is in this way that
a marriage is denounced, when through ignorance of an impediment it is
deemed lawful, whereas it is unlawful.
Reply to Objection 1: The punishment of retaliation takes place when a
person is accused of a crime, because then action is taken that he may
be punished. But when it is a deed that is accused, action is taken not
for the punishment of the doer, but in order to prevent what is
unlawful. Hence in a matrimonial suit the accuser does not bind himself
to a punishment. Moreover, the accusation may be made either in words
or in writing, provided the person who denounces the marriage
denounced, and the impediment for which it is denounced, be expressed.
Reply to Objection 2: Strangers cannot know of the consanguinity except
from the relatives, since these know with greater probability. Hence
when these are silent, a stranger is liable to be suspected of acting
from ill-will unless he wish the relatives to prove his assertion.
Wherefore a stranger is debarred from accusing when there are relatives
who are silent, and by whom he cannot prove his accusation. On the
other hand the relatives, however nearly related they be, are not
debarred from accusing, when the marriage is denounced on account of a
perpetual impediment, which prevents the contracting of the marriage
and voids the contract. When, however, the accusation is based on a
denial of the contract having taken place, the parents should be
debarred from witnessing as being liable to suspicion, except those of
the party that is inferior in rank and wealth, for they, one is
inclined to think, would be willing for the marriage to stand.
Reply to Objection 3: If the marriage is not yet contracted and there
is only a betrothal, there can be no accusation, for what is not,
cannot be accused. But the impediment can be denounced lest the
marriage be contracted.
Reply to Objection 4: He who is silent at first is sometimes heard
afterwards if he wish to denounce the marriage, and sometimes he is
repulsed. This is made clear by the Decretal (cap. Cum in tua, De his
qui matrim. accus. possunt. ) which runs as follows: "If an accuser
present himself after the marriage has been contracted, since he did
not declare himself when according to custom, the banns were published
in church, we may rightly ask whether he should be allowed to voice his
accusation. In this matter we deem that a distinction should be made,
so that if he who lodges information against persons already married
was absent from the diocese at the time of the aforesaid publication,
or if for some other reason this could not come to his knowledge, for
instance if through exceeding stress of weakness and fever he was not
in possession of his faculties, or was of so tender years as to be too
young to understand such matters, or if he were hindered by some other
lawful cause, his accusation should be heard. otherwise without doubt
he should be repulsed as open to suspicion, unless he swear that the
information lodged by him came to his knowledge subsequently and that
he is not moved by ill-will to make his accusation. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in a suit of this kind one should proceed by hearing witnesses in
the same way as in other suits?
Objection 1: It would seem that in such a suit one ought not to proceed
by hearing witnesses, in the same way as in other suits where any
witnesses may be called provided they be unexceptionable. But here
strangers are not admitted, although they be unexceptionable.
Therefore, etc.
Objection 2: Further, witnesses who are suspected of private hatred or
love are debarred from giving evidence. Now relatives are especially
open to suspicion of love for one party, and hatred for the other.
Therefore their evidence should not be taken.
Objection 3: Further, marriage is a more favorable suit than those
others in which purely corporeal questions are at stake. Now in these
the same person cannot be both accuser and witness. Neither therefore
can this be in a matrimonial suit; and so it would appear that it is
not right to proceed by hearing witnesses in a suit of this kind.
On the contrary, Witnesses are called in a suit in order to give the
judge evidence concerning matters of doubt. Now evidence should be
afforded the judge in this suit as in other suits, since he must not
pronounce a hasty judgment on what is not proven. Therefore here as in
other lawsuits witnesses should be called.
I answer that, In this kind of lawsuit as in others, truth must be
unveiled by witnesses: yet, as the lawyers say, there are many things
peculiar to this suit; namely that "the same person can be accuser and
witness; that evidence is not taken 'on oath of calumny,' since it is a
quasi-spiritual lawsuit; that relatives are allowed as witnesses; that
the juridical order is not perfectly observed, since if the
denunciation has been made, and the suit is uncontested, the defendant
may be excommunicated if contumacious; that hearsay evidence is
admitted; and that witnesses may be called after the publication of the
names of the witnesses. " All this is in order to prevent the sin that
may occur in such a union (cap. Quoties aliqui; cap. Super eo, De test.
et attest. ; cap. Literas, De juram. calumn. ).
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF SPIRITUAL RELATIONSHIP (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the impediment of spiritual relationship: under
which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether spiritual relationship is an impediment to marriage?
(2) From what cause is it contracted?
(3) Between whom?
(4) Whether it passes from husband to wife?
(5) Whether it passes to the father's carnal children?
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Whether spiritual relationship is an impediment to marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship is not an
impediment to marriage. For nothing is an impediment to marriage save
what is contrary to a marriage good. Now spiritual relationship is not
contrary to a marriage good. Therefore it is not an impediment to
marriage.
Objection 2: Further, a perpetual impediment to marriage cannot stand
together with marriage. But spiritual relationship sometimes stands
together with marriage, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42), as
when a man in a case of necessity baptizes his own child, for then he
contracts a spiritual relationship with his wife, and yet the marriage
is not dissolved. Therefore spiritual relationship is not an impediment
to marriage.
Objection 3: Further, union of the spirit does not pass to the flesh.
But marriage is a union of the flesh. Therefore since spiritual
relationship is a union of the spirit, it cannot become an impediment
to marriage.
Objection 4: Further, contraries have not the same effects. Now
spiritual relationship is apparently contrary to disparity of worship,
since spiritual relationship is a kinship resulting from the giving of
a sacrament or the intention of so doing [*See next Article, ad 3]:
whereas disparity of worship consists in the lack of a sacrament, as
stated above ([4980]Q[50], A[1]). Since then disparity of worship is an
impediment to matrimony, it would seem that spiritual relationship has
not this effect.
On the contrary, The holier the bond, the more is it to be safeguarded.
Now a spiritual bond is holier than a bodily tie: and since the tie of
bodily kinship is an impediment to marriage, it follows that spiritual
relationship should also be an impediment.
Further, in marriage the union of souls ranks higher than union of
bodies, for it precedes it. Therefore with much more reason can a
spiritual relationship hinder marriage than bodily relationship does.
I answer that, Just as by carnal procreation man receives natural
being, so by the sacraments he receives the spiritual being of grace.
Wherefore just as the tie that is contracted by carnal procreation is
natural to man, inasmuch as he is a natural being, so the tie that is
contracted from the reception of the sacraments is after a fashion
natural to man, inasmuch as he is a member of the Church. Therefore as
carnal relationship hinders marriage, even so does spiritual
relationship by command of the Church. We must however draw a
distinction in reference to spiritual relationship, since either it
precedes or follows marriage. If it precedes, it hinders the
contracting of marriage and voids the contract. If it follows, it does
not dissolve the marriage bond: but we must draw a further distinction
in reference to the marriage act. For either the spiritual relationship
is contracted in a case of necessity, as when a father baptizes his
child who is at the point of death---and then it is not an obstacle to
the marriage act on either side---or it is contracted without any
necessity and through ignorance, in which case if the person whose
action has occasioned the relationship acted with due caution, it is
the same with him as in the former case---or it is contracted purposely
and without any necessity, and then the person whose action has
occasioned the relationship, loses the right to ask for the debt; but
is bound to pay if asked, because the fault of the one party should not
be prejudicial to the other.
Reply to Objection 1: Although spiritual relationship does not hinder
any of the chief marriage goods, it hinders one of the secondary goods,
namely the extension of friendship, because spiritual relationship is
by itself a sufficient reason for friendship: wherefore intimacy and
friendship with other persons need to be sought by means of marriage.
Reply to Objection 2: Marriage is a lasting bond, wherefore no
supervening impediment can sever it. Hence it happens sometimes that
marriage and an impediment to marriage stand together, but not if the
impediment precedes.
Reply to Objection 3: In marriage there is not only a bodily but also a
spiritual union: and consequently kinship of spirit proves an
impediment thereto, without spiritual kinship having to pass into a
bodily relationship.
Reply to Objection 4: There is nothing unreasonable in two things that
are contrary to one another being contrary to the same thing, as great
and small are contrary to equal. Thus disparity of worship and
spiritual relationship are opposed to marriage, because in one the
distance is greater, and in the other less, than required by marriage.
Hence there is an impediment to marriage in either case.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether spiritual relationship is contracted by baptism only?
Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship is contracted by
Baptism only. For as bodily kinship is to bodily birth, so is spiritual
kinship to spiritual birth. Now Baptism alone is called spiritual
birth. Therefore spiritual kinship is contracted by Baptism only, even
as only by carnal birth is carnal kinship contracted.
Objection 2: Further, a character is imprinted in order as in
Confirmation. But spiritual relationship does not result from receiving
orders. Therefore it does not result from Confirmation but only from
Baptism.
Objection 3: Further, sacraments are more excellent than sacramentals.
Now spiritual relationship does not result from certain sacraments, for
instance from Extreme Unction. Much less therefore does it result from
catechizing, as some maintain.
Objection 4: Further, many other sacramentals are attached to Baptism
besides catechizing. Therefore spiritual relationship is not contracted
from catechism any more than from the others.
Objection 5: Further, prayer is no less efficacious than instruction of
catechism for advancement in good. But spiritual relationship does not
result from prayer. Therefore it does not result from catechism.
Objection 6: Further, the instruction given to the baptized by
preaching to them avails no less than preaching to those who are not
yet baptized. But no spiritual relationship results from preaching.
