This is
indicated by Augustine when he says (De Trin.
indicated by Augustine when he says (De Trin.
Summa Theologica
"
On the contrary, In the Creed it is said, "God of God. "
I answer that, Some have said that this name "God" and the like,
properly according to their nature, stand for the essence, but by
reason of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the Person. This
opinion apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity, which
requires that in God, He "who possesses" and "what is possessed" be the
same. So He who possesses Godhead, which is signified by the name God,
is the same as Godhead. But when we consider the proper way of
expressing ourselves, the mode of signification must be considered no
less than the thing signified. Hence as this word "God" signifies the
divine essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name "man"
signifies humanity in a subject, others more truly have said that this
word "God," from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense,
stand for person, as does the word "man. " So this word "God" sometimes
stands for the essence, as when we say "God creates"; because this
predicate is attributed to the subject by reason of the form
signified---that is, Godhead. But sometimes it stands for the person,
either for only one, as when we say, "God begets," or for two, as when
we say, "God spirates"; or for three, as when it is said: "To the King
of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God," etc. (1 Tim. 1:17).
Reply to Objection 1: Although this name "God" agrees with singular
terms as regards the form signified not being multiplied; nevertheless
it agrees also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be
found in several "supposita. " So it need not always stand for the
essence it signifies.
Reply to Objection 2: This holds good against those who say that the
word "God" does not naturally stand for person.
Reply to Objection 3: The word "God" stands for the person in a
different way from that in which this word "man" does; for since the
form signified by this word "man"---that is, humanity---is really
divided among its different subjects, it stands of itself for the
person, even if there is no adjunct determining it to the person---that
is, to a distinct subject. The unity or community of the human nature,
however, is not a reality, but is only in the consideration of the
mind. Hence this term "man" does not stand for the common nature,
unless this is required by some adjunct, as when we say, "man is a
species"; whereas the form signified by the name "God"---that is, the
divine essence---is really one and common. So of itself it stands for
the common nature, but by some adjunct it may be restricted so as to
stand for the person. So, when we say, "God generates," by reason of
the notional act this name "God" stands for the person of the Father.
But when we say, "God does not generate," there is no adjunct to
determine this name to the person of the Son, and hence the phrase
means that generation is repugnant to the divine nature. If, however,
something be added belonging to the person of the Son, this
proposition, for instance, "God begotten does not beget," is true.
Consequently, it does not follow that there exists a "God generator,"
and a "God not generator"; unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the
persons; as, for instance, if we were to say, "the Father is God the
generator" and the "Son is God the non-generator" and so it does not
follow that there are many Gods; for the Father and the Son are one
God, as was said above [321](A[3]).
Reply to Objection 4: This is false, "the Father begot God, that is
Himself," because the word "Himself," as a reciprocal term, refers to
the same "suppositum. " Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says (Ep.
lxvi ad Maxim. ) that "God the Father begot another self [alterum se],"
forasmuch as the word "se" is either in the ablative case, and then it
means "He begot another from Himself," or it indicates a single
relation, and thus points to identity of nature. This is, however,
either a figurative or an emphatic way of speaking, so that it would
really mean, "He begot another most like to Himself. " Likewise also it
is false to say, "He begot another God," because although the Son is
another than the Father, as above explained ([322]Q[31], A[2]),
nevertheless it cannot be said that He is "another God"; forasmuch as
this adjective "another" would be understood to apply to the
substantive God; and thus the meaning would be that there is a
distinction of Godhead. Yet this proposition "He begot another God" is
tolerated by some, provided that "another" be taken as a substantive,
and the word "God" be construed in apposition with it. This, however,
is an inexact way of speaking, and to be avoided, for fear of giving
occasion to error.
Reply to Objection 5: To say, "God begot God Who is God the Father," is
wrong, because since the word "Father" is construed in apposition to
"God," the word "God" is restricted to the person of the Father; so
that it would mean, "He begot God, Who is Himself the Father"; and then
the Father would be spoken of as begotten, which is false. Wherefore
the negative of the proposition is true, "He begot God Who is not God
the Father. " If however, we understand these words not to be in
apposition, and require something to be added, then, on the contrary,
the affirmative proposition is true, and the negative is false; so that
the meaning would be, "He begot God Who is God Who is the Father. " Such
a rendering however appears to be forced, so that it is better to say
simply that the affirmative proposition is false, and the negative is
true. Yet Prepositivus said that both the negative and affirmative are
false, because this relative "Who" in the affirmative proposition can
be referred to the "suppositum"; whereas in the negative it denotes
both the thing signified and the "suppositum. " Whence, in the
affirmative the sense is that "to be God the Father" is befitting to
the person of the Son; and in the negative sense is that "to be God the
Father," is to be removed from the Son's divinity as well as from His
personality. This, however, appears to be irrational; since, according
to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. ii), what is open to affirmation, is
open also to negation.
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Whether abstract essential names can stand for the person?
Objection 1: It would seem that abstract essential names can stand for
the person, so that this proposition is true, "Essence begets essence. "
For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i, 2): "The Father and the Son are
one Wisdom, because they are one essence; and taken singly Wisdom is
from Wisdom, as essence from essence. "
Objection 2: Further, generation or corruption in ourselves implies
generation or corruption of what is within us. But the Son is
generated. Therefore since the divine essence is in the Son, it seems
that the divine essence is generated.
Objection 3: Further, God and the divine essence are the same, as is
clear from what is above explained ([323]Q[3], A[3]). But, as was
shown, it is true to say that "God begets God. " Therefore this is also
true: "Essence begets essence. "
Objection 4: Further, a predicate can stand for that of which it is
predicated. But the Father is the divine essence; therefore essence can
stand for the person of the Father. Thus the essence begets.
Objection 5: Further, the essence is "a thing begetting," because the
essence is the Father who is begetting. Therefore if the essence is not
begetting, the essence will be "a thing begetting," and "not
begetting": which cannot be.
Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "The Father is
the principle of the whole Godhead. " But He is principle only by
begetting or spirating. Therefore the Father begets or spirates the
Godhead.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1): "Nothing begets
itself. " But if the essence begets the essence, it begets itself only,
since nothing exists in God as distinguished from the divine essence.
Therefore the essence does not beget essence.
I answer that, Concerning this, the abbot Joachim erred in asserting
that as we can say "God begot God," so we can say "Essence begot
essence": considering that, by reason of the divine simplicity God is
nothing else but the divine essence. In this he was wrong, because if
we wish to express ourselves correctly, we must take into account not
only the thing which is signified, but also the mode of its
signification as above stated [324](A[4]). Now although "God" is really
the same as "Godhead," nevertheless the mode of signification is not in
each case the same. For since this word "God" signifies the divine
essence in Him that possesses it, from its mode of signification it can
of its own nature stand for person. Thus the things which properly
belong to the persons, can be predicated of this word, "God," as, for
instance, we can say "God is begotten" or is "Begetter," as above
explained [325](A[4]). The word "essence," however, in its mode of
signification, cannot stand for Person, because it signifies the
essence as an abstract form. Consequently, what properly belongs to the
persons whereby they are distinguished from each other, cannot be
attributed to the essence. For that would imply distinction in the
divine essence, in the same way as there exists distinction in the
"supposita. "
Reply to Objection 1: To express unity of essence and of person, the
holy Doctors have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis
than the strict propriety of terms allows. Whence instead of enlarging
upon such expressions we should rather explain them: thus, for
instance, abstract names should be explained by concrete names, or even
by personal names; as when we find "essence from essence"; or "wisdom
from wisdom"; we should take the sense to be, "the Son" who is essence
and wisdom, is from the Father who is essence and wisdom. Nevertheless,
as regards these abstract names a certain order should be observed,
forasmuch as what belongs to action is more nearly allied to the
persons because actions belong to "supposita. " So "nature from nature,"
and "wisdom from wisdom" are less inexact than "essence from essence. "
Reply to Objection 2: In creatures the one generated has not the same
nature numerically as the generator, but another nature, numerically
distinct, which commences to exist in it anew by generation, and ceases
to exist by corruption, and so it is generated and corrupted
accidentally; whereas God begotten has the same nature numerically as
the begetter. So the divine nature in the Son is not begotten either
directly or accidentally.
Reply to Objection 3: Although God and the divine essence are really
the same, nevertheless, on account of their different mode of
signification, we must speak in a different way about each of them.
Reply to Objection 4: The divine essence is predicated of the Father by
mode of identity by reason of the divine simplicity; yet it does not
follow that it can stand for the Father, its mode of signification
being different. This objection would hold good as regards things which
are predicated of another as the universal of a particular.
Reply to Objection 5: The difference between substantive and adjectival
names consist in this, that the former carry their subject with them,
whereas the latter do not, but add the thing signified to the
substantive. Whence logicians are wont to say that the substantive is
considered in the light of "suppositum," whereas the adjective
indicates something added to the "suppositum. " Therefore substantive
personal terms can be predicated of the essence, because they are
really the same; nor does it follow that a personal property makes a
distinct essence; but it belongs to the "suppositum" implied in the
substantive. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated
of the essence unless we add some substantive. We cannot say that the
"essence is begetting"; yet we can say that the "essence is a thing
begetting," or that it is "God begetting," if "thing" and God stand for
person, but not if they stand for essence. Consequently there exists no
contradiction in saying that "essence is a thing begetting," and "a
thing not begetting"; because in the first case "thing" stands for
person, and in the second it stands for the essence.
Reply to Objection 6: So far as Godhead is one in several "supposita,"
it agrees in a certain degree with the form of a collective term. So
when we say, "the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead," the
term Godhead can be taken for all the persons together, inasmuch as it
is the principle in all the divine persons. Nor does it follow that He
is His own principle; as one of the people may be called the ruler of
the people without being ruler of himself. We may also say that He is
the principle of the whole Godhead; not as generating or spirating it,
but as communicating it by generation and spiration.
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Whether the persons can be predicated of the essential terms?
Objection 1: It would seem that the persons cannot be predicated of the
concrete essential names; so that we can say for instance, "God is
three persons"; or "God is the Trinity. " For it is false to say, "man
is every man," because it cannot be verified as regards any particular
subject. For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else is every man.
