No More Learning

78.
Ambition a Substitute for the Moral
SENSE. —The moral sense must not be lacking in
those natures which have no ambition. The am-



## p. 85 (#135) #############################################

The history of the moral sentiments. 85
bitious manage without it, with almost the same
results. For this reason the sons of unpreten-
tious, unambitious families, when once they lose the
moral sense, generally degenerate very quickly
into complete scamps.
79-
Vanity Enriches. —How poor would be the
human mind without vanity! Thus, however, it
resembles a well-stocked and constantly replen-
ished bazaar which attracts buyers of every kind.
There they can find almost everything, obtain
almost everything, provided that they bring the
right sort of coin, namely admiration.
80.
Old Age and Death. —Apart from the com-
mands of religion, the question may well be asked,
Why is it more worthy for an old man who feels
his powers decline, to await his slow exhaustion
and extinction than with full consciousness to set
a limit to his life? Suicide in this case is a per-
fectly natural, obvious action, which should justly
arouse respect as a triumph of reason, and did
arouse it in those times when the heads of Greek
philosophy and the sturdiest patriots used to seek
death through suicide. The seeking, on the con-
trary, to prolong existence from day to day, with
anxious consultation of doctors and painful mode
of living, without the power of drawing nearer to
the actual aim of life, is far less worthy. Religion
is rich in excuses to reply to the demand for


## p. 85 (#136) #############################################

84 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
75-
Misunderstanding Concerning Virtue.
—Whoever has known immorality in connection
with pleasure, as is the case with a man who has
a pleasure-seeking youth behind him, imagines
that virtue must be connected with absence of
pleasure. —Whoever, on the contrary, has been
much plagued by his passions and vices, longs to
find in virtue peace and the soul's happiness.
Hence it is possible for two virtuous persons
not to understand each other at all.
76.
THE ASCETIC. —The ascetic makes a necessity
of virtue.
77-
Transferring Honour from the Person
TO THE THING. —Deeds of love and sacrifice
for the benefit of one's neighbour are gener-
ally honoured, wherever they are manifested.
Thereby we multiply the valuation of things which
are thus loved, or for which we sacrifice ourselves,
although perhaps they are not worth much in
themselves. A brave army is convinced of the
cause for which it fights.
78.
Ambition a Substitute for the Moral
SENSE. —The moral sense must not be lacking in
those natures which have no ambition. The am-
-.



## p. 85 (#137) #############################################

The history of the moral sentiments. 85
bitious manage without it, with almost the same
results. For this reason the sons of unpreten-
tious, unambitious families, when once they lose the
moral sense, generally degenerate very quickly
into complete scamps.
79-
Vanity Enriches. —How poor would be the
human mind without vanity! Thus, however, it
resembles a well-stocked and constantly replen-
ished bazaar which attracts buyers of every kind.
There they can find almost everything, obtain
almost everything, provided that they bring the
right sort of coin, namely admiration.
80.
Old Age and Death. —Apart from the com-
mands of religion, the question may well be asked,
Why is it more worthy for an old man who feels
his powers decline, to await his slow exhaustion
and extinction than with full consciousness to set
a limit to his life? Suicide in this case is a per-
fectly natural, obvious action, which should justly
arouse respect as a triumph of reason, and did
arouse it in those times when the heads of Greek
philosophy and the sturdiest patriots used to seek
death through suicide. The seeking, on the con-
trary, to prolong existence from day to day, with
anxious consultation of doctors and painful mode
of living, without the power of drawing nearer to
the actual aim of life, is far less worthy. Religion
is rich in excuses to reply to the demand for


## p. 86 (#138) #############################################

86 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
suicide, and thus it ingratiates itself with those
who wish to cling to life.
81.
Errors of the Sufferer and the Doer.
—When a rich man deprives a poor man of a
possession (for instance, a prince taking the sweet-
heart of a plebeian), an error arises in the mind of
the poor man; he thinks that the rich man must be
utterly infamous to take away from him the little
that he has. But the rich man does not estimate
so highly the value of a single possession, because
he is accustomed to have many; hence he cannot
imagine himself in the poor man's place, and does
not commit nearly so great a wrong as the latter
supposes. They each have a mistaken idea of the
other. The injustice of the powerful, which, more
than anything else, rouses indignation in history,
is by no means so great as it appears. Alone the
mere inherited consciousness of being a higher
creation, with higher claims, produces a cold tem-
perament, and leaves the conscience quiet; we
all of us feel no injustice when the difference is
very great between ourselves and another creature,
and kill a fly, for instance, without any pricks of
conscience. Therefore it was no sign of badness
in Xerxes (whom even all Greeks describe as
superlatively noble) when he took a son away
from his father and had him cut in pieces, because
he had expressed a nervous, ominous distrust of
the whole campaign; in this case the individual
is put out of the way like an unpleasant insect; he


