These ships are now so circumstanced, that, if we are forced to
evacuate
Toulon, they must fall into the hands of the enemy or be
burnt by ourselves.
burnt by ourselves.
Edmund Burke
But if I could command the
whole military arm of Europe, I am sure that a
bribe of the best province in that kingdom would not
tempt me to intermeddle in their affairs, except in
perfect concurrence and concert with the natural,
legal interests of the country, composed of the ecclesiastical, the military, the several corporate bodies of justice and of burghership, making under a monarch (I repeat it again and again) the _French nation according to its fundamental Constitution. No considerate statesman would undertake to meddle with it upon any other condition.
The government of that kingdom is fundamentally
monarchical. The public law of Europe has never
recognized in it-any other form of government. The
potentates of Europe have, by that law, a right, an
interest, and a duty to know with what government
they are to treat, and what they are to admit into the
federative society, - or, in other words, into the diploVOL. IV. 28
? ? ? ? 434 ON THIE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
matic republic of Europe. This right is clear and
indisputable.
What other and further interference they have a
right to in the interior of the concerns of another people is a matter on which, as on every political subject, no very definite or positive rule can well be laid
down. Our neighbors are men; and who will attempt to dictate the laws under which it is allowable
or forbidden to take a part in the concerns of men,
whether they are considered individually or in a collective capacity, whenever charity to them, or a care
of my own safety, calls forth my activity? Circumstances perpetually variable, directing a moral prudence and discretion, the general principles of which
never vary, must alone prescribe a conduct fitting on
such occasions. The latest casuists of public law are
rather of a republican cast, and, in my mind, by no
means so averse as they ought to be to a right in the
people (a word which, ill defined, is of the most
dangerous use) to make changes at their pleasure in
the fundamental laws of their country. These writers, however, when a country is divided, leave abundant liberty for a neighbor to support any of the parties according to his choice. * This interference must, indeed, always be a right, whilst the privilege of doing good to others, and of averting from them every
sort of evil, I. s a right: circumstances may render
that right a duty. It depends wholly on this, whether it be a bona fide charity to a party, and a prudent
precaution with regard to yourself, or whether, under
the pretence of aiding one of the parties in a nation,
you act in such a manner as to aggravate its calami.
ties and accomplish its final destruction. In truth,
* Vattel.
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 435
It is not the interfering or keeping aloof, but iniquitous intermeddling, or treacherous inaction, which is praised or blamed by the decision of an equitable
judge.
It will be a just and irresistible presumption against
the fairness of the interposing power, that he takes
with him no party or description of men in the divided state. It is not probable that these parties should all, and all alike, be more adverse to the true interests of their country, and less capable of forming a judgment upon them, than those who are absolute
strangers to their affairs, and to the character of the
actors in them, and have but a remote, feeble, and
secondary sympathy with their interest. Sormetimes
a calm and healing arbiter may be necessary; but he
is to compose differences, not to give laws. It is impossible that any one should not feel the full force of that presumption. Even people, whose politics for
the supposed good of their own country lead them to
take advantage of the dissensions of a neighboring
nation in order to ruin it, will not directly propose to
exclude the natives, but they will take that mode of
consulting and employing them which most nearly
approaches to an exclusion. In some particulars they
propose what amounts to that exclusion, in others
they do much worse. They recommend to ministry,
"that no Frenchman who has given a decided opinion or acted a decided part in this great Revolution, for or against it, should be countenanced, brought
forward, trusted, or employed, even in the strictest
subordination to the ministers of the allied powers. "
Although one would think that this advice would
stand condemned on the first proposition, yet, as it
has been made popular, and has been proceeded upon
? ? ? ? 436 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
practically, I think it right to give it - full consideration.
And first, I have asked myself who these Frenchmen are, that, in the state their own country has been in for these last five years, of all the people of Europe, have alone not been able to form a decided opinion, or have been unwilling to act a decided
part?
Looking over all the names I have heard of in this
great revolution in all human affairs, I find no man
of any distinction who has remained in that more
than Stoical apathy, but the Prince de Conti. This
mean, stupid, selfish, swinish, and cowardly animal,
universally known and despised as such, has indeed,
except in one abortive attempt to elope, been perfectly neutral. However, his neutrality, which it seems would qualify him for trust, and on a competition must set aside the Prince de Conde, can
be of no sort of service. His moderation has not
been able to keep him from a jail. The allied powers must draw him from that jail, before they can have the full advantage of the exertions of this great
neutralist.
Except him, I do not recollect a man of rank or
talents, who by his speeches or his votes, by his pen
or by his sword, has not been active on this scene.
The time, indeed, could admit no neutrality in any
person worthy of the name of man. There were
originally two great divisions in France: the one is
that which overturned the whole of the government
in Church and State, and erected a republic on the
basis of atheism. Their grand engine was the Jacobin Club, a sort of secession from which, but exactly on the same principles, begat another short-lived one,
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 437
called the Club of Eighty-Nine,* which was chiefly
guided by the court rebels, who, in addition to the
crimes of which they were guilty in common with the
others, had the merit of betraying a gracious master
and a kind benefactor. Subdivisions of this faction,
which since we have seen, do not in the least differ
from each other in their principles, their dispositions,
or the means they have employed. Their only quarrel has been about power: in that quarrel, like wave
succeeding wave, one faction has got the better and
expelled the other. Thus, La Fayette for a while got
the better of Orleans; and Orleans afterwards prevailed over La Fayette. Brissot overpowered OrlMans; Barere and Robespierre, and their faction,
mastered them both, and cut off their heads. All
who were not Royalists have been listed in some or
other of these divisions. If it were of any use to settle a precedence, the elder ought to have his rank.
The first authors, plotters, and contrivers of this monstrous scheme seem to me entitled to the first place in
our distrust and abhorrence. I have seen some of
those who are thought the best amongst the original
rebels, and I have not neglected the means of being
informed concerning the others. I can very truly
say, that I have not found, by observation, or inquiry,
that any sense of the evils produced by their projects
has produced in them, or any one of them, the smallest degree of repentance. Disappointment and mortification undoubtedly they feel; but to them repentance is a thing impossible. They are atheists. This wretched opinion, by which they are possessed even
to the height of fanaticism, leading them to exclude
* The first object of this club was the propagation of Jacobin
principles.
? ? ? ? 438 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
from their ideas of a commonwealth the vital principle of the physical, the moral, and the political world engages them in a thousand absurd contrivances to
fill up this dreadful void. Incapable of innoxious
repose or honorable action or wise speculation in
the lurking-holes of a foreign land, into which (in a
common ruin) they are driven to hide their heads
amongst the innocent victims of their madness, they
are at this very hour as busy in the confection of the
dirt-pies of their imaginary constitutions as if they
had not been quite fresh from destroying, by their
impious and desperate vagaries, the finest country
upon earth.
It is, however, out of these, or of such as these,
guilty and impenitent, despising the experience of
others, and their own, that some people talk of
choosing their negotiators with those Jacobins who
they suppose may be recovered to a sounder mind.
They flatter themselves, it seems, that the friendly
habits formed during their original partnership of
iniquity, a similarity of character, and a conformity
in the groundwork of their principles, might facilitate their conversion, and gain them over to some recognition of royalty. But surely this is to read
human nature very ill. The several sectaries in
this schism of the Jacobins are the very last men
in the world to trust each other. Fellowship in
treason is a bad ground of confidence. The last
quarrels are the sorest; and the injuries received
or offered by your own associates are ever the most
bitterly resented. The people of France, of every
name and description, would a thousand times sooner
listen to the Prince de Cond6, or to the Archbishop
of Aix, or the Bishop of St. Pol, or to Monsieur de
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 439
Cazales, than to La Fayette, or Dumouriez, or the
Vicomte de Noailles, or the Bishop of Auturi, or
Necker, or his disciple Lally Tollendal. Against
the first description they have not the smallest animosity, beyond that of a merely political dissension. The others they regard as traitors.