In the same way this proposition, "God is the Trinity," cannot be
verified of any one of the "supposita" of the divine nature. For the
Father is not the Trinity; nor is the Son; nor is the Holy Ghost. So to
say, "God is the Trinity," is false.
Objection 2: Further, the lower is not predicated of the higher except
by accidental predication; as when I say, "animal is man"; for it is
accidental to animal to be man. But this name "God" as regards the
three persons is as a general term to inferior terms, as Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. iii, 4). Therefore it seems that the names of the
persons cannot be predicated of this name "God," except in an
accidental sense.
On the contrary, Augustine says, in his sermon on Faith [*Serm. ii, in
coena Domini], "We believe that one God is one divinely named Trinity. "
I answer that, As above explained [326](A[5]), although adjectival
terms, whether personal or notional, cannot be predicated of the
essence, nevertheless substantive terms can be so predicated, owing to
the real identity of essence and person. The divine essence is not only
really the same as one person, but it is really the same as the three
persons. Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be predicated of
the essence as if we were to say, "The essence is the Father, and the
Son, and the Holy Ghost. " And because this word "God" can of itself
stand for the essence, as above explained (A[4], ad 3), hence, as it is
true to say, "The essence is the three persons"; so likewise it is true
to say, "God is the three persons. "
Reply to Objection 1: As above explained this term "man" can of itself
stand for person, whereas an adjunct is required for it to stand for
the universal human nature. So it is false to say, "Man is every man";
because it cannot be verified of any particular human subject. On the
contrary, this word "God" can of itself be taken for the divine
essence. So, although to say of any of the "supposita" of the divine
nature, "God is the Trinity," is untrue, nevertheless it is true of the
divine essence. This was denied by Porretanus because he did not take
note of this distinction.
Reply to Objection 2: When we say, "God," or "the divine essence is the
Father," the predication is one of identity, and not of the lower in
regard to a higher species: because in God there is no universal and
singular. Hence, as this proposition, "The Father is God" is of itself
true, so this proposition "God is the Father" is true of itself, and by
no means accidentally.
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Whether the essential names should be appropriated to the persons?
Objection 1: It would seem that the essential names should not be
appropriated to the persons. For whatever might verge on error in faith
should be avoided in the treatment of divine things; for, as Jerome
says, "careless words involve risk of heresy" [*In substance Ep.
lvii. ]. But to appropriate to any one person the names which are common
to the three persons, may verge on error in faith; for it may be
supposed either that such belong only to the person to whom they are
appropriated or that they belong to Him in a fuller degree than to the
others. Therefore the essential attributes should not be appropriated
to the persons.
Objection 2: Further, the essential attributes expressed in the
abstract signify by mode of form. But one person is not as a form to
another; since a form is not distinguished in subject from that of
which it is the form. Therefore the essential attributes, especially
when expressed in the abstract, are not to be appropriated to the
persons.
Objection 3: Further, property is prior to the appropriated, for
property is included in the idea of the appropriated. But the essential
attributes, in our way of understanding, are prior to the persons; as
what is common is prior to what is proper. Therefore the essential
attributes are not to be appropriated to the persons.
On the contrary, the Apostle says: "Christ the power of God and the
wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24).
I answer that, For the manifestation of our faith it is fitting that
the essential attributes should be appropriated to the persons. For
although the trinity of persons cannot be proved by demonstration, as
was above expounded ([327]Q[32], A[1]), nevertheless it is fitting that
it be declared by things which are more known to us. Now the essential
attributes of God are more clear to us from the standpoint of reason
than the personal properties; because we can derive certain knowledge
of the essential attributes from creatures which are sources of
knowledge to us, such as we cannot obtain regarding the personal
properties, as was above explained ([328]Q[32], A[1]). As, therefore,
we make use of the likeness of the trace or image found in creatures
for the manifestation of the divine persons, so also in the same manner
do we make use of the essential attributes. And such a manifestation of
the divine persons by the use of the essential attributes is called
"appropriation. "
The divine person can be manifested in a twofold manner by the
essential attributes; in one way by similitude, and thus the things
which belong to the intellect are appropriated to the Son, Who proceeds
by way of intellect, as Word. In another way by dissimilitude; as power
is appropriated to the Father, as Augustine says, because fathers by
reason of old age are sometimes feeble; lest anything of the kind be
imagined of God.
Reply to Objection 1: The essential attributes are not appropriated to
the persons as if they exclusively belonged to them; but in order to
make the persons manifest by way of similitude, or dissimilitude, as
above explained. So, no error in faith can arise, but rather
manifestation of the truth.
Reply to Objection 2: If the essential attributes were appropriated to
the persons as exclusively belonging to each of them, then it would
follow that one person would be as a form as regards another; which
Augustine altogether repudiates (De Trin. vi, 2), showing that the
Father is wise, not by Wisdom begotten by Him, as though only the Son
were Wisdom; so that the Father and the Son together only can be called
wise, but not the Father without the Son. But the Son is called the
Wisdom of the Father, because He is Wisdom from the Father Who is
Wisdom. For each of them is of Himself Wisdom; and both together are
one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten by
Him, but by the wisdom which is His own essence.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the essential attribute is in its proper
concept prior to person, according to our way of understanding;
nevertheless, so far as it is appropriated, there is nothing to prevent
the personal property from being prior to that which is appropriated.
Thus color is posterior to body considered as body, but is naturally
prior to "white body," considered as white.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons in a
fitting manner by the holy doctors?
Objection 1: It would seem that the essential attributes are
appropriated to the persons unfittingly by the holy doctors. For Hilary
says (De Trin. ii): "Eternity is in the Father, the species in the
Image; and use is in the Gift. " In which words he designates three
names proper to the persons: the name of the "Father," the name "Image"
proper to the Son ([329]Q[35], A[2]), and the name "Bounty" or "Gift,"
which is proper to the Holy Ghost ([330]Q[38], A[2]). He also
designates three appropriated terms. For he appropriates "eternity" to
the Father, "species" to the Son, and "use" to the Holy Ghost. This he
does apparently without reason. For "eternity" imports duration of
existence; "species," the principle of existence; and 'use' belongs to
the operation. But essence and operation are not found to be
appropriated to any person. Therefore the above terms are not fittingly
appropriated to the persons.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): "Unity
is in the Father, equality in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost is the
concord of equality and unity. " This does not, however, seem fitting;
because one person does not receive formal denomination from what is
appropriated to another. For the Father is not wise by the wisdom
begotten, as above explained ([331]Q[37], A[2], ad 1). But, as he
subjoins, "All these three are one by the Father; all are equal by the
Son, and all united by the Holy Ghost. " The above, therefore, are not
fittingly appropriated to the Persons.
Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine, to the Father is
attributed "power," to the Son "wisdom," to the Holy Ghost "goodness. "
Nor does this seem fitting; for "strength" is part of power, whereas
strength is found to be appropriated to the Son, according to the text,
"Christ the strength [*Douay: power] of God" (1 Cor. 1:24). So it is
likewise appropriated to the Holy Ghost, according to the words,
"strength [*Douay: virtue] came out from Him and healed all" (Lk.
6:19). Therefore power should not be appropriated to the Father.
Objection 4: Likewise Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "What the
Apostle says, "From Him, and by Him, and in Him," is not to be taken in
a confused sense. " And (Contra Maxim. ii) "'from Him' refers to the
Father, 'by Him' to the Son, 'in Him' to the Holy Ghost. '" This,
however, seems to be incorrectly said; for the words "in Him" seem to
imply the relation of final cause, which is first among the causes.
Therefore this relation of cause should be appropriated to the Father,
Who is "the principle from no principle. "
Objection 5: Likewise, Truth is appropriated to the Son, according to
Jn. 14:6, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life"; and likewise "the
book of life," according to Ps. 39:9, "In the beginning of the book it
is written of Me," where a gloss observes, "that is, with the Father
Who is My head," also this word "Who is"; because on the text of Is.
65:1, "Behold I go to the Gentiles," a gloss adds, "The Son speaks Who
said to Moses, I am Who am. " These appear to belong to the Son, and are
not appropriated. For "truth," according to Augustine (De Vera Relig.
36), "is the supreme similitude of the principle without any
dissimilitude. " So it seems that it properly belongs to the Son, Who
has a principle. Also the "book of life" seems proper to the Son, as
signifying "a thing from another"; for every book is written by
someone. This also, "Who is," appears to be proper to the Son; because
if when it was said to Moses, "I am Who am," the Trinity spoke, then
Moses could have said, "He Who is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and the
Holy Ghost sent me to you," so also he could have said further, "He Who
is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you,"
pointing out a certain person. This, however, is false; because no
person is Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it cannot be common to
the Trinity, but is proper to the Son.
I answer that, Our intellect, which is led to the knowledge of God from
creatures, must consider God according to the mode derived from
creatures. In considering any creature four points present themselves
to us in due order. Firstly, the thing itself taken absolutely is
considered as a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its
intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered. The fourth
point of consideration embraces its relation to its effects. Hence this
fourfold consideration comes to our mind in reference to God.
According to the first point of consideration, whereby we consider God
absolutely in His being, the appropriation mentioned by Hilary applies,
according to which "eternity" is appropriated to the Father, "species"
to the Son, "use" to the Holy Ghost. For "eternity" as meaning a
"being" without a principle, has a likeness to the property of the
Father, Who is "a principle without a principle. " Species or beauty has
a likeness to the property of the Son. For beauty includes three
conditions, "integrity" or "perfection," since those things which are
impaired are by the very fact ugly; due "proportion" or "harmony"; and
lastly, "brightness" or "clarity," whence things are called beautiful
which have a bright color.
The first of these has a likeness to the property of the Son, inasmuch
as He as Son has in Himself truly and perfectly the nature of the
Father. To insinuate this, Augustine says in his explanation (De Trin.
vi, 10): "Where---that is, in the Son---there is supreme and primal
life," etc.
The second agrees with the Son's property, inasmuch as He is the
express Image of the Father. Hence we see that an image is said to be
beautiful, if it perfectly represents even an ugly thing.
