" The best explanation is that "he who is capable of understanding" is one in whom there are no causes of confusion, and in whom the
auditive
consciousness has already arisen.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-2-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
Paramartha translates: "Until the moment when one says thefourniirayas (Ok), all vqhapti and avijnapti dependent (##0 on this principal action,--as long as the series is not cut off,--is consecutive action.
" Hsiian-tsang is also obscure: chih^(ydvat) shuoWliaroc) ssu-iVBlfc(catvdro nUraydh) chilk(ca)yu i?
ifesa, anya) i$L(nifraya) ch'ien fij (prddurbhavanti ?
).
Vydkhyd: Catvdro nifraydf cwarapinaapdtas'ayyasamgldtktpratyayabhaq
307. Note of Saeki: A parkydga thought is a tatksanasamutthdna cause (iv. 10) which is simultaneous to the deed itself.
Parkydga, yons-su 'dorba, translated by Hsiian-tsang as mu-so-ku$$f\W^ "not to regard, to neglect," is a euphemism for "to destroy, kilL" See below note 313. Compare Atthasdlim, p. 91: gabbham. . . pdpakenamanasdnupekkhakohoti,"tonotbeindifferentwithregardtotheembryo" that is, "to desire its destructioa"
:
"Mind of violence," parusadtta; Paramartha: she {&, rough, harsh, uneven, karkafa; Hsiian-
tsang: ts'uM (auddrika) as in pdrusya. 308. Adbisfhdna - adhikarana, visaya.
Atthasdlim, p. 101.
309. Vydkhyd: Ndmakdyddhisfhdnd mfsavddddayo vdg ndmnipravartata hi kftvd See Vyakhydad
iii. 30c-d
310. See p. 643.
311. This refers to the principal action itself.
312. Paramartha: "If a person has the intention 1 shall kill so-and-so'; and if, with respect to such a one, there is the notion of 'such a one'; and if he kills such a one and not another by error, then by
Footnotes 1^1
? 738 Chapter Four
reason of these three factors the killing is the action itself. "
Samcintya = samcicca, Mahavyutpatti, 245. 68; P? r. iii. Karmaprajttapti, Mdo 62, chap. xi.
Buddhaghosa, AtthasdUm, p. 97 (=SumangalavUasint, p. 69); Sp. Hardy, Manual, p. 478; Bigandet (1914), ii. 195. Five things are necessary for killing: papa, panasa&itita, vadhakacUta, upakkama, and marana. The killing itself can be sahatthika, anattika, nissaggika, thdvara, vijjamaya, and iddhimaya. (See the translation of Maung Tin and Mrs. Rhys Davids, Expositor, 129: vijjd = art, iddhi = potency).
313. Hsuan-tsang: 'There is killing even when there is doubt: a person, with respect to the object that he desires to kill, is in doubt: I s this a living being or not? And, if it is living, is it such a one or another? ' then he makes the decision: 'Whether this is one or the other, I shall kill him': by reason of this parUyaga thought, if he kills a living being, he commits the action. " Paramartha: " . . . by reason of these three factors, there is the action (above, note 312). If this is the case,then a person can be in doubt and kill (=commit the transgression of murder): 'Is this a living being or not? Is this such a one or not? ' This person, with respect to the object to be killed, is determined to kill: 'Whether this be one or the other, I shall kill him. ' There is thus production of a parUyaga thought. If he kills, he obtains the transgression of killing. "
The Tibetan gives us: "There is only a parUyaga thought" or better: "He has indeed a parUyaga thought"
We do not see bow parUyaga differs from marana.
314. The skandhas are momentary, that is, perish in and of themselves (svarasena vinafvara). How
cantheirdestructionbecausedbyanexternalcause? (Seeiitrans,p. 244,and ivlb. )
315. Prdna depends on the mind since it does not exist among persons who have entered into the two absorptions of unconsciousness (iL42).
AtthasdUm, p. 97: prana = sattatJivUendrtya.
316. An objection may be formulated against the first definition that there is no as*vasapraivasa during the first four periods of embryonic life. Thus killing an embryo during this period will not be an aaion in and of itself. Hui-hui quotes the Wu-fen chieh-pen (a Maru&saka Pratimoksa, TD 22, number 1422) which makes the embryo up to the forty-ninth day the manusyavigraha of Pirijika iii (See Pratimoksa of the Sarvdstivddms by Finot-Huber, JAs. 1913, ii. 477, and Bhiksum- karmavacana, p. 138).
317. In fact, there is no living being, prSmn, that can be called dead.
318. VySkhya: Pudgalaprastisedhaprakarane. This refers to the last chapter of the Ko/a. (The passage referred to by Vasubandhu is translated by Stcherbatski, The soul theory ofthe Buddhists, p. 853; Hsiian-tsang's translation, TD 29, p. 152b. )
319. Quoted ad ii45a (trans, p. 233) and ciil3c
320. Milmda pp. 84,158; Kathavatthu, xx. 1. Sutrdkrtdnga,u. 6,26 (Sacred Books, 45, p. 414), also ii. 2
(five types of killing). See above note 3. Nirgrantha = nagnafaka.
321. The Tibetan adds: "In the same way the sufferings of illness and the herbs which cause death are guilty" (? ? nadpalagnodpadanfibanasmanparnams. ReacUr^dcHirxful). Not in the Chinese translations.
