This applies to all five senses; there is no direct perception, no
objective
perception.
Aryadeva - Four Hundred Verses
But Liberation cannot be produced by any of those superficial methods alone.
It is only through realizing the very subtle nature of everything that one can be truly Liberated from the whole cycle of samsara.
On the other hand, to be able to appreciate this one needs to have already accumulated enough merit through virtuous methods.
)
.
(-- Since emptiness is difficult to understand, and since the transformation of one's attitude, the focus of Buddhist practice, is hard to achieve, many people choose physical and verbal forms of practice by which they hope to attain liberation.
-- Question: Why, despite their inclination toward virtue, do people mostly follow Forders' systems and not the Buddha's teaching?
-- Answer: Since the teaching of the Sakyas, the Nirgranthas and Brahmins is understood by the mind, the eyes and the ears respectively, the Subduer's textual system is more subtle and thus most people do not follow it. The sun-like view, the understanding of non-inherent existence, is said to illuminate one's mindstream. It destroys all the thickets of unwholesome views. Seeing all products as being like dreams makes one's mindstream stainless. All this must be understood through meditative equipoise, and thus the Sakyas's teaching is subtle. Since the practices of Nirgranthas consist of a lack of hygiene and physical pain caused by the sun and wind, they can be understood by merely seeing them, and since Brahmins take recitation alone as the essence of their practice, it can be understood by hearing it. These are therefore easier to comprehend. )
.
L5: [2. Specific explanation]
L6: [a. Those seeking liberation should not try these systems] .
\ ###
\ 295.
\ Brahmin practices are said
\ Mainly to be an outward show.
\ The practices of Nirgranthas
\ Are said to be mainly stultifying.
.
(i. e. Most of these methods are not even wholesome enough, or creating enough merit, because they are just for the benefits of the appearances and of the ego. Instead of helping to diminish the ego and the illusions, they amplify them. ) .
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(-- Assertion: If ordinary people engage in outsiders' practices because they may be perceived by coarse forms of awareness, it is right for you to do so too.
-- Answer: Since most Brahmin practices such as recitation, burnt offerings, auspicious incantation, repentance, confession and so forth are mainly an outward show for the sake of reward and respect, it is said that they should not be performed by those who seek liberation. Similarly it is said that most of the Nirgranthas' practices, such as allowing their hair to become matted and employing the five fires, are stultifying. Therefore those who seek liberation should avoid them completely. )
.
L6: [b. How those of inferior intelligence develop respect]
.
\ ###
\ 296.
\ Brahmins are revered
\ Because they adopt the orthodox.
\ Nirgranthas are pitied
\ Because they adopt the deluded.
.
(i. e. Do are done for short terms benefits and do not constitute a proper progressive path. They do not bring one closer and closer to the real nature of everything. )
.
(-- Brahmin practices are mainly for outward show. Thus some unintelligent people revere Brahmins because they adopt orthodox practices such as reciting the Vedas ad so forth. They revere and pity Nirgranthas because they adopt painful and deluded forms of behavior such as mortifying the body through sun and wind. )
.
L6: [c. Why those systems are not excellent teaching]
.
\ ###
\ 297.
\ Suffering is a maturation
\ And thus is not virtuous.
\ Similarly, birth too is not virtuous,
\ Being a maturation of actions.
.
(i. e. No method alone can produce Liberation from samsara: Liberation is not about ascetic practices or Brahmin's views. It is not about doing this or not doing that, getting this or dropping that. All choices are karma formation, all discrimination are based on ignorance. All methods, wholesome or unwholesome actions, are all creating more causes for suffering. Without wisdom they are all bondage. The only way out of samsara is by realizing the real nature of this cycle, the real nature of everything. )
.
(-- Painful sensations such as mortification of the body are not virtuous but are instead, like the suffering in the hells, the maturation of non-virtuous actions. Similarly, because it is a maturation of past actions as are eyes and so forth, birth as a Brahmin is not something virtuous enabling the attainment of liberation. )
L3: [II. Exposition of good explanation in brief] L4: [A. Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 298.
\ In brief Tathagatas explain
\ VIRTUE AS NON-VIOLENCE
\ And EMPTINESS AS NIRVANA --
\ Here there are only these two.
.
(i. e. The Middle Way: What we need is both virtuous methods based on non-violence that diminish the importance of the ego and of the illusions (like morality, patience, love, compassion, bodhicitta) and wisdom based on emptiness. One is the accumulation of merit, the other the accumulation of wisdom. But, using only methods (dependent origination) is not enough. And using only wisdom (emptiness) is not enough. We need both method and wisdom together all the time,
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because only then are we more and more in accord with the real non-dual nature of everything, with the inseparability of the Two Truths. Only this kind of path can lead to total Enlightenment. )
.
(-- Although non-violence and emptiness are the salient principles of the Buddha's teaching and the only way by which a good rebirth and liberation can be attained, attachment to their own particular religious practices and views prevents people from adopting what the Buddha taught.
-- Question: If birth and suffering are not virtuous, what is?
-- Answer: Harmful thoughts toward others as well as physical and verbal actions thus motivated constitute violence toward others. Non-violence is the opposite of this, namely the ten virtuous paths of action.
-- In brief Tathagatas say that the principle through which one attains a high rebirth is non-violence. The principle through which liberation is attained is natural nirvana, the emptiness of inherent existence of all phenomena. By directly experiencing this and recognizing that suffering will never arise again, there is separation from adventitious stains -- the nirvana of separation from adventitious stains. Here [in this system] there are only these two.
"Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning" says:
~ When reality is seen
~ Nirvana is attained; the task is accomplished.
.
It is posited that having reached the path of seeing one attains mere nirvana. To attain this, all the aggregates do not have to cease. The reason for explaining this here is to show that one definitely needs to understand emptiness to attain liberation. )
.
L4: [B. Why outsiders do not appreciate the Teacher's doctrine]
.
