Rather, it has liways been emphasised that while in other sciences, a quiet build- o$ up of knowledge is the ride, as soon as they have once gained * lure methodical
rel* which is interrupted only from time to time by a sudden new btgmning, — in philosophy the reverse is true.
rel* which is interrupted only from time to time by a sudden new btgmning, — in philosophy the reverse is true.
Windelband - History of Philosophy
a Voto.
.
.
.
Op.
Or.
qu.
Durand de l'ourcain, In Sent- Prol.
, qu.
t-irniadiu of Sabunde, Theol.
Natur.
Prooem.
"-tar. Valla. Dialect. Dirp. III. 9; B. Telesio, De Ant. Her. Prooem. ; Ft. ^=i. De Auym. III. (Works, Spedding, 639 = 111. 336); Taurellus, <***-« Triumph. 1; Paracelsus, Paragr. (ed. JBuser) II. 23 G. Bruno, '*■-« '«■*«. etc. , IV. 107 (Lagarde,«I. it*) HoBbe\De Corpor. (Works, ■ «w»ima,
and
"karaetrristic definitions, on the one hand, in Gottsched, Ertte Griinde drr
f. ).
r**m*un WeltireUheit (Leips. 1756), pp. 97 ff. on the other hand, in the *"■*» naotophie, in the Encyrloprdie (Vol. XXV. pp. 632 ff).
■'
I. 2
I. 6
I. ;
;
I.
f. ;
f. ,
1
I. 3,
4 ;
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1
I Introduction.
antiquity had assigned to to supply from scientific insight foundation for theory of the world and of human life, where relig ion was no longer able to meet this need, or at least to meet alone In the conviction that was equal to this task, the philosophy the eighteenth century, like that of the Greeks, considered
right and duty to enlighten men with regard to the nature of things and from this position of insight to rule the life of the individua and of society.
In this position of self-security philosophy was shaken by Kant who demonstrated the impossibility of philosophical (». «. meta physical) knowledge of the world beside of or above the individua sciences, and thereby restricted once more the conception and th< task of philosophy for after this quitclaim the realm of philosophy as a particular science, was narrowed to just that critical consideratim by Reason of itself, from which Kant had won his decisive insight, am which needed only to be extended systematically to activities othei than that of knowing. With this function could be united whal Kant called the universal or cosmical conception of philosophy, — its vocation in the practical direction of life.
It to be sure, far from true that this new and apparently final conception of philosophy gained universal acceptance at once. It rather the case that the great variety of philosophical movements the nineteenth century has left no earlier form of philosophy unre
and that a luxuriant development of the "metaphysical need " even brought back, for time, the inclination to swallow up all human knowledge in philosophy, and complete this again as at all-embracing science.
In view of these mutations through which the meaning of the word " philosophy " has passed in the course of time, seems im practicable to pretend to gain a general conception of philosophy from historical comparison. None of those brought forward for this purpose* apply to all those structures of mental activity which lay claim to the name. Even the subordination of philosophy undei the more general conception " science " questionable in the cas* of those types of teaching which place one-sided emphasis on th<
Critique of Pure Season, A. 830 B. 866.
Schopenhauer, World as Will and Idea, Vol. II. ch. 17.
Instead of criticising particular conceptions sufficient here to point
the widely diverging formulas in which the attempt has been made to perforn this impossible task cf. , for example, only the introductions to works such a> those of Krdmann, Ueberweg, Kuno Fischer, Zeller, etc. All these conception thus determined apply only in so far as the history of philosophy has yieldec the result which they express, but they do not apply with reference to the inten tions expressed by the philosophers themselves.
peated,
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i Name and Conception Philosophy.
practical significance of their doctrine still less can we define the subject-matter and form of philosophy considered as special meat*, in a way that shall hold good for all cases. For even aside from the primitive or the revived standpoint for which philosophy 11 universal science,' the attempts to limit are extremely vari- oa The problems of natural science form at first almost the sole uojeets of interest for philosophy, then for long period are in-
•iided in its scope, and do not separate from until modern times. History, on the other hand, has remained an object of indifference to :u*t philosophical systems, and has emerged as an object of philo sophical investigation relatively late and in isolated cases. Meta- pCTiical doctrines, again, in which the centre of philosophy asaally sought, we see either pushed one side at important turning- (ttatt in history or declared to be entirely impossible and at sues the ability of philosophy to determine the life of the indi- T>lBal or of society emphasised, proud standpoint of pure theory ias renounced such a menial occupation. 4
From still another side has been claimed that philosophy treats *i* same subjects as the other sciences, but in another sense and by uother method but neither has this specific characteristic of form iustorical universality. That there no such acknowledged his torical method would of course be no objection only the endeavour iter each a method were a constant characteristic of all philoso- pssea This is, however, so far from being the case that in fact but philosophers imprint on their science the method of other iaciplines, e. g. of mathematics or of investigation of nature,1 while ■•tiers will have nothing at all to do with methodical treatment of their problems, and regard the philosophic activity as analogous to ue creations of genius in art.
explained also the fact that there
which
U* of definition valid for all history. Where philosophy presents iaelf as the universal science, the other sciences appear only as its
sore or less distinctly separated parts. * Where, on the contrary, /fcjosophy assigned the task of grasping the results of the par-
- to In the case of the majority of the philosophers of later antiquity. a* for Cnr. Wolf cf. his Logiea, JJ 29 ff. "
*Tfcs» m especially the case where philosophy regarded solely as science •fwcaitton. " Cf. , e. g. , W. Hamilton in his notes to Reid's works, II. 808. tM( the French at the close of the eighteenth and the beginning of this oen- ^"7. pkfloeophy = analfte de Ventendement humain.
*. #. with Plotinos.
•» DiMcaitea and Bacon.
•*. for example, in the Hegelian system.
From these circumstances
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of philosophy
to the other
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6 Introduction.
ticular sciences in their general significance, and harmonising them into a comprehensive knowledge of the world, we have as the result peculiarly complex relations : in the first place, a dependence ol philosophy upon the existing condition of insight reached in the par ticular disciplines — a dependence which expresses itself principally in the furtherance of philosophy by the prominent advances made by individual sciences;1 in the next place, an influence in the opposite direction, when philosophy takes part in the work of the particular sciences. This action is felt as help or as hindrance, according as the philosophical treatment of the questions embraced under the particular disciplines sometimes contributes valuable factors for their solution, by means of its wider range of vision and its tendency toward unity,2 but at other times presents itself only as a duplication which, if it leads to like results, appears useless, or if it wishes to furnish other results, dangerous. '
From what has been said it is evident farther, that the relations of philosophy to the other activities of civilisation are no less close than its relation to the individual sciences. For the conceptions arising from the religious and ethical and artistic life, from the life of the state and of society, force their way everywhere, side by side with the results won from scientific investigation, into the idea of the universe which the philosophy of metaphysical tendencies aims to frame ; and the reason's valuations ( Werthbestimmungen) and stand ards of judgment demand their place in that idea the more vigor ously, just in proportion as it is to become the basis for the practical significance of philosophy. In this way humanity's convictions and ideals find their expression in philosophy side by side with its intellectual insights ; and if these convictions and ideals are regarded, erroneously often, as gaining thereby the form of scientific intelli gence, they may receive under certain circumstances valuable clari fication and modification by this means. Thus this relation also of philosophy to general culture is not only that of receiving, but also that of giving.
