"
But, say other masters, Cakravartin Kings and the Uttarakurus are not guilty of the course of abhidhyd aaion, and yet they are not delivered from desire of the sphere of Kamadhatu.
But, say other masters, Cakravartin Kings and the Uttarakurus are not guilty of the course of abhidhyd aaion, and yet they are not delivered from desire of the sphere of Kamadhatu.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-2-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
Further, the false discourses of the Vedas, etc, are frivolous words arisen from ignorance.
8-10.
How do greed, wickedness and false views (iv.
77-78) arise out
of desire, etc? Since they are not preparatory action, this creates a difficulty:
69a-b. Greed and the other two mental courses arise from the three roots because they appear subsequent to these roots.
When they appear immediately after desire, they arise from desire;
? the same for the other two roots. ***
We have explained the bad courses of aaion in their relationship with the roots. As for the good courses of aaion,
69c-d Good actions, with their preparatory and consecutive aaions, arise fron non-desire, non-hatred, and non-ignorance.
Good courses of aaion, with their preparatory and consecutive aaions, have a good mind for their originating (pravartaka, iv. 10) cause. This good mind, being necessarily associated with the three roots, arises from the three roots.
The renouncing of a preparation of a bad course of aaion is a preparation of a good course of aaion; the renouncing of the aaion proper which constitutes a bad course of aaion is itself a good course of aaion; the renouncing of a consecutive aaion of a bad course of aaion is a consecutive aaion of a good course of aaion.
Let us give as an example: the ordination of a novice. From the
m
moment when the novice enters into the nandvasa, salutes the
Sangha, addresses his request to the Upadhyaya, until the first or second
305
karmavdcana, this is the preparatory aaion.
At the achievement of
the third karmavdcana there takes place a vijnapti, and an avijnapti
simultaneous to this vijnapti, which constitute the course of aaion itself.
After this moment, when one notifies the new monk of the nisrayas,
306
when he makes known that he accepts them, and as long as the series
of the avijnapti created by the principal aaion continues--that is to say, as long as the monk does not lose the Pratimoksa discipline (iv. 38)-- this is the consecutive aaion.
##*
We have seen that bad courses of aaion were not indifferently "achieved" by the three roots.
70a-b. Killing, wickedness, and injurious words are achieved through hate.
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307 Solely by hate. They are achieved when one thought of murder, or
one thought of violence (concerning wickedness and injurious words) manifests itself.
70b-d Adultery, greed, and stealing are achieved through desire. "Adultery" is illicit sexuality.
71a. False views, through ignorance. Through an extreme ignorance.
71b. The others, by the three.
The other courses of action,--lying, malicious words, and in- considerate words,--are achieved either through desire, hatred, or ignorance.
The courses of action, which have just been divided into four sections, three (70a-b), three, one and three, have respectively for their
71c-d Object: living beings, objeas of enjoyment, namarupa,
308 and ndman.
Living beings are the objects of killing, wickedness and injurious
speech; the objeas of enjoyment are the objeas of adultery, greed and
stealing; namarupa, that is, the five skandhas, are the objea of false
views; ndman, that is, the ndmakdya (ii. 47) is the objea of lying and the 309
other two transgressions of the voice.
#*#
When one has decided to kill someone, and if the murderer dies either before the intended victim, or if he dies at precisely the same
moment as the viaim, is there a principal course of action for the author of the murder?
72a-b. If one dies before or at the same time, there is no principal
310 course of aaion.
This is why the Vibhdsd says, "Question: When a person has made the preparation for killing, can it be that, at the moment when the result of this preparation is achieved, this person is not touched by the
? 311
transgression of killing? Answer: Yes, when the murderer dies
before or at the same time [as the viaim]. " The reason is clear: as long as the viaim is living, the murderer is not touched by the transgression of murder; and when the viaim dies, he (=the murderer) no longer exists if he died at the same time or before.
72b. Because a new body has come into existence.
The body--the personality--by whom the preparation had been accomplished, the body of the murderer, is destroyed; the murderer takes up a new body which belongs to another nikayasabhaga (ii. 41a): this body did not make the preparation, is not prayoktar and, as a consequence, cannot be touched by the transgression of murder.
*##
When many persons are united with the intention to kill, either in war, or in the hunt, or in banditry, who is guilty of murder, if only one of them kills?
72c-d As soldiers, etc. , concur in the realization of the same effea, all are as guilty as the one who kills.
Having a common goal, all are guilty exaaly as he who among them kills, for all mutually incite one another, not through speech, but by the very faa that they are united together in order to kill
But is the person who has been constrained through force to join the army also guilty?
Evidently so, unless he has formed the resolution, "Even in order to save my life, I shall not kill a living being. "
***
What does he do in order that he who kills should commit the course of aaion? Same question for the other transgressions up to and including false views.
73a-b. Murder is to kill another, consciously, without making an error.
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When a person kills by thinking, "I am killing such a one," and kills
this same person, and not another through error, then there is
312 murder.
But is there murder when a person kills, doubting if he hits a living being or a thing, or if he hits another?
This person possesses the certitude, "This is certainly him"; he hits
515 him; and as a consequence, there is the thought of paritydga.
***
How can there be murder, or destruction of the prdna (prdndtipdta), 314
since the skandhas are momentary?
Prdna, the "vital breath", is a wind whose existence depends on the
315
body and the mind. This prdna is annihilated by a murderer in the
same way in which one annihilates a flame or a sound of a bell, that is to
say, by obstructing the continuation of its reproducing itself. 316
Or rather, prdna is the vital organ (fivitendriya, ii. 45a): when a person creates an obstacle to the arising of a new moment of the vital organ, he annihilates it, and is touched by the transgression of killing.
But to whom do you attribute the vital organ? Who do you say is
317 dead when life is absent?
The true value of the pronoun "to whom" or "of whom" will be examined in the chapter on the Refutation of the Pudgala (Chapter
318
IX).
Let us observe that the Blessed One said, "When life, heat and
consciousness leave the body, it lies abandoned, like a piece of wood,
319
deprived of feeling. " One says that the body lives when it is endowed
with the organs; and that the body is dead when it is devoid of them.
**#
32
AccordingtotheNirgranthas, ? atransgression(adharma)results
for the doer from killing, even committed without knowing it, or without desiring it, in the way that contact with fire results in burning. But if this is the case, then one is guilty when one sees, or touches, without wanting to, the wife of another; he who trims the hair of the
Nigranthas is guilty; the master of the Nirgranthas is guilty since he preaches terrible austerities; he who gives the Nirgranthas food which
? provokes cholera and death is also guilty. The mother and the embryo
which are both the cause of suffering, are guilty; guilty also is the person
killed, for he is bound to the action of killing as the object killed: and fire
burns its own support. But on the other hand, he who has murder
committed by another is not guilty, for one is not himself burned when
one has another person touch the fire. Since you do not take intention
into consideration, wood and other materials, even though lacking
consciousness, are guilty of murder when a house collapses and living
321
beings perish. If you would avoid these consequences, recognize that
but one example--the example of the fire--and it alone, not accompanied by any argument, cannot prove your thesis.
#*#
73c-& Stealing--taking what is not given--is to appropriate to
322 oneself the goods of another through force or in secret.
The reservation above holds: "with the condition that there has
323 been no error. "
To appropriate to oneself, through force or in secret, that which is possessed by another, when one does not confuse the person from whom one wants to steal with another person, constitutes stealing.
The plunder of a Stupa is to take a thing that has not been given by
the Buddha: for, at the moment of Nirvana, the Blessed One accepted,
324
appropriated to himself all the gifts made to Stupas. According to
others, this is to take a thing which has not been given by the guardians
325 of the Stupa.
To take a thing that does not have an owner is to take what is not given by the ruler of the country.
326
To take the goods, the robes, etc, of an deceased monk, is to take
327
what is not given by the Sangha of the parish, in the case when an
ecclesiastical action has not been done; in the opposite case, this is to take what is not given by all the disciples of the Buddha.
74a-b. Illicit sexuality, fourfold, is intercourse with a woman
328 with whom one should not have intercourse.
1. Intercourse with a forbidden woman, that is, the wife of another,
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? 329 one's mother, one's daughter, or one's paternal or maternal relations;
33
2. Intercourse with one's own wife through a forbidden way; ? 3. in an
m unsuitable place: an uncovered spot, a caitya, an aranya; 4. at an
332 unsuitable time: when the wife is pregnant, when she is nursing, or
333
when she has taken a vow. Some say: when she has taken a vow only
with the consent of her husband
The reservation relative to killing, "with the condition that there
has been no error," also extends to illicit sexuality, and there is no course
of aaion when one has intercourse with the wife of another if one
334 thought that he was with his own wife.
