No More Learning

For the same reason he is not bound to fulfil those things that result
from the perfection of charity, although he is bound to intend to
fulfil them: against which intention he acts if he contemns them,
wherefore he sins not by omitting them but by contempt of them.

In like manner he is not bound to observe all the practices whereby
perfection may be attained, but only those which are definitely
prescribed to him by the rule which he has professed.

Reply to Objection 1: He who enters religion does not make profession
to be perfect, but he professes to endeavor to attain perfection; even
as he who enters the schools does not profess to have knowledge, but to
study in order to acquire knowledge. Wherefore as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei viii, 2), Pythagoras was unwilling to profess to be a wise
man, but acknowledged himself, "a lover of wisdom. " Hence a religious
does not violate his profession if he be not perfect, but only if he
despises to tend to perfection.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as, though all are bound to love God with
their whole heart, yet there is a certain wholeness of perfection which
cannot be omitted without sin, and another wholeness which can be
omitted without sin ([3790]Q[184], A[2], ad 3), provided there be no
contempt, as stated above (ad 1), so too, all, both religious and
seculars, are bound, in a certain measure, to do whatever good they
can, for to all without exception it is said (Eccles. 9:10):
"Whatsoever thy hand is able to do, do it earnestly. " Yet there is a
way of fulfilling this precept, so as to avoid sin, namely if one do
what one can as required by the conditions of one's state of life:
provided there be no contempt of doing better things, which contempt
sets the mind against spiritual progress.

Reply to Objection 3: There are some counsels such that if they be
omitted, man's whole life would be taken up with secular business; for
instance if he have property of his own, or enter the married state, or
do something of the kind that regards the essential vows of religion
themselves; wherefore religious are bound to keep all such like
counsels. Other counsels there are, however, about certain particular
better actions, which can be omitted without one's life being taken up
with secular actions; wherefore there is no need for religious to be
bound to fulfil all of them.
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Whether poverty is required for religious perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem that poverty is not required for religious
perfection. For that which it is unlawful to do does not apparently
belong to the state of perfection. But it would seem to be unlawful for
a man to give up all he possesses; since the Apostle (2 Cor. 8:12) lays
down the way in which the faithful are to give alms saying: "If the
will be forward, it is accepted according to that which a man hath,"
i. e. "you should keep back what you need," and afterwards he adds (2
Cor. 8:13): "For I mean not that others should be eased, and you
burthened," i. e. "with poverty," according to a gloss. Moreover a gloss
on 1 Tim. 6:8, "Having food, and wherewith to be covered," says:
"Though we brought nothing, and will carry nothing away, we must not
give up these temporal things altogether. " Therefore it seems that
voluntary poverty is not requisite for religious perfection.

Objection 2: Further, whosoever exposes himself to danger sins. But he
who renounces all he has and embraces voluntary poverty exposes himself
to danger---not only spiritual, according to Prov. 30:9, "Lest perhaps
. . . being compelled by poverty, I should steal and forswear the name
of my God," and Ecclus. 27:1, "Through poverty many have sinned"---but
also corporal, for it is written (Eccles. 7:13): "As wisdom is a
defense, so money is a defense," and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
1) that "the waste of property appears to be a sort of ruining of one's
self, since thereby man lives. " Therefore it would seem that voluntary
poverty is not requisite for the perfection of religious life.

Objection 3: Further, "Virtue observes the mean," as stated in Ethic.
ii, 6. But he who renounces all by voluntary poverty seems to go to the
extreme rather than to observe the mean. Therefore he does not act
virtuously: and so this does not pertain to the perfection of life.

Objection 4: Further, the ultimate perfection of man consists in
happiness. Now riches conduce to happiness; for it is written (Ecclus.
31:8): "Blessed is the rich man that is found without blemish," and the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) that "riches contribute instrumentally
to happiness. " Therefore voluntary poverty is not requisite for
religious perfection.

Objection 5: Further, the episcopal state is more perfect than the
religious state. But bishops may have property, as stated above
([3791]Q[185], A[6]). Therefore religious may also.

Objection 6: Further, almsgiving is a work most acceptable to God, and
as Chrysostom says (Hom. ix in Ep. ad Hebr. ) "is a most effective
remedy in repentance. " Now poverty excludes almsgiving. Therefore it
would seem that poverty does not pertain to religious perfection.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. viii, 26): "There are some of the
righteous who bracing themselves up to lay hold of the very height of
perfection, while they aim at higher objects within, abandon all things
without. " Now, as stated above, ([3792]AA[1],2), it belongs properly to
religious to brace themselves up in order to lay hold of the very
height of perfection. Therefore it belongs to them to abandon all
outward things by voluntary poverty.