322. AtthasaHni, p. 97-98. Mahavyutpatti, 281. 28-33: adattasya paflcamasakadeh steyacUtena manusyagatiparigxhUasyatatsamjh^ahara^ Bhiksunskarmaifdcana, p. 137-8
. . . antatah phalatusam api paraktyam nadatavyam kah punar vadah paficamasikam uttara- partcamasikam va. . .
325. Vyakhya:Nanyatrasamjfidvibhramat/yadi devadattadravyamharamUiyajnadattadravyam harati nadattadanam Uy abhtprayaJb. Correct: anyatra samjffavibbramat. Compare p. 76, line 12, anyatrajHSnM; p. 65, line 4, anyatra gldnyat; Para. 4, anyatrShimdanat, etc
? 324. See iv. 121, a different doctrine.
325. Opinion of the second masters of Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 585a7; an erroneous opinion, for, as they admit, the guardians of a Stupa would not steal what belongs to the Stupa.
326. Vydkhyd: Pofwartakam mrtasya bbiksoi cwarddidravyam {parwatteU, "to exchange," CuUavagga, vi. 19? ). According to the Tibetan, to take the goods of a dead person (ft ba'i norphrogs fla);according toParamarthaandHsiian-tsang,totakethegoodsoiabui-cb'uan W? 4 ,thatis,of a pratikranta (Mabavyutpatti, 130. 17).
327. The Sangha of the parish, Hsiian-tsang: chieh-nei seng # fa fH"; Paramartha: chih pu kung chu jen^^^^EA- ndndvdsagatdb; Tibetan: 'tshams kyi nan du gtogs pa mams - antahstmd- patydpanndb.
328. AtthasaUm, p. 98. According to the Mahayana (Le. , the YogScSra) quoted by Saeki, there are six prohibitions: 1. avisaya, agamya: males, and women such as one's mother, etc; 2. amdrga ananga: only the yommdrga; 3. asamaya: when the woman is having her period (hm-hsia H T ), is pregnant, is nursing a baby, has undertaken the Upavasa, or is sick; 4. asthana; 5. "without measure," manam atikramya gaccbati; and 6. ayoga: "not conforming to the rules of the world. "
329. Hsiian-tsang adds: " . . . and the rest to: protected by the king. " See the classic list MabSvyutpatti, 281. 251 (pitrraksitd, etc).
330. Mabavyutpatti, 281. 26-27: pravispah sparfasvtkftau / prasrdvakarane prasrdvakaranasya mukhe varcomdrge vd. Compare Siksasamuccaya, p. 76: evam svastrisv apy ayonimdrgena gacchatab;Suttavibhanga,i. 9. 3:angajdtenavaccamaggam. . . passdvamaggam. . . mukham. . .
331. Saeki glosses the ? W-fl&'*Mlll(distant place, etc) of Hsiian-tsang by a-lien-jo j|gl$f aranya; Paramartha: "place where one cultivates brahmacarya. " "Open place" is doubtless abhyavakdia.
332. Vydkhyd: Garbhmigamane garbboparodhah / dpyayanti (? see iv. 103) stanyopabhogdvastha- putrikd stri/ abrahmacarye hi tasydh stanyam ksiyate / bdlakasya vdpuspaye tatstonyam bhavati.
333. = posadhikd, iv. 28 = sdrakkhd of Atthasdlini, p. 98. Hsiian-tsang: "When the woman has undertaken the upavasa. " Siksasamuccaya, p. 76: evam upavdsastbdsu . . . See the Sanskrit commentary on the Uvdsagadasdo, e d Hoernle, p. 11, on the laws of marriage among the Jains.
334. Hsiian-tsang adds: "And vice versa. The same if one were to be mistaken with respect to the path, the time, etc"
335. Vydkhyd: Anyasmm vastuni prayogo'bhipreto'nyac ca vastu prihhuktam.
336. The version of Paramartha: "Lying is saying this discourse with another mind in order to
explain the meaning" (although in the karika we have: "indeed lying to another. . . ").
337. Hsiian-tsang: To which time period does the expression "who understands the sense" (arthdbhyfid*) refer to? Should we understand "he who understands at the present time [through manovijtidna] what he has heard? " Or should we understand: "he who is capable of presently understanding what he has presently heard [through the smtravynana]? " What consequences do these two solutions lead to? In the first hypothesis, the sense of the discourse, the object of mental consciousness and vocal vijfiapti [which the hearer misunderstands], would disappear at the same time as the auditive consciousness [which is mistaken], and the action will only be avij&apti [since the mental consciousness has not yet arisen]. In the second hypothesis, this objection does not hold, but as he does not understand the sense, how, at the moment when he understands, can he be said to be "capable of understanding?
" The best explanation is that "he who is capable of understanding" is one in whom there are no causes of confusion, and in whom the auditive consciousness has already arisen. One should explain the text in a manner that does not lead to objections.