This is
indicated by Augustine when he says (De Trin. vi, 10), "Where there
exists wondrous proportion and primal equality," etc.
The third agrees with the property of the Son, as the Word, which is
the light and splendor of the intellect, as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iii, 3). Augustine alludes to the same when he says (De Trin. vi,
10): "As the perfect Word, not wanting in anything, and, so to speak,
the art of the omnipotent God," etc.
"Use" has a likeness to the property of the Holy Ghost; provided the
"use" be taken in a wide sense, as including also the sense of "to
enjoy"; according as "to use" is to employ something at the beck of the
will, and "to enjoy" means to use joyfully, as Augustine says (De Trin.
x, 11). So "use," whereby the Father and the Son enjoy each other,
agrees with the property of the Holy Ghost, as Love. This is what
Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "That love, that delectation, that
felicity or beatitude, is called use by him" (Hilary). But the "use" by
which we enjoy God, is likened to the property of the Holy Ghost as the
Gift; and Augustine points to this when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): "In
the Trinity, the Holy Ghost, the sweetness of the Begettor and the
Begotten, pours out upon us mere creatures His immense bounty and
wealth. " Thus it is clear how "eternity," "species," and "use" are
attributed or appropriated to the persons, but not essence or
operation; because, being common, there is nothing in their concept to
liken them to the properties of the Persons.
The second consideration of God regards Him as "one. " In that view
Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) appropriates "unity" to the Father,
"equality" to the Son, "concord" or "union" to the Holy Ghost. It is
manifest that these three imply unity, but in different ways. For
"unity" is said absolutely, as it does not presuppose anything else;
and for this reason it is appropriated to the Father, to Whom any other
person is not presupposed since He is the "principle without
principle. " "Equality" implies unity as regards another; for that is
equal which has the same quantity as another. So equality is
appropriated to the Son, Who is the "principle from a principle. "
"Union" implies the unity of two; and is therefore appropriated to the
Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He proceeds from two. And from this we can
understand what Augustine means when he says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5)
that "The Three are one, by reason of the Father; They are equal by
reason of the Son; and are united by reason of the Holy Ghost. " For it
is clear that we trace a thing back to that in which we find it first:
just as in this lower world we attribute life to the vegetative soul,
because therein we find the first trace of life. Now "unity" is
perceived at once in the person of the Father, even if by an impossible
hypothesis, the other persons were removed. So the other persons derive
their unity from the Father. But if the other persons be removed, we do
not find equality in the Father, but we find it as soon as we suppose
the Son. So, all are equal by reason of the Son, not as if the Son were
the principle of equality in the Father, but that, without the Son
equal to the Father, the Father could not be called equal; because His
equality is considered firstly in regard to the Son: for that the Holy
Ghost is equal to the Father, is also from the Son. Likewise, if the
Holy Ghost, Who is the union of the two, be excluded, we cannot
understand the oneness of the union between the Father and the Son. So
all are connected by reason of the Holy Ghost; because given the Holy
Ghost, we find whence the Father and the Son are said to be united.
According to the third consideration, which brings before us the
adequate power of God in the sphere of causality, there is said to be a
third kind of appropriation, of "power," "wisdom," and "goodness. " This
kind of appropriation is made both by reason of similitude as regards
what exists in the divine persons, and by reason of dissimilitude if we
consider what is in creatures. For "power" has the nature of a
principle, and so it has a likeness to the heavenly Father, Who is the
principle of the whole Godhead. But in an earthly father it is wanting
sometimes by reason of old age. "Wisdom" has likeness to the heavenly
Son, as the Word, for a word is nothing but the concept of wisdom. In
an earthly son this is sometimes absent by reason of lack of years.
"Goodness," as the nature and object of love, has likeness to the Holy
Ghost; but seems repugnant to the earthly spirit, which often implies a
certain violent impulse, according to Is. 25:4: "The spirit of the
strong is as a blast beating on the wall. " "Strength" is appropriated
to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, not as denoting the power itself of a
thing, but as sometimes used to express that which proceeds from power;
for instance, we say that the strong work done by an agent is its
strength.
According to the fourth consideration, i. e. God's relation to His
effects, there arise appropriation of the expression "from Whom, by
Whom, and in Whom. " For this preposition "from" [ex] sometimes implies
a certain relation of the material cause; which has no place in God;
and sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient cause, which
can be applied to God by reason of His active power; hence it is
appropriated to the Father in the same way as power. The preposition
"by" [per] sometimes designates an intermediate cause; thus we may say
that a smith works "by" a hammer. Hence the word "by" is not always
appropriated to the Son, but belongs to the Son properly and strictly,
according to the text, "All things were made by Him" (Jn. 1:3); not
that the Son is an instrument, but as "the principle from a principle. "
Sometimes it designates the habitude of a form "by" which an agent
works; thus we say that an artificer works by his art. Hence, as wisdom
and art are appropriated to the Son, so also is the expression "by
Whom. " The preposition "in" strictly denotes the habitude of one
containing. Now, God contains things in two ways: in one way by their
similitudes; thus things are said to be in God, as existing in His
knowledge. In this sense the expression "in Him" should be appropriated
to the Son. In another sense things are contained in God forasmuch as
He in His goodness preserves and governs them, by guiding them to a
fitting end; and in this sense the expression "in Him" is appropriated
to the Holy Ghost, as likewise is "goodness. " Nor need the habitude of
the final cause (though the first of causes) be appropriated to the
Father, Who is "the principle without a principle": because the divine
persons, of Whom the Father is the principle, do not proceed from Him
as towards an end, since each of Them is the last end; but They proceed
by a natural procession, which seems more to belong to the nature of a
natural power.
Regarding the other points of inquiry, we can say that since "truth"
belongs to the intellect, as stated above ([332]Q[16], A[1]), it is
appropriated to the Son, without, however, being a property of His. For
truth can be considered as existing in the thought or in the thing
itself. Hence, as intellect and thing in their essential meaning, are
referred to the essence, and not to the persons, so the same is to be
said of truth. The definition quoted from Augustine belongs to truth as
appropriated to the Son. The "book of life" directly means knowledge
but indirectly it means life. For, as above explained ([333]Q[24],
A[1]), it is God's knowledge regarding those who are to possess eternal
life. Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son; although life is
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as implying a certain kind of interior
movement, agreeing in that sense with the property of the Holy Ghost as
Love. To be written by another is not of the essence of a book
considered as such; but this belongs to it only as a work produced. So
this does not imply origin; nor is it personal, but an appropriation to
a person. The expression "Who is" is appropriated to the person of the
Son, not by reason of itself, but by reason of an adjunct, inasmuch as,
in God's word to Moses, was prefigured the delivery of the human race
accomplished by the Son. Yet, forasmuch as the word "Who" is taken in a
relative sense, it may sometimes relate to the person of the Son; and
in that sense it would be taken personally; as, for instance, were we
to say, "The Son is the begotten 'Who is,'" inasmuch as "God begotten
is personal. " But taken indefinitely, it is an essential term. And
although the pronoun "this" [iste] seems grammatically to point to a
particular person, nevertheless everything that we can point to can be
grammatically treated as a person, although in its own nature it is not
a person; as we may say, "this stone," and "this ass. " So, speaking in
a grammatical sense, so far as the word "God" signifies and stands for
the divine essence, the latter may be designated by the pronoun "this,"
according to Ex. 15:2: "This is my God, and I will glorify Him. "
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OF THE PERSONS AS COMPARED TO THE RELATIONS OR PROPERTIES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider the persons in connection with the relations, or
properties; and there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether relation is the same as person?
(2) Whether the relations distinguish and constitute the persons?
(3) Whether mental abstraction of the relations from the persons leaves
the hypostases distinct?
(4) Whether the relations, according to our mode of understanding,
presuppose the acts of the persons, or contrariwise?
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Whether relation is the same as person?
Objection 1: It would seem that in God relation is not the same as
person. For when things are identical, if one is multiplied the others
are multiplied. But in one person there are several relations; as in
the person of the Father there is paternity and common spiration.
Again, one relation exists in two person, as common spiration in the
Father and in the Son. Therefore relation is not the same as person.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text.
24), nothing is contained by itself. But relation is in the person; nor
can it be said that this occurs because they are identical, for
otherwise relation would be also in the essence. Therefore relation, or
property, is not the same as person in God.
Objection 3: Further, when several things are identical, what is
predicated of one is predicated of the others. But all that is
predicated of a Person is not predicated of His property. For we say
that the Father begets; but not that the paternity is begetting.
Therefore property is not the same as person in God.
On the contrary, in God "what is" and "whereby it is" are the same,
according to Boethius (De Hebdom. ). But the Father is Father by
paternity. In the same way, the other properties are the same as the
persons.
I answer that, Different opinions have been held on this point. Some
have said that the properties are not the persons, nor in the persons;
and these have thought thus owing to the mode of signification of the
relations, which do not indeed signify existence "in" something, but
rather existence "towards" something. Whence, they styled the relations
"assistant," as above explained ([334]Q[28], A[2]). But since relation,
considered as really existing in God, is the divine essence Itself, and
the essence is the same as person, as appears from what was said above
([335]Q[39], A[1]), relation must necessarily be the same as person.
Others, therefore, considering this identity, said that the properties
were indeed the persons; but not "in" the persons; for, they said,
there are no properties in God except in our way of speaking, as stated
above ([336]Q[32], A[2]). We must, however, say that there are
properties in God; as we have shown ([337]Q[32], A[2]). These are
designated by abstract terms, being forms, as it were, of the persons.
So, since the nature of a form requires it to be "in" that of which it
is the form, we must say that the properties are in the persons, and
yet that they are the persons; as we say that the essence is in God,
and yet is God.