The first description is that of the Christian Royalists, men who as earnestly wished for reformation
as they opposed innovation in the fundamental parts
of their Church and State. Their part has been very
decided. Accordingly, they are to be set aside in the
restoration of Church and State. It is an odd kind
of disqualification, where the restoration of religion
and monarchy is the question. If England should
(God forbid it should! ) fall into the same misfortune
with France, and that the court. of Vienna should
undertake the restoration of our monarchy, I think
it would be extraordinary to object to the admission
of Mr. Pitt or Lord Grenville or Mr. Dundas into
any share in the management of that business, because in a day of trial they have stood up firmly and manfully, as I trust they always will do, and with
distinguished powers, for the monarchy and the legitimate Constitution of their country. I am sure, if I were to suppose myself at Vienna at such a time, I
should, as a man, as an Englishman, and as a Royalist, protest in that case, as I do in this, against a weak and ruinous principle of proceeding, which
can have no other tendency than to make those
who wish to support the crown meditate too profoundly on the consequences of the part they take, and consider whether for their open and forward
zeal in the royal cause they may not be thrust out
from any sort of confidence and employment, where
the interest of crowned heads is concerned.
? ? ? ? 440 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
These are the parties. I have said, and said truly,
that I know of no neutrals. But, as a general observation on this general principle of choosing neutra4s
on such occasions as the present, I have this to
say, that it amounts to neither more nor less than
this shocking proposition, - that we ought to exclude
men of honor and ability from. serving theirs and
our cause, and to put the dearest interests of ourselves and our posterity into the hands of men of
no decided character, without judgment to choose
and without courage to profess ally principle whatsoever.
Such men can serve no cause, for this plain reason,
-they have no cause at heart. They can, at best,
work only as mere mercenaries. They have not
been guilty of great crimes; but it is only because
they have not energy of mind to rise to any height
of wickedness. They are not hawks or kites: they
are only miserable fowls whose flight is not above
their dunghill or hen-roost. But they tremble before
the authors of these horrors. They admire them at
a safe and respectful distance. There never was a
mean and abject mind that did not admire an intrepid and dexterous villain. In the bottom of their
hearts they believe such hardy miscreants to be the
only men qualified for great affairs. If you set them
to transact with such persons, they are instantly subdued. They dare not so much as look their antagonist in the face. They are made to be their subjects. not to be their arbiters or controllers.
These men, to be sure, can look at atrocious acts
without indignation, and can behold suffering virtue
without sympathy. Therefore they are considered as
sober, dispassionate men. But they have their pas
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 441
sions, though of another kind, and which are infinitely more likely to carry them out of the path
of their duty. They are of a tame, timid, languid, inert temper, wherever the welfare of others
is concerned. In such causes, as they have no motives to action, they never possess any real ability,
and are totally destitute of all resource.
Believe a man who has seen much and observed
something. I have seen, in the course of my life, a
great many of that family of men. They are generally chosen because they have no opinion of their
own; and as far as they can be got in good earnest to embrace any opinion, it is that of whoever
happens to employ them, (neither longer nor shorter,
narrower nor broader,) with whom they have no discussion or consultation. The only thing which occurs to such a man, when he has got a business for others into his hands, is, how to make his own fortune out of it. The person he is to treat with is not,
with him, an adversary over whom he is to prevail,
but a new friend he is to gain; therefore he always
systematically betrays some part of his trust. Instead of thinking how he shall defend his ground
to the last, and, if forced to retreat, how little he
shall give up, this kind of man considers how much
of the interest of his employer he is to sacrifice to his
adversary. Having nothing but himself in view, he
knows, that, in serving his principal with zeal, he
must probably incur some resentment from the opposite party. His object is, to obtain the good-will of
the person with whom he contends, that, when an
agreement is made, he may join in rewarding him.
I would not take one of these as my arbitrator in
a dispute for so much as a fish-pond; for, if he re
? ? ? ? 442 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
served the mud to me, he would be sure to give the
water that fed the pool to my adversary. In a great
cause, I should certainly wish that my agent should
possess conciliating qualities: that he should be of a
frank, open, and candid disposition, soft in his nature, and of a temper to soften animosities and to
win confidence. He ought not to be a man odious
to the person he treats with, by personal injury, by
violence, or by deceit, or, above all, by the dereliction of his cause in any former transactions. But I
would be sure that my negotiator should be mine,that he should be as earnest in the cause as myself, and known to be so, -- that he should not be looked upon as a stipendiary advocate, but as a,
principled partisan. In all treaty it is a great
point that all idea of gaining your agent is hopeless. I would not trust the cause of royalty with
a man who, professing neutrality, is half a republican. The enemy has already a great part of his
suit without a struggle, --and he contends with advantage for all the rest. The common principle allowed between your adversary and your agent gives your adversary the advantage in every discussion.
Before I shut up this discourse about neutral agency, (which I conceive is not to be found, or, if found,
ought not to be used,) I have a few other remarks to
make on the cause which I conceive gives rise to it.
In all that we do, whether in the struggle or after
it, it is necessary that we should constantly have in
our eye the nature and character of the enemy we
have to contend with. The Jacobin Revolution is
carried on by men of no rank, of no consideration,
of wild, savage minds, full of levity, arrogance, and
presumption, without morals, without probity, with
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 443
out prudence. What have they, then, to supply their
innumerable defects, and to make them terrible even
to the firmest minds? One thing, and one thing only,
-but that one thing is worth a thousand; --they
have energy. In France, all things being put into
an universal ferment, in the decomposition of society,
no man comes forward but by his spirit of enterprise
and the vigor of his mind. If we meet this dreadful
and portentous energy, restrained by no consideration of God or man, that is always vigilant, always
on the attack, that allows itself no repose, and suffers
none to rest an hour with impunity, - if we meet this
energy with poor commonplace proceeding, with trivial maxims, paltry old saws, with doubts, fears, and suspicions, with a languid, uncertain hesitation, with
a formal, official spirit, which is turned aside by
every obstacle from its purpose, and which never sees
a difficulty but to yield to it, or at best to evade it, -
down we go to the bottom of the abyss, and nothing short of Omnipotence can save us. We must
meet a vicious and distempered energy with a manly
and rational vigor. As virtue is limited in its resources, we are doubly bound to use all that in
the circle drawn about us by our morals we are
able to command.
I do not contend against the advantages of distrust.
In the world we live in it is but too necessary.
Some of old called it the very sinews of discretion.
But what signify commonplaces that always run
parallel and equal? Distrust is good, or it is bad,
according to our position and our purpose. Distrust
is a defensive principle. They who have much to
lose have much to fear. But in France we hold
nothing. We are to break in upon a power in pos
? ? ? ? 444 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
session; we are to carry everything by storm, or by
surprise, or by intelligence, or by all. Adventure,
therefore, and not caution, is our policy. HIere to
be too presuming is the better error.
The world will judge of the spirit of our proceeding in those places of France which may fall into our
power by our conduct in those that are already in
our hands. Our wisdom should not be vulgar. Other
times, perhaps other measures; but in this awful hour
our politics ought to be made up of nothing but courage, decision, manliness, and rectitude. We should
have all the magnanimity of good faith. This is a
royal and commanding policy; and as long as we
are true to it, we may give the law. Never canll we
assume this command, if we will not risk the consequences. For which reason we ought to be bottomed
enough in principle not to be carried away upon the
first prospect of any sinister advantage. For depend
upon it, that, if we once give way to a sinister dealing, we shall teach others the game, and we shall be
outwitted and overborne; the Spaniards, the Prussians, God knows who, will put us under contribution
at their pleasure; and instead of being at the head
of a great confederacy, and the arbiters of Europe,
we shall, by our mistakes, break up a great design
into a thousand little selfish quarrels, the enemy will
triumph, and we shall sit down under the terms of
unsafe and dependent peace, weakened, mortified, and
disgraced, whilst all Europe, England included, is
left open and defenceless on every part, to Jacobin
principles, intrigues, and arms. In the case of the
king of France, declared to be our friend and ally, we will still be considering ourselves in the contradictory character of an enemy. This contradic
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 445
tion, I am afraid, will, in spite of us, give a color
of fraud to all our transactions, or at least will so
complicate our politics that we shall ourselves be
iniextricably entangled in them.
