christian
religion
is the religion of spirit; not just of the human spirit, but of God's spirit as well.
Hegels Philosophy of the Historical Religions
F.
Hegel, Vorlesungen u?
ber die Philosophie der Religion, in: Vorlesun-
gen. Ausgewa? hlte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (17 Vols. ), Vols. 3-5,
ed. W. Jaeschke, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 1983 ff.
G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 1, Introduction and the Concept of Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, Berkeley: University
of California Press 2007 (quoted as L1).
G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 2, Determinate
Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, Berkeley: University of California Press
2007 (quoted as L2).
G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 3, The Consum-
mate Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, Berkeley: University of California
Press 2007 (quoted as L3).
Hodgson's edition of Lectures contains the pagination of the German
edition in the margins. This present Volume refers to both editions. The first number refers to the English translation; the second number, after the slash, refers to the original German edition [L1 24, Hodgson/ Jaeschke].
G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. The Lectures of 1827, One Volume Edition, Peter C. Hodgson (ed. ), Berkeley: University of California Press 1988.
G. W. F. Hegel, Werke in 20 Ba? nden, Suhrkamp taschenbuch Wissenschaft [StW], Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag 1971 ff.
G. W. F. Hegel, Gesammelten Werke (40 Vols. ), Hamburg: Felix Meiner Ver- lag 1986 ff (quoted as GW).
G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen u? ber die Geschichte der Philosophie, in: Vor- lesungen. Ausgewa? hlte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (17 Vols. ), Vols. 6-9, eds. P. Garniron and W. Jaeschke, Hamburg: Meiner 1986 ff. [quoted as Vorl. 6-9].
x frequently cited works and abbreviations
G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen u? ber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, eds. K. H. Ilting, K. Brehmer, Hoo nam Selman, in: Vorlesungen. Ausgewa? hlte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (17 Vols. ), Vol. 12, Hamburg: Meiner 1996. [quoted as Vorl. 12].
G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, transl. A. V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1977 [quoted as PhSp].
Editorial introduction Bart labuschagne and timo Slootweg
1. introduction
all during his lifetime, religion has been a principal subject of interest and study for G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831). He wrote a lot on it, starting with some unpublished texts stemming from his Bern period (1793-1796), for example the Fragments on folk religion and Christianity, and The Positiv- ity of the Christian religion. during his time in Frankfurt (1797-1800), he wrote The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate, a text that became famous only after publication in the 20th century. in Jena, he devoted an entire chapter to religion; in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) religion is treated as a necessary step in the process of consciousness becoming conscious of itself and of the absolute. in the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sci- ences (first edition in 1817), religion figures, after art, as a second instance of absolute spirit, right before sublating into philosophy as the third and final shape. these last two publications were the only one Hegel produced during his lifetime on religion as such. But if we take a look at the massive and impressive material from his many lectures on religion, then it is safe to say that he certainly planned to publish much more on this subject, until his sudden death in november 1831 put an end to all plans.
Hegel started relatively late to lecture explicitly on the philosophy of religion, first in the summer semester of 1821, then in 1824, 1827 and finally in 1831. 1 in these days, philosophy of religion was a relatively new subject in academia. of course, religious philosophical thinking was done within theology, natural theology etc. But the explicit philosophical approach to religion could only take off after the publication of Kant's Religion within the boundaries of mere reason (1793/1794). to Hegel, the relation between religion and philosophy was that they both had the
1 G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, three volumes, edited by Peter c. Hodgson, oxford: clarendon Press 2007, translation based on Hegel's Vorlesungen u? ber die Philosophie der Religion, edited by Walter Jaeschke, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 1983 ff. Both Jaeschke and Hodgson contributed considerably to the accessibility and understand- ing of Hegel's philosophy of religion.
? xii bart labuschagne and timo slootweg
same object (truth, also known as God), but that their methods in treat- ing and attaining it differed radically: religion by way of feeling, repre- sentation etc. and philosophy through thinking. therefore, religion can become the subject of philosophical thinking in its own right. Hegel took up this task after having treated almost all other philosophical subjects extensively (such as law, morality, politics and history). religion remained for the most part untreated; this phenomenon in human life and history needed to be brought to Hegel's mature philosophical and systematical understanding.
in the Lectures (1821 ff ), Hegel systematically treated not only christian- ity, but also all other, major historical religions preceding (and partly con- curring with) christianity: Judaism, islam, the roman religion, the Greek, the Egyptian, the Persian, the chinese, but also Buddhism and Hinduism. Hegel called these great, non-christian, historical religions: 'determinate religions' (bestimmte Religionen). to establish accurately the place of the determinate religions in Hegel's philosophy of religion as a whole, we want to introduce his thoughts somewhat further by focusing (in short) on what he says about this subject in the context of (1) the Phenomenol- ogy of Spirit (1807) and (2) in the context of the Lectures. the context of the Lectures is that of his Philosophy, and will be discussed below. in contrast to this, the Phenomenology comprises the science of the experi- ence of consciousness with itself. a concise reference to this alternative, phenomenological approach, and its connection with the Philosophy, can be of help to a better understanding of Hegel's perception of religion, and of the meaning of his account of the many historical religions.
2. religion in the Phenomenology of Spirit
although consciousness is essentially one, it is nevertheless split into that of the world and that of itself. at first the subject acknowledges nothing but its object. out of this primary stage, a consciousness of self devel- ops, although the subject is unable to conceive of the unity of world and man. Self-consciousness develops gradually in relation to the object and the knowledge thereof. the phenomenology of the object reflects that of the subject, although there is no absolute conscious and reasonable rec- ognition thereof. nevertheless the subject 'feels' this unity already, and it anticipates this oneness. the phenomenology of experience follows the development of this mere 'feeling anticipation' towards the form of knowledge in which this truth is finally consummated. "reason is the con-
editorial introduction xiii
scious certainty of being all reality. "2 Hegel's method is modesty. the phi- losopher merely witnesses and describes the experiences of the subject, and the way they follow one another from stage to stage. the one thing he ads to this development is the consciousness thereof, and the knowledge he lends to it.
consciousness becomes aware of itself and transforms itself into self- consciousness. But before this self-consciousness is completely 'at home with itself ', it first passes through many a stage of experience. through his consciousness man is not only split of (Entzweit) from the world of things. the divisiveness is also inter-subjective, between the subject and another self, and between the individual and the general or universal. Morality witnesses this divisiveness. History is the process in which this separation and this estrangement (Entfremdung) is conquered. in the end, self-consciousness attains full satisfaction only in someone else's self- consciousness, until finally it reaches the consciousness of 'itself as another'. it is only by recognizing others and by being recognized by oth- ers that we can reach the final goal of integration and wholeness that is the purpose of mankind. the summa summarum of this development is the knowledge, the absolute science of the unity of one's (self )conscious- ness with the absolute Self which is God; it is only in the knowing and scientific reconciliation between God and man that the absolute unrest (die Absolute Unruhe) of the experience of consciousness comes to rest. religion is the truth of morality; it is of the essence of morality itself to 'move' and develop in the direction of religion. religion 'senses' the recon- ciliation of law (duty) and nature, conscience and reality. the realization of freedom and forgiveness (mercy) is the revelation of God in the world, here and now, and in-between its peoples. 3
it is however, not just any (arbitrary) religion that suffices to represent this truth of morality. it is only the true religion, christianity--'the religion of truth'--that is able to accomplish this task. of this final reconciliation of man with himself (with mankind), man at first experiences a mere Vor- stellung; a relation of feeling, a pictorial representation of an otherworldly Being. to this supreme object man relates not in a reasonable way, but through devotion (Andacht). this strange and otherworldly Being is the object of his hope and his longing. But here on earth these can never
2 G. W. F. Hegel, Pha? nomenologie des Geistes, Ed. Bonsiepen und Heede, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 1988, V, p. 158.
