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? DEDUCTION O? CUE CATlGORtES. 89
indicates accordingly, that the empirical consciousness of a given manifold in an intuition is subject to a pure self-con sciousness H priori, in the same manner as an empirical in tuition is subject to a pure sensuous intuition, which is also h priori. -- In the above proposition, then, lies the beginning of a deduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding. Now, as the categories have their origin in the understanding alone, independently of sensibility, I must in my deduction make abstraction of the mode in which the manifold of an em pirical intuition is given, in order to fix my attention exclu sively on the unity which is brought by the understanding into the intuition by means of the category. In what follows
(? 22), it will be shown from the mode in which the empirical intuition is given in the faculty of sensibility, that the unity which belongs to it is no other than that which the category (according to ? 16) imposes on the manifold in a given intui tion, and thus its (I priori validity in regard to all objects of sense being established, the purpose of our deduction will be fully attained.
But there is one thing in the above demonstration, of which I could not make abstraction, namely, that the manifold to be intuited must be given previously to the synthesis of the un derstanding, and independently of it. How this takes place remains here undetermined. For if I cogitate an understand ing which was itself intuitive (as, for example, a divine un derstanding which should not represent given objects, but by whose representation the objects themselves should be given or produced) -- the categories would possess no signification in relation to such a faculty of cognition. They are merely rules for an understanding, whose whole power consists in thought, that in the act of submitting the synthesis of the manifold which presented to in intuition from very different quarter, to the unity of apperception -- faculty, therefore, which cognizes nothing per >>e, but only connects and arranges the material of cognition, the intuition, namely, which must be presented to means of the object. But to show reasons for this peculiar character of our understandings, that produces unity of apperception priori only by means of categories, and certain kind and number thereof, as
impossible as to explain why we are endowed with precisely so many functions of judgment and no more, or why time and space arc the only forms of our intuition.
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? 00 TBAHSCXirDXHTAL LOGIC. ? 18.
In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is tit only legitimate use of the Category.
To think an object and to cognize an object are by no means the same thing. In cognition there are two elements :
firstly, the conception, whereby an object is cogitated category) ; and, secondly, the intuition, whereby the object is given. For supposing that to the conception a corresponding intuition could not be given, it would still be a thought as re gards its form, but without any object, and no cognition of anything would be possible by means of inasmuch as, so far as knew, there existed and could exist nothing to which my thought could be applied. Now all intuition possible to us
sensuous consequently, our thought of an object means of pure conception of the understanding, can become cogni tion for us, only in so far as this conception applied to objects of the senses. Sensuous intuition either pure intuition (space and time) or empirical intuition--of that which im mediately represented in space and time means of sensation as real. Through the determination of pure intuition we ob tain a priori cognitions of objects, as in mathematics, but only as regards their form as phenomena whether there can exist things which must be intuited in this form not thereby established. All mathematical conceptions, therefore, are not per se cognition, except in so far as we presuppose that there exist things, which can only be represented con formably to the form of our pure sensuous intuition. But things in space and time are given, only in so far as they are percep tions (representations accompanied with sensation), therefore only by empirical representation. Consequently the pure con. ceptions of the understanding, even when they are applied to intuitions priori (as in mathematics), produce cognition only in so far as these (and therefore the conceptions of the understanding by means of them,) can be applied to empirical intuitions. Consequently the categories do not, even means of pure intuition, afford us any cognition of things they can only do so in so far as they can be applied to empirical intui tion. That to say, the categories serve only to render em pirical cognition possible. But this what we call experience
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? DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGOBIEB. 91
cation to objects of ex* the categories.
The foregoing proposition of the utmost importance, for determines the limits of the exercise of the pure conceptions
of the understanding in regard to objects, just as transcen dental esthetic determined the limits of the exercise of the pure form of our sensuous intuition. Space and time, as conditions of the possibility of the presentation of objects to us, are valid no further than for objects of sense, con sequently, only for experience. Beyond these limits they re present to us nothing, for they belong only to sense, and have no reality apart from it. The pure conceptions of the understanding are free from this limitation, and extend to
objects of intuition in general, be the intuition like or unlike to ours, provided only be sensuous, and not intellectual. But this extension of conceptions beyond the range of our in tuition of no advantage for they are then mere empty con ceptions of objects, as to the possibility or impossibility of the existence of which they furnish us with no means of dis covery. They are mere forms of thought, without objective reality, because we have no intuition to which the synthetical unity of apperception, which alone the categories contain, could be applied, for the purpose of determining an object. Our sensuous and empirical intuition can alone give them significance and meaning. .
If, then, we suppose an object of non-sensuous intuition to be given, wo can in that case represent by all those pre dicates, which are implied in the presupposition that nothing appertaining to sensuous intuition belongs to for example that not extended, or in space that its duration not time that in no change (the effect of the determinations in time)
to be met with, and so on. But no proper knowledge merely indicate what the intuition of the object not, with
out being able to say what contained in for have not shown the possibility of an object to which my pure con
ception of understanding could be applicable, because have not been able to furnish any intuition corresponding to but am only able to say that our intuition not valid for it. But the most important point this, that to something al
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? 92 TRA2fSCEWDEirrAL LO9IC.
this kind not one category can be found applicable. Take, for example, the conception of substance, that is something tLat can exist as subject, but never as mere predicate ; in regard to this conception I am quite ignorant whether there can really be anything to correspond to such a determination of thought, if empirical intuition did not afford me the occa sion for its application. But of this more in the sequel.