Opinions differ on whether there is a course of action when one takes the wife of a certain one for the wife of another one. For some, yes, for it is the wife of another who was the object of the preparatory action; it is also the wife of another that one enjoys. For others, no, as in the case of killing with an error of person: the object of the preparatory aaion is
335 not the objea of the enjoyment.
With regard to whom is intercourse with Bhiksunis illicit sexuality?
With regard to the master of the land, who is not disposed to tolerate it. As for the master of the country himself, if his spouse, when she has undertaken a vow, is forbidden to him, all the more reason are nuns so forbidden.
Intercourse with a young girl is illicit with regard to the man to whom she is engaged, and, if she is not engaged, with regard to her guardian; if she has no guardian, then with regard to the king. (Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 585a20)
74c-d. Lying is discourse held, with differing thoughts, with a
336 person who understands the meaning.
1. Lying is discourse held, with thoughts different from the sense expressed, with a person who understands the meaning. When the person addressed does not understand, such discourse is only frivolous
words.
2. Discourse (ii. 47a-b) is sometimes made up of numerous syllables.
Which will be the course of aaion? Which will be lies?
The last syllable, which is vijnapti and which is accompanied by
avijnaptiOr rather, the syllable whose hearing causes the meaning to be understood. The preceeding syllables are a preparation for the lie.
? 3. How should one interpret the expression arthabhijna, "a person who understands the meaning? " Does this refer to the moment when the person addressed understands the meaning? Does it refer to a person addressed capable of understanding the meaning? In the first hypothesis, you admit that the course of action takes place when the person addressed has understood the meaning; it follows then that the course of action is solely avijnapti: for the person addressed understood the meaning through mental consciousness, which is consecutive to auditory consciousness; and the vijnapti, or vocal action, perishes at the same time as the auditory consciousness. There is no longer any vijOapti at the moment when the person addressed understands. In the second hypothesis, this difficulty is not present. But what must one do in order that the person addressed is "capable of understanding the mean- ing? "^
The person who knows the language and in whom auditory consciousness has arisen is "capable of understanding the meaning. "
One must interpret the text in a manner in which it will not give rise to criticism.
***
338
The Sutra teaches that there are sixteen "vocal actions," eight of
which are bad: to say that one has seen what one has not seen, to say that one has heard, cognized, or known what one has not heard, cognized, or known; to say that one has not seen when one has seen; and to say that one has not heard, cognized, or known when one has heard, cognized, or known; and eight are good: to say that one has not seen when one has not seen. . .
What is the meaning of the words seen (drsfa), heard (fruta), cognized (vijnata), and known (mata)?
75. What is perceived through the visual consciousness, through the auditory consciousness, through the mental consciousness, and through three consciousnesses, is called, in order, seen, heard, cognized, and known.
What is perceived through the visual consciousness receives the name of seen,. . . what is perceived through the consciousness of smell,
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taste, and touch, receives the name of knowa
How do you justify this last interpretation?
The Vaibhasikas say that odors, tastes and tangible things, being
morally neutral, are as dead (mrtakalpa); this is why they are called mata.
The Sautrantikas: According to what authority do you maintain that the expression mata refers to what is smelled, tasted, and touched?
The Vaibhasikas: According to the Sutra, and by virtue of reasoning.
339
The Sutra says, "What do you think, Oh Malakimatar, the visible
objeas that you have not seen, that you have not seen formerly, that you do not see, about which you do not think Would that I could see them,' do you have, by reason of them, any longing, lust, desire, affection,
340
attachment, appetite, or searching out? No, Lord Oh Malakimatar,
with regard to the subject seen, you will only think, 'it is seen,' with regard to the subject heard, cognized, and known, you will only think, 'it is heard, cognized, known (matamdtram bhavisyati). '"
The words "seen," "heard," and "cognized," certainly refer to visible things, to sounds, and to the dharmas: hence the word mata refers to smells, tastes, and tangible things (opinion of Buddhaghosa, Visuddhi- magga, 451). If it were otherwise, the experience relative to smells, tastes and tangible things would not be refered to in this teaching of the Blessed One.
The Sautrantikas: This Sutra does not have the meaning that you believe it does, and is does not confirm your interpretation of the word mata. The Blessed One does not aim to define the characteristics of the four experiences, having seen, having heard, having cognized, having mata. His mind is evidently, "In the fourfold experience, seeing, etc,-- each of which bears on the sixfold objects, visible things, sounds, smells,
tastes, tangible things and dharmas,--you maintain only that this experience takes place, that you see, etc, without attributing (adhya- ropa) to the object the characteristic of disagreeable or agreeable. "
Then what should one thus understand by seen, heard, mata (known) and cognized?
According to the Sautrantikas, that which is immediately perceived by the five material organs, is seen, drsta; that the consciousness of which is transmitted to us by another, is heard, iruta; what is admitted
? by reason of correct reasoning, is mata, known; and what is perceived by 541
the mental organ is cognized, vijndta. Thus five categories of objects--visible matter, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible things--are seen, heard, known, and cognized; the sixth category--dharmas--is not seen: such is the fourfold experience that the Sutra refers to. It is thus false that, in the hypothesis where mata does not designate odors, tastes, and tangible matter, the experience relative to these objects would be omitted in the Sutra: thus the argument of the Vaibhasikas does not hold
342
According to former masters, "seen" is what is perceived by the
organ of seeing; "heard" is what is perceivedby the organ of hearing and
what one learns from another: "known" is what is personally accepted
343
or experienced; and "cognized" is what one feels in and of oneself
(Le. , agreeable sensation, etc, or an intuition that one has in an absorption).
344
who, by means of his body and not by means of speech,
Does he
causes to be understood what is not in his mind, commit lying?
Yes. The Sastra says in fact, "Question: Can one be touched by the
transgression of killing, without acting, without attacking bodily?
345
Answer: Yes, when one acts vocally. Question: Gin one be touched by
the transgression of lying without vocal action? Answer: Yes, when one
acts bodily. Question: Qui one be touched by the transgression of
murder, by the transgression of lying, without either bodily or vocal
action? Answer: Yes, for example the R? is, guilty of murder through
346
their anger, and a Bhiksu, guilty of lying through his silence in the
347
confession ceremony. " (Vibhdfd, TD 27, p. 6l7c25).
But, we would say, how could one admit that R? is and a Bhiksu
accomplish a course of action which is at one and the same time vijnapti
and avijriapti! Neither the Rsis nor a Bhiksu have bodily or vocal action:
hence there is no vijnapti; and avijnapti of the sphere of Kamadhatu
cannot exist where vijnapti is absent (iv. 2a). This is a difficulty that 348
must be resolved.
76a-b. Malicious or slanderous speech is the discourse of a
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349 person with a defiled mind with a view to dividing.
The discourse that one has, with a defiled mind, with a view to dividing others and creating enmity, is malicious speech.
The restrictions formulated above, "when the person addressed understands, when there is no confusion of persons," applies here.
76c Injurious words are abusive discourse.
Discourse pronounced with a defiled mind, outraging, understood
by him whom one addresses, addressed to him whom one wants to
35 address, is injurious speech. ?
351 76c-d All defiled discourse is inconsiderate speech.
The Karika has "all defiled . . . "; but it refers here to discourse.
All defiled discourse is inconsiderate speech; one who utters it is 1
thus an"inconsiderate speaker" ; but the Karika has bhinnapralapita in place of sambhinnapraldpa.
11&. According to others, inconsiderate speech is the defiled discourse which differs from the others.
Lying, malicious and injurious speech and defiled discourse: the name "inconsiderate speech" is reserved for the defiled speech which is neither lying, nor malicious, nor injurious.
77b-c For example, boasting, singing, declamations; for example, bad commentaries.
For example, a monk boasts about himself in order to obtain alms,
etc;
352 353
through frivolity some others sing; in the course of plays or
dances, the dancers, in order to entertain the public, hold inconsiderate
discourse; adopting the doctrines of bad philosophers, non-Buddhists
read bad commentaries. And in addition, there are lamentations and
354
loquaciousness, carried out with a defiled mind but which differ from
lying, malicious speech and injurious speech.
But is it not true that, in the period of a Cakravartin King, there are
songs that do not have inconsiderate words?
In this period, songs are inspired by a spirit of detachment, not by
355
sensuality. Or, according to another opinion, there is, in this period,
? Karma 657 356
inconsiderate words, since one speaks of dvdha, of vivdha, etc. ; but this inconsiderate speech does not constitute the course of action of this name.
77c-d Greed is the desire to appropriate to oneself, by illigitimate means, the goods of another.