## p. 87 (#139) #############################################

THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 87
is too lowly to be allowed any longer to cause
annoyance to a ruler of the world. Yes, every
cruel man is not so cruel as the ill-treated one
imagines; the idea of pain is not the same as its
endurance. It is the same thing in the case
of unjust judges, of the journalist who leads
public opinion astray by small dishonesties. In
all these cases cause and effect are surrounded by
entirely different groups of feelings and thoughts;
yet one unconsciously takes it for granted that
doer and sufferer think and feel alike, and accord-
ing to this supposition we measure the guilt of the
one by the pain of the other.
82.
The Skin of the Soul. —As the bones, flesh,
entrails, and blood-vessels are enclosed within a
skin, which makes the aspect of man endurable,
so the emotions and passions of the soul are
enwrapped with vanity,—it is the skin of the soul.
S3-
The Sleep of Virtue. —^hen virtue has
slept, it will arise again all the fresher.
84.
The Refinement of Shame. —People are
not ashamed to think something foul, but they
are ashamed when they think these foul thoughts
are attributed to them.
-


## p. 88 (#140) #############################################

88 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
85.
Malice is Rare. —Most people are far too
much occupied with themselves to be malicious.
86.
The Tongue in the Balance. —We praise
or blame according as the one or the other affords
more opportunity for exhibiting our power of
judgment.
87.
St. Luke xviii. 14, Improved. —He that
humbleth himself wishes to be exalted.
The Prevention of Suicide. —There is a
certain right by which we may deprive a man of
life, but none by which we may deprive him of
death; this is mere cruelty.
89.
Vanity. —We care for the good opinion of
men, firstly because they are useful to us, and
then because we wish to please them (children
their parents, pupils their teachers, and well-
meaning people generally their fellow-men). Only
where the good opinion of men is of importance
to some one, apart from the advantage thereof or
his wish to please, can we speak of vanity. In


## p. 89 (#141) #############################################

THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 89
this case the man wishes to please himself, but at
the expense of his fellow-men, either by misleading
them into holding a false opinion about him, or by
aiming at a degree of " good opinion " which must
be painful to every one else (by arousing envy).
The individual usually wishes to corroborate the
opinion he holds of himself by the opinion of others,
and to strengthen it in his own eyes; but the strong
habit of authority—a habit as old as man himself
—induces many to support by authority their
belief in themselves: that is to say, they accept it
first from others; they trust the judgment of
others more than their own. The interest in
himself, the wish to please himself, attains to
such a height in a vain man that he misleads
others into having a false, all too elevated estimation
of him, and yet nevertheless sets store by their
authority,—thus causing an error and yet believing
in it. It must be confessed, therefore, that vain
people do not wish to please others so much as
themselves, and that they go so far therein as to
neglect their advantage, for they often endeavour
to prejudice their fellow - men unfavourably,
inimicably, enviously, consequently injuriously
against themselves, merely in order to have
pleasure in themselves, personal pleasure.
90.
The Limits of Human Love. —A man who
has declared that another is an idiot and a bad
companion, is angry when the latter eventually
proves himself to be otherwise.
J*


## p. 90 (#142) #############################################

go HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
91.
Moraute larmoyante. —What a great deal
of pleasure morality gives! Only think what a
sea of pleasant tears has been shed over descrip-
tions of noble and unselfish deeds! This charm
of life would vanish if the belief in absolute
irresponsibility were to obtain supremacy.
92.
The Origin of Justice. —Justice (equity) has
I its origin amongst powers which are fairly equal,
I as Thucydides (in the terrible dialogue between
'the Athenian and Melian ambassadors) rightly
comprehended: that is to say, where there is no
clearly recognisable supremacy, and where a
conflict would be useless and would injure both
sides, there arises the thought of coming to an
understanding and settling the opposing claims;
the character of exchange is the primary character
of justice. Each party satisfies the other, as each
obtains what he values more than the other.
Each one receives that which he desires, as his
own henceforth, and whatever is desired is received
in return. Justice, therefore, is recompense and
\ exchange based on the hypothesis of a fairly equal
degree of power,—thus, originally, revenge belongs
\to the province of justice, it is an exchange. Also
[gratitude. —Justice naturally is based on the point
k>{ view of a judicious self-preservation, on the
egoism, therefore, of that reflection, " Why should
I injure myself uselessly and perhaps not attain


