There is, then, a sort of
substratum
from which, with which, and in which nature effects her operations or her work, and which she endows with the mani- fold forms that result in such a great variety of species being presented to the eyes of reason.
Bruno-Cause-Principle-and-Unity
?
?
?
?
.
Cumdimidia[andonehalf].
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . . . . not only would it not follow that you, sir, are capable of judging philosophers, but what is more, it would certainly follow that you cannot help being the biggest, most bumbling beast that exists in human form; besides, there is nothing to prevent anyone who has the least knowledge of any of these tongues, even a bastard one, from being the wisest and most learned man in the whole world. Consider how useful these two have been now: one, a French archpedant,9 who has composed the Studies in the Liberal Arts and the Animadversions Against Aristotle, and another pedant scum, this one Italian, who has besmeared many an opuscule with his Peripatetic Discussions10. Everyone plainly sees that the first one very eloquently demonstrates his lack of intelligence, while the second shows that he has much in him of the beast and the ass, to put it bluntly. The first shows that he has understood Aristotle, at least, but badly. If he had understood him well, he might also have had the wit to wage honourable war with him, as the most judicious Telesio of Cosenza has. 11 Of the second, it is impossible to say whether he understood Aristotle either well or badly, but it can be claimed that he has read and re-read him, taken him apart, stitched him up again, and compared him pro [for] and con [against] with a thousand other Greek authors, going to the great- est lengths not only without any profit whatsoever, but etiam [even] to great loss. Whoever wants to see how far into insanity and presumptuous vanity a pedantic way of thinking can sink us has only to read this one book, before it disappears without a trace. But here come Teofilo and Dicsono.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Adestefelices,domini[youcomeattherighttime,masters]: your arrival prevents my glowing anger from exploding into thundering judgements against the vain remarks issued by this sterile chatterer.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . And it blocks me from mocking the majesty of this most venerable owl.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Alliswelliftempersdonotflare.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . WhatIsay,Isayinjest,becauseoftheaffectionIfeelforthe honourable master.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Ego quoque quod irascor, non serio irascor, quia Gervasium non odi [That holds for me too. If I grow angry, my anger is not serious, for I do not hate Gervasio. ]
9 Peter Ramus (? ? ? ? -? ? ), author of Scholae in Liberales and Aristoteliae Animadversiones. 10 Francesco Patrizi (? ? ? ? -? ? ). 11 Bernardino Telesio (? ? ? ? -? ? ).
? ? ?
Third dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Good. LetmetakeupmydiscussionwithTeofilo.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thus, Democritus and the Epicureans, who claim that what is not body is nothing, maintain as a consequence that matter alone is the substance of things, and that it is also the divine nature, as an Arab named Avicebron has said in a book entitled Fount of Life. They also hold, together with the Cyrenics, the Cynics and the Stoics, that forms are nothing but certain accidental dispositions of matter. I, myself, was an enthusiastic par- tisan of this view for a long time, solely because it corresponds to nature's workings more than Aristotle's. But after much thought, and after having considered more elements, we find that we must recognize two kinds of substance in nature: namely, form and matter. For there must be an absolutely substantial act in which the active potency of everything is found, as well as a potency or substratum, in which an equal passive potency can be found: in the first, the power to make, in the second, the power to be made.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Anyonewhoreasonswellwillclearlyseethatitisimpossible for the former continually to make everything, without there being some- thing which can become everything. How can the world soul (I mean, all form), which is indivisible, act as shaper, without the substratum of dimen- sions or quantities, which is matter? And how can matter be shaped? Perhaps by itself? It seems we can say that matter is shaped by itself, if we want to consider as matter the universal formed body and call it 'matter', just as we would call a living thing with all its faculties 'matter', distinguishing it, not by the form, but only by the efficient cause.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . No one can keep you from using the term 'matter' as you wish, just as the same term covers different meanings in various schools. But I know that your way of considering it is only apt for a technician or physician strictly within his practice, for example that physician who reduced the universal body to mercury, salt and sulfur, a thesis that reveals the stupidity of his desire to be called philosopher more than some divine talent for medicine. 12 The aim of philosophy is not simply to arrive at the distinction of principles which is realized physically by the separation which results from the power of fire, but also to arrive at that distinction of principles to which no material agent can, since the soul, which is insepa- rable from sulphur, mercury and salt, is a formal principle; that principle is not susceptible to material qualities, but totally dominates matter and is not touched by the experiments of the alchemists, whose divisions are limited
