No More Learning

-- ab: The Subduer said, "That which is the complete abandonment, removal, and extinction of this suffering . . . the abandonment of all the aggregates, the end of worldly existence and separation from attachment, is cessation and nirvana. " According to proponents of functional things as truly existent, this citation means the aggregates are entirely non-existent in the sphere of nirvana. Nor can there be a person imputed in dependence upon them, for neither the reliance nor reliant exist
-- cd: Neither the aggregates nor the person are seen as a truly existent reliance which reaches nirvana through the ending of disturbing attitudes and rebirth. What truly existent nirvana reliant upon that is there? Not the slightest, thus one should accept liberation, too, as a mere imputation. )
.
L5: [2. Refuting other sectarians' liberation identified with the self]
L6: [a. Refuting the permanent liberation consisting of consciousness imputed by Samkhyas]
.
\ ###
\ 222.
\ When free from attachment at [the time of] liberation
\ What good is the existence of consciousness?
\ Also to exist without consciousness
\ Is clearly the same as not existing.
.
(i. e. The real nature of the self is not existence, not non-existence: It is wrong to think that a primordial individual consciousness can be Liberated. There would be no need for consciousness at liberation; and there is no person without consciousness. )
.
(With or without consciousness, there could be no self at liberation: If there is no self in nirvana, then there is no self- consciousness. So it is not existing, not not-existing, not both, not neither. It is beyond conceptualization.
-- Samkhyas assertion: According to us there is no flaw that nirvana is not liberation because of lacking a reliance. When an adept understands that the principal and person are different the process of involvement in cyclic existence such as the great one and so forth stops. When everything subsides into the latent state of the principal, the conscious person remains alone. Thus there is a liberated self.
19 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
-- Answer ab: It follows that it is illogical to accept the existence of a conscious person at the time of liberation when there is freedom from attachment to objects, because you assert that the intellect makes known to the person objects to which there is attraction. You also assert that it is the person's nature to be conscious and that this is permanent and immutable. What is the value of accepting the existence of consciousness during liberation? There is not the slightest value, because while accepting the conscious person as an experiencer of objects, the transformations which are experienced no longer exist, having subsided into a latent state.
-- Question: What if the person remains without consciousness at liberation?
-- Answer cd: It follows that to accept the existence of a liberated person without consciousness clearly amounts to accepting the person's non-existence, because of accepting that the person and consciousness are of one nature, being either equally existent or non-existent. )
.
L6: [b. Refuting permanent liberation consisting of the potential for the existence of consciousness]
.
\ ###
\ 223.
\ If at liberation a self existed
\ There could be a seed of consciousness.
\ Without it there is no speculation
\ With regard to worldly existence.
.
(i. e. The true nature of the self and liberation is beyond conceptualization - speculating is useless: There no need to speculate about anything after liberation, after the cessation of those illusions. The real meaning of Liberation is beyond all conceptualization. )
.
(Without a self, there is no world, no need to speculate.
-- Assertion: There is a self during liberation, for though there is no actual consciousness, the potential to be conscious of objects exists.
-- Answer ab: That too is illogical.
-- If at liberation a self existed, there could be such a potential or seed of consciousness, but at that time there is no consciousness.
-- Objection: If there is no liberated self, there is no liberation and thus cyclic existence is indestructible. Many unwanted entailments arise.
-- Answer cd: It is irrelevant to speculate whether, because there is consciousnesses, [people would or would not enter liberation] or whether, because its seed is truly existent, people would or would not enter worldly existence. It would be relevant if a self as reliance existed but there is no liberated self. )
.
L6: [c. Suitability of the complete abandonment of conceptions of a self as liberation]
.
\ ###
\ 224.
\ It is certain that those liberated
\ From suffering have no other [self].
\ Therefore the end of the self
\ Should always be affirmed as good.
.
(i. e. Let's concentrate on no-self for now: The real nature of the self is beyond conceptualization; what happen after Liberation is imponderable. There no need to speculate about anything after liberation, after the cessation of all illusions. Instead of speculating about what is beyond all conceptualization, we should concentrate on the actual problem: the belief in a permanent self, and the realization that it is the root cause of all suffering. That is a sure thing in the actual context. )
.
(So don't think about liberating a permanent self -- that would be a mistake: So without the perception of a self based on the five aggregates, there is no more suffering. And there is no other causeless permanent self which does not depend on the aggregates. There is no liberated self.