I have Toulon in my eye. It was with infinite
sorrow I heard, that, in taking the king of France's
fleet in trust, we instantly unrigged and dismasted
the ships, instead of keeping them in a condition to
escape in case of disaster, and in order to fulfil our
trust, -- that is, to hold them for the use of the
owner, and in the mean time to employ them for our
common service.
These ships are now so circumstanced, that, if we are forced to evacuate Toulon, they must fall into the hands of the enemy or be
burnt by ourselves. I know this is by some considered as a fine thing for us. But the Athenians ought not to be better than the English, or Mr. Pitt less
virtuous than Aristides.
Are we, then, so poor in resources that we can do
no better with eighteen or twenty ships of the line
than to burn them? Had we sent for French Royalist naval officers, of which some hundreds are to be had, and made them select such seamen as they
could trust, and filled the rest with our own and
Mediterranean seamen, which are all over Italy to
be had by thousands, and put them under judicious
English commanders-in-chief, and with a judicious
mixture of our own subordinates, the West Indies
would at this day have been ours. It may be said
that these French officers would take them for the
king of France, and that they would not be in our
power. Be it so. The islands would not be ours,
but they would not be Jacobinized. This is, however, a thing impossible. They must in effect and
? ? ? ? 446 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
substance be ours. But all is upon that false principle of distrust, which, not confiding in strength, can
never have the full use of it. They that pay, and
feed, and equip, must direct. But I must speak
plain upon this subject. The French islands, if
they were all our own, ought not to be all kept.
A fair partition only ought to be made of those territories. This is a subject of policy very serious,
which has many relations and aspects. Just here
I only hint at it as answering an objection, whilst
I state the mischievous consequences which suffer
us to be surprised into a virtual breach of faith by
confounding our ally with our enemy, because they
both belong to the same geographical territory.
My clear opinion is, that Toulon ought to be made,
what we set out with, a royal French city. By the
necessity of the case, it must be under the influence,
civil and military, of the allies. But the only way
of keeping that jealous and discordant mass fiom
tearing its component parts to pieces, and hazarding
the loss of the whole, is, to put the place into the
nominal government of the regent, his officers being
approved by us. This, I say, is absolutely necessary
for a poise amongst ourselves. Otherwise is it to
be believed that the Spaniards, who hold that place
with us in a sort of partnership, contrary to our mutual interest, will see us absolute masters of the Mediterranean, with Gibraltar on one side and Toulon on the other, with a quiet and composed mind, whilst
we do little less than declare that we are to take the
whole West Indies into our hands, leaving the vast,
unwieldy, and feeble body of the Spanish dominions
in that part of the world absolutely at our mercy,
without any power to balance us in the smallest de
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 447
gree? Nothing is so fatal to a nation as an extreme
of self-partiality, and the total want of consideration
of what others will naturally hope or fear. Spain
must think she sees that we are taking advantage
of the confusions which reign in France to disable
that country, and of course every country, from affording her protection, and in the end to turn the
Spanish monarchy into a province. If she saw things
in a proper point of light, to be sure, she would not
consider any other plan of politics as of the least
moment in comparison of the extinction of Jacobinism. But her ministers (to say the best of them) are
vulgar politicians. It is no wonder that they should
postpone this great point, or balance it by considerations of the common politics, that is, the questions
of power between state and state. If we manifestly
endeavor to destroy the balance, especially the maritime and commercial balance, both in Europe and
the West Indies, (the latter their sore and vulnerable
part,) from fear of what France may do for Spain
hereafter, is it to be wondered that Spain, infinitely
weaker than we are, (weaker, indeed, than such a
mass of empire ever was,) should feel the same fears
from our uncontrolled power that we give way to
ourselves from a supposed resurrection of the ancient power of France under a monarchy? It signifies nothing whether we are wrong or right in the abstract; but in respect to our relation to Spain, with
such principles followed up in practice, it is absolutely impossible that any cordial alliance can subsist between the two nations. If Spain goes, Naples will speedily follow. Prussia is quite certain, and
thinks of nothing but making a market of the present
confusions. Italy is broken and divided. Switzer
? ? ? ? 448 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
land is Jacobinized, I am afraid, completely. I have
long seen with pain the progress of French principles
in that country. Things cannot go on upon the present bottom. The possession of Toulon, which, well
managed, might be of the greatest advantage, will be
the greatest misfortune that ever happened to this
nation. The more we multiply troops there, the
more we shall multiply causes and means of quarrel
amongst ourselves. I know but one way of avoiding it, which is, to give a greater degree of simplicity
to our politics. Our situation does necessarily render them a good deal involved. And to this evil,
instead of increasing it, we ought to apply all the
remedies in our power.
See what is in that place the consequence (to say
nothing of every other) of this complexity. Toulon
has, as it were, two gates, - an English and a Spanish.
The English gate is by our policy fast barred against
the entrance of any Royalists. The Spaniards open
theirs, I fear, upon no fixed principle, and with very
little judgment. By means, however, of this foolish,
mean, and jealous policy on our side, all the Royalists
whom the English might select as most practicable,
and most subservient to honest views, are totally excluded. Of those admitted the Spaniards are mlasters. As to the inhabitants, they are a nest of Jacobins, which is delivered into our hands, not from
principle, but from fear. The inhabitants of Toulon
may be described in a few words. It is differturn
nautis, cauponibus atque malignis. The rest of the
seaports are of the same description.
Another thing which I cannot account for is, the
sending for the Bishop of Toulon and afterwards forbidding his entrance. This is as directly contrary to
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 449
the declaration as it is to the practice of the allied
powers. The king of Prussia did better. When he
took Verdun, he actually reinstated the bishop and
his chapter. When he thought he should be the
master of Chalons, he called the bishop from Flanders, to put him into possession. The Austrians
have restored the clergy wherever they obtained possession. We have proposed to restore religion as well as monarchy; and in Toulon we have restored
neither the one nor the other. It is very likely that
the Jacobin sans-culottes, or some of them, objected
to this measure, who rather choose to have the atheistic buffoons of clergy they have got to sport with, till they are ready to come forward, with the restof their worthy brethren, in Paris and other places,,
to declare that they are a set of impostors, that tlheynever believed in God, and never will preach any sort of religion. If we give way to our Jacobins in
this point, it is fully and fairly putting the government, civil and ecclesiastical, not in the king of
France, to whom, as the protector and governor, and
in substance the head of the Gallican Church, the
nomination to the bishoprics belonged, and who made
the Bishop of Toulon, - it does not leave it with him,
or even ill the hands of the king of England, or the
king of Spain, - but in the basest Jacobins of a low
seaport, to exercise, pro tempore, the sovereignty.
If this point of religion is thus given up, the grand
instrument for reclaiming France is abandoned. We
cannot, if we would, delude ourselves about the true
state of this dreadful contest. It is a religious war.
It includes in its object, undoubtedly, every other
interest of society as well as this; but this is the
principal and leading feature. It is through this
VOL. IV. 29
? ? ? ? 450 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
destruction of religion that our enemies propose the
accomplishment of all their other views. The French
Revolution, impious at once and fanatical, had no
other plan for domestic power and foreign empire.
Look at all the proceedings of the National Assembly,
from the first day of declaring itself such, in the year
1789, to this very hour, and you will find full half of
their business to be directly on this subject. In fact,
it is the spirit of the whole. The religious system,
called the Constitutional Church, was, on the face
of the whole proceeding, set up only as a mere temporary amusement to the people, and so constantly stated in all their conversations, till the time should
come when they might with safety cast off the very
appearance of all religion whatsoever, and persecute
Christianity throughout Europe with fire and sword.
The Constitutional clergy are not the ministers of any
religion: they are the agents and instruments of this
horrible conspiracy against all morals. It was from
a sense of this, that, in the English addition to the
articles proposed at St. Domingo, tolerating all religions, we very wisely refused to suffer that kind of traitors and buffoons.