\ ###
\ 299.
\ To ordinary people their own position,
\ Like their birthplace, is attractive.
\ Why would you find attractive
\ That which precludes it?
.
(i. e. The problem: habituation, resistance to change, belief in their own absolutes, pride, conceit, identifying self with those views, personally feeling threatened by opposing ideas. In short people are stuck with their own accumulated conditioning, their own karma; they can't even see what is good for them. )
.
(-- Question: When outsiders are aware of the Subduer's teaching, why do they not appreciate these two principles?
-- Answer: Because they are attached to their own mistaken positions.
-- Attachment to their own position is something ordinary people have been accustomed to since beginningless time. Like their birthplace they find it attractive and do not want to give it up because of their attachment. Why would you outsiders find attractive these two principles which preclude and are contrary to your own position? You do not follow the Buddha's teaching because you cling to your own wrong views. )
L3: [III. Advising those who seek emancipation to adopt good explanations]
.
\ ###
\ 300.
\ The intelligent who seek what is good
\ Adopt what is worthwhile even from others.
\ Does the sun not belong to all
\ On earth who have sight?
.
(i. e. The requirements: enough open-mindness, enough understanding of relativity, enough accumulated merit, enough renunciation, enough morality, love and compassion. And access to the Buddha's teachings. )
.
(-- The wise, however, are unprejudiced enough to adopt whatever is truly beneficial, even if it belongs to a tradition other than their own.
-- Wise people, who see their birthplace as a reason for their difficulties, leave and settle in a prosperous place.
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Likewise, intelligent people seek what is good and therefore adopt those points which facilitate the attainment of a high rebirth or liberation once familiarity with them has been gained, even though they are from others' texts. the sun is unbiased and thus provides light for all on earth who have sight. Does it not belong equally to all? Similarly, the practice of these two principles can only be of benefit to everyone. Thus it is fitting to practice them with a sense of appreciation. )
.
L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
.
\ ###
\ Become a proper vessel for good explanation
\ And learned in the non-inherent existence of dependent arising,
\ The final object of the path that severs worldly existence,
\ The understanding of which frees from attachment to extreme views.
.
(i. e. A gradual path: first accumulate enough merit through the various virtuous methods, then combine it with the gradual development of the wisdom based on emptiness, the only final antidote. )
.
\ ###
\ This is the twelfth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on refuting views.
.
This concludes the commentary on the twelfth chapter, showing how to meditate on refuting views, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".
.
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.
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L2: [Chapter 13 - Refuting Truly Existent Sense Organs and Objects -
Refuting direct objective perception of an external reality independent of the mind and karma. Everyting is like an illusion. - P. 251]
-- SHOWING HOW TO MEDITATE ON THE REFUTATION OF SENSE ORGANS AND OBJECTS.
-- Refuting the true existence of sense organs and objects.
.
(i. e. One of the argument used to assert the true existence of things is based on the supposedly objective perception of everything. )
L3: [I. Extensively explaining the reasoning that refutes true existence]
L4: [A. Refuting true existence of that which is apprehended: the sense objects] L5: [1. General refutation]
L6: [a. Actual meaning]
L7: [(1) Refuting that a sense consciousness directly perceives
a pot existing by way of its own character]
.
\ ###
\ 301.
\ When seeing its form, one does not in fact
\ See the whole pot. Who that knows
\ Reality would claim that the pot
\ Is DIRECTLY PERCEPTIBLE also?
.
(i. e. Direct perception is impossible: otherwise we would perceive all of it, and there could be no mistake. There is no objective perception of an object; we only perceive part of it and make up for the rest. This also applies to the parts. We only perceive stimuli, compare them to memory and extrapolate the rest. )
.
(-- We feel that since objects are directly perceptible they must have true existence. In that case we should see every aspect of an object, such as a pot, at once. A pot, however, consists of many diverse elements of which visual perception apprehends only one, its visual form. Yet this visual form too has its specific components. Therefore the pot and its constituents are merely imputed to a collection of components and do not exist in and of themselves as directly perceptible objects
-- Question: When it says [in stanza 300]:
~ The intelligent who seek what is good
~ Adopt what is worthwhile even from others.
what is this good explanation?
-- Answer: It is about seeing that all phenomena have no inherent existence.
-- Assertion: It is impossible to cognize that all phenomena have no inherent existence, for if they would be totally non- existent like the horns of a donkey and so forth, and would not be directly perceptible. However, since a pot and blue are directly perceptible, all functional thing are in fact inherently existent.
-- Answer: It follow that direct perception of a pot which exists by way of its own entity is not feasible. If it were, the awareness perceiving the visible form of the pot should perceive all its parts. Yet when visual consciousness perceives the pot's form, it does not in fact perceive every single part of the pot. Who that knows the reality of things would claim that the pot is directly perceptible? "Also" refers to also blue existent by way of its own character.
The pot is imputed in dependence on eight substances and therefore cannot exist by way of its own character, nor by seeing one part can one see all its parts. Similarly, if fire existed by way of its own entity, the fallacy that it should always keep burning would arise, since it would not require fuel.
Dialecticians contradict both reasoning and common knowledge when they call awareness arising in dependence upon an individual sense organ direct perception, and assert that an awareness free from conceptuality in which a sound image and a generic image may be apprehended as merged is direct perception. Each individual moment of consciousness cannot be a direct perceiver. In the world objects like the waxing moon which are directly perceived by many people, are commonly held to be directly perceptible, whereas that which perceives these objects is not. Furthermore since they assert that sense consciousness is a direct perceiver, it is inconsistent to think that it is also a valid perceiver. An extensive explanation of this may be found in Candrakirti's commentary. it has not been included here for fear that it would be too long. )
.
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L7: [(2) Applying this reasoning to other instances]
.
\ ###
\ 302.
\ By means of this very analysis
\ Those with superior intelligence
\ Should refute individuality
\ All that is fragrant, sweet and soft.