? 20.
Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Sense* in general.
The pure conceptions of the understanding apply to objects of intuition in general, through the understanding alone, whether the intuition be our own or some other, provided only it be sensuous, but are, for this very reason, mere forms of thought, by means of which alone no determined object can be cognized. The synthesis or conjunction of the manifold in these conceptions relates, we have said, only to the unity of apperception, and is for this reason the ground of the possibility of & priori cognition, in so far as this cognition is dependent on the understanding. This synthesis is, there fore, not merely transcendental, but also purely intellectual. But because a certain form of sensuous intuition exists in the mind 5 priori which rests on the receptivity of the representa tive faculty (sensibility), the understanding, as a spontaneity, is able to determine the internal sense by means of the di versity of given representations, conformably to the synthetical unity of apperception, and thus to cogitate the synthetical unity of the apperception of the manifold of sensuous in tuition a priori, as the condition to which must necessarily
De submitted all objects of human intuition. And in this
nanner the categories as mere forms of thought receive ob
iective reality, that is application to objects which are given to us in intuition, but that only as phenomena, for it is only of phcenomena that we are capable of o priori intuition.
This synthesis of the-manifold of sensuous intuition, which is possible and necessary a priori, may be called figurative (synthesis speciosa), in contra-distinction to that which is co gitated in the mere category in regard to the manifold of an intuition in general, and is called connexion or conjunction of the understanding {synlhcr's intellectualis). Both are trans
? ? ? ? DEDUCTION OF TUB CATEGOBIES. M
cendental, not merely because they themselves precede A prion all experience, but also because they form the basis for the possibility of other cognition a priori.
But the figurative synthesis, when it has relation only to the originally synthetical unity of apperception, that is to the transcendental unity cogitated in the categories, must, to be distinguished from the purely intellectual conjunction, be en titled the transcendental synthesis of imagination. * Imagina tion is the faculty of representing an object even without its presence in intuition. Now, as all our intuition is sensuous, imagination, by reason of the subjective condition under which
alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the conceptions of the understanding, belongs to sensibility. But in so far as the synthesis of the imagination is an act of spontaneity, which is determinative, and not, like sense, merely determinable, and which is consequently able to determine sense a priori, according to its form, conformably to the unity of appercep tion, in so far is the imagination a faculty of determining sen sibility a priori, and ita synthesis of intuitions according to the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of the imagi
? nation. It is an operation of the understanding on sensibility, and the first application of the understanding to objects of possible intuition, and at the same time the basis for the exer cise of the other functions of that faculty. As figurative, it is distinguished from the merely intellectual synthesis, which is produced by the understanding alone, without the aid of imagination. Now, in so far as imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes call it also the productive imagination, and distin guish it from the reproductive, the synthesis of which is sub ject entirely to empirical laws, those of association, namely, and which, therefore, contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of a priori cognition, and for this reason belongs not to transcendental philosophy, but to psychology.
*****
We have now arrived at the proper place for explaining the paradox, which must have struck every one in our exposition of the internal sense (? 0), namely, --how this sense repre sents us to our own consciousness, only as we appear to our selves, not as wc are in ourselves, because, to wit, we uituitc
* Sec note on p. 3-1
? ? ? 94 TKANSCKNUENTAX LOOIO.
ourselves only as we are inwardly affected. Now this appears to be contradictory, inasmuch as we thus stand in a passive re lation to ourselves; and therefore in the systems- of psychology, the internal sense is commonly held to be one with the faculty of apperception, while we, on the contrary, carefully distin guish them.
That which determines the internal sense is the under standing, and its original power of conjoining the manifold of intuition, that is, of bringing this under an apperception (upon which rests the possibility of the understanding itself). Now, as the human understanding is not in itself a faculty of intuition, and is unable to exercise such a power, in order to conjoin, as it were, the manifold of its own intuition, the syn thesis of understanding considered per se, nothing but the unity of action, of which, as such, self-conscious, even apart from sensibility, by which, moreover, able to determine our internal sense in respect of the manifold which may be presented to according to the form of sensuous intuition. Thus, under the name of transcendental synthesis of imagi nation, the understanding exercises an activity upon the passive subject, whose faculty and so we are- right in saying that the internal sense affected thereby. Apperception and its synthetical unity are by no means one and the same with the internal sense. The former, as the source of all our synthetical conjunction, applies, under the name of the categories, to the manifold of intuition in general, prior to all sensuous intuition of objects. The internal sense, on the contrary, contains merely the form of intuition, but without any synthetical con
junction of the manifold therein, and consequently does not con tain any determined intuition, which possible only through consciousness of the determination of the manifold by the transcendental act of the imagination (synthetical influence of the understanding on the internal sense), which have named figurative synthesis.
