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OF THE GRACE OF MIRACLES (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider the grace of miracles, under which head there are
two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles?
OF THE GRACE OF MIRACLES (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider the grace of miracles, under which head there are
two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles?
Summa Theologica
Now God could make His disciples to be understood by all,
while speaking one tongue: hence a gloss on Acts 2:6, "Every man heard
them speak in his own tongue," says that "they spoke in every tongue,
or speaking in their own, namely the Hebrew language, were understood
by all, as though they spoke the language proper to each. " Therefore it
would seem that they had not the knowledge to speak in all languages.
Objection 3: Further, all graces flow from Christ to His body, which is
the Church, according to Jn. 1:16, "Of His fullness we all have
received. " Now we do not read that Christ spoke more than one language,
nor does each one of the faithful now speak save in one tongue.
Therefore it would seem that Christ's disciples did not receive the
grace to the extent of speaking in all languages.
On the contrary, It is written (Acts 2:4) that "they were all filled
with the Holy Ghost, and they began to speak with divers tongues,
according as the Holy Ghost gave them to speak"; on which passage a
gloss of Gregory [*Hom. xxx in Ev. ] says that "the Holy Ghost appeared
over the disciples under the form of fiery tongues, and gave them the
knowledge of all tongues. "
I answer that, Christ's first disciples were chosen by Him in order
that they might disperse throughout the whole world, and preach His
faith everywhere, according to Mat. 28:19, "Going . . . teach ye all
nations. " Now it was not fitting that they who were being sent to teach
others should need to be taught by others, either as to how they should
speak to other people, or as to how they were to understand those who
spoke to them; and all the more seeing that those who were being sent
were of one nation, that of Judea, according to Is. 27:6, "When they
shall rush out from Jacob [*Vulg. : 'When they shall rush in unto
Jacob,' etc. ] . . . they shall fill the face of the world with seed. "
Moreover those who were being sent were poor and powerless; nor at the
outset could they have easily found someone to interpret their words
faithfully to others, or to explain what others said to them,
especially as they were sent to unbelievers. Consequently it was
necessary, in this respect, that God should provide them with the gift
of tongues; in order that, as the diversity of tongues was brought upon
the nations when they fell away to idolatry, according to Gn. 11, so
when the nations were to be recalled to the worship of one God a remedy
to this diversity might be applied by the gift of tongues.
Reply to Objection 1: As it is written (1 Cor. 12:7), "the
manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit"; and
consequently both Paul and the other apostles were divinely instructed
in the languages of all nations sufficiently for the requirements of
the teaching of the faith. But as regards the grace and elegance of
style which human art adds to a language, the Apostle was instructed in
his own, but not in a foreign tongue. Even so they were sufficiently
instructed in wisdom and scientific knowledge, as required for teaching
the faith, but not as to all things known by acquired science, for
instance the conclusions of arithmetic and geometry.
Reply to Objection 2: Although either was possible, namely that, while
speaking in one tongue they should be understood by all, or that they
should speak in all tongues, it was more fitting that they should speak
in all tongues, because this pertained to the perfection of their
knowledge, whereby they were able not only to speak, but also to
understand what was said by others. Whereas if their one language were
intelligible to all, this would either have been due to the knowledge
of those who understood their speech, or it would have amounted to an
illusion, since a man's words would have had a different sound in
another's ears, from that with which they were uttered. Hence a gloss
says on Acts 2:6 that "it was a greater miracle that they should speak
all kinds of tongues"; and Paul says (1 Cor. 14:18): "I thank my God I
speak with all your tongues. "
Reply to Objection 3: Christ in His own person purposed preaching to
only one nation, namely the Jews. Consequently, although without any
doubt He possessed most perfectly the knowledge of all languages, there
was no need for Him to speak in every tongue. And therefore, as
Augustine says (Tract. xxxii in Joan. ), "whereas even now the Holy
Ghost is received, yet no one speaks in the tongues of all nations,
because the Church herself already speaks the languages of all nations:
since whoever is not in the Church, receives not the Holy Ghost. "
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Whether the gift of tongues is more excellent than the grace of prophecy?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent
than the grace of prophecy. For, seemingly, better things are proper to
better persons, according to the Philosopher (Topic. iii, 1). Now the
gift of tongues is proper to the New Testament, hence we sing in the
sequence of Pentecost [*The sequence: 'Sancti Spiritus adsit nobis
gratia' ascribed to King Robert of France, the reputed author of the
'Veni Sancte Spiritus. ' Cf. Migne, Patr. Lat. tom. CXLI]: "On this day
Thou gavest Christ's apostles an unwonted gift, a marvel to all time":
whereas prophecy is more pertinent to the Old Testament, according to
Heb. 1:1, "God Who at sundry times and in divers manners spoke in times
past to the fathers by the prophets. " Therefore it would seem that the
gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift of prophecy.
Objection 2: Further, that whereby we are directed to God is seemingly
more excellent than that whereby we are directed to men. Now, by the
gift of tongues, man is directed to God, whereas by prophecy he is
directed to man; for it is written (1 Cor. 14:2,3): "He that speaketh
in a tongue, speaketh not unto men, but unto God . . . but he that
prophesieth, speaketh unto men unto edification. " Therefore it would
seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift of
prophecy.
Objection 3: Further, the gift of tongues abides like a habit in the
person who has it, and "he can use it when he will"; wherefore it is
written (1 Cor. 14:18): "I thank my God I speak with all your tongues. "
But it is not so with the gift of prophecy, as stated above
([3704]Q[171], A[2]). Therefore the gift of tongues would seem to be
more excellent than the gift of prophecy.
Objection 4: Further, the "interpretation of speeches" would seem to be
contained under prophecy, because the Scriptures are expounded by the
same Spirit from Whom they originated. Now the interpretation of
speeches is placed after "divers kinds of tongues" (1 Cor. 12:10).
Therefore it seems that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the
gift of prophecy, particularly as regards a part of the latter.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:5): "Greater is he that
prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues. "
I answer that, The gift of prophecy surpasses the gift of tongues, in
three ways. First, because the gift of tongues regards the utterance of
certain words, which signify an intelligible truth, and this again is
signified by the phantasms which appear in an imaginary vision;
wherefore Augustine compares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 8) the gift of tongues
to an imaginary vision. On the other hand, it has been stated above
([3705]Q[173], A[2]) that the gift of prophecy consists in the mind
itself being enlightened so as to know an intelligible truth.
Wherefore, as the prophetic enlightenment is more excellent than the
imaginary vision, as stated above ([3706]Q[174], A[2]), so also is
prophecy more excellent than the gift of tongues considered in itself.
Secondly, because the gift of prophecy regards the knowledge of things,
which is more excellent than the knowledge of words, to which the gift
of tongues pertains.
Thirdly, because the gift of prophecy is more profitable. The Apostle
proves this in three ways (1 Cor. 14); first, because prophecy is more
profitable to the edification of the Church, for which purpose he that
speaketh in tongues profiteth nothing, unless interpretation follow (1
Cor. 14:4,5). Secondly, as regards the speaker himself, for if he be
enabled to speak in divers tongues without understanding them, which
pertains to the gift of prophecy, his own mind would not be edified (1
Cor. 14:7-14). Thirdly, as to unbelievers for whose especial benefit
the gift of tongues seems to have been given; since perchance they
might think those who speak in tongues to be mad (1 Cor. 14:23), for
instance the Jews deemed the apostles drunk when the latter spoke in
various tongues (Acts 2:13): whereas by prophecies the unbeliever is
convinced, because the secrets of his heart are made manifest (Acts
2:25).
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3707]Q[174], A[3], ad 1), it
belongs to the excellence of prophecy that a man is not only
enlightened by an intelligible light, but also that he should perceive
an imaginary vision: and so again it belongs to the perfection of the
Holy Ghost's operation, not only to fill the mind with the prophetic
light, and the imagination with the imaginary vision, as happened in
the Old Testament, but also to endow the tongue with external
erudition, in the utterance of various signs of speech. All this is
done in the New Testament, according to 1 Cor. 14:26, "Every one of you
hath a psalm, hath a doctrine, hath a tongue, hath a revelation," i. e.
a prophetic revelation.