I answer that, As stated above [3793](A[2]), the religious state is an
exercise and a school for attaining to the perfection of charity. For
this it is necessary that a man wholly withdraw his affections from
worldly things; since Augustine says (Confess. x, 29), speaking to God:
"Too little doth he love Thee, who loves anything with Thee, which he
loveth not for Thee. " Wherefore he says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that
"greater charity means less cupidity, perfect charity means no
cupidity. " Now the possession of worldly things draws a man's mind to
the love of them: hence Augustine says (Ep. xxxi ad Paulin. et Theras. )
that "we are more firmly attached to earthly things when we have them
than when we desire them: since why did that young man go away sad,
save because he had great wealth? For it is one thing not to wish to
lay hold of what one has not, and another to renounce what one already
has; the former are rejected as foreign to us, the latter are cut off
as a limb. " And Chrysostom says (Hom. lxiii in Matth. ) that "the
possession of wealth kindles a greater flame and the desire for it
becomes stronger. "

Hence it is that in the attainment of the perfection of charity the
first foundation is voluntary poverty, whereby a man lives without
property of his own, according to the saying of our Lord (Mat. 19:21),
"If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all [Vulg. : 'what'] thou hast, and
give to the poor . . . and come, follow Me. "

Reply to Objection 1: As the gloss adds, "when the Apostle said this
(namely "not that you should be burthened," i. e. with poverty)," he did
not mean that "it were better not to give: but he feared for the weak,
whom he admonished so to give as not to suffer privation. " Hence in
like manner the other gloss means not that it is unlawful to renounce
all one's temporal goods, but that this is not required of necessity.
Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): "Our Lord does not wish,"
namely does not command us "to pour out our wealth all at once, but to
dispense it; or perhaps to do as did Eliseus who slew his oxen, and fed
the poor with that which was his own so that no household care might
hold him back. "

Reply to Objection 2: He who renounces all his possessions for Christ's
sake exposes himself to no danger, neither spiritual nor corporal. For
spiritual danger ensues from poverty when the latter is not voluntary;
because those who are unwillingly poor, through the desire of
money-getting, fall into many sins, according to 1 Tim. 6:9, "They that
will become rich, fall into temptation and into the snare of the
devil. " This attachment is put away by those who embrace voluntary
poverty, but it gathers strength in those who have wealth, as stated
above. Again bodily danger does not threaten those who, intent on
following Christ, renounce all their possessions and entrust themselves
to divine providence. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii,
17): "Those who seek first the kingdom of God and His justice are not
weighed down by anxiety lest they lack what is necessary. "

Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), the
mean of virtue is taken according to right reason, not according to the
quantity of a thing. Consequently whatever may be done in accordance
with right reason is not rendered sinful by the greatness of the
quantity, but all the more virtuous. It would, however, be against
right reason to throw away all one's possessions through intemperance,
or without any useful purpose; whereas it is in accordance with right
reason to renounce wealth in order to devote oneself to the
contemplation of wisdom. Even certain philosophers are said to have
done this; for Jerome says (Ep. xlviii ad Paulin. ): "The famous Theban,
Crates, once a very wealthy man, when he was going to Athens to study
philosophy, cast away a large amount of gold; for he considered that he
could not possess both gold and virtue at the same time. " Much more
therefore is it according to right reason for a man to renounce all he
has, in order perfectly to follow Christ. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep.
cxxv ad Rust. Monach. ): "Poor thyself, follow Christ poor. "

Reply to Objection 4: Happiness or felicity is twofold. One is perfect,
to which we look forward in the life to come; the other is imperfect,
in respect of which some are said to be happy in this life. The
happiness of this life is twofold, one is according to the active life,
the other according to the contemplative life, as the Philosopher
asserts (Ethic. x, 7,8). Now wealth conduces instrumentally to the
happiness of the active life which consists in external actions,
because as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) "we do many things by
friends, by riches, by political influence, as it were by instruments. "
On the other hand, it does not conduce to the happiness of the
contemplative life, rather is it an obstacle thereto, inasmuch as the
anxiety it involves disturbs the quiet of the soul, which is most
necessary to one who contemplates. Hence it is that the Philosopher
asserts (Ethic. x, 8) that "for actions many things are needed, but the
contemplative man needs no such things," namely external goods, "for
his operation; in fact they are obstacles to his contemplation. "