This we can indeed always perceive in ourselves. We can not cogitate geometrical line without drawing in thought, nor circle without describing nor represent the three dimensions of space without drawing three lines from the same point perpendicular to one another. We cannot even cogitate time, unless, in drawing straight line (which to
* Length, breadth, and thickness. -- Tr. In difftr<<ut piwea. --7>
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? DEDUCTION OF THJ5 OATIdOBIM. 96
serve as the external figurative representation of time), we fix our attention on the act of the synthesis of the manifold, thereby we determine successively the internal sense, and
thus attend also to the succession of this
determination,
Motion as an act of the subject (not as a determination of an
object),* consequently the synthesis of the manifold in space,
if we make abstraction of space and attend merely to the act by which we determine the internal sense according to its form, is that which produces the conception of succession. The un derstanding, therefore, does by no means find in the internal sense any such synthesis of the manifold, but produces in that affects this sense. At the same time how [the]
who think distinct from the which intuites itself (other modes of intuition being cogitable as at least possible), and yet one and the same with this latter as the same subject how, therefore, am able to say " as an intelligence and
thinking subject, cognize myself as an object thought, so far as am, moreover, given to myself in intuition, --only, like other phsenomena, not as am in myself, and as considered the
understanding, but merely as appear," -- question that has in neither more nor less difficulty than the question, -- " How can be an object tomyself," or this, -- "How can be an object of my own intuition and internal perceptions. " But that such must be the fact, we admit that space merely pure form of the phenomena of external sense, can be clearly proved by the consideration that we cannot represent time, which not an object of external intuition, in any other way than under the image of line, which we draw in thought, mode of re presentation without which we could not cognize the unity of its dimension, and also that we are necessitated to take our determination of periods of time, or of points of tin. e, for all our internal perceptions from the changes which we perceive in outward things. follows that we must arrange the determinations of the internal sense, as phenomena in time, exactly in the same manner as we arrange those of the
Motion of an object in apace does not belong to pure science, con sequently not to geometry because, that thing moveable cannot be known priori, but only from experience. But motion, considered is tin ietcriptim of space, pure act of the successive synthesis of the rcani fold in external intuition by means of productive imagination, and
not only to geometry, but even to transcendental philosophy.
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external senses in space. And consequently, if we grant
this latter, that by means of them we know objects only in so far as we are affected externally, we must also con fess, with regard to tha internal sense, that by means of it we intuite ourselves only as we are internally affected by ourselves; in other words, as regards internal intuition, we cognize our own subject only as phenomenon, and not as it is in itself. *
? 21.
On the other hand, in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold content of representations, consequently in the syn thetical unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. This representation is a Thought, not an Intuition. Now, as in order to cognize ourselves, in addition to the act of thinking, which subjects the manifold of every possible intui tion to the unity of apperception, there is necessary a deter minate mode of intuition, whereby this manifold is given ; although my own existence is certainly not mere phenomenon
respecting
? (much less mere illusion), the determination of my existence f
* I do not see why so much difficulty should be found in admitting that our internal sense is affected by ourselves. Every act of attention exemplifies it. In such an act the understanding determines the internal sense by the synthetical conjunction which it cogitates, conformably to the internal intuition which corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the understanding. How much the mind is usually affected thereby every one will he able to perceive in himself.
f The / think expresses the act of determining my own existence. My existence is thus already given by the act of consciousness ; but the mode in which I must determine my existence, that is, the mode in which I must place the manifold belonging to my existence, is not thereby given. For this purpose intuition of self is required, and this intuition possesses a form given a priori, namely, time, which is sensuous, and belongs to our receptivity of the determinable. Now, as I do not possess another in tuition of self which gives the determining in me (of the spontaneity of which I am conscious), prior to the act of determination, in the same
manner as time gives the determinable, it is clear that I am unable to determine my own existence as that of a spontaneous being, but I am only able 10 represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought, that of my determination, and my existence remains ever determinable in
purely sensuous manner, that to say, like the existence of phenomenon.
But because of this spontaneity that call myself an intelligent.
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? DEDUCTION OF THI CATEGOBIXB. 97
can tnly take place conformably to the form of the internal sense, according to the particular mode in which the mani fold which I conjoin is giren in internal intuition, and I have therefore no knowledge of myself as I am, but merely as I appear to myself. The consciousness of self is thus very far from a knowledge of self, in which I do not use tiie categories, whereby I cogitate an object, by means of the conjunction of the manifold in one apperception. In the same way as I require^ in order to the cognition of an object distinct from myself, hot only the thought of an object in general (in the category), but also an intuition by which to determine that general conception, in the same way do I require, in order to the cognition of myself, not only the con sciousness of myself or the thought that I think myself, but in addition an intuition of the manifold in myself, by which to determine this thought. It is true that I exist as an intel ligence which is conscious only of its faculty of conjunction or synthesis, but subjected in relation to the manifold which this intelligence has to conjoin to a limitative conjunction called the internal sense. My intelligence (that can render that conjunction or synthesis perceptible only accord ing to the relations of time, which are quite beyond the proper sphere of the conceptions, of the understanding, and conse quently cognize itself in respect to an intuition (which cannot possibly be intellectual, nor given the understanding), only as appears to itself, and not as would cognize itself, its intuition were intellectual.