It is not without interest to consider also the mutations in external pogition and social relations which philosophy has experienced. It may be assumed that science was from the first, with perhaps a few exceptions (Socrates), pursued in Greece in closed schools. 4 The fact that these, even at a later time, had the form
1 As the influence of astronomy upon the beginnings of Greek, or that oi mechanics upon those of modern, philosophy.
1 The Protestant theology of the nineteenth century stands in this relation to German philosophy.
8 Cf. the opposition of natural science to Schelling's philosophy of nature.
4 H. Diels, Ueber die altesten Philosophenschulen tier Griechen in Philos. Aufsiltze zum Jubilaum K. Zeller's, Leips. 1887, pp. 241 ff.
J l. J Name and Conception of Philosophy. 7
of societies with religious laws > would not in itself alone, in view of the religious character of all Greek judicial institutions, prove a religious origin of these schools, but the circumstance that Greek science worked out its contents directly from religious ideas, and that certain connections with religious cults present themselves unmistakably in a number of directions,2 makes it not improbable that the scientific societies sprang originally from religious unions (the Mys teries) and continued in a certain connection with them. But when the scien tific life had developed to complete independence, these connections fell away »nd purely scientific schools were founded as free unions of men who, under the guidance of persons of importance, shared with each other the work of research, exposition, defence, and polemic," and at the same time had an ethical bond in a common ideal of the conduct of life.
With the advent of the larger relations of life in the Hellenistic and Roman period, these unions naturally became loosened, and we frequently meet writers, especially among the Kotnans, who are active in the field of philosophy in a purely individual way, neither members of a school nor professional teachers. Such were Cicero, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius. Not until the latest period of antiquity were the ties of the schools drawn more closely again, as in Neo- l*Tthagoreanism and Neo-Platonism.
Among the Romanic and Germanic peoples the course of events has been not unlike that in the ancient world. The science of the Middle Ages also appears in the train of the Church civilisation ; it has its seats in the cloister-schools, and l« stimulated toward independent development primarily by questions of religious interest. In it, too, the oppositions of various religious orders, such as the Do minicans and Franciscans, assert themselves for a time, and even the freer "cientific associations out of which the universities gradually developed, had "rurinally a religious background and an ecclesiastical stamp. 4 Hence there was always but a slight degree of independence with reference to Church doc trine in this corporate philosophy of the universities, and this held true on into the eighteenth century for the Protestant universities also, in the foundation and development of which ecclesiastical and religious interests had a foremost place. "
world-wisdom
philosophy which was gaining its independence at the beginning of the modern periTM! , that those who bring and support it are not at all men of the schools,
hut men of the world and of life. An escaped monk, a state-chancellor, a cobbler, a nobleman, a proscribed Jew, a learned diplomat, independent men of l<tiers and journalists, — these are the founders of modern philosophy, and in accord with this, their work takes for its outer form not the text-book or the deposit of academical disputations, but the free literary production, the essay.
Sot until the second half of the eighteenth century did philosophy again become corporate, and domesticated in the universities. This took place first in Germany, where the most favourable conditions were afforded by the rising independence of the universities, and where a fruitful interchange between teachers and students of the university was beneficial to philosophy also. '
• v. Wilamowitz-Mollendorf, Antigonos von Karystos (Philol. Stud. IV. Berlin, 1881, pp. 263 ff. ).
: The Pythagoreans, as is well known, offer a pre-eminent example of this ; tat •ympathies with the Apollo cultus are plain enough in the Platonic Academy alan. Pflekierer has lately sought to bring the apparently isolated Heraclitus
ntn connection with the Mysteries (K. Pfleiderer, Heraklit von Ephesus. fVrlin, 1886).
*Cf- II. I'sener, Ueber die Organisation der wissenschqftlichen Arbeit im AHathmm (Preuas. Jahrb. , Jahrg. Mil. , 1884, pp. 1 ff), and E. Heitz, Die Philo- tnpknuekuten Athen* (Deutsche Revue, 1884, pp. 3'26 ff. ).
' Cf G. Kaufmann, Oetchichte der deutschen Universitaten I. pp. 08 ff. (Stuttg.
' Srktlling has erected the finest monument to the ideal conception of science ■a the activity of German universities, in his Vorletunqen iiber die Methode des *kmtm,trken Studiumt (2. and 3. Vorlesung. Ges. Werke, I. Abth. , Vol. 6.
n-tan. ).
•hi the other hand, it is characteristic of the
"
or secular
8 Introduction.
From Germany this spread to Scotland, England, France, and Italy, and in gen eral it may be said that in the nineteenth century the seat of philosophy is esscn tially to be sought in the universities. 1
In conclusion, the share of the various peoples in the development of philoso phy deserves a brief mention. As with all developments of European culture so with philosophy, — the Greeks created it, and the primitive structure o philosophy due to their creative activity is still to-day an essential basis of th science. What was added in antiquity by the mixed peoples of Hellenism am by the Romans does not, in general, amount to more than a special form am practical adaptation of the Greek philosophy. Only in the religious turn whicl this last movement took (cf. below, Part II. ch. 2) do we find something essen tially new which sprang from the harmonising of national differences in th Roman Empire. The scientific culture of the Middle Ages was also international as is implied in the universal employment of the Latin language. It is will modern philosophy that the special characters of particular nations first presen themselves as of decisive influence. While the traditions of medieval scholas ticism maintain themselves most vigorously and independently in Spain an( Portugal, the Italians, Germans, English, and French supply the first movement of the new science which reached its highest point in the classical period o German philosophy. Compared with these four nations, the rest stand almos entirely in a receptive attitude ; a certain independence is noticeable, if any where, in more recent time among the Swedes.
§ 2. The History of Philosophy.
The more varied the character assumed by the problems and con tent of philosophy in the course of time, the more the questioi rises, what meaning there can be in uniting in historical investiga tion and exposition products of thought which are not only s< manifold, but also so different in kind, and between which then seems to be ultimately nothing in common but the name.
For the anecdotal interest in this checkered diversity of vari ous opinions on various things, which was perhaps formerly th( chief motive of a " History of Philosophy," stimulated too by th( remarkable and strange nature of many of these views, cannoi possibly serve as the permanent centre of a genuine scientific disci pline.
1. At all events, however, it is clear that the case stands other wise with the history of philosophy than with that of any othei science. For with all these the field of research remains fixed, oi the whole at least, however many the variations to which its extent its separation from a still more general field, and its limitation wit! reference to neighbouring fields, may be subject in the course of his tory. In such a case there is no difficulty in tracing the develop ment of knowledge over a field which can be determined in this way, and in eventually making just those variations intelligible as the natural consequences of this development of insight.