Neither therefore does it result from catechism.
Objection 7: On the other hand, It is written (1 Cor. 4:15): "In Christ
Jesus by the gospel I have begotten you. " Now spiritual birth causes
spiritual relationship. Therefore spiritual relationship results from
the preaching of the gospel and instruction, and not only from Baptism.
Objection 8: Further, as original sin is taken away by Baptism, so is
actual sin taken away by Penance. Therefore just as Baptism causes
spiritual relationship, so also does Penance.
Objection 9: Further, "father" denotes relationship. Now a man is
called another's spiritual father in respect of Penance, teaching,
pastoral care and many other like things. Therefore spiritual
relationship is contracted from many other sources besides Baptism and
Confirmation.
I answer that, There are three opinions on this question. Some say that
as spiritual regeneration is bestowed by the sevenfold grace of the
Holy Ghost, it is caused by means of seven things, beginning with the
first taste of blessed salt and ending with Confirmation given by the
bishop: and they say that spiritual relationship is contracted by each
of these seven things. But this does not seem reasonable, for carnal
relationship is not contracted except by a perfect act of generation.
Wherefore affinity is not contracted except there be mingling of seeds,
from which it is possible for carnal generation to follow. Now
spiritual generation is not perfected except by a sacrament: wherefore
it does not seem fitting for spiritual relationship to be contracted
otherwise than through a sacrament. Hence others say that spiritual
relationship is only contracted through three sacraments, namely
catechism, Baptism and Confirmation, but these do not apparently know
the meaning of what they say, since catechism is not a sacrament but a
sacramental. Wherefore others say that it is contracted through two
sacraments only, namely Confirmation and Baptism, and this is the more
common opinion. Some however of these say that catechism is a weak
impediment, since it hinders the contracting of marriage but does not
void the contract.
Reply to Objection 1: Carnal birth is twofold. The first is in the
womb, wherein that which is born is a weakling and cannot come forth
without danger: and to this birth regeneration by Baptism is likened;
wherein a man is regenerated as though yet needing to be fostered in
the womb of the Church. The second is birth from out of the womb, when
that which was born in the womb is so far strengthened that it can
without danger face the outer world which has a natural corruptive
tendency. To this is likened Confirmation, whereby man being
strengthened goes forth abroad to confess the name of Christ. Hence
spiritual relationship is fittingly contracted through both these
sacraments.
Reply to Objection 2: The effect of the sacrament of order is not
regeneration but the bestowal of power, for which reason it is not
conferred on women, and consequently no impediment to marriage can
arise therefrom. Hence this kind of relationship does not count.
Reply to Objection 3: In catechism one makes a profession of future
Baptism, just as in betrothal one enters an engagement of future
marriage. Wherefore just as in betrothal a certain kind of propinquity
is contracted, so is there in catechism, whereby marriage is rendered
at least unlawful, as some say; but not in the other sacraments.
Reply to Objection 4: There is not made a profession of faith in the
other sacramentals of Baptism, as in catechism: wherefore the
comparison fails.
The same answer applies to the Fifth and Sixth Objections.
Reply to Objection 7: The Apostle had instructed them in the faith by a
kind of catechism; and consequently his instruction was directed to
their spiritual birth.
Reply to Objection 8: Properly speaking a spiritual relationship is not
contracted through the sacrament of Penance. Wherefore a priest's son
can marry a woman whose confession the priest has heard, else in the
whole parish he could not find a woman whom he could marry. Nor does it
matter that by Penance actual sin is taken away, for this is not a kind
of birth, but a kind of healing. Nevertheless Penance occasions a kind
of bond between the woman penitent and the priest, that has a
resemblance to spiritual relationship, so that if he have carnal
intercourse with her, he sins as grievously as if she were his
spiritual daughter. The reason of this is that the relations between
priest and penitent are most intimate, and consequently in order to
remove the occasion of sin this prohibition [*Can. Omnes quos, and
seqq. , Caus. xxx] was made.
Reply to Objection 9: A spiritual father is so called from his likeness
to a carnal father. Now as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 2) a
carnal father gives his child three things, being nourishment and
instruction: and consequently a person's spiritual father is so called
from one of these three things. Nevertheless he has not, through being
his spiritual father, a spiritual relationship with him, unless he is
like a (carnal) father as to generation which is the way to being. This
solution may also be applied to the foregoing Eighth Objection.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether spiritual relationship is contracted between the person baptized and
the person who raises him from the sacred font?
Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship is not
contracted between the person baptized and the person who raises him
from the sacred font. For in carnal generation carnal relationship is
contracted only on the part of the person of whose seed the child is
born; and not on the part of the person who receives the child after
birth. Therefore neither is spiritual relationship contracted between
the receiver and the received at the sacred font.
Objection 2: Further, he who raises a person from the sacred font is
called {anadochos} by Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii): and it is part of his
office to instruct the child. But instruction is not a sufficient cause
of spiritual relationship, as stated above [4981](A[2]). Therefore no
relationship is contracted between him and the person whom he raises
from the sacred font.
Objection 3: Further, it may happen that someone raises a person from
the sacred font before he himself is baptized. Now spiritual
relationship is not contracted in such a case, since one who is not
baptized is not capable of spirituality. Therefore raising a person
from the sacred font is not sufficient to contract a spiritual
relationship.
On the contrary, There is the definition of spiritual relationship
quoted above [4982](A[1]), as also the authorities mentioned in the
text (Sent. iv, D, 42).
I answer that, Just as in carnal generation a person is born of a
father and mother, so in spiritual generation a person is born again a
son of God as Father, and of the Church as Mother. Now while he who
confers the sacrament stands in the place of God, whose instrument and
minister he is, he who raises a baptized person from the sacred font,
or holds the candidate for Confirmation, stands in the place of the
Church. Therefore spiritual relationship is contracted with both.
Reply to Objection 1: Not only the father, of whose seed the child is
born, is related carnally to the child, but also the mother who
provides the matter, and in whose womb the child is begotten. So too
the godparent who in place of the Church offers and raises the
candidate for Baptism and holds the candidate for Confirmation
contracts spiritual relationship.
Reply to Objection 2: He contracts spiritual relationship not by reason
of the instruction it is his duty to give, but on account of the
spiritual birth in which he co-operates.
Reply to Objection 3: A person who is not baptized cannot raise anyone
from the sacred font, since he is not a member of the Church whom the
godparent in Baptism represents: although he can baptize, because he is
a creature of God Whom the baptizer represents. And yet he cannot
contract a spiritual relationship, since he is void of spiritual life
to which man is first born by receiving Baptism.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether spiritual relationship passes from husband to wife?
Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship does not pass
from husband to wife. For spiritual and bodily union are disparate and
differ generically. Therefore carnal union which is between husband and
wife cannot be the means of contracting a spiritual relationship.
Objection 2: Further, the godfather and godmother have more in common
in the spiritual birth that is the cause of spiritual relationship,
than a husband, who is godfather, has with his wife. Now godfather and
godmother do not hereby contract spiritual relationship. Therefore
neither does a wife contract a spiritual relationship through her
husband being godfather to someone.
Objection 3: Further, it may happen that the husband is baptized, and
his wife not, for instance when he is converted from unbelief without
his wife being converted. Now spiritual relationship cannot be
contracted by one who is not baptized. Therefore it does not always
pass from husband to wife.
Objection 4: Further, husband and wife together can raise a person from
the sacred font, since no law forbids it. If therefore spiritual
relationship passed from husband to wife, it would follow that each of
them is twice godfather or godmother of the same individual: which is
absurd.
On the contrary, Spiritual goods are more communicable than bodily
goods. But the bodily consanguinity of the husband passes to his wife
by affinity. Much more therefore does spiritual relationship.
I answer that, A may become co-parent with B in two ways. First, by the
act of another (B), who baptizes A's child, or raises him in Baptism.
In this way spiritual relationship does not pass from husband to wife,
unless perchance it be his wife's child, for then she contracts
spiritual relationship directly, even as her husband.
Secondly, by his
own act, for instance when he raises B's child from the sacred font,
and thus spiritual relationship passes to the wife if he has already
had carnal knowledge of her, but not if the marriage be not yet
consummated, since they are not as yet made one flesh: and this is by
way of a kind of affinity; wherefore it would seem on the same grounds
to pass to a woman of whom he has carnal knowledge, though she be not
his wife. Hence the verse: "I may not marry my own child's godmother,
nor the mother of my godchild: but I may marry the godmother of my
wife's child. "
Reply to Objection 1: From the fact that corporal and spiritual union
differ generically we may conclude that the one is not the other, but
not that the one cannot cause the other, since things of different
genera sometimes cause one another either directly or indirectly.
Reply to Objection 2: The godfather and godmother of the same person
are not united in that person's spiritual birth save accidentally,
since one of them would be self-sufficient for the purpose. Hence it
does not follow from this that any spiritual relationship results
between them whereby they are hindered from marrying one another. Hence
the verse:
"Of two co-parents one is always spiritual, the other carnal: this rule
is infallible. "
On the other hand, marriage by itself makes husband and wife one flesh:
wherefore the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: If the wife be not baptized, the spiritual
relationship will not reach her, because she is not a fit subject, and
not because spiritual relationship cannot pass from husband to wife
through marriage.
Reply to Objection 4: Since no spiritual relationship results between
godfather and godmother, nothing prevents husband and wife from raising
together someone from the sacred font. Nor is it absurd that the wife
become twice godmother of the same person from different causes, just
as it is possible for her to be connected in carnal relationship both
by affinity and consanguinity to the same person.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether spiritual relationship passes to the godfather's carnal children?
Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship does not pass to
the godfather's carnal children. For no degrees are assigned to
spiritual relationship. Yet there would be degrees if it passed from
father to son, since the person begotten involves a change of degree,
as stated above ([4983]Q[55], A[5]). Therefore it does not pass to the
godfather's carnal sons.
Objection 2: Further, father and son are related in the same degree as
brother and brother. If therefore spiritual relationship passes from
father to son, it will equally pass from brother to brother: and this
is false.
On the contrary, This is proved by authority quoted in the text (Sent.
iv, D, 42).
I answer that, A son is something of his father and not conversely
(Ethic. viii, 12): wherefore spiritual relationship passes from father
to his carnal son and not conversely. Thus it is clear that there are
three spiritual relationships: one called spiritual fatherhood between
godfather and godchild; another called co-paternity between the
godparent and carnal parent of the same person; and the third is called
spiritual brotherhood, between godchild and the carnal children of the
same parent. Each of these hinders the contracting of marriage and
voids the contract.
Reply to Objection 1: The addition of a person by carnal generation
entails a degree with regard to a person connected by the same kind of
relationship, but not with regard to one connected by another kind of
relationship. Thus a son is connected with his father's wife in the
same degree as his father, but by another kind of relationship. Now
spiritual relationship differs in kind from carnal. Wherefore a godson
is not related to his godfather's carnal son in the same degree as the
latter's father is related to him, through whom the spiritual
relationship is contracted. Consequently it does not follow that
spiritual relationship admits of degrees.
Reply to Objection 2: A man is not part of his brother as a son is of
his father. But a wife is part of her husband, since she is made one
with him in body. Consequently the relationship does not pass from
brother to brother, whether the brother be born before or after
spiritual brotherhood.
__________________________________________________________________
OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIP, WHICH IS BY ADOPTION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider legal relationship which is by adoption. Under
this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) What is adoption?
(2) Whether one contracts through it a tie that is an impediment to
marriage?
(3) Between which persons is this tie contracted.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether adoption is rightly defined?
Objection 1: It would seem that adoption is not rightly defined:
"Adoption is the act by which a person lawfully takes for his child or
grandchild and so on one who does not belong to him. " For the child
should be subject to its father. Now, sometimes the person adopted does
not come under the power of the adopter. Therefore adoption is not
always the taking of someone as a child.
Objection 2: Further, "Parents should lay up for their children" (2
Cor. 12:14). But the adoptive father does not always necessarily lay up
for his adopted child, since sometimes the adopted does not inherit the
goods of the adopter. Therefore adoption is not the taking of someone
as a child.
Objection 3: Further, adoption, whereby someone is taken as a child, is
likened to natural procreation whereby a child is begotten naturally.
Therefore whoever is competent to beget a child naturally is competent
to adopt. But this is untrue, since neither one who is not his own
master, nor one who is not twenty-five years of age, nor a woman can
adopt, and yet they can beget a child naturally. Therefore, properly
speaking, adoption is not the taking of someone as a child.
Objection 4: Further, to take as one's child one who is not one's own
seems necessary in order to supply the lack of children begotten
naturally. Now one who is unable to beget, through being a eunuch or
impotent, suffers especially from the absence of children of his own
begetting. Therefore he is especially competent to adopt someone as his
child. But he is not competent to adopt. Therefore adoption is not the
taking of someone as one's child.
Objection 5: Further, in spiritual relationship, where someone is taken
as a child without carnal procreation, it is of no consequence whether
an older person become the father of a younger, or "vice versa," since
a youth can baptize an old man and "vice versa. " Therefore, if by
adoption a person is taken as a child without being carnally begotten,
it would make no difference whether an older person adopted a younger,
or a younger an older person; which is not true. Therefore the same
conclusion follows.
Objection 6: Further, there is no difference of degree between adopted
and adopter. Therefore whoever is adopted, is adopted as a child; and
consequently it is not right to say that one may be adopted as a
grandchild.
Objection 7: Further, adoption is a result of love, wherefore God is
said to have adopted us as children through charity. Now we should have
greater charity towards those who are connected with us than towards
strangers. Therefore adoption should be not of a stranger but of
someone connected with us.
I answer that, Art imitates nature and supplies the defect of nature
where nature is deficient. Hence just as a man begets by natural
procreation, so by positive law which is the art of what is good and
just, one person can take to himself another as a child in likeness to
one that is his child by nature, in order to take the place of the
children he has lost, this being the chief reason why adoption was
introduced. And since taking implies a term "wherefrom," for which
reason the taker is not the thing taken, it follows that the person
taken as a child must be a stranger. Accordingly, just as natural
procreation has a term "whereto," namely the form which is the end of
generation, and a term "wherefrom," namely the contrary form, so legal
generation has a term "whereto," namely a child or grandchild, and a
term "wherefrom," namely, a stranger. Consequently the above definition
includes the genus of adoption, for it is described as a "lawful
taking," and the term "wherefrom," since it is said to be the taking of
"a stranger," and the term "whereto," because it says, "as a child or
grandchild . "
Reply to Objection 1: The sonship of adoption is an imitation of
natural sonship. Wherefore there are two species of adoption, one which
imitates natural sonship perfectly, and this is called "arrogatio,"
whereby the person adopted is placed under the power of the adopter;
and one who is thus adopted inherits from his adopted father if the
latter die intestate, nor can his father legally deprive him of a
fourth part of his inheritance. But no one can adopt in this way except
one who is his own master, one namely who has no father or, if he has,
is of age. There can be no adoption of this kind without the authority
of the sovereign. The other kind of adoption imitates natural sonship
imperfectly, and is called "simple adoption," and by this the adopted
does not come under the power of the adopter: so that it is a
disposition to perfect adoption, rather than perfect adoption itself.
In this way even one who is not his own master can adopt, without the
consent of the sovereign and with the authority of a magistrate: and
one who is thus adopted does not inherit the estate of the adopter, nor
is the latter bound to bequeath to him any of his goods in his will,
unless he will.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: Natural procreation is directed to the production
of the species; wherefore anyone in whom the specific nature is not
hindered is competent to be able to beget naturally. But adoption is
directed to hereditary succession, wherefore those alone are competent
to adopt who have the power to dispose of their estate. Consequently
one who is not his own master, or who is less than twenty-five years of
age, or a woman, cannot adopt anyone, except by special permission of
the sovereign.
Reply to Objection 4: An inheritance cannot pass to posterity through
one who has a perpetual impediment from begetting: hence for this very
reason it ought to pass to those who ought to succeed to him by right
of relationship; and consequently he cannot adopt, as neither can he
beget. Moreover greater is sorrow for children lost than for children
one has never had. Wherefore those who are impeded from begetting need
no solace for their lack of children as those who have had and have
lost them, or could have had them but have them not by reason of some
accidental impediment.
Reply to Objection 5: Spiritual relationship is contracted through a
sacrament whereby the faithful are born again in Christ, in Whom there
is no difference between male and female, bondman and free, youth and
old age (Gal. 3:28; Col. 3:11). Wherefore anyone can indifferently
become another's godfather. But adoption aims at hereditary succession
and a certain subjection of the adopted to the adopter: and it is not
fitting that older persons should be subjected to younger in the care
of the household. Consequently a younger person cannot adopt an older;
but according to law the adopted person must be so much younger than
the adopter, that he might have been the child of his natural
begetting.
Reply to Objection 6: One may lose one's grandchildren and so forth
even as one may lose one's children. Wherefore since adoption was
introduced as a solace for children lost, just as someone may be
adopted in place of a child, so may someone be adopted in place of a
grandchild and so on.
Reply to Objection 7: A relative ought to succeed by right of
relationship; and therefore such a person is not competent to be chosen
to succeed by adoption. And if a relative, who is not competent to
inherit the estate, be adopted, he is adopted not as a relative, but as
a stranger lacking the right of succeeding to the adopter's goods.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a tie that is an impediment to marriage is contracted through
adoption?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is not contracted through
adoption a tie that is an impediment to marriage. For spiritual care is
more excellent than corporeal care. But no tie of relationship is
contracted through one's being subjected to another's spiritual care:
else all those who dwell in the parish would be related to the parish
priest and would be unable to marry his son. Neither therefore can this
result from adoption which places the adopted under the care of the
adopter.
Objection 2: Further, no tie of relationship results from persons
conferring a benefit on another. But adoption is nothing but the
conferring of a benefit. Therefore no tie of relationship results from
adoption.
Objection 3: Further, a natural father provides for his child chiefly
in three things, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 11,12), namely
by giving him being, nourishment and education; and hereditary
succession is subsequent to these. Now no tie of relationship is
contracted by one's providing for a person's nourishment and education,
else a person would be related to his nourishers, tutors and masters,
which is false. Therefore neither is any relationship contracted
through adoption by which one inherits another's estate.
Objection 4: Further, the sacraments of the Church are not subject to
human laws. Now marriage is a sacrament of the Church. Since then
adoption was introduced by human law, it would seem that a tie
contracted from adoption cannot be an impediment to marriage.
On the contrary, Relationship is an impediment to marriage. Now a kind
of relationship results from adoption, namely legal relationship, as
evidenced by its definition, for "legal relationship is a connection
arising out of adoption. " Therefore adoption results in a tie which is
an impediment to marriage.