22.
Transcendental Deduction the universally possible employ ment in experience the Pure Conceptions of the Under standing.
In the metaphysical deduction, the priori origin of the categories was proved by their complete accordance with the general logical functions of thought in the transcendental deduction was exhibited the possibility of the categories as a priori cognitions of objects of an intuition in general 16 and 17). At present we are about to explain the possibility of cognizing, priori, means of the categories, all objects which can possibly be presented to our senses, not, indeed, according to the form of their intuition, but according to the
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laws of their conjunction or synthesis, and thus, as it were, of prescribing laws to nature, and even of rendering nature pos sible. For if the categories were adequate to this task, it would not be evident to us why everything that is presented to our senses must be subject to those laws which have an ipriori origin in the understanding itself.
I premise, that by the term synthesis of apprehension, I understand the combination of the manifold in an empirical
intuition, whereby perception, that empirical consciousness of the intuition (as phsenomenon), possible.
We have priori forms of the external and internal sensuous intuition in the representations of space and time, and to these
must the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold in
menon be always conformable, because the synthesis itself can only take place according to these forms. But space and time are not merely forms of sensuous intuition, but intuitions them selves (which contain manifold), and therefore contain priori the determination of the unity of this manifold. *
the Trans. ^Esthetic. ) Therefore unity of the synthesis of the manifold without or within us, consequently also con junction to which all that to be represented as determined in space or time must correspond, given priori along with
? phseno
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(not in) these intuitions, as the condition of the synthesis of
all apprehension of them. But this synthetical unity can be no other than that of the conjunction of the manifold of given intuition in general, in primitive act of consciousness, according to the categories, but applied to our sensuous intui tion. Consequently all synthesis, whereby alone even per ception possible, subject to the categories. And, as experience
Space represented as an object (as geometry really requires tc be) contain. , more than the mere form of the intuition namely, com bination of the manifold given according to the form of sensibility into representation that can be intuited so that the form the intuition gives us merely the manifold, but the formal intuition gives unity of representation. In the . Esthetic regarded this unity as belonging entirely to sensibility, for the purpose of indicating that antecedes all conceptions, although presupposes synthesis which does not belong to sense, through which alone, however, all our conceptions of space and time are possible. For as by means of this unity alone (the understanding deter mining the sensibility) space and time arc given as intuitions, follows that the unity of this intuition priori belongs to space and time, tod sot to the concef iun of the understanding HO).
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ia cognition by means of conjoined perceptions, the categories
are conditions of the possibility of experience, and an there
fore valid a priori for all objects of experience. ? ****
When, then, for example, I make the empirical intuition of
a house by apprehension of the manifold contained therein
into a perception, the necessary unity of space and of my external sensuous intuition lies at the foundation of this act, and I, as it were, draw the form of the house conformably to this synthetical unity of the manifold in space. But this very synthetical unity remains, even when I abstract the form of space, and has its seat in the understanding, and is in fact the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in an intui tion ; that is to say, the category of quantity, to which the aforesaid synthesis of apprehension, that the perception, must be completely conformable. *
To take another example, when perceive the freezing of water, apprehend two states (fluidity and solidity), which as such, stand toward each other mutually in relation of time. But in the time, which place as an internal intuition, at the
? foundation of this phenomenon, represent to myself syn thetical unity of the manifold, without which the aforesaid relation could not be given in an intuition as determined (in regard to the succession of time). Now this synthetical unity, as the priori condition under which conjoin the manifold of an intuition, make abstraction of the permanent form of my internal intuition (that to say, of time), the category of cause, by means of which, when applied to my sensibility,
and so in all other cases. *****
determine everything that occurs according to relations
time. Consequently apprehension in such an event, and the
event itself, as far as regards the possibility of its peremption,
stands under the conception of the relation of cause and effect:
Categories are conceptions which prescribe laws priori to
In this manner proved, that the synthesis of apprehension, which empirical, must necessarily be conformable to the synthesis of apper
ception, which intellectual, and contained priori in the category. It one and the same spontaneity which at one time, under the name of ima gination, at another under that of understanding, produces conjunction in the manifold of intuition.
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? 100 TRAUSCEKDEHTAL LOGIC.
phenomena, consequently to nature as the complex of all phenomena (natura materialiter tpectata). And now the question arises -- inasmuch as these categories are not derived from nature, and do not regulate themselves according to her as their model (for in that case they would be empirical)-- how it is conceivable that nature must regulate herself accord ing to them, in other words, how the categories can determine a priori the synthesis of the manifold of nature, and yet not derive their origin from her. The following is the solution of this enigma.
? It is not in the least more difficult to conceive how the laws of the phenomena of nature must harmonize with the understanding and with its ti priori form -- that its culty of conjoining the manifold -- than to understand how the phenomena themselves must correspond with the
priori form of our sensuous intuition. For laws do not exist in the phenomena any more than the phenomena exist as things in themselves. Laws do not exist except by re lation to the subject in which the phenomena inhere, so far as possesses understanding, just as phenomena have no existence except relation to the same existing subject so far as has senses.
