No More Learning

It roused, of course, a strong
opposition, the leader of which was ason of the famous
Ohabrias, Who had fallen in his country's cause, fighting
on bb? d his ship at the siege of Chios. The son had
inherited from his father one of these honourable grants
of immunity. He was, it seems, himself utterly un-
worthy of it ; but he represented a principle, and had,
we may be sure, a numerous following. Demosthenes
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? DEMOSTHENES ENTERS POLITICAL LIFE. 37
became his advocate, and in the year subsequent to
the passing of the law, he assailed it in a speech which
has always been much admired.
This was his first political effort. He was quite a
young man at the time--thirty years of age at most,
probably less. The speech he delivered does not
exhibit the fire and force of some of his subsequent
orations; it is calm and argumentative, and deserves
the e ithet_Q_" subtle" which Cicero* applies to it.
It is in fact a specimen throughout of close and con-
secutive reasoning Leptines' proposal was no doubt
popular, and was supported by many plausible argu-
ments. The circumstances of the State were such as
made any exemptions and immunities 'from public
burdens of very questionable expediency. Athens had
been seriously impoverished by her recent disastrous
war with her allies, and many of her richer citizens
must, for a time at least, have been sorely straitened
in their resources. To exempt such wealthy men from
burdens which there was not too much wealth left to
bear, might well seem a distinct loss to the State. It
increased the difliculty of providing for those public
festivals which were so dear to the people. It could
also no doubt be plausibly argued that exemptions had
been granted too freely, and now and then to thoroughly
unworthy persons. Many a man not particularly rich
would think himself aggrieved, when he saw some one
far richer than himself altogether exempt. The favoured
few were sure to be envied, and might almost be said
to be defrauding the State of what they owed it. The
* Orator, c. xxxi.
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? 38 _ DEMOSTHENES.
object, in fact, of the law of Leptines was, it might be
contended, to insure for Athens the due performance of
services which she had a right to claim from every citizen
of ample means. The burden, he argued, ought to fall
on all such ; no exemptions ought to be granted, as it
was likely they would be granted unwisely, and the
examples of other states, such as Sparta and Thebes,
showed that these grants were unnecessary. Besides,
merit at Athens was rewarded in other ways; and in
sweeping away such rewards as these, they would be
really abolishing what was not needed by the posses-
sors, and was at the same time injurious to the State.
Thus the new law seemed on the surface a good one,
and must have enlisted popular sympathy. It promised
to get rid of invidious privileges, to distribute public
burdens equitably, and to provide for the celebration
of the festivals and games with becoming splendour.
The occasion was thus clearly one to task all the
powers of an opposition speaker. If we want a
modern analogy, we may suppose a motion brought
forward in the House of Commons in a time of
national distress, when every tax would be acutely
felt, to abolish all pensions ever granted to deserving
men and to their children. It is conceivable that such
a proposition might find supporters at a trying crisis,
and become a powerful party-cry. Demosthenes may
well have had an uphill battle to fight. But he took
the right ground, and rested his case on the highest
moral principles and the most enlightened view of
political expediency. The faith and honour of the
State, he maintained, must be superior to all other
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? DEMOSTHENES ENTERS POLITICAL LIFE. 39
considerations. We may say that the text of his
speech was--" A good name is better than riches. "
First, he argued that it was unjust to deprive the
people of the power to grant special privileges because
they had sometimes granted them improperly.
" You might as well take from them all their constitu-
tional rights because they dof not always exercise them
wisely. Even if a few undeserving persons received these
privileges, this was better than that none should be con-
ferred, and that a powerful encouragement to patriotism
should be withdrawn. To revoke gifts which the State
had bestowed would be a scandalous breach of the
national faith. It would cast a slur on democratic
government, and create an impression that such govern-
ments were as little to be trusted as those of oligarchs
and despots. It would be base ingratitude to many
distinguished foreigners--for example, to the king of
Bosporus, from whose country much corn was exported
to Athens, free of duty--and such men for the future
would not care to befriend the State in a time of need.
