The
foundation
of the stages of bonds.
Bruno-Cause-Principle-and-Unity
8 From what we have said in the 8 In other writings, Bruno uses this phrase to refer to himself.
? ? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? preface to this part of this treatise, these other descriptions of feelings and other types of bonds have an analogy to our notion of feelings and bonds.
? ? . The distribution of bonds. Perfect things are bonded to perfect things; noble things and nobility are bonded to noble things; and things which are imperfect and defective are bonded to things which are imperfect and defective. As a result, it was said above that part of what is in that which is to be bound must be present in the bonding agent. A completely chaste girl, in whom there are no seeds of excitement, is not bound to sensory pleasure by any star or by any artifice if she has not been touched or embraced, that is, (I say) she has not submitted herself to the hand of a bonding agent, and his hand has not reached out to her. I will say nothing about an immature girl, for in all actions there must be some seed, but not all seeds are fruitful everywhere. And whose attempt to entice someone who is ill, or old, or frigid or castrated would not be frustrated (the opposite would apply to those who would not make the attempt)? In regard to social bonds, a proportional judgement is quite easy to make.
? ? . The degrees of bonds. Things in the universe are so ordered that they constitute one definite co-ordination in which there can occur a transition from all things to all things in one continuous flow. Some of these things are immediately related to others, for example, the natural propagation of individuals of the same species, and in these cases the bonds are blood related, familiar and easy. Other things are interrelated through various intermediaries, and all of these intermediaries must be crossed over and penetrated so that bonds are stretched across from the bonding agent to that which is bound. Thus, by their generosity to things and by their good- will in sharing with these intermediaries, spirits influence inferior, and even the lowest, things and bind them to themselves. On the other hand, lower things are raised up with a certain reverence through a natural or rational sequence so that, through the free consent of higher things, they can bind to themselves superior things located far above them. And just as there are various species of things and differences between them, they also have var- ious times, places, intermediaries, pathways, instruments and functions. It is very easy to see this and to understand it for all types of bonds and things that can be bound.
? ? . The size of a bond. In all things there is a divine force, that is, love, the father himself, the source, the Amphitrite of bonds. Thus, Orpheus and
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? Mercury were not wrong when they called this the great demon, for this bond is indeed the entire substance, constitution, and (if I may say so) the hypostasis of things. We come to know this greatest and most important bond when we turn our eyes to the order of the universe. By this bond, higher things take care of lower ones, lower things are turned toward higher ones, equal things associate with each other and lastly, the perfection of the universe is revealed in the knowledge of its form.
? ? . The principal effect of a bond. If there were only one love, and thus only one bond, all things would be one. But there are many different character- istics in different things. Hence, the same thing binds different things in different ways. As a result, Cupid is said to be both above and below, both the newest and the oldest, both blind and most observant. Cupid made all things in such a way that, for the preservation of their species, they remain firm in their powers or in themselves and are not separated from them- selves. But then, in regard to the changes which occur in individual things, he arranged it so that they would be separated from themselves in a certain sense when the lover eagerly desires to be completely transported into the loved one; and also that they would be unrestrained, opened up and thrown wide open when the lover desires to embrace and to devour the loved one completely. Thus it happens that the bond by which things wish to be where they are and not to lose what they have also causes them to wish to be everywhere and to have what they do not possess. This is due to a sense of complacency with what is possessed, to a desire and an appetite for what is absent but possessable, and to a love for all things. A particular and finite good and truth is not sufficient for an individual appetite and intellect, which have as their objects what is universally good and universally true. From this it follows that a finite potency in some definite material body simultaneously experiences the effects both of being drawn together and of being pulled apart, dispersed and scattered by the same bond. This gen- eral characteristic of a bond is to be found in each individual type of bond.