Further, the same is proved by the authorities quoted in the text
(Sent. iv, D, 42).
I answer that, The Divine law especially forbids marriage between those
persons who have to live together lest, as Rabbi Moses observes (Doc.
Perp. iii, 49), if it were lawful for them to have carnal intercourse,
there should be more room for concupiscence to the repression of which
marriage is directed. And since the adopted child dwells in the house
of his adopted father like one that is begotten naturally human laws
forbid the contracting of marriage between the like, and this
prohibition is approved by the Church. Hence it is that legal adoption
is an impediment to marriage. This suffices for the Replies to the
first three Objections, because none of those things entails such a
cohabitation as might be an incentive to concupiscence. Therefore they
do not cause a relationship that is an impediment to marriage.
Reply to Objection 4: The prohibition of a human law would not suffice
to make an impediment to marriage, unless the authority of the Church
intervenes by issuing the same prohibition.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether legal relationship is contracted only between the adopting father
and the adopted child?
Objection 1: It would seem that a relationship of this kind is
contracted only between the adopting father and the adopted child. For
it would seem that it ought above all to be contracted between the
adopting father and the natural mother of the adopted, as happens in
spiritual relationship. Yet there is no legal relationship between
them. Therefore it is not contracted between any other persons besides
the adopter and adopted.
Objection 2: Further, the relationship that impedes marriage is a
perpetual impediment. But there is not a perpetual impediment between
the adopted son and the naturally begotten daughter of the adopted;
because when the adoption terminates at the death of the adopter, or
when the adopted comes of age, the latter can marry her. Therefore he
was not related to her in such a way as to prevent him from marrying
her.
Objection 3: Further, spiritual relationship passes to no person
incapable of being a god-parent; wherefore it does not pass to one who
is not baptized. Now a woman cannot adopt, as stated above (A[1], ad
2). Therefore legal relationship does not pass from husband to wife.
Objection 4: Further, spiritual relationship is stronger than legal.
But spiritual relationship does not pass to a grandchild. Neither,
therefore, does legal relationship.
On the contrary, Legal relationship is more in agreement with carnal
union or procreation than spiritual relationship is. But spiritual
relationship passes to another person. Therefore legal relationship
does so also.
Further, the same is proved by the authorities quoted in the text
(Sent. iv, D, 42).
I answer that, Legal relationship is of three kinds. The first is in
the descending order as it were, and is contracted between the adoptive
father and the adopted child, the latter's child grandchild and so on;
the second is between the adopted child and the naturally begotten
child; the third is like a kind of affinity, and is between the
adoptive father and the wife of the adopted son, or contrariwise
between the adopted son and the wife of the adoptive father.
Accordingly the first and third relationships are perpetual impediments
to marriage: but the second is not, but only so long as the adopted
person remains under the power of the adoptive father, wherefore when
the father dies or when the child comes of age, they can be married.
Reply to Objection 1: By spiritual generation the son is not withdrawn
from the father's power, as in the case of adoption, so that the godson
remains the son of both at the same time, whereas the adopted son does
not. Hence no relationship is contracted between the adoptive father
and the natural mother or father, as was the case in spiritual
relationship.
Reply to Objection 2: Legal relationship is an impediment to marriage
on account of the parties dwelling together: hence when the need for
dwelling together ceases, it is not unreasonable that the aforesaid tie
cease, for instance when he ceases to be under the power of the same
father. But the adoptive father and his wife always retain a certain
authority over their adopted son and his wife, wherefore the tie
between them remains.
Reply to Objection 3: Even a woman can adopt by permission of the
sovereign, wherefore legal relationship passes also to her. Moreover
the reason why spiritual relationship does not pass to a non-baptized
person is not because such a person cannot be a god-parent but because
he is not a fit subject of spirituality.
Reply to Objection 4: By spiritual relationship the son is not placed
under the power and care of the godfather, as in legal relationship:
because it is necessary that whatever is in the son's power pass under
the power of the adoptive father. Wherefore if a father be adopted the
children and grandchildren who are in the power of the person adopted
are adopted also.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF IMPOTENCE, SPELL, FRENZY OR MADNESS, INCEST AND
DEFECTIVE AGE (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider five impediments to marriage, namely the
impediments of impotence, spell, frenzy or madness, incest, and
defective age. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether impotence is an impediment to marriage?
(2) Whether a spell is?
(3) Whether frenzy or madness is?
(4) Whether incest is?
(5) Whether defective age is?
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Whether impotence is an impediment to marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that impotence is not an impediment to
marriage. For carnal copulation is not essential to marriage, since
marriage is more perfect when both parties observe continency by vow.
But impotence deprives marriage of nothing save carnal copulation.
Therefore it is not a diriment impediment to the marriage contract.
Objection 2: Further, just as impotence prevents carnal copulation so
does frigidity. But frigidity is not reckoned an impediment to
marriage. Therefore neither should impotence be reckoned as such.
Objection 3: Further, all old people are frigid. Yet old people can
marry. Therefore, etc.
Objection 4: Further, if the woman knows the man to be frigid when she
marries him, the marriage is valid. Therefore frigidity, considered in
itself, is not an impediment to marriage.
Objection 5: Further, calidity may prove a sufficient incentive to
carnal copulation with one who is not a virgin, but not with one who
is, because it happens to be so weak as to pass away quickly, and is
therefore insufficient for the deflowering of a virgin. Or again it may
move a man sufficiently in regard to a beautiful woman, but
insufficiently in regard to an uncomely one. Therefore it would seem
that frigidity, although it be an impediment in regard to one, is not
an impediment absolutely.
Objection 6: Further, generally speaking woman is more frigid than man.
But women are not debarred from marriage. Neither therefore should men
be debarred on account of frigidity.
On the contrary, It is stated (Extra, De Frigidis et Malefic. , cap.
Quod Sedem): "Just as a boy who is incapable of marital intercourse is
unfit to marry, so also those who are impotent are deemed most unfit
for the marriage contract. " Now persons affected with frigidity are the
like. Therefore, etc.
Further, no one can bind himself to the impossible. Now in marriage man
binds himself to carnal copulation; because it is for this purpose that
he gives the other party power over his body. Therefore a frigid
person, being incapable of carnal copulation, cannot marry.
I answer that, In marriage there is a contract whereby one is bound to
pay the other the marital debt: wherefore just as in other contracts,
the bond is unfitting if a person bind himself to what he cannot give
or do, so the marriage contract is unfitting, if it be made by one who
cannot pay the marital debt. This impediment is called by the general
name of impotence as regards coition, and can arise either from an
intrinsic and natural cause, or from an extrinsic and accidental cause,
for instance spell, of which we shall speak later [4984](A[2]). If it
be due to a natural cause, this may happen in two ways. For either it
is temporary, and can be remedied by medicine, or by the course of
time, and then it does not void a marriage: or it is perpetual and then
it voids marriage, so that the party who labors under this impediment
remains for ever without hope of marriage, while the other may "marry
to whom she will . . . in the Lord" (1 Cor. 7:39). In order to
ascertain whether the impediment be perpetual or not, the Church has
appointed a fixed time, namely three years, for putting the matter to a
practical proof: and if after three years, during which both parties
have honestly endeavored to fulfil their marital intercourse, the
marriage remain unconsummated, the Church adjudges the marriage to be
dissolved. And yet the Church is sometimes mistaken in this, because
three years are sometimes insufficient to prove impotence to be
perpetual. Wherefore if the Church find that she has been mistaken,
seeing that the subject of the impediment has completed carnal
copulation with another or with the same person, she reinstates the
former marriage and dissolves the subsequent one, although the latter
has been contracted with her permission. [*"Nowadays it is seldom
necessary to examine too closely into this matter, as all cases arising
from it are treated as far as possible under the form of dispensations
of non-consummated marriages. " Cf. Catholic Encyclopedia, article
Canonical Impediments. ]
Reply to Objection 1: Although the act of carnal copulation is not
essential to marriage, ability to fulfill the act is essential, because
marriage gives each of the married parties power over the other's body
in relation to marital intercourse.
Reply to Objection 2: Excessive calidity can scarcely be a perpetual
impediment. If, however, it were to prove an impediment to marital
intercourse for three years it would be adjudged to be perpetual.
Nevertheless, since frigidity is a greater and more frequent impediment
(for it not only hinders the mingling of seeds but also weakens the
members which co-operate in the union of bodies), it is accounted an
impediment rather than calidity, since all natural defects are reduced
to frigidity.
Reply to Objection 3: Although old people have not sufficient calidity
to procreate, they have sufficient to copulate. Wherefore they are
allowed to marry, in so far as marriage is intended as a remedy,
although it does not befit them as fulfilling an office of nature.
Reply to Objection 4: In all contracts it is agreed on all hands that
anyone who is unable to satisfy an obligation is unfit to make a
contract which requires the fulfilling of that obligation.
separation is at issue. Therefore accusation has no place then.
Objection 2: Further, in a matrimonial lawsuit only the relatives are
heard, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 41). But in accusations even
strangers are heard. Therefore in a suit for matrimonial separation the
process is not by way of accusation.
Objection 3: Further, if a marriage ought to be denounced this should
be done especially where it is least difficult to sever the tie. Now
this is when only the betrothal has been contracted, and then it is not
the marriage that is denounced. Therefore accusation should never take
place at any other time.
Objection 4: Further, a man is not prevented from accusing by the fact
that he does not accuse at once. But this happens in marriage, for if
he was silent at first when the marriage was being contracted, he
cannot denounce the marriage afterwards without laying himself open to
suspicion. Therefore, etc.