To things as things in themselves, con- formability to law must necessarily belong independently of on understanding to cognize them. But phenomena are only representations of things which are utterly unknown in re spect to what they are in themselves. But as mere repre sentations, they stand under no law of coi junction except that which the conjoining faculty prescribes. Now that which conjoins the manifold of sensuous intuition imagination,
mental act to which understanding contributes unity of intellectual synthesis, and sensibility, manifoldness of appre hension. Now as all possible perception depends on the syn thesis of apprehension, and this empirical synthesis itself on the transcendental, consequently on the categories, evident that all possible perceptions, and therefore everything that can attain to empirical consciousness, that all phenomena of nature, must, as regards their conjunction, be subject to the categories. And nature (considered merely as raiture in general) dependent on them as the original ground of her necessary con formability to law (as natura formaliter tpectata). But the pure faculty (of the understanding) of prescribing laws
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? RESULT OF THE DEDUCTIOIT.
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d priori to phenomena by means of mere categories, is not competent to enounce other or more laws than those on which a nature in general, as a conformability to law of phenomeua of space and time, depends. Particular laws, inasmuch as they concern empirically determined phsenomena, cannot be entirely deduced from pure laws, although they all stand under them. Experience must be superadded in order to know these particular laws ; but in regard to experience in
{general, and everything that can be cognized as an object I hereof, these <i priori laws arc our only rule and guide.
? 23.
Result of this Deduction of the Conceptions of the Under standing.
We cannot think any object except by means of the catego ries ; we cannot cognize any thought <<xcept by means of in tuitions corresponding to these conceptions. Now all our in tuitions are sensuous, and our cognition, in so far as the object of it is given, is empirical. But empirical cognition is expe rience ; consequently no h priori cognition is possible for us, except of objects of possible experience. *
But this cognition, which is limited to objects of experience, is not for that reason derived entirely from experience, but-- and this is asserted of the pure intuitions and the pure con ceptions cf the understanding -- there are, unquestionably, elements of cognition, which exist in the mind a priori. Now there are only two ways in which a necessary harmony of ex perience with the conceptions of its objects can be cogitated. Either experience makes these conceptions possible, or the conceptions make experience possible. The former of these
* Lest my readers should stumble tt this assertion, and the conclusions that may be too rashly drawn from it, I must remind them that the categories in the act of thought are by no means limited by the conditions of our sensuous intuition, but have nn unbounded sphere of action. It is only the cognition of the object of thought, the determining of the object, which requires intuition. In the absence of intuition, our thought of an object may still have true and useful consequences in regard to the exer. cise of reason by the subject. Hut as this exercise of reason is not always directed on the determination of the object, in other words, on cognition thereof, but also on the determination of the subject and its volition, I do not intend to treat of it in this place,
? ? ? ? 102 TRAJTBOOTDBWTAL LOCRO.
statements will not hold good with respect to the categories (nor in regard to pure sensuous intuition), for they are ctprion
conceptions, and therefore independent of experience. The assertion of an empirical origin would attribute to them a sort of generatio eequivoea. Consequently, nothing remains but to adopt the second alternative (which presents us with a system, as it were, of the Epigenesis of pure reason), namely, that on the part of the understanding the categories do contain the grounds of the possibility of all experience. But with respect to the questions how they make experience possible, and what are the principles of the possibility thereof with which they pre
sent us in their application to phsenomena, the following sec tion on the transcendental exercise of the faculty of judgment
? will inform the reader.
It is quite possible that some one may propose a species of
preeformation-system of pure reason --a middle way between the two--to wit, that the categories are neither innate and
first & priori principles of cognition, nor derived from expe rience, but are merely subjective aptitudes for thought implanted in us contemporaneously with our existence, which were so ordered and disposed by our Creator, that their exercise perfectly harmonizes with the laws of nature which
Now, not to mention that with such an hypothesis it is impossible to say at what point we
must stop in the employment of predetermined aptitudes, the fact that the categories would in this case entirely lose that character of necessity which is essentially involved in the very conception of them, is a conclusive objection to it. The conception of cause, for example, which expresses the necessity of an effect under a presupposed condition, would be false, if it rested only upon such an arbitrary subjective necessity of uniting certain empirical representations" according to such a rule of relation. 1 could not then say-- The effect is connected with its cause in the object (that necessarily)," but only, " am so constituted that can think this representa tion as so connected, and not otherwise. " Now this just what the sceptic wants. For in this case, all our knowledge,
depending on the supposed objective validity of our judg ment, nothing but mere illusion nor would there be want
ing people who would deny any such subjective necessity respect to themselves, though they must feel it. At all events,
regulate experience.
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? ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES. 103
we could not dispute with any one on that which merely de pends on the manner in which his subject is organized.
Short view of the above Deduction.
