We think that this last opinion is en-
tirely shared by all responsible men in
consul d'Angleterre a Beyrouth aide et assistance
contre les autorit6s ottomanes, et les journaux de
France epiloguerent longuement sur l'incident.
tirely shared by all responsible men in
consul d'Angleterre a Beyrouth aide et assistance
contre les autorit6s ottomanes, et les journaux de
France epiloguerent longuement sur l'incident.
Jabotinsky - 1917 - Turkey and the War
We refuse to admit that
England's past policy towards Russia was
ever inspired by the desire to prevent the
free development of her natural maritime
possibilities. We interpret the shade of
diffidence, felt and expressed on this matter
by the English public in days past and
forgotten, as a legitimate anxiety to keep
the control of the seas in the hands of a
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
nation to whom sea-power means every-
thing. We choose to believe that even
in those days English opinion would gladly
have agreed to any settlement conciliating
Russia's right to an access to the free sea
with England's natural jealousy of the
ocean. The Dardanelles solution serves
both purposes in a most admirablejway.
We use, indiscriminately, the names
Constantinople and the Dardanelles be-
cause they express the same thing. The
possession of the Golden Horn would be
of no use without that of Gallipoli. Timid
people suggest the compromise of sub-
mitting the Bosphorus to one rule and the
Dardanelles to another. But what is the
good of free traffic through the Bosphorus
if the Dardanelles shall remain liable to
be closed as before at the least shadow of
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? THE STRAITS
a quarrel in which Russia has nothing to
say ? The possession of the Straits im-
plies the possession of both passages on
both sides, Anatolian and Roumelian, in-
cluding Constantinople and Scutari, Princes'
and Marmora Isles, Gallipoli and Dar-
danelles-city.
We do not see why this scheme should
be considered an odious annexation
clashing with the principle of nationality,
holy to the Allies. This principle, as
already said, can be fully applied only
where there is a clear and decisive pre-
dominance of one race, in numbers as well
as in cultural value, over the others. Such
is by no means the case of the territories
indispensable to assure Russia's control
of the Straits. Here is an approximate, but
reliable, statistical estimate of the main
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
elements of the population in the region
including Constantinople with its Asiatic
dependencies (the suburbs of Kanlidja,
Scutari, Kadikeuy, the cazas of Princes'
Isles, Ghezb6, Beykos, Kartal, and Shile),
the sandjaks of Chataldja and Gallipoli,
and the mutessarriflik of Dardanelles :
Turks - 600,000
Greeks ------ 325,000
Armenians ----- 200,000
Levantines ----- 75,000
Jews 70,000
Bulgarians ----- 30,000
Foreigners - 130,000
Total (including smaller groups) - 1,450,000
This motley composition absolutely re-
fuses to support any claim based on ethnical
grounds. The Straits cannot be annexed
to a State " of their own race " because
they have no race of their own. Their
destinies can only be discussed and decided
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? THE STRAITS
from the standpoint of economical neces-
sity and political efficiency.
Of course we know that a strong party,
especially in Roumania, suggests a com-
promise : neutralization of the Straits and
of Constantinople. At the first glance this
project seems alluring as all compromises
do ; but, as almost all of them, it is an
utterly inefficient scheme, bound to create
a precarious and dangerous state of things.
Russia needs a passage completely and
absolutely free, independent of the good
will of her neighbours, big and small, near
and far. What neutralization means, the
world has learnt on the first day of this
war. This lesson will never be forgotten.
The " neutralized " Straits could be seized
and occupied in spite of scraps of paper
before Russia could oppose it by force,
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
and all that would remain to her would
be the moral comfort of writing diplomatic
notes. Would England ever agree to a
neutralization of the Suez Canal without
having secured for herself the control --
the military control -- of its approaches ?
The situation at the Dardanelles is quite
analogous. Even more : the Suez Canal
after all is not the only way to India, whilst
the Dardanelles are indeed the only access
to Russia's South. Some international
agreement concerning the free use of the
Straits may prove indispensable and would
certainly not be opposed by Russian opinion
in principle ; but Russia could accept it
only as a corollary in a settlement which
should leave to her the full sovereignty,
the military and administrative control of
the two shores of the Bosphorus and of the
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? THE STRAITS
two shores of the Dardanelles. * Any other
decision of the half-way sort would in-
evitably lead to this one result : that
Russia would seize the first opportunity
to help herself out of a precarious " neutral-
ization" which would leave her, just as
now, under the sword of Damocles.