-- It is certain that in the state of nirvana, people who have gained liberation from suffering by completely abandoning the contaminated aggregates through the total elimination of disturbing attitudes and emotions have no other causeless permanent self which does not depend on the aggregates. Therefore people who aspire to become free should always affirm that the complete ending forever of conceptions of a self is good and should never assert the existence of such a
20 / 117
useless liberated self. ) .
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
L3: [III. Arguing the unsuitability of refuting true existence]
.
\ ###
\ 225.
\ The conventional is preferable
\ But the ultimate never is.
\ Ordinary people have some [belief in this]
\ But none in the ultimate.
.
(i. e. Without falling into the other extreme, using a gradual path: On the other hand, we should not fall into the other extreme - nihilism, thinking there is no self at all, no path at all. Between the two truths, or between two extremes, it is preferable for beginners to think that there is a self that has to be Liberated by following a path consisting of virtuous methods - to think in real cause and effect like taught in the teaching of dependent origination, the Wheel of Life. It is preferable to start with the Hinayana teachings, because of the danger of total rejection of the dharma or failing into nihilism are great. Then it is preferable to teach love, compassion, patience, bodhicitta. Receptivity to a more subtle wisdom will come later. But, of course, a right path has to combine method and wisdom (the two accumulations) all the time, because only the wisdom directly realizing the true nature of reality is the final antidote, and only accumulating enough merit can make this possible. )
.
(-- Assertion: "the four lines of the stanza. "
-- If during liberation there is no liberated self, and nirvana which is termed the ultimate is said to be mere ending of conceptions of a self through the non-recurrence of that which is composite, what is the purpose of striving for such an ultimate? It is preferable for those interested in their own good to accept conventionalities like eyes, sprouts and so forth but not to assert any ultimate, for ordinary people have some belief in virtuous and non-virtuous actions, their homes, forests and so forth but none whatsoever in the ultimate.
-- This stanza was written in connection with the extensive refutation of the self in the following chapter. Since it is interpreted as a controversial contention in Candrakirti's commentary, it should not be accepted as our own contention. ) .
L3: [The summarizing stanza:]
.
\ ###
\ Discovering that external (i. e. world) and internal (i. e. mind) dependently arising Phenomena (i. e. the five aggregates) exist in reliance (i. e. dependently arisen - conventional truths / existence),
\ and understanding Their emptiness of existence (i. e. ultimate truth / non-existence) by way of their own entities,
\ Grow wise in the meaning of THE MIDDLE WAY FREE FROM EXTREMES. (i. e. Tetralemma - Aiming at the Union of The Two Truths)
.
(i. e. Trying to stay with the Middle Way using both method and wisdom together: The Union of method and wisdom. The Middle Way: at the same time as we use virtuous methods based on the law of dependent origination (causality) to accumulate merit, we need to gradually develop the wisdom realizing the emptiness of inherent existence of all dharma (including causes, conditions and causality, including dependent origination and all virtuous methods and paths). But that doesn't mean that there is no cause, condition or causality at all, or that we should drop all virtuous paths right now. We need both method and wisdom together all the time, because this is more in accord with the real non-dual nature of everything which is beyond all conceptualization. )
.
\ ###
\ This is the ninth chapter from the Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds, showing how to meditate on the refutation of permanent functional phenomena.
.
This concludes the commentary on the ninth chapter, showing how to meditate on the refutation of permanent functional phenomena, from Essence of Good Explanations, Explanation of the "Four Hundred on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas".
21 / 117
.
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
L2: [Chapter 10 - Refuting Misconceptions of the Self -
There is nothing permanent that is having rebirths, or is being Liberated - P. 215]
(i. e. SHOWING HOW TO MEDITATE ON REFUTING THE SELF.
-- Individual refutation of truly existent functional phenomena: Refuting the self.
.
-- Refuting various views of a permanent self:
-- Because the self is not real, it is not viewed as the same way by all opponents
.
-- As a permanent cause:
-- A cause cannot be permanent, thus the self cannot be permanent
-- An intangible self could not be the cause of the movement of tangible things
-- A permanent self/cause and its effects would not depend on other conditions; but that is not what is seen
-- Everything is not entirely existent only in the mind; there is a flow out there
-- Real existent cause and effect, because they cannot exist simultaneously nor be separate, could not explain continuity .