3 cf. Hegel, Pha? nomenologie des Geistes, p. 442.
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be satisfied, and they remain without realization and fulfillment until the Kingdom of God. reconciliation remains but a dream for this 'unhappy consciousness'. at the same time however, already this 'dreamed of ' rec- onciliation refers to and encompasses the negation of God as a merely transcendental 'beyond'; as a mere bad infinity (schlechte Unendlichkeit). the figure of christ inspires consciousness towards a 'religion of reason' (Vernunftreligion); a religion that transcends the dualism of christianity in the 'positive' sense, and within the 'philosophy of faith' (Jacobi's Glauben- sphilosophie). Just like the phenomenon of law and State can only be understood in a proper philosophical way (they are the general organism and the ethical commonwealth in which the moral subject is embedded and finds its freedom), religion also must be known through the Science of the absolute, that reveals itself as the spirit of the world.
Philosophical consciousness is the product of the phenomenology of religion that finds its fulfillment in the scientific 'appreciation' of the religion of truth. However, before the highest, 'revealed religion' steps upon the stage, religion itself has gone through a long and many-faceted development. a religious consciousness accompanies every stage in the phenomenology of the spirit. But in respect to the fulfillment of history, religion has a particularly important role to play. in the Phenomenology Hegel writes about it in the chapter called: 'die religion', where he dis- criminates between three groups and three kinds of worship: the natural, aesthetic and revealed religions. religion develops in accordance to the form of its object, the absolute. natural religion reveres God in natural objects. the first moment of this stage is, 'the religion of light'; the God of light makes itself seen in the surrounding darkness. later on, plants and animals are also included in the divinization of nature that finds its result in the imagination of the 'master artificer' (Werkmeister). aesthetic religion makes works of art, man transfigured by poetic imagination, the object of worship. classical Greece and its devotion to the divine, pictured in human forms and frozen statues, is the famous example that Hegel has in mind, as well as the spiritual art of epos, that shows the life of the hero and the fate of his people in close relationship to the whims of the Gods. revealed religion (offenbare Religion), that is christianity, rises to the level of revealing the absolute Spirit; although in some sense it is still veiled and indirect. its idea is the 'conjunction' of the individual and the absolute spirit; the eternal and the temporal; the divine and the human. that the Supreme Being is heard, and seen as an objective and very 'real' self-consciousness, this revelation is the culmination and consummation of concept of God. this revelation means 'salvation'. to die is the fate
editorial introduction xv
of mankind. in christianity however, God participates in this 'privilege'. God becomes man, and dies like a man. the divine God becomes mortal; mortality is conquered spiritually; the finite becomes eternal in respect to its spirituality.
religion is imagination and perception; it is the truth in its content, but not qua form (it is not in conformity to the medium of the concept). there is however, a spiritual kinship of faith and knowledge. only speculative reflection fully 'reveals' the truth of religion, the truth of morality. this even higher form of self-consciousness (Absolute Wissenschaft) is reached on the basis of a divine life of self-sacrifice, self-alienation and self-reconciliation. the (example of the) death of God as an abstract individual, the develop- ment of ethical consciousness, is the spiritual 'resurrection of God' in the spirit of the community and the State. in addition to this, the Phenomenol- ogy is the becoming of science (das reale Wissen). only he can save him- self, who 'loses himself '; this 'abstraction' is necessary to be able think in a proper, philosophical way. Man becomes himself once he loses himself as an abstract individual, not only in respect to the higher ethical life (Sit- tlichkeit) to which he belongs, but also in respect to the higher scientific, logical and ontological consciousness thereof.
Eventually it is only by philosophically 'thinking through' the truths of christianity as a revealed religion, for instance by analyzing the dogma of the Holy trinity, that the enlightened, integrated consciousness (das absolute Wissen) can break through. the development of the philosophi- cal consciousness is the highest stage of the phenomenology of the expe- rience of the personal subject (Ich). its highest object (Gegenstand), the absolute is understood as 'Spirit being conscious of itself, mediated by the consciousness of the subject'. therefore, the final stage of the road to Science comprises the beginning of the logic that focuses on the devel- opment of the absolute in itself. the metaphysics of the absolute object becoming conscious of itself is implicated in the concept (Begriff ) of reli- gion. the development (in itself ) of this absolute concept, the becoming conscious of itself thereof, is the 'real', ontological process (the Real Phi- losophie) behind the phenomenology of the consciousness of the subject. the Phenomenology of Spirit culminates in this real process; it wants to elevate consciousness towards this real Philosophy of the development of the concept.
christian religion is the religion of spirit; not just of the human spirit, but of God's spirit as well. this is, in fact where the more extensive Lectures (1821 ff ) fit in. the Lectures also include a (more exten- sive) treatment of the historical religions, but the context in which they appear is thoroughly different from that of the Phenomenology.
xvi bart labuschagne and timo slootweg
3. determinate religion in the lectures on the Philosophy of religion
there are several ways in which the difference between the treatment of religion in the Phenomenology and the Lectures can be characterized. one way is to see the Phenomenology as a 'bottom up' treatment of the subject and the Lectures as a 'top down' approach. another is that the perspec- tive of the former is taken from the subject itself, while that of the latter from the object: the absolute. Yet another way to characterize this differ- ence, is to say that the Phenomenology describes the development of con- sciousness as it enfolds within subjective consciousness itself, as its ( fu? r es) development and Bildung towards true knowledge and philosophy on the one hand, while the Lectures (on the other hand) contain a realphil- osophische exposition of the subject as it is in and for itself; as well as 'for us' ( fu? r uns), as already initiated philosophers. let us now take a closer look at the overall structure of the Lectures, and try to elucidate what the place is of the historical religions in this greater scheme.
as already stated, the three parts of which the Lectures are organized according to Hegel's idea of the concept, as laid down (mainly) in the Sci- ence of logic (Wissenschaft der Logik, 3 Vols. 1812/1813/1816) and the Ency- clopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Enzyklopa? die der Philosophischen Wissenschaften, 1e ed. 1817, 2 ed. 1827, 3 ed. 1830). according to Hegel, the gap between subject and object and between epistemology and meta- physics can and needs to be bridged. the task of philosophy in general and the logic in particular is to show that there is an inherent connection between thought and reality, and that reality is reasonable in itself and that reason is something real. 4 the various domains of human thought and experience, including religion, ethics, morality, politics, law and his- tory, show an intrinsic 'deep structure' which can be brought to philo- sophical understanding by the categorical scheme of Hegel's logic. 5 not only does it make the claim to ground theoretical knowledge (reflection on the conditions of the possibility for empirical knowledge) and practi- cal knowledge (reflection on the conditions of the possibility for moral- practical action), but also to interrelate the theoretical and the practical
4 See the preface to the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, (1821) Werke Band 7, edited by Eva Moldenhauer en Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag 1970, 1986, p. 24: "Was vernu? nftig ist, das ist wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernu? nftig. "
5 Peter c. Hodgson, 'Editorial introduction', in: G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philoso- phy of Religion, one-volume edition, the lectures of 1827, edited by Peter c. Hodgson, oxford: clarendon Press 2006, p. 11.