? ? . The quality of a bond. In itself, a bond is neither beautiful nor good. Rather, it is the means by which things as a whole, and each individual thing, pursue what is beautiful and good. It connects that which receives with that which is received, that which gives with that which is given, that which can be bound with a bonding agent, that which is desired with the one who desires. Indeed, that which desires the beautiful and the good
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? lacks these qualities insofar as it desires them. Thus, to that degree it is neither beautiful nor good. Hence, one of the Peripatetics was wrong in his statement about matter when he concluded that matter is ugly and evil, because the desire for the good and beautiful is itself evidence that matter lacks these properties. Aristotle said more carefully that matter is not 'ugly' or 'evil' as such. 9 Rather, the actual truth is that that which, like matter, tends and moves equally towards goodness and evil, ugliness and beauty, is in itself neither ugly nor beautiful, neither evil nor good. If matter were evil, it would be contrary to its nature to desire the good; the same would be true if it were naturally ugly. And if it were evil by analogy, then it would also analogously possess a contrary which does not desire, but, rather, excludes and rejects, the other contary. The more profound philosophers understand this as we have declared elsewhere. That is, matter itself, in its bosom, is the beginning of all forms, such that all things originate and are produced from it; it is not a pure negation, as if all things originated from the outside as foreigners; indeed, outside of the bosom of matter there are no forms; rather, all forms are both latent within it and are derived from it. Consequently for anyone who considers bonds at the social level and in their full meaning, it should be clear that in every material thing or part of matter, in every individual or particular thing, all seeds are contained within and lie hidden there, and, as a result, the inclinations of all bonds can be actuated by a skilful effort. In one of our 'Thirty Small Signs',10 we have explained in general how such an inclination and its transformation take place.
? ? . The generality or universality of a bond. From what has just been said, it follows that the love by which we love, and the tendency by which all things desire, are intermediaries between good and evil, between the ugly and the beautiful (not themselves being ugly or beautiful). And so they are good and beautiful because of a sort of sharing and participation, for the bond of love has a nature which is both active and passive. And by this, things act, or are acted upon, or both, as they desire to be ordered, joined, united and completed, insofar as it is within the nature of each thing to be occupied with order, joining, union and completion. Without this bond there is nothing, just as without nature there is nothing. Because of this, therefore, love is not a sign of imperfection when it is considered in matter and in the
9 See Physics, ? , ? (? ? ? . a. ? ? ).
10 See Part ? , 'On Bonding Agents in General', Article ? ? , 'No one particular thing can bind every-
thing'.
? ? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? chaos before things were produced. For indeed, anything which is con- sidered in the chaos and in brute matter, and is also said to be love, is simultaneously said to be a perfection. And whatever is said to be imper- fect, disordered and not to be, is understood not to be love. Thus, it is estab- lished that love is everywhere a perfection, and this bond of love gives witness everywhere to perfection. When an imperfect thing desires to be perfected, this, indeed, takes place in something which is imperfect, but not because it is imperfect. Rather, this happens because of a participation in a perfection and in a divine light and in an object having a more eminent nature, which it desires more strongly inasmuch as the object is more viva- cious. That which is more perfect burns with greater love for the highest good than does that which is imperfect. Therefore, that principle is most perfect which wishes to become all things, and which is not oriented to any particular form but to a universal form and universal perfection. And this is universal matter, without which there is no form, in whose power, desire and disposition all forms are located, and which receives all forms in the development of its parts, even though it cannot receive two forms at the same time. Hence, matter is in a sense divine, just as a form, which is either a form of matter or nothing, is also in a sense divine. There is nothing out- side of matter or without matter, otherwise the power to make and the power to be made would be one and the same thing, and would be grounded in one undivided principle, because the power to make anything and the power of anything to be made would be either present or absent together. There is only one potency taken absolutely and in itself (what- ever it may be in particulars, in composites and when taken accidentally, a question which dominated the thinking and the minds of the Peripatetics and their monkish followers). I have said this in many places in my De infinito et universo and more precisely in my De principio et uno11, where I conclude that it is not a foolish opinion which was defended by David of Dinant and by Avicebron in his Fons vitae, who cited the Arabs who also ventured to assert that God is matter.
? ? . The comparison of bonds. The most important of all bonds is the bond of Venus and of love in general, and that which is primarily and most power- fully the opposite of love's unity and evenness is the bond of hate. Indeed, to the degree that we love one of two opposites and contraries of any type,
? 11 For the former (De l'infinito universo e mondi), see G. Bruno, Dialoghi italiani, ed. by G. Gentile and G. Aquilecchia (Florence: Sansoni, ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? -? ; for the latter (De la causa, principio, e uno) see Ibid. , pp. ? ? ? , ? ? ? , ? ? ? . (above, pp. ? , ? ? , ? ? )
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? then to that same degree we hate and reject the other. These two feelings, or rather, in the last analysis, this one feeling of love (whose substance includes hate) dominates all things, is lord over all things, and elevates, arranges, rules and moderates all things. This bond dissolves all the other bonds. For example, female animals who are restrained by the bond of Venus do not get along well with other females, and males do not tolerate rival male suitors. They neglect food and drink and even life itself, not giv- ing up even when conquered. Rather, the more they are worn out, the more they press on, fearing neither storms nor the cold. Because of this argu- ment, Aristippus decided that the highest good is bodily, and especially sexual, pleasure, but he held before his eyes a rather animalistic view of man as a result of his own conclusion. But still, it is true that the more skilful and clever bonding agent, who uses things which the one to be bound or tied loves and hates, expands his pathway to the bonds of the other feelings. For indeed, love is the bond of bonds.