To desire to appropriate to oneself the goods of another in an
illegitimate manner, in an unjust manner, by force or secretly--"Would
357
that the goods of another were mine! " --is the course of action called
greed, abhidhyd.
According to another opinion, abhidhyd means all desire of the
358
sphere of Kamadhatu, for the Sutra of the Five Ntvaranas, on the
subjea of kdmacchanda, expresses itself thusly, "Having abandoned abhidhyd. . .
"
But, say other masters, Cakravartin Kings and the Uttarakurus are not guilty of the course of abhidhyd aaion, and yet they are not delivered from desire of the sphere of Kamadhatu.
Let us admit that all desire of the sphere of Kamadhatu is abhidhyd: but all abhidhyd is not a course of aaion. Only the most notable among the bad praaices are included among the courses of aaion (iv. 66b).
359 78a. Wickedness is a hatred of living beings.
It is a hatred of living beings, by which one desires to harm the
360 person of another.
78b-c False view is the opinion that there is neither good nor
361 bad.
As it is said in the Sutra, "There is no gift, no sacrifice, no oblation, no good aaion, no bad aaion. . . there are no Arhats in the world. " False view, as this Sutra shows, consists of negating aaion, its results, and the existence of Aryans. The Karika only indicates the beginning.
Such is the definition of the ten bad courses of aaion.
***
What is the meaning of the expression "course or pathway of aaion" (karmapatha)P
? 362 78c-d Three are courses of aaion; seven are also actioa
Greed, wickedness and false views are courses of action--courses of aaion that one terms volition (cetana, iv. lb). In faa, volition which is associated with them is moved by their movement, in that, by their force, it acts in conformity with them: it moves by their out-going.
Murder and the other six transgressions are action, for they are, by their nature, actions of body and voice; and they are also courses of this aaion that is called volition, for the volition that gives rise to them (tatsamutthanacetandyah, iv. 10) has in these transgressions its end and reason for existence.
The expression "course of aaion" thus simply means course of aaion when one applies it to greed, etc; it signifies aaion and course of action when it is applied to killing, etc A similar composition is justified by the rule of asarupdnam apy ekafesah: "A single meaning is maintained even when the terms of a compound are different" (Panini, i. 2. 64).
In the same way one should understand the good courses of aaion, the renouncing of killing, etc, non-greed, etc
***
Why are not preparatory and consecutive aaions considered as courses of aaion (iv. 66b-d)?
Because preparatory aaion is accomplished with a view to the
aaion proper; and because consecutive aaion has for its roots the aaion
363
itself. Furthermore, the most notable among good and bad practices
alone are courses of aaion. And finally, courses of aaion are aaions the augmentation and diminution of which have for their result the augumentation or the diminution of things and living beings (iv. 85, iii. 89).
#**
The Sautrantikas do not recognize volition as a mental action; for them, there is no mental action outside of greed, etc (iv. 65c-d).
How then do they explain the faa that the Sutra gives the name of
? course of action to greed etc? This is a question they must answer. The response is not difficult. Greed, wickedness (anger) and false
view are mental actions and they are pathways leading to bad realms of rebirth; or rather they are both courses of action, for greed sets into motion wickedness (anger) and false view, and vice versa.
***
The ten bad courses of action are in complete contradiction with the good dharmas.
364 79a. The view of negation cuts off the roots of good.
The cutting off of the roots of gpod takes place through the false view of the ninth degree, strong-strong (iv. 79d).
buttheTreatise says, Whatarethestrongrootsofevil? Theyarethe roots of evil which cut off the roots of gpod, the roots of evil which are initially adandoned when one acquires detachment from Kamadhatu. " This text proves that greed and the other roots of evil cut off the roots of good.
Answer: Only false view cuts off the roots of good; but fake view is brought about by the roots of evil: hence the Treatise attributes to these last the operation which more properly belongs to false views. In the same way that one says that bandits burn a village because it is they who light the fire that burns the village.
***
Objection: You affirm that only false view cuts off the roots of good, 365 f,
What roots of gpod are cut off?
79b. The innate roots of the sphere of Kamadhatu.
The roots of good of the sphere of Kamadhatu are cut off when one cuts off the roots of gpod; for one who cuts off the roots of good of Kamadhatu is not endowed with the roots of good of Rupadhatu or Arupyadhatu.
If this is so, how should one understand this text of the Prajndpti, "What cuts off this person's roots of good of the three spheres? "
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(quoted in Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 184bl7).
This text means that, at this moment, the acquisition of the roots of
good of the superior spheres become distant, because this person, who was formerly fit for these acquisitions, ceases to exist through the cutting off of the roots of good of Kamadhatu.
It refers to the innate roots of good: for one who cuts off the roots of good has already fallen from the acquired roots of good (prayogika, ii. 71b, trans, p. 314, Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 183b5).
***
What is the object of the false view which cuts off the roots of gpod? 79c The false view which negates cause and result.
Negation of cause is to think, "There is neither good nor bad action. " Negation of result is to think, "There is no retribution, no result of good or bad action" (iv. 78b-c, v. 7).
According to another opinion, these two false views,--that which negates cause, and that which negates result,--contribute to the cutting off of the roots of good in the same way as anantaryamarga and vimuktimarga contribute to the cutting off of the defilements (vi. 28, 65b).
Some say that the negation which cuts off the roots of good has for its object (that is, denies) sasrava, the impure, or the first two Truths, and not anasrava, the pure, or the last two Truths; rather it has for its object the sphere where one is to be found, and not Rupadhatu and ArupyadhattL In fact, the negation which bears on the "pure" or the higher spheres is weak, because it is in relation with these objects only
367 by association (v. 17-18).
368 But the Vaibhasikas say:
79d Completely.
The roots of good are cut off completely by false view, whether this refers to cause or result, pure or impure, Kamadhatu or the higher spheres.
###
? Some say that the nine categories of the roots of good, weak-weak roots of good, weak-medium, weak-strong, medium-weak, etc, are cut off all at once through one moment of false view, in the same way that the defilements which are abandoned by Seeing into one Truth are, in all their categories, abandoned through the Seeing of this Truth (vi. lc-d).
But the Vaibhasikas say: 79A Gradually.
The roots of good are cut off in the manner in which the defilements to be abandoned through Meditation on the Truths (satyabhavana, vi. 33) are abandoned: this means that the strong-strong root of good is cut off by a weak-weak false view, and thus following to the weak-weak root of good which is cut off by a strong-strong false view.
369
This theory is not in agreement with the text, "What are the
370
'small and concomitant* roots of good
abandoned lastly to the cutting off of the roots of good; those through the absence of which a person is termed one-who-has-the-roots-of- good-cut-off. "
Objection: If the cutting off is gradual, how should one understand the text, "What are the strong-strong roots of evil? The roots of evil through which one cuts off the roots of good? "
This text refers to the achievement of the cutting off of the roots of
good, for it is through the strong-strong roots of evil that the roots of
good totally disapear. As long as the last category of the roots of good,
the weak-weak, is not cut off, it can determine the reappearance of the
371 others.
According to certain masters, the cutting off of the nine categories
372
takes place at one time, without interruption, like the abandoning of
the defilements through the Path of Seeing into the Truths. But the Vaibhasikas say that it takes place either without interruption, or at several times.
According to certain masters, the abandoning of discipline (samvaraprahdna, iv. 38) preceeds the cutting off of the roots. But the
Vaibhasikas say that the discipline is lost when one loses the mind of 373
which this discipline is the result (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 183c8). #**
They are those which are
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What beings are capable of cutting off the roots of good? 79d The cutting off takes place among humans.
Only humans cut them off; not the creatures in the painful realms of
rebirth; for their discernment (pra/nd), whether defiled or not, is not 374
firm; not the gods, for the result of action is manifest to them. And only humans of the three continents cut them off, not those of
375 Uttarakuru, for they do not possess bad dfayas.
376
According to another opinion, only humans in Jambudvlpa cut
off the roots of good But this is in contradiaion with the text, "The
inhabitants of Jambudvlpa possess a minimum of eight organs; the
377 same for the inhabitants of Purvavidena and of Avaragodanlya. "
80a. Men and women cut off the roots.
According to another opinion, women do not cut off the roots because their will and their application are weak. But this is in contradiaion with the text, ''Whoever possesses the female organ necessarily possesses eight organs" (iL18d).
The sensualist does not cut off the roots of good because his dfaya is in movement; the only one who cuts them off is
378 80a-b. The rationalist.