? editorial introduction xvii
in ways that Kant failed to do. the method by which Hegel proceeds, is by reflecting on reflection itself: this is what Hegel call 'speculative thought', in order to distinguish this thought from the merely 'reflective' philosophy of Kant and other Enlightenment thinkers. this speculative philosophy not only grounds ethical, aesthetical, legal and historical experience, but also religious experience, man's experience of God. Hegel's God is not a supersensible entity, but rather the ultimate condition of the possibility for the totality of experience and for religious experience in particular. in this sense, the philosophical first principle and the theological first prin- ciple are one and the same: God is the absolute idea. this is not to say, however, that God is not actual (wirklich). God is actual, actual being in and for itself, but only in and through worldly reality, not as a separated, supersensible entity. When taken apart from the world, God's actuality remains abstract, unfulfilled, unrealized. in and through the world, of which God is the condition par excellence of its possibility, God becomes a concrete, living, true actuality--that is: absolute spirit. 6 and what we can come to terms with, is the way in which God has worked through human history and in the history of religions, in order to manifest himself finally in the consummate religion.
the deep, logical structure, that is grounded in the dialectic of specula- tive thought, consists of three moments or figures, and can be described as follows: (1) universality (Allgemeinheit), which is the most universal sub- stance or principle of a statement that can be discerned. this substance or principle is taken as such, an sich, in its most general and universal being. (2) Particularity (Besonderheid), the particular quality, determinate modification or application of the universal in the case at hand, which can be seen here for itself, fu? r sich. We take it as something particular, separate, as something being on its own, in its own right, but as a concrete manifestation and particularization of the general substance. (3) individu- ality or singularity (Einzelheit), where the former two come together in an adequate shape, wherein the universal is realized and embodied in an absolute way, that is: an und fu? r sich. the realization or embodiment is something that is adequate to its concept, wherein the concept finds its most perfect expression and can be regarded as being with itself or at home with itself in its otherness. this very triadic (or maybe: trinitarian) structure is mirrored in every aspect of Hegel's philosophical system. in the system as a whole (logical idea, nature, spirit), in the science of logic
6 Hodgson, op. cit. p. 12.
? xviii bart labuschagne and timo slootweg
(being / immediacy, essence / reflection, concept / subjectivity) and its subdivisions; the dialectics of consciousness (immediacy, differentiation, return; or identity, cleavage, reunification); and for example even in the doctrine of the trinity (Father, Son, Holy Spirit).
the threefold division of the philosophy of religion in the Lectures reflects this logical structure as well (1. concept of religion, 2. determi- nate religion, 3. consummate religion), as do the subdivisions of each of these main parts. 7 the first part is concerned with the concept of religion, that is: with religion in its most general and universal aspects: as it is an sich. abstraction is made of what particular form of religion whatsoever, and attention is focused only on the most general and universal charac- teristics of the religious phenomenon. themes such as the 'abstract' con- cept of God, the knowledge of God (the 'theoretical' relationship) and the cultus (the 'practical' relationship) are discussed. We will dwell on this first part of the Lectures below. the second part deals with the realisa- tion, the actual being of religion: the determinate religions. these are the religions that are dealt with in the volume that the reader has in hand now: the actual, historical religions that humankind has developed and known, and of which Hegel takes deep and serious account in the sec- ond part of his lectures. He treats (what he calls) immediate religion, or nature religion, the religion of Magic, Buddhism, Hindu religion, Persian religion, Egyptian religion, the religion of the Greeks, the religion of the Jews and finally the roman religion. the lectures exhibit a great variety in categorization and labelling of these religions, which shows that Hegel had difficulties with allotting them a proper place in his system. and the third part is devoted to the culmination of all the previous religion in the religion that is alone adequate to the concept of God: the consummate religion--that is revealed religion: christianity.
the first part of the Lectures is titled The Concept of Religion. it may be useful to expound the content of this part a little more, so that the reader, when studying the contributions on the several determinate religions in this volume, can understand in what way these determinate religions form a particularization of, or embody the concept into concrete, histori- cal religions. 8 Hegel starts with an exposition of the abstract (and not yet concrete) realization of the concept in its three constitutive, inner, logical
7 Hodgson, op. cit. p. 13.
8 For the sake of clarity and brevity, the one-volume edition of the lectures of 1827, edited by Peter c. Hodgson, op. cit. is used, especially the excellent Editorial introduction, pp. 27-39.
? editorial introduction xix
moments: (1) the 'abstract' concept of God, (2) the knowledge of God (the 'theoretical' religious relationship), and (3) the cultus (the 'practical' reli- gious relationship). these three moments correspond with the moments of the self-explication of the idea of God itself. in this first sphere of sheer immediacy and universality, the first thing that can and should be said, is that God is of course the absolute truth and that religion alone is the absolutely true knowledge. this content that stands at the beginning of the philosophy of religion, however, appears to be at the same time the result of the whole of philosophy. the three major disciplines of philoso- phy (logic, nature and spirit) lead up to God as their final result. Philoso- phy of religion is at once the final science within the philosophical system, presupposing all the other branches, starting from the (already in the Phe- nomenology obvious) premise, that man is a homo religiosus. Since this 'result' (and premise) is the absolute truth, it cannot be merely a result or just a premise. it must also be a philosophical presupposition, the first one, as well as the last one, that which results from itself. as such, God is the absolute substance, yet at the same time (in order to avoid the charge of pantheism or Spinozism) subject: God is being-with-itself and abiding- with-itself, in other words, God is spirit, absolute spirit. and we have this content in thought, not yet primarily in feeling, willing, imagination etc. Human beings think, and they alone have religion. thus religion has its inmost seat in thought, though no doubt it can also be felt, believed, imag- ined, represented, and practiced. 9
Knowledge of God, in faith, feeling, representation and thought, in short: the theoretical religious relationship, is dealt with in the second section. 10 in it, a large body of material treating the various forms of reli- gious consciousness is incorporated, such as immediate knowledge, faith, feeling, representation, thought etc. this theme of religious knowledge corresponds to the second, logical moment of religion, that is differentia- tion, distinction and concrete embodiment, which form the preconditions of relationship. this relationship can be seen from the point of God and from the view of consciousness. the God who can be known and rep- resented in the world, is a concrete, differentiated and self-manifesting subject. He is no longer an abstract, self-identical, universal substance. He enters into a relationship with man by manifesting himself in history.