It was nothing to the purpose to speak of Sparta and
Thebes, as proofs that these grants of exemption were
not required. The whole genius and character of those
states were so radically different, that no conclusion
could be reasonably drawn from them as to what suited
Athenians. It was of supreme importance that Athens,
as the noblest representative of Greece, should value
above all things a character for justice, generosity, and
public spirit. To attempt to bind her for all future
time by a law which might be a hurtful and dangerous
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? 40 DEMOSTHENES.
check on patriotic impulses must be inexpedient. No
one could foresee what course politics might take, and it
was possible that citizens like Harmodius and Aris-
togeiton might again be needed. All human legislation
must take account of such possibilities and contin-
gencies, improbable as they might seem at the time.
The law of Leptines was, in fact, an offence to Nemesis,
which ever waits on arrogance and presumption. "
These were some of the chief arguments with which
Demosthenes combated the reasonings of his opponent.
In one passage he reminds his audience how careful
Athens had been in the past of her good name.
"You have to consider not merely whether you love
money, but whether you love also a good name, which
you are more anxious after than money; and not you
only, but your ancestors, as I can prove. For when they
had got wealth in abundance, they expended it all in_
pursuit of honour. For glory's sake they never shrank
from any danger, but persevered to the last, spending
even their private fortunes. Instead of a good name,
this law fastens an opprobrium on the commonwealth,
unworthy both of your ancestors and yourselves. It
begets three of the greatest reproaches--the reputa~
tion of being envious, faithless, and ungrateful. That
it is altogether foreign to your character to establish a
law like this, I will endeavour to prove in a few words
by recounting one of the former acts of the State.
The Thirty Tyrants are said to have borrowed money
from the Lacedaemonians to attack the party in the
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? DEMOSTIIENES ENTERS POLITICAL LIFE. 41
Piraeus. When unanimity was restored, and these
troubles were composed, the Lacedaemonians sent am-
bassadors and demanded payment of their money.
Upon this there arose a debate, and some contended
that the borrowers, the city party, should pay; others
advised that it should be the first proof of harmony to
join in discharging the debt. The people, we know,
determined themselves to contribute, and share in the
expense, to avoid breaking any article of their conven-
tion. Then, were it not shameful if, at that time, you
chose to contribute money for the benefit of persons
who had injured you, rather than break your word, yet
now, when it is in your power, without cost, to do
justice to your benefactors by repealing this law, you
should prefer to break your word '1 "
He argues that the envious, grudging spirit displayed
in the law is, of all things, most alien to Athenian
feeling. . _
"Every possible reproach should be avoided, but
most of all, that of being envious. Why'? Because
envy is altogether the mark of a bad disposition, and
to have this feeling is wholly unpardonable. Besides,
abhorring, as our commonwealth does, everything dis-
graceful, there is no reproach from which she is further
removed than from the imputation of being envious.
Observe how strong are the proofs. In the first place,
you are the only people who have state funerals for
the dead, and funeral orations in which you glorify the
actions of brave men. Such a custom is that of a people
which admires virtue, and does not envy others who are
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? 42 DEMOSTHENES.
honoured for it. In the next place, you have ever
bestowed the highest rewards upon those who win the
garlands in gymnastic contests; nor have you, because
but few are born to partake of such rewards, envied
the parties receiving them, nor abridged your honours
on that account. Add to these striking evidences that
no one appears ever to have surpassed our State in
liberality--such munificence has she displayed in re-
quiting services. All these are manifestations of justice,
virtue, niagnanimity. Do not destroy the character for
which our State has all along been renowned ; do not,
in order that Leptines may wreak his personal malice
upon some whom he dislikes, deprive the State and
yourselves of the honourable name which you have
enjoyed throughout all time. Regard this as a contest
purely for the dignity of Athens, whether it is to be
maintained the same as before, or to be impaired and
degraded. "
The following passage is near the conclusion of the
speech. He is arguing against the impolicy of binding
the State for the future by such a law :-
" To one thing more I beg your attention. This law
cannot be good which makes the same provision for the
future as the past. ' N 0 one shall be exempt,' it says,
' not even the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogei-
ton. ' Good. ' Nor shall it be lawful to grant exemptions
hereafter. ' Not if similar men arise'! Blame former
doings as you may, know you also the future'! Oh,
but we are far from expecting anything of the kind.