379 Because his dfaya is bad, firm, and hidden.
38 Byvirtueofthesesameprinciples,eunuchs,etc, ? donotcutoffthe
roots of good, because they are counted among the sensualists, and because their discernment, like that of the creatures of painful realms of rebirth, is not firm.
What is the nature of the cutting off of the roots of good? 80b. The cutting off is non-possession
When the possession of the roots of good is obstmaed in rearising, in continuing, then ten non-possessions (aprdpti), or non-endowed- merits (asamanvdgama, ii. 37) arise.
When aprdptihas arisen, there is a cutting off of the roots of good.
? When the roots of good have been cut off, how do they rearise?
80c Rearising through doubt, through insight into the existence of cause, etc
It can happen that a person whose roots of good have been cut off produces, relative to cause and result, either doubt or insight into their existence, which is Right View. When Right View has arisen, then one
381
says that the roots of good have arisen, because the possession of
these roots is henceforth present. The roots arise in their nine
categories; but they will only gradually manifest themselves, in the same
way that one initially regains one's health and then, gradually, one's
382 strength.
383 80& Not here, for one guilty of anantarya.
Other persons who have cut off the roots of good can take them up again in this life, but not one guilty of an anantarya transgression (iv. 97) who has thus cut off the roots of good It is with regard to this transgressor that it is said, "This person is unfit to again take up the roots of good in this life; but he certainly will take them up either by
384
dying in hell, or by being bora" "By being born" means to be found in
an intermediate state [which preceeds existence in hell]. "By dying"
means disposed to die [in hell]. The roots of good are taken up by being
born since they have been cut off by the force of the cause; and by dying,
since they have been cut off by the force of a conditioa Same difference
when they have been cut off by one's own force, or by the force of
385 another.
m Thepersonwhoisafayavipanna --thatistosay,lost(vipanna)
by the fact of his false view--can take up again the roots of good in the
present existence. The person who is both dsayavipanna and prayo-
gavipanna--that is, one who is furthermore lost through the fact of his
anantarya transgression--takes up the roots again only after the 387
destruction of his body. [This is a variant of what has just been said, "One who has cut off the roots by his own force, or by the force of another . . . "]. Same difference for one who is drsfivipanna (lost through false view) and one who is at the same time both drsfivipanna
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388
and silavipanna (lost further by an anantarya transgression). [This is
a variant on the immediately preceeding passage].
One can cut off the roots of good and not be destined to hell
(mithyatvaniyata, iii. 44c-d). Four cases: 1. Purana and the other five 389
masters; 2. AjataSatru; 3. Devadatta; and 4. persons who have not cut off the roots and who have committed an anantarya transgression.
A person with a false view, who has cut off the roots of good, is
punished in Avici Hell; a person guilty of an anantarya transgression is 39
*##
Volition is the principal aaion. We shall explain with how many courses of aaion volition can coexist.
81a-c With regard to the painful realms of rebirth, volition can coexist at most with eight courses.
Volition can coexist with one course of aaion, as when either greed, anger, or a false view manifests itself, without any "material" (rupin) course of aaion having taken place; or rather the person who has prepared one of the material courses of aaion finds himself to have a non-defiled, that is, a good or neutral mind, at the moment when, on his
391 instigation, this course of aaion is perpetuated.
Volition can coexist with two courses of aaion, as when a person
with an angry mind kills; or when a person who is prey to greed steals,
392 or commits adultery, or speaks in an inconsiderate manner.
Volition can coexist with three courses of aaion, as when a person
393 with an angry mind kills and steals at the same time.
But haven't we seen that stealing is only achieved by desire alone
(iv. 70)? This restriction refers to the achievement of stealing com-
394 mitted by a person who only thinks of stealing.
Volition can coexist with three courses of aaion, as when greed is present at the moment when two material courses of aaion are completed that one has committed by another.
Volition can coexist with four courses of aaion, as when one lies or
when one injures with the intention of dividing: there is one mental
punishedinAvici,orelsewhere. ?
course of aaion and three vocal courses of aaioa
395
Or rather, when the
? mind is in the prey of greed, etc. , at the moment when three material courses are completed.
Volition can coexist with five, six, or seven courses of action, as when the mind is in the prey of greed, etc. , at the moment when four, five, or six material courses of action are completed
Volition can coexist with eight courses of action, as when a person has made the preparatory action of six courses of action, murder, etc. ; at the moment when these six courses of action are completed, he is in the prey of greed and commits adultery.
Volition cannot coexist with nine courses of action, or with ten courses, because greed, anger, false view are not simultaneous.
Slc-d Concerning good courses of action, volition can coexist with ten.
The ten good courses of action can be simultaneous to volition.
81d Volition does not coexist with one, eight, or five courses of
396 action.
Volition can coexist with two courses of actions, as when a ptrson in
the absorption of Arupyadhatu, in possession of ksayajnana or
armtpddajnana (vL45,50): his five consciousnesses are good There are 397
thus two courses of action: non-greed and non-anger.
Volition can coexist with three courses of action, as when the mental
consciousness is associated with Right View and when the seven good material courses of action are absent.
Volition can coexist with four courses of action. When, with a bad or neutral mind, one undertakes the discipline of an Upasaka or a Sramanera which embraces four material good courses of action, non- killing, etc.
Volition can coexist with six courses of action, as when, the five consciousnesses being good, one undertakes the same disciplines: four good material courses of action, non-greed and non-anger.
Volition can coexist with seven courses of action. When, with a good mental consciousness, one undertakes the same discipline, add Right View. Or rather, when, with a bad or neutral mind, one undertakes the discipline of Bhiksu: only seven material courses of action.
Volition can coexist with nine courses of action. [Three cases:] One
Karma 665
? undertakes the discipline of a Bhik? u, the five consciousnesses (visual consciousness, etc) being good: Right View is absent; one undertakes this same discipline at a moment when, in an absorption of Arupya- dhatu, one possesses ksayajndna or anutpadajnana. [This is the case, examined above, of the two courses of action: one must add the seven courses of aaion of discipline, which is here not avijnapti]; in the course of an absorption of a dhydna, one possesses ksayajndna or anutpada-
jnana [Right View is absent; the seven material courses of aaion exist as 398
part of the discipline of dhydna (avijnapti)].
Volition can coexist with ten good courses of aaion. In the different
cases: when one undertakes the discipline of a Bhiksu with a good mental consciousness, except in the case of ksayajndna and anutpada-
jnana; and all volition concomitant with the discipline of dhydna and pure discipline when this volition is not associated with ksayajndna or anutpadajnana.
We have shown under what conditions volition coexists with the good courses of aaion included in the disciplines. If one looks at the good courses of aaion independent of the disciplines, volition can also be found with one course of aaion, five courses of aaion, and eight courses of aaion:
1. When one renounces a transgression and when one has a mind different from that which provokes this renouncing, that is, a defiled or neutral mind; 2. when one renounces two transgressions and when one has a good mental consciousness: this good mental consciousness includes the three mental aaions to which is added two renouncings, two material aaions; and 3. when, under the same conditions, when one
399 renounces five transgressions.
***
What are the courses of aaion which exist, either in faa or as
400
potentiality, in the different realms of rebirth?
82a-b. Inconsiderate words, injurious words, anger, of two types,
401 exist in hell.
Inconsiderate words exist in hell, for beings in hell lament: injurious
402
words, for beings in hell mutually reproach one another; and anger,
? because they hate one another for the duration of their lives. 82c-d Greed and false views, as potentiality.
Beings in hell possess greed and false views, but these do not actually exist in hell: because of the absence of any object to which one
m
could become attached, and because the result of action is manifested In hell killing is absent, for beings in hell die through the exhaustion
of their actions (karmaksaya, ii. trans, p. 235-6); stealing and adultry are absent, for beings in hell do not have property or objeas of property, or women; lying is absent, for it is useless; and malicious words are useless, for beings in hell are at a distance and are always separate from one another.
82d Three exist in Uttarakuru.
Greed, anger and false views exist in Uttarakuru in the sense that the inhabitants of Uttarakuru are in possession of a potentiality for greed, anger and false views. But, in fact, greed is absent there, for no one has anything of his own; in the same way anger is absent, because they are soft, and because there is no cause for displeasure; so too false views are absent, because there is no bad asaya (apapasayatvat, iv. 80d).
83a. The seventh course exists there in fact also.
Inconsiderate words exist there in fact; for, sometimes, the inhabitants of Uttarakuru sing with a defiled mind
Because bad diaya is absent there; because the duration of one's life is determined there (iii. 78c; ii. trans, p. 236); and because no one possesses any property or object of property, or women, and also through its lack of usefulness, killing and the other courses of action are absent in Uttarakuru.