On the other side, there is no need to
complicate the question by alleging that,
in order to secure her future position on
* The Rech of Petrograd, the leading daily of the
Constitutional-Democratic Party, wrote in 1915 :
" With the idea of neutralization the discussion is
not yet closed for us. . . . The forms and degrees of
neutralization can be extremely various, from that
applied to the Strait of Magellan to that of the
Panama Canal where the United States has the
right to raise fortifications just for the security of
the Canal. . . . If this problem has been settled for
Panama, there is no reason to think that it could
not be settled with the same success for the Bosphorus
and the Dardanelles. " -- (Quoted, in a French transla-
tion, by M. N. Dascovici, " La question du Bosphore
et des Dardanelles," 1915, p. 293. )
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
the Straits, Russia must claim an unin-
terrupted land approach from Batum to
Scutari. England and France keep their
over-sea dominions without land ap-
proaches. The Russian Black Sea fleet,
under future conditions, will be completely
equal to the task of connecting the little
colony to the great metropolis.
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? XII-- SYRIA AND PALESTINE
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? XII
Syria and Palestine
If we eliminate the Drang nach Osten,
France has practically no competitors as
far as Syria is concerned. True, Colonel
Churchill wrote in the 'sixties that Syria
is geographically and historically the
indispensable corollary of Egypt, and that
both ought to belong to England. But,
although one-half of this prophetic wish
has been fulfilled, we think that nobody
in Britain would press for the execution
of the second moiety.
If such a tendency can be discovered
anywhere in our days, it is perhaps among
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
a section of Arab Nationalists in Egypt
and Syria. Their argument may be
worth mentioning. It presents a new
feature in the development of Arab political
opinion. Until recent times the Arabs,
especially those of Syria, were understood
to be strongly Francophil -- inasmuch as
they did not consider the possibility of
complete independence. It was a natural
result of their education, as most of the
modern-taught Arabs passed through the
numerous French schools of Syria. But
since the beginning of this war several
symptoms pointed to a notable change in
this attitude, at least among a section of
Syrian leaders. One of them, who lives
in Paris, gave us the following explanation
of this new departure.
" Before the war broke out it had always
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
been an axiom with us that England did
not want Syria. So the only alternative
to Turkish rule, for those who did not
believe in independence, was France. The
Turkish menace to Egypt changed the
whole situation. My friends from Cairo
write me that now on all sides the con-
viction is growing that England will not
be able to remain indifferent to the future
of Syria. They think England will claim
for herself the southern part of the Syrian
coast, if not the whole of it. If it is true,
then we Arabs have to reconsider our
attitude. If we really have a choice be-
tween France and England, many of us
would prefer England. We do not feel
any particular love for either ; as a matter
of feeling, our instinctive sympathy goes
rather to the French than to the English.
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
But the French rule is centralistic and
tends to impose on the native population
the French language and customs. Eng-
land is incomparably more liberal. We
have two examples before our eyes : Tunis
and Egypt were occupied at the same time.
Tunis has been completely " frenchified *
in everything -- administration, tribunals,
schools, even religious education ; whilst
in Egypt our national language plays a
prominent role in schools and public life.
This difference is eloquent enough. Be-
sides, there is another consideration of no
less importance. The populations of the
southern and eastern Mediterranean coasts,
who all speak Arab dialects and could
form in the future a great united nation,
have been cut up into sections under
different rule : Morocco, Algeria and Tunis
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
are French, Tripoli is Italian, Egypt is
British, and now they are speaking of
Syria about to become French. I think
it is trop de morcellement. Many of us
will certainly prefer Egypt and Syria to
be one, under the same rule, and so to
constitute a powerful nucleus of Arab
nationhood. " *
* Cf. also the impressions of a French observer
close at the eve of the war : "De toutes les puissances
qui cherchent a ? tendre leur influence sur la Syrie
et la Palestine, l'Angleterre est avec la France la
seule vers qui aillent les aspirations des populations
desireuses d'echapper de quelque maniere an gou-
vernement des Turcs. . . . Sans vouloir mettre en
doute la bonne foi du gouvernement anglais lorsqu'il
declara l'annee derniere n'avoir ' ni intention d'agir,
ni dessein, ni aspiration politique dans ces regions,'
il n'en est pas moins vrai que les musulmans se tour-
nent vers lui et qu'il ne fait rien pour les decourager.