.
(i. e.
This applies to all five senses; there is no direct perception, no objective perception. )
.
(-- This same analogy procedure should be applied to the objects of the other senses: to sounds, smells, tastes and tactile objects. One will discover that none of these are truly existent directly perceptible objects.
-- By means of this very analysis using the reasoning which refutes the assertion that sense consciousness is a direct perceiver in relation to a pot, blue and so forth, existent by way of their own entity, the wise with superior intelligence refute separately in each case the contention that sense consciousnesses are direct perceivers in relation to fragrances such as the fragrance of jasmine flowers, sweet tastes and that which is soft to touch, all existent by way of their own entity. Since one cannot make distinction such as seeing one part but not seeing others, or distinctions with regard to what touches and what does not, or with regard to closeness and distant in relation to truly existent functional things, such fallacies ensue. )
.
L7: [(3) Absurdity of positing that other parts are seen because visible form existent by way of its own character is seen]
.
\ ###
\ 303.
\ If because the form is seen
\ Everything is seen,
\ Why because of what is not seen
\ Would the form not be unseen?
.
(i. e. We perceive only part of it. )
.
(-- Assertion: All parts of the pot are seen when its visual form is seen, for the pot is not a separate entity from its visual form.
-- Answer: If on the grounds that visual consciousness sees the pot's form one can posit that all parts of the pot are seen, why on the grounds that visual consciousness does not perceive the pot's smell would even the visible form, which is accepted as seen, not be unseen? If one posits that all parts are seen because one part is seen, even that which is accepted as seen cannot be posited as seen if one part is not perceived. )
.
L7: [(4) Refuting direct perception of just visible form existent by way of its own character]
.
\ ###
\ 304.
\ There is no direct perception
\ of just the form alone,
\ Because it has a close and distant
\ As well as a central part.
.
(i. e. We perceive only a part of its form. )
.
(-- A close analysis then follows which establishes that all the components that make up a composite, . . .
-- Assertion: Though the pot is not a directly perceptible object of comprehension, its visible form is established by direct perception and thus, indirectly, the pot existing by way of its own entity is also directly perceptible.
-- Answer: It follows that there is no direct perception of just the visible form alone existent by way of its own entity, because the visible form too has many parts, such as close, distant and central parts, and is thus imputed in dependence upon many parts. There is not the slightest thing existent by way of its own entity that is directly perceptible to any kind of awareness. )
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L7: [(5) Showing that the proof and what is to be proved are alike]
.
\ ###
\ 305.
\ This also applies when one examines
\ Whether particles have parts or not.
\ Thus to prove a thesis by that
\ Which must be proved is not feasible.
.
(i. e. And we cannot conclude that the form exist because we see the particles composing it because this is not proven. In fact the same argument about seeing only a part of it also applies to particles. )
.
(. . . even particles, have parts.
-- When all the parts are separated, that form is finally reduced to the smallest particles. An investigation of whether particles have parts or not applies to those particles too. If they have parts like a front and a back, they are, like the pot, imputed in dependence upon many parts, in which case they no longer are the smallest particles. If they do not have parts, they cannot exist because of being inapprehensible. Thus it is not feasible to prove that the pot exists by way of its entity as a directly perceptible object of comprehension by means of that which must be proved, for things do not exist by way of their own character. )
.
L7: [(6) Showing other lines of reasoning]
.
\ ###
\ 306.
\ EVERYTHING TOO IS A COMPONENT
\ AS WELL AS BEING A COMPOSITE.
\ Thus even a spoken syllable
\ Does not have existence here.
.
(i. e. Everything is empty because everything is composed of parts, and there is no direct perception because we see
only part of any object - we assume the rest. And this applies to the parts, . . . Everything is empty of inherent existence because dependent on its parts. That is how perception works: we receive stimuli based on an endless flow of interdependence, and through habituation we imagine invariants (entities . . . ) in it in our attempt to try to control it. But all those objects, characteristics, relations, are mere hypothesis, created by our own mind and by conventions. We just forget that they are our own fabrications and think they exist by themselves independently of our own mind out there. Everything is merely imputed by the mind. )
.
(-- Thus each is simultaneously a component as well as a composite.
-- Moreover when objects apprehended by the physical sense organs are examined, all are components in relation to their composites as well as composites in relation to their components and are therefore merely imputed in dependence upon their parts. As with the analysis of the smallest particle, names, which are ultimately reduced to spoken syllables such as "a," are also just conventions in this world and do not exist by way of their own entity. Thus you must recognize all dependently arising phenomena as mere names and terms. )
.
L5: [2. Individual refutations]
L6: [a. Refuting that sense organs apprehend objects existing by way of their own entity] L7: [(1) Refuting truly existent visible objects]
L8: [(a) Refuting objects]
L9: [1: Refuting our own sectarians' contentions]
L9: [a: Refutation by examining whether the color and shape constituting a visible form existing by way of its own character taken as object of apprehension
by a visual consciousness are inherently one or different]
.
\ ###
\ 307.
\ If a shape is distinct from color
\ How is shape apprehended?
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\ If not distinct, why would the body
\ Not also apprehend color?
.
(i. e. Even parts like shape and color are not directly perceived, not inherently existing characteristics: We do not directly perceive objects through directly perceiving their shape and color, . . . Even (parts like) shape and colors are not inherently existing characteristics, independent of anything else, and directly perceptible as if truly existent on their own out there. Here it is proven that shape and color are not two, not one; they are interdependent, thus not existing on their own, not inherently existing. Those characteristics are also dependent on many many other factors. So we first receive stimuli (part of parts), compare them to memory, filter them through accumulated karma, and assume the rest like shape and colors, and then label the object, and then we have the illusion of perceiving the object as if it truly exist on its own. All the possible mistakes (optical illusions, color change due to other factors, miss-identification . . . ), proves that there is no objective perception of anything. )
.