I trust we are; but being human, our language and our
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? DEMOSTIIENES ENTERS POLITICAL LIFE. 43
law should be such as not to shock religious sentiment;
and while we look for good fortune, and implore
heaven to grant it, we will regard all fortune as sub-
ject to human casualties. The future, I take it, is un-
certain to all men, and small occasions are productive
of great events. Therefore we will be moderate in
prosperity, and show that we have an eye to the
future. "
It may be said that there is much of a modern tone
and character about this speech. Its arguments are
those of a constitutional lawyer and of a far-sighted
politician. It is quiet and temperate, and at the same
time singularly convincing. It was successful in its
immediate object, and it must have established the
reputation of Demosthenes as a political debater of the
first rank. From this time he must have felt but
little timidity or hesitation in addressing that critical
audience--the Athenian popular assembly.
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? CHAPTER V.
EARLY srsscnas or mnosrnssss on FOREIGN POLICY.
Psasm in the fourth century B. G. was a more consider-
able power than we might have supposed from the
comparative ease with which it was overthrown by
Alexander. The Great King, as he was always called,
was in the possession of immense resources. Financially
he was much stronger than the Greek world, though his
military inferiority had been more than once clearly
proved. He was still looked on by the Greeks generally
with a sort of wondering awe. He ruled in some fashion
a vast empire, and held it together by means of satraps
and vassal princes, notwithstanding occasional serious
revolts. He had had indeed, in past days, to acknow-
ledge the independence of the Asiatic Greeks; still he
was always distinctly felt as a force in Greek politics,
with which from time to time he was brought into
contact. On the whole, he was regarded as an enemy ;
but the unfortunate want of anything like hearty union
among the states of Greece tended to weaken this feel-
ing, and to make combined action against him all but
impossible. There was always, however, a vague fear
that he might some day, if violently provoked, crush
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? EARLY SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY. 45
the Greekworld beneath the weight of a huge bar-
barian invasion.
In the year 356 13. 0. , the second year of Athens' war
with her revolted allies, this fear rose, at Athens at least,
to a positive panic. Greek generals, as we have seen,
occasionally found it convenient to take service under
some Persian satrap, for the sake of the liberal pay
on which they could confidently reckon. In the year
above mentioned, Chares was in command of a fleet
which Athens had sent out to put down her rebellious
subjects in the islands of the Aigean. He was a man
thoroughly of the adventurer type ; and when he found
that he could not pay his troops, which were for the
most part foreign mercenaries, he carried off his arma-
ment on his own responsibility to the aid of Artabanus,
the satrap of the country south of the Propontis, who
was then in revolt against the Great King. Artabanus
was, at the time, in sore need of help; but Chares gained
for him a brilliant victory over the king's forces, and
he received for himself and his soldiers a liberal re-
ward. The proceeding was, of course, utterly irregular,
and gave great offence at Athens; but the success re-
conciled them to it. The King of Persia was naturally
very indignant, and sent an embassy to Athens to com-
plain of this unprovoked aggression. Soon it was
rumoured that he was preparing a fleet of 300 galleys
to aid their revolted allies and to attack their city.
There was intense excitement. Peace was immediately
concluded with the allies, but there was a strong feeling
in favour of declaring war against Persia. Now, it
was said, was the time for an appeal to Panhellenic sen-
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? 46 ' DEMOSTHENES.
4
timent, and to endeavour to unite Greece against her old
enemy.
We can well imagine that such language was
likely to meet with a response in many quarters, and
that it might well seem patriotic, and even prudent.
In this case, again, Demosthenes thought it his duty
to protest. He did so in a speech delivered in 354 13. 0.
