No More Learning

Even Ghazi-ud-din was alarmed and prevailed on his mother-in-law
to intercede for him. As a suppliant, forty miles from the city, he
met Ahmad, who at first rated him, but afterwards pardoned and
confirmed him as minister. So low was the empire fallen that the
disposal of its great offices of state was in the hands of the Afghan.
The real offender thus escaped unscathed, but Ahmad Abdali de-
manded reparation for the insult to his authority, and an innocent
people had to suffer for the fault of a headstrong youth.
Ahmad Abdali entered the fort of Delhi on 28 January, 1757, and
met 'Alamgir II, and on the same day the sack of the city began.
The pillage was not accompanied, as during Nadir Shah's invasion.
by massacre, but the people suffered great misery and many of the
more respectable killed themselves to escape dishonour. Ahmad
stayed in the city for nearly a month, during which time the daughter
of prince A'azz-ud-din, the emperor's deceased elder brother, was
married to prince Timur, eldest son of the invader. After resting
his troops in Delhi he sent a force under one of his officers, with
Ghazi-ud-din, to punish Suraj Mal the Jat for having allied himself
with Safdar Jang, and himself followed the troops. Suraj Mal's
forts were not easily reduced and Ghazi-ud-din begged that a force
might be sent with him into the Duab and Oudh, to collect tribute
for the Abdali, and that two princes of the imperial house should
accompany him to provide against any attempt to set up a pretender
at Delhi.
1 Coin was also struck at Shahjahanabad (Delhi) in the name of Ahmad
Shah. (Ed. )


## p. 439 (#477) ############################################

MASSACRE AT MUTTRA BY AHMAD SHAH ABDALI 439
His motive was partly to ingratiate himself with the invader and
to get rid of him, but chiefly to secure revenge on the son of his old
enemy. Safdar Jang had died on 5 October, 1754, and had been
succeeded in Oudh by his son Shuja'-ud-Daula. The expedition was
not a conspicuous success. The army reached Farrukhabad, where
Ahmad Khan Bangash presented gifts to the princes and to Ghazi-
ud-din and sent a contingent with it into Oudh.
Shuja'-ud-Daula met the invaders of his province at Sandi, near
Bilgram, and after two unimportant affairs of outposts was reinforced
by Sa'd-ullah Khan of Rohilkhand, who had now become his friend.
The arrival of this new force and Sa'd-ullah Khan's advocacy of
Shuja'-ud-Daula's cause put an end to hostilities and the aggressors
retired after receiving 500,000 rupees in cash from Shuja'-ud-Daula
and vague promises of more. Ghazi-ud-din retired to Farrukhabad,
where he halted to await the departure of Ahmad Abdali.
Ahmad had been conducting a campaign in his own manner.
After a siege of three days he had taken the Jat fort of Ballabhgarh,
twenty-four miles south of Delhi, and had put the garrison to the
sword. He had sent another force to Muttra, where the massacre
of a large assembly of unarmed pilgrims showed his zeal for Islam.
Further enterprises of a like nature were stopped by the fierce heat
of the Indian summer, and a pestilence, accompanied by great
mortality, which broke out in his army decided him to return. Near
Delhi he was met by 'Alamgir II, who complained bitterly of his
treatment by Ghazi-ud-din. Ahmad Abdali promoted Najib Khan,
who accompanied 'Alamgir, to the rank of Amir-ul-Umara, and
committed the helpless puppet to his protection. Najib Khan re-
ceived at the same time the title of Najib-ud-Daula.
Ahmad Abdali received, before leaving India, a strange appeal.
Two widows of Muhammad Shah bitterly resented the turbulence
of Ghazi-ud-din and the cowardice of the courtiers, which had caused
them to fall into the hands of Marathas. Fearing worse consequences
one of them begged Ahmad to marry her and to remove both from
the danger of dishonour. In spite of their age, their high rank and
their distress aroused the conqueror's compassion. He accordingly
married one and took both ladies with him to Afghanistan.
On Ahmad Abdali's departure from India, Ghazi-ud-din threw
down the gauntlet to his former servant, Najib Khan, by appointing
Ahmad Khan Bangash Amir-ul-Umara and, summoning to his aid
Raghunath Rao, brother of the Peshwa, and Malhar Rao Holkar,
marched on Delhi and besieged the emperor and Najib-ud-Daula in
the fort.
This action had been expected and some time before the departure
of Ahmad Abdali, the emperor had granted assignments to his eldest
son, 'Ali Gauhar, to the west of Delhi and had sent him into these
districts with secret instructions to raise an army for opposing Ghazi-


## p. 440 (#478) ############################################

440 AHMAD SHAH, 'ALAMGIR II AND SHAH ALAM
ud-din if he marched on Delhi. The participation of the Marathas
had not been expected and 'Ali Gauhar, who was not strong enough
to attack the combined forces, did nothing.
When the siege had lasted forty-five days, Najib-ud-Daula pur-
chased the protection of Holkar, and retired to his estates north-west
of Delhi. The emperor could no longer resist, and Ghazi-ud-din,
with Ahmad Khan Bangash, entered the fort and resumed control
of the emperor and the administration. His first act was to compel
‘Alamgir to send a force to recall his son to the capital. Vithal Rao,
a Maratha officer who had remained near Delhi after the retirement
of Raghunath Rao and Holkar, warned the prince that the order
had been wrúng from his father and advised him to disregard it,
and 'Ali Gauhar, on this advice, crossed the Jumna into the Duab
and occupied several parganas, but Vithal Rao was induced by a
heavy bribe to advise the prince to return to the capital. 'Ali Gauhar
entered Delhi with his troops but refused to live in the fort, and lodged
in a private house. He soon found himself unable to pay his troops
and Ghazi-ud-din advised him to send them to the districts allotted
for their payment as revenue could not be collected without their
assistance. The prince was once more compelled to comply, but
retained at Delhi a bodyguard and some of his most trustworthy
officers. Ghazi-ud-din, assembling ten or twelve thousand troops on
the pretext that he intended to make a pilgrimage to the shrine of
Nizam-ud-din Auliya, surrounded the house in which the prince
lodged. Some of his men forced an entrance, but 'Ali Gauhar, who
possessed the courage of his race, caused the outer wall of the house
nearest to the Jumna to be breached, and at the head of his men cut
his way through the minister's troops and rode to Vithal Rao's camp
across the river. Vithal Rao was now overcome with shame for having
advised the prince to place himself in the power of Ghazi-ud-din,
and pitched tents for him near his own camp, but it was only with
great difficulty that the prince reached them, for some of the minister's
troops barred his way. He would have been slain or taken but for
the devotion of a gallant Sayyid who kept the pursuers employed.
The Sayyid fell but the prince reached his tents and Vithal Rao
escorted him to Farrukhabad, where he was well received and sup-
plied with money. From Farrukhabad the prince marched to
Saharanpur and took refuge with Najib-ud-Daula, who protected
him for eight months and then, fearing complications with the
minister, advised him to attempt the reconquest of Bengal, where
the imperial authority had long been disregarded and British in-
fluence was paramount. 'Ali Gauhar accepted this advice and
marched first to Oudh, leaving his lieutenant to enlist troops and
collect supplies. Shuja'-ud-Daula met the prince near Lucknow,
on 19 January, 1758, and received him hospitably; but, anxious to
rid himself of so inconvenient a guest, supported Najib-ud-Daula's