? ? . The time and place of bonds. Even though the best seed is sown, the gen- eration of new things does not occur always and everywhere. Likewise, bonds are not effective always and everywhere in capturing an object, but only at the proper time and with the appropriate disposition of the object.
? ? . The distinction of bonds. There are no purely natural or purely voluntary bonds (in the sense in which people commonly distinguish between the natural and the voluntary). The will acts with the participation of the intel- lect, while the intellect is not limited by the will but acts everywhere, except where nothing exists. We have proven this in other places, and thus it would be useless to discuss the matter further here. According to our understanding, there are three different types of bonds: the natural, the rational and the voluntary (even though all things are based on one natural foundation). Consequently, to some degree we cannot set boundaries between one type of bond and another. Thus, the laws of prudence do not prohibit love, but love beyond reason. And the deceivers of the foolish pre- scribe without reason limits to reason, and condemn the laws of nature. And the most corrupt say that nature is corrupt, because humans are not raised above nature like heroes but are degraded like beasts as against nature and are beneath all dignity.
? ? . The development and stages of a bond. According to the Platonists, the construction of the bond of Cupid occurs as follows. First, some type of
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? beauty or goodness, or some such thing, is brought into the external senses. Second, it is taken on to the centre of the senses, that is, to the common sense; then, third, into the imagination; and fourth, into the memory. Then the soul, by its own power, desires first that it be moved, redirected and captured; second, once redirected and captured, it is enlightened by a ray of the beautiful or the good or the true; third, once enlightened and illu- minated, it is inflamed by sensory desire; fourth, once inflamed, it desires to be united to the thing loved; fifth, once united, it is absorbed and incor- porated; sixth, once incorporated, it then loses its previous form and in a sense abandons itself and takes on an alien quality; seventh, it, itself, is transformed by the qualities of the object through which it has moved and has thus been affected. The Platonists call the responses to the initial motions Cupid's preparation; the redirecting, Cupid's birth; the illumina- tion, Cupid's nourishment; the inflaming, Cupid's growth; the union, Cupid's attack; the incorporation, Cupid's domination; and the transfor- mation, Cupid's victory or completion.
? ? .
The foundation of the stages of bonds. You can now see how this scale is based on its individual stages. Cupid's birth issues first from the body's nourishment, sensitivity and sexual expression, and second from the soul or spirit because of its charm, or playfulness, or contemplation, which is worthy of a better name, in which beauty is joined with pleasantness. Cupid's food, which prevents the newborn from expiring, is the knowledge of what is beautiful. Cupid's growth is due to a lingering reflection on the knowledge of what is beautiful. Cupid's attack consists in the fact that the soul slides and spreads from one part to all parts of the beloved so that it can inflame the whole. Cupid's domination is grounded in the action by which the soul of the lover, having abandoned his own body, lives and acts in the other. Cupid's transformation occurs when the lover, having died to himself, lives another life in such a way that he lives there as in his own house rather than in someone else's house. Thus, it is said that Jupiter was transformed into a bull, Apollo into a shepherd, Saturn into a horse and the other gods into other forms. Likewise, the soul is transformed by the motion or disturbance of its feelings from one form and type of bond to another.
? ? . The condition of bonds. There are some external things which bind, for example, gifts, acts of deference, honours and favours. But these truly bind when they are not given in such a way as to earn a favour in return. And
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? thus, bonds based on commercial transactions are ignoble and merely utilitarian, and are held in low esteem.