He must have been, in all probability, on the un-
popular side. He had, too, against him the opinion of
the famous and clever rhetorician, Isocrates, who had
urged in one of his pamphlets the expediency of a
Panhellenic combination against Persia. The party of
Eubulus, backed up by a number of orators and dema-
gogues, supported this policy. To Demosthenes it
seemed an idle dream--the preposterous imagination of
a knot of political adventurers. The speech in which
he opposed it is calm and statesmanlike. "In no one
of his speeches," says Mr Grote, "is the spirit of
practi_cal wisdom more predominant than in this his
earliest known discourse to the public Assembly. " He
tells his excited countrymen some very plain home-
truths. " The Greeks," he frankly says, " are too
jealous of each other to be capable of uniting in an
aggressive war. They might indeed do so in a war of
self-defence. Should Athens declare war, the King of
Persia would be able to purchase aid from the Greeks
themselves. Such a step would consequently lay bare
the worst weaknesses of the Greek world. Their right
policy was to put Athens in a posture of defence, that
she might not be attacked unprepared. They must re-
organise their fleet. They must not shrink from personal
military service and lean upon foreign mercenaries.
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? EARLY SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY. 47
They must not rest contentedly on the glorious deeds of
their ancestors, but uphold the dignity of their State by
themselves imitating their deeds, whatever temporary
sacrifices it might cost them. And they should seek
to rally round Athens a host of confederates, united to
her by the bonds of common interest and mutual con-
fidence. " Some of these topics are such as, under
critical circumstances, it must have required much moral
courage to urge.
A few passages from the speech will give the reader
an idea of Demosthenes' views about Persia, about the
difiiculty of united action against that power, and the
immediate duties of the Athenians themselves :-
"I hold the King," he says, "to be the common
enemy of all the Greeks. Still I would not for this
reason advise you without the rest to undertake a war
against him. The Greeks themselves, I observe, are
not jriends to one another. On the contrary, some
have more cdnfidcnce in the King than in certain of
their own people. Such being the case, I deem it
expedient for you to see that the cause of war he
equitable and just, that all necessary preparations be
made, and that this should be the groundwork of your
resolution. Were there any plain proof that the King
of Persia was about to attack the Greeks, I think they
would join alliance, and be extremely grateful to those
who sided with them and defended them against him.
But if we rush into a quarrel before his intentions are
declared, I am afraid that we shall be driven into_a
war with both--with the King and with the people
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? 48 DEMOSTHENES.
whom we are anxious to protect. He will suspend his
designs, if he really has resolved to attack the Greeks,
will give money to some, and promise friendship; while
they, in the wish to carry on their own wars with
better success and intent on similar objects, will disre-
gard the common safety of the Greek world. I be-
seech you not to betray our country into such embar-
rassment and folly. You, I perceive, cannot adopt the
same policy in regard to the king as the other Greeks
can. Many of them, I conceive, may very well pursue
their selfish interests, and be utterly indifferent to the
national welfare. But for you it would be dishonour-
able, even though you had suffered wrong, so to punish
the wrong-doers as to let any of them fall under the
power of the barbarian. Under these circumstances
we must be careful not to engage in the war on un-
equal terms, and not to allow him whom we suppose to
be planning mischief against the Greeks to get the
credit of appearing their friend. "
Although Athens is rich, he warns the people that
those riches will not be forthcoming on a mere vague
rumour of hostilities from Persia. YVhen the danger
is seen to be really imminent, then it will be time for
the State to put a pressure on its wealthy citizens.