-- The permanent self vs. the aggregates: no one, not separate
-- A permanent self cannot be found in the aggregates, or outside of them
-- (The individual self is not identical to the aggregates, it is not different / separate. )
-- A permanent self would not change from one rebirth to another
-- A permanent self could not be matter only
-- A permanent self is not mental either, because mental states changes
-- A permanent consciousness, a knower, would not need the sense organs
-- A permanent self without a consciousness is unimaginable
-- Changing from potential to consciousness would mean not permanent
-- Again a person without consciousness is not imaginable
-- A liberated person without a self ?
-- (There is no self-nature that transmigrate (in the dispositions or aggregates, or out of it) )
-- (There is no subtle-self separate from an ego to Liberate. Some very subtle self-nature to purify. )
-- (There is no self bound in samsara, there is no bounding, there is no i, ii, iii; there is no self liberated, no liberation) .
-- Something omnipresent does not need to act, thus the self cannot be omnipresent
-- An actionless self, non-functional, is as non-existent
-- The "I" is relative to the subject, it is not an absolute independent functional thing
-- A permanent self would not change, nor be harmed, nor need protection, morality, or seek liberation
.
-- Concluding that there is no real self
-- It is more useful : (If there is no self, then there is no possessions, and no need to protect or satisfy an "ego". Thus all the defilements have no foundation, we can let go. There is not even a self with no ego (like implicit in self-Liberation). There is no "I" in opposition to "the World". And all the mental constructions based on this assumption are stopped. There is no more acquisition of karma resulting in the five aggregates (from rebirth, or as adaptation within a suppose "life"). There is no more accumulation of knowledge, expectations, views. And there is no more deceptions. It is this release, this stopping of mental constructions (based on self-existence), seeing everything as empty (even a very subtle self), that is Liberation. )
-- The wise does concludes that
-- Liberation would not be attained through lies
.
-- Impermanence does not necessitate discontinuation :
-- Products which undergo change moment by moment are neither permanent nor do they discontinue.
-- No need of a permanent self, as a support for karma, to explain memory, bondage, continuity, and liberation
-- The flow is from impermanent causes to impermanent effects, without limits on both sides
-- Everything is both cause and effect, both part and composite, everything continually change nothing last even a moment
-- Nothing is permanent in the flow / continuum
-- The illusion of real things, the names, are given by the mind trying to build conceptual models of the flow regularity
.
-- Avoiding the two extremes:
22 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
-- (But this does not mean that there is no self at all: It is not individual self, it is not non-individual self at all. Don't go to the other extreme: nihilism. )
-- origination fights annihilation/nihilism and impermanence/emptiness fight eternity/inherent existence
-- (THE UNION OF THE TWO TRUTHS (Dependent Origination, Emptiness))
.
L3: [I. Individual refutations of the self] L4: [A. Refuting the Vaisesika self] L5: [1. Refuting the nature of the self] L6: [a. Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 226.
\ When the inner self is not
\ Female, male or neuter,
\ It is only out of ignorance
\ That you think your own self male.
.
(i. e. There is no inherently existing self with its own permanent attributes defining it. Gender cannot be an essential attribute of the permanent inner self since it can change with rebirths. The basis for the attributes cannot be found in the whole. All attributes that would define a permanent self are like that, they change, they are impermanent. So they cannot be used to prove the existence of an inherently existing self. )
.
-- i. e. To maintain the need for morality with ordinary people who do not understand the true meaning of emptiness, some feel that there is a need to teach about a self, although very subtle, that could be liberated, and about a self that goes through rebirths. Otherwise they would think there is nothing after death, that they could escape the consequences of their actions through death, or that liberation is like annihilation of their own self. So, lets try to find this self.
.
(First the self asserted by the Vaisesikas. First it is shown that gender, which differs from one life to the next, is incompatible with the idea of a permanent self.
-- Male, female, neuter are not absolute attribute of a permanent self.
-- If the so-called self existed by way of its own entity, [it should be seen in the state of nirvana. ] Fearing its discontinuation because it is not seen during nirvana, they say, "The conventional is preferable," and so forth. However the self does not exist by way of its own entity for if it did, it should be male, female or neuter, but that is inappropriate. The Forders assert two selves, an inner and an outer self. The first is inside the body, and this inner agent which makes the various sense organs engage with objects is the focus of the conception "I" The second is a combination of the body and sense organs which assists the first.