1 The best evidence for this statement is afforded by just the passionate attacks which Schopenhauer directed against the relation between philosopbj and the universities.
i-] The History of Philosophy. 9
Quite otherwise, however, in the case of philosophy, which has ao such subject-matter common to all its periods, and whose " his- Wy," therefore, sets forth no constant advance or gradual approxi- Mtkm to a knowledge of the subject in question.
Rather, it has liways been emphasised that while in other sciences, a quiet build- o$ up of knowledge is the ride, as soon as they have once gained * lure methodical
rel* which is interrupted only from time to time by a sudden new btgmning, — in philosophy the reverse is true. There it is the ««ption that successors gratefully develop what has been already achieved, and each of the great systems of philosophy begins to
Kin its newly formulated problem ab ovo, as if the other systems
ui warcely existed.
"
If in
spite
of all of this we are still to be able to of a speak
his
footing after their rhapsodical beginnings, — a
2.
tjory of philosophy," the unity of connection, which we find neither
the objects with which philosophers busy themselves, nor in the tnbleins they have set themselves, can be found only in the common nrk tckich they have accomplished in spite of all the variety in their iab-«rt-matter and in the purposes with which they have worked.
But this common product, which constitutes the meaning of the katory of philosophy, rests on just the changing relations which tke work of philosophers has sustained in the course of history, not <»ly to the maturest results of science in general and of the special •oeaees in particular, but also to the other activities of European otflmtion. For was it that philosophy had in view the project of » reaeral scientific knowledge of the universe, which she would win *»ther in the role of universal science, or as a generalising compre- >aia« of the results of the special sciences, or was it that she (nght a view of life which should give a complete expression to '■> highest values of will and feeling, or was it finally that with a •>ul\ denned limitation of her field she made reason's self-knowl- •dge her goal, — the result always was that she was labouring to trag to conscious expression the necessary forms and principles in *ixh the human reason manifests its activity, and to transfer these frra their original form of perceptions, feelings, and impulses, into ^*i of conceptions. In some direction and in some fashion every pfclaiophy has striven to reach, over a more or less extensive field, lionsulation in conception of the material immediately given in '•i* world and in life; and so, as these efforts have passed into his- fc". the constitution of the mental and spiritual life has been rj? by step disclosed. The History of Philosophy is the process in «*<• European humanity has embodied in scientific conception* its
1 of the world and its judgments of life.
10 Introduction.
It is this common fruit of all the intellectual creations which present themselves as " philosophies," which alone gives to the history of philosophy as a genuine science its content, its problem, and its justification. This, too, is the reason why a knowledge of the history of philosophy is a necessary requirement, not only for all scholarly education, but for all culture whatever ; for it teaches how the conceptions and forms have been coined, in which we all, in every-day life as well as in the particular sciences, think and
judge the world of our experience.
The beginnings of the history of philosophy are to be sought in the historical compositions (for the most part lost) of the great schools of antiquity, especially the Peripatetic School. As we may see in the examples given by Aristotle,1 these works had the critical purpose of preparing for the development of their own views by a dialectical examination of views previously brought forward. Such collections of historical material were planned for the various fields of science, and doxographies 2 in philosophy arose in this way side by side with histories of particular disciplines, such as mathematics, astronomy, physics, etc. As inclination and power for independent philosophic thought later declined, this literature degenerated into a learned scrap-book work, in which were mingled anecdotes from the lives of the philosophers, individual epigrammatic sayings, and sketches of their doctrines.
Those expositions belonging to the modern period which were based upon the remains of ancient tradition had this same character of collections of curiosi ties. Such were Stanley's* reproduction of Diogenes Laertius, and Bruclcer's works. 4 Only with time do we find critical discernment in use of the sources (Buhle,b Fiilleborn6), a more unprejudiced apprehension of the historical significance of individual doctrines ( Tiedemann," Degerando 8), and systematic criticism of these upon the basis of the new standpoint (Tennemann,* Fries,1" and Schleiermacher11). u
It was, however, through Hegel that the history of philosophy was first made an independent science, for he discovered the essential point that the
1 E. g. in the beginning of the Metaphysics.
I More in detail on these below.
8 Th. Stanley, The History of Philosophy. Lond. 1685. ,
4 J. J. Brucker, Historia Critica Philosop h ice. 6 vols. Leipe. 1742 ff. Insti-
tutiones Historia; Philosophic. Leips. 1747.
* J. G. Buhle, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie. 8 vols. Gottingen,
1796 ff.
• G. G. FUUeborn, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie. 12 Studien.
Zlillichau, 1791 ff.
7 D. Tiedemann, Geist der Speculatioen Philosophie. 7 vols. Marburg,
1791 ff.
■De Gerando, Histoire Compar&e des Systemes de Philosophie. 2d ed. in
4 vols. Paris, 1822 f.
9 W. G. Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie. 11 vols. Leips. 1798 ff.
Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie fur den akademischen Leips. 1812. [Eng. trans. 1833 and 1852. ]
Unterricht.
10 J. Fr. Fries, Geschichte der Philosophie. 2 vols. Halle, 1837 ff.
II Fr. Schleiermacher, Geschichte der Philosophie, from his literary remains in the Coll. Works. III. Abth. , 4 Bd. , 1 Th. Berlin, 1839.
12 Cf. the introductions of the Phanomenologie des Geistes, of the lectures on the Philosophy of History, and those on the History of Philosophy. Ges. Werke, Bd. II. pp. 62 ff. ; IX. pp. 11 ff. ; XIII. pp. 11-134. In Hegel's works the Geschichte der Philosophie, edited from his lectures by Michelet, occupies Vols. XIII. —XV. Berlin, 1833-36. [Lectures on the History of Philosophy, by G. W. Hegel. Trans, by E. S. HaJdane in 3 vols. Vol. I. Lond. 1892. ] On his standpoint
$2. ] The History of Philosophy. 11
history of philosophy can set forth neither a motley collection of opinions of various learned gentleman "de omnibus rebus et de quibusdam aliis," nor a constantly widening and perfecting elaboration of the same subject-matter, but rather only the limited process in which the " categories" of reason have suc cessively attained distinct consciousness and reached the form of conceptions.
This valuable insight was, however, obscured and injured in the case of Hegel by an additional asumption, since he was convinced that the chronological order in which the above "categories" have presented themselves in the historical systems of philosophy must necessarily correspond with the logical and syste matic order in which these same categories should appear as "elements of truth " in the logical construction of the final system of philosophy (i. e. in Hegel's view, his own). The fundamental thought, right in itself, thus led to the mistake of a construction of the history of philosophy under the control of a philosophical system, and so to a frequent violation of historical fact. This error, which the development of a scientific history of philosophy in the nine teenth century has set aside in favour of historical accuracy and exactness, arose from the wrong idea (though an idea in logical consistence with the principles of Hegel's philosophy) that the historical progress of philosophical thought is due
solely, or at least essentially, to an ideal necessity with which one " category " poshes forward another in the dialectical movement. In truth, the picture of the historical movement of philosophy is quite a different one. It depenas not solely upon the thinking of "humanity " or even of the " Weltgeist," but just as truly upon the reflections, the needs of mind and heart, the presaging thought and sudden flashes of insight, of philosophising individuals.