(-- Assertion: The pot is directly perceptible since visual consciousness sees the pot's visible form existent by way of its own character, consisting of color and shape.
-- Answer: Are color and shape inherently one or distinct? If shape such as length and so forth is inherently distinct from color, how can a visual consciousness take shape as its object of apprehension? It follows that it cannot because shape is an entity distinct from color. Alternatively, if they are not distinct but inherently one, why does touch not apprehend color in the dark just as it apprehends shape? It follows that it should because they are one. )
.
L9: [b: Refutation through the consequence that because the elements are present, a visual consciousness taking a visible form as its object would apprehend both]
.
\ ###
\ 308.
\ Only the form is visible
\ But the form's causes are not seen.
\ If indeed it is thus,
\ Why are both not also
\ Perceived by just the eyes?
.
(i. e. Even parts like the so called elementary components are not inherently existing, or directly perceived: We cannot use the assumption of the elementary components to prove that a form really exist on its own. This is circular reasoning; they are assume based on the resulting form. Those elementary components have not been proven to exist on their own. In fact it is easy to prove that they could not exist as such as done in a previous chapter. )
.
(-- An analysis of the relationship between the four elements and their outcome, visual form, is then made to demonstrate that they are neither inherently one nor different.
-- Assertion: The visible form source exists because the four great elements which are causal forms exist.
-- Answer ab: Only the resultant form is visible but the form's causes such as the earth element are not seen. Since causal form is imputed in dependence upon resultant form, they cannot be inherently different. If they are inherently one, they must be one.
-- cde: In that case why does just visual consciousness itself not apprehend both the causal and resultant forms? It follows that it should because they are one. )
.
L9: [c: Showing what invalidates this contention]
.
\ ###
\ 309.
\ Earth is seen as firm and stable
\ And is apprehended by the body.
\ Only that which is tangible
\ Is referred to as earth.
.
(i. e. No possible direct visual perception of the elementary components: In fact the characteristics of those so called elementary components are based on their tactile sensation and have nothing to do with visual perception. So we cannot say we have direct perception of a form because we directly perceive those elementary components. )
.
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( -- Earth is seen as firm and stable and furthermore is apprehended by tactile consciousness. Thus only that which is tangible is referred to as earth. Therefore since visible forms are objects apprehended by visual consciousness and the four elements are objects apprehended by tactile consciousness, they are different. If one accepts them as truly existent, they are unrelated. It would thereby follow that visible form is causeless. )
.
L9: [2: Refuting contentions of other sectarians]
.
\ ###
\ 310.
\ Since it was produced as something visible,
\ It is of no use at all to the pot.
\ As with the production of visibility,
\ It lacks even the entity of existence.
.
(i. e. The case of the "visibility" characteristic: And "visibility" is not another directly perceptible, inherently existing elementary characteristic. This characteristic is also dependently arisen. )
.
(-- Vaisesika assertion: A pot is not visible by way of its own entity but neither is it not a visible object, since it is directly perceptible by virtue of possessing visibility, a separate generality.
-- Answer ab: This too is unacceptable. Has the pot come into existence as something visible through its own causes or not? In the first case it would follow that an association with the separate generality of visibility is of no use in making the pot directly perceptible, because it has come into existence as something visible through its own causes. For this reason the generality of visibility is not produced in relation to the pot.
-- cd: Further, a pot that has no connection with visibility and is not something visible lacks any inherently established entity of existence. Therefore the pot could not be either actually or imputedly directly perceptible as you contend. )
.
L8: [(b) Refuting that which perceives objects]
L9: [1: Refuting that the eye is by way of its own entity an instrument of looking at form]
.
\ ###
\ 311.
\ The eye, like the ear, is an outcome of
\ The elements. The eyes see while the others do not.
\ Certainly therefore the Subduer said
\ The fruition of actions is inconceivable.
.
(i. e. The Middle Way about the sense organs: There is no inherently existing sense organs either. The eye is also composed of parts, dependent on multiple factors, the fruit of evolution or accumulated karma. It is not a perfect organ capable of true objective perception, of direct perception. All of its mistakes are proof of that. As everything is samsara it is based on mistaken assumptions, illusions, ignorance and accumulated karma. The emptiness of the sense organs, and of the objects of the senses, doesn't mean that they are completely non-existent, it only means that they are dependently arisen, not independent, not existing on their own. Emptiness doesn't deny dependent origination; one implies the other. )
.
(-- The sense and the process of perception are examined next. Confusing lack of true existence with total non- existence, the opponent argues that the Madhyamika presentation of the senses contradicts what was said by the Buddha about the eyes and so forth being the maturation of past actions. In answer it is established that although nothing can sustain ultimate analysis, since nothing is findable when subjected to this kind of investigation, our experience confirms the existence of our senses and other phenomena. Thus the Buddha's statements about the relationship between actions and their effects are in no way contradicted, since such statements refer to the conventional existence of actions and their effects.
-- Assertion: Because sense organs exist -- such as the eyes, which are instruments of perception -- directly perceptible objects such as visible exist.
-- Answer ab: Regarding the subject, the eye organ: since the eye perceives visual stimuli while other senses do not, it does not perceive visual form by way of its own entity, for like the nose sense organ it is an outcome of the elements. A demonstration of the valid reasons which invalidate the entailment is given below.
-- Objection: If the eye and so forth do not exist it contradicts explanations concerning the maturation of actions.
-- Answer: But even we do not refute that.
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-- Question: Why is that not refuted?
-- Answer: We refute that things exist by way of their own entity but far from refuting the existence of all that is dependent arising, we affirm it in our own system.
-- cd: Although it cannot sustain investigation by the reasoning which analyzes suchness and though it is not established by way of its own entity, it is undeniable that the eye sees visible form and does not hear sound. Thus recognizing that the maturation of actions is inconceivable, one should accept it without applying analysis by reasoning. Certainly therefore the Subduer said that the fruition of actions is inconceivable. Sutra says:
~ The maturation of sentient beings' actions is inconceivable.