On the contrary, Whatever is unlawful can be denounced. But the
marriage of relatives by affinity and consanguinity is unlawful.
Therefore it can be denounced.
I answer that, Accusation is instituted lest the guilty be tolerated as
though they were innocent. Now just as it happens through ignorance of
fact that a guilty man is reputed innocent, so it happens through
ignorance of a circumstance that a certain fact is deemed lawful
whereas it is unlawful. Wherefore just as a man is sometimes accused,
so is a fact sometimes an object of accusation. It is in this way that
a marriage is denounced, when through ignorance of an impediment it is
deemed lawful, whereas it is unlawful.
Reply to Objection 1: The punishment of retaliation takes place when a
person is accused of a crime, because then action is taken that he may
be punished. But when it is a deed that is accused, action is taken not
for the punishment of the doer, but in order to prevent what is
unlawful. Hence in a matrimonial suit the accuser does not bind himself
to a punishment. Moreover, the accusation may be made either in words
or in writing, provided the person who denounces the marriage
denounced, and the impediment for which it is denounced, be expressed.
Reply to Objection 2: Strangers cannot know of the consanguinity except
from the relatives, since these know with greater probability. Hence
when these are silent, a stranger is liable to be suspected of acting
from ill-will unless he wish the relatives to prove his assertion.
Wherefore a stranger is debarred from accusing when there are relatives
who are silent, and by whom he cannot prove his accusation. On the
other hand the relatives, however nearly related they be, are not
debarred from accusing, when the marriage is denounced on account of a
perpetual impediment, which prevents the contracting of the marriage
and voids the contract. When, however, the accusation is based on a
denial of the contract having taken place, the parents should be
debarred from witnessing as being liable to suspicion, except those of
the party that is inferior in rank and wealth, for they, one is
inclined to think, would be willing for the marriage to stand.
Reply to Objection 3: If the marriage is not yet contracted and there
is only a betrothal, there can be no accusation, for what is not,
cannot be accused. But the impediment can be denounced lest the
marriage be contracted.
Reply to Objection 4: He who is silent at first is sometimes heard
afterwards if he wish to denounce the marriage, and sometimes he is
repulsed. This is made clear by the Decretal (cap. Cum in tua, De his
qui matrim. accus. possunt. ) which runs as follows: "If an accuser
present himself after the marriage has been contracted, since he did
not declare himself when according to custom, the banns were published
in church, we may rightly ask whether he should be allowed to voice his
accusation. In this matter we deem that a distinction should be made,
so that if he who lodges information against persons already married
was absent from the diocese at the time of the aforesaid publication,
or if for some other reason this could not come to his knowledge, for
instance if through exceeding stress of weakness and fever he was not
in possession of his faculties, or was of so tender years as to be too
young to understand such matters, or if he were hindered by some other
lawful cause, his accusation should be heard. otherwise without doubt
he should be repulsed as open to suspicion, unless he swear that the
information lodged by him came to his knowledge subsequently and that
he is not moved by ill-will to make his accusation. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in a suit of this kind one should proceed by hearing witnesses in
the same way as in other suits?
Objection 1: It would seem that in such a suit one ought not to proceed
by hearing witnesses, in the same way as in other suits where any
witnesses may be called provided they be unexceptionable. But here
strangers are not admitted, although they be unexceptionable.
Therefore, etc.
Objection 2: Further, witnesses who are suspected of private hatred or
love are debarred from giving evidence. Now relatives are especially
open to suspicion of love for one party, and hatred for the other.
Therefore their evidence should not be taken.
Objection 3: Further, marriage is a more favorable suit than those
others in which purely corporeal questions are at stake. Now in these
the same person cannot be both accuser and witness. Neither therefore
can this be in a matrimonial suit; and so it would appear that it is
not right to proceed by hearing witnesses in a suit of this kind.
On the contrary, Witnesses are called in a suit in order to give the
judge evidence concerning matters of doubt. Now evidence should be
afforded the judge in this suit as in other suits, since he must not
pronounce a hasty judgment on what is not proven. Therefore here as in
other lawsuits witnesses should be called.
I answer that, In this kind of lawsuit as in others, truth must be
unveiled by witnesses: yet, as the lawyers say, there are many things
peculiar to this suit; namely that "the same person can be accuser and
witness; that evidence is not taken 'on oath of calumny,' since it is a
quasi-spiritual lawsuit; that relatives are allowed as witnesses; that
the juridical order is not perfectly observed, since if the
denunciation has been made, and the suit is uncontested, the defendant
may be excommunicated if contumacious; that hearsay evidence is
admitted; and that witnesses may be called after the publication of the
names of the witnesses. " All this is in order to prevent the sin that
may occur in such a union (cap. Quoties aliqui; cap. Super eo, De test.
et attest. ; cap. Literas, De juram. calumn. ).
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF SPIRITUAL RELATIONSHIP (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the impediment of spiritual relationship: under
which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether spiritual relationship is an impediment to marriage?
(2) From what cause is it contracted?
(3) Between whom?
(4) Whether it passes from husband to wife?
(5) Whether it passes to the father's carnal children?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether spiritual relationship is an impediment to marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship is not an
impediment to marriage. For nothing is an impediment to marriage save
what is contrary to a marriage good. Now spiritual relationship is not
contrary to a marriage good. Therefore it is not an impediment to
marriage.
Objection 2: Further, a perpetual impediment to marriage cannot stand
together with marriage. But spiritual relationship sometimes stands
together with marriage, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42), as
when a man in a case of necessity baptizes his own child, for then he
contracts a spiritual relationship with his wife, and yet the marriage
is not dissolved. Therefore spiritual relationship is not an impediment
to marriage.
Objection 3: Further, union of the spirit does not pass to the flesh.
But marriage is a union of the flesh. Therefore since spiritual
relationship is a union of the spirit, it cannot become an impediment
to marriage.
Objection 4: Further, contraries have not the same effects. Now
spiritual relationship is apparently contrary to disparity of worship,
since spiritual relationship is a kinship resulting from the giving of
a sacrament or the intention of so doing [*See next Article, ad 3]:
whereas disparity of worship consists in the lack of a sacrament, as
stated above ([4980]Q[50], A[1]). Since then disparity of worship is an
impediment to matrimony, it would seem that spiritual relationship has
not this effect.
On the contrary, The holier the bond, the more is it to be safeguarded.
Now a spiritual bond is holier than a bodily tie: and since the tie of
bodily kinship is an impediment to marriage, it follows that spiritual
relationship should also be an impediment.
Further, in marriage the union of souls ranks higher than union of
bodies, for it precedes it. Therefore with much more reason can a
spiritual relationship hinder marriage than bodily relationship does.
I answer that, Just as by carnal procreation man receives natural
being, so by the sacraments he receives the spiritual being of grace.
Wherefore just as the tie that is contracted by carnal procreation is
natural to man, inasmuch as he is a natural being, so the tie that is
contracted from the reception of the sacraments is after a fashion
natural to man, inasmuch as he is a member of the Church. Therefore as
carnal relationship hinders marriage, even so does spiritual
relationship by command of the Church. We must however draw a
distinction in reference to spiritual relationship, since either it
precedes or follows marriage. If it precedes, it hinders the
contracting of marriage and voids the contract. If it follows, it does
not dissolve the marriage bond: but we must draw a further distinction
in reference to the marriage act. For either the spiritual relationship
is contracted in a case of necessity, as when a father baptizes his
child who is at the point of death---and then it is not an obstacle to
the marriage act on either side---or it is contracted without any
necessity and through ignorance, in which case if the person whose
action has occasioned the relationship acted with due caution, it is
the same with him as in the former case---or it is contracted purposely
and without any necessity, and then the person whose action has
occasioned the relationship, loses the right to ask for the debt; but
is bound to pay if asked, because the fault of the one party should not
be prejudicial to the other.
Reply to Objection 1: Although spiritual relationship does not hinder
any of the chief marriage goods, it hinders one of the secondary goods,
namely the extension of friendship, because spiritual relationship is
by itself a sufficient reason for friendship: wherefore intimacy and
friendship with other persons need to be sought by means of marriage.
Reply to Objection 2: Marriage is a lasting bond, wherefore no
supervening impediment can sever it. Hence it happens sometimes that
marriage and an impediment to marriage stand together, but not if the
impediment precedes.
Reply to Objection 3: In marriage there is not only a bodily but also a
spiritual union: and consequently kinship of spirit proves an
impediment thereto, without spiritual kinship having to pass into a
bodily relationship.
Reply to Objection 4: There is nothing unreasonable in two things that
are contrary to one another being contrary to the same thing, as great
and small are contrary to equal. Thus disparity of worship and
spiritual relationship are opposed to marriage, because in one the
distance is greater, and in the other less, than required by marriage.
Hence there is an impediment to marriage in either case.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether spiritual relationship is contracted by baptism only?
Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship is contracted by
Baptism only. For as bodily kinship is to bodily birth, so is spiritual
kinship to spiritual birth. Now Baptism alone is called spiritual
birth. Therefore spiritual kinship is contracted by Baptism only, even
as only by carnal birth is carnal kinship contracted.
Objection 2: Further, a character is imprinted in order as in
Confirmation. But spiritual relationship does not result from receiving
orders. Therefore it does not result from Confirmation but only from
Baptism.
Objection 3: Further, sacraments are more excellent than sacramentals.