This religious war is not a controversy between
sect and sect, as formerly, but a war against all sects
and all religions. The question is not, whether you
are to overturn the Catholic, to set up the Protestant.
Such an idea, in the present state of the world, is too
contemptible. Our business is, to leave to the schools
the discussion of the controverted points, abating as
much as we can the acrimony of disputants on all
sides. It is for Christian statesmen, as the world is
now circumstanced, to secure their common basis,
and not to risk the subversion of the whole fabric
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 451
by pursuing these distinctions with an ill-timed zeal.
We have in the present grand alliance all modes of
government, as well as all modes of religion. In
government, we mean to restore that which, notwithstanding our diversity of forms, we are all agreed
in as fundamental in government. The same principle ought to guide us in the religious part: conforming the mode, not to our particular ideas, (for in that point we have no ideas in common,) but to
what will best promote the great, general ends of
the alliance. As statesmen, we are to see which of
those modes best suits with the interests of such a
commonwealth as we wish to secure and promote.
There can be no doubt but that the Catholic religion, which is fundamentally the religion of France,
must go with the monarchy of France. We know
that the monarchy did not survive the hierarchy, no,
not even in appearance, for many months, --in substance, not for a single hour. As little can it exist in
future, if that pillar is taken away, or even shattered
and impaired.
If it should please God to give to the allies the
means of restoring peace and order in that focus of
war and confusion, I would, as I said in the beginning of this memorial, first replace the whole of the
old clergy; because we have proof more than sufficient, that, whether they err or not in the scholastic
disputes with us, they are not tainted with atheism,
the great political evil of the time. I hope I need
not apologize for this phrase, as if I thought religion
nothing but policy- it is far from my thoughts, and
I hope it is not to be inferred from my expressions.
But in the light of policy alone I am here considering the question. I speak of policy, too, in a large
? ? ? ? 452 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
light; in which'large light, policy, too, is a sacred
thing.
There are many, perhlaps half a million or more,
calling themselves Protestants, in the South of France,
and in other of the provinces. Some raise them to a
much greater number; but I think this nearer to the
mark. I am sorry to say that they have behaved
shockingly since the very beginning of this rebellion,
anld have been uniformly concerned in its worst and
most atrocious acts. Their clergy are just the same
atheists with those of the Constitutional Catholics,
but still more wicked and daring. Three of their
number have met from their republican associates
the reward of their crimes.
As the ancient Catholic religion is to be restored
for the body of France, the ancient Calvinistic religion ought to be restored for the Protestants, with every kind of protection and privilege. But not one
minister concerned in this rebellion ought to be suffered amongst them. If they have not clergy of their own, men well recommended, as untainted with
Jacobinisml, by the synods of those places where Calvinism prevails and French is spoken, ought to be sought. Many such there are. The Presbyterian
discipline ought, in my opinion, to be established in
its vigor, and the people professing it ought to be
bound to its maintenance. No man, under the false
and hypocritical pretence of liberty of conscience,
ought to be suffered to have no conscience at all.
The king's commissioner ought also to sit in their
synods, as before the revocation' of the Edict of
Nantes. I am conscious that this discipline disposes
men to republicanism: but it is still a discipline, and
it is a cure (such as it is) for the perverse and undis
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 453
ciplined habits which for some tim6 have prevailed.
Republicanism repressed may have its use in the composition,of a state. Inspection may be practicable,
and responsibility in the teachers and elders may be
established, in such an hierarchy as the Presbyterian.
For a time like ours, it is a great point gained, that
people should be taught to meet, to combine, and to
be classed and arrayed in some other way than in
clubs of Jacobins. If it be not the best mode of
Protestantism under a monarchy, it is still an orderly Christian church, orthodox in the fundamentals, and, what is to our point, capable enough of rendering men useful citizens. It was the impolitic
abolition of their discipline, which exposed them to
the wild opinions and conduct that have prevailed
amongst the Huguenots. The toleration in 1787 was
owing to the good disposition of the late king; but
it was modified by the profligate folly of his atheistic
minister, the Cardinal de Lom4nie. This mischievous minister did not follow, in the edict of toleration,
the wisdom of the Edict of Nantes. But his toleration
was granted' to non-Catholics, - a dangerous word,
which might signify anything, and was but too expressive of a fatal indifference with regard to all
piety. I speak for myself: I do not wish any man to
be converted from his sect. The distinctions which
we have reformed from animosity to emulation may
be even useful to the cause of religion. By some
moderate contention they keep alive zeal. Whereas
people who change, except under strong conviction,
(a thing now rather rare,) the religion of their early prejudices, especially if the conversion is brought
about by any political machine, are very apt to degenerate into indifference, laxity, and often downright
atheism.
? ? ? ? 454 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
Another political question arises about the mode of
government which ought to be established. I think
the proclamation (which I read before I had proceeded far in this memorial) puts it on the best footing, by postponing that arrangement to a time of peace.
When our politics lead us to enterprise a great
and almost total political revolution in Europe, we
ought to look seriously into the consequences of what
we are about to do. Some eminent persons discover
an apprehension that the monarchy, if restored in
France, may be restored in too great strength for the
liberty and happiness of the natives, and for the tranquillity of other states. They are therefore of opinion that terms ought to be made for the modification of that monarchy. They are persons too considerable, from the powers of their mind, and from their
situation, as well as from the real respect I have for
them, who seem to entertain these apprehensions, to
let me pass them by unnoticed.
As to the power of France as a state, and in its
exterior relations, I confess my fears are on the part
of its extreme reduction. There is undoubtedly
something in the vicinity of France, which makes it
naturally and properly an object of our watchfulness
and jealousy, whatever form its government may take.
But the difference is great between a plan for our
own security and a scheme for the utter destruction
of France. If there were no other countries in the
political map but these two, I admit that policy might
justify a wish to lower our neighbor to a standard
which would even render her in some measure, if not
wholly, our dependant. But the system of Europe is
extensive and extremely complex. However formi
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 455
dable to us, as taken in this one relation, France is
not equally dreadful to all other states. On the contrary, my clear opinion is, that the liberties of Europe cannot possibly be preserved but by her remaining a
very great and preponderating power. The design at
present evidently pursued by the combined potentates,
or of the two who lead, is totally to destroy her as
such a power. For Great Britain resolves that she
shall have no colonies, no commerce, and no marine.
Austria means to take away the whole frontier, from
the borders of Switzerland to Dunkirk. It is their
plan also to render the interior government lax and
feeble, by prescribing, by force of the arms of rival
and jealous nations, and without consulting the natural interests of the kingdom, such arrangements as, in the actual state of Jacobinism in France, and the
unsettled state in which property must remain for
a long time, will inevitably produce such distraction
and debility in government as to reduce it to nothing, or to throw it back into its old confusion. One cannot conceive so frightful a state of a nation. A
maritime country without a marine and without commerce; a continental country without a frontier, and for a thousand miles surrounded with powerful, warlike, and ambitious neighbors! It is possible that she might submit to lose her commerce and her colonies:
her security she never can abandon. If, contrary to
all expectations, under such a disgraced and impotent government, any energy should remain in that country, she will make every effort to recover her security, which will involve Europe for a century in war and blood. What has it cost to France to make
that frontier? What will it cost to recover it? Austria thinks that without a frontier she cannot secure
? ? ? ? 456 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
the Netherlands. But without her frontier France cannot secure herself. Austria has been, however, secure for an hundred years in those very Netherlands, and has never been dispossessed of them by the chance
of war without a moral certainty of receiving them
again on the restoration of peace. Her late dangers
have arisen not from the power or ambition of the
king of France. They arose from her own ill policy,
which dismantled all her towns, and discontented all
her subjects by Jacobinical innovations. She dismantles her own towns, and then says, " Give me the
frontier of France! " But let us depend upon it, whatever tends, under the name of security, to aggrandize
Austria, will discontent and alarm Prussia. Such
a length of frontier on the side of France, separated
from itself, and separated from the mass of the Austrian country, will be weak, unless connected at the
expense of the Elector of Bavaria (the Elector Palatine) and other lesser princes, or by such exchanges
as will again convulse the Empire.
whole military arm of Europe, I am sure that a
bribe of the best province in that kingdom would not
tempt me to intermeddle in their affairs, except in
perfect concurrence and concert with the natural,
legal interests of the country, composed of the ecclesiastical, the military, the several corporate bodies of justice and of burghership, making under a monarch (I repeat it again and again) the _French nation according to its fundamental Constitution. No considerate statesman would undertake to meddle with it upon any other condition.