Man is directed to future happiness by charity; and since voluntary
poverty is an efficient exercise for the attaining of perfect charity,
it follows that it is of great avail in acquiring the happiness of
heaven. Wherefore our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): "Go, sell all [Vulg. :
'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure
in heaven. " Now riches once they are possessed are in themselves of a
nature to hinder the perfection of charity, especially by enticing and
distracting the mind. Hence it is written (Mat. 13:22) that "the care
of this world and the deceitfulness of riches choketh up the word" of
God, for as Gregory says (Hom. xv in Ev. ) by "preventing the good
desire from entering into the heart, they destroy life at its very
outset. " Consequently it is difficult to safeguard charity amidst
riches: wherefore our Lord said (Mat. 19:23) that "a rich man shall
hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven," which we must understand as
referring to one who actually has wealth, since He says that this is
impossible for him who places his affection in riches, according to the
explanation of Chrysostom (Hom. lxiii in Matth. ), for He adds (Mat.
19:24): "It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle,
than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven. " Hence it is
not said simply that the "rich man" is blessed, but "the rich man that
is found without blemish, and that hath not gone after gold," and this
because he has done a difficult thing, wherefore the text continues
(Mat. 19:9): "Who is he? and we will praise him; for he hath done
wonderful things in his life," namely by not loving riches though
placed in the midst of them.

Reply to Objection 5: The episcopal state is not directed to the
attainment of perfection, but rather to the effect that, in virtue of
the perfection which he already has, a man may govern others, by
administering not only spiritual but also temporal things. This belongs
to the active life, wherein many things occur that may be done by means
of wealth as an instrument, as stated (ad 4). Wherefore it is not
required of bishops, who make profession of governing Christ's flock,
that they have nothing of their own, whereas it is required of
religious who make profession of learning to obtain perfection.

Reply to Objection 6: The renouncement of one's own wealth is compared
to almsgiving as the universal to the particular, and as the holocaust
to the sacrifice. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech. ) that those who
assist "the needy with the things they possess, by their good deeds
offer sacrifice, since they offer up something to God and keep back
something for themselves; whereas those who keep nothing for themselves
offer a holocaust which is greater than a sacrifice. " Wherefore Jerome
also says (Contra Vigilant. ): "When you declare that those do better
who retain the use of their possessions, and dole out the fruits of
their possessions to the poor, it is not I but the Lord Who answers
you; If thou wilt be perfect," etc. , and afterwards he goes on to say:
"This man whom you praise belongs to the second and third degree, and
we too commend him: provided we acknowledge the first as to be
preferred to the second and third. " For this reason in order to exclude
the error of Vigilantius it is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xxxviii): "It is a
good thing to give away one's goods by dispensing them to the poor: it
is better to give them away once for all with the intention of
following the Lord, and, free of solicitude, to be poor with Christ. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether perpetual continence is required for religious perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem that perpetual continence is not required
for religious perfection. For all perfection of the Christian life
began with Christ's apostles. Now the apostles do not appear to have
observed continence, as evidenced by Peter, of whose mother-in-law we
read Mat. 8:14. Therefore it would seem that perpetual continence is
not requisite for religious perfection.

Objection 2: Further, the first example of perfection is shown to us in
the person of Abraham, to whom the Lord said (Gn. 17:1): "Walk before
Me, and be perfect. " Now the copy should not surpass the example.
Therefore perpetual continence is not requisite for religious
perfection.

Objection 3: Further, that which is required for religious perfection
is to be found in every religious order. Now there are some religious
who lead a married life. Therefore religious perfection does not
require perpetual continence.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:1): "Let us cleanse
ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit,
perfecting sanctification in the fear of God. " Now cleanness of flesh
and spirit is safeguarded by continence, for it is said (1 Cor. 7:34):
"The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord
that she may be holy both in spirit and in body [Vulg. : 'both in body
and in spirit']. " Therefore religious perfection requires continence.