It follows that the inner self does not exist by way of its own entity. If it did a woman should in the future lives too only ever be a woman, yet change is observed. Femaleness and so forth are also not attributes of the self. Thus it follows that the inner agential person does not exist by way of its own entity, for when the inner self is neither female, male or neuter, it is just out of ignorant confusion that you imagine your own self male. It is a fabrication like mistaking a mottled rope for a snake. Sutra says:
~ An attitude of doubt foments poison,
~ And though it has not entered one, one faints) .
L6: [b. Refuting the rejoinder]
.
\ ###
\ 227.
\ When all the elements are not
\ Male, female or neuter,
\ How is that which depends on them
\ Male, female or neuter?
.
(i. e. And those attributes do not come with the parts: The basis for the attribute cannot be found in the parts. Gender cannot be an attribute of the outer self either since we cannot find it in the parts; gender is merely an imputation, a conventional name.
All attributes that would be used to define an inherently existing self are like that. )
.
23 / 117
.
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
(If you try to find this "female state", as the goddess did in the Vimalakirti Sutra, you will not find it. It is merely a name attributed, by convention, to some basis. So the self is not "essentially by nature" male, or female, or neuter.
-- Assertion: Male gender, female gender and so forth are marks of the outer self. Through its connection with this the inner self is male and so forth.
-- Answer: It follows that because of their connection with the outer self, the four great elements would also be a male self and so forth. If that were so, all the elements would be the person, since for truly existent functional things there can be no differences between what is and is not male and so forth.
-- When all the elements do not have male, female or neuter gender, how can the inner self which relies upon the outer self -- those elements -- feasibly be male, female or neuter? It cannot. If all the elements were male, female or neuter, it would follow that even during the early stages of the fetus, maleness and so forth should be observable.
-- Objection: The same error is entailed for you.
-- Answer: Since we impute gender in dependence upon elements which lack inherent existence, there is no error. )
.
L6: [c. [Unwanted] conclusion that generating the thought "I" when observing another's self is reasonable] .
\ ###
\ 228.
\ Your self is not my self and thus there is
\ No such self, since it is not ascertained.
\ Does the conception not arise
\ In relation to impermanent things?
.
(i. e. The term "I" is relative: The "I" is relative to the subject, it is not an absolute external functional thing. It is merely an imputation of the mind, a convention, a concept. )
.
(Sort of like: the perception of the "self" of someone is relative. It depends on the subject and on many other factors. It is a creation of the mind, an imputation on a valid base. If the "I" was an absolute functional thing everybody would see it as such, the "I", independently of who is looking. But, as we all know, the "I" is relative to the person looking. Exactly like right and left is relative to the position of the subject.
-- It follows that the personal self is not established by way of its own entity. If it were, just as the thought "blue" arises universally in relation to blue, the thought "I" should arise in Yajna when he observes Devadatta's self, but it does not. -- Since that which is your self is not my own self, it follows that the object of your conception of "I" is not a self existing by way of its own entity, because it is not ascertained as the object of my conception of "I" or my attachment to the self. Therefore doesn't the thought "I" arise in relation to impermanent things called form and so forth? The self is only imputed. )
.
L5: [2. Refuting the proofs]
L6: [a. Refuting that a permanent self is the cause of entering and leaving cyclic existence]
.
\ ###
\ 229.
\ From one rebirth to another
\ The person changes like the body.
\ It is illogical for yours to be
\ Separate from the body and permanent.
.
(i. e. No permanent self: Since a person change from one rebirth to another, there is nothing permanent. We cannot find a self that would be separated from the aggregates. )
.
(-- Assertion: The self is permanent because of being the one that enters and leaves cyclic existence. If there were no self, who would be in cyclic existence because of accumulation actions? Who would gain freedom from cyclic existence? Thus the self exists.
-- Answer: It follows that it is illogical for the self you assert to be permanent and a separate entity from the body, because the person, like the body, changes from one rebirth as a god, human and so forth to another. )
.
L6: [b. Refuting it as the activator of the body] L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
24 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
\ ###
\ 230.
\ Intangible things do not
\ Produce so-called motility.