The government of that kingdom is fundamentally
monarchical. The public law of Europe has never
recognized in it-any other form of government. The
potentates of Europe have, by that law, a right, an
interest, and a duty to know with what government
they are to treat, and what they are to admit into the
federative society, - or, in other words, into the diploVOL. IV. 28
? ? ? ? 434 ON THIE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
matic republic of Europe. This right is clear and
indisputable.
What other and further interference they have a
right to in the interior of the concerns of another people is a matter on which, as on every political subject, no very definite or positive rule can well be laid
down. Our neighbors are men; and who will attempt to dictate the laws under which it is allowable
or forbidden to take a part in the concerns of men,
whether they are considered individually or in a collective capacity, whenever charity to them, or a care
of my own safety, calls forth my activity? Circumstances perpetually variable, directing a moral prudence and discretion, the general principles of which
never vary, must alone prescribe a conduct fitting on
such occasions. The latest casuists of public law are
rather of a republican cast, and, in my mind, by no
means so averse as they ought to be to a right in the
people (a word which, ill defined, is of the most
dangerous use) to make changes at their pleasure in
the fundamental laws of their country. These writers, however, when a country is divided, leave abundant liberty for a neighbor to support any of the parties according to his choice. * This interference must, indeed, always be a right, whilst the privilege of doing good to others, and of averting from them every
sort of evil, I. s a right: circumstances may render
that right a duty. It depends wholly on this, whether it be a bona fide charity to a party, and a prudent
precaution with regard to yourself, or whether, under
the pretence of aiding one of the parties in a nation,
you act in such a manner as to aggravate its calami.
ties and accomplish its final destruction. In truth,
* Vattel.
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 435
It is not the interfering or keeping aloof, but iniquitous intermeddling, or treacherous inaction, which is praised or blamed by the decision of an equitable
judge.
It will be a just and irresistible presumption against
the fairness of the interposing power, that he takes
with him no party or description of men in the divided state. It is not probable that these parties should all, and all alike, be more adverse to the true interests of their country, and less capable of forming a judgment upon them, than those who are absolute
strangers to their affairs, and to the character of the
actors in them, and have but a remote, feeble, and
secondary sympathy with their interest. Sormetimes
a calm and healing arbiter may be necessary; but he
is to compose differences, not to give laws. It is impossible that any one should not feel the full force of that presumption. Even people, whose politics for
the supposed good of their own country lead them to
take advantage of the dissensions of a neighboring
nation in order to ruin it, will not directly propose to
exclude the natives, but they will take that mode of
consulting and employing them which most nearly
approaches to an exclusion. In some particulars they
propose what amounts to that exclusion, in others
they do much worse. They recommend to ministry,
"that no Frenchman who has given a decided opinion or acted a decided part in this great Revolution, for or against it, should be countenanced, brought
forward, trusted, or employed, even in the strictest
subordination to the ministers of the allied powers. "
Although one would think that this advice would
stand condemned on the first proposition, yet, as it
has been made popular, and has been proceeded upon
? ? ? ? 436 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
practically, I think it right to give it - full consideration.
And first, I have asked myself who these Frenchmen are, that, in the state their own country has been in for these last five years, of all the people of Europe, have alone not been able to form a decided opinion, or have been unwilling to act a decided
part?
Looking over all the names I have heard of in this
great revolution in all human affairs, I find no man
of any distinction who has remained in that more
than Stoical apathy, but the Prince de Conti. This
mean, stupid, selfish, swinish, and cowardly animal,
universally known and despised as such, has indeed,
except in one abortive attempt to elope, been perfectly neutral. However, his neutrality, which it seems would qualify him for trust, and on a competition must set aside the Prince de Conde, can
be of no sort of service. His moderation has not
been able to keep him from a jail. The allied powers must draw him from that jail, before they can have the full advantage of the exertions of this great
neutralist.
Except him, I do not recollect a man of rank or
talents, who by his speeches or his votes, by his pen
or by his sword, has not been active on this scene.
The time, indeed, could admit no neutrality in any
person worthy of the name of man. There were
originally two great divisions in France: the one is
that which overturned the whole of the government
in Church and State, and erected a republic on the
basis of atheism. Their grand engine was the Jacobin Club, a sort of secession from which, but exactly on the same principles, begat another short-lived one,
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 437
called the Club of Eighty-Nine,* which was chiefly
guided by the court rebels, who, in addition to the
crimes of which they were guilty in common with the
others, had the merit of betraying a gracious master
and a kind benefactor. Subdivisions of this faction,
which since we have seen, do not in the least differ
from each other in their principles, their dispositions,
or the means they have employed. Their only quarrel has been about power: in that quarrel, like wave
succeeding wave, one faction has got the better and
expelled the other. Thus, La Fayette for a while got
the better of Orleans; and Orleans afterwards prevailed over La Fayette. Brissot overpowered OrlMans; Barere and Robespierre, and their faction,
mastered them both, and cut off their heads. All
who were not Royalists have been listed in some or
other of these divisions. If it were of any use to settle a precedence, the elder ought to have his rank.
The first authors, plotters, and contrivers of this monstrous scheme seem to me entitled to the first place in
our distrust and abhorrence. I have seen some of
those who are thought the best amongst the original
rebels, and I have not neglected the means of being
informed concerning the others. I can very truly
say, that I have not found, by observation, or inquiry,
that any sense of the evils produced by their projects
has produced in them, or any one of them, the smallest degree of repentance. Disappointment and mortification undoubtedly they feel; but to them repentance is a thing impossible. They are atheists. This wretched opinion, by which they are possessed even
to the height of fanaticism, leading them to exclude
* The first object of this club was the propagation of Jacobin
principles.
? ? ? ? 438 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
from their ideas of a commonwealth the vital principle of the physical, the moral, and the political world engages them in a thousand absurd contrivances to
fill up this dreadful void. Incapable of innoxious
repose or honorable action or wise speculation in
the lurking-holes of a foreign land, into which (in a
common ruin) they are driven to hide their heads
amongst the innocent victims of their madness, they
are at this very hour as busy in the confection of the
dirt-pies of their imaginary constitutions as if they
had not been quite fresh from destroying, by their
impious and desperate vagaries, the finest country
upon earth.
It is, however, out of these, or of such as these,
guilty and impenitent, despising the experience of
others, and their own, that some people talk of
choosing their negotiators with those Jacobins who
they suppose may be recovered to a sounder mind.
They flatter themselves, it seems, that the friendly
habits formed during their original partnership of
iniquity, a similarity of character, and a conformity
in the groundwork of their principles, might facilitate their conversion, and gain them over to some recognition of royalty. But surely this is to read
human nature very ill. The several sectaries in
this schism of the Jacobins are the very last men
in the world to trust each other. Fellowship in
treason is a bad ground of confidence. The last
quarrels are the sorest; and the injuries received
or offered by your own associates are ever the most
bitterly resented. The people of France, of every
name and description, would a thousand times sooner
listen to the Prince de Cond6, or to the Archbishop
of Aix, or the Bishop of St. Pol, or to Monsieur de
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 439
Cazales, than to La Fayette, or Dumouriez, or the
Vicomte de Noailles, or the Bishop of Auturi, or
Necker, or his disciple Lally Tollendal. Against
the first description they have not the smallest animosity, beyond that of a merely political dissension. The others they regard as traitors.