## p. 441 (#479) ############################################

AN
11
aZJA
Gae
THE MARATHAS IN BENGAL
441
advice to attempt the recovery of Bengal, and was relieved when he
marched on to Allahabad.
The relief afforded to Bengal by the expulsion of Raghuji Bhonsle
in 1743 had been ephemeral. Balaji Rao Peshwa, having obtained
his reward, had immediately entered into an agreement acknow-
ledging Raghuji's right to collect chauth and sardeshmukhi in Bengal,
Bihar and Orissa; and in 1744 an army of 20,000 Maratha horse
invaded Bengal. 'Ali Vardi Khan craftily invited all the principal
officers to an entertainment, which they were induced to attend by
a false oath sworn by Mustafa Khan, an Afghan officer, on a brick
wrapped in a cloth which was supposed to contain a copy of the
Koran. On 14 April the twenty-one who attended were treacherously
murdered and the single superior officer who had been left in charge
of the camp tried to lead the army back, but the peasantry, exasperated
by recent depredations, allowed few stragglers to escape.
Mustafa Khan's reward was not, in his estimation, commensurate
with his services and he rose in rebellion in Bihar, where he attacked
Haibat, 'Ali Vardi Khan's lieutenant.
This atrocious crime greatly enraged Raghuji Bhonsle, but he was
detained at Nagpur throughout the year 1744 by a disputed suc-
cession in a Gond principality. Next year, having ascertained that
conditions were favourable, he invaded Orissa and without difficulty
cccupied Cuttack and captured the inefficient governor. From
Cuttack Raghuji sent a message to 'Ali Vardi, demanding thirty
million rupees as the price of evacuating Orissa. ‘Ali Vardi evaded
answering until he heard that the rebel Mustafa Khan was dead,
when he returned a provocative reply to which Raghuji answered
by overrunning the country as far as Burdwan. When the rainy
season was over he marched into Bihar in response to an invitation
from the remnant of the Afghan rebels, who had been driven into
the Kaimur hills on the north bank of the Son. They joined him
near Arwal on the east bank of the Son, within forty-five miles of
Patna. 'Ali Vardi advanced to Bankipore, and surprised the Marathas
at Muhibbʻalipur on the eastern bank of the Son, about eight miles
above Arwal. The advantage lay, on the whole, with the Muslims,
but the engagement was not decisive and for some days the armies
engaged in purposeless skirmishes. Then Raghuji suddenly marched
off, intending to reach Murshidabad and sack the town before Ali
Vardi Khan could return. 'Ali Vardi Khan turned back and marched
rapidly, but the more mobile Marathas were a day before him and,
though they could not enter the town, plundered and burnt tiie
neighbouring villages and marched on towards Katwa, still followed
by 'Ali Vardi Khan, who defeated them in a battle a few miles to the
south of that town.
Raghuji now returned to his own country, but left at Midnapore,
to guard the approaches to Orissa, a force of two or three thousand
LE


## p. 442 (#480) ############################################

442 AHMAD SHAH, ALAMGIR II AND SHAH ALAM
Marathas under Mir Habib, and six or seven thousand Afghans under
Murtaza Khan.
In 1746 Mir Muhammad Ja'far Khan, known as Mir Ja'far, was
appointed governor of Orissa with an injunction to recover it from
the Marathas. He defeated and drove southwards the garrison of
Midnapore, but refrained from pursuing them lest he should provoke
Raghuji Bhonsle to invade Bengal in force. Later, hearing that
Janoji, Raghuji's son, was marching on Cuttack, he fled panic-
stricken to Burdwan. Janoji followed him northward, but Mir Ja'far
had been reinforced and the Marathas were defeated. They returned
in the following year and were again defeated near Burdwan hy
‘Ali Vardi Khan, who pursued them to Midnapore but failed
to overtake them and retired to Murshidabad for the rainy
season.
Early in 1748 Haibat Jang engaged in Bihar a force of Afghans
who had been dismissed by ‘Ali Vardi Khan owing to suspicions
of their loyalty. It was believed that they might safely be employed
in Bihar, where their opportunities for communicating with the
Marathas would be fewer; but the officers, on the occasion of their
first reception, assassinated the governor, in revenge for the treat-
ment which they had received from his father-in-law, 'Ali Vardi
Khan. They then plundered the town and seized the government of
the province. A large force was soon collected and the leader,
knowing that he could enjoy no safety so long as ‘Ali Vardi Khan
retained the government of Bengal, made preparations for conquering
that province.
‘Ali Vardi Khan was again engaged with the Marathas south of
Katwa when this alarming news reached him. On 1 March, 1748
he marched towards Patna, leaving a sufficient garrison to protect
Murshidabad. The Marathas followed him, hanging on his flanks
and rear, and gave his army no rest. When he met the Afghan rebels
about eight miles to the west of the town of Barh, on the Ganges, he
was obliged to attack them while the Marathas were still threatening
his rear. His small army seemed doomed to destruction, but a fortu-
nate discharge of artillery and musketry killed or wounded the three
Afghan leaders early in the day, and this produced its usual result.
The great host, largely composed of raw levies, fled in all directions.
The Marathas, fearing lest the victorious army should turn on them,
dispersed, and Ali
‘ Vardi Khan,
Khan, entering Patna, appointed
Siraj-ud-Daula, his daughter's son by Haibat Jang, governor of
Bihar with Raja Janki Ram as his guardian and deputy, and followed
the retreating Marathas.
Janoji Bhonsle had been recalled to Nagpur by the news of his
mother's death and 'Ali Vardi seized the opportunity. He marched
to Cuttack, reoccupied the town, captured the citadel, put to death
the officers who had held it for Raghuji, and expelled the Marathas.


## p. 443 (#481) ############################################

THE MARATHAS RETAIN ORISSA
443
Their expulsion was, however, temporary and they returned to the
province almost immediately. Again, in 1750, they were defeated
at Midnapore, but it was as useless to defeat them in the field as it
was to expel them, in face of the mobility of irregular troops living
on the country and independent either of a base or of lines of com-
munication. The Muslims, after a victory in the field, often found
the beaten enemy immediately laying waste the country in their rear,
and were obliged to hasten to save their capital from pillage.
The Marathas claimed the right to levy chauth and sardeshmukhi in
the three provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and they had for
some time been anxious for a composition. They proposed that
Orissa should be absolutely ceded to them in place of the rights
claimed in all three. 'Ali Vardi Khan admitted no right, but he could
not exclude the Marathas, who treated the provinces as an enemy's
country, and destroyed what they could not carry off. The viceroy's
advisers had long urged him to purchase peace for his unfortunate
people. He had hitherto scornfully rejected this advice, but he was
now seventy-five years of age, his health was failing, he had for twelve
years been engaged in ceaseless and fruitless warfare, and a great
part of his territory lay waste. He gave way and in November, 1751,
ceded Orissa, salving his pride by the fiction of appointing Mir
Habib Raghuji's agent, as his governor of the province. He also
saved the district of Midnapore, which had hitherto been included
in Orissa, and fixed the Subarnarekha river as the boundary of the
Maratha province. Orissa thus passed finally out of the hands of
the viceroy of Bengal and the land had peace.
On 9 April, 1756, 'Ali Vardi Khan died and was succeeded by his
grandson, Siraj-ud-Daula, whose history will be found in chap. VII,
vol. v. Clive's victory at Plassey, on 23 June, 1757, established the
supremacy of the British in Bengal and thus furnished 'Ali Gauhar
with the pretext for his demonstration.
It is not quite correct to represent the prince as being in rebellion
against his father. He originally left the palace by his father's wish
and raised troops for service against Ghazi-ud-din. Subsequent orders
recalling him were actually issued by the minister, and though they
bore the emperor's seal there is every reason to believe that the
prince's course of action accorded with his father's wishes. Many
circumstances contributed to the choice of Bihar as a field for his
activity. Both Najib-ud-Daula and Shuja'-ud-Daula were anxious
to be rid of him and the latter was ambitious of adding the viceroyalty
of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa to that of Oudh and not unwilling to
employ the prince as his instrument. Muhammad Quli Khan,
Shuja'-ud-Daula's governor of Allahabad, a brave but foolish man,
was also ambitious of annexing the viceroyalty, for his master, as he
was careful to explain, but in reality for himself. Shuja'-ud-Daula
1 See Oxford History of India, p. 495.