Reply to Objection 1: Person and property are really the same, but
differ in concept. Consequently, it does not follow that if one is
multiplied, the other must also be multiplied. We must, however,
consider that in God, by reason of the divine simplicity, a twofold
real identity exists as regards what in creatures are distinct. For,
since the divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter and
form, it follows that in God the abstract is the same as the concrete,
as "Godhead" and "God. " And as the divine simplicity excludes the
composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever is
attributed to God, is His essence Itself; and so, wisdom and power are
the same in God, because they are both in the divine essence. According
to this twofold identity, property in God is the same person. For
personal properties are the same as the persons because the abstract
and the concrete are the same in God; since they are the subsisting
persons themselves, as paternity is the Father Himself, and filiation
is the Son, and procession is the Holy Ghost. But the non-personal
properties are the same as the persons according to the other reason of
identity, whereby whatever is attributed to God is His own essence.
Thus, common spiration is the same as the person of the Father, and the
person of the Son; not that it is one self-subsisting person; but that
as there is one essence in the two persons, so also there is one
property in the two persons, as above explained ([338]Q[30], A[2] ).
Reply to Objection 2: The properties are said to be in the essence,
only by mode of identity; but in the persons they exist by mode of
identity, not merely in reality, but also in the mode of signification;
as the form exists in its subject. Thus the properties determine and
distinguish the persons, but not the essence.
Reply to Objection 3: Notional participles and verbs signify the
notional acts: and acts belong to a "suppositum. " Now, properties are
not designated as "supposita," but as forms of "supposita. " And so
their mode of signification is against notional participles and verbs
being predicated of the properties.
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Whether the persons are distinguished by the relations?
Objection 1: It would seem that the persons are not distinguished by
the relations. For simple things are distinct by themselves. But the
persons are supremely simple. Therefore they are distinguished by
themselves, and not by the relation.
Objection 2: Further, a form is distinguished only in relation to its
genus. For white is distinguished from black only by quality. But
"hypostasis" signifies an individual in the genus of substance.
Therefore the hypostases cannot be distinguished by relations.
Objection 3: Further, what is absolute comes before what is relative.
But the distinction of the divine persons is the primary distinction.
Therefore the divine persons are not distinguished by the relations.
Objection 4: Further, whatever presupposes distinction cannot be the
first principle of distinction. But relation presupposes distinction,
which comes into its definition; for a relation is essentially what is
towards another. Therefore the first distinctive principle in God
cannot be relation.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin. ): "Relation alone multiplies
the Trinity of the divine persons. "
I answer that, In whatever multitude of things is to be found something
common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of
distinction. So, as the three persons agree in the unity of essence, we
must seek to know the principle of distinction whereby they are
several. Now, there are two principles of difference between the divine
persons, and these are "origin" and "relation. " Although these do not
really differ, yet they differ in the mode of signification; for
"origin" is signified by way of act, as "generation"; and "relation" by
way of the form, as "paternity. "
Some, then, considering that relation follows upon act, have said that
the divine hypostases are distinguished by origin, so that we may say
that the Father is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the former
begets and the latter is begotten. Further, that the relations, or the
properties, make known the distinctions of the hypostases or persons as
resulting therefrom; as also in creatures the properties manifest the
distinctions of individuals, which distinctions are caused by the
material principles.
This opinion, however, cannot stand---for two reasons. Firstly,
because, in order that two things be understood as distinct, their
distinction must be understood as resulting from something intrinsic to
both; thus in things created it results from their matter or their
form. Now origin of a thing does not designate anything intrinsic, but
means the way from something, or to something; as generation signifies
the way to a thing generated, and as proceeding from the generator.
Hence it is not possible that what is generated and the generator
should be distinguished by generation alone; but in the generator and
in the thing generated we must presuppose whatever makes them to be
distinguished from each other. In a divine person there is nothing to
presuppose but essence, and relation or property. Whence, since the
persons agree in essence, it only remains to be said that the persons
are distinguished from each other by the relations. Secondly: because
the distinction of the divine persons is not to be so understood as if
what is common to them all is divided, because the common essence
remains undivided; but the distinguishing principles themselves must
constitute the things which are distinct. Now the relations or the
properties distinguish or constitute the hypostases or persons,
inasmuch as they are themselves the subsisting persons; as paternity is
the Father, and filiation is the Son, because in God the abstract and
the concrete do not differ. But it is against the nature of origin that
it should constitute hypostasis or person. For origin taken in an
active sense signifies proceeding from a subsisting person, so that it
presupposes the latter; while in a passive sense origin, as "nativity,"
signifies the way to a subsisting person, and as not yet constituting
the person.
It is therefore better to say that the persons or hypostases are
distinguished rather by relations than by origin. For, although in both
ways they are distinguished, nevertheless in our mode of understanding
they are distinguished chiefly and firstly by relations; whence this
name "Father" signifies not only a property, but also the hypostasis;
whereas this term "Begetter" or "Begetting" signifies property only;
forasmuch as this name "Father" signifies the relation which is
distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis; and this term
"Begetter" or "Begotten" signifies the origin which is not distinctive
and constitutive of the hypostasis.
Reply to Objection 1: The persons are the subsisting relations
themselves. Hence it is not against the simplicity of the divine
persons for them to be distinguished by the relations.
Reply to Objection 2: The divine persons are not distinguished as
regards being, in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but
only as regards something relative. Hence relation suffices for their
distinction.
Reply to Objection 3: The more prior a distinction is, the nearer it
approaches to unity; and so it must be the least possible distinction.
So the distinction of the persons must be by that which distinguishes
the least possible; and this is by relation.
Reply to Objection 4: Relation presupposes the distinction of the
subjects, when it is an accident; but when the relation is subsistent,
it does not presuppose, but brings about distinction. For when it is
said that relation is by nature to be towards another, the word
"another" signifies the correlative which is not prior, but
simultaneous in the order of nature.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the hypostases remain if the relations are mentally abstracted from
the persons?
Objection 1: It would seem that the hypostases remain if the properties
or relations are mentally abstracted from the persons. For that to
which something is added, may be understood when the addition is taken
away; as man is something added to animal which can be understood if
rational be taken away. But person is something added to hypostasis;
for person is "a hypostasis distinguished by a property of dignity. "
Therefore, if a personal property be taken away from a person, the
hypostasis remains.
Objection 2: Further, that the Father is Father, and that He is
someone, are not due to the same reason. For as He is the Father by
paternity, supposing He is some one by paternity, it would follow that
the Son, in Whom there is not paternity, would not be "someone. " So
when paternity is mentally abstracted from the Father, He still remains
"someone"---that is, a hypostasis. Therefore, if property be removed
from person, the hypostasis remains.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6): "Unbegotten is
not the same as Father; for if the Father had not begotten the Son,
nothing would prevent Him being called unbegotten. " But if He had not
begotten the Son, there would be no paternity in Him. Therefore, if
paternity be removed, there still remains the hypostasis of the Father
as unbegotten.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The Son has nothing else
than birth. " But He is Son by "birth. " Therefore, if filiation be
removed, the Son's hypostasis no more remains; and the same holds as
regards the other persons.
I answer that, Abstraction by the intellect is twofold---when the
universal is abstracted from the particular, as animal abstracted from
man; and when the form is abstracted from the matter, as the form of a
circle is abstracted by the intellect from any sensible matter. The
difference between these two abstractions consists in the fact that in
the abstraction of the universal from the particular, that from which
the abstraction is made does not remain; for when the difference of
rationality is removed from man, the man no longer remains in the
intellect, but animal alone remains. But in the abstraction of the form
from the matter, both the form and the matter remain in the intellect;
as, for instance, if we abstract the form of a circle from brass, there
remains in our intellect separately the understanding both of a circle,
and of brass. Now, although there is no universal nor particular in
God, nor form and matter, in reality; nevertheless, as regards the mode
of signification there is a certain likeness of these things in God;
and thus Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that "substance is
common and hypostasis is particular. " So, if we speak of the
abstraction of the universal from the particular, the common universal
essence remains in the intellect if the properties are removed; but not
the hypostasis of the Father, which is, as it were, a particular.
But as regards the abstraction of the form from the matter, if the
non-personal properties are removed, then the idea of the hypostases
and persons remains; as, for instance, if the fact of the Father's
being unbegotten or spirating be mentally abstracted from the Father,
the Father's hypostasis or person remains.
If, however, the personal property be mentally abstracted, the idea of
the hypostasis no longer remains. For the personal properties are not
to be understood as added to the divine hypostases, as a form is added
to a pre-existing subject: but they carry with them their own
"supposita," inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting persons; thus
paternity is the Father Himself. For hypostasis signifies something
distinct in God, since hypostasis means an individual substance. So, as
relation distinguishes and constitutes the hypostases, as above
explained [339](A[2]), it follows that if the personal relations are
mentally abstracted, the hypostases no longer remain. Some, however,
think, as above noted, that the divine hypostases are not distinguished
by the relations, but only by origin; so that the Father is a
hypostasis as not from another, and the Son is a hypostasis as from
another by generation. And that the consequent relations which are to
be regarded as properties of dignity, constitute the notion of a
person, and are thus called "personal properties. " Hence, if these
relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostasis, but not the persons,
remain.
But this is impossible, for two reasons: first, because the relations
distinguish and constitute the hypostases, as shown above [340](A[2]);
secondly, because every hypostasis of a rational nature is a person, as
appears from the definition of Boethius (De Duab. Nat. ) that, "person
is the individual substance of a rational nature. " Hence, to have
hypostasis and not person, it would be necessary to abstract the
rationality from the nature, but not the property from the person.
Reply to Objection 1: Person does not add to hypostasis a
distinguishing property absolutely, but a distinguishing property of
dignity, all of which must be taken as the difference. Now, this
distinguishing property is one of dignity precisely because it is
understood as subsisting in a rational nature. Hence, if the
distinguishing property be removed from the person, the hypostasis no
longer remains; whereas it would remain were the rationality of the
nature removed; for both person and hypostasis are individual
substances. Consequently, in God the distinguishing relation belongs
essentially to both.
Reply to Objection 2: By paternity the Father is not only Father, but
is a person, and is "someone," or a hypostasis. It does not follow,
however, that the Son is not "someone" or a hypostasis; just as it does
not follow that He is not a person.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine does not mean to say that the
hypostasis of the Father would remain as unbegotten, if His paternity
were removed, as if innascibility constituted and distinguished the
hypostasis of the Father; for this would be impossible, since "being
unbegotten" says nothing positive and is only a negation, as he himself
says.