The foregoing deduction is an exposition of the pure con
ceptions of the understanding (and with them of all theo
and space as original forms of sensibility. *****
I consider the division by paragraphs to be necessary only up to this point, because we had to treat of the elementary
retical a priori cognition), as principles of the possibility of
experience, but of experience as the determination of all phe-
nomena in space and time in general-- of experience, finally,
from the principle of the original synthetical unity of apper
ception, as the form of the understanding in relation to time
? As we now proceed to the exposition of the em ployment of these, I shall not designate the chapters in this manner any further.
TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC
BOOK II. ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES
General logic is constructed upon a plan which coincides exactly with the division of the higher faculties of cognition. These are, Underttanding, Judgment, and Reason. This science, accordingly, treats in its analytic of Conceptions, Judgments, and Conclusions in exact correspondence with the functions and order of those mental powers which we include generally under the generic denomination of understanding.
As this merely formal logic makes abstraction of all con tent of cognition, whether pure or empirical, and occupies itself with the mere form of thought (discursive cognition), it must contain in its analytic a canon for reason. For the form of reason has its law, which, without taking into consi deration the particular nature of the cognition about which it is employed, can be discovered a priori, by the simple analysis of the action of reason into its momenta.
Transcendental logic, limited as it is to a determinate con tent, that of pure d priori cognitions, tc wit, cannot imitate general logic in this division. For it u evident that the
conceptions.
? ? ? 104 TRAN8CEITDENTAL LOGIC.
transcendental employment of reason is not objectively valid, and therefore does not belong to the logic of truth (that
to analytic), but as logic of illusion, occupies particular department in the scholastic system under the name of tran scendental Dialectic.
Understanding and judgment accordingly possess in tran scendental logic canon of objectively valid, and therefore true exercise, and are comprehended in the analytical depart ment of that logic. But reason, in her endeavours to arrive
priori means at some true statement concerning objects, and to extend cognition beyond the bounds of possible expe rience, altogether dialectic, and her illusory assertions cannot be constructed into canon such as an analytic ought to contain.
Accordingly, the analytic of principles will be merely canon for the faculty of judgment, for the instruction of this
faculty in its application to phenomena of the pure concep tions of the understanding, which contain the necessary con dition for the establishment of priori laws. On this account, although the subject of the following chapters the especinl principles of understanding, shall make use of the term " Doctrine of the faculty judgment," in order to define more particularly my present purpose.
INTRODUCTION.
OF THE TRANSCEXBXNTAL FACULTY OF JUDGMENT IS GENEKAL.
If understanding in general be defined as the faculty of laws or rules, the faculty of judgment may be termed the faculty of subsumption under these ruin that of dis tinguishing whether this or that does or does not stand under
given rule (casus data; legis). General logic contains no directions or precepts for the faculty of judgment, nor can contain any such. For as makes abstraction of alt con tent cognition, no duty left for except that of ex posing analytically the mere form of cognition in conceptions, judgments and conclusions, and of thereby establishing formal rules for all exercise of the understanding. Now this logic
wished to give some general direction how we should sub sume under these rules, that how we should distinguish
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whether this or that did or did not stand under them, thia again, could not be done otherwise than by means of a rule. But this rule, precisely because it is a rule, requires for itself direction from the faculty of judgment. Thus, it is evident, that the understanding is capable of being instructed by rules, but that the judgment is a peculiar talent, which does not, and cannot require tuition, but only exercise. This faculty is therefore the specific quality of the so-called mother- wit, the want of which no scholastic discipline can compen sate. For although education may furnish, and, as it were, ingraft upon a limited understanding rules borrowed from other minds, yet the power of employing these rules cor rectly must belong to the pupil himself; and no rule which we can prescribe to him with this purpose, is, in the absence or deficiency of this gift of nature, secure from misuse. * A physician therefore, a judge or a statesman, may have in his head many admirable pathological, juridical, or political rules, in a degree that may enable him to be a profound teacher in his particular science, and yet in the application of these rules, he may very possibly blunder,--either because he is wanting in natural judgment (though not in understand ing), and whilst he can comprehend the general in abstracto, cannot distinguish whether a particular case in concreto ought to rank under the former ; or because his faculty of judgment has not been sufficiently exercised by examples and real practice. Indeed, the grand and only use of ex amples, is to sharpen the judgment. For as regards the correctness and precision of the insight of the understand ing, examples are commonly injurious rather than other wise, because, as casus in terminis, they seldom adequately fulfil the Conditions of the rule. Besides, they often weaken the power of our understanding to apprehend rules or laws in their universality, independently of particular circum stances of experience ; and hence, accustom us to employ
* Deficiency in judgment is properly that which is called stupidity ; and for such a failing we know 110 remedy. A dull or narrow-minded person, to whom nothing is wanting but a proper degree of understand ing, may be improved by tuition, even so far as to deserve the epithet of learned. But as such persons frequently labour under a deficiency in the faculty of judgment, it is not uncommon to find men extremely learned, who in the application of their science betray to a lamentable degree this U remediable want.
? ? ? ? 106 TRANSCEJTDEKTAX ANALTTIC.
them more as formula: than a<< principles. Examples an thus the go-cart of the judgment, which he who is naturally deficient in that faculty, cannot afford to dispense with.