## p. 91 (#143) #############################################

THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 91
my aim after all? " So much about the origin of
justice. Because man, according to his intellectual
custom, has forgotten the original purpose of so-
called just and reasonable actions,-and particularly
because for hundreds of years children have been
taught to admire and imitate such actions, the
idea has gradually arisen that such an action is
un-egoistic; upon this idea, however, is based the
high estimation in which it is held: which, more-
over, like all valuations, is constantly growing, for
something that is valued highly is striven after,
imitated, multiplied, and increases, because the
value of the output of toil and enthusiasm of each
individual is added to the value of the thing itself.
How little moral would the world look without
this forgetfulness! A poet might say that God
had placed forgetfulness as door-keeper in the
temple of human dignity.
93-
The Right of>the Weaker. —When any
one submits under certain conditions to a greater
power, as a besieged town for instance, the counter-
condition is that one can destroy one's self, burn
the town, and so cause the mighty one a great
loss. Therefore there is a kind of equalisation
here, on the basis of which rights may be
determined. The enemy has his advantage in
maintaining it. In so far there are also rights
between slaves and masters, that is, precisely so
far as the possession of the slave is useful and
important to his master. The right originally
r
-


## p. 92 (#144) #############################################

92 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
extends so far as one appears to be valuable
to the other, essentially unlosable, unconquerable,
and so forth. In so far the weaker one also has
rights, but lesser ones. Hence the famous
unusquisque tankum juris habet, quantum potentia
valet (or more/ exactly, quantum potentia valere
creditur).
94-
The Three Phases of Hitherto Existing
MORALITY. —It is the first sign that the animal
has become man when its actions no longer have
regard only to momentary welfare, but to what is
enduring, when it grows useful and practical; there
the free rule of reason first breaks out. A still
higher step is reached when he acts according to
the principle of honour; by this means he brings
ftimself into order, submits to common feelings,
and that exalts him still higher over the phase in
which he was led only by the idea of usefulness
from a personal point of view; he respects and
wishes to be respected, i. e. he understands useful-
ness as dependent upon what he thinks of others
and what others think of him. Eventually he
acts, on the highest step of the hitherto existing
morality, according to his standard of things and
men; he himself decides for himself and others
what is honourable, what is useful; he has become
the law-giver of opinions, in accordance with the
ever more highly developed idea of what is useful
and honourable. Knowledge enables him to place
that which is most useful, that is to say the
general, enduring usefulness, above the personal,


## p. 93 (#145) #############################################

THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 93
the honourable recognition of general, enduring
validity above the momentary; he lives and acts
as a collective individual.
95-
The Morality of the Mature Individual.
—The impersonal has hitherto been looked upon
as the actual distinguishing mark of moral action;
and it has been pointed out that in the beginning
it was in consideration of the common good that
all impersonal actions were praised and distin-
guished. Is not an important change in these
views impending, now when it is more and more
recognised that it is precisely in the most personal
possible considerations that the common good is
the greatest, so that a strictly personal action now
best illustrates the present idea of morality, as
utility for the mass? To make a whole person-
ality out of ourselves, and in all that we do to keep
that personality's highest good in view, carries
us further than those sympathetic emotions and
actions for the benefit of others. We all still
suffer, certainly, from the too small consideration
of the personal in us; it is badly developed,—let
us admit it; rather has our mind been forcibly
drawn away from it and offered as a sacrifice to
the State, to science, or to those who stand in
need of help, as if it were the bad part which
must be sacrificed. We are still willing to work'
for our fellow-men, but only so far as we find our
own greatest advantage in this work, no more and
no less. It is only a question of what we under-
r


## p. 94 (#146) #############################################

94 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
stand as our advantage; the unripe, undeveloped,
crude individual will understand it in the crudest
way.
96.
Custom and Morality. —To be moral,correct,
and virtuous is to be obedient to an old-established
law and custom. Whether we submit with diffi-
culty or willingly is immaterial, enough that we
do so. He is called "good" who, as if naturally,
after long precedent, easily and willingly, there-
fore, does what is right, according to whatever this
may be (as, for instance, taking revenge, if to take
revenge be considered as right, as amongst the
ancient Greeks). He is called good because he
is good "for something"; but as goodwill, pity,
consideration, moderation, and such like, have come,
with the change in manners, to be looked upon as
"good for something," as useful, the good-natured
and helpful have, later on, come to be distinguished
specially as "good. " (In the beginning other and
more important kinds of usefulness stood in the
foreground. ) To be evil is to be "not moral"
(immoral), to be immoral is to be in opposi-
tion to tradition, however sensible or stupid it
may be; injury to the community (the "neigh-
bour" being understood thereby) has, however,
been looked upon by the social laws of all different
ages as being eminently the actual "immorality,"
so that now at the word "evil" we immediately
think of voluntary injury to one's neighbour. The
fundamental antithesis which has taught man the
distinction between moral and immoral, between