9 Hodgson, op. cit. pp. 27-28. Hegel's treatment of this section can be found on the pages 114-128.
10 Hegel, Lectures, op. cit. pp. 128-189.
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From the point of view of man's consciousness, a number of different forms of religious consciousness can be discerned. the first one is that of immediate knowledge--that is: the immediate certainty (Gewissheit) that God is, and that God indeed is this universality having being in and for itself, outside of me and independent of me. certainty is the most imme- diate relation between this content and myself. and the first and most basic form of this certainty is that of faith (Glaube), which can and should not be placed in opposition to knowledge (Wissen) but is in fact a form of knowledge in its own right. instead of using 'faith', Hegel prefers the term used in his general epistemology, 'intuition' (Anschauung), thereby stressing that this form of knowledge is not of a sensible nature--since God is not an object of sense-experience. the second element is 'feeling' (Gefu? hl), which connotes the subjective aspect of the immediate certainty, namely its relevance for our own, particular existence. We have at once the feeling of a content (for example, a hard object) and the feeling of ourselves (the feeling 'hardness'), which we feel that we feel. Feeling is something fashionable, says Hegel, because when we feel something, we are personally and subjectively involved with it, thereby attributing value to the thing in question, as well as to ourselves. However, feeling does not make us able to judge the validity of its contents. Feelings of the heart must be purified and cultivated, and this is exactly why 'thought' becomes indispensable. Before reaching 'thought' however, we encounter first the form of knowledge known as 'representation' (Vorstellung). if feeling con- stitutes the subjective aspect, then representation attends to the objec- tive aspect, the content, of whatever it is that we are immediately certain about. Yet it does not penetrate this content in any rational or cognitive way. representation has two basic forms, or configurations: sensible and non-sensible. the first are considered 'images' (Bilder), they are sym- bolic, allegorical, metaphorical and mythical. non-sensible configurations (nichtsinnliche Gestaltungen) have to do with spiritual contents, activities, relationships. 11
and finally in this section, 'thought' is treated, in a quite long chapter,12 where Hegel discusses the relationship of thought and representation and the question whether religious knowledge is immediate or mediated. the point is, that representation apprehends its various contents in their deter- minate isolation, whereas thought seeks for relationships and universality.
11 Hodgson, op. cit. pp. 29-32. 12 Hegel, Lectures, op. cit. pp. 151-189.
? editorial introduction xxi
thought raises representational configurations to a conceptual form. a concept (Begriff ) precisely grasps or holds together (be-greifen) exactly those elements that remain disparate in the simple placing-before (vor- stellen) the mind of various sensible or non-sensible images. By develop- ing arguments and hypotheses that elucidate the unity of representational features, it arrives at a 'conviction' (U? berzeugung), which is certainty in the form of thought. in a last chapter in this section on the theoretical reli- gious relationship, Hegel discusses the proofs of the existence of God. 13
the concluding section, The Cultus, demonstrates that the theoretical religious relationship is still unaccomplished. in the case of the knowledge of God, i am immersed in my object and know nothing about myself. But actually, the true situation is that i am in a relationship with this object; i should know myself as being filled with it. What accomplishes this unity is in fact action, that is: the activity of the cultus, which constitutes the prac- tical religious relationship. cultus is "the including, within my own self, of myself with God, the knowing of myself within God and of God within me. "14 this is accomplished through the act of 'enjoyment', 'partaking', or 'communion' (Genuss), which is the cultic act par excellence. it does not so much bring about the reconciliation of God with mankind, but it pre- supposes it, participates in is as something already accomplished by God's grace, either implicitly or explicitly. Hegel distinguishes three basic forms of the cultus. the first one is devotion (Andacht), which is "not the mere faith that God is, but is present when the faith becomes vivid, when the subject prays and is occupied with this content not merely in objective fashion but becomes immersed therein. "15 next, there are two external cultic forms, sacraments on the one hand (reconciliation brought into feeling, into present sensible consciousness) and sacrifice on the other (the negation involved in elevation sensibly accomplished). the third and highest form is repentance, whereby one not only renounces external things but also offers one's heart or innermost self to God. When purity of heart is properly cultivated, it results in ethical life, which is accord- ing to Hegel "the most genuine cultus. "16 actually, social and political eth- ics represent an extension and further realization of the religious cultus,
13 For an analysis of this, see Hodgson op. cit. pp. 34-38. discussion here would take us too far from the purpose of this introduction.
14 Hegel, Lectures, op. cit. p. 191.
15 Hegel, Lectures, op. cit. p. 193.
16 Hegel, Lectures, op. cit. p. 194. Hodgson, op. cit. p. 39.
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something which is treated by Hegel only at the end the lectures, in his treatment of the christian cultus.
the treatment of the cultus constitutes the final section of the first part of the Lectures. according to the logic of the concept, it is now time to develop the concept in the dimension of its particularity, that is: to show how the concept is embodied in concrete, actual and historical religions. these concrete manifestations of religion in the determinate religions are considered to be not yet fully adequate in relation to its concept. in the second part of his Lectures, Hegel discusses extensively practically all known major world religions, whereby he distinguishes between the deter- minate religions (all non-christian religions) and the consummate, revealed religion (christianity, in both its catholic and Protestant varieties).
4. Purpose of the Book
the present volume brings together a collection of critical essays that discuss Hegel's relation to each of these determinate, historical forms of religion; including the consummate, revealed religion of christianity. a discussion of islam is also included, although it does not figure promi- nently among Hegel's determinate religions. all contributions aim to shed light on the intriguing development of Hegel's conception of the history of these actual religions. they not only offer a text-immanent analyti- cal approach, but they also take a (more or less) critical stance in which Hegel's perception is confronted with a critique developed from the (point of view of the) religion in question. Moreover, important to observe here, is that the determinate religions are considered by Hegel to be less perfect religions; religious forms that are less adequate to the concept of religion. only christianity turns out to be in this sense a true religion. However, seen from these religions themselves, truth is involved as well; of course, at least for the believers in question. this poses (undeniably) a deep ten- sion between the self-understanding of these non-christian believers and how they view their religion (namely: as true religion) and Hegel's under- standing of these religions as less true than christianity.
it has been our aim not only to develop a comprehensive view of Hegel's philosophy of the historical religions, but also of its broader, con- temporary importance. We did not want to bundle separate, stand-alone contributions, but to offer an integral outline of Hegel's philosophy of the religions in general. the construction and structure of the book follow (for
editorial introduction xxiii
the most part) the dialectics that Hegel himself employed in his Lectures, with the exception of islam that Hegel finds difficult to rubricate.
apart from text-immanent exegesis and the critical appraisal, the further aim of this book is as indicated, to contribute to the discussion between (on the one hand) Hegel's daring, far-reaching philosophical treatment of the great historical religions, and (on the other hand) the current approach, prevailing in religious studies, that seems to be con- strained (more and more) to the merely empirical appreciation of the religious material. We could say that, in some sense, Hegel himself has been responsible for this self-imposed restriction. after his death, Hegel's philosophy of religion was severely criticized. it was presumed to be too speculative and too little empirical in order to be able to do justice to the actual, historical religions. For many scholars 19th century Hegelianism constituted a reason to withdraw and distance themselves from philoso- phy, and to a retreat into a non-reflexive religiosity and a mere descrip- tive science thereof. neo-Kantianism succeeded more or less in regaining some of the long lost trustworthiness of the idealistic approach.
gen. Ausgewa? hlte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (17 Vols. ), Vols. 3-5,
ed. W. Jaeschke, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 1983 ff.