I answer that, The religious state requires the removal of whatever
hinders man from devoting himself entirely to God's service. Now the
use of sexual union hinders the mind from giving itself wholly to the
service of God, and this for two reasons. First, on account of its
vehement delectation, which by frequent repetition increases
concupiscence, as also the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii, 12): and
hence it is that the use of venery withdraws the mind from that perfect
intentness on tending to God. Augustine expresses this when he says
(Solil. i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind
from its height as the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts
which belong to the married state. " Secondly, because it involves man
in solicitude for the control of his wife, his children, and his
temporalities which serve for their upkeep. Hence the Apostle says (1
Cor. 7:32,33): "He that is without a wife is solicitous for the things
that belong to the Lord, how he may please God: but he that is with a
wife is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his
wife. "

Therefore perpetual continence, as well as voluntary poverty, is
requisite for religious perfection. Wherefore just as Vigilantius was
condemned for equaling riches to poverty, so was Jovinian condemned for
equaling marriage to virginity.

Reply to Objection 1: The perfection not only of poverty but also of
continence was introduced by Christ Who said (Mat. 19:12): "There are
eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs, for the kingdom of heaven,"
and then added: "He that can take, let him take it. " And lest anyone
should be deprived of the hope of attaining perfection, he admitted to
the state of perfection those even who were married. Now the husbands
could not without committing an injustice forsake their wives, whereas
men could without injustice renounce riches. Wherefore Peter whom He
found married, He severed not from his wife, while "He withheld from
marriage John who wished to marry" [*Prolog. in Joan. among the
supposititious works of St. Jerome].

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxii), "the
chastity of celibacy is better than the chastity of marriage, one of
which Abraham had in use, both of them in habit. For he lived chastely,
and he might have been chaste without marrying, but it was not
requisite then. " Nevertheless if the patriarchs of old had perfection
of mind together with wealth and marriage, which is a mark of the
greatness of their virtue, this is no reason why any weaker person
should presume to have such great virtue that he can attain to
perfection though rich and married; as neither does a man unarmed
presume to attack his enemy, because Samson slew many foes with the
jaw-bone of an ass. For those fathers, had it been seasonable to
observe continence and poverty, would have been most careful to observe
them.

Reply to Objection 3: Such ways of living as admit of the use of
marriage are not the religious life simply and absolutely speaking, but
in a restricted sense, in so far as they have a certain share in those
things that belong to the religious state.
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Whether obedience belongs to religious perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem that obedience does not belong to religious
perfection. For those things seemingly belong to religious perfection,
which are works of supererogation and are not binding upon all. But all
are bound to obey their superiors, according to the saying of the
Apostle (Heb. 13:17), "Obey your prelates, and be subject to them. "
Therefore it would seem that obedience does not belong to religious
perfection.

Objection 2: Further, obedience would seem to belong properly to those
who have to be guided by the sense of others, and such persons are
lacking in discernment. Now the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that "strong
meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses
exercised to the discerning of good and evil. " Therefore it would seem
that obedience does not belong to the state of the perfect.

Objection 3: Further, if obedience were requisite for religious
perfection, it would follow that it is befitting to all religious. But
it is not becoming to all; since some religious lead a solitary life,
and have no superior whom they obey. Again religious superiors
apparently are not bound to obedience. Therefore obedience would seem
not to pertain to religious perfection.

Objection 4: Further, if the vow of obedience were requisite for
religion, it would follow that religious are bound to obey their
superiors in all things, just as they are bound to abstain from all
venery by their vow of continence.
But they are not bound to obey them
in all things, as stated above ([3794]Q[104], A[5]), when we were
treating of the virtue of obedience. Therefore the vow of obedience is
not requisite for religion.

Objection 5: Further, those services are most acceptable to God which
are done freely and not of necessity, according to 2 Cor. 9:7, "Not
with sadness or of necessity. " Now that which is done out of obedience
is done of necessity of precept. Therefore those good works are more
deserving of praise which are done of one's own accord. Therefore the
vow of obedience is unbecoming to religion whereby men seek to attain
to that which is better.

On the contrary, Religious perfection consists chiefly in the imitation
of Christ, according to Mat. 19:21, "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell
all [Vulg. : 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor, and follow Me. "
Now in Christ obedience is commended above all according to Phil. 2:8,
"He became [Vulg. : 'becoming'] obedient unto death. " Therefore
seemingly obedience belongs to religious perfection.

I answer that, As stated above ([3795]AA[2],3) the religious state is a
school and exercise for tending to perfection. Now those who are being
instructed or exercised in order to attain a certain end must needs
follow the direction of someone under whose control they are instructed
or exercised so as to attain that end as disciples under a master.
Hence religious need to be placed under the instruction and command of
someone as regards things pertaining to the religious life; wherefore
it is said (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): "The monastic life denotes
subjection and discipleship. " Now one man is subjected to another's
command and instruction by obedience: and consequently obedience is
requisite for religious perfection.