Reply to Objection 2: By the gift of prophecy man is directed to God in
his mind, which is more excellent than being directed to Him in his
tongue. "He that speaketh in a tongue "is said to speak "not unto men,"
i. e. to men's understanding or profit, but unto God's understanding and
praise. On the other hand, by prophecy a man is directed both to God
and to man; wherefore it is the more perfect gift.
Reply to Objection 3: Prophetic revelation extends to the knowledge of
all things supernatural; wherefore from its very perfection it results
that in this imperfect state of life it cannot be had perfectly by way
of habit, but only imperfectly by way of passion. on the other hand,
the gift of tongues is confined to a certain particular knowledge,
namely of human words; wherefore it is not inconsistent with the
imperfection of this life, that it should be had perfectly and by way
of habit.
Reply to Objection 4: The interpretation of speeches is reducible to
the gift of prophecy, inasmuch as the mind is enlightened so as to
understand and explain any obscurities of speech arising either from a
difficulty in the things signified, or from the words uttered being
unknown, or from the figures of speech employed, according to Dan.
5:16, "I have heard of thee, that thou canst interpret obscure things,
and resolve difficult things. " Hence the interpretation of speeches is
more excellent than the gift of tongues, as appears from the saying of
the Apostle (1 Cor. 14:5), "Greater is he that prophesieth than he that
speaketh with tongues; unless perhaps he interpret. " Yet the
interpretation of speeches is placed after the gift of tongues, because
the interpretation of speeches extends even to the interpretation of
divers kinds of tongues.
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OF THE GRATUITOUS GRACE CONSISTING IN WORDS (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gratuitous grace that attaches to words; of
which the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8): "To one . . . by the Spirit is
given the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge. " Under
this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words?
(2) To whom is the grace becoming?
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Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words?
Objection 1: It would seem that a gratuitous grace does not attach to
words. For grace is given for that which surpasses the faculty of
nature. But natural reason has devised the art of rhetoric whereby a
man is able to speak so as to teach, please, and persuade, as Augustine
says (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 12). Now this belongs to the grace of
words. Therefore it would seem that the grace of words is not a
gratuitous grace.
Objection 2: Further, all grace pertains to the kingdom of God. But the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:20): "The kingdom of God is not in speech, but
in power. " Therefore there is no gratuitous grace connected with words.
Objection 3: Further, no grace is given through merit, since "if by
grace, it is not now of works" (Rom. 11:6). But the word is sometimes
given to a man on his merits. For Gregory says (Moral. xi, 15) in
explanation of Ps. 118:43, "Take not Thou the word of truth utterly out
of my mouth" that "the word of truth is that which Almighty God gives
to them that do it, and takes away from them that do it not. " Therefore
it would seem that the gift of the word is not a gratuitous grace.
Objection 4: Further, it behooves man to declare in words things
pertaining to the virtue of faith, no less than those pertaining to the
gift of wisdom or of knowledge. Therefore if the word of wisdom and the
word of knowledge are reckoned gratuitous graces, the word of faith
should likewise be placed among the gratuitous graces.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 6:5): "A gracious tongue in a
good man shall abound [Vulg. : 'aboundeth']. " Now man's goodness is by
grace. Therefore graciousness in words is also by grace.
I answer that, The gratuitous graces are given for the profit of
others, as stated above ([3708]FS, Q[111], AA[1],4). Now the knowledge
a man receives from God cannot be turned to another's profit, except by
means of speech. And since the Holy Ghost does not fail in anything
that pertains to the profit of the Church, He provides also the members
of the Church with speech; to the effect that a man not only speaks so
as to be understood by different people, which pertains to the gift of
tongues, but also speaks with effect, and this pertains to the grace
"of the word. "
This happens in three ways. First, in order to instruct the intellect,
and this is the case when a man speaks so as "to teach. " Secondly, in
order to move the affections, so that a man willingly hearkens to the
word of God. This is the case when a man speaks so as "to please" his
hearers, not indeed with a view to his own favor, but in order to draw
them to listen to God's word. Thirdly, in order that men may love that
which is signified by the word, and desire to fulfill it, and this is
the case when a man so speaks as "to sway" his hearers. In order to
effect this the Holy Ghost makes use of the human tongue as of an
instrument; but He it is Who perfects the work within. Hence Gregory
says in a homily for Pentecost (Hom. xxx in Ev. ): "Unless the Holy
Ghost fill the hearts of the hearers, in vain does the voice of the
teacher resound in the ears of the body. "
Reply to Objection 1: Even as by a miracle God sometimes works in a
more excellent way those things which nature also can work, so too the
Holy Ghost effects more excellently by the grace of words that which
art can effect in a less efficient manner.
Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle is speaking there of the word that
relies on human eloquence without the power of the Holy Ghost.
Wherefore he says just before (1 Cor. 4:19): "I . . . will know, not
the speech of them that are puffed up, but the power": and of himself
he had already said (1 Cor. 2:4): "My speech and my preaching was not
in the persuasive words of human wisdom, but in the showing of the
spirit and power. "
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the grace of the word is given
to a man for the profit of others. Hence it is withdrawn sometimes
through the fault of the hearer, and sometimes through the fault of the
speaker. The good works of either of them do not merit this grace
directly, but only remove the obstacles thereto. For sanctifying grace
also is withdrawn on account of a person's fault, and yet he does not
merit it by his good works, which, however, remove the obstacles to
grace.
Reply to Objection 4: As stated above, the grace of the word is
directed to the profit of others. Now if a man communicates his faith
to others this is by the word of knowledge or of wisdom. Hence
Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "to know how faith may profit the
godly and be defended against the ungodly, is apparently what the
Apostle means by knowledge. " Hence it was not necessary for him to
mention the word of faith, but it was sufficient for him to mention the
word of knowledge and of wisdom.
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Whether the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge is becoming to women?
Objection 1: It would seem that the grace of the word of wisdom and
knowledge is becoming even to women. For teaching is pertinent to this
grace, as stated in the foregoing Article. Now it is becoming to a
woman to teach; for it is written (Prov. 4:3,4): "I was an only son in
the sight of my mother, and she taught me [*Vulg. : 'I was my father's
son, tender, and as an only son in the sight of my mother. And he
taught me. ']. " Therefore this grace is becoming to women.
Objection 2: Further, the grace of prophecy is greater than the grace
of the word, even as the contemplation of truth is greater than its
utterance. But prophecy is granted to women, as we read of Deborah
(Judges 4:4), and of Holda the prophetess, the wife of Sellum (4 Kings
22:14), and of the four daughters of Philip (Acts 21:9). Moreover the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:5): "Every woman praying or prophesying," etc.
Much more therefore would it seem that the grace of the word is
becoming to a woman.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Pet. 4:10): "As every man hath
received grace ministering the same one to another. " Now some women
receive the grace of wisdom and knowledge, which they cannot minister
to others except by the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of the
word is becoming to women.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:34): "Let women keep
silence in the churches," and (1 Tim. 2:12): "I suffer not a woman to
teach. " Now this pertains especially to the grace of the word.
Therefore the grace of the word is not becoming to women.
I answer that, Speech may be employed in two ways: in one way
privately, to one or a few, in familiar conversation, and in this
respect the grace of the word may be becoming to women; in another way,
publicly, addressing oneself to the whole church, and this is not
permitted to women. First and chiefly, on account of the condition
attaching to the female sex, whereby woman should be subject to man, as
appears from Gn. 3:16. Now teaching and persuading publicly in the
church belong not to subjects but to the prelates (although men who are
subjects may do these things if they be so commissioned, because their
subjection is not a result of their natural sex, as it is with women,
but of some thing supervening by accident). Secondly, lest men's minds
be enticed to lust, for it is written (Ecclus. 9:11): "Her conversation
burneth as fire. " Thirdly, because as a rule women are not perfected in
wisdom, so as to be fit to be intrusted with public teaching.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted speaks of private teaching
whereby a father instructs his son.