3. The history of philosophy, considered as such a sum-total, in which the fundamental conceptions of man's views of the world and judgments of life have been embodied, is the product of a great variety of single movements of thought. And as the actual motives of these movements, various factors are to be distinguished, both in the setting of the problems and in the attempts at their logical solution.
The logical, pragmatic factor is no doubt sufficiently important. For the problems of philosophy are in the main given, and this is
shown by the fact that they are constantly recurring in the histor ical movement of thought as the "primeval enigma of existence," and are ever anew demanding imperiously the solution which has nerer completely succeeded. They are given, however, by the inadequacy and internal contradictions of the material which con sciousness presents for philosophical consideration. 1 But just for
<tand G. O. Marbach, Lehrbuch der Qeschichte Philosophic (2. Abth. Leips. IKS* fl\). C. Hermann, (iesehiehte der Philosophie in pragmatischer Behandlung 'Letps. 1867), and in part also the survey of the entire history of philosophy which J. Braniss has published as the first (only) volume of a Geschichte der Plilnmpkie seit Kant (Breslan, 1842). In France this line is represented by V. roosin, Introdurtion a I'llistoire de la Philosophie (Paris, 1828 ; 7th ed. 1872) ; HiMioire Ginerale de la Philosophie (12th ed. , Paris, 1884).
1 More precisely, this inadequacy, which cannot here be more exactly devel oped, and which can be fully brought out only in a system of epistemology, oomusts in the circumstance that that which is given in experience never meets ("TOpletely the conceptional demands which, in elaborating the same according ui u> inner nature of the reason, we set up, at first naively and immediately, tad later with reflective consciousness. This antinomism (or failure to meet the laws of thought) can be escaped by ordinary life, or even by experiential
12
Introduction.
this reason this material contains the real presuppositions and the logical constraining forces for all rational reflection upon it, and because from the nature of the case these are always asserting themselves anew in the same way, it follows that not only the chief problems in the history of philosophy, but also the chief lines along which a solution is attempted, are repeated. Just this constancy in all change, which, regarded from without, makes the impression that philosophy is striving fruitlessly in ever-repeated circles for a goal that is never attained, proves only this, — that the problems of philosophy are tasks which the human mind cannot escape. 1 And so we understand how the same logical necessity in repeated instances causes one doctrine to give birth to another. Hence prog ress in the history of philosophy during certain periods, to be understood entirely pragmatically," i. e. through the internal necessity of the thoughts and through the logic of things. "
The mistake of Hegel's mentioned above, consists, then, only in his wishing to make of factor which effective within certain limits, the only, or at least the principal, factor. It would be the opposite error to deny absolutely the " reason in history," and to see in the successive doctrines of philosophy only confused chance- thoughts of individuals. It rather true that the total content of the history of philosophy can be explained only through the fact that the necessities existing in the nature of things assert themselves over and over in the thinking of individuals, however accidental the special conditions of this latter may be. On these relations rest the attempts made to classify all philo sophical doctrines under certain types, and to establish sort of rhythmical repetition in their historical development. On this basis V. Cousin3 brought forward his theory of the four systems, Idealism, Sensualism, Scepticism, Mys ticism so too August Comte his of the three stages, the theological, the meta physical, and the positive. An interesting and in many ways instructive grouping of philosophical doctrines about the particular main problems is afforded by A. Renouvier in his Esquisse cTune Classification Systematique des Doctrines Philosophiques vols. , Paris, 1886 f. ). A school-book which arranges the philosophical doctrines according to problems and schools has been issued by Paul Janet and Seailles Histoire de la Philosophic les problemes et Its icoles (Paris, 1887).
But the pragmatic thread very ofteri breaks off in the history of philosophy. The historical order in particular, in which prob lems have presented themselves, shows almost complete absence
science, by working with auxiliary conceptions, which indeed remain problem atical in themselves, but which, within certain bounds, suffice for an elaboration of the material of experience that meets our practical needs. But just in these auxiliary conceptions that the problems of philosophy inhere.
In this way the results of Kant's investigations on "The Antinomy of Pure Reason " Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Dialectic, second sec. ) might be historically and systematically extended cf. W. Windelband, Geschichte dtr neueren Philosophic, II. 96
Cf. Note 12, p. 10.
A. Comte, Cours de Philosophic Positive with which Vols. V. and VI. are to be compared as the carrying out of the scheme. Similar thoughts are also found in D'Alembert's Discours Priliminaire in the Encyclopedic.
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4. (a
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;
;
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fi] The History of Philosophy. 18
of such an immanent
mother factor asserts itself which may best be designated as the
logical necessity. Here, on the contrary,
factor contributed by the history of civilisation. For philosophy receives both its problems and the materials for their solution from the ideas of the general consciousness of the time, and from the seeds of society. The great conquests and the newly emerging questions of the special sciences, the movements of the religious consciousness, the intuitions of art, the revolutions in social and political life, — all these give philosophy new impulses at irregular intervals, and condition the directions of the interest which forces, now these, now those, problems into the foreground, and crowds others for the time being aside ; and no less do they condition also the changes which questions and answers experience in course of nae. Where this dependence shows itself with especial clearness, we have under certain circumstances a philosophical system appear ing that represents exactly the knowledge which a definite age has of itself ; or we may have the oppositions in the general culture of d* age finding their expression in the strife of philosophical sys tems. And so besides the constant dependence upon the essential character of the subject-matter — the pragmatic factor — there pre- tuIs also a necessity growing out of the history of civilisation, or current state of culture, which warrants a historical right of exist ence to structures of thought in themselves untenable.
This relation also was first brought to notice in a greater degree than before k? Brffl, although the "relative truth" which he ascribes to the particular «? sttius has with him at the same time a systematic meaning, owing to his slahninl fundamental thought On the other hand, the element due to the aaaery of civilisation has been best formulated among his successors by Kuno Richer. 1 who has also availed himself of it in most brilliant manner in his expo- ■sue of the subject. He regards philosophy in its historical unfolding as the nragreasive self-knowledge of the human mind, and makes its development
appear a* constantly conditioned by the development of the object which in it ■ "~>rtlng aelf-knowledge. Although this applies to a number of the most important systems, it is yet but one of the factors involved.
TVr influences from the history of civilisation which condition the statement u4 aotation of philosophic problems, afford an explanation in most cases of an •Enrnety interesting phenomenon which is of great importance for understand- 2* la* historical development ; viz. the complication or interwearing of prob- >mt For when interest is directed chiefly on certain lines of thought, it is arotabi*. according to psychological laws, that associations will be formed fatvtn different bodies of thought, — associations which are not based on the «a»)act-niatt*r, — and so, that questions which in themselves have nothing to do »a» tacb other become blended and made to depend upon each other in their •msuosl An extremely important and very often recurring example of this is t*t nacnoincUng of ethical and asathetic interests in the treatment of theoretical fAiam. The well-known fact of daily life that men's views are determined *J Mr wisbea, hopes, fears, and inclinations, that their theoretical are condi-
anno Fischer, Oeschichte der neuertn Philosophic, I. 1, Einleitung I. -V. [mm. by J. P. Gordy, Descartes and his School, N. Y. 1887].