Reply to Objection 1: To obey one's superiors in matters that are
essential to virtue is not a work of supererogation, but is common to
all: whereas to obey in matters pertaining to the practice of
perfection belongs properly to religious. This latter obedience is
compared to the former as the universal to the particular. For those
who live in the world, keep something for themselves, and offer
something to God; and in the latter respect they are under obedience to
their superiors: whereas those who live in religion give themselves
wholly and their possessions to God, as stated above ([3796]AA[1],3).
Hence their obedience is universal.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1,2), by
performing actions we contract certain habits, and when we have
acquired the habit we are best able to perform the actions. Accordingly
those who have not attained to perfection, acquire perfection by
obeying, while those who have already acquired perfection are most
ready to obey, not as though they need to be directed to the
acquisition of perfection, but as maintaining themselves by this means
in that which belongs to perfection.

Reply to Objection 3: The subjection of religious is chiefly in
reference to bishops, who are compared to them as perfecters to
perfected, as Dionysius states (Eccl. Hier. vi), where he also says
that the "monastic order is subjected to the perfecting virtues of the
bishops, and is taught by their godlike enlightenment. " Hence neither
hermits nor religious superiors are exempt from obedience to bishops;
and if they be wholly or partly exempt from obedience to the bishop of
the diocese, they are nevertheless bound to obey the Sovereign Pontiff,
not only in matters affecting all in common, but also in those which
pertain specially to religious discipline.

Reply to Objection 4: The vow of obedience taken by religious, extends
to the disposition of a man's whole life, and in this way it has a
certain universality, although it does not extend to all individual
acts. For some of these do not belong to religion, through not being of
those things that concern the love of God and of our neighbor, such as
rubbing one's beard, lifting a stick from the ground and so forth,
which do not come under a vow nor under obedience; and some are
contrary to religion. Nor is there any comparison with continence
whereby acts are excluded which are altogether contrary to religion.

Reply to Objection 5: The necessity of coercion makes an act
involuntary and consequently deprives it of the character of praise or
merit; whereas the necessity which is consequent upon obedience is a
necessity not of coercion but of a free will, inasmuch as a man is
willing to obey, although perhaps he would not be willing to do the
thing commanded considered in itself. Wherefore since by the vow of
obedience a man lays himself under the necessity of doing for God's
sake certain things that are not pleasing in themselves, for this very
reason that which he does is the more acceptable to God, though it be
of less account, because man can give nothing greater to God, than by
subjecting his will to another man's for God's sake. Hence in the
Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xviii, 7) it is stated that "the
Sarabaitae are the worst class of monks, because through providing for
their own needs without being subject to superiors, they are free to do
as they will; and yet day and night they are more busily occupied in
work than those who live in monasteries. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether it is requisite for religious perfection that poverty, continence,
and obedience should come under a vow?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not requisite for religious
perfection that the three aforesaid, namely poverty, continence, and
obedience, should come under a vow. For the school of perfection is
founded on the principles laid down by our Lord. Now our Lord in
formulating perfection (Mat. 19:21) said: "If thou wilt be perfect, go,
sell all [Vulg. : 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor," without any
mention of a vow. Therefore it would seem that a vow is not necessary
for the school of religion.

Objection 2: Further, a vow is a promise made to God, wherefore
(Eccles. 5:3) the wise man after saying: "If thou hast vowed anything
to God, defer not to pay it," adds at once, "for an unfaithful and
foolish promise displeaseth Him. " But when a thing is being actually
given there is no need for a promise. Therefore it suffices for
religious perfection that one keep poverty, continence, and obedience
without. vowing them.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Ad Pollent. , de Adult. Conjug. i,
14): "The services we render are more pleasing when we might lawfully
not render them, yet do so out of love. " Now it is lawful not to render
a service which we have not vowed, whereas it is unlawful if we have
vowed to render it. Therefore seemingly it is more pleasing to God to
keep poverty, continence, and obedience without a vow. Therefore a vow
is not requisite for religious perfection.

On the contrary, In the Old Law the Nazareans were consecrated by vow
according to Num. 6:2, "When a man or woman shall make a vow to be
sanctified and will consecrate themselves to the Lord," etc. Now these
were a figure of those "who attain the summit of perfection," as a
gloss [*Cf. Moral. ii] of Gregory states. Therefore a vow is requisite
for religious perfection.