Reply to Objection 2: The grace of prophecy consists in God
enlightening the mind, on the part of which there is no difference of
sex among men, according to Col. 3:10,11, "Putting on the new" man,
"him who is renewed unto knowledge, according to the image of Him that
created him, where there is neither male nor female [*Vulg. : 'Neither
Gentile nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian nor
Scythian, bond nor free. ' Cf. [3709]FP, Q[93], A[6], ad 2 footnote]. "
Now the grace of the word pertains to the instruction of men among whom
the difference of sex is found. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: The recipients of a divinely conferred grace
administer it in different ways according to their various conditions.
Hence women, if they have the grace of wisdom or of knowledge, can
administer it by teaching privately but not publicly.
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OF THE GRACE OF MIRACLES (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider the grace of miracles, under which head there are
two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles?
(2) To whom is it becoming?
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Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles?
Objection 1: It would seem that no gratuitous grace is directed to the
working of miracles. For every grace puts something in the one to whom
it is given (Cf. [3710]FS, Q[90], A[1]). Now the working of miracles
puts nothing in the soul of the man who receives it since miracles are
wrought at the touch even of a dead body. Thus we read (4 Kings 13:21)
that "some . . . cast the body into the sepulchre of Eliseus. And when
it had touched the bones of Eliseus, the man came to life, and stood
upon his feet. " Therefore the working of miracles does not belong to a
gratuitous grace.
Objection 2: Further, the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost,
according to 1 Cor. 12:4, "There are diversities of graces, but the
same Spirit. " Now the working of miracles is effected even by the
unclean spirit, according to Mat. 24:24, "There shall arise false
Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders. "
Therefore it would seem that the working of miracles does not belong to
a gratuitous grace.
Objection 3: Further, miracles are divided into "signs," "wonders" or
"portents," and "virtues. " [*Cf. 2 Thess. 2:9, where the Douay version
renders 'virtus' by 'power. ' The use of the word 'virtue' in the sense
of a miracle is now obsolete, and the generic term 'miracle' is
elsewhere used in its stead: Cf. 1 Cor. 12:10, 28; Heb. 2:4; Acts
2:22]. Therefore it is unreasonable to reckon the "working of miracles"
a gratuitous grace, any more than the "working of signs" and "wonders. "
Objection 4: Further, the miraculous restoring to health is done by the
power of God. Therefore the grace of healing should not be
distinguished from the working of miracles.
Objection 5: Further, the working of miracles results from
faith---either of the worker, according to 1 Cor. 13:2, "If I should
have all faith, so that I could remove mountains," or of other persons
for whose sake miracles are wrought, according to Mat. 13:58, "And He
wrought not many miracles there, because of their unbelief. " Therefore,
if faith be reckoned a gratuitous grace, it is superfluous to reckon in
addition the working of signs as another gratuitous grace.
On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:9,10) says that among other
gratuitous graces, "to another" is given "the grace of healing . . . to
another, the working of miracles. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3711]Q[177], A[1]), the Holy Ghost
provides sufficiently for the Church in matters profitable unto
salvation, to which purpose the gratuitous graces are directed. Now
just as the knowledge which a man receives from God needs to be brought
to the knowledge of others through the gift of tongues and the grace of
the word, so too the word uttered needs to be confirmed in order that
it be rendered credible. This is done by the working of miracles,
according to Mk. 16:20, "And confirming the word with signs that
followed": and reasonably so. For it is natural to man to arrive at the
intelligible truth through its sensible effects. Wherefore just as man
led by his natural reason is able to arrive at some knowledge of God
through His natural effects, so is he brought to a certain degree of
supernatural knowledge of the objects of faith by certain supernatural
effects which are called miracles. Therefore the working of miracles
belongs to a gratuitous grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as prophecy extends to whatever can be known
supernaturally, so the working of miracles extends to all things that
can be done supernaturally; the cause whereof is the divine omnipotence
which cannot be communicated to any creature. Hence it is impossible
for the principle of working miracles to be a quality abiding as a
habit in the soul. On the other hand, just as the prophet's mind is
moved by divine inspiration to know something supernaturally, so too is
it possible for the mind of the miracle worker to be moved to do
something resulting in the miraculous effect which God causes by His
power. Sometimes this takes place after prayer, as when Peter raised to
life the dead Tabitha (Acts 9:40): sometimes without any previous
prayer being expressed, as when Peter by upbraiding the lying Ananias
and Saphira delivered them to death (Acts 5:4, 9). Hence Gregory says
(Dial. ii, 30) that "the saints work miracles, sometimes by authority,
sometimes by prayer. " In either case, however, God is the principal
worker, for He uses instrumentally either man's inward movement, or his
speech, or some outward action, or again the bodily contact of even a
dead body. Thus when Josue had said as though authoritatively (Josh.
10:12): "Move not, O sun, toward Gabaon," it is said afterwards (Josh.
10:14): "There was not before or after so long a day, the Lord obeying
the voice of a man. "
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord is speaking there of the miracles to be
wrought at the time of Antichrist, of which the Apostle says (2 Thess.
2:9) that the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the working of
Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders. " To quote the words
of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 19), "it is a matter of debate whether
they are called signs and lying wonders, because he will deceive the
senses of mortals by imaginary visions, in that he will seem to do what
he does not, or because, though they be real wonders, they will seduce
into falsehood them that believe. " They are said to be real, because
the things themselves will be real, just as Pharaoh's magicians made
real frogs and real serpents; but they will not be real miracles,
because they will be done by the power of natural causes, as stated in
the [3712]FP, Q[114], A[4]; whereas the working of miracles which is
ascribed to a gratuitous grace, is done by God's power for man's
profit.
Reply to Objection 3: Two things may be considered in miracles. One is
that which is done: this is something surpassing the faculty of nature,
and in this respect miracles are called "virtues. " The other thing is
the purpose for which miracles are wrought, namely the manifestation of
something supernatural, and in this respect they are commonly called
"signs": but on account of some excellence they receive the name of
"wonder" or "prodigy," as showing something from afar [procul].
Reply to Objection 4: The "grace of healing" is mentioned separately,
because by its means a benefit, namely bodily health, is conferred on
man in addition to the common benefit bestowed in all miracles, namely
the bringing of men to the knowledge of God.
Reply to Objection 5: The working of miracles is ascribed to faith for
two reasons. First, because it is directed to the confirmation of
faith, secondly, because it proceeds from God's omnipotence on which
faith relies. Nevertheless, just as besides the grace of faith, the
grace of the word is necessary that people may be instructed in the
faith, so too is the grace of miracles necessary that people may be
confirmed in their faith.
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Whether the wicked can work miracles?
Objection 1: It would seem that the wicked cannot work miracles. For
miracles are wrought through prayer, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now
the prayer of a sinner is not granted, according to Jn. 9:31, "We know
that God doth not hear sinners," and Prov. 28:9, "He that turneth away
his ear from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomination. "
Therefore it would seem that the wicked cannot work miracles.
Objection 2: Further, miracles are ascribed to faith, according to Mat.
17:19, "If you have faith as a grain of mustard seed you shall say to
this mountain: Remove from hence hither, and it shall remove. " Now
"faith without works is dead," according to James 2:20, so that,
seemingly, it is devoid of its proper operation. Therefore it would
seem that the wicked, since they do not good works, cannot work
miracles.
Objection 3: Further, miracles are divine attestations, according to
Heb. 2:4, "God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders and
divers miracles": wherefore in the Church the canonization of certain
persons is based on the attestation of miracles. Now God cannot bear
witness to a falsehood. Therefore it would seem that wicked men cannot
work miracles.
Objection 4: Further, the good are more closely united to God than the
wicked. But the good do not all work miracles. Much less therefore do
the wicked.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:2): "If I should have all
faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am
nothing. " Now whosoever has not charity is wicked, because "this gift
alone of the Holy Ghost distinguishes the children of the kingdom from
the children of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18).
Therefore it would seem that even the wicked can work miracles.
I answer that, Some miracles are not true but imaginary deeds, because
they delude man by the appearance of that which is not; while others
are true deeds, yet they have not the character of a true miracle,
because they are done by the power of some natural cause. Both of these
can be done by the demons, as stated above (A[1], ad 2).