14 Introduction.
"-tar. Valla. Dialect. Dirp. III. 9; B. Telesio, De Ant. Her. Prooem. ; Ft. ^=i. De Auym. III. (Works, Spedding, 639 = 111. 336); Taurellus, <***-« Triumph. 1; Paracelsus, Paragr. (ed. JBuser) II. 23 G. Bruno, '*■-« '«■*«. etc. , IV. 107 (Lagarde,«I. it*) HoBbe\De Corpor. (Works, ■ «w»ima,
and
"karaetrristic definitions, on the one hand, in Gottsched, Ertte Griinde drr
f. ).
r**m*un WeltireUheit (Leips. 1756), pp. 97 ff. on the other hand, in the *"■*» naotophie, in the Encyrloprdie (Vol. XXV. pp. 632 ff).
■'
I. 2
I. 6
I. ;
;
I.
f. ;
f. ,
1
I. 3,
4 ;
8 ;;
1
I Introduction.
antiquity had assigned to to supply from scientific insight foundation for theory of the world and of human life, where relig ion was no longer able to meet this need, or at least to meet alone In the conviction that was equal to this task, the philosophy the eighteenth century, like that of the Greeks, considered
right and duty to enlighten men with regard to the nature of things and from this position of insight to rule the life of the individua and of society.
In this position of self-security philosophy was shaken by Kant who demonstrated the impossibility of philosophical (». «. meta physical) knowledge of the world beside of or above the individua sciences, and thereby restricted once more the conception and th< task of philosophy for after this quitclaim the realm of philosophy as a particular science, was narrowed to just that critical consideratim by Reason of itself, from which Kant had won his decisive insight, am which needed only to be extended systematically to activities othei than that of knowing. With this function could be united whal Kant called the universal or cosmical conception of philosophy, — its vocation in the practical direction of life.
It to be sure, far from true that this new and apparently final conception of philosophy gained universal acceptance at once. It rather the case that the great variety of philosophical movements the nineteenth century has left no earlier form of philosophy unre
and that a luxuriant development of the "metaphysical need " even brought back, for time, the inclination to swallow up all human knowledge in philosophy, and complete this again as at all-embracing science.
In view of these mutations through which the meaning of the word " philosophy " has passed in the course of time, seems im practicable to pretend to gain a general conception of philosophy from historical comparison. None of those brought forward for this purpose* apply to all those structures of mental activity which lay claim to the name. Even the subordination of philosophy undei the more general conception " science " questionable in the cas* of those types of teaching which place one-sided emphasis on th<
Critique of Pure Season, A. 830 B. 866.
Schopenhauer, World as Will and Idea, Vol. II. ch. 17.
Instead of criticising particular conceptions sufficient here to point
the widely diverging formulas in which the attempt has been made to perforn this impossible task cf. , for example, only the introductions to works such a> those of Krdmann, Ueberweg, Kuno Fischer, Zeller, etc. All these conception thus determined apply only in so far as the history of philosophy has yieldec the result which they express, but they do not apply with reference to the inten tions expressed by the philosophers themselves.
peated,
:
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2.
2
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i Name and Conception Philosophy.
practical significance of their doctrine still less can we define the subject-matter and form of philosophy considered as special meat*, in a way that shall hold good for all cases. For even aside from the primitive or the revived standpoint for which philosophy 11 universal science,' the attempts to limit are extremely vari- oa The problems of natural science form at first almost the sole uojeets of interest for philosophy, then for long period are in-
•iided in its scope, and do not separate from until modern times. History, on the other hand, has remained an object of indifference to :u*t philosophical systems, and has emerged as an object of philo sophical investigation relatively late and in isolated cases. Meta- pCTiical doctrines, again, in which the centre of philosophy asaally sought, we see either pushed one side at important turning- (ttatt in history or declared to be entirely impossible and at sues the ability of philosophy to determine the life of the indi- T>lBal or of society emphasised, proud standpoint of pure theory ias renounced such a menial occupation. 4
From still another side has been claimed that philosophy treats *i* same subjects as the other sciences, but in another sense and by uother method but neither has this specific characteristic of form iustorical universality. That there no such acknowledged his torical method would of course be no objection only the endeavour iter each a method were a constant characteristic of all philoso- pssea This is, however, so far from being the case that in fact but philosophers imprint on their science the method of other iaciplines, e. g. of mathematics or of investigation of nature,1 while ■•tiers will have nothing at all to do with methodical treatment of their problems, and regard the philosophic activity as analogous to ue creations of genius in art.
explained also the fact that there
which
U* of definition valid for all history. Where philosophy presents iaelf as the universal science, the other sciences appear only as its
sore or less distinctly separated parts. * Where, on the contrary, /fcjosophy assigned the task of grasping the results of the par-
- to In the case of the majority of the philosophers of later antiquity. a* for Cnr. Wolf cf. his Logiea, JJ 29 ff. "
*Tfcs» m especially the case where philosophy regarded solely as science •fwcaitton. " Cf. , e. g. , W. Hamilton in his notes to Reid's works, II. 808. tM( the French at the close of the eighteenth and the beginning of this oen- ^"7. pkfloeophy = analfte de Ventendement humain.
*. #. with Plotinos.
•» DiMcaitea and Bacon.
•*. for example, in the Hegelian system.
From these circumstances
Jso fixed relation
of philosophy
to the other
sciences,
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6 Introduction.
ticular sciences in their general significance, and harmonising them into a comprehensive knowledge of the world, we have as the result peculiarly complex relations : in the first place, a dependence ol philosophy upon the existing condition of insight reached in the par ticular disciplines — a dependence which expresses itself principally in the furtherance of philosophy by the prominent advances made by individual sciences;1 in the next place, an influence in the opposite direction, when philosophy takes part in the work of the particular sciences. This action is felt as help or as hindrance, according as the philosophical treatment of the questions embraced under the particular disciplines sometimes contributes valuable factors for their solution, by means of its wider range of vision and its tendency toward unity,2 but at other times presents itself only as a duplication which, if it leads to like results, appears useless, or if it wishes to furnish other results, dangerous. '
From what has been said it is evident farther, that the relations of philosophy to the other activities of civilisation are no less close than its relation to the individual sciences. For the conceptions arising from the religious and ethical and artistic life, from the life of the state and of society, force their way everywhere, side by side with the results won from scientific investigation, into the idea of the universe which the philosophy of metaphysical tendencies aims to frame ; and the reason's valuations ( Werthbestimmungen) and stand ards of judgment demand their place in that idea the more vigor ously, just in proportion as it is to become the basis for the practical significance of philosophy. In this way humanity's convictions and ideals find their expression in philosophy side by side with its intellectual insights ; and if these convictions and ideals are regarded, erroneously often, as gaining thereby the form of scientific intelli gence, they may receive under certain circumstances valuable clari fication and modification by this means. Thus this relation also of philosophy to general culture is not only that of receiving, but also that of giving.