I answer that, It belongs to religious to be in the state of
perfection, as shown above (Q[174], A[5]). Now the state of perfection
requires an obligation to whatever belongs to perfection: and this
obligation consists in binding oneself to God by means of a vow. But it
is evident from what has been said ([3797]AA[3],4,5) that poverty,
continence, and obedience belong to the perfection of the Christian
life. Consequently the religious state requires that one be bound to
these three by vow. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech. ): "When a man
vows to God all his possessions, all his life, all his knowledge, it is
a holocaust"; and afterwards he says that this refers to those who
renounce the present world.

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord declared that it belongs to the
perfection of life that a man follow Him, not anyhow, but in such a way
as not to turn back. Wherefore He says again (Lk. 9:62): "No man
putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the
kingdom of God. " And though some of His disciples went back, yet when
our Lord asked (Jn. 6:68,69), "Will you also go away? " Peter answered
for the others: "Lord, to whom shall we go? " Hence Augustine says (De
Consensu Ev. ii, 17) that "as Matthew and Mark relate, Peter and Andrew
followed Him after drawing their boats on to the beach, not as though
they purposed to return, but as following Him at His command. " Now this
unwavering following of Christ is made fast by a vow: wherefore a vow
is requisite for religious perfection.

Reply to Objection 2: As Gregory says (Moral. ii) religious perfection
requires that a man give "his whole life" to God. But a man cannot
actually give God his whole life, because that life taken as a whole is
not simultaneous but successive. Hence a man cannot give his whole life
to God otherwise than by the obligation of a vow.

Reply to Objection 3: Among other services that we can lawfully give,
is our liberty, which is dearer to man than aught else. Consequently
when a man of his own accord deprives himself by vow of the liberty of
abstaining from things pertaining to God's service, this is most
acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Paulin. et
Arment. ): "Repent not of thy vow; rejoice rather that thou canst no
longer do lawfully, what thou mightest have done lawfully but to thy
own cost. Happy the obligation that compels to better things. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether it is right to say that religious perfection consists in these three
vows?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not right to say that religious
perfection consists in these three vows. For the perfection of life
consists of inward rather than of outward acts, according to Rom.
14:17, "The Kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace
and joy in the Holy Ghost. " Now the religious vow binds a man to things
belonging to perfection. Therefore vows of inward actions, such as
contemplation, love of God and our neighbor, and so forth, should
pertain to the religious state, rather than the vows of poverty,
continence, and obedience which refer to outward actions.

Objection 2: Further, the three aforesaid come under the religious vow,
in so far as they belong to the practice of tending to perfection. But
there are many other things that religious practice, such as
abstinence, watchings, and the like. Therefore it would seem that these
three vows are incorrectly described as pertaining to the state of
perfection.

Objection 3: Further, by the vow of obedience a man is bound to do
according to his superior's command whatever pertains to the practice
of perfection. Therefore the vow of obedience suffices without the two
other vows.

Objection 4: Further, external goods comprise not only riches but also
honors. Therefore, if religious, by the vow of poverty, renounce
earthly riches, there should be another vow whereby they may despise
worldly honors.

On the contrary, It is stated (Extra, de Statu Monach. , cap. Cum ad
monasterium) that "the keeping of chastity and the renouncing of
property are affixed to the monastic rule. "

I answer that, The religious state may be considered in three ways.
First, as being a practice of tending to the perfection of charity:
secondly, as quieting the human mind from outward solicitude, according
to 1 Cor. 7:32: "I would have you to be without solicitude": thirdly,
as a holocaust whereby a man offers himself and his possessions wholly
to God; and in corresponding manner the religious state is constituted
by these three vows.

First, as regards the practice of perfection a man is required to
remove from himself whatever may hinder his affections from tending
wholly to God, for it is in this that the perfection of charity
consists. Such hindrances are of three kinds. First, the attachment to
external goods, which is removed by the vow of poverty; secondly, the
concupiscence of sensible pleasures, chief among which are venereal
pleasures, and these are removed by the vow of continence; thirdly, the
inordinateness of the human will, and this is removed by the vow of
obedience. In like manner the disquiet of worldly solicitude is aroused
in man in reference especially to three things. First, as regards the
dispensing of external things, and this solicitude is removed from man
by the vow of poverty; secondly, as regards the control of wife and
children, which is cut away by the vow of continence; thirdly, as
regards the disposal of one's own actions, which is eliminated by the
vow of obedience, whereby a man commits himself to the disposal of
another.