338. Dirgha, TD 1, p. 50b27; Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 86ib20; Anguttara, ii. 246, iv. 307; Majjhima, iii. 29; Digha, iii. 232: cattdro anariyavohdrd: adifpbe diffbavdditd, assute sutavdditd, amute mutavdditd,
Footnotes 739
? 740 Chapter Four
avmliate vifUfatavadka. Apore pi caUoro anariyavobari: adsffbavadita. . . (Compare Majjhima, L 135, quoted verbatim in Vijnanakaya, foL 12b, which, like the Paji sources, places vijttata after mata. )
Buddhism employs the traditional phraseology (Upamsbads) and is at great pains to interpret it
339. The Vyikbya (with an unclear reading) gives Mahakimatar. In Samyutta, iv. 72, the hearer of this discourse is Mahinkyaputta (Mahinkya). Tibetan: mchod byed kyi ma can. Paramartha: mo-lo-chib-nm^W^My which supposes a reading Mahakimatar; Fu-kuang: man-muM M(man: long hair, etc) which gives Mother Mala, or Mother Alaki, or even Mallikamatar {Mabavyutpatti, 240. 14:man-huaM^=Mallika;forthedifferentMailikas,seeKern,-A4*<<^p. 40. Hsu^^ ta-muj\&="be who hasfor his mother the Great One (MahallakTmarar? ). " For mchod byed kyima can, compare ? arad Chandra Das: mchodIdan ma = mabila (from maha, religious festival=mchod) [The remarks of S. Levi and J. Przyluski have been used for this note. ]
Majjhima, 1135, iii. 261 adds pattam pariyesitam anuvicaritam manasa (na upddryisami na ca me tanmssitam vihnanam bhavissati) to diffbam sutam mutant vmHatam.
340. Samyutta, iv. 72, only gives three synonyms: atthi te tattha chando va rdgo vapeman ti/ no hetam bhante. The stanzas which follow (iv. 72-76), whkh are Theragatha, 794, are quoted by Samghabhadra, TD 29, p. 579al8.
Hsiian-tsang gives Maya and nikdnti in transcription (ni-yen-tt); compare Dhammapada, 411 and Commentary to 348 (Fausboll, p. 413:tilayammkanttm ajjhesanam pafwuffbanam gdham pardmdsam tanham, Hsiian-tsang has tfsnd in place of rSga and places tfsnd after preman.
341. Paramartha and Hsiian-tsang have oniyiyan fnanabpratyaksibbmam tad vtjHatam.
542. The Yogacaras {Vyakhya): Yat pratyaksikrtam caksusd. . .
545. Vydkhyd: PratyOampratisamvedaam sukhadyasamabitena cktena / adhigatam samahitena kukikenawe na lokottarena / lauJukavyavabarddbikdrM. That which is known in pure, or supramundane absorption is not vijUata, batjnata.
344 The problem discussed in this paragraph is also treated by Buddhaghosa {AtthasaUm, pp. 90-95). There are many points of contact between the two presentations: a monk can lie through his silence, and a possessor of magical powers can kill an embryo; thus one can commit trangressions of the voice and the body by means of the mind.
345. Vacd parakrameta - vacaparam marayet: when one kills by speech.
346. This is the story of the Dancfaka Forest, etc, empty of living beings through the anger of the (tsis {Majjhima, 1378; UpatisOtra, quoted by Vasubandhu, Vnh&ka, 20, Mmion, 1912, i. ) which proves the gravity of mental action (see below iv. l05a-b), Mumda, p. 130. For the mention of this episode in the Saddbarmasmftyupastbana and the references in the Ramayana, see S. Levi, 'Tour l'histoireduRamayana,"JAs. 1918,197. IntheRamayana,theDan^akaforestwasdepopulated through the curse of the $si Usanas.
Vasubandhu, in Vnhiaha, 20c-d, proves that demonic beings would not intervene (see below note 348).
347. In feet, in the Bhiksupofodha, the Vinayadhara asks (anufrav): "Are you pure? " (kacett[s]- thaparifaddhah). If a Bhiksu does not declare his transgression (sathn apattim) and by this very silence acquiesces (adhhdtayati), he lies {mfsdvadibbavet). Compare the Pratimoksa edited by L. Finot, JAs. 1913, p. 476, 488 (with the reading: tatrayvsmatap pfecbami kacctf sthatra parifuddhab). Mahavagga, ii. 3.
348. "This is a difficulty to be resolved by the Vaibhasikas. "
Samghabhadra explains: In fact (arthatas), the $sis ordered (ajnapitaras) the killing. Some
demonic beings (amanusya), knowing (avetya) their sinful intention of destroying living beings (sattvapafnyagapruvfttapapafaya), came to the Rsis. How did the $sis manifest (trijnapti) their
? intention? By reason of their anger, they modified their bodies and their voices; if they cursed, there was certainly movement (cesfd) of the body and voice. Some other masters say that ahavijifapUoi the sphere of Kamadhatu does not depend on a vijfiapti_For example, die Five (pakcaka) in obtaining the result at the same time as thePrdtimoksa discipline (above p. 592): in this same way a bad avijfiapti can arise without there being a vijfiapti. Would one say that the Five previously created vijfiapti? It would also be the same in other cases. So too in the case of the (Lsjs. With respect to lying at the confession ceremony (posadhamrsdvdda)y the fact that the guilty monk (aparUuddhd) enters the assembly, sits down, and remains there as he should (svam iryapdtham kalpayati), and says what he should say, signifies that there was for him a vtjriapti previous [to the moment when he acquiesces by his silence]. (Vyakhyd; Samghabhadra, TD 29, p. 580a7).