## p. 444 (#482) ############################################

AHMAD SHAH, ‘ALAMGIR II AND SHAH 'ALAM
suspected his servant's ambitions but was ready to permit him to
embark on the enterprise.
'Ali Gauhar and Muhammad Quli crossed the Karamnasa late in
1758, and shortly afterwards camped near Patna, the governor of which,
Raja Ram Narayan, feigned to submit. Though the invading force
was contemptible, Clive himself marched from Murshidabad with
a small force. The raja then shut the city gates and repulsed an
attack, and 'Ali Gauhar fled to Rewah.
After the Maratha conquest of the Punjabi Dattaji Sindia sought
to crush Najib-ud-Daula, and marched towards Saharanpur. Najib-
ud-Daula, unable to meet his enemy in the field, entrenched himself
at Shukartar, seventeen miles south-west of Saharanpur, where
Dattaji Sindia besieged him throughout the rainy season of 1759
while another force under Govind Pant Bundele crossed the Ganges
and devastated northern Rohilkhand, driving the Afghans into the
hills and depriving Najib-ud-Daula of hopes of relief from that
quarter. At the end of the rainy season, however, Shuja'-ud-Daula
marched to his assistance, defeated Govind Pant near Chandpur,"
and put him to flight. Further operations were unnecessary as
Dattaji Sindia was obliged by the news of Ahmad Shah Abdali's
fresh invasion of India to abandon the blockade of Shukartar and
recross the Jumna; and in December, 1759, Shuja'-ud-Daula returned
to Oudh.
The unfortunate emperor had incurred the resentment of his
minister by lending what little support he could to Najib-ud-Daula,
whom, since the departure of Ahmad Shah Abdali, he regarded as
his potential protector, and had further offended by maintaining
a correspondence, which he believed to be secret, with the Afghan
king. On 29 November, 1759, he was inveigled to Firuz Shah's
Kotla beyond the city walls, on the pretext that a darvish who was
worth visiting lodged there, and was assassinated. The corpse of the
murdered emperor was thrown out on the sands of the Jumna where
it lay naked for several hours, having been stripped of its clothes,
betore it was buried in Humayun's tomb. Intizam-ud-Daula was
strangled next day.
Ghazi-ud-din now proclaimed as emperor, under the title of Shah
Jahan III, Muhiyy-ul-Millat, grandson of Kam Bakhsh, the youngest
son of Aurangzib, and marched towards Shukartar to assist Dattaji
Sindia in crushing Najib-ud-Daula, but heard on the way that an
armistice had been arranged and that Dattaji had marched towards
Lahore to oppose Ahmad Shah Abdali.
Not only the great Muslim nobles of northern India but also the
Hindu chieftains of Rajasthan were weary of the aggressions of the
Marathas, who were credited with the design of overthrowing even
the pageant of Mughul sovereignty. Many had on this account
1 See chap. XIV, p. 416.
2 29° 8' N. , 78° 16' E.


## p. 445 (#483) ############################################

THE MARATHAS OCCUPY THE PUNJAB
445
entered into correspondence with the Abdali and had begged him to
free them from the burden of Maratha oppression. The Abdali him-
self had recently received from the Marathas provocation so gross
as to call for immediate and severe chastisement.
When, after the sack of Delhi and the massacre at Muttra, he
returned in 1757 to Afghanistan, he left as his governor in the Punjab
his son Timur, with Jahan Khan as his guardian and adviser. Jahan
Khan appointed as governor of the Jullundur Duab the restless plotter
Adina Beg Khan, who had served many masters and betrayed all.
Shortly after his appointment he was summoned to Lahore in the
ordinary course of official business, but, fearing to trust himself
within his master's reach, fled into the hills. Adina Beg Khan then
entered into a conspiracy with the Sikhs who, with the help of a
detachment of his troops, attacked Jullundur, and expelled the new
governor. Raghunath Rao, the Peshwa's brother, who was now in
the neighbourhood of Delhi, also came to his assistance and, undeter-
red by the punishment which had followed previous intervention in
the Punjab, marched northward in April, 1758. He defeated and
captured the governor of Sirhind and in May entered Lahore as a
conqueror while Timur and Jahan Khan fled across the Indus. The
Punjab to the Chenab and as far south as the confluence of the Indus
and the Panjnad, with the transfluvial tract of Dera Ghazi Khan,
fell into the hands of the Marathas. Adina Beg Khan was appointed
governor on promising to pay an annual tribute of 7,500,000 rupees
and Raghunath Rao retired, as the rainy season was approaching.
Leaving Jankoji Sindia, nephew of Dattaji, in the neighbourhood
of Delhi with instructions to overrun Rajputana and to control
generally Maratha interests in northern India, he returned to the
Deccan, where his recent adventure was the subject of much un-
favourable criticism. In September, 1758, Adina Beg Khan died
and Jankoji Sindia appointed Sabaji Bhonsle as governor of the
Punjab.
In August, 1759, Ahmad Shah Abdali crossed the Indus, driving
the Maratha outposts before him, and Sabaji retreated rapidly
towards Delhi. Ahmad marched to Jammu, where he levied tribute
from the Raja, Ranjit Deo, and then continued his advance towards
Delhi. As the country west of the Jumna had been denuded of
supplies by the frequent passage of Maratha armies, he crossed the
Jumna into the northern Duab, but sent a force by the western route
to deal with Dattaji Sindia who, having abandoned the siege of
Shukartar, had crossed the Jumna and was marching towards Sirhind
to oppose his advance.
Ghazi-ud-din had two heavy crimes to answer for, the murders of
‘Alamgir II and of his own uncle, Intizam-ud-Daula, and on hearing
of the invader's advance he took refuge with Suraj Mal the Jat, who
sheltered him in one of his forts.


## p. 446 (#484) ############################################

4 16 AHMAD SHAH, 'ALAMGIR II AND SHAH 'ALAM
Ahmad was joined, on entering the northern Duab, by the Rohilla
chiefs Sa'd-ullah Khan, son of 'Ali Muhammad Khan, Hafiz Rahmat
Khan, and Dunde Khan, and by Najib-ud-Daula and Ahmad Khan
Bangash.
Dattaji Sindia retired before the Afghan force as the latter ad-
vanced from Sirhind and in January, 1760, had reached Barari, ten
miles north of Delhi. The force before which he had been retreating
faced him, and as the action began Ahmad Shah Abdali crossed the
Jumna with his whole army and suddenly attacked him in flank.
Dattaji perceived at once that defeat was inevitable and sent his
nephew Jankoji with a small force to the Deccan to raise the Marathas.
He then dismounted and died fighting bravely.
Ahmad Shah without halting to rest his army continued the pursuit
of Jankoji as far as Narnaul, and halted there.
Malhar Rao Holkar had hastened to meet Jankoji and planned
with him a campaign to harass the Afghans in the usual Maratha
style. He crossed into the Duab and there received information of
a large convoy of supplies and treasure in the Farrukhabad district,
which the troops of Ahmad Khan Bangash were escorting to Ahmad
Shah Abdali's camp, and which he promptly attacked and plundered.
Ahmad Shah at once sent a force to punish Holkar's temerity. This
force rode from Narnaul to Delhi, a distance of over eighty miles,
in a day and a night, rested for a day at Delhi and marched again
in the evening, traversing thirty-three miles and reaching Holkar's
camp at Sikandarabad at dawn. Holkar was completely surprised,
and his troops were routed with great slaughter. He escaped with
only about three hundred men, mounted on bare-backed horses.
The Peshwa was encamped on the Manjra river, in the Mughul
dominions in the Deccan, when he heard of these disasters, and sent
his eldest son, Vishvas Rao, in nominal command of a large army
with Sadashiv Rao, known as the Bhao 1 or cousin of Balaji Rao,
as real commander-in-chief. The Bhao's claim to be the virtual leader
of the expedition into Hindustan was admitted in view of his recent
victories in the Deccan. 2 Vishvas Rao was understood to be destined
for the throne of Delhi, and his position in the campaign was analo-
gous to that of a Mughul prince of tender years appointed to the
nominal command in an important enterprise, the direction of which
was, in fact, in the hands of a great noble designated as his tutor
or guardian.
The great force advanced northwards, joined as it passed along
by Marathas, by parties of horse sent by a few of the Rajput chief-
1
1 Bhao is the Marathi for "brother”. Among all Hindus relationship on the
male side, however distant, is commonly described by the terms "brother”,
"uncle”, and “nephew". Fifth or sixth cousins of the same generation are
"brothers”. A remove of a generation changes the relationship to “uncle" and
"nephew".
2 See chap. XIV, p. 413.