12 The reference is to Paracelsus.
? ? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? to the three aforesaid elements, and who recognize another kind of soul, apart from this world soul, which we must define here.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Excellently said. And very satisfactory reasoning, for I see some people so lacking in judgement that they do not distinguish the causes of nature taken absolutely, according to the entire extension of their being, as philosophers do, and those taken according to a limited sense appropri- ate to their work. The first mode is excessive and vain for physicians as such, and the second is restricted and insufficient for philosophers as such.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . YouhavetouchedonthatverypointwhichearnsParacelsus praise. In discussing medical philosophy, he reproves Galen for having introduced philosophical medicine, and for having created such an annoy- ing mixture and tangled web that, in the last analysis, he comes across as a very shallow physician and a very confused philosopher. But let that be said with some reserve, since I have not had the leisure to examine all parts of his work.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Please, Teofilo, first do me the favour, since I am not so competent in philosophy, of making clear what you mean by the word 'matter', and what matter is in natural things.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . All who want to distinguish matter and consider it in itself, without form, resort to the analogy of art. So it is with the Pythagoreans, the Platonists and the Peripatetics. Take, for example, the art of carpentry: it has wood as substratum for all its forms and all its work, as iron is for the blacksmith and cloth for the tailor. All these arts produce various images, compositions and figures in their own particular material, none of which is natural or proper to that material. Nature is similar to art in that it needs material for its operations, since it is impossible for any agent who wishes to make something to create out of nothing, or to work on nothing.
There is, then, a sort of substratum from which, with which, and in which nature effects her operations or her work, and which she endows with the mani- fold forms that result in such a great variety of species being presented to the eyes of reason. And just as wood does not possess, by itself, any artifi- cial form, but may have them all as a result of the carpenter's activity, in a similar way the matter of which we speak, because of its nature, has no nat- ural form by itself, but may take on all forms through the operation of the active agent which is the principle of nature. This natural matter is not per- ceptible, as is artificial matter, because nature's matter has absolutely no form, while the matter of art is something already formed by nature. Art can operate only on the surface of things already formed, like wood, iron,
? ?
Third dialogue
? stone, wool and the like, but nature works, so to speak, from the centre of its substratum, or matter, which is totally formless. Furthermore, the substrata of art are many, and that of nature one, because the former, formed by nature in different ways, are diverse and various, while the lat- ter, in no way formed, is undifferentiated throughout, since all difference or diversity proceeds from form.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Sothatthethingsformedbynatureserveasart'smaterial, while a single, formless thing serves as nature's material.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Can we know the substratum of nature, just as we can clearly see and know the substrata of the arts?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Doubtless, but with different cognitive principles, for just as we do not know colours and sounds through the same senses, we cannot see the substrata of the arts and of nature with the same eye.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You mean we see the first with the eyes of sense and the second with the eye of reason.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Pleaseelaborate.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Gladly. Therelationthattheformofarthaswithitsmaterial
is the same (allowing for proportions) as that of nature with its material. Just as in art, then, while the forms vary to infinity (if this were possible), under those forms there always persists one and the same matter - the form of the tree, for example, being followed by the form of the trunk, then of a board, then of a table, a stool, a chest, a comb and so on, while the wood remains the same - and it is no different in nature, where forms vary infinitely, one after the other, and the matter always remains the same.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Howcanthisanalogybeconfirmed?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Do you not see that what was seed becomes stalk, what was stalk becomes an ear of wheat, what was an ear becomes bread, what was bread turns to chyle, from chyle to blood, from blood to seed, from seed to embryo, and then to man, corpse, earth, stone or something else, in suc- cession, involving all natural forms?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Iseethiseasily.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then,theremustexistonesamethingwhich,initself,isnei- ther stone, nor earth, nor corpse, nor man, nor embryo, nor blood, nor any- thing else, but which, after having been blood, turns to an embryo by receiving the being of the embryo, and which, after having been an embryo, receives the being of man to become human, just as the matter formed by