G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 1, Introduction and the Concept of Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, Berkeley: University
of California Press 2007 (quoted as L1).
G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 2, Determinate
Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, Berkeley: University of California Press
2007 (quoted as L2).
G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 3, The Consum-
mate Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, Berkeley: University of California
Press 2007 (quoted as L3).
Hodgson's edition of Lectures contains the pagination of the German
edition in the margins. This present Volume refers to both editions. The first number refers to the English translation; the second number, after the slash, refers to the original German edition [L1 24, Hodgson/ Jaeschke].
G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. The Lectures of 1827, One Volume Edition, Peter C. Hodgson (ed. ), Berkeley: University of California Press 1988.
G. W. F. Hegel, Werke in 20 Ba? nden, Suhrkamp taschenbuch Wissenschaft [StW], Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag 1971 ff.
G. W. F. Hegel, Gesammelten Werke (40 Vols. ), Hamburg: Felix Meiner Ver- lag 1986 ff (quoted as GW).
G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen u? ber die Geschichte der Philosophie, in: Vor- lesungen. Ausgewa? hlte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (17 Vols. ), Vols. 6-9, eds. P. Garniron and W. Jaeschke, Hamburg: Meiner 1986 ff. [quoted as Vorl. 6-9].
x frequently cited works and abbreviations
G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen u? ber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, eds. K. H. Ilting, K. Brehmer, Hoo nam Selman, in: Vorlesungen. Ausgewa? hlte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (17 Vols. ), Vol. 12, Hamburg: Meiner 1996. [quoted as Vorl. 12].
G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, transl. A. V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1977 [quoted as PhSp].
Editorial introduction Bart labuschagne and timo Slootweg
1. introduction
all during his lifetime, religion has been a principal subject of interest and study for G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831). He wrote a lot on it, starting with some unpublished texts stemming from his Bern period (1793-1796), for example the Fragments on folk religion and Christianity, and The Positiv- ity of the Christian religion. during his time in Frankfurt (1797-1800), he wrote The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate, a text that became famous only after publication in the 20th century. in Jena, he devoted an entire chapter to religion; in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) religion is treated as a necessary step in the process of consciousness becoming conscious of itself and of the absolute. in the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sci- ences (first edition in 1817), religion figures, after art, as a second instance of absolute spirit, right before sublating into philosophy as the third and final shape. these last two publications were the only one Hegel produced during his lifetime on religion as such. But if we take a look at the massive and impressive material from his many lectures on religion, then it is safe to say that he certainly planned to publish much more on this subject, until his sudden death in november 1831 put an end to all plans.
Hegel started relatively late to lecture explicitly on the philosophy of religion, first in the summer semester of 1821, then in 1824, 1827 and finally in 1831. 1 in these days, philosophy of religion was a relatively new subject in academia. of course, religious philosophical thinking was done within theology, natural theology etc. But the explicit philosophical approach to religion could only take off after the publication of Kant's Religion within the boundaries of mere reason (1793/1794). to Hegel, the relation between religion and philosophy was that they both had the
1 G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, three volumes, edited by Peter c. Hodgson, oxford: clarendon Press 2007, translation based on Hegel's Vorlesungen u? ber die Philosophie der Religion, edited by Walter Jaeschke, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 1983 ff. Both Jaeschke and Hodgson contributed considerably to the accessibility and understand- ing of Hegel's philosophy of religion.
? xii bart labuschagne and timo slootweg
same object (truth, also known as God), but that their methods in treat- ing and attaining it differed radically: religion by way of feeling, repre- sentation etc. and philosophy through thinking. therefore, religion can become the subject of philosophical thinking in its own right. Hegel took up this task after having treated almost all other philosophical subjects extensively (such as law, morality, politics and history). religion remained for the most part untreated; this phenomenon in human life and history needed to be brought to Hegel's mature philosophical and systematical understanding.
in the Lectures (1821 ff ), Hegel systematically treated not only christian- ity, but also all other, major historical religions preceding (and partly con- curring with) christianity: Judaism, islam, the roman religion, the Greek, the Egyptian, the Persian, the chinese, but also Buddhism and Hinduism. Hegel called these great, non-christian, historical religions: 'determinate religions' (bestimmte Religionen). to establish accurately the place of the determinate religions in Hegel's philosophy of religion as a whole, we want to introduce his thoughts somewhat further by focusing (in short) on what he says about this subject in the context of (1) the Phenomenol- ogy of Spirit (1807) and (2) in the context of the Lectures. the context of the Lectures is that of his Philosophy, and will be discussed below. in contrast to this, the Phenomenology comprises the science of the experi- ence of consciousness with itself. a concise reference to this alternative, phenomenological approach, and its connection with the Philosophy, can be of help to a better understanding of Hegel's perception of religion, and of the meaning of his account of the many historical religions.
2. religion in the Phenomenology of Spirit
although consciousness is essentially one, it is nevertheless split into that of the world and that of itself. at first the subject acknowledges nothing but its object. out of this primary stage, a consciousness of self devel- ops, although the subject is unable to conceive of the unity of world and man. Self-consciousness develops gradually in relation to the object and the knowledge thereof. the phenomenology of the object reflects that of the subject, although there is no absolute conscious and reasonable rec- ognition thereof. nevertheless the subject 'feels' this unity already, and it anticipates this oneness. the phenomenology of experience follows the development of this mere 'feeling anticipation' towards the form of knowledge in which this truth is finally consummated. "reason is the con-
editorial introduction xiii
scious certainty of being all reality. "2 Hegel's method is modesty. the phi- losopher merely witnesses and describes the experiences of the subject, and the way they follow one another from stage to stage. the one thing he ads to this development is the consciousness thereof, and the knowledge he lends to it.
consciousness becomes aware of itself and transforms itself into self- consciousness. But before this self-consciousness is completely 'at home with itself ', it first passes through many a stage of experience. through his consciousness man is not only split of (Entzweit) from the world of things. the divisiveness is also inter-subjective, between the subject and another self, and between the individual and the general or universal. Morality witnesses this divisiveness. History is the process in which this separation and this estrangement (Entfremdung) is conquered. in the end, self-consciousness attains full satisfaction only in someone else's self- consciousness, until finally it reaches the consciousness of 'itself as another'. it is only by recognizing others and by being recognized by oth- ers that we can reach the final goal of integration and wholeness that is the purpose of mankind. the summa summarum of this development is the knowledge, the absolute science of the unity of one's (self )conscious- ness with the absolute Self which is God; it is only in the knowing and scientific reconciliation between God and man that the absolute unrest (die Absolute Unruhe) of the experience of consciousness comes to rest. religion is the truth of morality; it is of the essence of morality itself to 'move' and develop in the direction of religion. religion 'senses' the recon- ciliation of law (duty) and nature, conscience and reality. the realization of freedom and forgiveness (mercy) is the revelation of God in the world, here and now, and in-between its peoples. 3
it is however, not just any (arbitrary) religion that suffices to represent this truth of morality. it is only the true religion, christianity--'the religion of truth'--that is able to accomplish this task. of this final reconciliation of man with himself (with mankind), man at first experiences a mere Vor- stellung; a relation of feeling, a pictorial representation of an otherworldly Being. to this supreme object man relates not in a reasonable way, but through devotion (Andacht). this strange and otherworldly Being is the object of his hope and his longing. But here on earth these can never
2 G. W. F. Hegel, Pha? nomenologie des Geistes, Ed. Bonsiepen und Heede, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 1988, V, p. 158.