? ? . The appropriateness of bonds. The bonds which are most powerful and appropriate are those which occur through close contact with a contrary in a way which can be better explained here by examples rather than by a def- inition or by a name (which is unfamiliar. ) Thus, consider the case in which a humble and honourable person binds a proud soul. The proud person loves those whom he perceives to praise him, and the greater the praise, the greater the love. And, in fact, the praise of a great man is more significant than that of unimportant persons, whose praise we even sometimes reject. So the one who binds carefully observes the ways in which the proud man is praised. Again, consider soldiers who wish to be known primarily for their physical strength and courage, and, as a result, are little concerned if they are not noted primarily for their wisdom and influence over things. Again, consider philosophers who glory in their knowledge of things, but are little concerned if they are not praised for their heartfelt courage. The same judgement applies to the casting of other bonds.
? ? . The gratitude of bonds. Bonds create a desire for some sort of gratitude. To give an example from one type of bond, quarrels arise between lovers when it is taken for granted that each has an obligation to the other. The lover thinks that the beloved is obliged to turn over to him her stolen soul where he, who has died in his own body, lives in another body. If the lover is less flattering to his beloved, she complains that he cares less for her. The lover complains to the beloved if . . .
(Bruno's text ends abruptly here in mid-sentence. )
? ? ?
accident and substance ? , ? , ? ? -? , ? ? -? , ? ? -? , ? ? , ? ? -? , ? ? ? , ? ? ? -? ?
forms ? ? -? ? , ? ? accidentality ? ? Achaeans ? ? ?
act / action/s
Andrew, St ? ? ?
angels ? ? , ? ? , ? ? ?
anima mundi see world-soul animals ? ? , ? ? ?
bonding ? ? ? , ? ? ? -? ? with humans ? ? ?
constitution ? ? ? humans within ? ? ? intellect ? ? -?
love ? ? ? , ? ? ?
conditions requisite
and potency ? ? -? , ? ? absolute
air
attraction ? ? ?
bodies of ? ? ?
motion ? ? ?
spirits of ? ? ? -? ? , ? ? ? , ? ? ?
archetypal world
Archytas ? ?
Ariosto: Orlando Furioso ? ? Aristippus ? ? ?
Aristotle x, ? ? , ? ? , ? ? , ? ? , ? ? , ? ? n.
on act and potency ? ? , ? ? -? on artists ? ?
on categories ? ? -?
on contraries ? ? ?
on cosmology xx
on forms xvi, ? ? , ? ? , ? ? , ? ? , ? ?
Albert the Great, St alchemy ? ? , ? ? -?
? ? ?
chemistry ?
? ? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? preface to this part of this treatise, these other descriptions of feelings and other types of bonds have an analogy to our notion of feelings and bonds.
? ? . The distribution of bonds. Perfect things are bonded to perfect things; noble things and nobility are bonded to noble things; and things which are imperfect and defective are bonded to things which are imperfect and defective. As a result, it was said above that part of what is in that which is to be bound must be present in the bonding agent. A completely chaste girl, in whom there are no seeds of excitement, is not bound to sensory pleasure by any star or by any artifice if she has not been touched or embraced, that is, (I say) she has not submitted herself to the hand of a bonding agent, and his hand has not reached out to her. I will say nothing about an immature girl, for in all actions there must be some seed, but not all seeds are fruitful everywhere. And whose attempt to entice someone who is ill, or old, or frigid or castrated would not be frustrated (the opposite would apply to those who would not make the attempt)? In regard to social bonds, a proportional judgement is quite easy to make.
? ? . The degrees of bonds. Things in the universe are so ordered that they constitute one definite co-ordination in which there can occur a transition from all things to all things in one continuous flow. Some of these things are immediately related to others, for example, the natural propagation of individuals of the same species, and in these cases the bonds are blood related, familiar and easy. Other things are interrelated through various intermediaries, and all of these intermediaries must be crossed over and penetrated so that bonds are stretched across from the bonding agent to that which is bound. Thus, by their generosity to things and by their good- will in sharing with these intermediaries, spirits influence inferior, and even the lowest, things and bind them to themselves. On the other hand, lower things are raised up with a certain reverence through a natural or rational sequence so that, through the free consent of higher things, they can bind to themselves superior things located far above them. And just as there are various species of things and differences between them, they also have var- ious times, places, intermediaries, pathways, instruments and functions. It is very easy to see this and to understand it for all types of bonds and things that can be bound.
? ? . The size of a bond. In all things there is a divine force, that is, love, the father himself, the source, the Amphitrite of bonds. Thus, Orpheus and
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? Mercury were not wrong when they called this the great demon, for this bond is indeed the entire substance, constitution, and (if I may say so) the hypostasis of things. We come to know this greatest and most important bond when we turn our eyes to the order of the universe. By this bond, higher things take care of lower ones, lower things are turned toward higher ones, equal things associate with each other and lastly, the perfection of the universe is revealed in the knowledge of its form.