## p. 447 (#485) ############################################

1
A LARGE MARATHA ARMY REACHES DELHI 447
tains, by vast numbers of Pindaris and by irregulars of all descrip-
tions. It seemed a national cause to Hindus, and Suraj Mal the Jat,
through the agency of Holkar, was induced to meet the army with
30,000 men.
Ahmad Shah Abdali had returned from Narnaul to Delhi and, as
the country to the west of the Jumna was suffering from recent
depredations of the Marathas, he crossed that river and encamped
for the rainy season within easy reach of the Afghans in the Duab
and Rohilkhand, at Sikandarabad, the scene of Holkar's recent defeat.
Najib-ud-Daula was sent to invite Shuja'-ud-Daula to join the Afghan
army, and, meeting him near Kanauj, easily persuaded him that the
cause of the Abdali was that of Islam. On 18 July he joined Ahmad
Shah's camp with his forces.
In July the Maratha army reached the neighbourhood of Delhi.
The rainy season was at its height and, the Jumna not being fordable,
Sadashiv Bhao decided to occupy the capital before attacking the
enemy.
Suraj Mal and Ghazi-ud-din were not prepossessed by the appear-
ance or the methods of the Maratha army, or by the personality of
its commander. They had taken no part in the operations which had
led to the surrender of the fort, and they now definitely and finally
deserted the Maratha cause and retired to the Jat fortress of
Ballabhgarh.
Sadashiv Bhao made strenuous but fruitless efforts to detach
Shuja'-ud-Daula from Ahmad Abdali, and when these failed tried
to arouse Ahmad's suspicion and to create discord. On 10 October
he deposed and imprisoned the puppet Shah Jahan III and enthroned
Mirza Javan Bakht, son of 'Ali Gauhar, appointing Shuja'-ud-Daula
as his minister. Ahmad Shah refused to be hoodwinked and Shuja -
ud-Daula to be ensnared, but correspondence still continued after
the oriental fashion, between him and the Bhao, and he was, through-
out the campaign, the Bhao's channel of communication with Ahmad
Shah.
In October, at the close of the rainy season, Sadashiv marched
from Delhi towards Sirhind, his object being, apparently, to raise
and occupy the Punjab and thus cut off Ahmad Shah's retreat. On
17 October he reached the fort of Kunjpura, six miles north-east of
Karnal, now held for Ahmad Shah. He took and plundered the fort,
and continued his march towards Sirhind.
Ahmad Shah Abdali, learning of his movements left Sikandarabad.
crossed the Jumna at Baghpat, twenty-five miles north of Delhi, and
marched in pursuit, and Sadashiv Bhao, turning back, halted at
Panipat, at which place Ahmad Shah arrived three days later.
1 Some of these probably now repented of their appeal to the Afghan. The
Marathas undoubtedly posed as the champions of Hinduism against the unclean
alien.
2 The enthronement of Javan Bakht was purely nominal.


## p. 448 (#486) ############################################

418 AHMAD SHAH, ‘ALAMGIR II AND SHAH 'ALAM
As Sadashiv Rao had violated Maratha precedent in the equip-
ment of his army, so he now violated their traditional rules of war
and displayed a consciousness of his inferiority by strongly entrenching
himself in the town of Panipat, though this plan was opposed by many
of the leaders, who wished to fight in the old Maratha manner.
For more than two months after the arrival of the Abdali's army,
skirmishes continued which culminated in a great battle on 14
January, 1761, already described in the last chapter. This, the most
desperate of the three contests fought on the field of Panipat, destroyed
the great Maratha confederation and, for a time, the power of the
Maratha chiefs. On the eve of the battle India from the Indus and
Himalaya almost to the extreme limit of the Peninsula was forced
to own, however unwillingly, their sway, and those tracts not im-
mediately administered by them paid them tribute, and their nume-
rous chiefs all owned allegiance to one man, the Peshwa. Various
chiefs, Mahadji Sindia in Gwalior, Raghuji Bhonsle in Nagpur and
Berar, Malhar Rao Holkar in Malwa, and Damaji Gaikwar in Gujarat,
recovered portions of the Maratha empire, but the Peshwa's authority
was broken and cohesion was lost. Maratha alliances and confede-
racies again vexed India, but all hopes of a Maratha empire were
destroyed at Panipat.
The conqueror's design of seizing the empire of India for himself
was frustrated by the clamours of his troops demanding arrears of
pay and an immediate return to Kabul.
Before leaving India he
nominated 'Ali Gauhar, son of the murdered 'Alamgir II, as emperor
of Delhi, under the title of Shah 'Alam; Shuja'-ud-Daula was ap-
pointed minister, from which circumstance he and his successors in
Dudh were known to the British as Nawab Vazir, or “Nabob Vizier”,
until permitted, in 1819, to assume the royal title; and Najib-ud-Daula
was confirmed in the rank and appointment of Amir-ul-Umara.
Ghazi-ud-din disappeared from political life and according to some
accounts lingered in obscurity till 1800.
The third battle of Panipat closes the history of the Mughul Empire.
The destruction of the Maratha power did nothing to weld the various
states into which it had been broken or to restore the power and
authority of the emperor. Shah 'Alam was brutally blinded in 1788
by a Rohilla ruffian, Ghulam Qadir, and in 1803 was formally taken
under the protection of that power which the victory of Plassey had
already designated as successor of the Great Mughuls. His son
Akbar II (1806-37) lived and died a pensioner of the same power,
whose outraged authority sent his grandson, Bahadur II, to end his
days as an exile in Rangoon.


## p. 449 (#487) ############################################

CHAPTER XVI
THE REVENUE SYSTEM OF THE MUGHUL
EMPIRE
THE fiscal resources of the Mughul empire may be considered in
two main divisions-central and local. The local revenue, which
was apparently collected and disbursed without reference to the
central finance authorities, was derived from a bewildering variety of
petty taxes and duties levied on production and consumption, on trades
and occupations, on various incidents of social life, and most of all
on transport. There is nothing to be said for this mass of imposts
except that the system was accepted by the people as traditional,
that it prevailed outside the empire as well as within, and that it
can be traced back at any rate to the days of the Maurya rulers. In
the fourteenth century these imposts had been forbidden in the mass
by Firuz Tughluq as being contrary to Islamic law. The prohibition
was renewed on other 'grounds by Akbar, and it was repeated by
Aurangzib, but the effect of these orders was transitory, and the
system maintained itself up to the close of the Mughul period.
The central sources of revenue were by comparison few in number;
they may be classed as Commerce, Mint, Presents, Inheritance, Salt,
Customs, Poll-tax, and Land. From time to time the state took an
active part in commerce, but its operations were fiscally important
only when they involved a monopoly of particular commodities; these
monopolies ordinarily concerned munitions, such as lead or saltpetre,
but occasionally other articles were affected, the most noteworthy
case being the general monopoly of indigo created by Shah Jahan
in 1633, which, however, was quickly broken by the opposition of
the foreign buyers. The working of the mints was commonly farmed,
so that they must be regarded as a source of revenue; the yield is not
recorded, but it cannot have been large so long as the prescribed
standards of the currency were maintained.
Court etiquette required that presents of substantial value should
be offered to the emperor on various occasions, and ordinarily these
were worth much more than the presents given in return; an idea
of their fiscal importance can be formed from the fact that under
Shah Jahan, when the incidence was heaviest, the presents given at
the new year, the chief ceremonial occasion, totalled from one to
three million rupees in different years, from which must be deducted
the value, whatever it was, of what was given by the emperor in
return. As regards inheritance, the state claimed all the property
left by its officers, and the claim was extended on occasion to the
1 River tolls, and also exactions by assignees were prohibited by Jahangir.
29


## p. 450 (#488) ############################################

450
REVENUE SYSTEM OF THE MUGHUL EMPIRE
estates of wealthy merchants; anything relinquished for the main-
tenance of families and dependants was a matter of favour. The whole
claim was formally abandoned by Aurangzib, but there are some
indications that his orders were not carried out in their entirety.
Income from this source necessarily fluctuated; a particular officer
might leave a really large sum, such as Asaf Khan's fortune of twenty-
five millions of rupees in the reign of Shah Jahan, but such great
accumulations were necessarily rare, while many officers died in debt
or left very little for the treasury.
There was no uniform system of taxing salt, and some important
sources were controlled locally; the mines in the Punjab and the salt
lake at Sambhar in Rajputana were, however, administered by the
state. The income from these sources was apparently brought to
account as part of the land-revenue, and cannot be stated in precise
figures, but on the basis of the available statistics it cannot have been
more than about one million rupees. Compared with the present
standards, customs duties were formally low, ranging from 5 per cent.
downwards, but in practice their incidence was seriously increased
by arbitrary over-valuation, and by extra charges for prompt clear-
ance of goods. Some idea of the magnitude of the customs revenue
can be formed from the fact that in the middle of the seventeenth
century the port of Surat, at that time by far the most important
source, was reckoned to yield half a million rupees a year, after the
cost of its administration had been met.
The jizya, or poll-tax, which according to strict Islamic law was
payable only by Jews and Christians, had been claimed by some
earlier Muslim rulers from their Hindu subjects. The claim was
formally abandoned by Akbar, and in the Mughul period it was first
asserted by Aurangzib. Under effective administration the yield
might have been substantial, but this condition was not present, and
probably was unattainable in the circumstances of the time; the
amount actually realised is not recorded in the published authorities
for the period.
All these sources of the central revenue, taken together, were quite
small when compared with the land-revenue, which was reckoned
at more than ninety millions of rupees in the latter part of Akbar's
reign, and at 220 millions in the larger empire of Shah Jahan. The
disparity is indeed sufficient to justify the practice traditional in
India, and adopted in the remainder of this chapter, of using the
word 'revenue" in the restricted sense of land-revenue. The burden
on the land was increased further by the levy of cesses, proportionate
to the revenue, or charged on the unit of cultivation, as the case
might be, some of them general and permanent, others local and
temporary; but the authorities say very little about these, and no
estimate can be formed of the aggregate addition which they made
to the burdens of the peasant. The remainder of this chapter is