3 cf. Hegel, Pha? nomenologie des Geistes, p. 442.
? xiv bart labuschagne and timo slootweg
be satisfied, and they remain without realization and fulfillment until the Kingdom of God. reconciliation remains but a dream for this 'unhappy consciousness'. at the same time however, already this 'dreamed of ' rec- onciliation refers to and encompasses the negation of God as a merely transcendental 'beyond'; as a mere bad infinity (schlechte Unendlichkeit). the figure of christ inspires consciousness towards a 'religion of reason' (Vernunftreligion); a religion that transcends the dualism of christianity in the 'positive' sense, and within the 'philosophy of faith' (Jacobi's Glauben- sphilosophie). Just like the phenomenon of law and State can only be understood in a proper philosophical way (they are the general organism and the ethical commonwealth in which the moral subject is embedded and finds its freedom), religion also must be known through the Science of the absolute, that reveals itself as the spirit of the world.
Philosophical consciousness is the product of the phenomenology of religion that finds its fulfillment in the scientific 'appreciation' of the religion of truth. However, before the highest, 'revealed religion' steps upon the stage, religion itself has gone through a long and many-faceted development. a religious consciousness accompanies every stage in the phenomenology of the spirit. But in respect to the fulfillment of history, religion has a particularly important role to play. in the Phenomenology Hegel writes about it in the chapter called: 'die religion', where he dis- criminates between three groups and three kinds of worship: the natural, aesthetic and revealed religions. religion develops in accordance to the form of its object, the absolute. natural religion reveres God in natural objects. the first moment of this stage is, 'the religion of light'; the God of light makes itself seen in the surrounding darkness. later on, plants and animals are also included in the divinization of nature that finds its result in the imagination of the 'master artificer' (Werkmeister). aesthetic religion makes works of art, man transfigured by poetic imagination, the object of worship. classical Greece and its devotion to the divine, pictured in human forms and frozen statues, is the famous example that Hegel has in mind, as well as the spiritual art of epos, that shows the life of the hero and the fate of his people in close relationship to the whims of the Gods. revealed religion (offenbare Religion), that is christianity, rises to the level of revealing the absolute Spirit; although in some sense it is still veiled and indirect. its idea is the 'conjunction' of the individual and the absolute spirit; the eternal and the temporal; the divine and the human. that the Supreme Being is heard, and seen as an objective and very 'real' self-consciousness, this revelation is the culmination and consummation of concept of God. this revelation means 'salvation'. to die is the fate
editorial introduction xv
of mankind. in christianity however, God participates in this 'privilege'. God becomes man, and dies like a man. the divine God becomes mortal; mortality is conquered spiritually; the finite becomes eternal in respect to its spirituality.
religion is imagination and perception; it is the truth in its content, but not qua form (it is not in conformity to the medium of the concept). there is however, a spiritual kinship of faith and knowledge. only speculative reflection fully 'reveals' the truth of religion, the truth of morality. this even higher form of self-consciousness (Absolute Wissenschaft) is reached on the basis of a divine life of self-sacrifice, self-alienation and self-reconciliation. the (example of the) death of God as an abstract individual, the develop- ment of ethical consciousness, is the spiritual 'resurrection of God' in the spirit of the community and the State. in addition to this, the Phenomenol- ogy is the becoming of science (das reale Wissen). only he can save him- self, who 'loses himself '; this 'abstraction' is necessary to be able think in a proper, philosophical way. Man becomes himself once he loses himself as an abstract individual, not only in respect to the higher ethical life (Sit- tlichkeit) to which he belongs, but also in respect to the higher scientific, logical and ontological consciousness thereof.
Eventually it is only by philosophically 'thinking through' the truths of christianity as a revealed religion, for instance by analyzing the dogma of the Holy trinity, that the enlightened, integrated consciousness (das absolute Wissen) can break through. the development of the philosophi- cal consciousness is the highest stage of the phenomenology of the expe- rience of the personal subject (Ich). its highest object (Gegenstand), the absolute is understood as 'Spirit being conscious of itself, mediated by the consciousness of the subject'. therefore, the final stage of the road to Science comprises the beginning of the logic that focuses on the devel- opment of the absolute in itself. the metaphysics of the absolute object becoming conscious of itself is implicated in the concept (Begriff ) of reli- gion. the development (in itself ) of this absolute concept, the becoming conscious of itself thereof, is the 'real', ontological process (the Real Phi- losophie) behind the phenomenology of the consciousness of the subject. the Phenomenology of Spirit culminates in this real process; it wants to elevate consciousness towards this real Philosophy of the development of the concept.
christian religion is the religion of spirit; not just of the human spirit, but of God's spirit as well. this is, in fact where the more extensive Lectures (1821 ff ) fit in. the Lectures also include a (more exten- sive) treatment of the historical religions, but the context in which they appear is thoroughly different from that of the Phenomenology.
xvi bart labuschagne and timo slootweg
3. determinate religion in the lectures on the Philosophy of religion
there are several ways in which the difference between the treatment of religion in the Phenomenology and the Lectures can be characterized. one way is to see the Phenomenology as a 'bottom up' treatment of the subject and the Lectures as a 'top down' approach. another is that the perspec- tive of the former is taken from the subject itself, while that of the latter from the object: the absolute. Yet another way to characterize this differ- ence, is to say that the Phenomenology describes the development of con- sciousness as it enfolds within subjective consciousness itself, as its ( fu? r es) development and Bildung towards true knowledge and philosophy on the one hand, while the Lectures (on the other hand) contain a realphil- osophische exposition of the subject as it is in and for itself; as well as 'for us' ( fu? r uns), as already initiated philosophers. let us now take a closer look at the overall structure of the Lectures, and try to elucidate what the place is of the historical religions in this greater scheme.
as already stated, the three parts of which the Lectures are organized according to Hegel's idea of the concept, as laid down (mainly) in the Sci- ence of logic (Wissenschaft der Logik, 3 Vols. 1812/1813/1816) and the Ency- clopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Enzyklopa? die der Philosophischen Wissenschaften, 1e ed. 1817, 2 ed. 1827, 3 ed. 1830). according to Hegel, the gap between subject and object and between epistemology and meta- physics can and needs to be bridged. the task of philosophy in general and the logic in particular is to show that there is an inherent connection between thought and reality, and that reality is reasonable in itself and that reason is something real. 4 the various domains of human thought and experience, including religion, ethics, morality, politics, law and his- tory, show an intrinsic 'deep structure' which can be brought to philo- sophical understanding by the categorical scheme of Hegel's logic. 5 not only does it make the claim to ground theoretical knowledge (reflection on the conditions of the possibility for empirical knowledge) and practi- cal knowledge (reflection on the conditions of the possibility for moral- practical action), but also to interrelate the theoretical and the practical
4 See the preface to the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, (1821) Werke Band 7, edited by Eva Moldenhauer en Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag 1970, 1986, p. 24: "Was vernu? nftig ist, das ist wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernu? nftig. "
5 Peter c. Hodgson, 'Editorial introduction', in: G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philoso- phy of Religion, one-volume edition, the lectures of 1827, edited by Peter c. Hodgson, oxford: clarendon Press 2006, p. 11.