? ? . The principal effect of a bond. If there were only one love, and thus only one bond, all things would be one. But there are many different character- istics in different things. Hence, the same thing binds different things in different ways. As a result, Cupid is said to be both above and below, both the newest and the oldest, both blind and most observant. Cupid made all things in such a way that, for the preservation of their species, they remain firm in their powers or in themselves and are not separated from them- selves. But then, in regard to the changes which occur in individual things, he arranged it so that they would be separated from themselves in a certain sense when the lover eagerly desires to be completely transported into the loved one; and also that they would be unrestrained, opened up and thrown wide open when the lover desires to embrace and to devour the loved one completely. Thus it happens that the bond by which things wish to be where they are and not to lose what they have also causes them to wish to be everywhere and to have what they do not possess. This is due to a sense of complacency with what is possessed, to a desire and an appetite for what is absent but possessable, and to a love for all things. A particular and finite good and truth is not sufficient for an individual appetite and intellect, which have as their objects what is universally good and universally true. From this it follows that a finite potency in some definite material body simultaneously experiences the effects both of being drawn together and of being pulled apart, dispersed and scattered by the same bond. This gen- eral characteristic of a bond is to be found in each individual type of bond.
? ? . The quality of a bond. In itself, a bond is neither beautiful nor good. Rather, it is the means by which things as a whole, and each individual thing, pursue what is beautiful and good. It connects that which receives with that which is received, that which gives with that which is given, that which can be bound with a bonding agent, that which is desired with the one who desires. Indeed, that which desires the beautiful and the good
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? lacks these qualities insofar as it desires them. Thus, to that degree it is neither beautiful nor good. Hence, one of the Peripatetics was wrong in his statement about matter when he concluded that matter is ugly and evil, because the desire for the good and beautiful is itself evidence that matter lacks these properties. Aristotle said more carefully that matter is not 'ugly' or 'evil' as such. 9 Rather, the actual truth is that that which, like matter, tends and moves equally towards goodness and evil, ugliness and beauty, is in itself neither ugly nor beautiful, neither evil nor good. If matter were evil, it would be contrary to its nature to desire the good; the same would be true if it were naturally ugly. And if it were evil by analogy, then it would also analogously possess a contrary which does not desire, but, rather, excludes and rejects, the other contary. The more profound philosophers understand this as we have declared elsewhere. That is, matter itself, in its bosom, is the beginning of all forms, such that all things originate and are produced from it; it is not a pure negation, as if all things originated from the outside as foreigners; indeed, outside of the bosom of matter there are no forms; rather, all forms are both latent within it and are derived from it. Consequently for anyone who considers bonds at the social level and in their full meaning, it should be clear that in every material thing or part of matter, in every individual or particular thing, all seeds are contained within and lie hidden there, and, as a result, the inclinations of all bonds can be actuated by a skilful effort. In one of our 'Thirty Small Signs',10 we have explained in general how such an inclination and its transformation take place.
? ? . The generality or universality of a bond. From what has just been said, it follows that the love by which we love, and the tendency by which all things desire, are intermediaries between good and evil, between the ugly and the beautiful (not themselves being ugly or beautiful). And so they are good and beautiful because of a sort of sharing and participation, for the bond of love has a nature which is both active and passive. And by this, things act, or are acted upon, or both, as they desire to be ordered, joined, united and completed, insofar as it is within the nature of each thing to be occupied with order, joining, union and completion. Without this bond there is nothing, just as without nature there is nothing. Because of this, therefore, love is not a sign of imperfection when it is considered in matter and in the
9 See Physics, ? , ? (? ? ? . a. ? ? ).
10 See Part ? , 'On Bonding Agents in General', Article ? ? , 'No one particular thing can bind every-
thing'.
? ? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? chaos before things were produced. For indeed, anything which is con- sidered in the chaos and in brute matter, and is also said to be love, is simultaneously said to be a perfection. And whatever is said to be imper- fect, disordered and not to be, is understood not to be love. Thus, it is estab- lished that love is everywhere a perfection, and this bond of love gives witness everywhere to perfection. When an imperfect thing desires to be perfected, this, indeed, takes place in something which is imperfect, but not because it is imperfect. Rather, this happens because of a participation in a perfection and in a divine light and in an object having a more eminent nature, which it desires more strongly inasmuch as the object is more viva- cious. That which is more perfect burns with greater love for the highest good than does that which is imperfect. Therefore, that principle is most perfect which wishes to become all things, and which is not oriented to any particular form but to a universal form and universal perfection. And this is universal matter, without which there is no form, in whose power, desire and disposition all forms are located, and which receives all forms in the development of its parts, even though it cannot receive two forms at the same time. Hence, matter is in a sense divine, just as a form, which is either a form of matter or nothing, is also in a sense divine. There is nothing out- side of matter or without matter, otherwise the power to make and the power to be made would be one and the same thing, and would be grounded in one undivided principle, because the power to make anything and the power of anything to be made would be either present or absent together. There is only one potency taken absolutely and in itself (what- ever it may be in particulars, in composites and when taken accidentally, a question which dominated the thinking and the minds of the Peripatetics and their monkish followers). I have said this in many places in my De infinito et universo and more precisely in my De principio et uno11, where I conclude that it is not a foolish opinion which was defended by David of Dinant and by Avicebron in his Fons vitae, who cited the Arabs who also ventured to assert that God is matter.
? ? . The comparison of bonds. The most important of all bonds is the bond of Venus and of love in general, and that which is primarily and most power- fully the opposite of love's unity and evenness is the bond of hate. Indeed, to the degree that we love one of two opposites and contraries of any type,
? 11 For the former (De l'infinito universo e mondi), see G. Bruno, Dialoghi italiani, ed. by G. Gentile and G. Aquilecchia (Florence: Sansoni, ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? -? ; for the latter (De la causa, principio, e uno) see Ibid. , pp. ? ? ? , ? ? ? , ? ? ? . (above, pp. ? , ? ? , ? ? )
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? then to that same degree we hate and reject the other. These two feelings, or rather, in the last analysis, this one feeling of love (whose substance includes hate) dominates all things, is lord over all things, and elevates, arranges, rules and moderates all things. This bond dissolves all the other bonds. For example, female animals who are restrained by the bond of Venus do not get along well with other females, and males do not tolerate rival male suitors. They neglect food and drink and even life itself, not giv- ing up even when conquered. Rather, the more they are worn out, the more they press on, fearing neither storms nor the cold. Because of this argu- ment, Aristippus decided that the highest good is bodily, and especially sexual, pleasure, but he held before his eyes a rather animalistic view of man as a result of his own conclusion. But still, it is true that the more skilful and clever bonding agent, who uses things which the one to be bound or tied loves and hates, expands his pathway to the bonds of the other feelings. For indeed, love is the bond of bonds.
? ? . The time and place of bonds. Even though the best seed is sown, the gen- eration of new things does not occur always and everywhere. Likewise, bonds are not effective always and everywhere in capturing an object, but only at the proper time and with the appropriate disposition of the object.
? ? . The distinction of bonds. There are no purely natural or purely voluntary bonds (in the sense in which people commonly distinguish between the natural and the voluntary). The will acts with the participation of the intel- lect, while the intellect is not limited by the will but acts everywhere, except where nothing exists. We have proven this in other places, and thus it would be useless to discuss the matter further here. According to our understanding, there are three different types of bonds: the natural, the rational and the voluntary (even though all things are based on one natural foundation). Consequently, to some degree we cannot set boundaries between one type of bond and another. Thus, the laws of prudence do not prohibit love, but love beyond reason. And the deceivers of the foolish pre- scribe without reason limits to reason, and condemn the laws of nature. And the most corrupt say that nature is corrupt, because humans are not raised above nature like heroes but are degraded like beasts as against nature and are beneath all dignity.
? ? . The development and stages of a bond. According to the Platonists, the construction of the bond of Cupid occurs as follows. First, some type of
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? beauty or goodness, or some such thing, is brought into the external senses. Second, it is taken on to the centre of the senses, that is, to the common sense; then, third, into the imagination; and fourth, into the memory. Then the soul, by its own power, desires first that it be moved, redirected and captured; second, once redirected and captured, it is enlightened by a ray of the beautiful or the good or the true; third, once enlightened and illu- minated, it is inflamed by sensory desire; fourth, once inflamed, it desires to be united to the thing loved; fifth, once united, it is absorbed and incor- porated; sixth, once incorporated, it then loses its previous form and in a sense abandons itself and takes on an alien quality; seventh, it, itself, is transformed by the qualities of the object through which it has moved and has thus been affected. The Platonists call the responses to the initial motions Cupid's preparation; the redirecting, Cupid's birth; the illumina- tion, Cupid's nourishment; the inflaming, Cupid's growth; the union, Cupid's attack; the incorporation, Cupid's domination; and the transfor- mation, Cupid's victory or completion.