## p. 95 (#147) #############################################

THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 95
good and evil, is not the "egoistic" and "un-
egoistic," but the being bound to the tradition,
law, and solution thereof. How the tradition has
arisen is immaterial, at all events without regard
to good and evil or any immanent categorical im-
perative, but above all for the purpose of preserving
a community, a generation, an association, a people;
every superstitious custom that has arisen on
account of some falsely explained accident, creates
a tradition, which it is moral to follow; to separate
one's self from it is dangerous, but more dangerous
for the community than for the individual (because
the Godhead punishes the community for every
outrage and every violation of its rights, and the
individual only in proportion). Now every tradition
grows continually more venerable, the farther off
lies its origin, the more this is lost sight of; the
veneration paid it accumulates from generation
to generation, the tradition at last becomes holy
and excites awe; and thus in any case the morality
of piety is a much older morality than that which
requires un-egoistic actions.
97-
Pleasure in Traditional Custom. —An
important species of pleasure, and therewith
the source of morality, arises out of habit.
Man does what is habitual to him more easily,
better, and therefore more willingly; he feels
a pleasure therein, and knows from experience
that the habitual has been tested, and is there-
fore useful; a custom that we can live with is
proved to be wholesome and advantageous in con-
r
*m.


## p. 96 (#148) #############################################

96 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
trast to all new and not yet tested experiments.
According to this, morality is the union of the
pleasant and the useful; moreover, it requires no
reflection. As soon as man can use compulsion,
he uses it to introduce and enforce his customs; for
in his eyes they are proved as the wisdom of life.
In the same way a company of individuals com-
pels each single one to adopt the same customs.
Here the inference is wrong; because we feel at
ease with a morality, or at least because we are
able to carry on existence with it, therefore this
morality is necessary, for it seems to be the only
possibility of feeling at ease; the ease of life seems
to grow out of it alone. This comprehension of
the habitual as a necessity of existence is pursued
even to the smallest details of custom,—as insight
into genuine causality is very small with lower
peoples and civilisations, they take precautions
with superstitious fear that everything should go
in its same groove; even where custom is
difficult, hard, and burdensome, it is preserved
on account of its apparent highest usefulness. It
is not known that the same degree of well-being
can also exist with other customs, and that even
higher degrees may be attained. We become
aware, however, that all customs, even the hardest,
grow pleasanter and milder with time, and that
the severest way of life may become a habit and
therefore a pleasure.
98.
Pleasure and Social Instinct. —Out of
his relations with other men, man obtains a new


## p. 97 (#149) #############################################

THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 97
species of pleasure in addition to those pleasurable
sensations which he derives from himself; whereby
he greatly increases the scope of enjoyment. Per-
haps he has already taken too many of the pleasures
of this sphere from animals, which visibly feel
pleasure when they play with each other, especially
the mother with her young. Then consider the
sexual relations, which make almost every female
interesting to a male with regard to pleasure, and
j vice versa. The feeling of pleasure on the basis
of human relations generally makes man better;
i joy in common, pleasure enjoyed together is in-
creased, it gives the individual security, makes him
good-tempered, and dispels mistrust and envy, for
we feel ourselves at ease and see others at ease.
Similar manifestations of pleasure awaken the idea
* of the same sensations, the feeling of being like
something; a like effect is produced by common
sufferings, the same bad weather, dangers, enemies.
Upon this foundation is based the oldest alliance,
the object of which is the mutual obviating and
averting of a threatening danger for the benefit
i of each individual. And thus the social instinct
* grows out of pleasure.
99.
The Innocent Side of so-called Evil
ACTIONS. —All "evil" actions are prompted by
the instinct of preservation, or, more exactly, by
the desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain
on the part of the individual; thus prompted, but
not evil. "To cause pain per se" does not exist,
vol. 1. G


## p. 98 (#150) #############################################

98 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
except in the brains of philosophers, neither does
"to give pleasure per se" (pity in Schopenhauer's
meaning). In the social condition before the State
we kill the creature, be it ape or man, who tries
to take from us the fruit of a tree when we are
hungry and approach the tree, as we should still
do with animals in inhospitable countries. The
evil actions which now most rouse our indignation,
are based upon the error that he who causes them
has a free will, that he had the option, therefore,
of not doing us this injury. This belief in option
arouses hatred, desire for revenge, spite, and the
deterioration of the whole imagination, while we
are much less angry with an animal because we
consider it irresponsible. To do injury, not from
the instinct of preservation, but as requital, is the
consequence of a false judgment and therefore
equally innocent. The individual can in the con-
dition which lies before the State, act sternly and
cruelly towards other creatures for the purpose of
terrifying, to establish his existence firmly by such
terrifying proofs of his power. Thus act the
violent, the mighty, the original founders of States,
who subdue the weaker to themselves. They have
the right to do so, such as the State still takes for
itself; or rather, there is no right that can hinder
this. The ground for all morality can only be
made ready when a stronger individual or a
collective individual, for instance society or the
State, subdues the single individuals, draws them
out of their singleness, and forms them into an
association.
Compulsion precedes morality, indeed
morality itself is compulsion for a time, to