Again, "a holocaust is the offering to God of all that one has,"
according to Gregory (Hom. xx in Ezech. ). Now man has a threefold good,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 8). First, the good of external
things, which he wholly offers to God by the vow of voluntary poverty:
secondly, the good of his own body, and this good he offers to God
especially by the vow of continence, whereby he renounces the greatest
bodily pleasures. the third is the good of the soul, which man wholly
offers to God by the vow of obedience, whereby he offers God his own
will by which he makes use of all the powers and habits of the soul.
Therefore the religious state is fittingly constituted by the three
vows.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [3798](A[1]), the end whereunto
the religious vow is directed is the perfection of charity, since all
the interior acts of virtue belong to charity as to their mother,
according to 1 Cor. 13:4, "Charity is patient, is kind," etc. Hence the
interior acts of virtue, for instance humility, patience, and so forth,
do not come under the religious vow, but this is directed to them as
its end.

Reply to Objection 2: All other religious observances are directed to
the three aforesaid principal vows; for if any of them are ordained for
the purpose of procuring a livelihood, such as labor, questing, and so
on, they are to be referred to poverty; for the safeguarding of which
religious seek a livelihood by these means. Other observances whereby
the body is chastised, such as watching, fasting, and the like, are
directly ordained for the observance of the vow of continence. And such
religious observances as regard human actions whereby a man is directed
to the end of religion, namely the love of God and his neighbor (such
as reading, prayer, visiting the sick, and the like), are comprised
under the vow of obedience that applies to the will, which directs its
actions to the end according to the ordering of another person. The
distinction of habit belongs to all three vows, as a sign of being
bound by them: wherefore the religious habit is given or blessed at the
time of profession.

Reply to Objection 3: By obedience a man offers to God his will, to
which though all human affairs are subject, yet some are subject to it
alone in a special manner, namely human actions, since passions belong
also to the sensitive appetite. Wherefore in order to restrain the
passions of carnal pleasures and of external objects of appetite, which
hinder the perfection of life, there was need for the vows of
continence and poverty; but for the ordering of one's own actions
accordingly as the state of perfection requires, there was need for the
vow of obedience.

Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), strictly
and truly speaking honor is not due save to virtue. Since, however,
external goods serve instrumentally for certain acts of virtue, the
consequence is that a certain honor is given to their excellence
especially by the common people who acknowledge none but outward
excellence. Therefore since religious tend to the perfection of virtue
it becomes them not to renounce the honor which God and all holy men
accord to virtue, according to Ps. 138:17, "But to me Thy friends, O
God, are made exceedingly honorable. " On the other hand, they renounce
the honor that is given to outward excellence, by the very fact that
they withdraw from a worldly life: hence no special vow is needed for
this.
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Whether the vow of obedience is the chief of the three religious vows?

Objection 1: It would seem that the vow of obedience is not the chief
of the three religious vows. For the perfection of the religious life
was inaugurated by Christ. Now Christ gave a special counsel of
poverty; whereas He is not stated to have given a special counsel of
obedience. Therefore the vow of poverty is greater than the vow of
obedience.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 26:20) that "no price is
worthy of a continent soul. " Now the vow of that which is more worthy
is itself more excellent. Therefore the vow of continence is more
excellent than the vow of obedience.

Objection 3: Further, the greater a vow the more indispensable it would
seem to be. Now the vows of poverty and continence "are so inseparable
from the monastic rule, that not even the Sovereign Pontiff can allow
them to be broken," according to a Decretal (De Statu Monach. , cap. Cum
ad monasterium): yet he can dispense a religious from obeying his
superior. Therefore it would seem that the vow of obedience is less
than the vow of poverty and continence.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv, 14): "Obedience is rightly
placed before victims, since by victims another's flesh, but by
obedience one's own will, is sacrificed. " Now the religious vows are
holocausts, as stated above ([3799]AA[1],3, ad 6). Therefore the vow of
obedience is the chief of all religious vows.

I answer that, The vow of obedience is the chief of the three religious
vows, and this for three reasons.