But although general logic cannot give directions to the faculty of judgment, the case very different as regards trans cendental logic, insomuch that appears to be the especial duty of the latter to secure and direct, means of determinate rules, the faculty of judgment in the employment of the pure
faculty of judgment (lapsus judicii) the employment of the few pure conceptions of the understanding which we possess, although its use in this case purely negative, philosophy
called upon to apply all its acuteness and penetration.
But transcendental philosophy has this peculiarity, that besides indicating the rule, or rather the general condition for rules, which given in the pure conception of the understand ing, can, at the same time, indicate priori the case to which the rule must be applied. The cause of the superiority which, in this respect, transcendental philosophy possesses above all other sciences except mathematics, lies in this -- treats of conceptions which must relate priori to their objects, whose objective validity consequently cannot be demonstrated posteriori, and at the same time, under the obligation of presenting in general but sufficient tests, the conditions under which objects can be given in harmony with those con ceptions otherwise they would be mere logical forms, without content, and not pure conceptions of the understanding.
Our transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgment will contain two chapters. The first wild treat of the sensuous condition under which alone pure conceptions of the under standing can be employed, --that of the schematism of the pure understanding. The second will treat of those synthetical judgments which are derived priori from pure conceptions of the understanding under those conditions, and which lie
priori at the foundation of all other cognitions, that
to say, will treat of the principles of the pure understanding,
For, as doctrine, that as an endeavour to
understanding.
enlarge the sphere of the understanding in regard to pure priori cognitions, philosophy worse than useless, since from all the attempts hitherto made, little or no ground has been gained. But, as critique, order to guard against the mistakes of the
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107
TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGMENT,
On, Analytic of Principles.
CHAPTER I.
Of the Schematism of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding.
In all subsumptions of an object under a conception, the representation of the object must be homogeneous with the conception ; in other words, the conception must contain that which is represented in the object to be subsumed under it. For this is the meaning of the expression, An object is con tained under a conception. Thus the empirical conception of a plate is homogeneous with the pure geometrical conception of a circle, inasmuch as the roundness which is cogitated in the former is intuited in the latter.
But pure conceptions of the understanding, when compared with empirical intuitions, or even with sensuous intuitions in
general, are quite heterogeneous, and never can be discovered in any intuition. How then is the tubsumption of the latter under the former, and consequently the application of the cate gories to phenomena, possible 1 -- For it is impossible to say, for example, Causality can be intuited through the senses, and is contained in the phsenomenon. --This natural and important question forms the real cause of the necessity of a transcen dental doctrine of the faculty of judgment, with the purpose, to wit, of shewing how pure conceptions of the understand ing can be applied to phenomena. In all other sciences, where the conceptions by which the object is thought in the general are not so different and heterogeneous from those which represent the object in eoncreto--as it is given, it is quite unnecessary to institute any special inquiries concerning the application of the former to the latter.
Now it is quite clear, that there must be some third thing, which on the one side is homogeneous with the category, and with the phsenomenon on the other, and so makes the applica tion of the fo rmer to the latter possible. This mediating repre
? ? ? ? 108 &KAXYTI0 Or PBIHOTPLBS.
eentation must be pure (without any empirical content), and yet must on the one side be intellectual, on the other sensuous. Such a representation is the transcendental schema.
The conception of the understanding contains pure syn thetical unity of the manifold in general. Time, as the formal condition of the manifold of the internal sense, oonsequently of the conjunction of all representations, contains a priori a manifold in the pure intuition. Now a transcendental deter mination of time is so far homogeneous with the category, which constitutes the unity thereof, that it is universal, and rests upon a rule a priori. On the other hand, it is so far ho mogeneous with the phenomenon, inasmuch as time is con tained in every empirical representation of the manifold. Thus an application of the category to phenomena becomes possible. by means of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of the conceptions of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of the latter under the former.
After what has been proved in our deduction of the catego ries, no one, it is to be hoped, can hesitate ns to the proper de cision of the question, whether the employment of these pure conceptions of the understanding ought to be merely empirical or also transcendental ; in other words, whether the categories, as conditions of a possible experience, relate h priori solely to phenomena, or whether, as conditions of the possibility of things in general, their application can be extended to objects as things in themselves. For we have there seen that con ceptions are quite impossible, and utterly without signification, unless either to them, or at least to the elements of which they consist, an object be given ; and that, consequently, they cannot possibly apply to objects as things in themselves without re gard to the question whether and how these may be given to us ; and further, that the only manner in which objects can be given to us, is by means of the modification of our sensibility ; and finally, that pure h priori conceptions, in addition to tli? function of the understanding in the category, must contain a priori formal conditions of sensibility (of the internal sense, namely), which again contain the general condition under which alone the category can be applied to any oliject. This formal and pure condition of sensibility, to which the conception of tho understanding is restricted in its employment, we shall name the schema of the conception of th-' understandinij, and thf
? ? ? ? Or THJS SCHEMATISM Or THE CATEGORIES. 109
procedure of the understanding with these schemata, we shall oull the Schematism of the pure understanding.