~ Thus this whole world comes into existence through causes. ) .
L9: [2: Refuting consciousness as agent]
.
\ ###
\ 312.
.
(-- Since emptiness is difficult to understand, and since the transformation of one's attitude, the focus of Buddhist practice, is hard to achieve, many people choose physical and verbal forms of practice by which they hope to attain liberation.
-- Question: Why, despite their inclination toward virtue, do people mostly follow Forders' systems and not the Buddha's teaching?
-- Answer: Since the teaching of the Sakyas, the Nirgranthas and Brahmins is understood by the mind, the eyes and the ears respectively, the Subduer's textual system is more subtle and thus most people do not follow it. The sun-like view, the understanding of non-inherent existence, is said to illuminate one's mindstream. It destroys all the thickets of unwholesome views. Seeing all products as being like dreams makes one's mindstream stainless. All this must be understood through meditative equipoise, and thus the Sakyas's teaching is subtle. Since the practices of Nirgranthas consist of a lack of hygiene and physical pain caused by the sun and wind, they can be understood by merely seeing them, and since Brahmins take recitation alone as the essence of their practice, it can be understood by hearing it. These are therefore easier to comprehend. )
.
L5: [2. Specific explanation]
L6: [a. Those seeking liberation should not try these systems] .
\ ###
\ 295.
\ Brahmin practices are said
\ Mainly to be an outward show.
\ The practices of Nirgranthas
\ Are said to be mainly stultifying.
.
(i. e. Most of these methods are not even wholesome enough, or creating enough merit, because they are just for the benefits of the appearances and of the ego. Instead of helping to diminish the ego and the illusions, they amplify them. ) .
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(-- Assertion: If ordinary people engage in outsiders' practices because they may be perceived by coarse forms of awareness, it is right for you to do so too.
-- Answer: Since most Brahmin practices such as recitation, burnt offerings, auspicious incantation, repentance, confession and so forth are mainly an outward show for the sake of reward and respect, it is said that they should not be performed by those who seek liberation. Similarly it is said that most of the Nirgranthas' practices, such as allowing their hair to become matted and employing the five fires, are stultifying. Therefore those who seek liberation should avoid them completely. )
.
L6: [b. How those of inferior intelligence develop respect]
.
\ ###
\ 296.
\ Brahmins are revered
\ Because they adopt the orthodox.
\ Nirgranthas are pitied
\ Because they adopt the deluded.
.
(i. e. Do are done for short terms benefits and do not constitute a proper progressive path. They do not bring one closer and closer to the real nature of everything. )
.
(-- Brahmin practices are mainly for outward show. Thus some unintelligent people revere Brahmins because they adopt orthodox practices such as reciting the Vedas ad so forth. They revere and pity Nirgranthas because they adopt painful and deluded forms of behavior such as mortifying the body through sun and wind. )
.
L6: [c. Why those systems are not excellent teaching]
.
\ ###
\ 297.
\ Suffering is a maturation
\ And thus is not virtuous.
\ Similarly, birth too is not virtuous,
\ Being a maturation of actions.
.
(i. e. No method alone can produce Liberation from samsara: Liberation is not about ascetic practices or Brahmin's views. It is not about doing this or not doing that, getting this or dropping that. All choices are karma formation, all discrimination are based on ignorance. All methods, wholesome or unwholesome actions, are all creating more causes for suffering. Without wisdom they are all bondage. The only way out of samsara is by realizing the real nature of this cycle, the real nature of everything. )
.
(-- Painful sensations such as mortification of the body are not virtuous but are instead, like the suffering in the hells, the maturation of non-virtuous actions. Similarly, because it is a maturation of past actions as are eyes and so forth, birth as a Brahmin is not something virtuous enabling the attainment of liberation. )
L3: [II. Exposition of good explanation in brief] L4: [A. Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 298.
\ In brief Tathagatas explain
\ VIRTUE AS NON-VIOLENCE
\ And EMPTINESS AS NIRVANA --
\ Here there are only these two.
.
(i. e. The Middle Way: What we need is both virtuous methods based on non-violence that diminish the importance of the ego and of the illusions (like morality, patience, love, compassion, bodhicitta) and wisdom based on emptiness. One is the accumulation of merit, the other the accumulation of wisdom. But, using only methods (dependent origination) is not enough. And using only wisdom (emptiness) is not enough. We need both method and wisdom together all the time,
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because only then are we more and more in accord with the real non-dual nature of everything, with the inseparability of the Two Truths. Only this kind of path can lead to total Enlightenment. )
.
(-- Although non-violence and emptiness are the salient principles of the Buddha's teaching and the only way by which a good rebirth and liberation can be attained, attachment to their own particular religious practices and views prevents people from adopting what the Buddha taught.
-- Question: If birth and suffering are not virtuous, what is?
-- Answer: Harmful thoughts toward others as well as physical and verbal actions thus motivated constitute violence toward others. Non-violence is the opposite of this, namely the ten virtuous paths of action.
-- In brief Tathagatas say that the principle through which one attains a high rebirth is non-violence. The principle through which liberation is attained is natural nirvana, the emptiness of inherent existence of all phenomena. By directly experiencing this and recognizing that suffering will never arise again, there is separation from adventitious stains -- the nirvana of separation from adventitious stains. Here [in this system] there are only these two.
"Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning" says:
~ When reality is seen
~ Nirvana is attained; the task is accomplished.
.
It is posited that having reached the path of seeing one attains mere nirvana. To attain this, all the aggregates do not have to cease. The reason for explaining this here is to show that one definitely needs to understand emptiness to attain liberation. )
.
L4: [B. Why outsiders do not appreciate the Teacher's doctrine]
.
\ ###
\ 299.
\ To ordinary people their own position,
\ Like their birthplace, is attractive.
\ Why would you find attractive
\ That which precludes it?
.