\ Thus the life force is not
\ Agent of the body's movements.
.
(i. e. No intangible self: An intangible inner self would not be able to create physical movement, just like a permanent self would not produce impermanent effect. )
.
(How could an inner permanent self, which would be intangible because not part of the body, have influence on the body. This is like the problem of the interaction between mind and matter in western philosophy. It has never been seen that an intangible could cause an effect on a tangible. So this inner self cannot exist and be the "driver" of your actions. This is like the fact that a permanent cause cannot create an impermanent effect as mentioned in chapter 9.
-- Nor can a permanent intangible self act as agent of the body's movement, as is claimed, since only something tangible can cause motion.
-- Assertion: Without a self there would be no physical movements such as stretching of flexing because the body would lack an activator. Thus an inner agential person exists who activates the body just as Devadatta drives his chariot. -- Answer: That is illogical. It follows that your life force or self is not the instigator of physical movement because the self is not tangible.
-- It is so because, just as a chariot can only be moved by something tangible and not by anything intangible, an intangible functional thing cannot actually move that which has form from one place to another. Though Vaisesikas assert that the self has form, they do not accept that it has external tangibility and so forth. )
.
L7: [(2) Showing what invalidated [belief in] a permanent self]
.
\ ###
\ 231.
\ Why [teach] non-violence and wonder about
\ Conditions for a permanent self?
\ A diamond never has to be
\ Protected against woodworm.
.
(i. e. A permanent self would not need morality: On the contrary, it is the though of a permanent self that would eliminate the need for morality. )
.
(-- A permanent self would be invulnerable to harm of any kind and would therefore not need to seek spiritual practices as a means of protection.
-- It follows that if the self is permanent, it is contradictory to teach non-violence as a practice to protect it from dangers such as a bad rebirth or to wonder what conditions are not unfavorable to it, because nothing can harm a permanent functional thing, just as a diamond which is not in danger of harm is never protected against woodworms, nor does it need to be. )
.
L6: [c. Refuting proof of a permanent self]
L7: [(1) Seeing memory of past rebirths is unsuitable as proof of a permanent self]
.
\ ###
\ 232.
\ If your self is permanent
\ Because of remembering other lives,
\ How can your body be impermanent
\ When you see a scar previously formed?
.
(i. e. There is no need for a permanent self to explain continuity / memory of past rebirths: There is no need for a permanent memory holder -- a permanent holder of karma seeds. There is no need for inherently existing causes and effects to explain interdependence, to support dependent origination. On the contrary, one would not exist without the other; dependent origination and emptiness implies each other. The continuum permits the uninterrupted flow of influences / information / cause & effect, without assuming inherently existing causes and effects. )
25 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
.
(-- Nor does memory of past lives establish the self as permanent, but demonstrates the presence of a continuum of consciousness, consisting of moments which arise in dependence upon each other.
-- Assertion: The self is permanent because there is memory of previous rebirths. Memory of other lives is not feasible for a composite thing whose nature is to disintegrate as soon as it is produced.
-- Answer: You may consider the self permanent because there is memory of past lives, like thinking, "I was human in my last rebirth. " Then how could your body be impermanent? It should be permanent because in a past life you saw the scar of a wound inflicted on the body and now, when you see a birthmark which resembles that previously inflicted wound, you say, "That is the scar of the wound inflicted in the past. " According to us the object of the thought "I" is co- extensive with both the past and of this life. Since it is merely imputed, memory of past rebirths is feasible.
There is a bowl of curd in a house. The footprint of a pale-colored pigeon perched on the thick thatch is visible on it, even though its foot has not touched the curd and so forth. Similarly, all actions and agents are feasible for that which arises dependently. )
.
L7: [(2) Unfeasibility of mindless matter remembering past rebirths]
.
\ ###
\ 233.
\ If the self when possessing that
\ Which has mind is a knower,
\ By that [same argument] that which has mind would be
\ Mindless and the person permanent.
.
(i. e. The self is not different, nor the same as karma / memories: On the contrary, the simple fact that it can accumulate memory makes this self impermanent. This self cannot be separated from the mind, nor can it be the same as the mind - next verse. )
.