On the contrary, In the Creed it is said, "God of God. "
I answer that, Some have said that this name "God" and the like,
properly according to their nature, stand for the essence, but by
reason of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the Person. This
opinion apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity, which
requires that in God, He "who possesses" and "what is possessed" be the
same. So He who possesses Godhead, which is signified by the name God,
is the same as Godhead. But when we consider the proper way of
expressing ourselves, the mode of signification must be considered no
less than the thing signified. Hence as this word "God" signifies the
divine essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name "man"
signifies humanity in a subject, others more truly have said that this
word "God," from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense,
stand for person, as does the word "man. " So this word "God" sometimes
stands for the essence, as when we say "God creates"; because this
predicate is attributed to the subject by reason of the form
signified---that is, Godhead. But sometimes it stands for the person,
either for only one, as when we say, "God begets," or for two, as when
we say, "God spirates"; or for three, as when it is said: "To the King
of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God," etc. (1 Tim. 1:17).
Reply to Objection 1: Although this name "God" agrees with singular
terms as regards the form signified not being multiplied; nevertheless
it agrees also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be
found in several "supposita. " So it need not always stand for the
essence it signifies.
Reply to Objection 2: This holds good against those who say that the
word "God" does not naturally stand for person.
Reply to Objection 3: The word "God" stands for the person in a
different way from that in which this word "man" does; for since the
form signified by this word "man"---that is, humanity---is really
divided among its different subjects, it stands of itself for the
person, even if there is no adjunct determining it to the person---that
is, to a distinct subject. The unity or community of the human nature,
however, is not a reality, but is only in the consideration of the
mind. Hence this term "man" does not stand for the common nature,
unless this is required by some adjunct, as when we say, "man is a
species"; whereas the form signified by the name "God"---that is, the
divine essence---is really one and common. So of itself it stands for
the common nature, but by some adjunct it may be restricted so as to
stand for the person. So, when we say, "God generates," by reason of
the notional act this name "God" stands for the person of the Father.
But when we say, "God does not generate," there is no adjunct to
determine this name to the person of the Son, and hence the phrase
means that generation is repugnant to the divine nature. If, however,
something be added belonging to the person of the Son, this
proposition, for instance, "God begotten does not beget," is true.
Consequently, it does not follow that there exists a "God generator,"
and a "God not generator"; unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the
persons; as, for instance, if we were to say, "the Father is God the
generator" and the "Son is God the non-generator" and so it does not
follow that there are many Gods; for the Father and the Son are one
God, as was said above [321](A[3]).
Reply to Objection 4: This is false, "the Father begot God, that is
Himself," because the word "Himself," as a reciprocal term, refers to
the same "suppositum. " Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says (Ep.
lxvi ad Maxim. ) that "God the Father begot another self [alterum se],"
forasmuch as the word "se" is either in the ablative case, and then it
means "He begot another from Himself," or it indicates a single
relation, and thus points to identity of nature. This is, however,
either a figurative or an emphatic way of speaking, so that it would
really mean, "He begot another most like to Himself. " Likewise also it
is false to say, "He begot another God," because although the Son is
another than the Father, as above explained ([322]Q[31], A[2]),
nevertheless it cannot be said that He is "another God"; forasmuch as
this adjective "another" would be understood to apply to the
substantive God; and thus the meaning would be that there is a
distinction of Godhead. Yet this proposition "He begot another God" is
tolerated by some, provided that "another" be taken as a substantive,
and the word "God" be construed in apposition with it. This, however,
is an inexact way of speaking, and to be avoided, for fear of giving
occasion to error.
Reply to Objection 5: To say, "God begot God Who is God the Father," is
wrong, because since the word "Father" is construed in apposition to
"God," the word "God" is restricted to the person of the Father; so
that it would mean, "He begot God, Who is Himself the Father"; and then
the Father would be spoken of as begotten, which is false. Wherefore
the negative of the proposition is true, "He begot God Who is not God
the Father. " If however, we understand these words not to be in
apposition, and require something to be added, then, on the contrary,
the affirmative proposition is true, and the negative is false; so that
the meaning would be, "He begot God Who is God Who is the Father. " Such
a rendering however appears to be forced, so that it is better to say
simply that the affirmative proposition is false, and the negative is
true. Yet Prepositivus said that both the negative and affirmative are
false, because this relative "Who" in the affirmative proposition can
be referred to the "suppositum"; whereas in the negative it denotes
both the thing signified and the "suppositum. " Whence, in the
affirmative the sense is that "to be God the Father" is befitting to
the person of the Son; and in the negative sense is that "to be God the
Father," is to be removed from the Son's divinity as well as from His
personality. This, however, appears to be irrational; since, according
to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. ii), what is open to affirmation, is
open also to negation.
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Whether abstract essential names can stand for the person?
Objection 1: It would seem that abstract essential names can stand for
the person, so that this proposition is true, "Essence begets essence. "
For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i, 2): "The Father and the Son are
one Wisdom, because they are one essence; and taken singly Wisdom is
from Wisdom, as essence from essence. "
Objection 2: Further, generation or corruption in ourselves implies
generation or corruption of what is within us. But the Son is
generated. Therefore since the divine essence is in the Son, it seems
that the divine essence is generated.
Objection 3: Further, God and the divine essence are the same, as is
clear from what is above explained ([323]Q[3], A[3]). But, as was
shown, it is true to say that "God begets God. " Therefore this is also
true: "Essence begets essence. "
Objection 4: Further, a predicate can stand for that of which it is
predicated. But the Father is the divine essence; therefore essence can
stand for the person of the Father. Thus the essence begets.
Objection 5: Further, the essence is "a thing begetting," because the
essence is the Father who is begetting. Therefore if the essence is not
begetting, the essence will be "a thing begetting," and "not
begetting": which cannot be.
Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "The Father is
the principle of the whole Godhead. " But He is principle only by
begetting or spirating. Therefore the Father begets or spirates the
Godhead.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1): "Nothing begets
itself. " But if the essence begets the essence, it begets itself only,
since nothing exists in God as distinguished from the divine essence.
Therefore the essence does not beget essence.
I answer that, Concerning this, the abbot Joachim erred in asserting
that as we can say "God begot God," so we can say "Essence begot
essence": considering that, by reason of the divine simplicity God is
nothing else but the divine essence. In this he was wrong, because if
we wish to express ourselves correctly, we must take into account not
only the thing which is signified, but also the mode of its
signification as above stated [324](A[4]). Now although "God" is really
the same as "Godhead," nevertheless the mode of signification is not in
each case the same. For since this word "God" signifies the divine
essence in Him that possesses it, from its mode of signification it can
of its own nature stand for person. Thus the things which properly
belong to the persons, can be predicated of this word, "God," as, for
instance, we can say "God is begotten" or is "Begetter," as above
explained [325](A[4]). The word "essence," however, in its mode of
signification, cannot stand for Person, because it signifies the
essence as an abstract form. Consequently, what properly belongs to the
persons whereby they are distinguished from each other, cannot be
attributed to the essence. For that would imply distinction in the
divine essence, in the same way as there exists distinction in the
"supposita. "
Reply to Objection 1: To express unity of essence and of person, the
holy Doctors have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis
than the strict propriety of terms allows. Whence instead of enlarging
upon such expressions we should rather explain them: thus, for
instance, abstract names should be explained by concrete names, or even
by personal names; as when we find "essence from essence"; or "wisdom
from wisdom"; we should take the sense to be, "the Son" who is essence
and wisdom, is from the Father who is essence and wisdom. Nevertheless,
as regards these abstract names a certain order should be observed,
forasmuch as what belongs to action is more nearly allied to the
persons because actions belong to "supposita. " So "nature from nature,"
and "wisdom from wisdom" are less inexact than "essence from essence. "
Reply to Objection 2: In creatures the one generated has not the same
nature numerically as the generator, but another nature, numerically
distinct, which commences to exist in it anew by generation, and ceases
to exist by corruption, and so it is generated and corrupted
accidentally; whereas God begotten has the same nature numerically as
the begetter. So the divine nature in the Son is not begotten either
directly or accidentally.
Reply to Objection 3: Although God and the divine essence are really
the same, nevertheless, on account of their different mode of
signification, we must speak in a different way about each of them.
Reply to Objection 4: The divine essence is predicated of the Father by
mode of identity by reason of the divine simplicity; yet it does not
follow that it can stand for the Father, its mode of signification
being different. This objection would hold good as regards things which
are predicated of another as the universal of a particular.
Reply to Objection 5: The difference between substantive and adjectival
names consist in this, that the former carry their subject with them,
whereas the latter do not, but add the thing signified to the
substantive. Whence logicians are wont to say that the substantive is
considered in the light of "suppositum," whereas the adjective
indicates something added to the "suppositum. " Therefore substantive
personal terms can be predicated of the essence, because they are
really the same; nor does it follow that a personal property makes a
distinct essence; but it belongs to the "suppositum" implied in the
substantive. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated
of the essence unless we add some substantive. We cannot say that the
"essence is begetting"; yet we can say that the "essence is a thing
begetting," or that it is "God begetting," if "thing" and God stand for
person, but not if they stand for essence. Consequently there exists no
contradiction in saying that "essence is a thing begetting," and "a
thing not begetting"; because in the first case "thing" stands for
person, and in the second it stands for the essence.
Reply to Objection 6: So far as Godhead is one in several "supposita,"
it agrees in a certain degree with the form of a collective term. So
when we say, "the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead," the
term Godhead can be taken for all the persons together, inasmuch as it
is the principle in all the divine persons. Nor does it follow that He
is His own principle; as one of the people may be called the ruler of
the people without being ruler of himself. We may also say that He is
the principle of the whole Godhead; not as generating or spirating it,
but as communicating it by generation and spiration.
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Whether the persons can be predicated of the essential terms?
Objection 1: It would seem that the persons cannot be predicated of the
concrete essential names; so that we can say for instance, "God is
three persons"; or "God is the Trinity. " For it is false to say, "man
is every man," because it cannot be verified as regards any particular
subject. For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else is every man.