The Schema is, in itself, always a mere product of the ima
gination. * But as the synthesis of imagination has for its aim no single intuition, but merely unity in the determination of sen
sibility, the schema is clearly distinguishable from the image. Thus, if I place five points one after another, this is an image of the number five. On the other hand, if I only think a number in general, which may be either five or a hun dred, this thought is rather the representation of a method of representing in an image a sum g. thousand) in con formity with conception, than the image itself, an image which should find some little difficulty in reviewing, and comparing with the conception. Now this representation of general procedure of the imagination to present its image to conception, call the schema of this conception.
In truth, not images of objects, but schemata, which lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions. No image could ever be adequate to our conception of triangle general. For the geueralness of the conception never could attain to, as this includes under itself all triangles, whether
right-angled, acute-angled, &c. , whilst the image would always be limited to single part of this sphere. The schema of the triangle can exist nowhere else than in thought, and indi cates rule of the synthesis of the imagination in regard to pure figures in space. Still less an object of experience, or an image of the object, ever adequate to the empirical concep tion. On the contrary, the conception always relates imme diately to the schema of the imagination, as rule for the de termination of our intuition, in conformity with certain ge neral conception. The conception of dog indicates rule, according to which my imagination can delineate the figure of
four-footed animal in general, without being limited to any particular individual form which experience presents to me, or indeed to any possible image that can represent to myself in eoncreto. This schematism of our understanding in regard to phenomena and their mere form, an art, hidden in the depths of the human soul, whose true modes of action we shall only with difficulty discover and unveil. Thus much only enii
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we say : --The image is a product of the empirical faculty of the productive imagination, --the schema of sensuous conceptions (of figures in space, for example) is a product, and, as it were, a monogram of the pure imagination a priori, whereby and according to which images first become possible, which, however, can be connected with the conception only mediately by means of the schema which they indicate, and are in themselves never fully adequate to it. On the other hand, the schema of a pure conception of the understanding is something that cannot be reduced into any image, --it is nothing else than the pure synthesis expressed by the category, con formably to a rule of unity according to conceptions. It is a transcendental product of the imagination, a product which concerns the determination of the internal sense,
? according to conditions of its form (time) in respect to all representa
tions, in so far as these representations must be conjoined H priori in one conception, conformably to the unity of apper
ception.
Without entering upon a dry and tedious analysis of the
essential requisites of transcendental schemata of the pure conceptions of the understanding, we shall rather proceed at once to give an explanation of them according to the order of the categories, and in connection therewith.
For the external sense the pure image of all quantities (quantorum) is space ; the pure image of aU objects of sense in general, is time. But the pure schema of quantity (quantila- tis) as a conception of the understanding, is number, a re presentation which comprehends the successive addition of one to one (homogeneous quantities). Thus, number is no thing else than the unity of the synthesis of the manifold in a homogeneous intuition, by means of my generating time* it self in my apprehension of the intuition.
Reality, in the pure conception of the understanding, is that
which corresponds to a sensation in general ; that, conse
quently, the conception of which indicates a being (in time). Negation is that the conception of which represents a not-
The opposition of these two consists there fore in the difference of one and the same time, as a time filled or a time empty. Now as time is only the form of intuition,
>> I generate time because I generate succession, namely, in the sue- ecMive addition of one to one. -- Tr.
being (in time).
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consequently of objects as plienomena, that which in objects corresponds to sensation is the transcendental matter of all objects as things in themselves {Sachheit, reality). Now every sensation has a degree or quantity by which it can fill time, that is to say, the internal sense in respect of the representation of an object, more or less, until it vanishes into nothing (=0= negatio). Thus there is a relation and connection between reality and negation, or rather a transition from the former to the latter, which makes every reality representable to us as a quantum ; and the schema of a reality as the quantity of something in so far as it fills time, is exactly this continuous and uniform generation of the reality in time, as we descend in time from the sensation which has a certain degree, down to the vanishing thereof, or gradually ascend from negation to the quantity thereof.
The schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time ; that the representation of as substratum of the empirical determination of time substratum which there fore remains, whilst all else changes. (Time passes not, but in
passes the existence of the changeable. To time, therefore,
which itself unchangeable and permanent, corresponds that which in the phenomenon unchangeable in existence, that
substance, and only by that the succession and co existence of phsenomena can be determined in regard to time. ) The schema of cause and of the causality of thing the
real which, when posited, always followed by something else. consists, therefore, in the succession of the manifold, in so
far as that succession subjected to rule.
The schema of community (reciprocity of action and re
action), or the reciprocal causality of substances in respect of their accidents, the co-existence of the determinations of the one with those of the other, according to general rule.
The schema of possibility the accordance of the synthesis
of different representations with the conditions of time in ge
neral (as, for example, oppopites cannot exist together at the same time in the same thing, but only after each other), and therefore the determination of the representation of thing
at any time.
The schema of reality* existence in determined time.
WWklichkeit. Id the table of categoric! called Bxiitenc* (Dueyn). -- Tr.
OF TlIE SCHEMATISM Of THE CATESORIEB.
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