## p. 451 (#489) ############################################

SOURCES OF REVENUE
451
devoted to Revenue in the restricted sense, beginning with a general
view of the agrarian system of the country, and then describing the
course of events during the Mughul period.
The Mughuls did not, as has sometimes been suggested, introduce
a new revenue system into northern India; they took over the system
which they found in operation, a system which in its main lines was
consistent with Islamic law, as well as with the sacred law of Hindu-
ism on which it was ultimately based. Under the sacred law occupation
of land for production involved a liability to pay a share of the produce
a
to the state, which determined within certain limits the amount of
the share, and regulated the methods of assessment and collection.
Under Islamic law a conqueror was authorised to dispossess infidel
occupants, and distribute their lands among his followers; but if he
permitted the infidels to remain in possession, as was usually done in
India, he was entitled to claim from them a share of the produce, to
be assessed and collected as he thought best, and to be applied for the
benefit of Muslims in general, or in practice as the revenue of the
state which he established. Thus the ordinary Indian peasant was
not necessarily affected by conquest; he remained on the land, but he
came under a new master, who might possibly increase his burdens,
or more probably fall in for the moment with the arrangements which
he found in existence. Under this system there were three questions
of immediate interest to both the parties—the amount of the share
claimed by the state, the method of its assessment, and the arrange-
ments for collecting the sums due; these three points will be noticed
in order but something must first be said of the position occupiea
by the peasant.
The face of the country was divided into villages in the Indian
sense of the word, which is very nearly that of the English "civil
parish", denoting a specific area of land, usually but not necessarily
inhabited, originating probably more
more or less at haphazard, but
defined and recognised for administrative purposes. Most villages,
though not all, were occupied and managed by what appears to be
a very old institution, a brotherhood or community of peasants,
acknowledging, and united by, the tie of common ancestry. Each
member of the brotherhood held in separate possession the land which
he cultivated, and enjoyed the fruits of his labour; but in the manage-
ment of the affairs of the village the members acted as a body, their
agents being the headmen, chosen from among themselves according
to the custom of the locality. The headmen could let to tenants the
land not required by members of the brotherhood, and they repre-
sented the village in its dealings with the administration; the extent
of their powers varied in different regions, but they were everywhere
important; and in those villages where a brotherhood did not exist,
headmen were usually appointed by external authority for the dis-
charge of similar functions. Each village had a hereditary registrar


## p. 452 (#490) ############################################

452 REVENUE SYSTEM OF THE MUGHUL EMPIRE
or accountant, who maintained records of cultivation, receipts, and
payments, and assisted the headmen in the performance of the duties
which have just been described.
The villages were grouped into larger units known as parganas,
which were also recognised for administrative purposes. There was
a headman (chaudhri) in each pargana; his functions in the Muslim
period are not described in the authorities, but he received orders
from the administration, and exercised some sort of local jurisdiction.
There was also a registrar or accountant (qanungo) for the pargana,
the post was ordinarily hereditary, and its holder was the repository
of local agrarian knowledge, and, as the name implies, the interpreter
of local customs on whom foreign administrators relied.
The nature of the peasants' tenure cannot be described accurately
in the precise legal terms now in use. When a peasant not belonging
to the brotherhood was allowed by the headmen to cultivate land
in the village, the conditions of his tenure were primarily matters for
agreement between the two parties, and anything like uniformity
cannot be postulated; but it is probable that, while such agreements
were ordinarily made for a single year, the terms tended to be
repeated until they became customary in the eyes of both parties,
so that arbitrary ejectment or enhancement would have been viewed
with disfavour, provided always that the tenant paid the stipulated
sums. The amount of a tenant's payment was not usually fixed in
the lump, but was made up of the revenue due on his cultivation,
together with a proportionate addition representing the profit of the
brotherhood; and consequently it would vary with any alteration
made in the assessment of the village.
As regards the members of the brotherhood, there is no doubt that,
subject to due payment of the revenue, their connection with the
village was regarded as a settled fact; and if a village was deserted
owing to economic or administrative pressure, there was a general
understanding that the brotherhood could return and occupy it if
they chose to do so. Individual members of the brotherhood could
transmit their land to their heirs, and could transfer it by sale or
mortgage, but always subject to the fundamental condition that the
revenue due was paid. Under Hindu law a peasant could be ejected
for inefficiency, and possibly for other reasons also; no similar pro-
vision has been traced in the extant official documents of the Muslim
period, but these establish the fact that peasants could be flogged
for failure to produce adequate crops, while sale of a peasant's wife
and children, although not of the peasant himself, was a recognised
process for the recovery of arrears.
The explanation of this position, which appears so anomalous at
the present day, is to be found in the fact that neither Hindu text-
1 Known in northern India as patwari, in Gujarat as talati, in the Bombay
Deccan as kulkarni, and in Madras as karnam.


## p. 453 (#491) ############################################

THE AGRARIAN SYSTEM
453
writers nor Muslim administrators were concerned primarily with
peasants' rights. In Hindu law, the emphasis is on the peasant's
duty io cultivate land and pay the revenue; and the same idea
persisted throughout the Muslim period, when failure to cultivate,
or to pay was regarded as tantamount to rebellion. So long as a
peasant performed his duty, there would be no reason for displacing
him, while if he failed in his duty, his displacement would follow as
a matter of course, provided that a more efficient successor was avail-
able. The proviso is, however, important. During the Muslim period
competition for productive land was not general; in most places land
was waiting for peasants with the material resources needed for its
cultivation; and an inefficient peasant might be better than none at
all. In such circumstances the essence of successful administration
was to keep peasants on the land, not to turn them off it.
The operation of these ideas can be traced in documents issued in
the Muslim period by the Revenue Ministry, an organisation which
was, of course, controlled by the ruler of the time, but which appears
to have preserved its continuity during periods of violent political
change, and to have maintained a permanent departmental tradition
of its own. To attract peasants to vacant land, to induce peasants to
extend the area tilled, to secure improvement in the class of crops
grown, these were the permanent ideals, though in practice they
might often be masked by the need or the greed of the moment.
The texts are not absolutely in accordance regarding the share
of produce which a Hindu king might claim from the peasants
without sin, but the commonest figure is one-sixth, which might be
increased in emergencies to one-fourth, or even one-third. How far
practice conformed to theory in this matter is doubtful; some cases
which have been studied in detail indicate that the share actually
taken in particular Hindu kingdoms was nearer one-fourth than one-
sixth, but they are too few to form the basis of a confident generalisa-
tion. There is no similar arithmetical limitation in Islamic law; the
sovereign has a free hand, subject only to the warning emphasised
in the early texts that he should avoid discouraging production by
excessive burdens. In Muslim India it may be said in a general way
that the claim usually varied from one-third to one-half; and, in
the economic conditions which prevailed, it is probable that the lower
proportion was not far short of the danger-point, where production
would begin to be checked, while the higher proportion was almost
certainly injurious. There is nothing in the contemporary authorities
to show that any deductions were allowed before the produce was
divided, but it is not improbable that some small customary provision
was made in this way for charity and for the menial servants employed
in the village.
As regards methods of assessment, the primitive plan of dividing
the produce of each field at harvest is open to obvious practical