"You invite the Greeks to join you. But if you
will not act as they wish, how can you expect they will
obey your call, when some of them have no good-will
towards you'! Because, forsooth, they will hear from
you that Persia has designs on them'? Pray, do you
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? EARLY SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY. 49
imagine that they don't foresee it themselves! I am
sure they do ; but at present the fear outweighs the
enmity which some of them bear towards you and
towards each other. Athens contains treasures equal
to the rest of the Greek states put together. But the
owners of wealth are so minded that if all your orators
alarmed them with the intelligence that the King was
coming, that he was at hand, that the danger was in-
evitable--if, besides the orators, a number of persons
gave oracular warning--so far from contributing, they
would not even discover their wealth or acknowledge
its possession. But if they knew that what is so ter-
rible in report was really begun, there is not a man so
foolish who would not be ready to give and foremost
to contribute. I say that we have money against the
time of actual need, but not before. And therefore I
advise you not to search for it now. Your right course
is to complete your other preparations. Let the rich
retain their riches for the present (it cannot be in better
hands for the State) 3 and should the crisis come, then
take it from them in voluntary contributions. "
The speech is thus concluded :-
"My advice is, do not be over-alarmed at the war;
neither be led to commence it. As far as I see, no other
state of Greece has reason to fear it. All the Greeks
know that so long as they regarded Persia as their
common enemy, theywere at peace one with another,
and enjoyed much prosperity. But since they have
looked on the King as a friend, and quarrelled about
disputes with each other, they have suffered worse
a. c. s. s. vol. iv. D
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? 50 DEJIIOSTHENES.
calamities than any one could possibly imprecate upon
them. Should we fear a man whom both fortune and
heaven declare to be an unprofitable friend and a useful
enemy'! If it were possible with one heart and with
united forces to attack him alone, such an injury I
could not pronounce to be an injustice. But since this
cannot be, I say we must be cautious, and not afford
the King a pretence for vindicating the rights of the
other Greeks. Do not expose the melancholy condi-
tion of Greece by convoking her people when you can-
not persuade them, and making war when you cannot
carry it on. Only keep quiet, fear nothing, and pre-
pare yourselves. My advice in brief is this: Prepare
yourselves against existing enemies; and you ought
with the same force to be able to resist the King and
all others, if they attempt to injure you. But never
begin a wrong in word or deed. Let us look that our
actions, and not our speeches on the platform, be
worthy of our ancestors. If you pursue this course,
you will do service not only to yourselves, but also to
those who give the opposite cmmscl; for you will not
be angry with them afterwards for errors now com-
mitted. "
In this speech Demosthenes may be said to fore-
shadow the general character of his foreign 'policy. He
did not wish Athens to be aggressive, but simply to
hold her own with a firm hand. This, he thought, she
might well be persuaded to do. Grand schemes of
Panhellenic union against the empire of Persia, such
as floated before the imagination of Isocrates, and wore,
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? EARLY SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY 51
through his influence, fascinating the minds of a certain
class of political enthusiasts, he scouted as Quixotic.
Above all things, he aimed at being a practical states-
man ; and of this the speech from which we have just
been quoting, delivered by him in the commencement
of his public life, is decisive evidence.
In the following year he delivered a speech which
is of considerable interest as showing his view of Greek
politics at the time. It was important, he thought, for
Athens that there should be, as we say, a balance of
power in the Greek world, and that neither Sparta nor
Thebes should be too strong. I have explained the
circumstances under which Megalopolis was founded
in 371 B. 0. , after the great battle of Leuctra, under
Theban influence, as the metropolis of Arcadia, and
specially as a check on Sparta. The establishment of
this city, together with the loss of the Messenian terri-
tory, which soon followed, was a terrible blow to that
state. Sparta, in fact, for the time, was reduced to a
second-rate power. She was hemmed in by enemies
on the north and on the west. It was hardly to be
expected that she would acquiesce in such humiliation.
And so, in the year 353 13. 0. , her king, Archidamus,
began to plan a counter-revolution, which should undo
the work of Leuctra by the destruction of Megalopolis
and the reconquest of Messenia. It was, however,
necessary for him to have some pretext which should
commend itself generally to Greek opinion. He was
meditating an entire unsettlement of the affairs of the
Peloponnese in the interest of Sparta; and this, he
knew, would not be allowed if it were to be openly
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? 52 DEMOSTHENES.
avowed. Accordingly he put forward the policy of a
general restoration of ancient rights to the different
states. Athens would thus recover the border town of
Oropus, now in the possession of Thebes, the loss of
which had much vexed and distressed her. Thus, it
was hoped, she might be disposed to favour the Spar-
tan proposals, which, as a matter of course, the anti-
Theban party, then very strong, would back up to the
utmost of its power. The result which such a policy
would have on Megalopolis, as a barrier in Sparta's
way, was kept in the background. The new city must
have inevitably dwindled down into an insignificant
township, and the purpose with which it had been
founded would have been frustrated.