If the men of Uttarakuru do not have wives, how can they have unchaste behavior? They take the women with whom they desire to enjoy pleasure by the hand and go to a tree. If sex with this woman is allowable, the tree covers up the couple with its branches; in the
404 contrary case, the tree does not cover up the couple.
83b.
of desire, etc? Since they are not preparatory action, this creates a difficulty:
69a-b. Greed and the other two mental courses arise from the three roots because they appear subsequent to these roots.
When they appear immediately after desire, they arise from desire;
? the same for the other two roots. ***
We have explained the bad courses of aaion in their relationship with the roots. As for the good courses of aaion,
69c-d Good actions, with their preparatory and consecutive aaions, arise fron non-desire, non-hatred, and non-ignorance.
Good courses of aaion, with their preparatory and consecutive aaions, have a good mind for their originating (pravartaka, iv. 10) cause. This good mind, being necessarily associated with the three roots, arises from the three roots.
The renouncing of a preparation of a bad course of aaion is a preparation of a good course of aaion; the renouncing of the aaion proper which constitutes a bad course of aaion is itself a good course of aaion; the renouncing of a consecutive aaion of a bad course of aaion is a consecutive aaion of a good course of aaion.
Let us give as an example: the ordination of a novice. From the
m
moment when the novice enters into the nandvasa, salutes the
Sangha, addresses his request to the Upadhyaya, until the first or second
305
karmavdcana, this is the preparatory aaion.
At the achievement of
the third karmavdcana there takes place a vijnapti, and an avijnapti
simultaneous to this vijnapti, which constitute the course of aaion itself.
After this moment, when one notifies the new monk of the nisrayas,
306
when he makes known that he accepts them, and as long as the series
of the avijnapti created by the principal aaion continues--that is to say, as long as the monk does not lose the Pratimoksa discipline (iv. 38)-- this is the consecutive aaion.
##*
We have seen that bad courses of aaion were not indifferently "achieved" by the three roots.
70a-b. Killing, wickedness, and injurious words are achieved through hate.
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307 Solely by hate. They are achieved when one thought of murder, or
one thought of violence (concerning wickedness and injurious words) manifests itself.
70b-d Adultery, greed, and stealing are achieved through desire. "Adultery" is illicit sexuality.
71a. False views, through ignorance. Through an extreme ignorance.
71b. The others, by the three.
The other courses of action,--lying, malicious words, and in- considerate words,--are achieved either through desire, hatred, or ignorance.
The courses of action, which have just been divided into four sections, three (70a-b), three, one and three, have respectively for their
71c-d Object: living beings, objeas of enjoyment, namarupa,
308 and ndman.
Living beings are the objects of killing, wickedness and injurious
speech; the objeas of enjoyment are the objeas of adultery, greed and
stealing; namarupa, that is, the five skandhas, are the objea of false
views; ndman, that is, the ndmakdya (ii. 47) is the objea of lying and the 309
other two transgressions of the voice.
#*#
When one has decided to kill someone, and if the murderer dies either before the intended victim, or if he dies at precisely the same
moment as the viaim, is there a principal course of action for the author of the murder?
72a-b. If one dies before or at the same time, there is no principal
310 course of aaion.
This is why the Vibhdsd says, "Question: When a person has made the preparation for killing, can it be that, at the moment when the result of this preparation is achieved, this person is not touched by the
? 311
transgression of killing? Answer: Yes, when the murderer dies
before or at the same time [as the viaim]. " The reason is clear: as long as the viaim is living, the murderer is not touched by the transgression of murder; and when the viaim dies, he (=the murderer) no longer exists if he died at the same time or before.
72b. Because a new body has come into existence.
The body--the personality--by whom the preparation had been accomplished, the body of the murderer, is destroyed; the murderer takes up a new body which belongs to another nikayasabhaga (ii. 41a): this body did not make the preparation, is not prayoktar and, as a consequence, cannot be touched by the transgression of murder.
*##
When many persons are united with the intention to kill, either in war, or in the hunt, or in banditry, who is guilty of murder, if only one of them kills?
72c-d As soldiers, etc. , concur in the realization of the same effea, all are as guilty as the one who kills.
Having a common goal, all are guilty exaaly as he who among them kills, for all mutually incite one another, not through speech, but by the very faa that they are united together in order to kill
But is the person who has been constrained through force to join the army also guilty?
Evidently so, unless he has formed the resolution, "Even in order to save my life, I shall not kill a living being. "
***
What does he do in order that he who kills should commit the course of aaion? Same question for the other transgressions up to and including false views.
73a-b. Murder is to kill another, consciously, without making an error.
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When a person kills by thinking, "I am killing such a one," and kills
this same person, and not another through error, then there is
312 murder.
But is there murder when a person kills, doubting if he hits a living being or a thing, or if he hits another?
This person possesses the certitude, "This is certainly him"; he hits
515 him; and as a consequence, there is the thought of paritydga.
***
How can there be murder, or destruction of the prdna (prdndtipdta), 314
since the skandhas are momentary?
Prdna, the "vital breath", is a wind whose existence depends on the
315
body and the mind. This prdna is annihilated by a murderer in the
same way in which one annihilates a flame or a sound of a bell, that is to
say, by obstructing the continuation of its reproducing itself. 316
Or rather, prdna is the vital organ (fivitendriya, ii. 45a): when a person creates an obstacle to the arising of a new moment of the vital organ, he annihilates it, and is touched by the transgression of killing.
But to whom do you attribute the vital organ? Who do you say is
317 dead when life is absent?
The true value of the pronoun "to whom" or "of whom" will be examined in the chapter on the Refutation of the Pudgala (Chapter
318
IX).
Let us observe that the Blessed One said, "When life, heat and
consciousness leave the body, it lies abandoned, like a piece of wood,
319
deprived of feeling. " One says that the body lives when it is endowed
with the organs; and that the body is dead when it is devoid of them.
**#
32
AccordingtotheNirgranthas, ? atransgression(adharma)results
for the doer from killing, even committed without knowing it, or without desiring it, in the way that contact with fire results in burning. But if this is the case, then one is guilty when one sees, or touches, without wanting to, the wife of another; he who trims the hair of the
Nigranthas is guilty; the master of the Nirgranthas is guilty since he preaches terrible austerities; he who gives the Nirgranthas food which
? provokes cholera and death is also guilty. The mother and the embryo
which are both the cause of suffering, are guilty; guilty also is the person
killed, for he is bound to the action of killing as the object killed: and fire
burns its own support. But on the other hand, he who has murder
committed by another is not guilty, for one is not himself burned when
one has another person touch the fire. Since you do not take intention
into consideration, wood and other materials, even though lacking
consciousness, are guilty of murder when a house collapses and living
321
beings perish. If you would avoid these consequences, recognize that
but one example--the example of the fire--and it alone, not accompanied by any argument, cannot prove your thesis.
#*#
73c-& Stealing--taking what is not given--is to appropriate to
322 oneself the goods of another through force or in secret.
The reservation above holds: "with the condition that there has
323 been no error. "
To appropriate to oneself, through force or in secret, that which is possessed by another, when one does not confuse the person from whom one wants to steal with another person, constitutes stealing.
The plunder of a Stupa is to take a thing that has not been given by
the Buddha: for, at the moment of Nirvana, the Blessed One accepted,
324
appropriated to himself all the gifts made to Stupas. According to
others, this is to take a thing which has not been given by the guardians
325 of the Stupa.
To take a thing that does not have an owner is to take what is not given by the ruler of the country.
326
To take the goods, the robes, etc, of an deceased monk, is to take
327
what is not given by the Sangha of the parish, in the case when an
ecclesiastical action has not been done; in the opposite case, this is to take what is not given by all the disciples of the Buddha.
74a-b. Illicit sexuality, fourfold, is intercourse with a woman
328 with whom one should not have intercourse.
1. Intercourse with a forbidden woman, that is, the wife of another,
Karma 651
? 329 one's mother, one's daughter, or one's paternal or maternal relations;
33
2. Intercourse with one's own wife through a forbidden way; ? 3. in an
m unsuitable place: an uncovered spot, a caitya, an aranya; 4. at an
332 unsuitable time: when the wife is pregnant, when she is nursing, or
333
when she has taken a vow. Some say: when she has taken a vow only
with the consent of her husband
The reservation relative to killing, "with the condition that there
has been no error," also extends to illicit sexuality, and there is no course
of aaion when one has intercourse with the wife of another if one
334 thought that he was with his own wife.
Opinions differ on whether there is a course of action when one takes the wife of a certain one for the wife of another one. For some, yes, for it is the wife of another who was the object of the preparatory action; it is also the wife of another that one enjoys. For others, no, as in the case of killing with an error of person: the object of the preparatory aaion is
335 not the objea of the enjoyment.