## p. 99 (#151) #############################################

THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 99
which one submits for the avoidance of pain.
Later on it becomes custom,—later still, free
obedience, and finally almost instinct,—then, like
everything long accustomed and natural, it is
connected with pleasure—and is henceforth called
virtue.
100.
SHAME. —Shame exists everywhere where there
is a "mystery"; this, however, is a religious
idea, which was widely extended in the older
times of human civilisation. Everywhere were
found bounded domains to which access was for-
bidden by divine right, except under certain con-
ditions; at first locally, as, for example, certain
spots that ought not to be trodden by the feet
of the uninitiated, in the neighbourhood of
which these latter experienced horror and fear.
This feeling was a good deal carried over into
other relations, for instance, the sex relations,
which, as a privilege and aBvrov of riper years,
had to be withheld from the knowledge of the
young for their advantage, relations for the pro-
tection and sanctification of which many gods
were invented and were set up as guardians in
the nuptiaj chamber. (In Turkish this room is
on this account called harem, " sanctuary," and is
distinguished with the same name, therefore, that
is used for the entrance courts of the mosques. )
Thus the kingdom is as a centre from which
radiate power and glory, to the subjects a mystery
full of secrecy and shame, of which many after-
effects may still be felt among nations which
r


## p. 100 (#152) ############################################

IOO HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
otherwise do not by any means belong to the
bashful type. Similarly, the whole world of inner
conditions, the so-called "soul," is still a mystery
for all who are not philosophers, after it has been
looked upon for endless ages as of divine origin
and as worthy of divine intercourse; according
to this it is an SZvtov and arouses shame.
IOI.
JUDGE NOT. —In considering earlier periods,
care must be taken not to fall into unjust abuse.
The injustice in slavery, the cruelty in the sup-
pression of persons and nations, is not to be
measured by our standard. For the instinct of
justice was not then so far developed. Who
dares to reproach the Genevese Calvin with the
burning of the physician Servet? It was an
action following and resulting from his convictions,
and in the same way the Inquisition had a good
right; only the ruling views were false, and pro-
duced a result which seems hard to us because
those views have now grown strange to us. Be-
sides, what is the burning of a single individual
compared with eternal pains of hell for almost
all! And yet this idea was universal at that
time, without essentially injuring by its dreadful-
ness the conception of a God. With us, too,
political sectarians are hardly and cruelly treated,
but because one is accustomed to believe in the
necessity of the State, the cruelty is not so deeply
felt here as it is where we repudiate the views.
Cruelty to animals in children and Italians is
<


## p. 101 (#153) ############################################

THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. IOI
due to ignorance, i. e. the animal, through the
interests of Church teaching, has been placed too
far behind man. Much that is dreadful and in-
human in history, much that one hardly likes to
believe, is mitigated by the reflection that the
one who commands and the one who carries out
are different persons,—the former does not be-
hold the right and therefore does not experience
the strong impression on the imagination; the
latter obeys a superior and therefore feels no
responsibility. Most princes and military heads,
through lack of imagination, easily appear hard
and cruel without really being so. Egoism is
not evil, because the idea of the "neighbour "—
the word is of Christian origin and does not
represent the truth—is very weak in us; and we
feel ourselves almost as free and irresponsible
towards him as towards plants and stones. We
have yet to learn that others suffer, and this can
never be completely learnt.
102.
"Man always Acts Rightly. "—We do not "7
complain of nature as immoral because it sends
a thunderstorm and makes us wet,—why do
we call those who injure us immoral? Because J
in the latter case we take for granted a free will
functioning voluntarily; in the former we see
necessity. But this distinction is an error. Thus
we do not call even intentional injury immoral in )
all circumstances; for instance, we kill a fly un-
hesitatingly and intentionally, only because its