In the same way this proposition, "God is the Trinity," cannot be
verified of any one of the "supposita" of the divine nature. For the
Father is not the Trinity; nor is the Son; nor is the Holy Ghost. So to
say, "God is the Trinity," is false.
Objection 2: Further, the lower is not predicated of the higher except
by accidental predication; as when I say, "animal is man"; for it is
accidental to animal to be man. But this name "God" as regards the
three persons is as a general term to inferior terms, as Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. iii, 4). Therefore it seems that the names of the
persons cannot be predicated of this name "God," except in an
accidental sense.
On the contrary, Augustine says, in his sermon on Faith [*Serm. ii, in
coena Domini], "We believe that one God is one divinely named Trinity. "
I answer that, As above explained [326](A[5]), although adjectival
terms, whether personal or notional, cannot be predicated of the
essence, nevertheless substantive terms can be so predicated, owing to
the real identity of essence and person. The divine essence is not only
really the same as one person, but it is really the same as the three
persons. Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be predicated of
the essence as if we were to say, "The essence is the Father, and the
Son, and the Holy Ghost. " And because this word "God" can of itself
stand for the essence, as above explained (A[4], ad 3), hence, as it is
true to say, "The essence is the three persons"; so likewise it is true
to say, "God is the three persons. "
Reply to Objection 1: As above explained this term "man" can of itself
stand for person, whereas an adjunct is required for it to stand for
the universal human nature. So it is false to say, "Man is every man";
because it cannot be verified of any particular human subject. On the
contrary, this word "God" can of itself be taken for the divine
essence. So, although to say of any of the "supposita" of the divine
nature, "God is the Trinity," is untrue, nevertheless it is true of the
divine essence. This was denied by Porretanus because he did not take
note of this distinction.
Reply to Objection 2: When we say, "God," or "the divine essence is the
Father," the predication is one of identity, and not of the lower in
regard to a higher species: because in God there is no universal and
singular. Hence, as this proposition, "The Father is God" is of itself
true, so this proposition "God is the Father" is true of itself, and by
no means accidentally.
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Whether the essential names should be appropriated to the persons?
Objection 1: It would seem that the essential names should not be
appropriated to the persons. For whatever might verge on error in faith
should be avoided in the treatment of divine things; for, as Jerome
says, "careless words involve risk of heresy" [*In substance Ep.
lvii. ]. But to appropriate to any one person the names which are common
to the three persons, may verge on error in faith; for it may be
supposed either that such belong only to the person to whom they are
appropriated or that they belong to Him in a fuller degree than to the
others. Therefore the essential attributes should not be appropriated
to the persons.
Objection 2: Further, the essential attributes expressed in the
abstract signify by mode of form. But one person is not as a form to
another; since a form is not distinguished in subject from that of
which it is the form. Therefore the essential attributes, especially
when expressed in the abstract, are not to be appropriated to the
persons.
Objection 3: Further, property is prior to the appropriated, for
property is included in the idea of the appropriated. But the essential
attributes, in our way of understanding, are prior to the persons; as
what is common is prior to what is proper. Therefore the essential
attributes are not to be appropriated to the persons.
On the contrary, the Apostle says: "Christ the power of God and the
wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24).
I answer that, For the manifestation of our faith it is fitting that
the essential attributes should be appropriated to the persons. For
although the trinity of persons cannot be proved by demonstration, as
was above expounded ([327]Q[32], A[1]), nevertheless it is fitting that
it be declared by things which are more known to us. Now the essential
attributes of God are more clear to us from the standpoint of reason
than the personal properties; because we can derive certain knowledge
of the essential attributes from creatures which are sources of
knowledge to us, such as we cannot obtain regarding the personal
properties, as was above explained ([328]Q[32], A[1]). As, therefore,
we make use of the likeness of the trace or image found in creatures
for the manifestation of the divine persons, so also in the same manner
do we make use of the essential attributes. And such a manifestation of
the divine persons by the use of the essential attributes is called
"appropriation. "
The divine person can be manifested in a twofold manner by the
essential attributes; in one way by similitude, and thus the things
which belong to the intellect are appropriated to the Son, Who proceeds
by way of intellect, as Word. In another way by dissimilitude; as power
is appropriated to the Father, as Augustine says, because fathers by
reason of old age are sometimes feeble; lest anything of the kind be
imagined of God.
Reply to Objection 1: The essential attributes are not appropriated to
the persons as if they exclusively belonged to them; but in order to
make the persons manifest by way of similitude, or dissimilitude, as
above explained. So, no error in faith can arise, but rather
manifestation of the truth.
Reply to Objection 2: If the essential attributes were appropriated to
the persons as exclusively belonging to each of them, then it would
follow that one person would be as a form as regards another; which
Augustine altogether repudiates (De Trin. vi, 2), showing that the
Father is wise, not by Wisdom begotten by Him, as though only the Son
were Wisdom; so that the Father and the Son together only can be called
wise, but not the Father without the Son. But the Son is called the
Wisdom of the Father, because He is Wisdom from the Father Who is
Wisdom. For each of them is of Himself Wisdom; and both together are
one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten by
Him, but by the wisdom which is His own essence.
Reply to Objection 3: Although the essential attribute is in its proper
concept prior to person, according to our way of understanding;
nevertheless, so far as it is appropriated, there is nothing to prevent
the personal property from being prior to that which is appropriated.
Thus color is posterior to body considered as body, but is naturally
prior to "white body," considered as white.
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Whether the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons in a
fitting manner by the holy doctors?
Objection 1: It would seem that the essential attributes are
appropriated to the persons unfittingly by the holy doctors. For Hilary
says (De Trin. ii): "Eternity is in the Father, the species in the
Image; and use is in the Gift. " In which words he designates three
names proper to the persons: the name of the "Father," the name "Image"
proper to the Son ([329]Q[35], A[2]), and the name "Bounty" or "Gift,"
which is proper to the Holy Ghost ([330]Q[38], A[2]). He also
designates three appropriated terms. For he appropriates "eternity" to
the Father, "species" to the Son, and "use" to the Holy Ghost. This he
does apparently without reason. For "eternity" imports duration of
existence; "species," the principle of existence; and 'use' belongs to
the operation. But essence and operation are not found to be
appropriated to any person. Therefore the above terms are not fittingly
appropriated to the persons.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): "Unity
is in the Father, equality in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost is the
concord of equality and unity. " This does not, however, seem fitting;
because one person does not receive formal denomination from what is
appropriated to another. For the Father is not wise by the wisdom
begotten, as above explained ([331]Q[37], A[2], ad 1). But, as he
subjoins, "All these three are one by the Father; all are equal by the
Son, and all united by the Holy Ghost. " The above, therefore, are not
fittingly appropriated to the Persons.
Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine, to the Father is
attributed "power," to the Son "wisdom," to the Holy Ghost "goodness. "
Nor does this seem fitting; for "strength" is part of power, whereas
strength is found to be appropriated to the Son, according to the text,
"Christ the strength [*Douay: power] of God" (1 Cor. 1:24). So it is
likewise appropriated to the Holy Ghost, according to the words,
"strength [*Douay: virtue] came out from Him and healed all" (Lk.
6:19). Therefore power should not be appropriated to the Father.
Objection 4: Likewise Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "What the
Apostle says, "From Him, and by Him, and in Him," is not to be taken in
a confused sense. " And (Contra Maxim. ii) "'from Him' refers to the
Father, 'by Him' to the Son, 'in Him' to the Holy Ghost. '" This,
however, seems to be incorrectly said; for the words "in Him" seem to
imply the relation of final cause, which is first among the causes.
Therefore this relation of cause should be appropriated to the Father,
Who is "the principle from no principle. "
Objection 5: Likewise, Truth is appropriated to the Son, according to
Jn. 14:6, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life"; and likewise "the
book of life," according to Ps. 39:9, "In the beginning of the book it
is written of Me," where a gloss observes, "that is, with the Father
Who is My head," also this word "Who is"; because on the text of Is.
65:1, "Behold I go to the Gentiles," a gloss adds, "The Son speaks Who
said to Moses, I am Who am. " These appear to belong to the Son, and are
not appropriated. For "truth," according to Augustine (De Vera Relig.
36), "is the supreme similitude of the principle without any
dissimilitude. " So it seems that it properly belongs to the Son, Who
has a principle. Also the "book of life" seems proper to the Son, as
signifying "a thing from another"; for every book is written by
someone. This also, "Who is," appears to be proper to the Son; because
if when it was said to Moses, "I am Who am," the Trinity spoke, then
Moses could have said, "He Who is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and the
Holy Ghost sent me to you," so also he could have said further, "He Who
is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you,"
pointing out a certain person. This, however, is false; because no
person is Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it cannot be common to
the Trinity, but is proper to the Son.
I answer that, Our intellect, which is led to the knowledge of God from
creatures, must consider God according to the mode derived from
creatures. In considering any creature four points present themselves
to us in due order. Firstly, the thing itself taken absolutely is
considered as a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its
intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered. The fourth
point of consideration embraces its relation to its effects. Hence this
fourfold consideration comes to our mind in reference to God.
According to the first point of consideration, whereby we consider God
absolutely in His being, the appropriation mentioned by Hilary applies,
according to which "eternity" is appropriated to the Father, "species"
to the Son, "use" to the Holy Ghost. For "eternity" as meaning a
"being" without a principle, has a likeness to the property of the
Father, Who is "a principle without a principle. " Species or beauty has
a likeness to the property of the Son. For beauty includes three
conditions, "integrity" or "perfection," since those things which are
impaired are by the very fact ugly; due "proportion" or "harmony"; and
lastly, "brightness" or "clarity," whence things are called beautiful
which have a bright color.
The first of these has a likeness to the property of the Son, inasmuch
as He as Son has in Himself truly and perfectly the nature of the
Father. To insinuate this, Augustine says in his explanation (De Trin.
vi, 10): "Where---that is, in the Son---there is supreme and primal
life," etc.
The second agrees with the Son's property, inasmuch as He is the
express Image of the Father. Hence we see that an image is said to be
beautiful, if it perfectly represents even an ugly thing.