True miracles cannot be wrought save by the power of God, because God
works them for man's benefit, and this in two ways: in one way for the
confirmation of truth declared, in another way in proof of a person's
holiness, which God desires to propose as an example of virtue. In the
first way miracles can be wrought by any one who preaches the true
faith and calls upon Christ's name, as even the wicked do sometimes. In
this way even the wicked can work miracles. Hence Jerome commenting on
Mat. 7:22, "Have not we prophesied in Thy name? " says: "Sometimes
prophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons are
accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but to the
invoking of Christ's name, that men may honor God, by invoking Whom
such great miracles are wrought. "
In the second way miracles are not wrought except by the saints, since
it is in proof of their holiness that miracles are wrought during their
lifetime or after death, either by themselves or by others. For we read
(Acts 19:11,12) that "God wrought by the hand of Paul . . . miracles"
and "even there were brought from his body to the sick, handkerchiefs .
. . and the diseases departed from them. " In this way indeed there is
nothing to prevent a sinner from working miracles by invoking a saint;
but the miracle is ascribed not to him, but to the one in proof of
whose holiness such things are done.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3713]Q[83], A[16]) when we were
treating of prayer, the prayer of impetration relies not on merit but
on God's mercy, which extends even to the wicked, wherefore the prayers
even of sinners are sometimes granted by God. Hence Augustine says
(Tract. xliv in Joan. ) that "the blind man spoke these words before he
was anointed," that is, before he was perfectly enlightened; "since God
does hear sinners. " When it is said that the prayer of one who hears
not the law is an abomination, this must be understood so far as the
sinner's merit is concerned; yet it is sometimes granted, either for
the spiritual welfare of the one who prays---as the publican was heard
(Lk. 18:14)---or for the good of others and for God's glory.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith without works is said to be dead, as
regards the believer, who lives not, by faith, with the life of grace.
But nothing hinders a living thing from working through a dead
instrument, as a man through a stick. It is thus that God works while
employing instrumentally the faith of a sinner.
Reply to Objection 3: Miracles are always true witnesses to the purpose
for which they are wrought. Hence wicked men who teach a false doctrine
never work true miracles in confirmation of their teaching, although
sometimes they may do so in praise of Christ's name which they invoke,
and by the power of the sacraments which they administer. If they teach
a true doctrine, sometimes they work true miracles as confirming their
teaching, but not as an attestation of holiness. Hence Augustine says
(QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79): "Magicians work miracles in one way, good
Christians in another, wicked Christians in another. Magicians by
private compact with the demons, good Christians by their manifest
righteousness, evil Christians by the outward signs of righteousness. "
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79), "the
reason why these are not granted to all holy men is lest by a most
baneful error the weak be deceived into thinking such deeds to imply
greater gifts than the deeds of righteousness whereby eternal life is
obtained. "
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OF THE DIVISION OF LIFE INTO ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider active and contemplative life. This consideration
will be fourfold: (1) Of the division of life into active and
contemplative; (2) Of the contemplative life; (3) Of the active life;
(4) Of the comparison between the active and the contemplative life.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?
(2) Whether this is an adequate division?
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Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that life is not fittingly divided into
active and contemplative. For the soul is the principle of life by its
essence: since the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "in living
things to live is to be. " Now the soul is the principle of action and
contemplation by its powers. Therefore it would seem that life is not
fittingly divided into active and contemplative.
Objection 2: Further, the division of that which comes afterwards is
unfittingly applied to that which comes first. Now active and
contemplative, or "speculative" and "practical," are differences of the
intellect (De Anima iii, 10); while "to live" comes before "to
understand," since "to live" comes first to living things through the
vegetative soul, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore
life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
Objection 3: Further, the word "life" implies movement, according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. vi): whereas contemplation consists rather in
rest, according to Wis. 8:16: "When I enter into my house, I shall
repose myself with her. " Therefore it would seem that life is
unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv super Ezech. ): "There is a
twofold life wherein Almighty God instructs us by His holy word, the
active life and the contemplative. "
I answer that, Properly speaking, those things are said to live whose
movement or operation is from within themselves. Now that which is
proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined is that which is
most becoming to it from itself; wherefore every living thing gives
proof of its life by that operation which is most proper to it, and to
which it is most inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to consist
in nourishment and generation; the life of animals in sensation and
movement; and the life of men in their understanding and acting
according to reason. Wherefore also in men the life of every man would
seem to be that wherein he delights most, and on which he is most
intent; thus especially does he wish "to associate with his friends"
(Ethic. ix, 12).
Accordingly since certain men are especially intent on the
contemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on external
actions, it follows that man's life is fittingly divided into active
and contemplative.
Reply to Objection 1: Each thing's proper form that makes it actually
"to be" is properly that thing's principle of operation. Hence "to
live" is, in living things, "to be," because living things through
having "being" from their form, act in such and such a way.
Reply to Objection 2: Life in general is not divided into active and
contemplative, but the life of man, who derives his species from having
an intellect, wherefore the same division applies to intellect and
human life.
Reply to Objection 3: It is true that contemplation enjoys rest from
external movements. Nevertheless to contemplate is itself a movement of
the intellect, in so far as every operation is described as a movement;
in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that sensation
and understanding are movements of a kind, in so far as movement is
defined "the act of a perfect thing. " In this way Dionysius (Div. Nom.
iv) ascribes three movements to the soul in contemplation, namely,
"straight," "circular," and "oblique" [*Cf. [3714] Q[180], A[6]].
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Whether life is adequately divided into active and contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that life is not adequately divided into
active and contemplative. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5) that
there are three most prominent kinds of life, the life of "pleasure,"
the "civil" which would seem to be the same as the active, and the
"contemplative" life. Therefore the division of life into active and
contemplative would seem to be inadequate.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1,2,3,19) mentions
three kinds of life, namely the life of "leisure" which pertains to the
contemplative, the "busy" life which pertains to the active, and a
third "composed of both. " Therefore it would seem that life is
inadequately divided into active and contemplative.
Objection 3: Further, man's life is diversified according to the divers
actions in which men are occupied. Now there are more than two
occupations of human actions. Therefore it would seem that life should
be divided into more kinds than the active and the contemplative.
On the contrary, These two lives are signified by the two wives of
Jacob; the active by Lia, and the contemplative by Rachel: and by the
two hostesses of our Lord; the contemplative life by Mary, and the
active life by Martha, as Gregory declares (Moral. vi, 37 [*Hom. xiv in
Ezech. ]). Now this signification would not be fitting if there were
more than two lives. Therefore life is adequately divided into active
and contemplative.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2), this division applies to
the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is
divided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellective
knowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to
the contemplative intellect, or some external action, which pertains to
the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too is adequately
divided into active and contemplative.
Reply to Objection 1: The life of pleasure places its end in pleasures
of the body, which are common to us and dumb animals; wherefore as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. Ethic. i, 5), it is the life "of a beast. "
Hence it is not included in this division of the life of a man into
active and contemplative.
Reply to Objection 2: A mean is a combination of extremes, wherefore it
is virtually contained in them, as tepid in hot and cold, and pale in
white and black. In like manner active and contemplative comprise that
which is composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture one of the
simples predominates, so too in the mean state of life sometimes the
contemplative, sometimes the active element, abounds.
Reply to Objection 3: All the occupations of human actions, if directed
to the requirements of the present life in accord with right reason,
belong to the active life which provides for the necessities of the
present life by means of well-ordered activity. If, on the other hand,
they minister to any concupiscence whatever, they belong to the life of
pleasure, which is not comprised under the active life. Those human
occupations that are directed to the consideration of truth belong to
the contemplative life.
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OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the contemplative life, under which head there are
eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to the intellect only, or
also to the affections?
(2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?
(3) Whether the contemplative life consists in one action or in
several?
(4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the
contemplative life?
(5) Whether the contemplative life of man in this state can arise to
the vision of God?
(6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (Div. Nom.
iv);
(7) Of the pleasure of contemplation;
(8) Of the duration of contemplation.