With regard to whom is intercourse with Bhiksunis illicit sexuality?
With regard to the master of the land, who is not disposed to tolerate it. As for the master of the country himself, if his spouse, when she has undertaken a vow, is forbidden to him, all the more reason are nuns so forbidden.
Intercourse with a young girl is illicit with regard to the man to whom she is engaged, and, if she is not engaged, with regard to her guardian; if she has no guardian, then with regard to the king. (Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 585a20)
74c-d. Lying is discourse held, with differing thoughts, with a
336 person who understands the meaning.
1. Lying is discourse held, with thoughts different from the sense expressed, with a person who understands the meaning. When the person addressed does not understand, such discourse is only frivolous
words.
2. Discourse (ii. 47a-b) is sometimes made up of numerous syllables.
Which will be the course of aaion? Which will be lies?
The last syllable, which is vijnapti and which is accompanied by
avijnaptiOr rather, the syllable whose hearing causes the meaning to be understood. The preceeding syllables are a preparation for the lie.
? 3. How should one interpret the expression arthabhijna, "a person who understands the meaning? " Does this refer to the moment when the person addressed understands the meaning? Does it refer to a person addressed capable of understanding the meaning? In the first hypothesis, you admit that the course of action takes place when the person addressed has understood the meaning; it follows then that the course of action is solely avijnapti: for the person addressed understood the meaning through mental consciousness, which is consecutive to auditory consciousness; and the vijnapti, or vocal action, perishes at the same time as the auditory consciousness. There is no longer any vijOapti at the moment when the person addressed understands. In the second hypothesis, this difficulty is not present. But what must one do in order that the person addressed is "capable of understanding the mean- ing? "^
The person who knows the language and in whom auditory consciousness has arisen is "capable of understanding the meaning. "
One must interpret the text in a manner in which it will not give rise to criticism.
***
338
The Sutra teaches that there are sixteen "vocal actions," eight of
which are bad: to say that one has seen what one has not seen, to say that one has heard, cognized, or known what one has not heard, cognized, or known; to say that one has not seen when one has seen; and to say that one has not heard, cognized, or known when one has heard, cognized, or known; and eight are good: to say that one has not seen when one has not seen. . .
What is the meaning of the words seen (drsfa), heard (fruta), cognized (vijnata), and known (mata)?
75. What is perceived through the visual consciousness, through the auditory consciousness, through the mental consciousness, and through three consciousnesses, is called, in order, seen, heard, cognized, and known.
What is perceived through the visual consciousness receives the name of seen,. . . what is perceived through the consciousness of smell,
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taste, and touch, receives the name of knowa
How do you justify this last interpretation?
The Vaibhasikas say that odors, tastes and tangible things, being
morally neutral, are as dead (mrtakalpa); this is why they are called mata.
The Sautrantikas: According to what authority do you maintain that the expression mata refers to what is smelled, tasted, and touched?
The Vaibhasikas: According to the Sutra, and by virtue of reasoning.
339
The Sutra says, "What do you think, Oh Malakimatar, the visible
objeas that you have not seen, that you have not seen formerly, that you do not see, about which you do not think Would that I could see them,' do you have, by reason of them, any longing, lust, desire, affection,
340
attachment, appetite, or searching out? No, Lord Oh Malakimatar,
with regard to the subject seen, you will only think, 'it is seen,' with regard to the subject heard, cognized, and known, you will only think, 'it is heard, cognized, known (matamdtram bhavisyati). '"
The words "seen," "heard," and "cognized," certainly refer to visible things, to sounds, and to the dharmas: hence the word mata refers to smells, tastes, and tangible things (opinion of Buddhaghosa, Visuddhi- magga, 451). If it were otherwise, the experience relative to smells, tastes and tangible things would not be refered to in this teaching of the Blessed One.
The Sautrantikas: This Sutra does not have the meaning that you believe it does, and is does not confirm your interpretation of the word mata. The Blessed One does not aim to define the characteristics of the four experiences, having seen, having heard, having cognized, having mata. His mind is evidently, "In the fourfold experience, seeing, etc,-- each of which bears on the sixfold objects, visible things, sounds, smells,
tastes, tangible things and dharmas,--you maintain only that this experience takes place, that you see, etc, without attributing (adhya- ropa) to the object the characteristic of disagreeable or agreeable. "
Then what should one thus understand by seen, heard, mata (known) and cognized?
According to the Sautrantikas, that which is immediately perceived by the five material organs, is seen, drsta; that the consciousness of which is transmitted to us by another, is heard, iruta; what is admitted
? by reason of correct reasoning, is mata, known; and what is perceived by 541
the mental organ is cognized, vijndta. Thus five categories of objects--visible matter, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible things--are seen, heard, known, and cognized; the sixth category--dharmas--is not seen: such is the fourfold experience that the Sutra refers to. It is thus false that, in the hypothesis where mata does not designate odors, tastes, and tangible matter, the experience relative to these objects would be omitted in the Sutra: thus the argument of the Vaibhasikas does not hold
342
According to former masters, "seen" is what is perceived by the
organ of seeing; "heard" is what is perceivedby the organ of hearing and
what one learns from another: "known" is what is personally accepted
343
or experienced; and "cognized" is what one feels in and of oneself
(Le. , agreeable sensation, etc, or an intuition that one has in an absorption).
344
who, by means of his body and not by means of speech,
Does he
causes to be understood what is not in his mind, commit lying?
Yes. The Sastra says in fact, "Question: Can one be touched by the
transgression of killing, without acting, without attacking bodily?
345
Answer: Yes, when one acts vocally. Question: Gin one be touched by
the transgression of lying without vocal action? Answer: Yes, when one
acts bodily. Question: Qui one be touched by the transgression of
murder, by the transgression of lying, without either bodily or vocal
action? Answer: Yes, for example the R? is, guilty of murder through
346
their anger, and a Bhiksu, guilty of lying through his silence in the
347
confession ceremony. " (Vibhdfd, TD 27, p. 6l7c25).
But, we would say, how could one admit that R? is and a Bhiksu
accomplish a course of action which is at one and the same time vijnapti
and avijriapti! Neither the Rsis nor a Bhiksu have bodily or vocal action:
hence there is no vijnapti; and avijnapti of the sphere of Kamadhatu
cannot exist where vijnapti is absent (iv. 2a). This is a difficulty that 348
must be resolved.
76a-b. Malicious or slanderous speech is the discourse of a
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349 person with a defiled mind with a view to dividing.
The discourse that one has, with a defiled mind, with a view to dividing others and creating enmity, is malicious speech.
The restrictions formulated above, "when the person addressed understands, when there is no confusion of persons," applies here.
76c Injurious words are abusive discourse.
Discourse pronounced with a defiled mind, outraging, understood
by him whom one addresses, addressed to him whom one wants to
35 address, is injurious speech. ?
351 76c-d All defiled discourse is inconsiderate speech.
The Karika has "all defiled . . . "; but it refers here to discourse.
All defiled discourse is inconsiderate speech; one who utters it is 1
thus an"inconsiderate speaker" ; but the Karika has bhinnapralapita in place of sambhinnapraldpa.
11&. According to others, inconsiderate speech is the defiled discourse which differs from the others.
Lying, malicious and injurious speech and defiled discourse: the name "inconsiderate speech" is reserved for the defiled speech which is neither lying, nor malicious, nor injurious.
77b-c For example, boasting, singing, declamations; for example, bad commentaries.
For example, a monk boasts about himself in order to obtain alms,
etc;
352 353
through frivolity some others sing; in the course of plays or
dances, the dancers, in order to entertain the public, hold inconsiderate
discourse; adopting the doctrines of bad philosophers, non-Buddhists
read bad commentaries. And in addition, there are lamentations and
354
loquaciousness, carried out with a defiled mind but which differ from
lying, malicious speech and injurious speech.
But is it not true that, in the period of a Cakravartin King, there are
songs that do not have inconsiderate words?
In this period, songs are inspired by a spirit of detachment, not by
355
sensuality. Or, according to another opinion, there is, in this period,
? Karma 657 356
inconsiderate words, since one speaks of dvdha, of vivdha, etc. ; but this inconsiderate speech does not constitute the course of action of this name.
77c-d Greed is the desire to appropriate to oneself, by illigitimate means, the goods of another.
To desire to appropriate to oneself the goods of another in an
illegitimate manner, in an unjust manner, by force or secretly--"Would
357
that the goods of another were mine! " --is the course of action called
greed, abhidhyd.