This is
indicated by Augustine when he says (De Trin. vi, 10), "Where there
exists wondrous proportion and primal equality," etc.
The third agrees with the property of the Son, as the Word, which is
the light and splendor of the intellect, as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iii, 3). Augustine alludes to the same when he says (De Trin. vi,
10): "As the perfect Word, not wanting in anything, and, so to speak,
the art of the omnipotent God," etc.
"Use" has a likeness to the property of the Holy Ghost; provided the
"use" be taken in a wide sense, as including also the sense of "to
enjoy"; according as "to use" is to employ something at the beck of the
will, and "to enjoy" means to use joyfully, as Augustine says (De Trin.
x, 11). So "use," whereby the Father and the Son enjoy each other,
agrees with the property of the Holy Ghost, as Love. This is what
Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "That love, that delectation, that
felicity or beatitude, is called use by him" (Hilary). But the "use" by
which we enjoy God, is likened to the property of the Holy Ghost as the
Gift; and Augustine points to this when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): "In
the Trinity, the Holy Ghost, the sweetness of the Begettor and the
Begotten, pours out upon us mere creatures His immense bounty and
wealth. " Thus it is clear how "eternity," "species," and "use" are
attributed or appropriated to the persons, but not essence or
operation; because, being common, there is nothing in their concept to
liken them to the properties of the Persons.
The second consideration of God regards Him as "one. " In that view
Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) appropriates "unity" to the Father,
"equality" to the Son, "concord" or "union" to the Holy Ghost. It is
manifest that these three imply unity, but in different ways. For
"unity" is said absolutely, as it does not presuppose anything else;
and for this reason it is appropriated to the Father, to Whom any other
person is not presupposed since He is the "principle without
principle. " "Equality" implies unity as regards another; for that is
equal which has the same quantity as another. So equality is
appropriated to the Son, Who is the "principle from a principle. "
"Union" implies the unity of two; and is therefore appropriated to the
Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He proceeds from two. And from this we can
understand what Augustine means when he says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5)
that "The Three are one, by reason of the Father; They are equal by
reason of the Son; and are united by reason of the Holy Ghost. " For it
is clear that we trace a thing back to that in which we find it first:
just as in this lower world we attribute life to the vegetative soul,
because therein we find the first trace of life. Now "unity" is
perceived at once in the person of the Father, even if by an impossible
hypothesis, the other persons were removed. So the other persons derive
their unity from the Father. But if the other persons be removed, we do
not find equality in the Father, but we find it as soon as we suppose
the Son. So, all are equal by reason of the Son, not as if the Son were
the principle of equality in the Father, but that, without the Son
equal to the Father, the Father could not be called equal; because His
equality is considered firstly in regard to the Son: for that the Holy
Ghost is equal to the Father, is also from the Son. Likewise, if the
Holy Ghost, Who is the union of the two, be excluded, we cannot
understand the oneness of the union between the Father and the Son. So
all are connected by reason of the Holy Ghost; because given the Holy
Ghost, we find whence the Father and the Son are said to be united.
According to the third consideration, which brings before us the
adequate power of God in the sphere of causality, there is said to be a
third kind of appropriation, of "power," "wisdom," and "goodness. " This
kind of appropriation is made both by reason of similitude as regards
what exists in the divine persons, and by reason of dissimilitude if we
consider what is in creatures. For "power" has the nature of a
principle, and so it has a likeness to the heavenly Father, Who is the
principle of the whole Godhead. But in an earthly father it is wanting
sometimes by reason of old age. "Wisdom" has likeness to the heavenly
Son, as the Word, for a word is nothing but the concept of wisdom. In
an earthly son this is sometimes absent by reason of lack of years.
"Goodness," as the nature and object of love, has likeness to the Holy
Ghost; but seems repugnant to the earthly spirit, which often implies a
certain violent impulse, according to Is. 25:4: "The spirit of the
strong is as a blast beating on the wall. " "Strength" is appropriated
to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, not as denoting the power itself of a
thing, but as sometimes used to express that which proceeds from power;
for instance, we say that the strong work done by an agent is its
strength.
According to the fourth consideration, i. e. God's relation to His
effects, there arise appropriation of the expression "from Whom, by
Whom, and in Whom. " For this preposition "from" [ex] sometimes implies
a certain relation of the material cause; which has no place in God;
and sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient cause, which
can be applied to God by reason of His active power; hence it is
appropriated to the Father in the same way as power. The preposition
"by" [per] sometimes designates an intermediate cause; thus we may say
that a smith works "by" a hammer. Hence the word "by" is not always
appropriated to the Son, but belongs to the Son properly and strictly,
according to the text, "All things were made by Him" (Jn. 1:3); not
that the Son is an instrument, but as "the principle from a principle. "
Sometimes it designates the habitude of a form "by" which an agent
works; thus we say that an artificer works by his art. Hence, as wisdom
and art are appropriated to the Son, so also is the expression "by
Whom. " The preposition "in" strictly denotes the habitude of one
containing. Now, God contains things in two ways: in one way by their
similitudes; thus things are said to be in God, as existing in His
knowledge. In this sense the expression "in Him" should be appropriated
to the Son. In another sense things are contained in God forasmuch as
He in His goodness preserves and governs them, by guiding them to a
fitting end; and in this sense the expression "in Him" is appropriated
to the Holy Ghost, as likewise is "goodness. " Nor need the habitude of
the final cause (though the first of causes) be appropriated to the
Father, Who is "the principle without a principle": because the divine
persons, of Whom the Father is the principle, do not proceed from Him
as towards an end, since each of Them is the last end; but They proceed
by a natural procession, which seems more to belong to the nature of a
natural power.
Regarding the other points of inquiry, we can say that since "truth"
belongs to the intellect, as stated above ([332]Q[16], A[1]), it is
appropriated to the Son, without, however, being a property of His. For
truth can be considered as existing in the thought or in the thing
itself. Hence, as intellect and thing in their essential meaning, are
referred to the essence, and not to the persons, so the same is to be
said of truth. The definition quoted from Augustine belongs to truth as
appropriated to the Son. The "book of life" directly means knowledge
but indirectly it means life. For, as above explained ([333]Q[24],
A[1]), it is God's knowledge regarding those who are to possess eternal
life. Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son; although life is
appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as implying a certain kind of interior
movement, agreeing in that sense with the property of the Holy Ghost as
Love. To be written by another is not of the essence of a book
considered as such; but this belongs to it only as a work produced. So
this does not imply origin; nor is it personal, but an appropriation to
a person. The expression "Who is" is appropriated to the person of the
Son, not by reason of itself, but by reason of an adjunct, inasmuch as,
in God's word to Moses, was prefigured the delivery of the human race
accomplished by the Son. Yet, forasmuch as the word "Who" is taken in a
relative sense, it may sometimes relate to the person of the Son; and
in that sense it would be taken personally; as, for instance, were we
to say, "The Son is the begotten 'Who is,'" inasmuch as "God begotten
is personal. " But taken indefinitely, it is an essential term. And
although the pronoun "this" [iste] seems grammatically to point to a
particular person, nevertheless everything that we can point to can be
grammatically treated as a person, although in its own nature it is not
a person; as we may say, "this stone," and "this ass. " So, speaking in
a grammatical sense, so far as the word "God" signifies and stands for
the divine essence, the latter may be designated by the pronoun "this,"
according to Ex. 15:2: "This is my God, and I will glorify Him. "
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PERSONS AS COMPARED TO THE RELATIONS OR PROPERTIES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider the persons in connection with the relations, or
properties; and there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether relation is the same as person?
(2) Whether the relations distinguish and constitute the persons?
(3) Whether mental abstraction of the relations from the persons leaves
the hypostases distinct?
(4) Whether the relations, according to our mode of understanding,
presuppose the acts of the persons, or contrariwise?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether relation is the same as person?
Objection 1: It would seem that in God relation is not the same as
person. For when things are identical, if one is multiplied the others
are multiplied. But in one person there are several relations; as in
the person of the Father there is paternity and common spiration.
Again, one relation exists in two person, as common spiration in the
Father and in the Son. Therefore relation is not the same as person.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text.
24), nothing is contained by itself. But relation is in the person; nor
can it be said that this occurs because they are identical, for
otherwise relation would be also in the essence. Therefore relation, or
property, is not the same as person in God.
Objection 3: Further, when several things are identical, what is
predicated of one is predicated of the others. But all that is
predicated of a Person is not predicated of His property. For we say
that the Father begets; but not that the paternity is begetting.
Therefore property is not the same as person in God.
On the contrary, in God "what is" and "whereby it is" are the same,
according to Boethius (De Hebdom. ). But the Father is Father by
paternity. In the same way, the other properties are the same as the
persons.
I answer that, Different opinions have been held on this point. Some
have said that the properties are not the persons, nor in the persons;
and these have thought thus owing to the mode of signification of the
relations, which do not indeed signify existence "in" something, but
rather existence "towards" something. Whence, they styled the relations
"assistant," as above explained ([334]Q[28], A[2]). But since relation,
considered as really existing in God, is the divine essence Itself, and
the essence is the same as person, as appears from what was said above
([335]Q[39], A[1]), relation must necessarily be the same as person.
Others, therefore, considering this identity, said that the properties
were indeed the persons; but not "in" the persons; for, they said,
there are no properties in God except in our way of speaking, as stated
above ([336]Q[32], A[2]). We must, however, say that there are
properties in God; as we have shown ([337]Q[32], A[2]). These are
designated by abstract terms, being forms, as it were, of the persons.
So, since the nature of a form requires it to be "in" that of which it
is the form, we must say that the properties are in the persons, and
yet that they are the persons; as we say that the essence is in God,
and yet is God.
Reply to Objection 1: Person and property are really the same, but
differ in concept. Consequently, it does not follow that if one is
multiplied, the other must also be multiplied. We must, however,
consider that in God, by reason of the divine simplicity, a twofold
real identity exists as regards what in creatures are distinct. For,
since the divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter and
form, it follows that in God the abstract is the same as the concrete,
as "Godhead" and "God. " And as the divine simplicity excludes the
composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever is
attributed to God, is His essence Itself; and so, wisdom and power are
the same in God, because they are both in the divine essence. According
to this twofold identity, property in God is the same person. For
personal properties are the same as the persons because the abstract
and the concrete are the same in God; since they are the subsisting
persons themselves, as paternity is the Father Himself, and filiation
is the Son, and procession is the Holy Ghost. But the non-personal
properties are the same as the persons according to the other reason of
identity, whereby whatever is attributed to God is His own essence.