It is not without interest to consider also the mutations in external pogition and social relations which philosophy has experienced. It may be assumed that science was from the first, with perhaps a few exceptions (Socrates), pursued in Greece in closed schools. 4 The fact that these, even at a later time, had the form
1 As the influence of astronomy upon the beginnings of Greek, or that oi mechanics upon those of modern, philosophy.
1 The Protestant theology of the nineteenth century stands in this relation to German philosophy.
8 Cf. the opposition of natural science to Schelling's philosophy of nature.
4 H. Diels, Ueber die altesten Philosophenschulen tier Griechen in Philos. Aufsiltze zum Jubilaum K. Zeller's, Leips. 1887, pp. 241 ff.
J l. J Name and Conception of Philosophy. 7
of societies with religious laws > would not in itself alone, in view of the religious character of all Greek judicial institutions, prove a religious origin of these schools, but the circumstance that Greek science worked out its contents directly from religious ideas, and that certain connections with religious cults present themselves unmistakably in a number of directions,2 makes it not improbable that the scientific societies sprang originally from religious unions (the Mys teries) and continued in a certain connection with them. But when the scien tific life had developed to complete independence, these connections fell away »nd purely scientific schools were founded as free unions of men who, under the guidance of persons of importance, shared with each other the work of research, exposition, defence, and polemic," and at the same time had an ethical bond in a common ideal of the conduct of life.
With the advent of the larger relations of life in the Hellenistic and Roman period, these unions naturally became loosened, and we frequently meet writers, especially among the Kotnans, who are active in the field of philosophy in a purely individual way, neither members of a school nor professional teachers. Such were Cicero, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius. Not until the latest period of antiquity were the ties of the schools drawn more closely again, as in Neo- l*Tthagoreanism and Neo-Platonism.
Among the Romanic and Germanic peoples the course of events has been not unlike that in the ancient world. The science of the Middle Ages also appears in the train of the Church civilisation ; it has its seats in the cloister-schools, and l« stimulated toward independent development primarily by questions of religious interest. In it, too, the oppositions of various religious orders, such as the Do minicans and Franciscans, assert themselves for a time, and even the freer "cientific associations out of which the universities gradually developed, had "rurinally a religious background and an ecclesiastical stamp. 4 Hence there was always but a slight degree of independence with reference to Church doc trine in this corporate philosophy of the universities, and this held true on into the eighteenth century for the Protestant universities also, in the foundation and development of which ecclesiastical and religious interests had a foremost place. "
world-wisdom
philosophy which was gaining its independence at the beginning of the modern periTM! , that those who bring and support it are not at all men of the schools,
hut men of the world and of life. An escaped monk, a state-chancellor, a cobbler, a nobleman, a proscribed Jew, a learned diplomat, independent men of l<tiers and journalists, — these are the founders of modern philosophy, and in accord with this, their work takes for its outer form not the text-book or the deposit of academical disputations, but the free literary production, the essay.
Sot until the second half of the eighteenth century did philosophy again become corporate, and domesticated in the universities. This took place first in Germany, where the most favourable conditions were afforded by the rising independence of the universities, and where a fruitful interchange between teachers and students of the university was beneficial to philosophy also. '
• v. Wilamowitz-Mollendorf, Antigonos von Karystos (Philol. Stud. IV. Berlin, 1881, pp. 263 ff. ).
: The Pythagoreans, as is well known, offer a pre-eminent example of this ; tat •ympathies with the Apollo cultus are plain enough in the Platonic Academy alan. Pflekierer has lately sought to bring the apparently isolated Heraclitus
ntn connection with the Mysteries (K. Pfleiderer, Heraklit von Ephesus. fVrlin, 1886).
*Cf- II. I'sener, Ueber die Organisation der wissenschqftlichen Arbeit im AHathmm (Preuas. Jahrb. , Jahrg. Mil. , 1884, pp. 1 ff), and E. Heitz, Die Philo- tnpknuekuten Athen* (Deutsche Revue, 1884, pp. 3'26 ff. ).
' Cf G. Kaufmann, Oetchichte der deutschen Universitaten I. pp. 08 ff. (Stuttg.
' Srktlling has erected the finest monument to the ideal conception of science ■a the activity of German universities, in his Vorletunqen iiber die Methode des *kmtm,trken Studiumt (2. and 3. Vorlesung. Ges. Werke, I. Abth. , Vol. 6.
n-tan. ).
•hi the other hand, it is characteristic of the
"
or secular
8 Introduction.
From Germany this spread to Scotland, England, France, and Italy, and in gen eral it may be said that in the nineteenth century the seat of philosophy is esscn tially to be sought in the universities. 1
In conclusion, the share of the various peoples in the development of philoso phy deserves a brief mention. As with all developments of European culture so with philosophy, — the Greeks created it, and the primitive structure o philosophy due to their creative activity is still to-day an essential basis of th science. What was added in antiquity by the mixed peoples of Hellenism am by the Romans does not, in general, amount to more than a special form am practical adaptation of the Greek philosophy. Only in the religious turn whicl this last movement took (cf. below, Part II. ch. 2) do we find something essen tially new which sprang from the harmonising of national differences in th Roman Empire. The scientific culture of the Middle Ages was also international as is implied in the universal employment of the Latin language. It is will modern philosophy that the special characters of particular nations first presen themselves as of decisive influence. While the traditions of medieval scholas ticism maintain themselves most vigorously and independently in Spain an( Portugal, the Italians, Germans, English, and French supply the first movement of the new science which reached its highest point in the classical period o German philosophy. Compared with these four nations, the rest stand almos entirely in a receptive attitude ; a certain independence is noticeable, if any where, in more recent time among the Swedes.
§ 2. The History of Philosophy.
The more varied the character assumed by the problems and con tent of philosophy in the course of time, the more the questioi rises, what meaning there can be in uniting in historical investiga tion and exposition products of thought which are not only s< manifold, but also so different in kind, and between which then seems to be ultimately nothing in common but the name.
For the anecdotal interest in this checkered diversity of vari ous opinions on various things, which was perhaps formerly th( chief motive of a " History of Philosophy," stimulated too by th( remarkable and strange nature of many of these views, cannoi possibly serve as the permanent centre of a genuine scientific disci pline.
1. At all events, however, it is clear that the case stands other wise with the history of philosophy than with that of any othei science. For with all these the field of research remains fixed, oi the whole at least, however many the variations to which its extent its separation from a still more general field, and its limitation wit! reference to neighbouring fields, may be subject in the course of his tory. In such a case there is no difficulty in tracing the develop ment of knowledge over a field which can be determined in this way, and in eventually making just those variations intelligible as the natural consequences of this development of insight.
1 The best evidence for this statement is afforded by just the passionate attacks which Schopenhauer directed against the relation between philosopbj and the universities.
i-] The History of Philosophy. 9
Quite otherwise, however, in the case of philosophy, which has ao such subject-matter common to all its periods, and whose " his- Wy," therefore, sets forth no constant advance or gradual approxi- Mtkm to a knowledge of the subject in question.