? ? .
The foundation of the stages of bonds. You can now see how this scale is based on its individual stages. Cupid's birth issues first from the body's nourishment, sensitivity and sexual expression, and second from the soul or spirit because of its charm, or playfulness, or contemplation, which is worthy of a better name, in which beauty is joined with pleasantness. Cupid's food, which prevents the newborn from expiring, is the knowledge of what is beautiful. Cupid's growth is due to a lingering reflection on the knowledge of what is beautiful. Cupid's attack consists in the fact that the soul slides and spreads from one part to all parts of the beloved so that it can inflame the whole. Cupid's domination is grounded in the action by which the soul of the lover, having abandoned his own body, lives and acts in the other. Cupid's transformation occurs when the lover, having died to himself, lives another life in such a way that he lives there as in his own house rather than in someone else's house. Thus, it is said that Jupiter was transformed into a bull, Apollo into a shepherd, Saturn into a horse and the other gods into other forms. Likewise, the soul is transformed by the motion or disturbance of its feelings from one form and type of bond to another.
? ? . The condition of bonds. There are some external things which bind, for example, gifts, acts of deference, honours and favours. But these truly bind when they are not given in such a way as to earn a favour in return. And
? ? ?
A general account of bonding
? thus, bonds based on commercial transactions are ignoble and merely utilitarian, and are held in low esteem.
? ? . The appropriateness of bonds. The bonds which are most powerful and appropriate are those which occur through close contact with a contrary in a way which can be better explained here by examples rather than by a def- inition or by a name (which is unfamiliar. ) Thus, consider the case in which a humble and honourable person binds a proud soul. The proud person loves those whom he perceives to praise him, and the greater the praise, the greater the love. And, in fact, the praise of a great man is more significant than that of unimportant persons, whose praise we even sometimes reject. So the one who binds carefully observes the ways in which the proud man is praised. Again, consider soldiers who wish to be known primarily for their physical strength and courage, and, as a result, are little concerned if they are not noted primarily for their wisdom and influence over things. Again, consider philosophers who glory in their knowledge of things, but are little concerned if they are not praised for their heartfelt courage. The same judgement applies to the casting of other bonds.
? ? . The gratitude of bonds. Bonds create a desire for some sort of gratitude. To give an example from one type of bond, quarrels arise between lovers when it is taken for granted that each has an obligation to the other. The lover thinks that the beloved is obliged to turn over to him her stolen soul where he, who has died in his own body, lives in another body. If the lover is less flattering to his beloved, she complains that he cares less for her. The lover complains to the beloved if . . .
(Bruno's text ends abruptly here in mid-sentence. )
? ? ?
accident and substance ? , ? , ? ? -? , ? ? -? , ? ? -? , ? ? , ? ? -? , ? ? ? , ? ? ? -? ?
forms ? ? -? ? , ? ? accidentality ? ? Achaeans ? ? ?
act / action/s
Andrew, St ? ? ?
angels ? ? , ? ? , ? ? ?
anima mundi see world-soul animals ? ? , ? ? ?
bonding ? ? ? , ? ? ? -? ? with humans ? ? ?
constitution ? ? ? humans within ? ? ? intellect ? ? -?
love ? ? ? , ? ? ?
conditions requisite
and potency ? ? -? , ? ? absolute
air
attraction ? ? ?
bodies of ? ? ?
motion ? ? ?
spirits of ? ? ? -? ? , ? ? ? , ? ? ?
archetypal world
Archytas ? ?
Ariosto: Orlando Furioso ? ? Aristippus ? ? ?
Aristotle x, ? ? , ? ? , ? ? , ? ? , ? ? , ? ? n.
on act and potency ? ? , ? ? -? on artists ? ?
on categories ? ? -?
on contraries ? ? ?
on cosmology xx
on forms xvi, ? ? , ? ? , ? ? , ? ? , ? ?
Albert the Great, St alchemy ? ? , ? ? -?
? ? ?
chemistry ?