Thus, common spiration is the same as the person of the Father, and the
person of the Son; not that it is one self-subsisting person; but that
as there is one essence in the two persons, so also there is one
property in the two persons, as above explained ([338]Q[30], A[2] ).
Reply to Objection 2: The properties are said to be in the essence,
only by mode of identity; but in the persons they exist by mode of
identity, not merely in reality, but also in the mode of signification;
as the form exists in its subject. Thus the properties determine and
distinguish the persons, but not the essence.
Reply to Objection 3: Notional participles and verbs signify the
notional acts: and acts belong to a "suppositum. " Now, properties are
not designated as "supposita," but as forms of "supposita. " And so
their mode of signification is against notional participles and verbs
being predicated of the properties.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the persons are distinguished by the relations?
Objection 1: It would seem that the persons are not distinguished by
the relations. For simple things are distinct by themselves. But the
persons are supremely simple. Therefore they are distinguished by
themselves, and not by the relation.
Objection 2: Further, a form is distinguished only in relation to its
genus. For white is distinguished from black only by quality. But
"hypostasis" signifies an individual in the genus of substance.
Therefore the hypostases cannot be distinguished by relations.
Objection 3: Further, what is absolute comes before what is relative.
But the distinction of the divine persons is the primary distinction.
Therefore the divine persons are not distinguished by the relations.
Objection 4: Further, whatever presupposes distinction cannot be the
first principle of distinction. But relation presupposes distinction,
which comes into its definition; for a relation is essentially what is
towards another. Therefore the first distinctive principle in God
cannot be relation.
On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin. ): "Relation alone multiplies
the Trinity of the divine persons. "
I answer that, In whatever multitude of things is to be found something
common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of
distinction. So, as the three persons agree in the unity of essence, we
must seek to know the principle of distinction whereby they are
several. Now, there are two principles of difference between the divine
persons, and these are "origin" and "relation. " Although these do not
really differ, yet they differ in the mode of signification; for
"origin" is signified by way of act, as "generation"; and "relation" by
way of the form, as "paternity. "
Some, then, considering that relation follows upon act, have said that
the divine hypostases are distinguished by origin, so that we may say
that the Father is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the former
begets and the latter is begotten. Further, that the relations, or the
properties, make known the distinctions of the hypostases or persons as
resulting therefrom; as also in creatures the properties manifest the
distinctions of individuals, which distinctions are caused by the
material principles.
This opinion, however, cannot stand---for two reasons. Firstly,
because, in order that two things be understood as distinct, their
distinction must be understood as resulting from something intrinsic to
both; thus in things created it results from their matter or their
form. Now origin of a thing does not designate anything intrinsic, but
means the way from something, or to something; as generation signifies
the way to a thing generated, and as proceeding from the generator.
Hence it is not possible that what is generated and the generator
should be distinguished by generation alone; but in the generator and
in the thing generated we must presuppose whatever makes them to be
distinguished from each other. In a divine person there is nothing to
presuppose but essence, and relation or property. Whence, since the
persons agree in essence, it only remains to be said that the persons
are distinguished from each other by the relations. Secondly: because
the distinction of the divine persons is not to be so understood as if
what is common to them all is divided, because the common essence
remains undivided; but the distinguishing principles themselves must
constitute the things which are distinct. Now the relations or the
properties distinguish or constitute the hypostases or persons,
inasmuch as they are themselves the subsisting persons; as paternity is
the Father, and filiation is the Son, because in God the abstract and
the concrete do not differ. But it is against the nature of origin that
it should constitute hypostasis or person. For origin taken in an
active sense signifies proceeding from a subsisting person, so that it
presupposes the latter; while in a passive sense origin, as "nativity,"
signifies the way to a subsisting person, and as not yet constituting
the person.
It is therefore better to say that the persons or hypostases are
distinguished rather by relations than by origin. For, although in both
ways they are distinguished, nevertheless in our mode of understanding
they are distinguished chiefly and firstly by relations; whence this
name "Father" signifies not only a property, but also the hypostasis;
whereas this term "Begetter" or "Begetting" signifies property only;
forasmuch as this name "Father" signifies the relation which is
distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis; and this term
"Begetter" or "Begotten" signifies the origin which is not distinctive
and constitutive of the hypostasis.
Reply to Objection 1: The persons are the subsisting relations
themselves. Hence it is not against the simplicity of the divine
persons for them to be distinguished by the relations.
Reply to Objection 2: The divine persons are not distinguished as
regards being, in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but
only as regards something relative. Hence relation suffices for their
distinction.
Reply to Objection 3: The more prior a distinction is, the nearer it
approaches to unity; and so it must be the least possible distinction.
So the distinction of the persons must be by that which distinguishes
the least possible; and this is by relation.
Reply to Objection 4: Relation presupposes the distinction of the
subjects, when it is an accident; but when the relation is subsistent,
it does not presuppose, but brings about distinction. For when it is
said that relation is by nature to be towards another, the word
"another" signifies the correlative which is not prior, but
simultaneous in the order of nature.
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Whether the hypostases remain if the relations are mentally abstracted from
the persons?
Objection 1: It would seem that the hypostases remain if the properties
or relations are mentally abstracted from the persons. For that to
which something is added, may be understood when the addition is taken
away; as man is something added to animal which can be understood if
rational be taken away. But person is something added to hypostasis;
for person is "a hypostasis distinguished by a property of dignity. "
Therefore, if a personal property be taken away from a person, the
hypostasis remains.
Objection 2: Further, that the Father is Father, and that He is
someone, are not due to the same reason. For as He is the Father by
paternity, supposing He is some one by paternity, it would follow that
the Son, in Whom there is not paternity, would not be "someone. " So
when paternity is mentally abstracted from the Father, He still remains
"someone"---that is, a hypostasis. Therefore, if property be removed
from person, the hypostasis remains.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6): "Unbegotten is
not the same as Father; for if the Father had not begotten the Son,
nothing would prevent Him being called unbegotten. " But if He had not
begotten the Son, there would be no paternity in Him. Therefore, if
paternity be removed, there still remains the hypostasis of the Father
as unbegotten.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The Son has nothing else
than birth. " But He is Son by "birth. " Therefore, if filiation be
removed, the Son's hypostasis no more remains; and the same holds as
regards the other persons.
I answer that, Abstraction by the intellect is twofold---when the
universal is abstracted from the particular, as animal abstracted from
man; and when the form is abstracted from the matter, as the form of a
circle is abstracted by the intellect from any sensible matter. The
difference between these two abstractions consists in the fact that in
the abstraction of the universal from the particular, that from which
the abstraction is made does not remain; for when the difference of
rationality is removed from man, the man no longer remains in the
intellect, but animal alone remains. But in the abstraction of the form
from the matter, both the form and the matter remain in the intellect;
as, for instance, if we abstract the form of a circle from brass, there
remains in our intellect separately the understanding both of a circle,
and of brass. Now, although there is no universal nor particular in
God, nor form and matter, in reality; nevertheless, as regards the mode
of signification there is a certain likeness of these things in God;
and thus Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that "substance is
common and hypostasis is particular. " So, if we speak of the
abstraction of the universal from the particular, the common universal
essence remains in the intellect if the properties are removed; but not
the hypostasis of the Father, which is, as it were, a particular.
But as regards the abstraction of the form from the matter, if the
non-personal properties are removed, then the idea of the hypostases
and persons remains; as, for instance, if the fact of the Father's
being unbegotten or spirating be mentally abstracted from the Father,
the Father's hypostasis or person remains.
If, however, the personal property be mentally abstracted, the idea of
the hypostasis no longer remains. For the personal properties are not
to be understood as added to the divine hypostases, as a form is added
to a pre-existing subject: but they carry with them their own
"supposita," inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting persons; thus
paternity is the Father Himself. For hypostasis signifies something
distinct in God, since hypostasis means an individual substance. So, as
relation distinguishes and constitutes the hypostases, as above
explained [339](A[2]), it follows that if the personal relations are
mentally abstracted, the hypostases no longer remain. Some, however,
think, as above noted, that the divine hypostases are not distinguished
by the relations, but only by origin; so that the Father is a
hypostasis as not from another, and the Son is a hypostasis as from
another by generation. And that the consequent relations which are to
be regarded as properties of dignity, constitute the notion of a
person, and are thus called "personal properties. " Hence, if these
relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostasis, but not the persons,
remain.
But this is impossible, for two reasons: first, because the relations
distinguish and constitute the hypostases, as shown above [340](A[2]);
secondly, because every hypostasis of a rational nature is a person, as
appears from the definition of Boethius (De Duab. Nat. ) that, "person
is the individual substance of a rational nature. " Hence, to have
hypostasis and not person, it would be necessary to abstract the
rationality from the nature, but not the property from the person.
Reply to Objection 1: Person does not add to hypostasis a
distinguishing property absolutely, but a distinguishing property of
dignity, all of which must be taken as the difference. Now, this
distinguishing property is one of dignity precisely because it is
understood as subsisting in a rational nature. Hence, if the
distinguishing property be removed from the person, the hypostasis no
longer remains; whereas it would remain were the rationality of the
nature removed; for both person and hypostasis are individual
substances. Consequently, in God the distinguishing relation belongs
essentially to both.
Reply to Objection 2: By paternity the Father is not only Father, but
is a person, and is "someone," or a hypostasis. It does not follow,
however, that the Son is not "someone" or a hypostasis; just as it does
not follow that He is not a person.
Reply to Objection 3: Augustine does not mean to say that the
hypostasis of the Father would remain as unbegotten, if His paternity
were removed, as if innascibility constituted and distinguished the
hypostasis of the Father; for this would be impossible, since "being
unbegotten" says nothing positive and is only a negation, as he himself
says.