(i. e. The problem: habituation, resistance to change, belief in their own absolutes, pride, conceit, identifying self with those views, personally feeling threatened by opposing ideas. In short people are stuck with their own accumulated conditioning, their own karma; they can't even see what is good for them. )
.
(-- Question: When outsiders are aware of the Subduer's teaching, why do they not appreciate these two principles?
-- Answer: Because they are attached to their own mistaken positions.
-- Attachment to their own position is something ordinary people have been accustomed to since beginningless time. Like their birthplace they find it attractive and do not want to give it up because of their attachment. Why would you outsiders find attractive these two principles which preclude and are contrary to your own position? You do not follow the Buddha's teaching because you cling to your own wrong views. )
L3: [III. Advising those who seek emancipation to adopt good explanations]
.
\ ###
\ 300.
\ The intelligent who seek what is good
\ Adopt what is worthwhile even from others.
\ Does the sun not belong to all
\ On earth who have sight?
.
(i. e. The requirements: enough open-mindness, enough understanding of relativity, enough accumulated merit, enough renunciation, enough morality, love and compassion. And access to the Buddha's teachings. )
.
(-- The wise, however, are unprejudiced enough to adopt whatever is truly beneficial, even if it belongs to a tradition other than their own.
-- Wise people, who see their birthplace as a reason for their difficulties, leave and settle in a prosperous place.
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Likewise, intelligent people seek what is good and therefore adopt those points which facilitate the attainment of a high rebirth or liberation once familiarity with them has been gained, even though they are from others' texts. the sun is unbiased and thus provides light for all on earth who have sight. Does it not belong equally to all? Similarly, the practice of these two principles can only be of benefit to everyone. Thus it is fitting to practice them with a sense of appreciation. )
.
L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
.
\ ###
\ Become a proper vessel for good explanation
\ And learned in the non-inherent existence of dependent arising,
\ The final object of the path that severs worldly existence,
\ The understanding of which frees from attachment to extreme views.
.
(i. e. A gradual path: first accumulate enough merit through the various virtuous methods, then combine it with the gradual development of the wisdom based on emptiness, the only final antidote. )
.
\ ###
\ This is the twelfth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on refuting views.
.
This concludes the commentary on the twelfth chapter, showing how to meditate on refuting views, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".
.
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L2: [Chapter 13 - Refuting Truly Existent Sense Organs and Objects -
Refuting direct objective perception of an external reality independent of the mind and karma. Everyting is like an illusion. - P. 251]
-- SHOWING HOW TO MEDITATE ON THE REFUTATION OF SENSE ORGANS AND OBJECTS.
-- Refuting the true existence of sense organs and objects.
.
(i. e. One of the argument used to assert the true existence of things is based on the supposedly objective perception of everything. )
L3: [I. Extensively explaining the reasoning that refutes true existence]
L4: [A. Refuting true existence of that which is apprehended: the sense objects] L5: [1. General refutation]
L6: [a. Actual meaning]
L7: [(1) Refuting that a sense consciousness directly perceives
a pot existing by way of its own character]
.
\ ###
\ 301.
\ When seeing its form, one does not in fact
\ See the whole pot. Who that knows
\ Reality would claim that the pot
\ Is DIRECTLY PERCEPTIBLE also?
.
(i. e. Direct perception is impossible: otherwise we would perceive all of it, and there could be no mistake. There is no objective perception of an object; we only perceive part of it and make up for the rest. This also applies to the parts. We only perceive stimuli, compare them to memory and extrapolate the rest. )
.
(-- We feel that since objects are directly perceptible they must have true existence. In that case we should see every aspect of an object, such as a pot, at once. A pot, however, consists of many diverse elements of which visual perception apprehends only one, its visual form. Yet this visual form too has its specific components. Therefore the pot and its constituents are merely imputed to a collection of components and do not exist in and of themselves as directly perceptible objects
-- Question: When it says [in stanza 300]:
~ The intelligent who seek what is good
~ Adopt what is worthwhile even from others.
what is this good explanation?
-- Answer: It is about seeing that all phenomena have no inherent existence.
-- Assertion: It is impossible to cognize that all phenomena have no inherent existence, for if they would be totally non- existent like the horns of a donkey and so forth, and would not be directly perceptible. However, since a pot and blue are directly perceptible, all functional thing are in fact inherently existent.
-- Answer: It follow that direct perception of a pot which exists by way of its own entity is not feasible. If it were, the awareness perceiving the visible form of the pot should perceive all its parts. Yet when visual consciousness perceives the pot's form, it does not in fact perceive every single part of the pot. Who that knows the reality of things would claim that the pot is directly perceptible? "Also" refers to also blue existent by way of its own character.
The pot is imputed in dependence on eight substances and therefore cannot exist by way of its own character, nor by seeing one part can one see all its parts. Similarly, if fire existed by way of its own entity, the fallacy that it should always keep burning would arise, since it would not require fuel.
Dialecticians contradict both reasoning and common knowledge when they call awareness arising in dependence upon an individual sense organ direct perception, and assert that an awareness free from conceptuality in which a sound image and a generic image may be apprehended as merged is direct perception. Each individual moment of consciousness cannot be a direct perceiver. In the world objects like the waxing moon which are directly perceived by many people, are commonly held to be directly perceptible, whereas that which perceives these objects is not. Furthermore since they assert that sense consciousness is a direct perceiver, it is inconsistent to think that it is also a valid perceiver. An extensive explanation of this may be found in Candrakirti's commentary. it has not been included here for fear that it would be too long. )
.
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L7: [(2) Applying this reasoning to other instances]
.
\ ###
\ 302.
\ By means of this very analysis
\ Those with superior intelligence
\ Should refute individuality
\ All that is fragrant, sweet and soft.
.
(i. e.
This applies to all five senses; there is no direct perception, no objective perception. )
.
(-- This same analogy procedure should be applied to the objects of the other senses: to sounds, smells, tastes and tactile objects. One will discover that none of these are truly existent directly perceptible objects.