The first description is that of the Christian Royalists, men who as earnestly wished for reformation
as they opposed innovation in the fundamental parts
of their Church and State. Their part has been very
decided. Accordingly, they are to be set aside in the
restoration of Church and State. It is an odd kind
of disqualification, where the restoration of religion
and monarchy is the question. If England should
(God forbid it should! ) fall into the same misfortune
with France, and that the court. of Vienna should
undertake the restoration of our monarchy, I think
it would be extraordinary to object to the admission
of Mr. Pitt or Lord Grenville or Mr. Dundas into
any share in the management of that business, because in a day of trial they have stood up firmly and manfully, as I trust they always will do, and with
distinguished powers, for the monarchy and the legitimate Constitution of their country. I am sure, if I were to suppose myself at Vienna at such a time, I
should, as a man, as an Englishman, and as a Royalist, protest in that case, as I do in this, against a weak and ruinous principle of proceeding, which
can have no other tendency than to make those
who wish to support the crown meditate too profoundly on the consequences of the part they take, and consider whether for their open and forward
zeal in the royal cause they may not be thrust out
from any sort of confidence and employment, where
the interest of crowned heads is concerned.
? ? ? ? 440 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
These are the parties. I have said, and said truly,
that I know of no neutrals. But, as a general observation on this general principle of choosing neutra4s
on such occasions as the present, I have this to
say, that it amounts to neither more nor less than
this shocking proposition, - that we ought to exclude
men of honor and ability from. serving theirs and
our cause, and to put the dearest interests of ourselves and our posterity into the hands of men of
no decided character, without judgment to choose
and without courage to profess ally principle whatsoever.
Such men can serve no cause, for this plain reason,
-they have no cause at heart. They can, at best,
work only as mere mercenaries. They have not
been guilty of great crimes; but it is only because
they have not energy of mind to rise to any height
of wickedness. They are not hawks or kites: they
are only miserable fowls whose flight is not above
their dunghill or hen-roost. But they tremble before
the authors of these horrors. They admire them at
a safe and respectful distance. There never was a
mean and abject mind that did not admire an intrepid and dexterous villain. In the bottom of their
hearts they believe such hardy miscreants to be the
only men qualified for great affairs. If you set them
to transact with such persons, they are instantly subdued. They dare not so much as look their antagonist in the face. They are made to be their subjects. not to be their arbiters or controllers.
These men, to be sure, can look at atrocious acts
without indignation, and can behold suffering virtue
without sympathy. Therefore they are considered as
sober, dispassionate men. But they have their pas
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 441
sions, though of another kind, and which are infinitely more likely to carry them out of the path
of their duty. They are of a tame, timid, languid, inert temper, wherever the welfare of others
is concerned. In such causes, as they have no motives to action, they never possess any real ability,
and are totally destitute of all resource.
Believe a man who has seen much and observed
something. I have seen, in the course of my life, a
great many of that family of men. They are generally chosen because they have no opinion of their
own; and as far as they can be got in good earnest to embrace any opinion, it is that of whoever
happens to employ them, (neither longer nor shorter,
narrower nor broader,) with whom they have no discussion or consultation. The only thing which occurs to such a man, when he has got a business for others into his hands, is, how to make his own fortune out of it. The person he is to treat with is not,
with him, an adversary over whom he is to prevail,
but a new friend he is to gain; therefore he always
systematically betrays some part of his trust. Instead of thinking how he shall defend his ground
to the last, and, if forced to retreat, how little he
shall give up, this kind of man considers how much
of the interest of his employer he is to sacrifice to his
adversary. Having nothing but himself in view, he
knows, that, in serving his principal with zeal, he
must probably incur some resentment from the opposite party. His object is, to obtain the good-will of
the person with whom he contends, that, when an
agreement is made, he may join in rewarding him.
I would not take one of these as my arbitrator in
a dispute for so much as a fish-pond; for, if he re
? ? ? ? 442 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
served the mud to me, he would be sure to give the
water that fed the pool to my adversary. In a great
cause, I should certainly wish that my agent should
possess conciliating qualities: that he should be of a
frank, open, and candid disposition, soft in his nature, and of a temper to soften animosities and to
win confidence. He ought not to be a man odious
to the person he treats with, by personal injury, by
violence, or by deceit, or, above all, by the dereliction of his cause in any former transactions. But I
would be sure that my negotiator should be mine,that he should be as earnest in the cause as myself, and known to be so, -- that he should not be looked upon as a stipendiary advocate, but as a,
principled partisan. In all treaty it is a great
point that all idea of gaining your agent is hopeless. I would not trust the cause of royalty with
a man who, professing neutrality, is half a republican. The enemy has already a great part of his
suit without a struggle, --and he contends with advantage for all the rest. The common principle allowed between your adversary and your agent gives your adversary the advantage in every discussion.
Before I shut up this discourse about neutral agency, (which I conceive is not to be found, or, if found,
ought not to be used,) I have a few other remarks to
make on the cause which I conceive gives rise to it.
In all that we do, whether in the struggle or after
it, it is necessary that we should constantly have in
our eye the nature and character of the enemy we
have to contend with. The Jacobin Revolution is
carried on by men of no rank, of no consideration,
of wild, savage minds, full of levity, arrogance, and
presumption, without morals, without probity, with
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 443
out prudence. What have they, then, to supply their
innumerable defects, and to make them terrible even
to the firmest minds? One thing, and one thing only,
-but that one thing is worth a thousand; --they
have energy. In France, all things being put into
an universal ferment, in the decomposition of society,
no man comes forward but by his spirit of enterprise
and the vigor of his mind. If we meet this dreadful
and portentous energy, restrained by no consideration of God or man, that is always vigilant, always
on the attack, that allows itself no repose, and suffers
none to rest an hour with impunity, - if we meet this
energy with poor commonplace proceeding, with trivial maxims, paltry old saws, with doubts, fears, and suspicions, with a languid, uncertain hesitation, with
a formal, official spirit, which is turned aside by
every obstacle from its purpose, and which never sees
a difficulty but to yield to it, or at best to evade it, -
down we go to the bottom of the abyss, and nothing short of Omnipotence can save us. We must
meet a vicious and distempered energy with a manly
and rational vigor. As virtue is limited in its resources, we are doubly bound to use all that in
the circle drawn about us by our morals we are
able to command.
I do not contend against the advantages of distrust.
In the world we live in it is but too necessary.
Some of old called it the very sinews of discretion.
But what signify commonplaces that always run
parallel and equal? Distrust is good, or it is bad,
according to our position and our purpose. Distrust
is a defensive principle. They who have much to
lose have much to fear. But in France we hold
nothing. We are to break in upon a power in pos
? ? ? ? 444 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
session; we are to carry everything by storm, or by
surprise, or by intelligence, or by all. Adventure,
therefore, and not caution, is our policy. HIere to
be too presuming is the better error.
The world will judge of the spirit of our proceeding in those places of France which may fall into our
power by our conduct in those that are already in
our hands. Our wisdom should not be vulgar. Other
times, perhaps other measures; but in this awful hour
our politics ought to be made up of nothing but courage, decision, manliness, and rectitude. We should
have all the magnanimity of good faith. This is a
royal and commanding policy; and as long as we
are true to it, we may give the law. Never canll we
assume this command, if we will not risk the consequences. For which reason we ought to be bottomed
enough in principle not to be carried away upon the
first prospect of any sinister advantage. For depend
upon it, that, if we once give way to a sinister dealing, we shall teach others the game, and we shall be
outwitted and overborne; the Spaniards, the Prussians, God knows who, will put us under contribution
at their pleasure; and instead of being at the head
of a great confederacy, and the arbiters of Europe,
we shall, by our mistakes, break up a great design
into a thousand little selfish quarrels, the enemy will
triumph, and we shall sit down under the terms of
unsafe and dependent peace, weakened, mortified, and
disgraced, whilst all Europe, England included, is
left open and defenceless on every part, to Jacobin
principles, intrigues, and arms. In the case of the
king of France, declared to be our friend and ally, we will still be considering ourselves in the contradictory character of an enemy. This contradic
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 445
tion, I am afraid, will, in spite of us, give a color
of fraud to all our transactions, or at least will so
complicate our politics that we shall ourselves be
iniextricably entangled in them.