## p. 102 (#154) ############################################

102 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
buzzing annoys us; we punish a criminal
intentionally and hurt him in order to protect
ourselves and society. In the first case it is the
individual who, in order to preserve himself, or
even to protect himself from worry, does inten-
tional injury; in the second case it is the State.
All morals allow intentional injury in the case of
necessity, that is, when it is a matter of self-pre-
'servation! But these two points of view suffice
to explain all evil actions committed by men
against men, we are desirous of obtaining
pleasure or avoiding pain; in any case it is
always a question of self-preservation. Socrates
and Plato are right: whatever man does he always
does well, that is, he does that which seems to
him good (useful) according to the degree of his
'intellect, the particular standard of his reason-
ableness.
103.
The Harmlessness of Malice. —The aim
of malice is not the suffering of others in itself, |
but our own enjoyment; for instance, as the feeling
of revenge, or stronger nervous excitement. All
teasing, even, shows the pleasure it gives to ex- 1]
ercise our power on others and bring it to an
enjoyable feeling of preponderance. Is it im-
moral to taste pleasure at the expense of another's
pain? Is malicious joy * devilish, as Schopen-
hauer says? We give ourselves pleasure in
*This is the untranslatable word Schadenfreude, which
means joy at the misfortune of others. —J. M. K.


## p. 103 (#155) ############################################

THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. IO3
nature by breaking off twigs, loosening stones,
fighting with wild animals, and do this in order
to become thereby conscious of our strength. Is
the knowledge, therefore, that another suffers
through us, the same thing concerning which we
otherwise feel irresponsible, supposed to make us
immoral? But if we did not know this we would
not thereby have the enjoyment of our own
superiority, which can only manifest itself by the
suffering of others, for instance in teasing. All
pleasure per se is neither good nor evil; whence
should come the decision that in order to have
pleasure ourselves we may not cause displeasure
to others? From the point of view of usefulness
alone, that is, out of consideration for the conse-
quences, for possible displeasure, when the injured
one or the replacing State gives the expectation
of resentment and revenge: this only can have
been the original reason for denying ourselves
such actions. Pity aims just as little at the
pleasure of others as malice at the pain of others
per se. For it contains at least two (perhaps
many more) elements of a personal pleasure, and
is so far self-gratification; in the first place as the
pleasure of emotion, which is the kind of pity
that exists in tragedy, and then, when it impels
to action, as the pleasure of satisfaction in the
exercise of power. If, besides this, a suffering
person is very dear to us, we lift a sorrow from
ourselves by the exercise of sympathetic actions.
Except by a few philosophers, pity has always
been placed very low in the scale of moral
feelings, and rightly so.
■■-


## p. 104 (#156) ############################################

104 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
f
104.
Self-defence. —If self-defence is allowed to
pass as moral, then almost all manifestations of
the so-called immoral egoism must also stand;
men injure, rob, or kill in order to preserve or
defend themselves, to prevent personal injury;
they lie where cunning and dissimulation are the
right means of self-preservation. Intentional
injury, when our existence or safety (preservation
of our comfort) is concerned, is conceded to be
moral; the State itself injures, according to this
point of view, when it punishes. In unintentional
injury, of course, there can be nothing immoral,
that is ruled by chance. Is there, then, a kind
of intentional injury where our existence or the
preservation of our comfort is not concerned? Is
there an injuring out of pure malice, for instance
in cruelty? If one does not know how much an
action hurts, it is no deed of malice; thus the
child is not malicious towards the animal, not
evil; he examines and destroys it like a toy.
But do we ever know entirely how an action hurts
another? As far as our nervous system extends
we protect ourselves from pain; if it extended
farther, to our fellow-men, namely, we should do
no one an injury (except in such cases as we
injure ourselves, where we cut ourselves for the
sake of cure, tire and exert ourselves for the sake
of health). We conclude by analogy that some-
thing hurts somebody, and through memory and
the strength of imagination we may suffer from it


## p. 105 (#157) ############################################

THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 105
ourselves. But still what a difference there is
between toothache and the pain (pity) that the
sight of toothache calls forth! Therefore, in
injury out of so-called malice the degree of pain
produced is always unknown to us; but inasmuch
as there is pleasure in the action (the feeling of
one's own power, one's own strong excitement),
the action is committed, in order to preserve the
comfort of the individual, and is regarded, there-
fore, from a similar point of view as defence and
falsehood in necessity. No life without pleasure;
the struggle for pleasure is the struggle for life.
Whether the individual so fights this fight that
men call him good, or so that they call him evil,
is determined by the measure and the constitution
of his intellect.
105.
Recompensing Justice. —Whoever has com-
pletely comprehended the doctrine of absolute
irresponsibility can no longer include the so-called
punishing and recompensing justice in the idea of
justice, should this consist of giving to each man
his due. For he who is punished does not deserve j
the punishment, he is only used as a means of
henceforth warning away from certain actions;
equally so, he who is rewarded does not merit this
reward, he could not act otherwise than he did.
Therefore the reward is meant only as an
encouragement to him and others, to provide a
motive for subsequent actions; words of praise
are flung to the runners on the course, not to the
y"