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Whether the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections, and
pertains wholly to the intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to
do with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect.
while speaking one tongue: hence a gloss on Acts 2:6, "Every man heard
them speak in his own tongue," says that "they spoke in every tongue,
or speaking in their own, namely the Hebrew language, were understood
by all, as though they spoke the language proper to each. " Therefore it
would seem that they had not the knowledge to speak in all languages.
Objection 3: Further, all graces flow from Christ to His body, which is
the Church, according to Jn. 1:16, "Of His fullness we all have
received. " Now we do not read that Christ spoke more than one language,
nor does each one of the faithful now speak save in one tongue.
Therefore it would seem that Christ's disciples did not receive the
grace to the extent of speaking in all languages.
On the contrary, It is written (Acts 2:4) that "they were all filled
with the Holy Ghost, and they began to speak with divers tongues,
according as the Holy Ghost gave them to speak"; on which passage a
gloss of Gregory [*Hom. xxx in Ev. ] says that "the Holy Ghost appeared
over the disciples under the form of fiery tongues, and gave them the
knowledge of all tongues. "
I answer that, Christ's first disciples were chosen by Him in order
that they might disperse throughout the whole world, and preach His
faith everywhere, according to Mat. 28:19, "Going . . . teach ye all
nations. " Now it was not fitting that they who were being sent to teach
others should need to be taught by others, either as to how they should
speak to other people, or as to how they were to understand those who
spoke to them; and all the more seeing that those who were being sent
were of one nation, that of Judea, according to Is. 27:6, "When they
shall rush out from Jacob [*Vulg. : 'When they shall rush in unto
Jacob,' etc. ] . . . they shall fill the face of the world with seed. "
Moreover those who were being sent were poor and powerless; nor at the
outset could they have easily found someone to interpret their words
faithfully to others, or to explain what others said to them,
especially as they were sent to unbelievers. Consequently it was
necessary, in this respect, that God should provide them with the gift
of tongues; in order that, as the diversity of tongues was brought upon
the nations when they fell away to idolatry, according to Gn. 11, so
when the nations were to be recalled to the worship of one God a remedy
to this diversity might be applied by the gift of tongues.
Reply to Objection 1: As it is written (1 Cor. 12:7), "the
manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit"; and
consequently both Paul and the other apostles were divinely instructed
in the languages of all nations sufficiently for the requirements of
the teaching of the faith. But as regards the grace and elegance of
style which human art adds to a language, the Apostle was instructed in
his own, but not in a foreign tongue. Even so they were sufficiently
instructed in wisdom and scientific knowledge, as required for teaching
the faith, but not as to all things known by acquired science, for
instance the conclusions of arithmetic and geometry.
Reply to Objection 2: Although either was possible, namely that, while
speaking in one tongue they should be understood by all, or that they
should speak in all tongues, it was more fitting that they should speak
in all tongues, because this pertained to the perfection of their
knowledge, whereby they were able not only to speak, but also to
understand what was said by others. Whereas if their one language were
intelligible to all, this would either have been due to the knowledge
of those who understood their speech, or it would have amounted to an
illusion, since a man's words would have had a different sound in
another's ears, from that with which they were uttered. Hence a gloss
says on Acts 2:6 that "it was a greater miracle that they should speak
all kinds of tongues"; and Paul says (1 Cor. 14:18): "I thank my God I
speak with all your tongues. "
Reply to Objection 3: Christ in His own person purposed preaching to
only one nation, namely the Jews. Consequently, although without any
doubt He possessed most perfectly the knowledge of all languages, there
was no need for Him to speak in every tongue. And therefore, as
Augustine says (Tract. xxxii in Joan. ), "whereas even now the Holy
Ghost is received, yet no one speaks in the tongues of all nations,
because the Church herself already speaks the languages of all nations:
since whoever is not in the Church, receives not the Holy Ghost. "
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Whether the gift of tongues is more excellent than the grace of prophecy?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent
than the grace of prophecy. For, seemingly, better things are proper to
better persons, according to the Philosopher (Topic. iii, 1). Now the
gift of tongues is proper to the New Testament, hence we sing in the
sequence of Pentecost [*The sequence: 'Sancti Spiritus adsit nobis
gratia' ascribed to King Robert of France, the reputed author of the
'Veni Sancte Spiritus. ' Cf. Migne, Patr. Lat. tom. CXLI]: "On this day
Thou gavest Christ's apostles an unwonted gift, a marvel to all time":
whereas prophecy is more pertinent to the Old Testament, according to
Heb. 1:1, "God Who at sundry times and in divers manners spoke in times
past to the fathers by the prophets. " Therefore it would seem that the
gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift of prophecy.
Objection 2: Further, that whereby we are directed to God is seemingly
more excellent than that whereby we are directed to men. Now, by the
gift of tongues, man is directed to God, whereas by prophecy he is
directed to man; for it is written (1 Cor. 14:2,3): "He that speaketh
in a tongue, speaketh not unto men, but unto God . . . but he that
prophesieth, speaketh unto men unto edification. " Therefore it would
seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift of
prophecy.
Objection 3: Further, the gift of tongues abides like a habit in the
person who has it, and "he can use it when he will"; wherefore it is
written (1 Cor. 14:18): "I thank my God I speak with all your tongues. "
But it is not so with the gift of prophecy, as stated above
([3704]Q[171], A[2]). Therefore the gift of tongues would seem to be
more excellent than the gift of prophecy.
Objection 4: Further, the "interpretation of speeches" would seem to be
contained under prophecy, because the Scriptures are expounded by the
same Spirit from Whom they originated. Now the interpretation of
speeches is placed after "divers kinds of tongues" (1 Cor. 12:10).
Therefore it seems that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the
gift of prophecy, particularly as regards a part of the latter.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:5): "Greater is he that
prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues. "
I answer that, The gift of prophecy surpasses the gift of tongues, in
three ways. First, because the gift of tongues regards the utterance of
certain words, which signify an intelligible truth, and this again is
signified by the phantasms which appear in an imaginary vision;
wherefore Augustine compares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 8) the gift of tongues
to an imaginary vision. On the other hand, it has been stated above
([3705]Q[173], A[2]) that the gift of prophecy consists in the mind
itself being enlightened so as to know an intelligible truth.
Wherefore, as the prophetic enlightenment is more excellent than the
imaginary vision, as stated above ([3706]Q[174], A[2]), so also is
prophecy more excellent than the gift of tongues considered in itself.
Secondly, because the gift of prophecy regards the knowledge of things,
which is more excellent than the knowledge of words, to which the gift
of tongues pertains.
Thirdly, because the gift of prophecy is more profitable. The Apostle
proves this in three ways (1 Cor. 14); first, because prophecy is more
profitable to the edification of the Church, for which purpose he that
speaketh in tongues profiteth nothing, unless interpretation follow (1
Cor. 14:4,5). Secondly, as regards the speaker himself, for if he be
enabled to speak in divers tongues without understanding them, which
pertains to the gift of prophecy, his own mind would not be edified (1
Cor. 14:7-14). Thirdly, as to unbelievers for whose especial benefit
the gift of tongues seems to have been given; since perchance they
might think those who speak in tongues to be mad (1 Cor. 14:23), for
instance the Jews deemed the apostles drunk when the latter spoke in
various tongues (Acts 2:13): whereas by prophecies the unbeliever is
convinced, because the secrets of his heart are made manifest (Acts
2:25).
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3707]Q[174], A[3], ad 1), it
belongs to the excellence of prophecy that a man is not only
enlightened by an intelligible light, but also that he should perceive
an imaginary vision: and so again it belongs to the perfection of the
Holy Ghost's operation, not only to fill the mind with the prophetic
light, and the imagination with the imaginary vision, as happened in
the Old Testament, but also to endow the tongue with external
erudition, in the utterance of various signs of speech. All this is
done in the New Testament, according to 1 Cor. 14:26, "Every one of you
hath a psalm, hath a doctrine, hath a tongue, hath a revelation," i. e.
a prophetic revelation.