## p. 454 (#492) ############################################

454
REVENUE SYSTEM OF THE MUGHUL EMPIRE
objections, and for an indefinite period the usual practice of the
country has been to estimate the yield of the growing crop, and
charge the grower on the estimate, dividing the produce only in
those cases—ordinarily very rare—where the accuracy of the estimate
is disputed. Under these arrangements, which are conveniently
described as Sharing, by division or by estimation as the case may
be, the grower's liability varies from season to season both with the
area sown and with the yield harvested. In the common alternative
called Measurement, a fixed charge, either in cash or in produce, is
made on each unit of area sown, and the grower takes the whole
risk, being in theory liable for the full charge even when the crop
has failed; but in practice it was usually necessary to remit a portion
of the state's claim in unfavourable seasons. These two methods
of assessment-Sharing and Measurement-persisted side by side
throughout the Muslim period, but at some uncertain epoch there
emerged a third, which may be called Contract; under it the indi-
vidual peasant came to terms with the assessor, or with the headman,
to pay a stated sum for his holding, independent of the area he might
sow or the crop he might reap, so that his position was substantially
that of a tenant at the present day. Finally, in some parts of the
country there was a fourth method, the Plough-rent, which is not
easy to reconcile with the terms of the sacred law, and is perhaps even
older; under it, a stated charge was made on each plough and team,
the unit of productive power, and the owner of the team was free
to cultivate as much land as he could, and in whatever way he chose.
Under each of these methods the demand on the peasant might be
made either in cash or in produce at the option of the state, the
amount of produce due being valued at current prices when payment
was required in cash. Collection in kind was doubtless the earlier
practice, but throughout the Muslim period cash payment was the
general rule, though produce continued to be paid in some backward
areas, and in two recorded instances cash payments were suspended
to meet financial emergencies.
The modern idea that collection of State dues should be made by
salaried officials directly from the person liable is not generally
applicable to India during the Muslim period. The practice existed,
and on occasion was enforced over wide areas by individual admini-
strators; but the general rule was to delegate the work of collection
to one class or another of a heterogeneous group, whom it is con-
venient to describe collectively as Intermediaries, and who in practice
frequently decided on the method of assessment to be applied within
their charge. The main classes of Intermediaries were Chiefs, Head-
men, Farmers, and Assignees.
Under Muslim rule large areas of the country were left in the
possession of Hindu chiefs who had, at any rate, a claim to sovereignty,
but had submitted to the Muslim rulers on terms which preserved


## p. 455 (#493) ############################################

METHODS OF ASSESSMENT
455
to them internal jurisdiction; these terms might include the payment
of a fixed tribute, or merely the personal service of the chief with his
troops, but in either case the Muslim administration did not ordinarily
interfere with assessment or collection of the revenue, so long as the
terms were observed. If a chief defaulted, the result was ordinarily
a punitive expedition, and either his displacement or a revision of
the terms previously in force; but so long as he remained loyal, he
enjoyed the revenue of his territories subject to the payment of the
stipulated tribute, if any.
The position of a chief depended partly on the accessibility of his
territory, and partly on the strength of his clan. In broken country,
remote from an administrative centre, even a petty chief might main-
tain himself for an indefinite period merely or mainly because his
possessions were not worth annexing; in the open plains a chief who
was the head of a numerous and martial clan settled in a compact
area might survive because his fighting strength made him a dangerous
enemy but a valuable ally. The chronicles tell us little of such chiefs,
but their importance in the Muslm period can be inferred from the
number who survived into the nineteenth century, not only in
Rajputana and Central India, where many of them were accepted
as princes, but also in large areas in Bihar and the United Provinces,
where they usually became landholders.
It was a common practice for the revenue assessors to come to
terms with the headmen year by year for the revenue to be paid
by the village as a whole; the sum to be paid was fixed on a con-
sideration of the productive resources of the village, but was not
assessed directly on the separate portions of cultivated land, or on
the individual peasants. When this arrangement was made, the
headmen distributed the burden of the revenue according to the
custom of the village, collected each peasant's quota, paid the authori-
ties in lump sums, and bore the brunt of official severity in case of
default.
The practice of farming the revenue of a village, or larger area, is
of old standing in India; the farmer engaged to pay a lump sum,
hoping to collect more from the peasants, and so make a profit for
himself. Almost up to the end of the Muslim period the duration
of such farms was very short, one year being an ordinary term; but
in the eighteenth century the duration tended to become indefinite,
and in practice the position might even become hereditary.
Assignment was, however, the most distinctive institution of the
period. Every officer of the State was entitled to receive an income
defined precisely in cash, out of which he had ordinarily to maintain
a specified force of cavalry, available for the service of the ruler at
any time; but for all the more important officers payment of this
income in cash was the exception. Ordinarily an officer's claim was
satisfied by assignment of the revenue of an area estimated to yield


## p. 456 (#494) ############################################

456 REVENUE SYSTEM OF THE MUGHUL EMPIRE
the income due to him, and the assignee thereupon assumed the
administration of that area, assessing and collecting the revenue, and
endeavouring to obtain from it at least the amount of his claim, and
if possible something more. The assignee thus stood to the peasants
in the position of the state, and, subject to any restrictions imposed
on him by the authority, he had a free hand in the administration; he
could assess and collect the revenue of each peasant through his
servants, or he could deal with the headmen of the villages, or he
could hand them over to farmers. Throughout the Muslim period
the great bulk of the cultivated land was ordinarily in the hands of
assignees, but certain tracts, described as khalisa, were reserved to
provide the treasury with cash, and were managed by the Revenue
Ministry on one or other of the systems already described.
The foregoing analysis is necessary for descriptive purposes, but,
taken by itself, it might give a misleading idea of rigidity in what was
essentially a flexible structure. It was a simple and natural arrange-
ment for a salaried staff working at a distance to undertake to supply
a stated net income, instead of rendering complicated and detailed
accounts of receipts and expenditure, and collectors could thus easily
be transformed into farmers. A farmer holding for an indefinite term
could assume a position not distinguishable in practice from that
of a tribute-paying chief; a village headman might in favourable
circumstances become a village autocrat, and, by taking farms of
neighbouring villages, raise himself by degrees to a similar position;
and in periods when the central authority was weak such tendencies
might operate to transform the conditions prevailing over large areas.
From these preliminary explanations we may turn to the history
of the subject during the Mughul period. There is no formal descrip-
tion of the revenue system in force in northern India at the opening
of the sixteenth century; but incidental notices in the chronicles show
that under the Lodi dynasty the great bulk of the kingdom was held
in assignment by the Afghan leaders who constituted its effective
· strength. They show also that in practice the assignees enjoyed a free
hand in regard to assessment, as well as in the treatment of any
minor chiefs whose lands lay within their assignments; and the only
record of interference by the king is an order issued by Ibrahim
Lodi prohibiting the assignees from taking revenue in cash, an order
which appears to have been justified by the prevailing scarcity of
silver currency. In the absence of any record of a change, it may be
assumed that these arrangements persisted in their main lines under
Babur and Humayun, and the basis of Akbar's distinctive system is
to be found in the reorganisation effected by Sher Shah.
As depicted in the chronicles Sher Shah stands out as a masterful
and tireless administrator of the Indian type, attending personally
to every detail of the business of his kingdom, and introducing large
changes of system in what would now be thought a very summary


## p. 457 (#495) ############################################

SHER SHAH'S REORGANISATION
457
manner;. but his reign was too short to furnish a final test of the
suitability of the measures he introduced. He stands out also as the
only ruler of northern India who is known to have acquired practical
experience in the detailed work of assessing and collecting revenue,
for as a young man he had brought into order the assignment held
by his father from the Lodi dynasty. The chronicler's account of his
activities at this time shows that he had already accepted the prin-
ciples which later on he was to apply on a large scale in northern
India; he believed in maintaining direct relations with the individual
peasants, he distrusted the village headmen, and he regarded equitable
assessment and strict collection as the two essentials of revenue
administration.
The share of the produce which he claimed at this time is not on
record; but after his accession to the throne in the year 1540 the
general proportion taken from the kingdom, apart from one favoured
region, was one-third, and probably this was not an innovation, but
was a standard already familiar in practice. The method of assess-
ment adopted was measurement, the charge on each unit of area
sown being a stated weight of produce. The authorities do not indicate
a
clearly whether the peasants were now required to pay in cash or in
grain; the former is more probable, because Ibrahim's order for
grain-payments was the result of scarcity of currency, and this diffi-
culty must have disappeared under Sher Shah, who reorganised the
currency and coined both silver and copper in large quantities. The
distinctive feature of the new arrangements was the way in which
the demand on the peasants was calculated. Standard yields of each
staple crop were calculated or estimated-how this was done is not
recorded—separately for three classes of land, described as “good”,
"middling”, and “inferior"; the average of these figures was struck;
and one-third of the average was claimed as revenue from each unit
of area, whatever its actual yield might be. The effect was neces-
sarily to overcharge the bad land, and to undercharge the good;
in the case of wheat, for instance, the charge works out at about
24 per cent. of the estimated produce of “good” land, while on
"inferior” land it was 48 per cent. The inequality would, however,
naturally adjust itself by variations in the crops grown, so that exces-
sive charges would tend to be eliminated.
On one point of great practical importance the authorities are
ambiguous; it is uncertain whether these standard yields were calcu-
lated separately for each agricultural tract, or whether single standards
were adopted for the kingdom as a whole. If the latter course was
followed, over-pressure of the less productive regions must, in an
extensive kingdom, have led to a complete breakdown on the occur-
rence of unfavourable seasons; if the former, the arrangements might
have been reasonably successful; but, as has been said above, the
reign was too short for them to be adequately tested, and the political
7