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? nature, which is the substratum of art, is a board and receives the being of board from what was a tree, and from the matter which was a board it receives the being of a door and is door.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . NowIunderstanditwell. Butitseemstomethatthissub- stratum of nature cannot be a body, nor have a definite quality. For, passing sometimes into such and such a form and natural being, sometimes into another form and being, it does not manifest itself corporally, like wood or stone, which always show through as they are, even if considered as material or substratum, no matter what the form.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Wellsaid.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . What shall I do, then, when I happen to be discussing this thought with some stubborn person who refuses to believe that there is only one matter underneath all nature's forms, just as there is only one beneath all the forms of each art? For we cannot deny what we see with our own eyes, but what we see solely through reason may be denied.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Sendhimawayordonotanswer.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . But what if this stubborn individual demands evidence of this matter and is a respectable person, more liable to send me away than I am him, and takes my refusal to answer as an insult?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Whatwouldyoudoifablinddemigod,worthyofeveryhon- our and respect, were so insistent, importunate and stubborn as to demand knowledge of and evidence for colours, or even for the external shapes of natural things? What if he asked, for example: What is the form of a tree? What is the form of mountains? of stars? Or again: What is the form of a statue, of a robe, or other artificial things, which are so plain to our eyes?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Iwouldtellhimthatifhehadeyes,hewouldnotaskforevi- dence of these things, since he could see them for himself, but since he is blind, it is impossible for others to show them to him.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . . . . not only would it not follow that you, sir, are capable of judging philosophers, but what is more, it would certainly follow that you cannot help being the biggest, most bumbling beast that exists in human form; besides, there is nothing to prevent anyone who has the least knowledge of any of these tongues, even a bastard one, from being the wisest and most learned man in the whole world. Consider how useful these two have been now: one, a French archpedant,9 who has composed the Studies in the Liberal Arts and the Animadversions Against Aristotle, and another pedant scum, this one Italian, who has besmeared many an opuscule with his Peripatetic Discussions10. Everyone plainly sees that the first one very eloquently demonstrates his lack of intelligence, while the second shows that he has much in him of the beast and the ass, to put it bluntly. The first shows that he has understood Aristotle, at least, but badly. If he had understood him well, he might also have had the wit to wage honourable war with him, as the most judicious Telesio of Cosenza has. 11 Of the second, it is impossible to say whether he understood Aristotle either well or badly, but it can be claimed that he has read and re-read him, taken him apart, stitched him up again, and compared him pro [for] and con [against] with a thousand other Greek authors, going to the great- est lengths not only without any profit whatsoever, but etiam [even] to great loss. Whoever wants to see how far into insanity and presumptuous vanity a pedantic way of thinking can sink us has only to read this one book, before it disappears without a trace. But here come Teofilo and Dicsono.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Adestefelices,domini[youcomeattherighttime,masters]: your arrival prevents my glowing anger from exploding into thundering judgements against the vain remarks issued by this sterile chatterer.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . And it blocks me from mocking the majesty of this most venerable owl.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Alliswelliftempersdonotflare.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . WhatIsay,Isayinjest,becauseoftheaffectionIfeelforthe honourable master.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Ego quoque quod irascor, non serio irascor, quia Gervasium non odi [That holds for me too. If I grow angry, my anger is not serious, for I do not hate Gervasio. ]
9 Peter Ramus (? ? ? ? -? ? ), author of Scholae in Liberales and Aristoteliae Animadversiones. 10 Francesco Patrizi (? ? ? ? -? ? ). 11 Bernardino Telesio (? ? ? ? -? ? ).