Reply to Objection 2: By the gift of prophecy man is directed to God in
his mind, which is more excellent than being directed to Him in his
tongue. "He that speaketh in a tongue "is said to speak "not unto men,"
i. e. to men's understanding or profit, but unto God's understanding and
praise. On the other hand, by prophecy a man is directed both to God
and to man; wherefore it is the more perfect gift.
Reply to Objection 3: Prophetic revelation extends to the knowledge of
all things supernatural; wherefore from its very perfection it results
that in this imperfect state of life it cannot be had perfectly by way
of habit, but only imperfectly by way of passion. on the other hand,
the gift of tongues is confined to a certain particular knowledge,
namely of human words; wherefore it is not inconsistent with the
imperfection of this life, that it should be had perfectly and by way
of habit.
Reply to Objection 4: The interpretation of speeches is reducible to
the gift of prophecy, inasmuch as the mind is enlightened so as to
understand and explain any obscurities of speech arising either from a
difficulty in the things signified, or from the words uttered being
unknown, or from the figures of speech employed, according to Dan.
5:16, "I have heard of thee, that thou canst interpret obscure things,
and resolve difficult things. " Hence the interpretation of speeches is
more excellent than the gift of tongues, as appears from the saying of
the Apostle (1 Cor. 14:5), "Greater is he that prophesieth than he that
speaketh with tongues; unless perhaps he interpret. " Yet the
interpretation of speeches is placed after the gift of tongues, because
the interpretation of speeches extends even to the interpretation of
divers kinds of tongues.
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OF THE GRATUITOUS GRACE CONSISTING IN WORDS (TWO ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gratuitous grace that attaches to words; of
which the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8): "To one . . . by the Spirit is
given the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge. " Under
this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words?
(2) To whom is the grace becoming?
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Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words?
Objection 1: It would seem that a gratuitous grace does not attach to
words. For grace is given for that which surpasses the faculty of
nature. But natural reason has devised the art of rhetoric whereby a
man is able to speak so as to teach, please, and persuade, as Augustine
says (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 12). Now this belongs to the grace of
words. Therefore it would seem that the grace of words is not a
gratuitous grace.
Objection 2: Further, all grace pertains to the kingdom of God. But the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:20): "The kingdom of God is not in speech, but
in power. " Therefore there is no gratuitous grace connected with words.
Objection 3: Further, no grace is given through merit, since "if by
grace, it is not now of works" (Rom. 11:6). But the word is sometimes
given to a man on his merits. For Gregory says (Moral. xi, 15) in
explanation of Ps. 118:43, "Take not Thou the word of truth utterly out
of my mouth" that "the word of truth is that which Almighty God gives
to them that do it, and takes away from them that do it not. " Therefore
it would seem that the gift of the word is not a gratuitous grace.
Objection 4: Further, it behooves man to declare in words things
pertaining to the virtue of faith, no less than those pertaining to the
gift of wisdom or of knowledge. Therefore if the word of wisdom and the
word of knowledge are reckoned gratuitous graces, the word of faith
should likewise be placed among the gratuitous graces.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 6:5): "A gracious tongue in a
good man shall abound [Vulg. : 'aboundeth']. " Now man's goodness is by
grace. Therefore graciousness in words is also by grace.
I answer that, The gratuitous graces are given for the profit of
others, as stated above ([3708]FS, Q[111], AA[1],4). Now the knowledge
a man receives from God cannot be turned to another's profit, except by
means of speech. And since the Holy Ghost does not fail in anything
that pertains to the profit of the Church, He provides also the members
of the Church with speech; to the effect that a man not only speaks so
as to be understood by different people, which pertains to the gift of
tongues, but also speaks with effect, and this pertains to the grace
"of the word. "
This happens in three ways. First, in order to instruct the intellect,
and this is the case when a man speaks so as "to teach. " Secondly, in
order to move the affections, so that a man willingly hearkens to the
word of God. This is the case when a man speaks so as "to please" his
hearers, not indeed with a view to his own favor, but in order to draw
them to listen to God's word. Thirdly, in order that men may love that
which is signified by the word, and desire to fulfill it, and this is
the case when a man so speaks as "to sway" his hearers. In order to
effect this the Holy Ghost makes use of the human tongue as of an
instrument; but He it is Who perfects the work within. Hence Gregory
says in a homily for Pentecost (Hom. xxx in Ev. ): "Unless the Holy
Ghost fill the hearts of the hearers, in vain does the voice of the
teacher resound in the ears of the body. "
Reply to Objection 1: Even as by a miracle God sometimes works in a
more excellent way those things which nature also can work, so too the
Holy Ghost effects more excellently by the grace of words that which
art can effect in a less efficient manner.
Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle is speaking there of the word that
relies on human eloquence without the power of the Holy Ghost.
Wherefore he says just before (1 Cor. 4:19): "I . . . will know, not
the speech of them that are puffed up, but the power": and of himself
he had already said (1 Cor. 2:4): "My speech and my preaching was not
in the persuasive words of human wisdom, but in the showing of the
spirit and power. "
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the grace of the word is given
to a man for the profit of others. Hence it is withdrawn sometimes
through the fault of the hearer, and sometimes through the fault of the
speaker. The good works of either of them do not merit this grace
directly, but only remove the obstacles thereto. For sanctifying grace
also is withdrawn on account of a person's fault, and yet he does not
merit it by his good works, which, however, remove the obstacles to
grace.
Reply to Objection 4: As stated above, the grace of the word is
directed to the profit of others. Now if a man communicates his faith
to others this is by the word of knowledge or of wisdom. Hence
Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "to know how faith may profit the
godly and be defended against the ungodly, is apparently what the
Apostle means by knowledge. " Hence it was not necessary for him to
mention the word of faith, but it was sufficient for him to mention the
word of knowledge and of wisdom.
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Whether the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge is becoming to women?
Objection 1: It would seem that the grace of the word of wisdom and
knowledge is becoming even to women. For teaching is pertinent to this
grace, as stated in the foregoing Article. Now it is becoming to a
woman to teach; for it is written (Prov. 4:3,4): "I was an only son in
the sight of my mother, and she taught me [*Vulg. : 'I was my father's
son, tender, and as an only son in the sight of my mother. And he
taught me. ']. " Therefore this grace is becoming to women.
Objection 2: Further, the grace of prophecy is greater than the grace
of the word, even as the contemplation of truth is greater than its
utterance. But prophecy is granted to women, as we read of Deborah
(Judges 4:4), and of Holda the prophetess, the wife of Sellum (4 Kings
22:14), and of the four daughters of Philip (Acts 21:9). Moreover the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:5): "Every woman praying or prophesying," etc.
Much more therefore would it seem that the grace of the word is
becoming to a woman.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Pet. 4:10): "As every man hath
received grace ministering the same one to another. " Now some women
receive the grace of wisdom and knowledge, which they cannot minister
to others except by the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of the
word is becoming to women.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:34): "Let women keep
silence in the churches," and (1 Tim. 2:12): "I suffer not a woman to
teach. " Now this pertains especially to the grace of the word.
Therefore the grace of the word is not becoming to women.
I answer that, Speech may be employed in two ways: in one way
privately, to one or a few, in familiar conversation, and in this
respect the grace of the word may be becoming to women; in another way,
publicly, addressing oneself to the whole church, and this is not
permitted to women. First and chiefly, on account of the condition
attaching to the female sex, whereby woman should be subject to man, as
appears from Gn. 3:16. Now teaching and persuading publicly in the
church belong not to subjects but to the prelates (although men who are
subjects may do these things if they be so commissioned, because their
subjection is not a result of their natural sex, as it is with women,
but of some thing supervening by accident). Secondly, lest men's minds
be enticed to lust, for it is written (Ecclus. 9:11): "Her conversation
burneth as fire. " Thirdly, because as a rule women are not perfected in
wisdom, so as to be fit to be intrusted with public teaching.
Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted speaks of private teaching
whereby a father instructs his son.