Now spiritual relationship does not result from certain sacraments, for
instance from Extreme Unction. Much less therefore does it result from
catechizing, as some maintain.
Objection 4: Further, many other sacramentals are attached to Baptism
besides catechizing. Therefore spiritual relationship is not contracted
from catechism any more than from the others.
Objection 5: Further, prayer is no less efficacious than instruction of
catechism for advancement in good. But spiritual relationship does not
result from prayer. Therefore it does not result from catechism.
Objection 6: Further, the instruction given to the baptized by
preaching to them avails no less than preaching to those who are not
yet baptized. But no spiritual relationship results from preaching.
Neither therefore does it result from catechism.
Objection 7: On the other hand, It is written (1 Cor. 4:15): "In Christ
Jesus by the gospel I have begotten you. " Now spiritual birth causes
spiritual relationship. Therefore spiritual relationship results from
the preaching of the gospel and instruction, and not only from Baptism.
Objection 8: Further, as original sin is taken away by Baptism, so is
actual sin taken away by Penance. Therefore just as Baptism causes
spiritual relationship, so also does Penance.
Objection 9: Further, "father" denotes relationship. Now a man is
called another's spiritual father in respect of Penance, teaching,
pastoral care and many other like things. Therefore spiritual
relationship is contracted from many other sources besides Baptism and
Confirmation.
I answer that, There are three opinions on this question. Some say that
as spiritual regeneration is bestowed by the sevenfold grace of the
Holy Ghost, it is caused by means of seven things, beginning with the
first taste of blessed salt and ending with Confirmation given by the
bishop: and they say that spiritual relationship is contracted by each
of these seven things. But this does not seem reasonable, for carnal
relationship is not contracted except by a perfect act of generation.
Wherefore affinity is not contracted except there be mingling of seeds,
from which it is possible for carnal generation to follow. Now
spiritual generation is not perfected except by a sacrament: wherefore
it does not seem fitting for spiritual relationship to be contracted
otherwise than through a sacrament. Hence others say that spiritual
relationship is only contracted through three sacraments, namely
catechism, Baptism and Confirmation, but these do not apparently know
the meaning of what they say, since catechism is not a sacrament but a
sacramental. Wherefore others say that it is contracted through two
sacraments only, namely Confirmation and Baptism, and this is the more
common opinion. Some however of these say that catechism is a weak
impediment, since it hinders the contracting of marriage but does not
void the contract.
Reply to Objection 1: Carnal birth is twofold. The first is in the
womb, wherein that which is born is a weakling and cannot come forth
without danger: and to this birth regeneration by Baptism is likened;
wherein a man is regenerated as though yet needing to be fostered in
the womb of the Church. The second is birth from out of the womb, when
that which was born in the womb is so far strengthened that it can
without danger face the outer world which has a natural corruptive
tendency. To this is likened Confirmation, whereby man being
strengthened goes forth abroad to confess the name of Christ. Hence
spiritual relationship is fittingly contracted through both these
sacraments.
Reply to Objection 2: The effect of the sacrament of order is not
regeneration but the bestowal of power, for which reason it is not
conferred on women, and consequently no impediment to marriage can
arise therefrom. Hence this kind of relationship does not count.
Reply to Objection 3: In catechism one makes a profession of future
Baptism, just as in betrothal one enters an engagement of future
marriage. Wherefore just as in betrothal a certain kind of propinquity
is contracted, so is there in catechism, whereby marriage is rendered
at least unlawful, as some say; but not in the other sacraments.
Reply to Objection 4: There is not made a profession of faith in the
other sacramentals of Baptism, as in catechism: wherefore the
comparison fails.
The same answer applies to the Fifth and Sixth Objections.
Reply to Objection 7: The Apostle had instructed them in the faith by a
kind of catechism; and consequently his instruction was directed to
their spiritual birth.
Reply to Objection 8: Properly speaking a spiritual relationship is not
contracted through the sacrament of Penance. Wherefore a priest's son
can marry a woman whose confession the priest has heard, else in the
whole parish he could not find a woman whom he could marry. Nor does it
matter that by Penance actual sin is taken away, for this is not a kind
of birth, but a kind of healing. Nevertheless Penance occasions a kind
of bond between the woman penitent and the priest, that has a
resemblance to spiritual relationship, so that if he have carnal
intercourse with her, he sins as grievously as if she were his
spiritual daughter. The reason of this is that the relations between
priest and penitent are most intimate, and consequently in order to
remove the occasion of sin this prohibition [*Can. Omnes quos, and
seqq. , Caus. xxx] was made.
Reply to Objection 9: A spiritual father is so called from his likeness
to a carnal father. Now as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 2) a
carnal father gives his child three things, being nourishment and
instruction: and consequently a person's spiritual father is so called
from one of these three things. Nevertheless he has not, through being
his spiritual father, a spiritual relationship with him, unless he is
like a (carnal) father as to generation which is the way to being. This
solution may also be applied to the foregoing Eighth Objection.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether spiritual relationship is contracted between the person baptized and
the person who raises him from the sacred font?
Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship is not
contracted between the person baptized and the person who raises him
from the sacred font. For in carnal generation carnal relationship is
contracted only on the part of the person of whose seed the child is
born; and not on the part of the person who receives the child after
birth. Therefore neither is spiritual relationship contracted between
the receiver and the received at the sacred font.
Objection 2: Further, he who raises a person from the sacred font is
called {anadochos} by Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii): and it is part of his
office to instruct the child. But instruction is not a sufficient cause
of spiritual relationship, as stated above [4981](A[2]). Therefore no
relationship is contracted between him and the person whom he raises
from the sacred font.
Objection 3: Further, it may happen that someone raises a person from
the sacred font before he himself is baptized. Now spiritual
relationship is not contracted in such a case, since one who is not
baptized is not capable of spirituality. Therefore raising a person
from the sacred font is not sufficient to contract a spiritual
relationship.
On the contrary, There is the definition of spiritual relationship
quoted above [4982](A[1]), as also the authorities mentioned in the
text (Sent. iv, D, 42).
I answer that, Just as in carnal generation a person is born of a
father and mother, so in spiritual generation a person is born again a
son of God as Father, and of the Church as Mother. Now while he who
confers the sacrament stands in the place of God, whose instrument and
minister he is, he who raises a baptized person from the sacred font,
or holds the candidate for Confirmation, stands in the place of the
Church. Therefore spiritual relationship is contracted with both.
Reply to Objection 1: Not only the father, of whose seed the child is
born, is related carnally to the child, but also the mother who
provides the matter, and in whose womb the child is begotten. So too
the godparent who in place of the Church offers and raises the
candidate for Baptism and holds the candidate for Confirmation
contracts spiritual relationship.
Reply to Objection 2: He contracts spiritual relationship not by reason
of the instruction it is his duty to give, but on account of the
spiritual birth in which he co-operates.
Reply to Objection 3: A person who is not baptized cannot raise anyone
from the sacred font, since he is not a member of the Church whom the
godparent in Baptism represents: although he can baptize, because he is
a creature of God Whom the baptizer represents. And yet he cannot
contract a spiritual relationship, since he is void of spiritual life
to which man is first born by receiving Baptism.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether spiritual relationship passes from husband to wife?
Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship does not pass
from husband to wife. For spiritual and bodily union are disparate and
differ generically. Therefore carnal union which is between husband and
wife cannot be the means of contracting a spiritual relationship.
Objection 2: Further, the godfather and godmother have more in common
in the spiritual birth that is the cause of spiritual relationship,
than a husband, who is godfather, has with his wife. Now godfather and
godmother do not hereby contract spiritual relationship. Therefore
neither does a wife contract a spiritual relationship through her
husband being godfather to someone.
Objection 3: Further, it may happen that the husband is baptized, and
his wife not, for instance when he is converted from unbelief without
his wife being converted. Now spiritual relationship cannot be
contracted by one who is not baptized. Therefore it does not always
pass from husband to wife.
Objection 4: Further, husband and wife together can raise a person from
the sacred font, since no law forbids it. If therefore spiritual
relationship passed from husband to wife, it would follow that each of
them is twice godfather or godmother of the same individual: which is
absurd.
On the contrary, Spiritual goods are more communicable than bodily
goods. But the bodily consanguinity of the husband passes to his wife
by affinity. Much more therefore does spiritual relationship.
I answer that, A may become co-parent with B in two ways. First, by the
act of another (B), who baptizes A's child, or raises him in Baptism.
In this way spiritual relationship does not pass from husband to wife,
unless perchance it be his wife's child, for then she contracts
spiritual relationship directly, even as her husband.
Secondly, by his
own act, for instance when he raises B's child from the sacred font,
and thus spiritual relationship passes to the wife if he has already
had carnal knowledge of her, but not if the marriage be not yet
consummated, since they are not as yet made one flesh: and this is by
way of a kind of affinity; wherefore it would seem on the same grounds
to pass to a woman of whom he has carnal knowledge, though she be not
his wife. Hence the verse: "I may not marry my own child's godmother,
nor the mother of my godchild: but I may marry the godmother of my
wife's child. "
Reply to Objection 1: From the fact that corporal and spiritual union
differ generically we may conclude that the one is not the other, but
not that the one cannot cause the other, since things of different
genera sometimes cause one another either directly or indirectly.