-- By means of this very analysis using the reasoning which refutes the assertion that sense consciousness is a direct perceiver in relation to a pot, blue and so forth, existent by way of their own entity, the wise with superior intelligence refute separately in each case the contention that sense consciousnesses are direct perceivers in relation to fragrances such as the fragrance of jasmine flowers, sweet tastes and that which is soft to touch, all existent by way of their own entity. Since one cannot make distinction such as seeing one part but not seeing others, or distinctions with regard to what touches and what does not, or with regard to closeness and distant in relation to truly existent functional things, such fallacies ensue. )
.
L7: [(3) Absurdity of positing that other parts are seen because visible form existent by way of its own character is seen]
.
\ ###
\ 303.
\ If because the form is seen
\ Everything is seen,
\ Why because of what is not seen
\ Would the form not be unseen?
.
(i. e. We perceive only part of it. )
.
(-- Assertion: All parts of the pot are seen when its visual form is seen, for the pot is not a separate entity from its visual form.
-- Answer: If on the grounds that visual consciousness sees the pot's form one can posit that all parts of the pot are seen, why on the grounds that visual consciousness does not perceive the pot's smell would even the visible form, which is accepted as seen, not be unseen? If one posits that all parts are seen because one part is seen, even that which is accepted as seen cannot be posited as seen if one part is not perceived. )
.
L7: [(4) Refuting direct perception of just visible form existent by way of its own character]
.
\ ###
\ 304.
\ There is no direct perception
\ of just the form alone,
\ Because it has a close and distant
\ As well as a central part.
.
(i. e. We perceive only a part of its form. )
.
(-- A close analysis then follows which establishes that all the components that make up a composite, . . .
-- Assertion: Though the pot is not a directly perceptible object of comprehension, its visible form is established by direct perception and thus, indirectly, the pot existing by way of its own entity is also directly perceptible.
-- Answer: It follows that there is no direct perception of just the visible form alone existent by way of its own entity, because the visible form too has many parts, such as close, distant and central parts, and is thus imputed in dependence upon many parts. There is not the slightest thing existent by way of its own entity that is directly perceptible to any kind of awareness. )
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L7: [(5) Showing that the proof and what is to be proved are alike]
.
\ ###
\ 305.
\ This also applies when one examines
\ Whether particles have parts or not.
\ Thus to prove a thesis by that
\ Which must be proved is not feasible.
.
(i. e. And we cannot conclude that the form exist because we see the particles composing it because this is not proven. In fact the same argument about seeing only a part of it also applies to particles. )
.
(. . . even particles, have parts.
-- When all the parts are separated, that form is finally reduced to the smallest particles. An investigation of whether particles have parts or not applies to those particles too. If they have parts like a front and a back, they are, like the pot, imputed in dependence upon many parts, in which case they no longer are the smallest particles. If they do not have parts, they cannot exist because of being inapprehensible. Thus it is not feasible to prove that the pot exists by way of its entity as a directly perceptible object of comprehension by means of that which must be proved, for things do not exist by way of their own character. )
.
L7: [(6) Showing other lines of reasoning]
.
\ ###
\ 306.
\ EVERYTHING TOO IS A COMPONENT
\ AS WELL AS BEING A COMPOSITE.
\ Thus even a spoken syllable
\ Does not have existence here.
.
(i. e. Everything is empty because everything is composed of parts, and there is no direct perception because we see
only part of any object - we assume the rest. And this applies to the parts, . . . Everything is empty of inherent existence because dependent on its parts. That is how perception works: we receive stimuli based on an endless flow of interdependence, and through habituation we imagine invariants (entities . . . ) in it in our attempt to try to control it. But all those objects, characteristics, relations, are mere hypothesis, created by our own mind and by conventions. We just forget that they are our own fabrications and think they exist by themselves independently of our own mind out there. Everything is merely imputed by the mind. )
.
(-- Thus each is simultaneously a component as well as a composite.
-- Moreover when objects apprehended by the physical sense organs are examined, all are components in relation to their composites as well as composites in relation to their components and are therefore merely imputed in dependence upon their parts. As with the analysis of the smallest particle, names, which are ultimately reduced to spoken syllables such as "a," are also just conventions in this world and do not exist by way of their own entity. Thus you must recognize all dependently arising phenomena as mere names and terms. )
.
L5: [2. Individual refutations]
L6: [a. Refuting that sense organs apprehend objects existing by way of their own entity] L7: [(1) Refuting truly existent visible objects]
L8: [(a) Refuting objects]
L9: [1: Refuting our own sectarians' contentions]
L9: [a: Refutation by examining whether the color and shape constituting a visible form existing by way of its own character taken as object of apprehension
by a visual consciousness are inherently one or different]
.
\ ###
\ 307.
\ If a shape is distinct from color
\ How is shape apprehended?
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\ If not distinct, why would the body
\ Not also apprehend color?
.
(i. e. Even parts like shape and color are not directly perceived, not inherently existing characteristics: We do not directly perceive objects through directly perceiving their shape and color, . . . Even (parts like) shape and colors are not inherently existing characteristics, independent of anything else, and directly perceptible as if truly existent on their own out there. Here it is proven that shape and color are not two, not one; they are interdependent, thus not existing on their own, not inherently existing. Those characteristics are also dependent on many many other factors. So we first receive stimuli (part of parts), compare them to memory, filter them through accumulated karma, and assume the rest like shape and colors, and then label the object, and then we have the illusion of perceiving the object as if it truly exist on its own. All the possible mistakes (optical illusions, color change due to other factors, miss-identification . . . ), proves that there is no objective perception of anything. )
.
(-- Assertion: The pot is directly perceptible since visual consciousness sees the pot's visible form existent by way of its own character, consisting of color and shape.