? editorial introduction xvii
in ways that Kant failed to do. the method by which Hegel proceeds, is by reflecting on reflection itself: this is what Hegel call 'speculative thought', in order to distinguish this thought from the merely 'reflective' philosophy of Kant and other Enlightenment thinkers. this speculative philosophy not only grounds ethical, aesthetical, legal and historical experience, but also religious experience, man's experience of God. Hegel's God is not a supersensible entity, but rather the ultimate condition of the possibility for the totality of experience and for religious experience in particular. in this sense, the philosophical first principle and the theological first prin- ciple are one and the same: God is the absolute idea. this is not to say, however, that God is not actual (wirklich). God is actual, actual being in and for itself, but only in and through worldly reality, not as a separated, supersensible entity. When taken apart from the world, God's actuality remains abstract, unfulfilled, unrealized. in and through the world, of which God is the condition par excellence of its possibility, God becomes a concrete, living, true actuality--that is: absolute spirit. 6 and what we can come to terms with, is the way in which God has worked through human history and in the history of religions, in order to manifest himself finally in the consummate religion.
the deep, logical structure, that is grounded in the dialectic of specula- tive thought, consists of three moments or figures, and can be described as follows: (1) universality (Allgemeinheit), which is the most universal sub- stance or principle of a statement that can be discerned. this substance or principle is taken as such, an sich, in its most general and universal being. (2) Particularity (Besonderheid), the particular quality, determinate modification or application of the universal in the case at hand, which can be seen here for itself, fu? r sich. We take it as something particular, separate, as something being on its own, in its own right, but as a concrete manifestation and particularization of the general substance. (3) individu- ality or singularity (Einzelheit), where the former two come together in an adequate shape, wherein the universal is realized and embodied in an absolute way, that is: an und fu? r sich. the realization or embodiment is something that is adequate to its concept, wherein the concept finds its most perfect expression and can be regarded as being with itself or at home with itself in its otherness. this very triadic (or maybe: trinitarian) structure is mirrored in every aspect of Hegel's philosophical system. in the system as a whole (logical idea, nature, spirit), in the science of logic
6 Hodgson, op. cit. p. 12.
? xviii bart labuschagne and timo slootweg
(being / immediacy, essence / reflection, concept / subjectivity) and its subdivisions; the dialectics of consciousness (immediacy, differentiation, return; or identity, cleavage, reunification); and for example even in the doctrine of the trinity (Father, Son, Holy Spirit).
the threefold division of the philosophy of religion in the Lectures reflects this logical structure as well (1. concept of religion, 2. determi- nate religion, 3. consummate religion), as do the subdivisions of each of these main parts. 7 the first part is concerned with the concept of religion, that is: with religion in its most general and universal aspects: as it is an sich. abstraction is made of what particular form of religion whatsoever, and attention is focused only on the most general and universal charac- teristics of the religious phenomenon. themes such as the 'abstract' con- cept of God, the knowledge of God (the 'theoretical' relationship) and the cultus (the 'practical' relationship) are discussed. We will dwell on this first part of the Lectures below. the second part deals with the realisa- tion, the actual being of religion: the determinate religions. these are the religions that are dealt with in the volume that the reader has in hand now: the actual, historical religions that humankind has developed and known, and of which Hegel takes deep and serious account in the sec- ond part of his lectures. He treats (what he calls) immediate religion, or nature religion, the religion of Magic, Buddhism, Hindu religion, Persian religion, Egyptian religion, the religion of the Greeks, the religion of the Jews and finally the roman religion. the lectures exhibit a great variety in categorization and labelling of these religions, which shows that Hegel had difficulties with allotting them a proper place in his system. and the third part is devoted to the culmination of all the previous religion in the religion that is alone adequate to the concept of God: the consummate religion--that is revealed religion: christianity.
the first part of the Lectures is titled The Concept of Religion. it may be useful to expound the content of this part a little more, so that the reader, when studying the contributions on the several determinate religions in this volume, can understand in what way these determinate religions form a particularization of, or embody the concept into concrete, histori- cal religions. 8 Hegel starts with an exposition of the abstract (and not yet concrete) realization of the concept in its three constitutive, inner, logical
7 Hodgson, op. cit. p. 13.
8 For the sake of clarity and brevity, the one-volume edition of the lectures of 1827, edited by Peter c. Hodgson, op. cit. is used, especially the excellent Editorial introduction, pp. 27-39.
? editorial introduction xix
moments: (1) the 'abstract' concept of God, (2) the knowledge of God (the 'theoretical' religious relationship), and (3) the cultus (the 'practical' reli- gious relationship). these three moments correspond with the moments of the self-explication of the idea of God itself. in this first sphere of sheer immediacy and universality, the first thing that can and should be said, is that God is of course the absolute truth and that religion alone is the absolutely true knowledge. this content that stands at the beginning of the philosophy of religion, however, appears to be at the same time the result of the whole of philosophy. the three major disciplines of philoso- phy (logic, nature and spirit) lead up to God as their final result. Philoso- phy of religion is at once the final science within the philosophical system, presupposing all the other branches, starting from the (already in the Phe- nomenology obvious) premise, that man is a homo religiosus. Since this 'result' (and premise) is the absolute truth, it cannot be merely a result or just a premise. it must also be a philosophical presupposition, the first one, as well as the last one, that which results from itself. as such, God is the absolute substance, yet at the same time (in order to avoid the charge of pantheism or Spinozism) subject: God is being-with-itself and abiding- with-itself, in other words, God is spirit, absolute spirit. and we have this content in thought, not yet primarily in feeling, willing, imagination etc. Human beings think, and they alone have religion. thus religion has its inmost seat in thought, though no doubt it can also be felt, believed, imag- ined, represented, and practiced. 9
Knowledge of God, in faith, feeling, representation and thought, in short: the theoretical religious relationship, is dealt with in the second section. 10 in it, a large body of material treating the various forms of reli- gious consciousness is incorporated, such as immediate knowledge, faith, feeling, representation, thought etc. this theme of religious knowledge corresponds to the second, logical moment of religion, that is differentia- tion, distinction and concrete embodiment, which form the preconditions of relationship. this relationship can be seen from the point of God and from the view of consciousness. the God who can be known and rep- resented in the world, is a concrete, differentiated and self-manifesting subject. He is no longer an abstract, self-identical, universal substance. He enters into a relationship with man by manifesting himself in history.