349. Atthasdlmi, p. 99.
350. 1nv4#^i^p. l00,/>? 4fw^
to oneself or to others" (yaya attdnam piparam pi pharusam karoti). Buddhaghosa gives some examples of mental curses: a mother desires that an enraged buffab crush the child that goes into the woods in spite of her prohibitions against him doing so, or that the house collapse on her children; the school master desires the death of liis lazy students. In thesecases, there is no p ^ m r i vdcd But on the contrary, there is phamsd vdcd when one says "Sleep well" to a person that one wants to assassinate.
351. Manu, xii. 7: ambaddhapndapa.
352. This monk is a mithyajmn (iv. 86b). Mithydpva is defined by the Vyakhyd as kuhond Iopond notminikotd noispesikatd. Wogihara (Bodhisattvabbtimi, Leipzig, 1906) has a long note on these four terms and quotes the definition that the Vyakhyd gives here of the term Iopond: lopondm karothi Idbbayafaskdmatayd sevdbhidyotikom vdcarh niicdroyatity arthoh: it would thus be appropriate to translate lapand by "flattery," as do Paramartha and Hsuan-tsang. But the sources quoted by Wogihara (namely TD 26, number 1537, the Dharmaskandha, etc) show that they refer to a monk who flaunts his own merits. See Majjhima, iii. 75; Vibhanga, 352, commented on in Visuddhhnagga p. 22 and following, JPTS. 1891,79.
353. latdya (Siksasamuccaya, p. 69).
354 Mahavastu, &355:ye sarhganikaramdb. . . ; Divya, 46419; Majjhima, iii. 110; Childers, p. 447. The Atthasdtint, p. 100, gives the recitation of the battle of the Bharatas and the kidnapping of SM as examples of samphappaldpa.
355. Tibetan:". . . are endowed with naiskramya, are not endowed with stegs-snags"; Hsiian-tsang: " . . . come from out of naiskramya, are capable of producing naiskramya, do not prepare a defiled mind. " Paramartha gives the original of stegs-snags as mithya-rasa. Nekkhamma is opposed to samgamka in Majjhima, iii. 110. See iip.
356. Vyakhyd'Avaha=ddrikdydddrakagrhagamanam; vivdha = ddrakasyaddrikdgrhdgamanam;ot rather, according to others, dvdha = prave/anaka (free union? ), vivdha - parinayana. Compare Childers, avahana, vtvahana, Senart, Ptyadasi, i. 203 (marriage of a son or daughter)-- Mahdvyutpatti, 225246-7 (dvdha = bag ma gton ha = to give a daughter in marriage; dvdha - hag ma lenpa-xo take a woman); 281. 261-262 (where the meanings are reversed).
357. Atthasdtim, p. 101: oho vata idam mam'assdti.
358. The translation of Paramartha and Hsiian-tsang.
So'bhidhyam loke prahdya vigatdbhidhyena cetasd bahulam viharati / vydpddam styanamid- dhamauddbatyakaukftyamvicikitsamfokeprakdyatfr^
kuialesu dharmesu / sa paHca mvarandni prahdya. . . Samyukta, TD 2, p. 207bl2. Digha, iii. 49, Majjhima, iii. 3, Anguttara, ii. 210; quoted and commented on in Vibhanga, p. 252 where abhidhyd is explained as rdga sdrdga, etc It results from this text that the term abhidhyd is synonymous with kdmacchanda, the first ntvarana. On the nwaranas, see Kofa, v. 59.
Footnotes 741
? 359. Manu, xii. 5: manasamspacintanam.
360. Atthasdlmi, p. 101: apravindsdya manopadosalakkhano. . . oho vatdyam ucchijjeyya vmasseyyd
ti.
361. Atthikavdda is opposed to ndstidrspi (Majjhima, i. 515).
As the Bhdsya shows, mithyadrspi is the dipphivipaUi of the Puggalapafiffatti, a doctrine
condemned in the Sutra as belonging to Ajita Kesakambali (Digba L55, Majjhima, 1515, TD 2, p. WsHJnanaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 1027M7, Vibhdfd, TD 27, p. 505a6, treatise "Refutation of the Pudga/a," trans. Hsuan-tsang, TD 29, p. 152).
Pali sources, Kathavatthu, xiv. 8-9, whose commentary quotes notably Majjhima, i. 388, and Samyutta, iv. 307, where s%avratapardmaria is designated a micchdditthi (Ko/a, v. 7) punished by hell or by an animal existence (The same in Theragdthd, 1091, Commentary, on the realm of rebirth of the person who believes that the doers of karma are reborn in heaven). But Atthasatint, p. 358, distinguishes micchadipphi niyatd (-nastidrspis iubhdiubhe of the Abhidharma) from the other micchddipphis (see below note 438), and, p. 101, teaches that it is solely through the negation of action, etc, that the kammapatha of micchadipphi \& realized, not by other wrong views (The Expositor translates:. . . kammapathabhedo hoti na an~tiadipphiki "the distinctive stage of the course of action is reached by the views: there is no result. . . and not by other views"; kammapathabheda, "realization of the deed itself," should be understood as vacibheda, "words").
362. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 598a24. Why not consider volition, cetand, as a deed in and of itself? Cetand is action. What is called deed, is where the cetand goes. . . The same way that where the King goes is called the King's Road, but the King is not the road. . . The dharma which coexists with the cetand can serve as a road for the cetand and will thus be called a road of action (=the deed itself).
Vydkhyd: Catvdro nifraydf cwarapinaapdtas'ayyasamgldtktpratyayabhaq
307. Note of Saeki: A parkydga thought is a tatksanasamutthdna cause (iv. 10) which is simultaneous to the deed itself.
Parkydga, yons-su 'dorba, translated by Hsiian-tsang as mu-so-ku$$f\W^ "not to regard, to neglect," is a euphemism for "to destroy, kilL" See below note 313. Compare Atthasdlim, p. 91: gabbham. . . pdpakenamanasdnupekkhakohoti,"tonotbeindifferentwithregardtotheembryo" that is, "to desire its destructioa"
:
"Mind of violence," parusadtta; Paramartha: she {&, rough, harsh, uneven, karkafa; Hsiian-
tsang: ts'uM (auddrika) as in pdrusya. 308. Adbisfhdna - adhikarana, visaya.
Atthasdlim, p. 101.
309. Vydkhyd: Ndmakdyddhisfhdnd mfsavddddayo vdg ndmnipravartata hi kftvd See Vyakhydad
iii. 30c-d
310. See p. 643.
311. This refers to the principal action itself.
312. Paramartha: "If a person has the intention 1 shall kill so-and-so'; and if, with respect to such a one, there is the notion of 'such a one'; and if he kills such a one and not another by error, then by
Footnotes 1^1
? 738 Chapter Four
reason of these three factors the killing is the action itself. "
Samcintya = samcicca, Mahavyutpatti, 245. 68; P? r. iii. Karmaprajttapti, Mdo 62, chap. xi.
Buddhaghosa, AtthasdUm, p. 97 (=SumangalavUasint, p. 69); Sp. Hardy, Manual, p. 478; Bigandet (1914), ii. 195. Five things are necessary for killing: papa, panasa&itita, vadhakacUta, upakkama, and marana. The killing itself can be sahatthika, anattika, nissaggika, thdvara, vijjamaya, and iddhimaya. (See the translation of Maung Tin and Mrs. Rhys Davids, Expositor, 129: vijjd = art, iddhi = potency).
313. Hsuan-tsang: 'There is killing even when there is doubt: a person, with respect to the object that he desires to kill, is in doubt: I s this a living being or not? And, if it is living, is it such a one or another? ' then he makes the decision: 'Whether this is one or the other, I shall kill him': by reason of this parUyaga thought, if he kills a living being, he commits the action. " Paramartha: " . . . by reason of these three factors, there is the action (above, note 312). If this is the case,then a person can be in doubt and kill (=commit the transgression of murder): 'Is this a living being or not? Is this such a one or not? ' This person, with respect to the object to be killed, is determined to kill: 'Whether this be one or the other, I shall kill him. ' There is thus production of a parUyaga thought. If he kills, he obtains the transgression of killing. "
The Tibetan gives us: "There is only a parUyaga thought" or better: "He has indeed a parUyaga thought"
We do not see bow parUyaga differs from marana.
314. The skandhas are momentary, that is, perish in and of themselves (svarasena vinafvara). How
cantheirdestructionbecausedbyanexternalcause? (Seeiitrans,p. 244,and ivlb. )
315. Prdna depends on the mind since it does not exist among persons who have entered into the two absorptions of unconsciousness (iL42).
AtthasdUm, p. 97: prana = sattatJivUendrtya.
316. An objection may be formulated against the first definition that there is no as*vasapraivasa during the first four periods of embryonic life. Thus killing an embryo during this period will not be an aaion in and of itself. Hui-hui quotes the Wu-fen chieh-pen (a Maru&saka Pratimoksa, TD 22, number 1422) which makes the embryo up to the forty-ninth day the manusyavigraha of Pirijika iii (See Pratimoksa of the Sarvdstivddms by Finot-Huber, JAs. 1913, ii. 477, and Bhiksum- karmavacana, p. 138).
317. In fact, there is no living being, prSmn, that can be called dead.
318. VySkhya: Pudgalaprastisedhaprakarane. This refers to the last chapter of the Ko/a. (The passage referred to by Vasubandhu is translated by Stcherbatski, The soul theory ofthe Buddhists, p. 853; Hsiian-tsang's translation, TD 29, p. 152b. )
319. Quoted ad ii45a (trans, p. 233) and ciil3c
320. Milmda pp. 84,158; Kathavatthu, xx. 1. Sutrdkrtdnga,u. 6,26 (Sacred Books, 45, p. 414), also ii. 2
(five types of killing). See above note 3. Nirgrantha = nagnafaka.
321. The Tibetan adds: "In the same way the sufferings of illness and the herbs which cause death are guilty" (? ? nadpalagnodpadanfibanasmanparnams. ReacUr^dcHirxful). Not in the Chinese translations.
322. AtthasaHni, p. 97-98. Mahavyutpatti, 281. 28-33: adattasya paflcamasakadeh steyacUtena manusyagatiparigxhUasyatatsamjh^ahara^ Bhiksunskarmaifdcana, p. 137-8
. . . antatah phalatusam api paraktyam nadatavyam kah punar vadah paficamasikam uttara- partcamasikam va. . .