Reply to Objection 2: The godfather and godmother of the same person
are not united in that person's spiritual birth save accidentally,
since one of them would be self-sufficient for the purpose. Hence it
does not follow from this that any spiritual relationship results
between them whereby they are hindered from marrying one another. Hence
the verse:
"Of two co-parents one is always spiritual, the other carnal: this rule
is infallible. "
On the other hand, marriage by itself makes husband and wife one flesh:
wherefore the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: If the wife be not baptized, the spiritual
relationship will not reach her, because she is not a fit subject, and
not because spiritual relationship cannot pass from husband to wife
through marriage.
Reply to Objection 4: Since no spiritual relationship results between
godfather and godmother, nothing prevents husband and wife from raising
together someone from the sacred font. Nor is it absurd that the wife
become twice godmother of the same person from different causes, just
as it is possible for her to be connected in carnal relationship both
by affinity and consanguinity to the same person.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether spiritual relationship passes to the godfather's carnal children?
Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship does not pass to
the godfather's carnal children. For no degrees are assigned to
spiritual relationship. Yet there would be degrees if it passed from
father to son, since the person begotten involves a change of degree,
as stated above ([4983]Q[55], A[5]). Therefore it does not pass to the
godfather's carnal sons.
Objection 2: Further, father and son are related in the same degree as
brother and brother. If therefore spiritual relationship passes from
father to son, it will equally pass from brother to brother: and this
is false.
On the contrary, This is proved by authority quoted in the text (Sent.
iv, D, 42).
I answer that, A son is something of his father and not conversely
(Ethic. viii, 12): wherefore spiritual relationship passes from father
to his carnal son and not conversely. Thus it is clear that there are
three spiritual relationships: one called spiritual fatherhood between
godfather and godchild; another called co-paternity between the
godparent and carnal parent of the same person; and the third is called
spiritual brotherhood, between godchild and the carnal children of the
same parent. Each of these hinders the contracting of marriage and
voids the contract.
Reply to Objection 1: The addition of a person by carnal generation
entails a degree with regard to a person connected by the same kind of
relationship, but not with regard to one connected by another kind of
relationship. Thus a son is connected with his father's wife in the
same degree as his father, but by another kind of relationship. Now
spiritual relationship differs in kind from carnal. Wherefore a godson
is not related to his godfather's carnal son in the same degree as the
latter's father is related to him, through whom the spiritual
relationship is contracted. Consequently it does not follow that
spiritual relationship admits of degrees.
Reply to Objection 2: A man is not part of his brother as a son is of
his father. But a wife is part of her husband, since she is made one
with him in body. Consequently the relationship does not pass from
brother to brother, whether the brother be born before or after
spiritual brotherhood.
__________________________________________________________________
OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIP, WHICH IS BY ADOPTION (THREE ARTICLES)
We must now consider legal relationship which is by adoption. Under
this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) What is adoption?
(2) Whether one contracts through it a tie that is an impediment to
marriage?
(3) Between which persons is this tie contracted.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether adoption is rightly defined?
Objection 1: It would seem that adoption is not rightly defined:
"Adoption is the act by which a person lawfully takes for his child or
grandchild and so on one who does not belong to him. " For the child
should be subject to its father. Now, sometimes the person adopted does
not come under the power of the adopter. Therefore adoption is not
always the taking of someone as a child.
Objection 2: Further, "Parents should lay up for their children" (2
Cor. 12:14). But the adoptive father does not always necessarily lay up
for his adopted child, since sometimes the adopted does not inherit the
goods of the adopter. Therefore adoption is not the taking of someone
as a child.
Objection 3: Further, adoption, whereby someone is taken as a child, is
likened to natural procreation whereby a child is begotten naturally.
Therefore whoever is competent to beget a child naturally is competent
to adopt. But this is untrue, since neither one who is not his own
master, nor one who is not twenty-five years of age, nor a woman can
adopt, and yet they can beget a child naturally. Therefore, properly
speaking, adoption is not the taking of someone as a child.
Objection 4: Further, to take as one's child one who is not one's own
seems necessary in order to supply the lack of children begotten
naturally. Now one who is unable to beget, through being a eunuch or
impotent, suffers especially from the absence of children of his own
begetting. Therefore he is especially competent to adopt someone as his
child. But he is not competent to adopt. Therefore adoption is not the
taking of someone as one's child.
Objection 5: Further, in spiritual relationship, where someone is taken
as a child without carnal procreation, it is of no consequence whether
an older person become the father of a younger, or "vice versa," since
a youth can baptize an old man and "vice versa. " Therefore, if by
adoption a person is taken as a child without being carnally begotten,
it would make no difference whether an older person adopted a younger,
or a younger an older person; which is not true. Therefore the same
conclusion follows.
Objection 6: Further, there is no difference of degree between adopted
and adopter. Therefore whoever is adopted, is adopted as a child; and
consequently it is not right to say that one may be adopted as a
grandchild.
Objection 7: Further, adoption is a result of love, wherefore God is
said to have adopted us as children through charity. Now we should have
greater charity towards those who are connected with us than towards
strangers. Therefore adoption should be not of a stranger but of
someone connected with us.
I answer that, Art imitates nature and supplies the defect of nature
where nature is deficient. Hence just as a man begets by natural
procreation, so by positive law which is the art of what is good and
just, one person can take to himself another as a child in likeness to
one that is his child by nature, in order to take the place of the
children he has lost, this being the chief reason why adoption was
introduced. And since taking implies a term "wherefrom," for which
reason the taker is not the thing taken, it follows that the person
taken as a child must be a stranger. Accordingly, just as natural
procreation has a term "whereto," namely the form which is the end of
generation, and a term "wherefrom," namely the contrary form, so legal
generation has a term "whereto," namely a child or grandchild, and a
term "wherefrom," namely, a stranger. Consequently the above definition
includes the genus of adoption, for it is described as a "lawful
taking," and the term "wherefrom," since it is said to be the taking of
"a stranger," and the term "whereto," because it says, "as a child or
grandchild . "
Reply to Objection 1: The sonship of adoption is an imitation of
natural sonship. Wherefore there are two species of adoption, one which
imitates natural sonship perfectly, and this is called "arrogatio,"
whereby the person adopted is placed under the power of the adopter;
and one who is thus adopted inherits from his adopted father if the
latter die intestate, nor can his father legally deprive him of a
fourth part of his inheritance. But no one can adopt in this way except
one who is his own master, one namely who has no father or, if he has,
is of age. There can be no adoption of this kind without the authority
of the sovereign. The other kind of adoption imitates natural sonship
imperfectly, and is called "simple adoption," and by this the adopted
does not come under the power of the adopter: so that it is a
disposition to perfect adoption, rather than perfect adoption itself.
In this way even one who is not his own master can adopt, without the
consent of the sovereign and with the authority of a magistrate: and
one who is thus adopted does not inherit the estate of the adopter, nor
is the latter bound to bequeath to him any of his goods in his will,
unless he will.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: Natural procreation is directed to the production
of the species; wherefore anyone in whom the specific nature is not
hindered is competent to be able to beget naturally. But adoption is
directed to hereditary succession, wherefore those alone are competent
to adopt who have the power to dispose of their estate. Consequently
one who is not his own master, or who is less than twenty-five years of
age, or a woman, cannot adopt anyone, except by special permission of
the sovereign.
Reply to Objection 4: An inheritance cannot pass to posterity through
one who has a perpetual impediment from begetting: hence for this very
reason it ought to pass to those who ought to succeed to him by right
of relationship; and consequently he cannot adopt, as neither can he
beget. Moreover greater is sorrow for children lost than for children
one has never had. Wherefore those who are impeded from begetting need
no solace for their lack of children as those who have had and have
lost them, or could have had them but have them not by reason of some
accidental impediment.
Reply to Objection 5: Spiritual relationship is contracted through a
sacrament whereby the faithful are born again in Christ, in Whom there
is no difference between male and female, bondman and free, youth and
old age (Gal. 3:28; Col. 3:11). Wherefore anyone can indifferently
become another's godfather. But adoption aims at hereditary succession
and a certain subjection of the adopted to the adopter: and it is not
fitting that older persons should be subjected to younger in the care
of the household. Consequently a younger person cannot adopt an older;
but according to law the adopted person must be so much younger than
the adopter, that he might have been the child of his natural
begetting.
Reply to Objection 6: One may lose one's grandchildren and so forth
even as one may lose one's children. Wherefore since adoption was
introduced as a solace for children lost, just as someone may be
adopted in place of a child, so may someone be adopted in place of a
grandchild and so on.
Reply to Objection 7: A relative ought to succeed by right of
relationship; and therefore such a person is not competent to be chosen
to succeed by adoption. And if a relative, who is not competent to
inherit the estate, be adopted, he is adopted not as a relative, but as
a stranger lacking the right of succeeding to the adopter's goods.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a tie that is an impediment to marriage is contracted through
adoption?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is not contracted through
adoption a tie that is an impediment to marriage. For spiritual care is
more excellent than corporeal care. But no tie of relationship is
contracted through one's being subjected to another's spiritual care:
else all those who dwell in the parish would be related to the parish
priest and would be unable to marry his son. Neither therefore can this
result from adoption which places the adopted under the care of the
adopter.
Objection 2: Further, no tie of relationship results from persons
conferring a benefit on another. But adoption is nothing but the
conferring of a benefit. Therefore no tie of relationship results from
adoption.
Objection 3: Further, a natural father provides for his child chiefly
in three things, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 11,12), namely
by giving him being, nourishment and education; and hereditary
succession is subsequent to these. Now no tie of relationship is
contracted by one's providing for a person's nourishment and education,
else a person would be related to his nourishers, tutors and masters,
which is false. Therefore neither is any relationship contracted
through adoption by which one inherits another's estate.