Rather, it has liways been emphasised that while in other sciences, a quiet build- o$ up of knowledge is the ride, as soon as they have once gained * lure methodical
rel* which is interrupted only from time to time by a sudden new btgmning, — in philosophy the reverse is true. There it is the ««ption that successors gratefully develop what has been already achieved, and each of the great systems of philosophy begins to
Kin its newly formulated problem ab ovo, as if the other systems
ui warcely existed.
"
If in
spite
of all of this we are still to be able to of a speak
his
footing after their rhapsodical beginnings, — a
2.
tjory of philosophy," the unity of connection, which we find neither
the objects with which philosophers busy themselves, nor in the tnbleins they have set themselves, can be found only in the common nrk tckich they have accomplished in spite of all the variety in their iab-«rt-matter and in the purposes with which they have worked.
But this common product, which constitutes the meaning of the katory of philosophy, rests on just the changing relations which tke work of philosophers has sustained in the course of history, not <»ly to the maturest results of science in general and of the special •oeaees in particular, but also to the other activities of European otflmtion. For was it that philosophy had in view the project of » reaeral scientific knowledge of the universe, which she would win *»ther in the role of universal science, or as a generalising compre- >aia« of the results of the special sciences, or was it that she (nght a view of life which should give a complete expression to '■> highest values of will and feeling, or was it finally that with a •>ul\ denned limitation of her field she made reason's self-knowl- •dge her goal, — the result always was that she was labouring to trag to conscious expression the necessary forms and principles in *ixh the human reason manifests its activity, and to transfer these frra their original form of perceptions, feelings, and impulses, into ^*i of conceptions. In some direction and in some fashion every pfclaiophy has striven to reach, over a more or less extensive field, lionsulation in conception of the material immediately given in '•i* world and in life; and so, as these efforts have passed into his- fc". the constitution of the mental and spiritual life has been rj? by step disclosed. The History of Philosophy is the process in «*<• European humanity has embodied in scientific conception* its
1 of the world and its judgments of life.
10 Introduction.
It is this common fruit of all the intellectual creations which present themselves as " philosophies," which alone gives to the history of philosophy as a genuine science its content, its problem, and its justification. This, too, is the reason why a knowledge of the history of philosophy is a necessary requirement, not only for all scholarly education, but for all culture whatever ; for it teaches how the conceptions and forms have been coined, in which we all, in every-day life as well as in the particular sciences, think and
judge the world of our experience.
The beginnings of the history of philosophy are to be sought in the historical compositions (for the most part lost) of the great schools of antiquity, especially the Peripatetic School. As we may see in the examples given by Aristotle,1 these works had the critical purpose of preparing for the development of their own views by a dialectical examination of views previously brought forward. Such collections of historical material were planned for the various fields of science, and doxographies 2 in philosophy arose in this way side by side with histories of particular disciplines, such as mathematics, astronomy, physics, etc. As inclination and power for independent philosophic thought later declined, this literature degenerated into a learned scrap-book work, in which were mingled anecdotes from the lives of the philosophers, individual epigrammatic sayings, and sketches of their doctrines.
Those expositions belonging to the modern period which were based upon the remains of ancient tradition had this same character of collections of curiosi ties. Such were Stanley's* reproduction of Diogenes Laertius, and Bruclcer's works. 4 Only with time do we find critical discernment in use of the sources (Buhle,b Fiilleborn6), a more unprejudiced apprehension of the historical significance of individual doctrines ( Tiedemann," Degerando 8), and systematic criticism of these upon the basis of the new standpoint (Tennemann,* Fries,1" and Schleiermacher11). u
It was, however, through Hegel that the history of philosophy was first made an independent science, for he discovered the essential point that the
1 E. g. in the beginning of the Metaphysics.
I More in detail on these below.
8 Th. Stanley, The History of Philosophy. Lond. 1685. ,
4 J. J. Brucker, Historia Critica Philosop h ice. 6 vols. Leipe. 1742 ff. Insti-
tutiones Historia; Philosophic. Leips. 1747.
* J. G. Buhle, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie. 8 vols. Gottingen,
1796 ff.
• G. G. FUUeborn, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie. 12 Studien.
Zlillichau, 1791 ff.
7 D. Tiedemann, Geist der Speculatioen Philosophie. 7 vols. Marburg,
1791 ff.
■De Gerando, Histoire Compar&e des Systemes de Philosophie. 2d ed. in
4 vols. Paris, 1822 f.
9 W. G. Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie. 11 vols. Leips. 1798 ff.
Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie fur den akademischen Leips. 1812. [Eng. trans. 1833 and 1852. ]
Unterricht.
10 J. Fr. Fries, Geschichte der Philosophie. 2 vols. Halle, 1837 ff.
II Fr. Schleiermacher, Geschichte der Philosophie, from his literary remains in the Coll. Works. III. Abth. , 4 Bd. , 1 Th. Berlin, 1839.
12 Cf. the introductions of the Phanomenologie des Geistes, of the lectures on the Philosophy of History, and those on the History of Philosophy. Ges. Werke, Bd. II. pp. 62 ff. ; IX. pp. 11 ff. ; XIII. pp. 11-134. In Hegel's works the Geschichte der Philosophie, edited from his lectures by Michelet, occupies Vols. XIII. —XV. Berlin, 1833-36. [Lectures on the History of Philosophy, by G. W. Hegel. Trans, by E. S. HaJdane in 3 vols. Vol. I. Lond. 1892. ] On his standpoint
$2. ] The History of Philosophy. 11
history of philosophy can set forth neither a motley collection of opinions of various learned gentleman "de omnibus rebus et de quibusdam aliis," nor a constantly widening and perfecting elaboration of the same subject-matter, but rather only the limited process in which the " categories" of reason have suc cessively attained distinct consciousness and reached the form of conceptions.
This valuable insight was, however, obscured and injured in the case of Hegel by an additional asumption, since he was convinced that the chronological order in which the above "categories" have presented themselves in the historical systems of philosophy must necessarily correspond with the logical and syste matic order in which these same categories should appear as "elements of truth " in the logical construction of the final system of philosophy (i. e. in Hegel's view, his own). The fundamental thought, right in itself, thus led to the mistake of a construction of the history of philosophy under the control of a philosophical system, and so to a frequent violation of historical fact. This error, which the development of a scientific history of philosophy in the nine teenth century has set aside in favour of historical accuracy and exactness, arose from the wrong idea (though an idea in logical consistence with the principles of Hegel's philosophy) that the historical progress of philosophical thought is due
solely, or at least essentially, to an ideal necessity with which one " category " poshes forward another in the dialectical movement. In truth, the picture of the historical movement of philosophy is quite a different one. It depenas not solely upon the thinking of "humanity " or even of the " Weltgeist," but just as truly upon the reflections, the needs of mind and heart, the presaging thought and sudden flashes of insight, of philosophising individuals.
3. The history of philosophy, considered as such a sum-total, in which the fundamental conceptions of man's views of the world and judgments of life have been embodied, is the product of a great variety of single movements of thought. And as the actual motives of these movements, various factors are to be distinguished, both in the setting of the problems and in the attempts at their logical solution.