325. Vyakhya:Nanyatrasamjfidvibhramat/yadi devadattadravyamharamUiyajnadattadravyam harati nadattadanam Uy abhtprayaJb. Correct: anyatra samjffavibbramat. Compare p. 76, line 12, anyatrajHSnM; p. 65, line 4, anyatra gldnyat; Para. 4, anyatrShimdanat, etc
? 324. See iv. 121, a different doctrine.
325. Opinion of the second masters of Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 585a7; an erroneous opinion, for, as they admit, the guardians of a Stupa would not steal what belongs to the Stupa.
326. Vydkhyd: Pofwartakam mrtasya bbiksoi cwarddidravyam {parwatteU, "to exchange," CuUavagga, vi. 19? ). According to the Tibetan, to take the goods of a dead person (ft ba'i norphrogs fla);according toParamarthaandHsiian-tsang,totakethegoodsoiabui-cb'uan W? 4 ,thatis,of a pratikranta (Mabavyutpatti, 130. 17).
327. The Sangha of the parish, Hsiian-tsang: chieh-nei seng # fa fH"; Paramartha: chih pu kung chu jen^^^^EA- ndndvdsagatdb; Tibetan: 'tshams kyi nan du gtogs pa mams - antahstmd- patydpanndb.
328. AtthasaUm, p. 98. According to the Mahayana (Le. , the YogScSra) quoted by Saeki, there are six prohibitions: 1. avisaya, agamya: males, and women such as one's mother, etc; 2. amdrga ananga: only the yommdrga; 3. asamaya: when the woman is having her period (hm-hsia H T ), is pregnant, is nursing a baby, has undertaken the Upavasa, or is sick; 4. asthana; 5. "without measure," manam atikramya gaccbati; and 6. ayoga: "not conforming to the rules of the world. "
329. Hsiian-tsang adds: " . . . and the rest to: protected by the king. " See the classic list MabSvyutpatti, 281. 251 (pitrraksitd, etc).
330. Mabavyutpatti, 281. 26-27: pravispah sparfasvtkftau / prasrdvakarane prasrdvakaranasya mukhe varcomdrge vd. Compare Siksasamuccaya, p. 76: evam svastrisv apy ayonimdrgena gacchatab;Suttavibhanga,i. 9. 3:angajdtenavaccamaggam. . . passdvamaggam. . . mukham. . .
331. Saeki glosses the ? W-fl&'*Mlll(distant place, etc) of Hsiian-tsang by a-lien-jo j|gl$f aranya; Paramartha: "place where one cultivates brahmacarya. " "Open place" is doubtless abhyavakdia.
332. Vydkhyd: Garbhmigamane garbboparodhah / dpyayanti (? see iv. 103) stanyopabhogdvastha- putrikd stri/ abrahmacarye hi tasydh stanyam ksiyate / bdlakasya vdpuspaye tatstonyam bhavati.
333. = posadhikd, iv. 28 = sdrakkhd of Atthasdlini, p. 98. Hsiian-tsang: "When the woman has undertaken the upavasa. " Siksasamuccaya, p. 76: evam upavdsastbdsu . . . See the Sanskrit commentary on the Uvdsagadasdo, e d Hoernle, p. 11, on the laws of marriage among the Jains.
334. Hsiian-tsang adds: "And vice versa. The same if one were to be mistaken with respect to the path, the time, etc"
335. Vydkhyd: Anyasmm vastuni prayogo'bhipreto'nyac ca vastu prihhuktam.
336. The version of Paramartha: "Lying is saying this discourse with another mind in order to
explain the meaning" (although in the karika we have: "indeed lying to another. . . ").
337. Hsiian-tsang: To which time period does the expression "who understands the sense" (arthdbhyfid*) refer to? Should we understand "he who understands at the present time [through manovijtidna] what he has heard? " Or should we understand: "he who is capable of presently understanding what he has presently heard [through the smtravynana]? " What consequences do these two solutions lead to? In the first hypothesis, the sense of the discourse, the object of mental consciousness and vocal vijfiapti [which the hearer misunderstands], would disappear at the same time as the auditive consciousness [which is mistaken], and the action will only be avij&apti [since the mental consciousness has not yet arisen]. In the second hypothesis, this objection does not hold, but as he does not understand the sense, how, at the moment when he understands, can he be said to be "capable of understanding?
" The best explanation is that "he who is capable of understanding" is one in whom there are no causes of confusion, and in whom the auditive consciousness has already arisen. One should explain the text in a manner that does not lead to objections.