I have Toulon in my eye. It was with infinite
sorrow I heard, that, in taking the king of France's
fleet in trust, we instantly unrigged and dismasted
the ships, instead of keeping them in a condition to
escape in case of disaster, and in order to fulfil our
trust, -- that is, to hold them for the use of the
owner, and in the mean time to employ them for our
common service.
These ships are now so circumstanced, that, if we are forced to evacuate Toulon, they must fall into the hands of the enemy or be
burnt by ourselves. I know this is by some considered as a fine thing for us. But the Athenians ought not to be better than the English, or Mr. Pitt less
virtuous than Aristides.
Are we, then, so poor in resources that we can do
no better with eighteen or twenty ships of the line
than to burn them? Had we sent for French Royalist naval officers, of which some hundreds are to be had, and made them select such seamen as they
could trust, and filled the rest with our own and
Mediterranean seamen, which are all over Italy to
be had by thousands, and put them under judicious
English commanders-in-chief, and with a judicious
mixture of our own subordinates, the West Indies
would at this day have been ours. It may be said
that these French officers would take them for the
king of France, and that they would not be in our
power. Be it so. The islands would not be ours,
but they would not be Jacobinized. This is, however, a thing impossible. They must in effect and
? ? ? ? 446 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
substance be ours. But all is upon that false principle of distrust, which, not confiding in strength, can
never have the full use of it. They that pay, and
feed, and equip, must direct. But I must speak
plain upon this subject. The French islands, if
they were all our own, ought not to be all kept.
A fair partition only ought to be made of those territories. This is a subject of policy very serious,
which has many relations and aspects. Just here
I only hint at it as answering an objection, whilst
I state the mischievous consequences which suffer
us to be surprised into a virtual breach of faith by
confounding our ally with our enemy, because they
both belong to the same geographical territory.
My clear opinion is, that Toulon ought to be made,
what we set out with, a royal French city. By the
necessity of the case, it must be under the influence,
civil and military, of the allies. But the only way
of keeping that jealous and discordant mass fiom
tearing its component parts to pieces, and hazarding
the loss of the whole, is, to put the place into the
nominal government of the regent, his officers being
approved by us. This, I say, is absolutely necessary
for a poise amongst ourselves. Otherwise is it to
be believed that the Spaniards, who hold that place
with us in a sort of partnership, contrary to our mutual interest, will see us absolute masters of the Mediterranean, with Gibraltar on one side and Toulon on the other, with a quiet and composed mind, whilst
we do little less than declare that we are to take the
whole West Indies into our hands, leaving the vast,
unwieldy, and feeble body of the Spanish dominions
in that part of the world absolutely at our mercy,
without any power to balance us in the smallest de
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 447
gree? Nothing is so fatal to a nation as an extreme
of self-partiality, and the total want of consideration
of what others will naturally hope or fear. Spain
must think she sees that we are taking advantage
of the confusions which reign in France to disable
that country, and of course every country, from affording her protection, and in the end to turn the
Spanish monarchy into a province. If she saw things
in a proper point of light, to be sure, she would not
consider any other plan of politics as of the least
moment in comparison of the extinction of Jacobinism. But her ministers (to say the best of them) are
vulgar politicians. It is no wonder that they should
postpone this great point, or balance it by considerations of the common politics, that is, the questions
of power between state and state. If we manifestly
endeavor to destroy the balance, especially the maritime and commercial balance, both in Europe and
the West Indies, (the latter their sore and vulnerable
part,) from fear of what France may do for Spain
hereafter, is it to be wondered that Spain, infinitely
weaker than we are, (weaker, indeed, than such a
mass of empire ever was,) should feel the same fears
from our uncontrolled power that we give way to
ourselves from a supposed resurrection of the ancient power of France under a monarchy? It signifies nothing whether we are wrong or right in the abstract; but in respect to our relation to Spain, with
such principles followed up in practice, it is absolutely impossible that any cordial alliance can subsist between the two nations. If Spain goes, Naples will speedily follow. Prussia is quite certain, and
thinks of nothing but making a market of the present
confusions. Italy is broken and divided. Switzer
? ? ? ? 448 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
land is Jacobinized, I am afraid, completely. I have
long seen with pain the progress of French principles
in that country. Things cannot go on upon the present bottom. The possession of Toulon, which, well
managed, might be of the greatest advantage, will be
the greatest misfortune that ever happened to this
nation. The more we multiply troops there, the
more we shall multiply causes and means of quarrel
amongst ourselves. I know but one way of avoiding it, which is, to give a greater degree of simplicity
to our politics. Our situation does necessarily render them a good deal involved. And to this evil,
instead of increasing it, we ought to apply all the
remedies in our power.
See what is in that place the consequence (to say
nothing of every other) of this complexity. Toulon
has, as it were, two gates, - an English and a Spanish.
The English gate is by our policy fast barred against
the entrance of any Royalists. The Spaniards open
theirs, I fear, upon no fixed principle, and with very
little judgment. By means, however, of this foolish,
mean, and jealous policy on our side, all the Royalists
whom the English might select as most practicable,
and most subservient to honest views, are totally excluded. Of those admitted the Spaniards are mlasters. As to the inhabitants, they are a nest of Jacobins, which is delivered into our hands, not from
principle, but from fear. The inhabitants of Toulon
may be described in a few words. It is differturn
nautis, cauponibus atque malignis. The rest of the
seaports are of the same description.
Another thing which I cannot account for is, the
sending for the Bishop of Toulon and afterwards forbidding his entrance. This is as directly contrary to
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 449
the declaration as it is to the practice of the allied
powers. The king of Prussia did better. When he
took Verdun, he actually reinstated the bishop and
his chapter. When he thought he should be the
master of Chalons, he called the bishop from Flanders, to put him into possession. The Austrians
have restored the clergy wherever they obtained possession. We have proposed to restore religion as well as monarchy; and in Toulon we have restored
neither the one nor the other. It is very likely that
the Jacobin sans-culottes, or some of them, objected
to this measure, who rather choose to have the atheistic buffoons of clergy they have got to sport with, till they are ready to come forward, with the restof their worthy brethren, in Paris and other places,,
to declare that they are a set of impostors, that tlheynever believed in God, and never will preach any sort of religion. If we give way to our Jacobins in
this point, it is fully and fairly putting the government, civil and ecclesiastical, not in the king of
France, to whom, as the protector and governor, and
in substance the head of the Gallican Church, the
nomination to the bishoprics belonged, and who made
the Bishop of Toulon, - it does not leave it with him,
or even ill the hands of the king of England, or the
king of Spain, - but in the basest Jacobins of a low
seaport, to exercise, pro tempore, the sovereignty.
If this point of religion is thus given up, the grand
instrument for reclaiming France is abandoned. We
cannot, if we would, delude ourselves about the true
state of this dreadful contest. It is a religious war.
It includes in its object, undoubtedly, every other
interest of society as well as this; but this is the
principal and leading feature. It is through this
VOL. IV. 29
? ? ? ? 450 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
destruction of religion that our enemies propose the
accomplishment of all their other views. The French
Revolution, impious at once and fanatical, had no
other plan for domestic power and foreign empire.
Look at all the proceedings of the National Assembly,
from the first day of declaring itself such, in the year
1789, to this very hour, and you will find full half of
their business to be directly on this subject. In fact,
it is the spirit of the whole. The religious system,
called the Constitutional Church, was, on the face
of the whole proceeding, set up only as a mere temporary amusement to the people, and so constantly stated in all their conversations, till the time should
come when they might with safety cast off the very
appearance of all religion whatsoever, and persecute
Christianity throughout Europe with fire and sword.
The Constitutional clergy are not the ministers of any
religion: they are the agents and instruments of this
horrible conspiracy against all morals. It was from
a sense of this, that, in the English addition to the
articles proposed at St. Domingo, tolerating all religions, we very wisely refused to suffer that kind of traitors and buffoons.
This religious war is not a controversy between
sect and sect, as formerly, but a war against all sects
and all religions. The question is not, whether you
are to overturn the Catholic, to set up the Protestant.