Reply to Objection 2: The grace of prophecy consists in God
enlightening the mind, on the part of which there is no difference of
sex among men, according to Col. 3:10,11, "Putting on the new" man,
"him who is renewed unto knowledge, according to the image of Him that
created him, where there is neither male nor female [*Vulg. : 'Neither
Gentile nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian nor
Scythian, bond nor free. ' Cf. [3709]FP, Q[93], A[6], ad 2 footnote]. "
Now the grace of the word pertains to the instruction of men among whom
the difference of sex is found. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection 3: The recipients of a divinely conferred grace
administer it in different ways according to their various conditions.
Hence women, if they have the grace of wisdom or of knowledge, can
administer it by teaching privately but not publicly.
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OF THE GRACE OF MIRACLES (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider the grace of miracles, under which head there are
two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles?
(2) To whom is it becoming?
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Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles?
Objection 1: It would seem that no gratuitous grace is directed to the
working of miracles. For every grace puts something in the one to whom
it is given (Cf. [3710]FS, Q[90], A[1]). Now the working of miracles
puts nothing in the soul of the man who receives it since miracles are
wrought at the touch even of a dead body. Thus we read (4 Kings 13:21)
that "some . . . cast the body into the sepulchre of Eliseus. And when
it had touched the bones of Eliseus, the man came to life, and stood
upon his feet. " Therefore the working of miracles does not belong to a
gratuitous grace.
Objection 2: Further, the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost,
according to 1 Cor. 12:4, "There are diversities of graces, but the
same Spirit. " Now the working of miracles is effected even by the
unclean spirit, according to Mat. 24:24, "There shall arise false
Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders. "
Therefore it would seem that the working of miracles does not belong to
a gratuitous grace.
Objection 3: Further, miracles are divided into "signs," "wonders" or
"portents," and "virtues. " [*Cf. 2 Thess. 2:9, where the Douay version
renders 'virtus' by 'power. ' The use of the word 'virtue' in the sense
of a miracle is now obsolete, and the generic term 'miracle' is
elsewhere used in its stead: Cf. 1 Cor. 12:10, 28; Heb. 2:4; Acts
2:22]. Therefore it is unreasonable to reckon the "working of miracles"
a gratuitous grace, any more than the "working of signs" and "wonders. "
Objection 4: Further, the miraculous restoring to health is done by the
power of God. Therefore the grace of healing should not be
distinguished from the working of miracles.
Objection 5: Further, the working of miracles results from
faith---either of the worker, according to 1 Cor. 13:2, "If I should
have all faith, so that I could remove mountains," or of other persons
for whose sake miracles are wrought, according to Mat. 13:58, "And He
wrought not many miracles there, because of their unbelief. " Therefore,
if faith be reckoned a gratuitous grace, it is superfluous to reckon in
addition the working of signs as another gratuitous grace.
On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:9,10) says that among other
gratuitous graces, "to another" is given "the grace of healing . . . to
another, the working of miracles. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3711]Q[177], A[1]), the Holy Ghost
provides sufficiently for the Church in matters profitable unto
salvation, to which purpose the gratuitous graces are directed. Now
just as the knowledge which a man receives from God needs to be brought
to the knowledge of others through the gift of tongues and the grace of
the word, so too the word uttered needs to be confirmed in order that
it be rendered credible. This is done by the working of miracles,
according to Mk. 16:20, "And confirming the word with signs that
followed": and reasonably so. For it is natural to man to arrive at the
intelligible truth through its sensible effects. Wherefore just as man
led by his natural reason is able to arrive at some knowledge of God
through His natural effects, so is he brought to a certain degree of
supernatural knowledge of the objects of faith by certain supernatural
effects which are called miracles. Therefore the working of miracles
belongs to a gratuitous grace.
Reply to Objection 1: Just as prophecy extends to whatever can be known
supernaturally, so the working of miracles extends to all things that
can be done supernaturally; the cause whereof is the divine omnipotence
which cannot be communicated to any creature. Hence it is impossible
for the principle of working miracles to be a quality abiding as a
habit in the soul. On the other hand, just as the prophet's mind is
moved by divine inspiration to know something supernaturally, so too is
it possible for the mind of the miracle worker to be moved to do
something resulting in the miraculous effect which God causes by His
power. Sometimes this takes place after prayer, as when Peter raised to
life the dead Tabitha (Acts 9:40): sometimes without any previous
prayer being expressed, as when Peter by upbraiding the lying Ananias
and Saphira delivered them to death (Acts 5:4, 9). Hence Gregory says
(Dial. ii, 30) that "the saints work miracles, sometimes by authority,
sometimes by prayer. " In either case, however, God is the principal
worker, for He uses instrumentally either man's inward movement, or his
speech, or some outward action, or again the bodily contact of even a
dead body. Thus when Josue had said as though authoritatively (Josh.
10:12): "Move not, O sun, toward Gabaon," it is said afterwards (Josh.
10:14): "There was not before or after so long a day, the Lord obeying
the voice of a man. "
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord is speaking there of the miracles to be
wrought at the time of Antichrist, of which the Apostle says (2 Thess.
2:9) that the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the working of
Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders. " To quote the words
of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 19), "it is a matter of debate whether
they are called signs and lying wonders, because he will deceive the
senses of mortals by imaginary visions, in that he will seem to do what
he does not, or because, though they be real wonders, they will seduce
into falsehood them that believe. " They are said to be real, because
the things themselves will be real, just as Pharaoh's magicians made
real frogs and real serpents; but they will not be real miracles,
because they will be done by the power of natural causes, as stated in
the [3712]FP, Q[114], A[4]; whereas the working of miracles which is
ascribed to a gratuitous grace, is done by God's power for man's
profit.
Reply to Objection 3: Two things may be considered in miracles. One is
that which is done: this is something surpassing the faculty of nature,
and in this respect miracles are called "virtues. " The other thing is
the purpose for which miracles are wrought, namely the manifestation of
something supernatural, and in this respect they are commonly called
"signs": but on account of some excellence they receive the name of
"wonder" or "prodigy," as showing something from afar [procul].
Reply to Objection 4: The "grace of healing" is mentioned separately,
because by its means a benefit, namely bodily health, is conferred on
man in addition to the common benefit bestowed in all miracles, namely
the bringing of men to the knowledge of God.
Reply to Objection 5: The working of miracles is ascribed to faith for
two reasons. First, because it is directed to the confirmation of
faith, secondly, because it proceeds from God's omnipotence on which
faith relies. Nevertheless, just as besides the grace of faith, the
grace of the word is necessary that people may be instructed in the
faith, so too is the grace of miracles necessary that people may be
confirmed in their faith.
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Whether the wicked can work miracles?
Objection 1: It would seem that the wicked cannot work miracles. For
miracles are wrought through prayer, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now
the prayer of a sinner is not granted, according to Jn. 9:31, "We know
that God doth not hear sinners," and Prov. 28:9, "He that turneth away
his ear from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomination. "
Therefore it would seem that the wicked cannot work miracles.
Objection 2: Further, miracles are ascribed to faith, according to Mat.
17:19, "If you have faith as a grain of mustard seed you shall say to
this mountain: Remove from hence hither, and it shall remove. " Now
"faith without works is dead," according to James 2:20, so that,
seemingly, it is devoid of its proper operation. Therefore it would
seem that the wicked, since they do not good works, cannot work
miracles.
Objection 3: Further, miracles are divine attestations, according to
Heb. 2:4, "God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders and
divers miracles": wherefore in the Church the canonization of certain
persons is based on the attestation of miracles. Now God cannot bear
witness to a falsehood. Therefore it would seem that wicked men cannot
work miracles.
Objection 4: Further, the good are more closely united to God than the
wicked. But the good do not all work miracles. Much less therefore do
the wicked.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:2): "If I should have all
faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am
nothing. " Now whosoever has not charity is wicked, because "this gift
alone of the Holy Ghost distinguishes the children of the kingdom from
the children of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18).
Therefore it would seem that even the wicked can work miracles.
I answer that, Some miracles are not true but imaginary deeds, because
they delude man by the appearance of that which is not; while others
are true deeds, yet they have not the character of a true miracle,
because they are done by the power of some natural cause. Both of these
can be done by the demons, as stated above (A[1], ad 2).