(-- If, as claimed, the person were mindless matter only capable of memory through an association with consciousness, then the person could not be permanent and unchanging, since it would first lack and then possess the faculty of remembering
-- It follows that the self cannot remember past rebirths because it is asserted as mindless matter. It is also unreasonable to assert that it remembers past lives by virtue of having mind, because by first lacking memory and later possessing memory, it has given up its entity.
-- If the self, despite being matter, is a knower of the past because of possessing that which has mind, by that [same argument] the attribute, that which has mind, should be mindless and matter because of possessing a self which is classified as matter. It follows that the self is also not permanent because first it does not remember but later newly develops memory of past lives. )
.
L7: [(3) Entailment of permanence, if that which has attributes such as intelligence remembers past rebirths]
.
\ ###
\ 234.
\ A life force which has pleasure and so forth
\ Appears as various as pleasure and so forth.
\ Thus like pleasure it is not
\ Suitable as something permanent.
.
(i. e. The self is not different, nor the same as the five aggregates: The simple fact that it can change makes it impermanent. )
.
(-- Moreover something which at different times has different attributes, such as pleasure and pain, cannot be permanent either.
-- If the life force or self has mind because of having attributes like intelligence, then because of having attributes like pleasure and pain, it should appear as different as pleasure and so forth while experiencing satisfaction and affliction. Thus like pleasure and so forth it cannot be permanent either. )
.
26 / 117
.
\ ###
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
L4: [B. Refuting the self imputed by Samkhyas]
L5: [1. Unacceptability of asserting a permanent conscious person]
.
\ ###
\ 235.
\ If consciousness is permanent
\ An agent is superfluous.
\ if fire is permanent
\ Fuel is unnecessary.
.
(i. e. Consciousness and it object are not two, not one - so there is no permanent consciousness: A permanent consciousness, a knower, would not need the sense organs, nor the object of which it is conscious . . . On the contrary consciousness is dependent on the sense organs, and to be conscious has to be conscious of something . . . Those two are interdependent, two concepts co-dependently arisen. )
.
(-- The Samkhya assertion that a permanent conscious person exists is then examined and its flaws are revealed. What role would the eyes and other senses play, if such a continually conscious person existed?
-- Samkhya assertion: If the self is asserted as matter these inconsistencies apply, but since, according to us, the person's nature is to be conscious, there is not the least unwanted entailment.
-- Answer: Samkhyas define twenty-five categories of phenomena of which twenty-two are matter and the twenty-fifth is asserted as the knower, person and self . They assert that the person experiences objects which the intellect makes it crave. This is explained extensively elsewhere.
-- If the conscious person is asserted as permanent, it follows that agents such as the eyes and so forth which permit experience of objects are superfluous and useless because the person that experiences objects exists as a permanent functional thing. Fuel is needed to make a fire but if fire is permanent, fuel is unnecessary. )
.
L5: [2. Entailment that [the activity of experiencing] cannot stop until the conscious person, the substance, has disintegrated]
.
\ ###
\ 236.
\ A substantial entity, unlike an action,
\ Does not alter until it disintegrates.
\ Thus it is improper to claim
\ The person exists but consciousness does not.
.
(i. e. Consciousness and the activity of being conscious are not two, not one: There is no consciousness without the activity of being conscious of something. So there is no consciousness that exist and then become conscious of something; like there is no doer without the action of doing. Those two are interdependent, two concepts co- dependently arisen. So there is no permanent consciousness. )
.
(Maybe like in "the doer does" the subject and the action are not one, neither separate. Here, the self and the activity of being conscious cannot be thought as separated independent entity, nor as the same. Consciousness is not something added to a permanent self.
-- Assertion: The person whose nature is potential consciousness is the experiencer of objects and being conscious is the activity of experiencing. Since this depends on agents like the eye, there is no flaw.
-- Answer: Movement does not occur unless, for instance, a tree is agitated by the wind, but those fallacies would entail movement until the substantial entity disintegrates. The phenomenon of activity depends on the substantial entity and its motion.
-- The activity of moving depends on the substantial entity and may cease even though the substantial entity has not disintegrated. The nature of the substantial entity does not likewise change between its production and its disintegration. By contrast, consciousness and the person are an indifferentiable permanent entity. Thus it is improper to claim that the person but not consciousness exists prior to experiencing an object. )
.
L5: [3. Unacceptability of asserting that the person's nature [changes] f rom actual consciousness first to potential consciousness]
27 / 117
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
\ 237.