Envoys came to Athens both from Sparta and from
Megalopolis. There was a warm and angry debate.
The bitter hatred Athenians had always felt towards
Thebans, coupled with the immediate desire of recover-
ing Oropus, was enough to recommend the Spartan
proposals. It seems strange that the memory of what
Athens had suffered from the hands of Sparta did not
at once decide the question, and open the eyes of the
people to the dangers of Sparta's insidious policy.
Some there were who saw through it and denounced
it. Demosthenes was among the number. He was
with the "Opposition," and it appears that on this
occasion he failed. He supported the cause of Mega-
lopolis--the cause, in fact, of Thebes--arguing that it
would be a grave political blunder to assist Sparta in
recovering the position which she held in Greece pre-
vious to the battle of Leuctra. His speech is subtle
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? EARLY SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY. '53
'and ingenious, and must have been convincing to those
who would not let themselves be carried away by an
unreasoning antipathy to everything Theban.
" The Lacedaemonians," he says, " are acting a
crafty part. They say they cannot retain the grati-
tude they feel for you for helping them in a time of
urgent need unless you now allow them to commit an
injustice. However repugnant it may be to the designs
of the Spartans that we should adopt the Arcadian
alliance" (that is, the alliance of Megalopolis), "surely
their gratitude for having been saved by us in a crisis
of extreme peril ought to outweigh their resentment
for being checked in their aggression now. "
As to the bait held out by Sparta to Athens in the
prospect of the recovery of Oropus, he says :-- '
"My opinion is, first, that our State, even without
sacrificing any Arcadian people to the Lacedeemonians,
may recover Oropus, both with their aid, if they are
minded to act justly, and that of others who hold
Theban usurpation to be intolerable. Secondly, sup-
posing that it were evident to us that, unless we permit
the Lacedaemonians to reduce the Peloponnese, we can-
not obtain possession of Oropus, allow me to say, I
deem it more expedient to let Oropus alone than to
abandon Messenia and the Peloponnese to the Lace-
daemonians. I imagine the question between us and
them would soon be about other matters.
"I am sure, to judge from rational observation-
and I think most Athenians will agree with me--that
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:56 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 54 DEMOSTHENES.
if the Lacedaemonians take Megalopolis, Messenia will
be in danger; and if they take Messenia, I predict
that you and the Thebans will be allies. Then it is
much better and more honourable for us to receive the
Theban confederacy as our friends and resist Lacedae-
monian ambition, than, out of reluctance to save the
allies of Thebes, to abandon them now, and have after-
wards to save Thebes herself and be in fear also for our
own safety. I cannot but regard it as perilous to our
State should the Laeedaemonians take Megalopolis and
again become strong. For I see they have undertaken
the war not to defend themselves, but to recover their
ancient power. What were their designs when they
possessed that power, you perhaps know better than I,
and therefore may have reason to be alarmed. "
This was plain speaking, and sound, statesmanlike
advice. It could not have been the interest of Athens
to let Sparta regain her old supremacy, as she was
certainly striving to do. It was her interest, as Demos-
thenes says towards the conclusion of his speech, not to
abandon Megalopolis and the Arcadians, and to make
them feel (should they survive the struggle) that they
had owed their deliverance not to themselves or to any
other people but the Athenians. As affairs turned
out, the dangers he apprehended never came to pass.
He could not persuade his countrymen to support
Megalopolis. They simply stood neutral. The Lace-
daemonians waged war for two years in Arcadia, and
gained some partial successes, but they could not carry
out their designs. Thebes, though she had occupation
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-12-27 04:56 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/coo. 31924026456347 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? EARLY SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY. 55
for her soldiers in other quarters, contrived to send
an army into the Peloponnese; and after some inde~
cisive engagements, a truce was concluded, which left
matters as they were. Megalopolis and the . Arcadian
confederacy escaped the peril with which Sparta had
threatened them.