## p. 106 (#158) ############################################

106 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
one who has reached the goal. Neither punish-
ment nor reward is anything that comes to one
as ones own; they are given from motives of use-
fulness, without one having a right to claim them.
Hence we must say," The wise man gives no reward
because the deed has been well done," just as we
have said, " The wise man does not punish because
evil has been committed, but in order that evil
shall not be committed. " If punishment and
reward no longer existed, then the strongest
motives which deter men from certain actions and
impel them to certain other actions, would also
no longer exist; the needs of mankind require
their continuance; and inasmuch as punishment
and reward, blame and praise, work most sensibly
on vanity, the same need requires the continuance
of vanity.
106.
At the Waterfall. —In looking at a water-
fall we imagine that there is freedom of will and
fancy in the countless turnings, twistings, and
breakings of the waves; but everything is com-
y pulsory, every movement can be mathematically
N°- calculated. So it is also with human actions;
t«Wu\tl one would have to be able to calculate every single
(W^r^***' action beforehand if one were all-knowing; equally
w}'w so all progress of knowledge, every error, all malice.
The one who acts certainly labours under the
illusion of voluntariness; if the world's wheel were
to stand still for a moment and an all-knowing,
calculating reason were there to make use of this


## p. 107 (#159) ############################################

THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 107
pause, it could foretell the future of every creature
to the remotest times, and mark out every track
upon which that wheel would continue to roll. The
delusion of the acting agent about himself, the
supposition of a free will, belongs to this mechanism
which still remains to be calculated.
107.
Irresponsibility and Innocence. — The
complete irresponsibility of man for his actions
and his nature is the bitterest drop which he who
understands must swallow if he was accustomed
to see the patent of nobility of his humanity
in responsibility and duty. All his valuations,
distinctions, disinclinations, are thereby deprived
of value and become false,—his deepest feeling
for the sufferer and the hero was based on an
error; he may no longer either praise or blame,
for it is absurd to praise and blame nature and
necessity. In the same way as he loves a fine
work of art, but does not praise it, because it can
do nothing for itself; in the same way as he regards
plants, so must he regard his own actions and
those of mankind. He can admire strength,
beauty, abundance, in themselves; but must find
no merit therein,—the chemical progress and the
strife of the elements, the torments of the sick
person who thirsts after recovery, are all equally
as little merits as those struggles of the soul and
states of distress in which we are torn hither and
thither by different impulses until we finally decide
_


## p. 108 (#160) ############################################

108 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
for the strongest—as we say (but in reality it is
the strongest motive which decides for us). All
these motives, however, whatever fine names we
may give them, have all grown out of the same
root, in which we believe the evil poisons to be
C'' situated; between good and evil actions there is
no difference of species, but at most of degree.
I Good actions are sublimated evil ones; evil actions
/ are vulgarised and stupefied good ones. The
I single longing of the individual for self-gratification
"(together with the fear of losing it) satisfies itself
i in all circumstances: man may act as he can,that
is as he must, be it in deeds of vanity, revenge,
pleasure, usefulness, malice, cunning; be it in deeds
of sacrifice, of pity, of knowledge. The degrees
of the power of judgment determine whither any
one lets himself be drawn through this longing;
to every society, to every individual, a scale of
possessions is continually present, according to
which he determines his actions and judges those
of others. But this standard changes constantly;
many actions are called evil and are only stupid,
because the degree of intelligence which decided
for them was very low. In a certain sense, even,
all actions are still stupid; for the highest degree
of human intelligence which can now be attained
will assuredly be yet surpassed, and then, in a
retrospect, all our actions and judgments will
appear as limited and hasty as the actions and
judgments of primitive wild peoples now appear
limited and hasty to us. To recognise all this
may be deeply painful, but consolation comes
after: such pains are the pangs of birth. The


## p. 109 (#161) ############################################

THE HISTORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS. 109
butterfly wants to break through its chrysalis: it
rends and tears it, and is then blinded and confused
by the unaccustomed light, the kingdom of liberty.
In such people as are capable of such sadness—and
how few are ! —the first experiment made is to see
whether mankind can change itself from a moral
into a wise mankind. The sun of a new gospel
throws its rays upon the highest point in the soul
of each single individual, then the mists gather
thicker than ever, and the brightest light and
the dreariest shadow lie side by side. Everything
is necessity—so says the new knowledge, and
this knowledge itself is necessity. Everything is
innocence, and knowledge is the road to insight
into this innocence. Are pleasure, egoism, vanity
necessary for the production of the moral
phenomena and their highest result, the sense for
truth and justice in knowledge; were error and
the confusion of the imagination the only means
through which mankind could raise itself gradually
to this degree of self-enlightenment and self-
liberation—who would dare to undervalue these
means? Who would dare to be sad if he
perceived the goal to which those roads led?
Everything in the domain of morality has evolved,
is changeable, unstable, everything is dissolved, it
is true; but everything is also streaming towards
one goal. Even if the inherited habit of erroneous *"]
valuation, love and hatred, continue to reign in us,
yet under the influence of growing knowledge it
will become weaker; a new habit, that of com-
prehension, of not loving, not hating, of over-
looking, is gradually implanting itself in us upon
J