-- Answer: Are color and shape inherently one or distinct? If shape such as length and so forth is inherently distinct from color, how can a visual consciousness take shape as its object of apprehension? It follows that it cannot because shape is an entity distinct from color. Alternatively, if they are not distinct but inherently one, why does touch not apprehend color in the dark just as it apprehends shape? It follows that it should because they are one. )
.
L9: [b: Refutation through the consequence that because the elements are present, a visual consciousness taking a visible form as its object would apprehend both]
.
\ ###
\ 308.
\ Only the form is visible
\ But the form's causes are not seen.
\ If indeed it is thus,
\ Why are both not also
\ Perceived by just the eyes?
.
(i. e. Even parts like the so called elementary components are not inherently existing, or directly perceived: We cannot use the assumption of the elementary components to prove that a form really exist on its own. This is circular reasoning; they are assume based on the resulting form. Those elementary components have not been proven to exist on their own. In fact it is easy to prove that they could not exist as such as done in a previous chapter. )
.
(-- An analysis of the relationship between the four elements and their outcome, visual form, is then made to demonstrate that they are neither inherently one nor different.
-- Assertion: The visible form source exists because the four great elements which are causal forms exist.
-- Answer ab: Only the resultant form is visible but the form's causes such as the earth element are not seen. Since causal form is imputed in dependence upon resultant form, they cannot be inherently different. If they are inherently one, they must be one.
-- cde: In that case why does just visual consciousness itself not apprehend both the causal and resultant forms? It follows that it should because they are one. )
.
L9: [c: Showing what invalidates this contention]
.
\ ###
\ 309.
\ Earth is seen as firm and stable
\ And is apprehended by the body.
\ Only that which is tangible
\ Is referred to as earth.
.
(i. e. No possible direct visual perception of the elementary components: In fact the characteristics of those so called elementary components are based on their tactile sensation and have nothing to do with visual perception. So we cannot say we have direct perception of a form because we directly perceive those elementary components. )
.
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( -- Earth is seen as firm and stable and furthermore is apprehended by tactile consciousness. Thus only that which is tangible is referred to as earth. Therefore since visible forms are objects apprehended by visual consciousness and the four elements are objects apprehended by tactile consciousness, they are different. If one accepts them as truly existent, they are unrelated. It would thereby follow that visible form is causeless. )
.
L9: [2: Refuting contentions of other sectarians]
.
\ ###
\ 310.
\ Since it was produced as something visible,
\ It is of no use at all to the pot.
\ As with the production of visibility,
\ It lacks even the entity of existence.
.
(i. e. The case of the "visibility" characteristic: And "visibility" is not another directly perceptible, inherently existing elementary characteristic. This characteristic is also dependently arisen. )
.
(-- Vaisesika assertion: A pot is not visible by way of its own entity but neither is it not a visible object, since it is directly perceptible by virtue of possessing visibility, a separate generality.
-- Answer ab: This too is unacceptable. Has the pot come into existence as something visible through its own causes or not? In the first case it would follow that an association with the separate generality of visibility is of no use in making the pot directly perceptible, because it has come into existence as something visible through its own causes. For this reason the generality of visibility is not produced in relation to the pot.
-- cd: Further, a pot that has no connection with visibility and is not something visible lacks any inherently established entity of existence. Therefore the pot could not be either actually or imputedly directly perceptible as you contend. )
.
L8: [(b) Refuting that which perceives objects]
L9: [1: Refuting that the eye is by way of its own entity an instrument of looking at form]
.
\ ###
\ 311.
\ The eye, like the ear, is an outcome of
\ The elements. The eyes see while the others do not.
\ Certainly therefore the Subduer said
\ The fruition of actions is inconceivable.
.
(i. e. The Middle Way about the sense organs: There is no inherently existing sense organs either. The eye is also composed of parts, dependent on multiple factors, the fruit of evolution or accumulated karma. It is not a perfect organ capable of true objective perception, of direct perception. All of its mistakes are proof of that. As everything is samsara it is based on mistaken assumptions, illusions, ignorance and accumulated karma. The emptiness of the sense organs, and of the objects of the senses, doesn't mean that they are completely non-existent, it only means that they are dependently arisen, not independent, not existing on their own. Emptiness doesn't deny dependent origination; one implies the other. )
.
(-- The sense and the process of perception are examined next. Confusing lack of true existence with total non- existence, the opponent argues that the Madhyamika presentation of the senses contradicts what was said by the Buddha about the eyes and so forth being the maturation of past actions. In answer it is established that although nothing can sustain ultimate analysis, since nothing is findable when subjected to this kind of investigation, our experience confirms the existence of our senses and other phenomena. Thus the Buddha's statements about the relationship between actions and their effects are in no way contradicted, since such statements refer to the conventional existence of actions and their effects.
-- Assertion: Because sense organs exist -- such as the eyes, which are instruments of perception -- directly perceptible objects such as visible exist.
-- Answer ab: Regarding the subject, the eye organ: since the eye perceives visual stimuli while other senses do not, it does not perceive visual form by way of its own entity, for like the nose sense organ it is an outcome of the elements. A demonstration of the valid reasons which invalidate the entailment is given below.
-- Objection: If the eye and so forth do not exist it contradicts explanations concerning the maturation of actions.
-- Answer: But even we do not refute that.
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-- Question: Why is that not refuted?
-- Answer: We refute that things exist by way of their own entity but far from refuting the existence of all that is dependent arising, we affirm it in our own system.
-- cd: Although it cannot sustain investigation by the reasoning which analyzes suchness and though it is not established by way of its own entity, it is undeniable that the eye sees visible form and does not hear sound. Thus recognizing that the maturation of actions is inconceivable, one should accept it without applying analysis by reasoning. Certainly therefore the Subduer said that the fruition of actions is inconceivable. Sutra says:
~ The maturation of sentient beings' actions is inconceivable.
~ Thus this whole world comes into existence through causes. ) .
L9: [2: Refuting consciousness as agent]
.
\ ###
\ 312.