According to another opinion, abhidhyd means all desire of the
358
sphere of Kamadhatu, for the Sutra of the Five Ntvaranas, on the
subjea of kdmacchanda, expresses itself thusly, "Having abandoned abhidhyd. . .
"
But, say other masters, Cakravartin Kings and the Uttarakurus are not guilty of the course of abhidhyd aaion, and yet they are not delivered from desire of the sphere of Kamadhatu.
Let us admit that all desire of the sphere of Kamadhatu is abhidhyd: but all abhidhyd is not a course of aaion. Only the most notable among the bad praaices are included among the courses of aaion (iv. 66b).
359 78a. Wickedness is a hatred of living beings.
It is a hatred of living beings, by which one desires to harm the
360 person of another.
78b-c False view is the opinion that there is neither good nor
361 bad.
As it is said in the Sutra, "There is no gift, no sacrifice, no oblation, no good aaion, no bad aaion. . . there are no Arhats in the world. " False view, as this Sutra shows, consists of negating aaion, its results, and the existence of Aryans. The Karika only indicates the beginning.
Such is the definition of the ten bad courses of aaion.
***
What is the meaning of the expression "course or pathway of aaion" (karmapatha)P
? 362 78c-d Three are courses of aaion; seven are also actioa
Greed, wickedness and false views are courses of action--courses of aaion that one terms volition (cetana, iv. lb). In faa, volition which is associated with them is moved by their movement, in that, by their force, it acts in conformity with them: it moves by their out-going.
Murder and the other six transgressions are action, for they are, by their nature, actions of body and voice; and they are also courses of this aaion that is called volition, for the volition that gives rise to them (tatsamutthanacetandyah, iv. 10) has in these transgressions its end and reason for existence.
The expression "course of aaion" thus simply means course of aaion when one applies it to greed, etc; it signifies aaion and course of action when it is applied to killing, etc A similar composition is justified by the rule of asarupdnam apy ekafesah: "A single meaning is maintained even when the terms of a compound are different" (Panini, i. 2. 64).
In the same way one should understand the good courses of aaion, the renouncing of killing, etc, non-greed, etc
***
Why are not preparatory and consecutive aaions considered as courses of aaion (iv. 66b-d)?
Because preparatory aaion is accomplished with a view to the
aaion proper; and because consecutive aaion has for its roots the aaion
363
itself. Furthermore, the most notable among good and bad practices
alone are courses of aaion. And finally, courses of aaion are aaions the augmentation and diminution of which have for their result the augumentation or the diminution of things and living beings (iv. 85, iii. 89).
#**
The Sautrantikas do not recognize volition as a mental action; for them, there is no mental action outside of greed, etc (iv. 65c-d).
How then do they explain the faa that the Sutra gives the name of
? course of action to greed etc? This is a question they must answer. The response is not difficult. Greed, wickedness (anger) and false
view are mental actions and they are pathways leading to bad realms of rebirth; or rather they are both courses of action, for greed sets into motion wickedness (anger) and false view, and vice versa.
***
The ten bad courses of action are in complete contradiction with the good dharmas.
364 79a. The view of negation cuts off the roots of good.
The cutting off of the roots of gpod takes place through the false view of the ninth degree, strong-strong (iv. 79d).
buttheTreatise says, Whatarethestrongrootsofevil? Theyarethe roots of evil which cut off the roots of gpod, the roots of evil which are initially adandoned when one acquires detachment from Kamadhatu. " This text proves that greed and the other roots of evil cut off the roots of good.
Answer: Only false view cuts off the roots of good; but fake view is brought about by the roots of evil: hence the Treatise attributes to these last the operation which more properly belongs to false views. In the same way that one says that bandits burn a village because it is they who light the fire that burns the village.
***
Objection: You affirm that only false view cuts off the roots of good, 365 f,
What roots of gpod are cut off?
79b. The innate roots of the sphere of Kamadhatu.
The roots of good of the sphere of Kamadhatu are cut off when one cuts off the roots of gpod; for one who cuts off the roots of good of Kamadhatu is not endowed with the roots of good of Rupadhatu or Arupyadhatu.
If this is so, how should one understand this text of the Prajndpti, "What cuts off this person's roots of good of the three spheres? "
Karma 659
366
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(quoted in Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 184bl7).
This text means that, at this moment, the acquisition of the roots of
good of the superior spheres become distant, because this person, who was formerly fit for these acquisitions, ceases to exist through the cutting off of the roots of good of Kamadhatu.
It refers to the innate roots of good: for one who cuts off the roots of good has already fallen from the acquired roots of good (prayogika, ii. 71b, trans, p. 314, Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 183b5).
***
What is the object of the false view which cuts off the roots of gpod? 79c The false view which negates cause and result.
Negation of cause is to think, "There is neither good nor bad action. " Negation of result is to think, "There is no retribution, no result of good or bad action" (iv. 78b-c, v. 7).
According to another opinion, these two false views,--that which negates cause, and that which negates result,--contribute to the cutting off of the roots of good in the same way as anantaryamarga and vimuktimarga contribute to the cutting off of the defilements (vi. 28, 65b).
Some say that the negation which cuts off the roots of good has for its object (that is, denies) sasrava, the impure, or the first two Truths, and not anasrava, the pure, or the last two Truths; rather it has for its object the sphere where one is to be found, and not Rupadhatu and ArupyadhattL In fact, the negation which bears on the "pure" or the higher spheres is weak, because it is in relation with these objects only
367 by association (v. 17-18).
368 But the Vaibhasikas say:
79d Completely.
The roots of good are cut off completely by false view, whether this refers to cause or result, pure or impure, Kamadhatu or the higher spheres.
###
? Some say that the nine categories of the roots of good, weak-weak roots of good, weak-medium, weak-strong, medium-weak, etc, are cut off all at once through one moment of false view, in the same way that the defilements which are abandoned by Seeing into one Truth are, in all their categories, abandoned through the Seeing of this Truth (vi. lc-d).
But the Vaibhasikas say: 79A Gradually.
The roots of good are cut off in the manner in which the defilements to be abandoned through Meditation on the Truths (satyabhavana, vi. 33) are abandoned: this means that the strong-strong root of good is cut off by a weak-weak false view, and thus following to the weak-weak root of good which is cut off by a strong-strong false view.
369
This theory is not in agreement with the text, "What are the
370
'small and concomitant* roots of good
abandoned lastly to the cutting off of the roots of good; those through the absence of which a person is termed one-who-has-the-roots-of- good-cut-off. "
Objection: If the cutting off is gradual, how should one understand the text, "What are the strong-strong roots of evil? The roots of evil through which one cuts off the roots of good? "
This text refers to the achievement of the cutting off of the roots of
good, for it is through the strong-strong roots of evil that the roots of
good totally disapear. As long as the last category of the roots of good,
the weak-weak, is not cut off, it can determine the reappearance of the
371 others.
According to certain masters, the cutting off of the nine categories
372
takes place at one time, without interruption, like the abandoning of
the defilements through the Path of Seeing into the Truths. But the Vaibhasikas say that it takes place either without interruption, or at several times.
According to certain masters, the abandoning of discipline (samvaraprahdna, iv. 38) preceeds the cutting off of the roots. But the
Vaibhasikas say that the discipline is lost when one loses the mind of 373
which this discipline is the result (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 183c8). #**
They are those which are
Karma 661
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What beings are capable of cutting off the roots of good? 79d The cutting off takes place among humans.
Only humans cut them off; not the creatures in the painful realms of
rebirth; for their discernment (pra/nd), whether defiled or not, is not 374
firm; not the gods, for the result of action is manifest to them. And only humans of the three continents cut them off, not those of
375 Uttarakuru, for they do not possess bad dfayas.
376
According to another opinion, only humans in Jambudvlpa cut
off the roots of good But this is in contradiaion with the text, "The
inhabitants of Jambudvlpa possess a minimum of eight organs; the
377 same for the inhabitants of Purvavidena and of Avaragodanlya. "
80a. Men and women cut off the roots.
According to another opinion, women do not cut off the roots because their will and their application are weak. But this is in contradiaion with the text, ''Whoever possesses the female organ necessarily possesses eight organs" (iL18d).
The sensualist does not cut off the roots of good because his dfaya is in movement; the only one who cuts them off is
378 80a-b. The rationalist.
379 Because his dfaya is bad, firm, and hidden.
38 Byvirtueofthesesameprinciples,eunuchs,etc, ? donotcutoffthe
roots of good, because they are counted among the sensualists, and because their discernment, like that of the creatures of painful realms of rebirth, is not firm.