9 Hodgson, op. cit. pp. 27-28. Hegel's treatment of this section can be found on the pages 114-128.
10 Hegel, Lectures, op. cit. pp. 128-189.
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From the point of view of man's consciousness, a number of different forms of religious consciousness can be discerned. the first one is that of immediate knowledge--that is: the immediate certainty (Gewissheit) that God is, and that God indeed is this universality having being in and for itself, outside of me and independent of me. certainty is the most imme- diate relation between this content and myself. and the first and most basic form of this certainty is that of faith (Glaube), which can and should not be placed in opposition to knowledge (Wissen) but is in fact a form of knowledge in its own right. instead of using 'faith', Hegel prefers the term used in his general epistemology, 'intuition' (Anschauung), thereby stressing that this form of knowledge is not of a sensible nature--since God is not an object of sense-experience. the second element is 'feeling' (Gefu? hl), which connotes the subjective aspect of the immediate certainty, namely its relevance for our own, particular existence. We have at once the feeling of a content (for example, a hard object) and the feeling of ourselves (the feeling 'hardness'), which we feel that we feel. Feeling is something fashionable, says Hegel, because when we feel something, we are personally and subjectively involved with it, thereby attributing value to the thing in question, as well as to ourselves. However, feeling does not make us able to judge the validity of its contents. Feelings of the heart must be purified and cultivated, and this is exactly why 'thought' becomes indispensable. Before reaching 'thought' however, we encounter first the form of knowledge known as 'representation' (Vorstellung). if feeling con- stitutes the subjective aspect, then representation attends to the objec- tive aspect, the content, of whatever it is that we are immediately certain about. Yet it does not penetrate this content in any rational or cognitive way. representation has two basic forms, or configurations: sensible and non-sensible. the first are considered 'images' (Bilder), they are sym- bolic, allegorical, metaphorical and mythical. non-sensible configurations (nichtsinnliche Gestaltungen) have to do with spiritual contents, activities, relationships. 11
and finally in this section, 'thought' is treated, in a quite long chapter,12 where Hegel discusses the relationship of thought and representation and the question whether religious knowledge is immediate or mediated. the point is, that representation apprehends its various contents in their deter- minate isolation, whereas thought seeks for relationships and universality.
11 Hodgson, op. cit. pp. 29-32. 12 Hegel, Lectures, op. cit. pp. 151-189.
? editorial introduction xxi
thought raises representational configurations to a conceptual form. a concept (Begriff ) precisely grasps or holds together (be-greifen) exactly those elements that remain disparate in the simple placing-before (vor- stellen) the mind of various sensible or non-sensible images. By develop- ing arguments and hypotheses that elucidate the unity of representational features, it arrives at a 'conviction' (U? berzeugung), which is certainty in the form of thought. in a last chapter in this section on the theoretical reli- gious relationship, Hegel discusses the proofs of the existence of God. 13
the concluding section, The Cultus, demonstrates that the theoretical religious relationship is still unaccomplished. in the case of the knowledge of God, i am immersed in my object and know nothing about myself. But actually, the true situation is that i am in a relationship with this object; i should know myself as being filled with it. What accomplishes this unity is in fact action, that is: the activity of the cultus, which constitutes the prac- tical religious relationship. cultus is "the including, within my own self, of myself with God, the knowing of myself within God and of God within me. "14 this is accomplished through the act of 'enjoyment', 'partaking', or 'communion' (Genuss), which is the cultic act par excellence. it does not so much bring about the reconciliation of God with mankind, but it pre- supposes it, participates in is as something already accomplished by God's grace, either implicitly or explicitly. Hegel distinguishes three basic forms of the cultus. the first one is devotion (Andacht), which is "not the mere faith that God is, but is present when the faith becomes vivid, when the subject prays and is occupied with this content not merely in objective fashion but becomes immersed therein. "15 next, there are two external cultic forms, sacraments on the one hand (reconciliation brought into feeling, into present sensible consciousness) and sacrifice on the other (the negation involved in elevation sensibly accomplished). the third and highest form is repentance, whereby one not only renounces external things but also offers one's heart or innermost self to God. When purity of heart is properly cultivated, it results in ethical life, which is accord- ing to Hegel "the most genuine cultus. "16 actually, social and political eth- ics represent an extension and further realization of the religious cultus,
13 For an analysis of this, see Hodgson op. cit. pp. 34-38. discussion here would take us too far from the purpose of this introduction.
14 Hegel, Lectures, op. cit. p. 191.
15 Hegel, Lectures, op. cit. p. 193.
16 Hegel, Lectures, op. cit. p. 194. Hodgson, op. cit. p. 39.
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something which is treated by Hegel only at the end the lectures, in his treatment of the christian cultus.
the treatment of the cultus constitutes the final section of the first part of the Lectures. according to the logic of the concept, it is now time to develop the concept in the dimension of its particularity, that is: to show how the concept is embodied in concrete, actual and historical religions. these concrete manifestations of religion in the determinate religions are considered to be not yet fully adequate in relation to its concept. in the second part of his Lectures, Hegel discusses extensively practically all known major world religions, whereby he distinguishes between the deter- minate religions (all non-christian religions) and the consummate, revealed religion (christianity, in both its catholic and Protestant varieties).
4. Purpose of the Book
the present volume brings together a collection of critical essays that discuss Hegel's relation to each of these determinate, historical forms of religion; including the consummate, revealed religion of christianity. a discussion of islam is also included, although it does not figure promi- nently among Hegel's determinate religions. all contributions aim to shed light on the intriguing development of Hegel's conception of the history of these actual religions. they not only offer a text-immanent analyti- cal approach, but they also take a (more or less) critical stance in which Hegel's perception is confronted with a critique developed from the (point of view of the) religion in question. Moreover, important to observe here, is that the determinate religions are considered by Hegel to be less perfect religions; religious forms that are less adequate to the concept of religion. only christianity turns out to be in this sense a true religion. However, seen from these religions themselves, truth is involved as well; of course, at least for the believers in question. this poses (undeniably) a deep ten- sion between the self-understanding of these non-christian believers and how they view their religion (namely: as true religion) and Hegel's under- standing of these religions as less true than christianity.
it has been our aim not only to develop a comprehensive view of Hegel's philosophy of the historical religions, but also of its broader, con- temporary importance. We did not want to bundle separate, stand-alone contributions, but to offer an integral outline of Hegel's philosophy of the religions in general. the construction and structure of the book follow (for
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the most part) the dialectics that Hegel himself employed in his Lectures, with the exception of islam that Hegel finds difficult to rubricate.
apart from text-immanent exegesis and the critical appraisal, the further aim of this book is as indicated, to contribute to the discussion between (on the one hand) Hegel's daring, far-reaching philosophical treatment of the great historical religions, and (on the other hand) the current approach, prevailing in religious studies, that seems to be con- strained (more and more) to the merely empirical appreciation of the religious material. We could say that, in some sense, Hegel himself has been responsible for this self-imposed restriction. after his death, Hegel's philosophy of religion was severely criticized. it was presumed to be too speculative and too little empirical in order to be able to do justice to the actual, historical religions. For many scholars 19th century Hegelianism constituted a reason to withdraw and distance themselves from philoso- phy, and to a retreat into a non-reflexive religiosity and a mere descrip- tive science thereof. neo-Kantianism succeeded more or less in regaining some of the long lost trustworthiness of the idealistic approach.