First, because by the vow of obedience man offers God something
greater, namely his own will; for this is of more account than his own
body, which he offers God by continence, and than external things,
which he offers God by the vow of poverty. Wherefore that which is done
out of obedience is more acceptable to God than that which is done of
one's own will, according to the saying of Jerome (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic
Monach. ): "My words are intended to teach you not to rely on your own
judgment": and a little further on he says: "You may not do what you
will; you must eat what you are bidden to eat, you may possess as much
as you receive, clothe yourself with what is given to you. " Hence
fasting is not acceptable to God if it is done of one's own will,
according to Is. 58:3, "Behold in the day of your fast your own will is
found. "

Secondly, because the vow of obedience includes the other vows, but not
vice versa: for a religious, though bound by vow to observe continence
and poverty, yet these also come under obedience, as well as many other
things besides the keeping of continence and poverty.

Thirdly, because the vow of obedience extends properly to those acts
that are closely connected with the end of religion; and the more
closely a thing is connected with the end, the better it is.

It follows from this that the vow of obedience is more essential to the
religious life. For if a man without taking a vow of obedience were to
observe, even by vow, voluntary poverty and continence, he would not
therefore belong to the religious state, which is to be preferred to
virginity observed even by vow; for Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi):
"No one, methinks, would prefer virginity to the monastic life. " [*St.
Augustine wrote not 'monasterio' but 'martyrio'---to 'martyrdom'; and
St. Thomas quotes the passage correctly above[3800], Q[124], A[3]
and[3801] Q[152], A[5]].

Reply to Objection 1: The counsel of obedience was included in the very
following of Christ, since to obey is to follow another's will.
Consequently it is more pertinent to perfection than the vow of
poverty, because as Jerome, commenting on Mat. 19:27, "Behold we have
left all things," observes, "Peter added that which is perfect when he
said: And have followed Thee. "

Reply to Objection 2: The words quoted mean that continence is to be
preferred, not to all other acts of virtue, but to conjugal chastity,
or to external riches of gold and silver which are measured by weight
[*'Pondere,' referring to the Latin 'ponderatio' in the Vulgate, which
the Douay version renders 'price. ']. Or again continence is taken in a
general sense for abstinence from ali evil, as stated above
([3802]Q[155], A[4], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 3: The Pope cannot dispense a religious from his vow
of obedience so as to release him from obedience to every superior in
matters relating to the perfection of life, for he cannot exempt him
from obedience to himself. He can, however, exempt him from subjection
to a lower superior, but this is not to dispense him from his vow of
obedience.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses the things
contained in his rule?

Objection 1: It would seem that a religious sins mortally whenever he
transgresses the things contained in his rule. For to break a vow is a
sin worthy of condemnation, as appears from 1 Tim. 5:11,12, where the
Apostle says that widows who "will marry have [Vulg. : 'having']
damnation, because they have made void their first faith. " But
religious are bound to a rule by the vows of their profession.
Therefore they sin mortally by transgressing the things contained in
their rule.

Objection 2: Further, the rule is enjoined upon a religious in the same
way as a law. Now he who transgresses a precept of law sins mortally.
Therefore it would seem that a monk sins mortally if he transgresses
the things contained in his rule.

Objection 3: Further, contempt involves a mortal sin. Now whoever
repeatedly does what he ought not to do seems to sin from contempt.
Therefore it would seem that a religious sins mortally by frequently
transgressing the things contained in his rule.

On the contrary, The religious state is safer than the secular state;
wherefore Gregory at the beginning of his Morals [*Epist. Missoria, ad
Leand. Episc. i] compares the secular life to the stormy sea, and the
religious life to the calm port. But if every transgression of the
things contained in his rule were to involve a religious in mortal sin,
the religious life would be fraught with danger of account of its
multitude of observances. Therefore not every transgression of the
things contained in the rule is a mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 1,2), a thing is contained in
the rule in two ways. First, as the end of the rule, for instance
things that pertain to the acts of the virtues; and the transgression
of these, as regards those which come under a common precept, involves
a mortal sin; but as regards those which are not included in the common
obligation of a precept, the transgression thereof does not involve a
mortal sin, except by reason of contempt, because, as stated above
[3803](A[2]), a religious is not bound to be perfect, but to tend to
perfection, to which the contempt of perfection is opposed.

Secondly, a thing is contained in the rule through pertaining to the
outward practice, such as all external observances, to some of which a
religious is bound by the vow of his profession. Now the vow of
profession regards chiefly the three things aforesaid, namely poverty,
continence, and obedience, while all others are directed to these.