Objection 4: Further, the sacraments of the Church are not subject to
human laws. Now marriage is a sacrament of the Church. Since then
adoption was introduced by human law, it would seem that a tie
contracted from adoption cannot be an impediment to marriage.
On the contrary, Relationship is an impediment to marriage. Now a kind
of relationship results from adoption, namely legal relationship, as
evidenced by its definition, for "legal relationship is a connection
arising out of adoption. " Therefore adoption results in a tie which is
an impediment to marriage.
Further, the same is proved by the authorities quoted in the text
(Sent. iv, D, 42).
I answer that, The Divine law especially forbids marriage between those
persons who have to live together lest, as Rabbi Moses observes (Doc.
Perp. iii, 49), if it were lawful for them to have carnal intercourse,
there should be more room for concupiscence to the repression of which
marriage is directed. And since the adopted child dwells in the house
of his adopted father like one that is begotten naturally human laws
forbid the contracting of marriage between the like, and this
prohibition is approved by the Church. Hence it is that legal adoption
is an impediment to marriage. This suffices for the Replies to the
first three Objections, because none of those things entails such a
cohabitation as might be an incentive to concupiscence. Therefore they
do not cause a relationship that is an impediment to marriage.
Reply to Objection 4: The prohibition of a human law would not suffice
to make an impediment to marriage, unless the authority of the Church
intervenes by issuing the same prohibition.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether legal relationship is contracted only between the adopting father
and the adopted child?
Objection 1: It would seem that a relationship of this kind is
contracted only between the adopting father and the adopted child. For
it would seem that it ought above all to be contracted between the
adopting father and the natural mother of the adopted, as happens in
spiritual relationship. Yet there is no legal relationship between
them. Therefore it is not contracted between any other persons besides
the adopter and adopted.
Objection 2: Further, the relationship that impedes marriage is a
perpetual impediment. But there is not a perpetual impediment between
the adopted son and the naturally begotten daughter of the adopted;
because when the adoption terminates at the death of the adopter, or
when the adopted comes of age, the latter can marry her. Therefore he
was not related to her in such a way as to prevent him from marrying
her.
Objection 3: Further, spiritual relationship passes to no person
incapable of being a god-parent; wherefore it does not pass to one who
is not baptized. Now a woman cannot adopt, as stated above (A[1], ad
2). Therefore legal relationship does not pass from husband to wife.
Objection 4: Further, spiritual relationship is stronger than legal.
But spiritual relationship does not pass to a grandchild. Neither,
therefore, does legal relationship.
On the contrary, Legal relationship is more in agreement with carnal
union or procreation than spiritual relationship is. But spiritual
relationship passes to another person. Therefore legal relationship
does so also.
Further, the same is proved by the authorities quoted in the text
(Sent. iv, D, 42).
I answer that, Legal relationship is of three kinds. The first is in
the descending order as it were, and is contracted between the adoptive
father and the adopted child, the latter's child grandchild and so on;
the second is between the adopted child and the naturally begotten
child; the third is like a kind of affinity, and is between the
adoptive father and the wife of the adopted son, or contrariwise
between the adopted son and the wife of the adoptive father.
Accordingly the first and third relationships are perpetual impediments
to marriage: but the second is not, but only so long as the adopted
person remains under the power of the adoptive father, wherefore when
the father dies or when the child comes of age, they can be married.
Reply to Objection 1: By spiritual generation the son is not withdrawn
from the father's power, as in the case of adoption, so that the godson
remains the son of both at the same time, whereas the adopted son does
not. Hence no relationship is contracted between the adoptive father
and the natural mother or father, as was the case in spiritual
relationship.
Reply to Objection 2: Legal relationship is an impediment to marriage
on account of the parties dwelling together: hence when the need for
dwelling together ceases, it is not unreasonable that the aforesaid tie
cease, for instance when he ceases to be under the power of the same
father. But the adoptive father and his wife always retain a certain
authority over their adopted son and his wife, wherefore the tie
between them remains.
Reply to Objection 3: Even a woman can adopt by permission of the
sovereign, wherefore legal relationship passes also to her. Moreover
the reason why spiritual relationship does not pass to a non-baptized
person is not because such a person cannot be a god-parent but because
he is not a fit subject of spirituality.
Reply to Objection 4: By spiritual relationship the son is not placed
under the power and care of the godfather, as in legal relationship:
because it is necessary that whatever is in the son's power pass under
the power of the adoptive father. Wherefore if a father be adopted the
children and grandchildren who are in the power of the person adopted
are adopted also.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF IMPOTENCE, SPELL, FRENZY OR MADNESS, INCEST AND
DEFECTIVE AGE (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider five impediments to marriage, namely the
impediments of impotence, spell, frenzy or madness, incest, and
defective age. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether impotence is an impediment to marriage?
(2) Whether a spell is?
(3) Whether frenzy or madness is?
(4) Whether incest is?
(5) Whether defective age is?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether impotence is an impediment to marriage?
Objection 1: It would seem that impotence is not an impediment to
marriage. For carnal copulation is not essential to marriage, since
marriage is more perfect when both parties observe continency by vow.
But impotence deprives marriage of nothing save carnal copulation.
Therefore it is not a diriment impediment to the marriage contract.
Objection 2: Further, just as impotence prevents carnal copulation so
does frigidity. But frigidity is not reckoned an impediment to
marriage. Therefore neither should impotence be reckoned as such.
Objection 3: Further, all old people are frigid. Yet old people can
marry. Therefore, etc.
Objection 4: Further, if the woman knows the man to be frigid when she
marries him, the marriage is valid. Therefore frigidity, considered in
itself, is not an impediment to marriage.
Objection 5: Further, calidity may prove a sufficient incentive to
carnal copulation with one who is not a virgin, but not with one who
is, because it happens to be so weak as to pass away quickly, and is
therefore insufficient for the deflowering of a virgin. Or again it may
move a man sufficiently in regard to a beautiful woman, but
insufficiently in regard to an uncomely one. Therefore it would seem
that frigidity, although it be an impediment in regard to one, is not
an impediment absolutely.
Objection 6: Further, generally speaking woman is more frigid than man.
But women are not debarred from marriage. Neither therefore should men
be debarred on account of frigidity.
On the contrary, It is stated (Extra, De Frigidis et Malefic. , cap.
Quod Sedem): "Just as a boy who is incapable of marital intercourse is
unfit to marry, so also those who are impotent are deemed most unfit
for the marriage contract. " Now persons affected with frigidity are the
like. Therefore, etc.
Further, no one can bind himself to the impossible. Now in marriage man
binds himself to carnal copulation; because it is for this purpose that
he gives the other party power over his body. Therefore a frigid
person, being incapable of carnal copulation, cannot marry.
I answer that, In marriage there is a contract whereby one is bound to
pay the other the marital debt: wherefore just as in other contracts,
the bond is unfitting if a person bind himself to what he cannot give
or do, so the marriage contract is unfitting, if it be made by one who
cannot pay the marital debt. This impediment is called by the general
name of impotence as regards coition, and can arise either from an
intrinsic and natural cause, or from an extrinsic and accidental cause,
for instance spell, of which we shall speak later [4984](A[2]). If it
be due to a natural cause, this may happen in two ways. For either it
is temporary, and can be remedied by medicine, or by the course of
time, and then it does not void a marriage: or it is perpetual and then
it voids marriage, so that the party who labors under this impediment
remains for ever without hope of marriage, while the other may "marry
to whom she will . . . in the Lord" (1 Cor. 7:39). In order to
ascertain whether the impediment be perpetual or not, the Church has
appointed a fixed time, namely three years, for putting the matter to a
practical proof: and if after three years, during which both parties
have honestly endeavored to fulfil their marital intercourse, the
marriage remain unconsummated, the Church adjudges the marriage to be
dissolved. And yet the Church is sometimes mistaken in this, because
three years are sometimes insufficient to prove impotence to be
perpetual. Wherefore if the Church find that she has been mistaken,
seeing that the subject of the impediment has completed carnal
copulation with another or with the same person, she reinstates the
former marriage and dissolves the subsequent one, although the latter
has been contracted with her permission. [*"Nowadays it is seldom
necessary to examine too closely into this matter, as all cases arising
from it are treated as far as possible under the form of dispensations
of non-consummated marriages. " Cf. Catholic Encyclopedia, article
Canonical Impediments. ]
Reply to Objection 1: Although the act of carnal copulation is not
essential to marriage, ability to fulfill the act is essential, because
marriage gives each of the married parties power over the other's body
in relation to marital intercourse.
Reply to Objection 2: Excessive calidity can scarcely be a perpetual
impediment. If, however, it were to prove an impediment to marital
intercourse for three years it would be adjudged to be perpetual.
Nevertheless, since frigidity is a greater and more frequent impediment
(for it not only hinders the mingling of seeds but also weakens the
members which co-operate in the union of bodies), it is accounted an
impediment rather than calidity, since all natural defects are reduced
to frigidity.
Reply to Objection 3: Although old people have not sufficient calidity
to procreate, they have sufficient to copulate. Wherefore they are
allowed to marry, in so far as marriage is intended as a remedy,
although it does not befit them as fulfilling an office of nature.
Reply to Objection 4: In all contracts it is agreed on all hands that
anyone who is unable to satisfy an obligation is unfit to make a
contract which requires the fulfilling of that obligation.