## p. 458 (#496) ############################################

458
REVENUE SYSTEM OF THE MUGHUL EMPIRE
instability of the years intervening between the death of Sher Shah
and the accession of Akbar was such as to mask the operation of
economic factors.
As regards the method of collection, Sher Shah granted assign-
ments as his predecessors had done; there is nothing on record to
indicate that he curtailed the freedom which assignees had pre-
viously enjoyed, though the general character of his administration
renders this not improbable. We may be confident that his methods
were followed closely in the tracts reserved for the treasury, and we
may conjecture that, to a varying extent, they prevailed also in
assignments.
The historical importance of Sher Shah's methods lies in the fact
that they formed the starting-point of the series of experiments in
administration which marked the first half of Akbar's reign. Much
information regarding these experiments is furnished by the authori-
ties, but they are in some respects incomplete, while their language
is highly technical; particular statements divorced from their context
may easily be misunderstood; and the account which follows, based
on study of the authorities as a whole, differs substantially from much
which has been written on the subject in the past. It deals in order,
first, with the experiments in assessment made in the heart of the
empire, from the Punjab to Bihar; next, with the practice in regard
to assignments; and then with the working of the arrangements finally
adopted for the empire as a whole.
In the early years of Akbar's reign the revenue was assessed by
measurement, and the demand made on the peasants was based on
a schedule of assessment rates which had been prepared under Sher
Shah: as has been said above, it is uncertain whether Sher Shah
used one schedule or several, but under Akbar there is no doubt
that only one was employed. From the outset the demand was made
in cash, the produce due under the schedule being valued at prices
fixed by order of the emperor. These arrangements could not be
made to work satisfactorily: nor is it possible that they could have
worked for long. Just at first, the prices fixed for valuing the produce
were uniform for the whole empire, and were apparently based on
those which ruled in the vicinity of the court. In the tenth year of
the reign varying local prices were substituted for the uniform scale
previously used; but this measure, though obviously an improvement,
did not suffice to remove the difficulties, and three years later the
use of Sher Shah's schedule was abandoned so far as the reserved
areas were concerned, though seasonal cash-rates continued to be
calculated from it, presumably for the use of assignees. For the
reserved areas a more summary procedure was introduced, which is
not explained in detail; probably it was assessment through the
headmen, though it is possible that in some cases farms were given.
These summary assessments must be regarded as a temporary


## p. 459 (#497) ############################################

ASSESSMENT UNDER AKBAR
459
mneacure, intended merely to tide over the emergency, for in the
fifteenth year of the reign (1570-71) new schedules of assessment
rates, applicable to all land whether assigned or reserved, were
brought into force throughout the country. According to my reading
of the authorities, the new schedules were of precisely the same form
as the old, showing the demand to be made on the peasant as one-
third of the average estimated produce; the difference lay in the
fact that the average produce was now estimated separately for each
pargana, and not for the empire as a whole, thus eliminating the
difficulties which had resulted from ignoring local differences in pro-
ductivity. The demand was still stated in terms of produce, and the
prices at which it was valued in each season required the emperor's
sanction.
These new schedules were worked out by the qanungos, each for
his own pargana, under the supervision of Raja Todar Mal, who was
now associated with Muzaffar Khan in the charge of the Revenue
Ministry, and was in practice its effective head. Todar Mal's early
history is obscure. He has been identified by some modern writers
with one Todar Khattri, who was employed by Sher Shah in building
the fort of Rohtas, and it has been assumed that he was connected
with the revenue administration from that time onward; but the
identification is not supported by anything in the contemporary
chronicles, and the mere name is scarcely an adequate basis for a
confident conclusion. In Akbar's reign he emerges first in the year
1565, when he was performing military duties; and from 1570 to
his death in 1589 he fills a conspicuous place in the chronicles, some-
times as a successful commander in the field, sometimes as the
Revenue Minister, to which post he returned from successive military
expeditions, always as a highly competent and exceptionally honest
officer, who at the same time was not easy to work with owing to
his ill-temper, obstinacy, and vindictiveness.
The assessment schedules which were introduced in 1570-71
remained in force for ten years, and apparently they were found
suitable, so far as the claim, stated in produce, was concerned; but
recurring difficulties in calculating the seasonal cash-demand even-
tually led to their abandonment. The prices at which the produce-
claim should be valued had to be sanctioned by the emperor,
separately for each region and for each season. The emperor was
constantly on the move, the distances to be covered increased with
the expansion of the empire, the issue of orders was delayed, and the
whole business of assessment and collection was thereby hindered,
to the inconvenience of everyone concerned; while, in addition, the
reports of local prices, on which the emperor's orders were based,
were suspected in some cases to be fraudulent. Akbar met the
emergency by deciding to discard schedules stated in produce, and
to fix assessment rates in cash, which could be applied, season by


## p. 460 (#498) ############################################

460
REVENUE SYSTEM OF THE MUGHUL EMPIRE
season, to the area actually cropped without the need for recurring
references to the court.
For this purpose the parganas were grouped into what would now
be called assessment circles on the basis of agricultural homogeneity,
and for each circle a schedule of rates was framed showing the amount
of money to be demanded on the unit area of each crop, known as
bigha; the size of this unit varied within wide limits, but the bigha
to which the schedules refer was probably a little less than five-
eighths of an acre. The range of the rates was extensive; one schedule,
which may be taken as a fair sample, shows that small millets were
charged 11 dam, large millets from 25 to 30, barley 40, wheat 60,
sugarcane and indigo 120, and betel 220 dam, the dam being approxi-
mately one-fortieth of a rupee. Such figures make it easy to under-
a
stand why the Revenue Ministry consistently pressed for improvement
in the class of crops; a change from cereals to sugarcane for instance
would immediately double or treble the revenue due from the area
affected.
Contemporary descriptions of this reform are incomplete, but
apparently the method adopted was to strike an average for each
circle of the cash-demand rates which had been used within that
circle during the ten years for which Todar Mal's schedules had been
in operation. It is uncertain whether these averages were adjusted,
or were used as they worked out; but the schedules, in which the
rates are given in thousandths of a rupee, show that no attempt was
made to secure round or convenient figures for the recurring calcula-
tions, and it is probable that no formal adjustments were made.
With these schedules of rates stated in cash, the process of seasonal
assessment was simple. When the crops were showing above ground,
measuring parties were sent into the villages to record the areas
which had been sown. From these field records the total area sown
by each peasant was extracted, crop by crop, care being taken to
exclude areas where sowings had failed; the sanctioned assessment
rates were then used to calculate the total revenue due from that
peasant; and the sums due from each peasant were brought together
in an assessment statement for the village, on the basis of which col-
lections were made at harvest, though the rules provided for adjust-
ments required by injury to crops after the assessment had been made.
So far as the chronicles show, this method of assessment remained
in force until the end of Akbar's reign, but its application was not
absolutely rigid. One case is recorded where the sanctioned charges
were temporarily raised. Akbar's prolonged residence in Lahore had
resulted in a marked rise of local prices, and the revenue demand
was increased by 20 per cent, in the area affected, but this temporary
increase was discontinued when the emperor left the Punjab in the
year 1598. No other increase of the same kind is recorded, but the
silence of the chronicles is not conclusive in such matters. On the