The logical, pragmatic factor is no doubt sufficiently important. For the problems of philosophy are in the main given, and this is
shown by the fact that they are constantly recurring in the histor ical movement of thought as the "primeval enigma of existence," and are ever anew demanding imperiously the solution which has nerer completely succeeded. They are given, however, by the inadequacy and internal contradictions of the material which con sciousness presents for philosophical consideration. 1 But just for
<tand G. O. Marbach, Lehrbuch der Qeschichte Philosophic (2. Abth. Leips. IKS* fl\). C. Hermann, (iesehiehte der Philosophie in pragmatischer Behandlung 'Letps. 1867), and in part also the survey of the entire history of philosophy which J. Braniss has published as the first (only) volume of a Geschichte der Plilnmpkie seit Kant (Breslan, 1842). In France this line is represented by V. roosin, Introdurtion a I'llistoire de la Philosophie (Paris, 1828 ; 7th ed. 1872) ; HiMioire Ginerale de la Philosophie (12th ed. , Paris, 1884).
1 More precisely, this inadequacy, which cannot here be more exactly devel oped, and which can be fully brought out only in a system of epistemology, oomusts in the circumstance that that which is given in experience never meets ("TOpletely the conceptional demands which, in elaborating the same according ui u> inner nature of the reason, we set up, at first naively and immediately, tad later with reflective consciousness. This antinomism (or failure to meet the laws of thought) can be escaped by ordinary life, or even by experiential
12
Introduction.
this reason this material contains the real presuppositions and the logical constraining forces for all rational reflection upon it, and because from the nature of the case these are always asserting themselves anew in the same way, it follows that not only the chief problems in the history of philosophy, but also the chief lines along which a solution is attempted, are repeated. Just this constancy in all change, which, regarded from without, makes the impression that philosophy is striving fruitlessly in ever-repeated circles for a goal that is never attained, proves only this, — that the problems of philosophy are tasks which the human mind cannot escape. 1 And so we understand how the same logical necessity in repeated instances causes one doctrine to give birth to another. Hence prog ress in the history of philosophy during certain periods, to be understood entirely pragmatically," i. e. through the internal necessity of the thoughts and through the logic of things. "
The mistake of Hegel's mentioned above, consists, then, only in his wishing to make of factor which effective within certain limits, the only, or at least the principal, factor. It would be the opposite error to deny absolutely the " reason in history," and to see in the successive doctrines of philosophy only confused chance- thoughts of individuals. It rather true that the total content of the history of philosophy can be explained only through the fact that the necessities existing in the nature of things assert themselves over and over in the thinking of individuals, however accidental the special conditions of this latter may be. On these relations rest the attempts made to classify all philo sophical doctrines under certain types, and to establish sort of rhythmical repetition in their historical development. On this basis V. Cousin3 brought forward his theory of the four systems, Idealism, Sensualism, Scepticism, Mys ticism so too August Comte his of the three stages, the theological, the meta physical, and the positive. An interesting and in many ways instructive grouping of philosophical doctrines about the particular main problems is afforded by A. Renouvier in his Esquisse cTune Classification Systematique des Doctrines Philosophiques vols. , Paris, 1886 f. ). A school-book which arranges the philosophical doctrines according to problems and schools has been issued by Paul Janet and Seailles Histoire de la Philosophic les problemes et Its icoles (Paris, 1887).
But the pragmatic thread very ofteri breaks off in the history of philosophy. The historical order in particular, in which prob lems have presented themselves, shows almost complete absence
science, by working with auxiliary conceptions, which indeed remain problem atical in themselves, but which, within certain bounds, suffice for an elaboration of the material of experience that meets our practical needs. But just in these auxiliary conceptions that the problems of philosophy inhere.
In this way the results of Kant's investigations on "The Antinomy of Pure Reason " Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Dialectic, second sec. ) might be historically and systematically extended cf. W. Windelband, Geschichte dtr neueren Philosophic, II. 96
Cf. Note 12, p. 10.
A. Comte, Cours de Philosophic Positive with which Vols. V. and VI. are to be compared as the carrying out of the scheme. Similar thoughts are also found in D'Alembert's Discours Priliminaire in the Encyclopedic.
I. 9,
is
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f.
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;
is,
4. (a
it is
a
a
;
;
;
is
fi] The History of Philosophy. 18
of such an immanent
mother factor asserts itself which may best be designated as the
logical necessity. Here, on the contrary,
factor contributed by the history of civilisation. For philosophy receives both its problems and the materials for their solution from the ideas of the general consciousness of the time, and from the seeds of society. The great conquests and the newly emerging questions of the special sciences, the movements of the religious consciousness, the intuitions of art, the revolutions in social and political life, — all these give philosophy new impulses at irregular intervals, and condition the directions of the interest which forces, now these, now those, problems into the foreground, and crowds others for the time being aside ; and no less do they condition also the changes which questions and answers experience in course of nae. Where this dependence shows itself with especial clearness, we have under certain circumstances a philosophical system appear ing that represents exactly the knowledge which a definite age has of itself ; or we may have the oppositions in the general culture of d* age finding their expression in the strife of philosophical sys tems. And so besides the constant dependence upon the essential character of the subject-matter — the pragmatic factor — there pre- tuIs also a necessity growing out of the history of civilisation, or current state of culture, which warrants a historical right of exist ence to structures of thought in themselves untenable.
This relation also was first brought to notice in a greater degree than before k? Brffl, although the "relative truth" which he ascribes to the particular «? sttius has with him at the same time a systematic meaning, owing to his slahninl fundamental thought On the other hand, the element due to the aaaery of civilisation has been best formulated among his successors by Kuno Richer. 1 who has also availed himself of it in most brilliant manner in his expo- ■sue of the subject. He regards philosophy in its historical unfolding as the nragreasive self-knowledge of the human mind, and makes its development
appear a* constantly conditioned by the development of the object which in it ■ "~>rtlng aelf-knowledge. Although this applies to a number of the most important systems, it is yet but one of the factors involved.
TVr influences from the history of civilisation which condition the statement u4 aotation of philosophic problems, afford an explanation in most cases of an •Enrnety interesting phenomenon which is of great importance for understand- 2* la* historical development ; viz. the complication or interwearing of prob- >mt For when interest is directed chiefly on certain lines of thought, it is arotabi*. according to psychological laws, that associations will be formed fatvtn different bodies of thought, — associations which are not based on the «a»)act-niatt*r, — and so, that questions which in themselves have nothing to do »a» tacb other become blended and made to depend upon each other in their •msuosl An extremely important and very often recurring example of this is t*t nacnoincUng of ethical and asathetic interests in the treatment of theoretical fAiam. The well-known fact of daily life that men's views are determined *J Mr wisbea, hopes, fears, and inclinations, that their theoretical are condi-
anno Fischer, Oeschichte der neuertn Philosophic, I. 1, Einleitung I. -V. [mm. by J. P. Gordy, Descartes and his School, N. Y. 1887].
14 Introduction.