What is the nature of the cutting off of the roots of good? 80b. The cutting off is non-possession
When the possession of the roots of good is obstmaed in rearising, in continuing, then ten non-possessions (aprdpti), or non-endowed- merits (asamanvdgama, ii. 37) arise.
When aprdptihas arisen, there is a cutting off of the roots of good.
? When the roots of good have been cut off, how do they rearise?
80c Rearising through doubt, through insight into the existence of cause, etc
It can happen that a person whose roots of good have been cut off produces, relative to cause and result, either doubt or insight into their existence, which is Right View. When Right View has arisen, then one
381
says that the roots of good have arisen, because the possession of
these roots is henceforth present. The roots arise in their nine
categories; but they will only gradually manifest themselves, in the same
way that one initially regains one's health and then, gradually, one's
382 strength.
383 80& Not here, for one guilty of anantarya.
Other persons who have cut off the roots of good can take them up again in this life, but not one guilty of an anantarya transgression (iv. 97) who has thus cut off the roots of good It is with regard to this transgressor that it is said, "This person is unfit to again take up the roots of good in this life; but he certainly will take them up either by
384
dying in hell, or by being bora" "By being born" means to be found in
an intermediate state [which preceeds existence in hell]. "By dying"
means disposed to die [in hell]. The roots of good are taken up by being
born since they have been cut off by the force of the cause; and by dying,
since they have been cut off by the force of a conditioa Same difference
when they have been cut off by one's own force, or by the force of
385 another.
m Thepersonwhoisafayavipanna --thatistosay,lost(vipanna)
by the fact of his false view--can take up again the roots of good in the
present existence. The person who is both dsayavipanna and prayo-
gavipanna--that is, one who is furthermore lost through the fact of his
anantarya transgression--takes up the roots again only after the 387
destruction of his body. [This is a variant of what has just been said, "One who has cut off the roots by his own force, or by the force of another . . . "]. Same difference for one who is drsfivipanna (lost through false view) and one who is at the same time both drsfivipanna
Karma 663
? 664 Chapter Four
388
and silavipanna (lost further by an anantarya transgression). [This is
a variant on the immediately preceeding passage].
One can cut off the roots of good and not be destined to hell
(mithyatvaniyata, iii. 44c-d). Four cases: 1. Purana and the other five 389
masters; 2. AjataSatru; 3. Devadatta; and 4. persons who have not cut off the roots and who have committed an anantarya transgression.
A person with a false view, who has cut off the roots of good, is
punished in Avici Hell; a person guilty of an anantarya transgression is 39
*##
Volition is the principal aaion. We shall explain with how many courses of aaion volition can coexist.
81a-c With regard to the painful realms of rebirth, volition can coexist at most with eight courses.
Volition can coexist with one course of aaion, as when either greed, anger, or a false view manifests itself, without any "material" (rupin) course of aaion having taken place; or rather the person who has prepared one of the material courses of aaion finds himself to have a non-defiled, that is, a good or neutral mind, at the moment when, on his
391 instigation, this course of aaion is perpetuated.
Volition can coexist with two courses of aaion, as when a person
with an angry mind kills; or when a person who is prey to greed steals,
392 or commits adultery, or speaks in an inconsiderate manner.
Volition can coexist with three courses of aaion, as when a person
393 with an angry mind kills and steals at the same time.
But haven't we seen that stealing is only achieved by desire alone
(iv. 70)? This restriction refers to the achievement of stealing com-
394 mitted by a person who only thinks of stealing.
Volition can coexist with three courses of aaion, as when greed is present at the moment when two material courses of aaion are completed that one has committed by another.
Volition can coexist with four courses of aaion, as when one lies or
when one injures with the intention of dividing: there is one mental
punishedinAvici,orelsewhere. ?
course of aaion and three vocal courses of aaioa
395
Or rather, when the
? mind is in the prey of greed, etc. , at the moment when three material courses are completed.
Volition can coexist with five, six, or seven courses of action, as when the mind is in the prey of greed, etc. , at the moment when four, five, or six material courses of action are completed
Volition can coexist with eight courses of action, as when a person has made the preparatory action of six courses of action, murder, etc. ; at the moment when these six courses of action are completed, he is in the prey of greed and commits adultery.
Volition cannot coexist with nine courses of action, or with ten courses, because greed, anger, false view are not simultaneous.
Slc-d Concerning good courses of action, volition can coexist with ten.
The ten good courses of action can be simultaneous to volition.
81d Volition does not coexist with one, eight, or five courses of
396 action.
Volition can coexist with two courses of actions, as when a ptrson in
the absorption of Arupyadhatu, in possession of ksayajnana or
armtpddajnana (vL45,50): his five consciousnesses are good There are 397
thus two courses of action: non-greed and non-anger.
Volition can coexist with three courses of action, as when the mental
consciousness is associated with Right View and when the seven good material courses of action are absent.
Volition can coexist with four courses of action. When, with a bad or neutral mind, one undertakes the discipline of an Upasaka or a Sramanera which embraces four material good courses of action, non- killing, etc.
Volition can coexist with six courses of action, as when, the five consciousnesses being good, one undertakes the same disciplines: four good material courses of action, non-greed and non-anger.
Volition can coexist with seven courses of action. When, with a good mental consciousness, one undertakes the same discipline, add Right View. Or rather, when, with a bad or neutral mind, one undertakes the discipline of Bhiksu: only seven material courses of action.
Volition can coexist with nine courses of action. [Three cases:] One
Karma 665
? undertakes the discipline of a Bhik? u, the five consciousnesses (visual consciousness, etc) being good: Right View is absent; one undertakes this same discipline at a moment when, in an absorption of Arupya- dhatu, one possesses ksayajndna or anutpadajnana. [This is the case, examined above, of the two courses of action: one must add the seven courses of aaion of discipline, which is here not avijnapti]; in the course of an absorption of a dhydna, one possesses ksayajndna or anutpada-
jnana [Right View is absent; the seven material courses of aaion exist as 398
part of the discipline of dhydna (avijnapti)].
Volition can coexist with ten good courses of aaion. In the different
cases: when one undertakes the discipline of a Bhiksu with a good mental consciousness, except in the case of ksayajndna and anutpada-
jnana; and all volition concomitant with the discipline of dhydna and pure discipline when this volition is not associated with ksayajndna or anutpadajnana.
We have shown under what conditions volition coexists with the good courses of aaion included in the disciplines. If one looks at the good courses of aaion independent of the disciplines, volition can also be found with one course of aaion, five courses of aaion, and eight courses of aaion:
1. When one renounces a transgression and when one has a mind different from that which provokes this renouncing, that is, a defiled or neutral mind; 2. when one renounces two transgressions and when one has a good mental consciousness: this good mental consciousness includes the three mental aaions to which is added two renouncings, two material aaions; and 3. when, under the same conditions, when one
399 renounces five transgressions.
***
What are the courses of aaion which exist, either in faa or as
400
potentiality, in the different realms of rebirth?
82a-b. Inconsiderate words, injurious words, anger, of two types,
401 exist in hell.
Inconsiderate words exist in hell, for beings in hell lament: injurious
402
words, for beings in hell mutually reproach one another; and anger,
? because they hate one another for the duration of their lives. 82c-d Greed and false views, as potentiality.
Beings in hell possess greed and false views, but these do not actually exist in hell: because of the absence of any object to which one
m
could become attached, and because the result of action is manifested In hell killing is absent, for beings in hell die through the exhaustion
of their actions (karmaksaya, ii. trans, p. 235-6); stealing and adultry are absent, for beings in hell do not have property or objeas of property, or women; lying is absent, for it is useless; and malicious words are useless, for beings in hell are at a distance and are always separate from one another.
82d Three exist in Uttarakuru.
Greed, anger and false views exist in Uttarakuru in the sense that the inhabitants of Uttarakuru are in possession of a potentiality for greed, anger and false views. But, in fact, greed is absent there, for no one has anything of his own; in the same way anger is absent, because they are soft, and because there is no cause for displeasure; so too false views are absent, because there is no bad asaya (apapasayatvat, iv. 80d).
83a. The seventh course exists there in fact also.
Inconsiderate words exist there in fact; for, sometimes, the inhabitants of Uttarakuru sing with a defiled mind
Because bad diaya is absent there; because the duration of one's life is determined there (iii. 78c; ii. trans, p. 236); and because no one possesses any property or object of property, or women, and also through its lack of usefulness, killing and the other courses of action are absent in Uttarakuru.
If the men of Uttarakuru do not have wives, how can they have unchaste behavior? They take the women with whom they desire to enjoy pleasure by the hand and go to a tree. If sex with this woman is allowable, the tree covers up the couple with its branches; in the
404 contrary case, the tree does not cover up the couple.
83b.