## p. 461 (#499) ############################################

ASSIGNMENTS UNDER AKBAR
461
other hand, a series of exceptionally good seasons occurring in the
country between Delhi and Allahabad from 1585 to 1590 led to such
a fall of prices that the revenue could not be paid, and large remis-
sions had to be granted—by assignees as well as in the lands reserved
for the treasury. There is no record of remissions having been made
in years when the crops were bad, and we may assume that this
eventuality was considered to be met by the standing provisions
mentioned above for the exclusion of areas where sowings had failed,
and for adjusting the assessment to meet subsequent injuries.
We now pass from assessments to assignments. In the opening
years of Akbar's reign, officers were ordinarily remunerated by
assignment, and a difficulty emerged which must always have been
latent in the system. An eastern autocrat was bound to be liberal,
if he was to retain the services of an adequate and competent staff;
and liberality was even more indispensable in the case of an autocracy
in the making, the position which Bairam Khan as regent for Akbar
had to face. It is no matter for surprise therefore that the cost of
establishment should have grown more quickly than the resources
of what was a relatively small empire, and that the Revenue Ministry
should have found itself unable to make assignments sufficient to
cover the salaries granted by the regent. The way in which the
difficulty was met was characteristic of the times. For the purpose
of allocating assignments the Ministry maintained registers, which
may be called “the Valuation of the Empire”, or more shortly, “the
Valuation”, showing the income which each local area might be
expected to yield, one year with another, to the assignee. When
orders for assignments could not be met in full, the figures in the
valuation were arbitrarily raised, so that the orders could be carried
out on paper, but the assignee would in fact be unable to realise
the income to which he was entitled. The inevitable result was dis-
satisfaction throughout the staff of the empire, and corruption inside
the Ministry
The original record having thus become worthless, Akbar in the
year 1566 ordered the preparation of a new valuation, which was
duly effected, but it went the way of the first, being corruptly
falsified; and by 1573 the dissatisfaction in the state service was such
that the emperor decided, with the concurrence, or perhaps at the
suggestion, of Raja Todar Mal, to pay salaries in cash, and to bring
practically the whole of northern India directly under the Revenue
Ministry. For this purpose the country was divided into circles, each
estimated to yield, when fully developed, a crore (karor) of dam
(250,000 rupees), and a staff of officials was posted to each circle
with instructions to press on agricultural development as quickly as
possible; the officer in charge of the circle was officially designated
'Amil, or 'Amalguzar, that is to say, Administrator, but popularly
he became known as Karori, a sobriquet derived from the nominal


## p. 462 (#500) ############################################

462 REVENUE SYSTEM OF THE MUGHUL EMPIRE
extent of his charge, and eventually this designation passed into the
official language. These arrangements lasted for five years. In 1579–
80 a new valuation was made, calculated on the precise data furnished
by the ten years' operation of Todar Mal's assessment rates, and the
practice of assignment again became general, though this fact is not
formally recorded in the chronicles. The reasons for the change are
matters for conjecture. The most probable view is that the intro-
duction of cash salaries was intended from the first as a temporary
measure, pending the time when data for a trustworthy valuation
should become available; but in any case the reversion to the practice
of assignment may have been hastened by the occurrence of grave
scandals in the revenue administration.
The large and sudden extension of direct assessment and collection
was obviously an enterprise requiring careful supervision. This re-
quirement was provided at the outset, for the initial measures were
planned by Raja Todar Mal, and executed by the staff which he
had chosen; but shortly afterwards he was called away for military
duty, and the charge of the Revenue Ministry devolved on Khvaja
Shah Mansur, who, it may be assumed, followed the usual practice
of the period, and replaced the existing staff by his own nominees.
A period of corruption and extortion ensued, which brought the
revenue administration into disrepute, and operated to restrict culti-
vation, and thereby reduce the financial resources of the empire,
which it had been hoped to increase. When, after the execution of
Shah Mansur for treason in 1581, Raja Todar Mal resumed effective
charge of the Ministry, he issued orders for the prevention of such
malpractices in future, and at the same time took drastic action
against the officials suspected of misconduct, calling them to account
for the sums they had embezzled or extorted, and employing the
traditional procedure, under which a suspect was detained in prison,
and flogged, or otherwise tortured, periodically, until a satisfactory
settlement was reached.
These processes dragged on for some years, but were at last brought
to a close by the intervention of Akbar, who appointed Amir Fath-
ullah Shirazi as an imperial commissioner (Amin-ul-mulk) to dispose
of the cases pending in the Revenue Ministry, and in effect to be at
its head, though Todar Mal was not formally superseded. The com-
missioner performed his duties effectively, and drew up proposals,
which were sanctioned by the emperor, for reforming the procedure
of the Ministry in its relations with the local staff. This measure,
introduced in 1585, practically completes the revenue history of the
reign, so far as it finds a place in the chronicles. The only important
change recorded in later years was the decision, taken in 1596, to bring
the provincial revenue officers, now designated Diwan, directly under
the orders of the Ministry, thus relieving the viceroy of responsibility
for revenue administration, and originating the administrative dyarchy


## p. 463 (#501) ############################################

AKBAR'S REGULATION SYSTEM
463
which persisted until the collapse of the empire, with revenue busi-
ness (diwani) conducted independently of the general administration
(faujdari).
The result of the period of experiment which covered the first half
of Akbar's reign was to provide a workable revenue system for
northern India; but the system was not applied to the outlying
portions of the empire, each of which was treated as the local circum-
stances required. The standard, or "regulation", system may be
described as follows. The basis of the state's claim on the peasant
was still one-third of the produce, but the actual demand was made
in the form of a sum of money, varying with the locality and with
the crop, on each unit of area sown in each season. The bulk of
northern India was assigned, and the detailed conduct of assessment
and collection was in the hands of the assignees, who, however, were
bound by the sanctioned schedules of assessment rates. The area
reserved for the treasury was divided into circles, each in charge of a
karori or collector, who was under the orders of the provincial diwan,
himself responsible, at first to the viceroy, but afterwards directly
to the Revenue Ministry. The collector was required to deal with
established cultivation strictly in accordance with the regulation
system; but he was under constant pressure to increase the revenue
yielded by his circle by the two traditional processes, extension of
cultivation and improvement in the class of crops; and, in order to
attain these objects, he was allowed a considerable degree of latitude.
Thus he was authorised to reduce the standard rates on the more
remunerative crops, when this was necessary in order to secure an
increase in the area under them; he could make temporary reductions
in the schedules of rates in case of land which had gone out of cultiva-
tion, so as to stimulate its reclamation; for extension of tillage in
waste land he could agree to almost whatever terms the peasants
offered; and when the village headmen exerted themselves success-
fully with this object, he could allow them a substantial commission
by way of reward. When the assessments fell due, the peasants
were encouraged to bring their revenue personally to the local
treasury, though collecting agents were also employed in the villages;
and, speaking generally, it may be said that the distinctive feature
of the system was the direct relationship which it established between
the collector and the individual peasant, who was to be treated as
an independent unit, encouraged to increase production, and assisted
with loans for that purpose, but held firmly to the engagements into
which he had entered.
It will be obvious that the success or failure of this system must
have depended entirely on the quality of the administration. The
amount of detailed work, to be accomplished season by season under
the strict time limit imposed by agricultural conditions, was very
great; opportunities for extortion and oppression of individuals were


## p. 464 (#502) ############################################

464
REVENUE SYSTEM OF THE MUGHUL EMPIRE
numerous; and if there was dishonesty or inefficiency at the centre,
the system must soon have broken down. There is no record of a
collapse, or of a recurrence of scandals like those which occurred
before the year 1581; but it must be borne in mind that our informa-
tion regarding the closing years of the reign is much less detailed than
for the earlier period. The most probable view is that, while the system
worked reasonably well under Akbar, it disappeared under his suc-
cessor, but definite evidence on this question is wanting.
This regulation system extended, broadly speaking, to the plains
of northern India, excluding the areas left in the hands of the Hindu
chiefs, that is to say, to the provinces of Multan, Lahore, Delhi
(excluding the Kumaun hills), Agra, Allahabad, and the bulk of Bihar;
but the southern parts of the two last-named provinces, bordering on
the unadministered region known as Gondwana, were excluded from
its operations, as was the hill-country lying between Bihar and
Bengal. The system was in force also in those parts of Ajmer which
were not left to the chiefs, and it is said to have been introduced in
Malwa, but the records regarding this province are obscure; the
eastern portion, bordering on Gondwana, and the western portion,
bordering on Ajmer, were left to chiefs, while apparently some
arrangements more simple than the regulation system were in force
over a large part of the remainder of the province.
In the outlying provinces, local practices were ordinarily continued.
In the northern mountains Kashmir, Kabul and Qandahar-these
practices were diversified, and too complex to be summarised in a
few words; here as elsewhere, the basic idea was to take a share of
the produce, but the share was ordinarily calculated by methods
which gave an approximation to the system of measurement. In
Sind one-third of the produce was claimed, and the demand was
assessed by sharing. The records regarding Gujarat are conflicting,
but can be interpreted on the hypothesis that measurement was prac-
tised for a time, and then superseded by assessment on the village as
a unit made with the headmen, or possibly with farmers. In Berar
and (probably) Khandesh such village assessments were the rule,
and the same statement holds good of Bengal (including Orissa);
contemporary authorities lend no support to the legend which was
current at the end of the eighteenth century that Todar Mal made
a detailed assessment on the individual peasants of Bengal.