338. Dirgha, TD 1, p. 50b27; Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 86ib20; Anguttara, ii. 246, iv. 307; Majjhima, iii. 29; Digha, iii. 232: cattdro anariyavohdrd: adifpbe diffbavdditd, assute sutavdditd, amute mutavdditd,
Footnotes 739
? 740 Chapter Four
avmliate vifUfatavadka. Apore pi caUoro anariyavobari: adsffbavadita. . . (Compare Majjhima, L 135, quoted verbatim in Vijnanakaya, foL 12b, which, like the Paji sources, places vijttata after mata. )
Buddhism employs the traditional phraseology (Upamsbads) and is at great pains to interpret it
339. The Vyikbya (with an unclear reading) gives Mahakimatar. In Samyutta, iv. 72, the hearer of this discourse is Mahinkyaputta (Mahinkya). Tibetan: mchod byed kyi ma can. Paramartha: mo-lo-chib-nm^W^My which supposes a reading Mahakimatar; Fu-kuang: man-muM M(man: long hair, etc) which gives Mother Mala, or Mother Alaki, or even Mallikamatar {Mabavyutpatti, 240. 14:man-huaM^=Mallika;forthedifferentMailikas,seeKern,-A4*<<^p. 40. Hsu^^ ta-muj\&="be who hasfor his mother the Great One (MahallakTmarar? ). " For mchod byed kyima can, compare ? arad Chandra Das: mchodIdan ma = mabila (from maha, religious festival=mchod) [The remarks of S. Levi and J. Przyluski have been used for this note. ]
Majjhima, 1135, iii. 261 adds pattam pariyesitam anuvicaritam manasa (na upddryisami na ca me tanmssitam vihnanam bhavissati) to diffbam sutam mutant vmHatam.
340. Samyutta, iv. 72, only gives three synonyms: atthi te tattha chando va rdgo vapeman ti/ no hetam bhante. The stanzas which follow (iv. 72-76), whkh are Theragatha, 794, are quoted by Samghabhadra, TD 29, p. 579al8.
Hsiian-tsang gives Maya and nikdnti in transcription (ni-yen-tt); compare Dhammapada, 411 and Commentary to 348 (Fausboll, p. 413:tilayammkanttm ajjhesanam pafwuffbanam gdham pardmdsam tanham, Hsiian-tsang has tfsnd in place of rSga and places tfsnd after preman.
341. Paramartha and Hsiian-tsang have oniyiyan fnanabpratyaksibbmam tad vtjHatam.
542. The Yogacaras {Vyakhya): Yat pratyaksikrtam caksusd. . .
545. Vydkhyd: PratyOampratisamvedaam sukhadyasamabitena cktena / adhigatam samahitena kukikenawe na lokottarena / lauJukavyavabarddbikdrM. That which is known in pure, or supramundane absorption is not vijUata, batjnata.
344 The problem discussed in this paragraph is also treated by Buddhaghosa {AtthasaUm, pp. 90-95). There are many points of contact between the two presentations: a monk can lie through his silence, and a possessor of magical powers can kill an embryo; thus one can commit trangressions of the voice and the body by means of the mind.
345. Vacd parakrameta - vacaparam marayet: when one kills by speech.
346. This is the story of the Dancfaka Forest, etc, empty of living beings through the anger of the (tsis {Majjhima, 1378; UpatisOtra, quoted by Vasubandhu, Vnh&ka, 20, Mmion, 1912, i. ) which proves the gravity of mental action (see below iv. l05a-b), Mumda, p. 130. For the mention of this episode in the Saddbarmasmftyupastbana and the references in the Ramayana, see S. Levi, 'Tour l'histoireduRamayana,"JAs. 1918,197. IntheRamayana,theDan^akaforestwasdepopulated through the curse of the $si Usanas.
Vasubandhu, in Vnhiaha, 20c-d, proves that demonic beings would not intervene (see below note 348).
347. In feet, in the Bhiksupofodha, the Vinayadhara asks (anufrav): "Are you pure? " (kacett[s]- thaparifaddhah). If a Bhiksu does not declare his transgression (sathn apattim) and by this very silence acquiesces (adhhdtayati), he lies {mfsdvadibbavet). Compare the Pratimoksa edited by L. Finot, JAs. 1913, p. 476, 488 (with the reading: tatrayvsmatap pfecbami kacctf sthatra parifuddhab). Mahavagga, ii. 3.
348. "This is a difficulty to be resolved by the Vaibhasikas. "
Samghabhadra explains: In fact (arthatas), the $sis ordered (ajnapitaras) the killing. Some
demonic beings (amanusya), knowing (avetya) their sinful intention of destroying living beings (sattvapafnyagapruvfttapapafaya), came to the Rsis. How did the $sis manifest (trijnapti) their
? intention? By reason of their anger, they modified their bodies and their voices; if they cursed, there was certainly movement (cesfd) of the body and voice. Some other masters say that ahavijifapUoi the sphere of Kamadhatu does not depend on a vijfiapti_For example, die Five (pakcaka) in obtaining the result at the same time as thePrdtimoksa discipline (above p. 592): in this same way a bad avijfiapti can arise without there being a vijfiapti. Would one say that the Five previously created vijfiapti? It would also be the same in other cases. So too in the case of the (Lsjs. With respect to lying at the confession ceremony (posadhamrsdvdda)y the fact that the guilty monk (aparUuddhd) enters the assembly, sits down, and remains there as he should (svam iryapdtham kalpayati), and says what he should say, signifies that there was for him a vtjriapti previous [to the moment when he acquiesces by his silence]. (Vyakhyd; Samghabhadra, TD 29, p. 580a7).