True miracles cannot be wrought save by the power of God, because God
works them for man's benefit, and this in two ways: in one way for the
confirmation of truth declared, in another way in proof of a person's
holiness, which God desires to propose as an example of virtue. In the
first way miracles can be wrought by any one who preaches the true
faith and calls upon Christ's name, as even the wicked do sometimes. In
this way even the wicked can work miracles. Hence Jerome commenting on
Mat. 7:22, "Have not we prophesied in Thy name? " says: "Sometimes
prophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons are
accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but to the
invoking of Christ's name, that men may honor God, by invoking Whom
such great miracles are wrought. "
In the second way miracles are not wrought except by the saints, since
it is in proof of their holiness that miracles are wrought during their
lifetime or after death, either by themselves or by others. For we read
(Acts 19:11,12) that "God wrought by the hand of Paul . . . miracles"
and "even there were brought from his body to the sick, handkerchiefs .
. . and the diseases departed from them. " In this way indeed there is
nothing to prevent a sinner from working miracles by invoking a saint;
but the miracle is ascribed not to him, but to the one in proof of
whose holiness such things are done.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3713]Q[83], A[16]) when we were
treating of prayer, the prayer of impetration relies not on merit but
on God's mercy, which extends even to the wicked, wherefore the prayers
even of sinners are sometimes granted by God. Hence Augustine says
(Tract. xliv in Joan. ) that "the blind man spoke these words before he
was anointed," that is, before he was perfectly enlightened; "since God
does hear sinners. " When it is said that the prayer of one who hears
not the law is an abomination, this must be understood so far as the
sinner's merit is concerned; yet it is sometimes granted, either for
the spiritual welfare of the one who prays---as the publican was heard
(Lk. 18:14)---or for the good of others and for God's glory.
Reply to Objection 2: Faith without works is said to be dead, as
regards the believer, who lives not, by faith, with the life of grace.
But nothing hinders a living thing from working through a dead
instrument, as a man through a stick. It is thus that God works while
employing instrumentally the faith of a sinner.
Reply to Objection 3: Miracles are always true witnesses to the purpose
for which they are wrought. Hence wicked men who teach a false doctrine
never work true miracles in confirmation of their teaching, although
sometimes they may do so in praise of Christ's name which they invoke,
and by the power of the sacraments which they administer. If they teach
a true doctrine, sometimes they work true miracles as confirming their
teaching, but not as an attestation of holiness. Hence Augustine says
(QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79): "Magicians work miracles in one way, good
Christians in another, wicked Christians in another. Magicians by
private compact with the demons, good Christians by their manifest
righteousness, evil Christians by the outward signs of righteousness. "
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79), "the
reason why these are not granted to all holy men is lest by a most
baneful error the weak be deceived into thinking such deeds to imply
greater gifts than the deeds of righteousness whereby eternal life is
obtained. "
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OF THE DIVISION OF LIFE INTO ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider active and contemplative life. This consideration
will be fourfold: (1) Of the division of life into active and
contemplative; (2) Of the contemplative life; (3) Of the active life;
(4) Of the comparison between the active and the contemplative life.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?
(2) Whether this is an adequate division?
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Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that life is not fittingly divided into
active and contemplative. For the soul is the principle of life by its
essence: since the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "in living
things to live is to be. " Now the soul is the principle of action and
contemplation by its powers. Therefore it would seem that life is not
fittingly divided into active and contemplative.
Objection 2: Further, the division of that which comes afterwards is
unfittingly applied to that which comes first. Now active and
contemplative, or "speculative" and "practical," are differences of the
intellect (De Anima iii, 10); while "to live" comes before "to
understand," since "to live" comes first to living things through the
vegetative soul, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore
life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
Objection 3: Further, the word "life" implies movement, according to
Dionysius (Div. Nom. vi): whereas contemplation consists rather in
rest, according to Wis. 8:16: "When I enter into my house, I shall
repose myself with her. " Therefore it would seem that life is
unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv super Ezech. ): "There is a
twofold life wherein Almighty God instructs us by His holy word, the
active life and the contemplative. "
I answer that, Properly speaking, those things are said to live whose
movement or operation is from within themselves. Now that which is
proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined is that which is
most becoming to it from itself; wherefore every living thing gives
proof of its life by that operation which is most proper to it, and to
which it is most inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to consist
in nourishment and generation; the life of animals in sensation and
movement; and the life of men in their understanding and acting
according to reason. Wherefore also in men the life of every man would
seem to be that wherein he delights most, and on which he is most
intent; thus especially does he wish "to associate with his friends"
(Ethic. ix, 12).
Accordingly since certain men are especially intent on the
contemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on external
actions, it follows that man's life is fittingly divided into active
and contemplative.
Reply to Objection 1: Each thing's proper form that makes it actually
"to be" is properly that thing's principle of operation. Hence "to
live" is, in living things, "to be," because living things through
having "being" from their form, act in such and such a way.
Reply to Objection 2: Life in general is not divided into active and
contemplative, but the life of man, who derives his species from having
an intellect, wherefore the same division applies to intellect and
human life.
Reply to Objection 3: It is true that contemplation enjoys rest from
external movements. Nevertheless to contemplate is itself a movement of
the intellect, in so far as every operation is described as a movement;
in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that sensation
and understanding are movements of a kind, in so far as movement is
defined "the act of a perfect thing. " In this way Dionysius (Div. Nom.
iv) ascribes three movements to the soul in contemplation, namely,
"straight," "circular," and "oblique" [*Cf. [3714] Q[180], A[6]].
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Whether life is adequately divided into active and contemplative?
Objection 1: It would seem that life is not adequately divided into
active and contemplative. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5) that
there are three most prominent kinds of life, the life of "pleasure,"
the "civil" which would seem to be the same as the active, and the
"contemplative" life. Therefore the division of life into active and
contemplative would seem to be inadequate.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1,2,3,19) mentions
three kinds of life, namely the life of "leisure" which pertains to the
contemplative, the "busy" life which pertains to the active, and a
third "composed of both. " Therefore it would seem that life is
inadequately divided into active and contemplative.
Objection 3: Further, man's life is diversified according to the divers
actions in which men are occupied. Now there are more than two
occupations of human actions. Therefore it would seem that life should
be divided into more kinds than the active and the contemplative.
On the contrary, These two lives are signified by the two wives of
Jacob; the active by Lia, and the contemplative by Rachel: and by the
two hostesses of our Lord; the contemplative life by Mary, and the
active life by Martha, as Gregory declares (Moral. vi, 37 [*Hom. xiv in
Ezech. ]). Now this signification would not be fitting if there were
more than two lives. Therefore life is adequately divided into active
and contemplative.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2), this division applies to
the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is
divided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellective
knowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to
the contemplative intellect, or some external action, which pertains to
the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too is adequately
divided into active and contemplative.
Reply to Objection 1: The life of pleasure places its end in pleasures
of the body, which are common to us and dumb animals; wherefore as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. Ethic. i, 5), it is the life "of a beast. "
Hence it is not included in this division of the life of a man into
active and contemplative.
Reply to Objection 2: A mean is a combination of extremes, wherefore it
is virtually contained in them, as tepid in hot and cold, and pale in
white and black. In like manner active and contemplative comprise that
which is composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture one of the
simples predominates, so too in the mean state of life sometimes the
contemplative, sometimes the active element, abounds.
Reply to Objection 3: All the occupations of human actions, if directed
to the requirements of the present life in accord with right reason,
belong to the active life which provides for the necessities of the
present life by means of well-ordered activity. If, on the other hand,
they minister to any concupiscence whatever, they belong to the life of
pleasure, which is not comprised under the active life. Those human
occupations that are directed to the consideration of truth belong to
the contemplative life.
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OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
We must now consider the contemplative life, under which head there are
eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to the intellect only, or
also to the affections?
(2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?
(3) Whether the contemplative life consists in one action or in
several?
(4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the
contemplative life?
(5) Whether the contemplative life of man in this state can arise to
the vision of God?
(6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (Div. Nom.
iv);
(7) Of the pleasure of contemplation;
(8) Of the duration of contemplation.
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Whether the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections, and
pertains wholly to the intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to
do with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect.