? ? ?
Third dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Good. LetmetakeupmydiscussionwithTeofilo.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thus, Democritus and the Epicureans, who claim that what is not body is nothing, maintain as a consequence that matter alone is the substance of things, and that it is also the divine nature, as an Arab named Avicebron has said in a book entitled Fount of Life. They also hold, together with the Cyrenics, the Cynics and the Stoics, that forms are nothing but certain accidental dispositions of matter. I, myself, was an enthusiastic par- tisan of this view for a long time, solely because it corresponds to nature's workings more than Aristotle's. But after much thought, and after having considered more elements, we find that we must recognize two kinds of substance in nature: namely, form and matter. For there must be an absolutely substantial act in which the active potency of everything is found, as well as a potency or substratum, in which an equal passive potency can be found: in the first, the power to make, in the second, the power to be made.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Anyonewhoreasonswellwillclearlyseethatitisimpossible for the former continually to make everything, without there being some- thing which can become everything. How can the world soul (I mean, all form), which is indivisible, act as shaper, without the substratum of dimen- sions or quantities, which is matter? And how can matter be shaped? Perhaps by itself? It seems we can say that matter is shaped by itself, if we want to consider as matter the universal formed body and call it 'matter', just as we would call a living thing with all its faculties 'matter', distinguishing it, not by the form, but only by the efficient cause.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . No one can keep you from using the term 'matter' as you wish, just as the same term covers different meanings in various schools. But I know that your way of considering it is only apt for a technician or physician strictly within his practice, for example that physician who reduced the universal body to mercury, salt and sulfur, a thesis that reveals the stupidity of his desire to be called philosopher more than some divine talent for medicine. 12 The aim of philosophy is not simply to arrive at the distinction of principles which is realized physically by the separation which results from the power of fire, but also to arrive at that distinction of principles to which no material agent can, since the soul, which is insepa- rable from sulphur, mercury and salt, is a formal principle; that principle is not susceptible to material qualities, but totally dominates matter and is not touched by the experiments of the alchemists, whose divisions are limited
12 The reference is to Paracelsus.
? ? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? to the three aforesaid elements, and who recognize another kind of soul, apart from this world soul, which we must define here.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Excellently said. And very satisfactory reasoning, for I see some people so lacking in judgement that they do not distinguish the causes of nature taken absolutely, according to the entire extension of their being, as philosophers do, and those taken according to a limited sense appropri- ate to their work. The first mode is excessive and vain for physicians as such, and the second is restricted and insufficient for philosophers as such.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . YouhavetouchedonthatverypointwhichearnsParacelsus praise. In discussing medical philosophy, he reproves Galen for having introduced philosophical medicine, and for having created such an annoy- ing mixture and tangled web that, in the last analysis, he comes across as a very shallow physician and a very confused philosopher. But let that be said with some reserve, since I have not had the leisure to examine all parts of his work.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Please, Teofilo, first do me the favour, since I am not so competent in philosophy, of making clear what you mean by the word 'matter', and what matter is in natural things.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . All who want to distinguish matter and consider it in itself, without form, resort to the analogy of art. So it is with the Pythagoreans, the Platonists and the Peripatetics. Take, for example, the art of carpentry: it has wood as substratum for all its forms and all its work, as iron is for the blacksmith and cloth for the tailor. All these arts produce various images, compositions and figures in their own particular material, none of which is natural or proper to that material. Nature is similar to art in that it needs material for its operations, since it is impossible for any agent who wishes to make something to create out of nothing, or to work on nothing.