349. Atthasdlmi, p. 99.
350. 1nv4#^i^p. l00,/>? 4fw^
to oneself or to others" (yaya attdnam piparam pi pharusam karoti). Buddhaghosa gives some examples of mental curses: a mother desires that an enraged buffab crush the child that goes into the woods in spite of her prohibitions against him doing so, or that the house collapse on her children; the school master desires the death of liis lazy students. In thesecases, there is no p ^ m r i vdcd But on the contrary, there is phamsd vdcd when one says "Sleep well" to a person that one wants to assassinate.
351. Manu, xii. 7: ambaddhapndapa.
352. This monk is a mithyajmn (iv. 86b). Mithydpva is defined by the Vyakhyd as kuhond Iopond notminikotd noispesikatd. Wogihara (Bodhisattvabbtimi, Leipzig, 1906) has a long note on these four terms and quotes the definition that the Vyakhyd gives here of the term Iopond: lopondm karothi Idbbayafaskdmatayd sevdbhidyotikom vdcarh niicdroyatity arthoh: it would thus be appropriate to translate lapand by "flattery," as do Paramartha and Hsuan-tsang. But the sources quoted by Wogihara (namely TD 26, number 1537, the Dharmaskandha, etc) show that they refer to a monk who flaunts his own merits. See Majjhima, iii. 75; Vibhanga, 352, commented on in Visuddhhnagga p. 22 and following, JPTS. 1891,79.
353. latdya (Siksasamuccaya, p. 69).
354 Mahavastu, &355:ye sarhganikaramdb. . . ; Divya, 46419; Majjhima, iii. 110; Childers, p. 447. The Atthasdtint, p. 100, gives the recitation of the battle of the Bharatas and the kidnapping of SM as examples of samphappaldpa.
355. Tibetan:". . . are endowed with naiskramya, are not endowed with stegs-snags"; Hsiian-tsang: " . . . come from out of naiskramya, are capable of producing naiskramya, do not prepare a defiled mind. " Paramartha gives the original of stegs-snags as mithya-rasa. Nekkhamma is opposed to samgamka in Majjhima, iii. 110. See iip.
356. Vyakhyd'Avaha=ddrikdydddrakagrhagamanam; vivdha = ddrakasyaddrikdgrhdgamanam;ot rather, according to others, dvdha = prave/anaka (free union? ), vivdha - parinayana. Compare Childers, avahana, vtvahana, Senart, Ptyadasi, i. 203 (marriage of a son or daughter)-- Mahdvyutpatti, 225246-7 (dvdha = bag ma gton ha = to give a daughter in marriage; dvdha - hag ma lenpa-xo take a woman); 281. 261-262 (where the meanings are reversed).
357. Atthasdtim, p. 101: oho vata idam mam'assdti.
358. The translation of Paramartha and Hsiian-tsang.
So'bhidhyam loke prahdya vigatdbhidhyena cetasd bahulam viharati / vydpddam styanamid- dhamauddbatyakaukftyamvicikitsamfokeprakdyatfr^
kuialesu dharmesu / sa paHca mvarandni prahdya. . . Samyukta, TD 2, p. 207bl2. Digha, iii. 49, Majjhima, iii. 3, Anguttara, ii. 210; quoted and commented on in Vibhanga, p. 252 where abhidhyd is explained as rdga sdrdga, etc It results from this text that the term abhidhyd is synonymous with kdmacchanda, the first ntvarana. On the nwaranas, see Kofa, v. 59.
Footnotes 741
? 359. Manu, xii. 5: manasamspacintanam.
360. Atthasdlmi, p. 101: apravindsdya manopadosalakkhano. . . oho vatdyam ucchijjeyya vmasseyyd
ti.
361. Atthikavdda is opposed to ndstidrspi (Majjhima, i. 515).
As the Bhdsya shows, mithyadrspi is the dipphivipaUi of the Puggalapafiffatti, a doctrine
condemned in the Sutra as belonging to Ajita Kesakambali (Digba L55, Majjhima, 1515, TD 2, p. WsHJnanaprasthdna, TD 26, p. 1027M7, Vibhdfd, TD 27, p. 505a6, treatise "Refutation of the Pudga/a," trans. Hsuan-tsang, TD 29, p. 152).
Pali sources, Kathavatthu, xiv. 8-9, whose commentary quotes notably Majjhima, i. 388, and Samyutta, iv. 307, where s%avratapardmaria is designated a micchdditthi (Ko/a, v. 7) punished by hell or by an animal existence (The same in Theragdthd, 1091, Commentary, on the realm of rebirth of the person who believes that the doers of karma are reborn in heaven). But Atthasatint, p. 358, distinguishes micchadipphi niyatd (-nastidrspis iubhdiubhe of the Abhidharma) from the other micchddipphis (see below note 438), and, p. 101, teaches that it is solely through the negation of action, etc, that the kammapatha of micchadipphi \& realized, not by other wrong views (The Expositor translates:. . . kammapathabhedo hoti na an~tiadipphiki "the distinctive stage of the course of action is reached by the views: there is no result. . . and not by other views"; kammapathabheda, "realization of the deed itself," should be understood as vacibheda, "words").
362. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 598a24. Why not consider volition, cetand, as a deed in and of itself? Cetand is action. What is called deed, is where the cetand goes. . . The same way that where the King goes is called the King's Road, but the King is not the road. . . The dharma which coexists with the cetand can serve as a road for the cetand and will thus be called a road of action (=the deed itself).