## p. 110 (#162) ############################################

I IO HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
the same ground, and in thousands of years will
perhaps be powerful enough to give humanity the
strength to produce wise, innocent (consciously
innocent) men, as it now produces unwise, guilt-
conscious men, that is the necessary preliminary
step, not its opposite.


## p. 110 (#163) ############################################

THIRD DIVISION.
THE RELIGIOUS LIFE.
108.
The Double Fight against Evil. —When
misfortune overtakes us we can either pass over
it so lightly that its cause is removed, or so that
the result which it has on our temperament is
altered, through a changing, therefore, of the evil
into a good, the utility of which is perhaps not
visible until later on. Religion and art (also
metaphysical philosophy) work upon the changing
of the temperament, partly through the changing
of our judgment on events (for instance, with the
help of the phrase "whom the Lord loveth He
chasteneth"), partly through the awakening of a
pleasure in pain, in emotion generally (whence
the tragic art takes its starting-point). The more
a man is inclined to twist and arrange meanings
the less he will grasp the causes of evil and dis-
perse them; the momentary mitigation and in-
fluence of a narcotic, as for example in toothache,
suffices him even in more serious sufferings. The
more the dominion of creeds and all arts dispense
with narcotics, the more strictly men attend to
the actual removing of the evil, which is certainly


## p. 110 (#164) ############################################

I IG HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
exists neither relationship nor friendship, nor even
enmity; they live on different planets. Every
philosophy which shows a religious comet's tail
shining in the darkness of its last prospects r.
all the science it contains suspicious; all
is presumably also religion, even though in
guise of science. Moreover, if all nations were
agree about certain religious matters, for instal
the existence of a God (which, it may be remarke
is not the case with regard to this point), th
would only be an argument against those affirme
matters, for instance the existence of a God; th
consensus gentium and hominum in general can
only take place in case of a huge folly. On the
other hand, there is no consensus omnium sapientium,
with regard to any single thing, with that exception
mentioned in Goethe's lines:
“Alle die Weisesten aller der Zeiten
Lächeln und winken und stimmen mit ein :
Théricht, auf Bess'rung der Thoren zu harren
Kinder der Klugheit, o habet die Narren
Eben zum Narren auch, wie sich's gehört l” *
Spoken without verse and rhyme and applied to
our case, the consensus sapientium consists in
this: that the consensus gentium counts as a folly.
* “All greatest sages of all latest ages
Will chuckle and slily agree,
'Tis folly to wait till a fool's empty pate
Has learnt to be knowing and free :
So children of wisdom, make use of the fools
And use them whenever you can as your tools. ”—J. M. K


## p. 111 (#165) ############################################

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## p. 112 (#166) ############################################

112 HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN.
bad for writers of tragedy; for the material for
tragedy is growing scarcer because the domain of
pitiless, inexorable fate is growing ever narrower,
—but worse still for the priests, for they have
hitherto lived on the narcotisation of human
woes.
109.
Sorrow is Knowledge. —How greatly we
should like to exchange the false assertions of the
priests, that there is a god who desires good from
us, a guardian and witness of every action, every
moment, every thought, who loves us and seeks
our welfare in all misfortune,—how greatly we
\ would like to exchange these ideas for/aruths
which would be just as healing, pacifying and
beneficial as those errors! But there are no such
truths; at most philosophy can oppose to them
metaphysical appearances (at bottom also un-
truths). The tragedy consists in the fact that
we cannot believe those dogmas of religion and
metaphysics, if we have strict methods of truth
in heart and brain: on the other hand, mankind
has, through development, become so delicate,
irritable and suffering, that it has need of
/ the highest means of healing and consolation;
whence also the danger arises that man would
bleed to death from recognised truth, or, more
correctly, from discovered error. Byron has
expressed this in the immortal lines:—
Sorrow is knowledge: they who know the most
Must mourn the deepest o'er the fatal truth,
The Tree of Knowledge is not that of Life.



## p. 113 (#167) ############################################

THE RELIGIOUS LIFE.