There is, then, a sort of substratum from which, with which, and in which nature effects her operations or her work, and which she endows with the mani- fold forms that result in such a great variety of species being presented to the eyes of reason. And just as wood does not possess, by itself, any artifi- cial form, but may have them all as a result of the carpenter's activity, in a similar way the matter of which we speak, because of its nature, has no nat- ural form by itself, but may take on all forms through the operation of the active agent which is the principle of nature. This natural matter is not per- ceptible, as is artificial matter, because nature's matter has absolutely no form, while the matter of art is something already formed by nature. Art can operate only on the surface of things already formed, like wood, iron,
? ?
Third dialogue
? stone, wool and the like, but nature works, so to speak, from the centre of its substratum, or matter, which is totally formless. Furthermore, the substrata of art are many, and that of nature one, because the former, formed by nature in different ways, are diverse and various, while the lat- ter, in no way formed, is undifferentiated throughout, since all difference or diversity proceeds from form.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Sothatthethingsformedbynatureserveasart'smaterial, while a single, formless thing serves as nature's material.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Can we know the substratum of nature, just as we can clearly see and know the substrata of the arts?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Doubtless, but with different cognitive principles, for just as we do not know colours and sounds through the same senses, we cannot see the substrata of the arts and of nature with the same eye.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You mean we see the first with the eyes of sense and the second with the eye of reason.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Pleaseelaborate.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Gladly. Therelationthattheformofarthaswithitsmaterial
is the same (allowing for proportions) as that of nature with its material. Just as in art, then, while the forms vary to infinity (if this were possible), under those forms there always persists one and the same matter - the form of the tree, for example, being followed by the form of the trunk, then of a board, then of a table, a stool, a chest, a comb and so on, while the wood remains the same - and it is no different in nature, where forms vary infinitely, one after the other, and the matter always remains the same.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Howcanthisanalogybeconfirmed?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Do you not see that what was seed becomes stalk, what was stalk becomes an ear of wheat, what was an ear becomes bread, what was bread turns to chyle, from chyle to blood, from blood to seed, from seed to embryo, and then to man, corpse, earth, stone or something else, in suc- cession, involving all natural forms?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Iseethiseasily.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then,theremustexistonesamethingwhich,initself,isnei- ther stone, nor earth, nor corpse, nor man, nor embryo, nor blood, nor any- thing else, but which, after having been blood, turns to an embryo by receiving the being of the embryo, and which, after having been an embryo, receives the being of man to become human, just as the matter formed by
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? nature, which is the substratum of art, is a board and receives the being of board from what was a tree, and from the matter which was a board it receives the being of a door and is door.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . NowIunderstanditwell. Butitseemstomethatthissub- stratum of nature cannot be a body, nor have a definite quality. For, passing sometimes into such and such a form and natural being, sometimes into another form and being, it does not manifest itself corporally, like wood or stone, which always show through as they are, even if considered as material or substratum, no matter what the form.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Wellsaid.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . What shall I do, then, when I happen to be discussing this thought with some stubborn person who refuses to believe that there is only one matter underneath all nature's forms, just as there is only one beneath all the forms of each art? For we cannot deny what we see with our own eyes, but what we see solely through reason may be denied.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Sendhimawayordonotanswer.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . But what if this stubborn individual demands evidence of this matter and is a respectable person, more liable to send me away than I am him, and takes my refusal to answer as an insult?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Whatwouldyoudoifablinddemigod,worthyofeveryhon- our and respect, were so insistent, importunate and stubborn as to demand knowledge of and evidence for colours, or even for the external shapes of natural things? What if he asked, for example: What is the form of a tree? What is the form of mountains? of stars? Or again: What is the form of a statue, of a robe, or other artificial things, which are so plain to our eyes?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Iwouldtellhimthatifhehadeyes,hewouldnotaskforevi- dence of these things, since he could see them for himself, but since he is blind, it is impossible for others to show them to him.