Such an idea, in the present state of the world, is too
contemptible. Our business is, to leave to the schools
the discussion of the controverted points, abating as
much as we can the acrimony of disputants on all
sides. It is for Christian statesmen, as the world is
now circumstanced, to secure their common basis,
and not to risk the subversion of the whole fabric
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 451
by pursuing these distinctions with an ill-timed zeal.
We have in the present grand alliance all modes of
government, as well as all modes of religion. In
government, we mean to restore that which, notwithstanding our diversity of forms, we are all agreed
in as fundamental in government. The same principle ought to guide us in the religious part: conforming the mode, not to our particular ideas, (for in that point we have no ideas in common,) but to
what will best promote the great, general ends of
the alliance. As statesmen, we are to see which of
those modes best suits with the interests of such a
commonwealth as we wish to secure and promote.
There can be no doubt but that the Catholic religion, which is fundamentally the religion of France,
must go with the monarchy of France. We know
that the monarchy did not survive the hierarchy, no,
not even in appearance, for many months, --in substance, not for a single hour. As little can it exist in
future, if that pillar is taken away, or even shattered
and impaired.
If it should please God to give to the allies the
means of restoring peace and order in that focus of
war and confusion, I would, as I said in the beginning of this memorial, first replace the whole of the
old clergy; because we have proof more than sufficient, that, whether they err or not in the scholastic
disputes with us, they are not tainted with atheism,
the great political evil of the time. I hope I need
not apologize for this phrase, as if I thought religion
nothing but policy- it is far from my thoughts, and
I hope it is not to be inferred from my expressions.
But in the light of policy alone I am here considering the question. I speak of policy, too, in a large
? ? ? ? 452 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
light; in which'large light, policy, too, is a sacred
thing.
There are many, perhlaps half a million or more,
calling themselves Protestants, in the South of France,
and in other of the provinces. Some raise them to a
much greater number; but I think this nearer to the
mark. I am sorry to say that they have behaved
shockingly since the very beginning of this rebellion,
anld have been uniformly concerned in its worst and
most atrocious acts. Their clergy are just the same
atheists with those of the Constitutional Catholics,
but still more wicked and daring. Three of their
number have met from their republican associates
the reward of their crimes.
As the ancient Catholic religion is to be restored
for the body of France, the ancient Calvinistic religion ought to be restored for the Protestants, with every kind of protection and privilege. But not one
minister concerned in this rebellion ought to be suffered amongst them. If they have not clergy of their own, men well recommended, as untainted with
Jacobinisml, by the synods of those places where Calvinism prevails and French is spoken, ought to be sought. Many such there are. The Presbyterian
discipline ought, in my opinion, to be established in
its vigor, and the people professing it ought to be
bound to its maintenance. No man, under the false
and hypocritical pretence of liberty of conscience,
ought to be suffered to have no conscience at all.
The king's commissioner ought also to sit in their
synods, as before the revocation' of the Edict of
Nantes. I am conscious that this discipline disposes
men to republicanism: but it is still a discipline, and
it is a cure (such as it is) for the perverse and undis
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 453
ciplined habits which for some tim6 have prevailed.
Republicanism repressed may have its use in the composition,of a state. Inspection may be practicable,
and responsibility in the teachers and elders may be
established, in such an hierarchy as the Presbyterian.
For a time like ours, it is a great point gained, that
people should be taught to meet, to combine, and to
be classed and arrayed in some other way than in
clubs of Jacobins. If it be not the best mode of
Protestantism under a monarchy, it is still an orderly Christian church, orthodox in the fundamentals, and, what is to our point, capable enough of rendering men useful citizens. It was the impolitic
abolition of their discipline, which exposed them to
the wild opinions and conduct that have prevailed
amongst the Huguenots. The toleration in 1787 was
owing to the good disposition of the late king; but
it was modified by the profligate folly of his atheistic
minister, the Cardinal de Lom4nie. This mischievous minister did not follow, in the edict of toleration,
the wisdom of the Edict of Nantes. But his toleration
was granted' to non-Catholics, - a dangerous word,
which might signify anything, and was but too expressive of a fatal indifference with regard to all
piety. I speak for myself: I do not wish any man to
be converted from his sect. The distinctions which
we have reformed from animosity to emulation may
be even useful to the cause of religion. By some
moderate contention they keep alive zeal. Whereas
people who change, except under strong conviction,
(a thing now rather rare,) the religion of their early prejudices, especially if the conversion is brought
about by any political machine, are very apt to degenerate into indifference, laxity, and often downright
atheism.
? ? ? ? 454 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
Another political question arises about the mode of
government which ought to be established. I think
the proclamation (which I read before I had proceeded far in this memorial) puts it on the best footing, by postponing that arrangement to a time of peace.
When our politics lead us to enterprise a great
and almost total political revolution in Europe, we
ought to look seriously into the consequences of what
we are about to do. Some eminent persons discover
an apprehension that the monarchy, if restored in
France, may be restored in too great strength for the
liberty and happiness of the natives, and for the tranquillity of other states. They are therefore of opinion that terms ought to be made for the modification of that monarchy. They are persons too considerable, from the powers of their mind, and from their
situation, as well as from the real respect I have for
them, who seem to entertain these apprehensions, to
let me pass them by unnoticed.
As to the power of France as a state, and in its
exterior relations, I confess my fears are on the part
of its extreme reduction. There is undoubtedly
something in the vicinity of France, which makes it
naturally and properly an object of our watchfulness
and jealousy, whatever form its government may take.
But the difference is great between a plan for our
own security and a scheme for the utter destruction
of France. If there were no other countries in the
political map but these two, I admit that policy might
justify a wish to lower our neighbor to a standard
which would even render her in some measure, if not
wholly, our dependant. But the system of Europe is
extensive and extremely complex. However formi
? ? ? ? ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES. 455
dable to us, as taken in this one relation, France is
not equally dreadful to all other states. On the contrary, my clear opinion is, that the liberties of Europe cannot possibly be preserved but by her remaining a
very great and preponderating power. The design at
present evidently pursued by the combined potentates,
or of the two who lead, is totally to destroy her as
such a power. For Great Britain resolves that she
shall have no colonies, no commerce, and no marine.
Austria means to take away the whole frontier, from
the borders of Switzerland to Dunkirk. It is their
plan also to render the interior government lax and
feeble, by prescribing, by force of the arms of rival
and jealous nations, and without consulting the natural interests of the kingdom, such arrangements as, in the actual state of Jacobinism in France, and the
unsettled state in which property must remain for
a long time, will inevitably produce such distraction
and debility in government as to reduce it to nothing, or to throw it back into its old confusion. One cannot conceive so frightful a state of a nation. A
maritime country without a marine and without commerce; a continental country without a frontier, and for a thousand miles surrounded with powerful, warlike, and ambitious neighbors! It is possible that she might submit to lose her commerce and her colonies:
her security she never can abandon. If, contrary to
all expectations, under such a disgraced and impotent government, any energy should remain in that country, she will make every effort to recover her security, which will involve Europe for a century in war and blood. What has it cost to France to make
that frontier? What will it cost to recover it? Austria thinks that without a frontier she cannot secure
? ? ? ? 456 ON THE POLICY OF THE ALLIES.
the Netherlands. But without her frontier France cannot secure herself. Austria has been, however, secure for an hundred years in those very Netherlands, and has never been dispossessed of them by the chance
of war without a moral certainty of receiving them
again on the restoration of peace. Her late dangers
have arisen not from the power or ambition of the
king of France. They arose from her own ill policy,
which dismantled all her towns, and discontented all
her subjects by Jacobinical innovations. She dismantles her own towns, and then says, " Give me the
frontier of France! " But let us depend upon it, whatever tends, under the name of security, to aggrandize
Austria, will discontent and alarm Prussia. Such
a length of frontier on the side of France, separated
from itself, and separated from the mass of the Austrian country, will be weak, unless connected at the
expense of the Elector of Bavaria (the Elector Palatine) and other lesser princes, or by such exchanges
as will again convulse the Empire.