Certes, aucune propagande omcielle n'est faite par
l'Angleterre en Syrie, mais il faut que les musulmans
aient ete, comme on dit, fortement ' travailles '
precddemment par ses agents pour qu'ils la regardent
comme leur protect rice naturelle. On vit au prin-
temps dernier les notables musulmans reclamer au
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
These ideas did not 'pass unnoticed. In
the early spring of 1915 they formed the
subject of a lively polemic between some
leading vernacular papers of Cairo. A
little later, one of the most important
Paris dailies spoke with some anxiety of
" a section among the Syrian Arabs who
are said to turn their eyes towards a
Power other than France/' and tried to
persuade them that France is still the
fittest alternative for them.
We think that this last opinion is en-
tirely shared by all responsible men in
consul d'Angleterre a Beyrouth aide et assistance
contre les autorit6s ottomanes, et les journaux de
France epiloguerent longuement sur l'incident. Que
les diplomates anglais n'agissent plus aujourd'hui
sur les musulmans de Palestine et de Syrie, il n'en
reste pas moins que l'Angleterre a conserve sur eux
une influence politique dont ils sont devenus eux-
memes les propagateurs. " -- (Andre Dubosq, " Syrie,
Tripolitaine, Albanie," 1914, pp. 32, 33. )
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
British politics and press. The only ques-
tion that remains and really concerns
vital English interests is to know where
the southern frontier of the future French
Syria should be drawn. In other terms :
Syria must unquestionably go to France,
but what shall be the fate of that southern
part of the Syrian coast which bears the
historic name of Palestine ?
This question has met with little interest
on the part of the British public, with the
exception of some official circles in this
country and in Egypt. Not so in France.
The question of Palestine is vividly dis-
cussed in papers and at public meetings ;
the battlecry is " il nous faut la Syrie
integrate. " Among the leaders of this pro-
paganda we find many prominent names --
for one instance, that of Senator Leygues.
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
Although not in the least supported by
the Government, which keeps a correct
silence on the whole matter, this movement
shows that French political sentiment is
almost as keen on Palestine as on the
rest of Syria.
Analysing, however, this part of the
French claim, one cannot help seeing that
it is hardly supported by anything but
sentiment. Palestine occupies less than a
sixth of the total surface of Syria, and
includes less than a sixth of Syria's total
population. In the present conditions it
is the poorest part of Syria. The large
commercial towns, Beyrouth, Damascus and
Aleppo lie outside of Palestine ; compared
with them Jerusalem is small and poor.
Palestine has no natural harbour com-
parable to Alexandretta or Beyrouth. And
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
indeed commercial arguments do not play
any noticeable part in the agitation in
favour of a French Palestine, whilst they
predominate in any expose of the French
case concerning the rest of Syria. The
case for Palestine is supported exclusively
by motives of an ideal sort, such as recol-
lections of the first Crusade when Godfrey
of Bouillon and Baudoin of Flanders
founded the kingdom of Jerusalem, doomed
to disappear in one century, or the tradi-
tion which from 1535 and 1604 to 1878
entrusted to France the protection of all
the Christians in the Orient and particu-
larly of the pilgrims going to the Holy
Places.
It would be cynical to underrate the
value of ideal motives. Supposing that
after the partition of Turkey there could
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
arise a question of entrusting the " pro-
tection of Christians/' or the guardianship
of the Holy Places, to one Power, no
nation would be better entitled to perform
this honourable task than France. But
the protection of Christians has been as-
sumed long ago by all the Christian Powers
for their respective dependents, reducing
the French privilege to practically nothing. *
* M. Delcasse said in the French Chamber, on
January 19th, 1903 : " Le protectorat de la France
(i. e. the protectorate over the Christians in Turkey)
ne s'etend pas ? il s'etend de moins en moins a des
Strangers. Depuis quelques annees, il a evolue.
Tout en gardant son caractere universel (? ), il tend
de plus en plus . . . a ne s'exercer qu'en faveur des
Francais et a leur benefice exclusif. " -- (Quoted by
M. A. Cheradame, " Le chemin de fer de Bagdad et
les Puissances/' 1903, p. 309. ) " C'est surtout depuis
le traite de Berlin que les droits de la France furent
contestes et battus en breche. . . . Le protectorat,
ce n'etait plus, en effet, comme jadis, la protection
des marchands et des pelerins, chaque nation se
chargeant aujourd'hui de proteger les siens. On
pouvait meme contester qu'il fut question des ordres
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
Besides, such protection was needed only
as long as Palestine was under Moham-
medan rule. The partition of Turkey will
remove this state of things purely and
simply, leaving no ground even for the
slightest fiction of ex-territorial protection.
Whichever be the State that will inherit
Palestine, it will be just as able to protect
Christians as England in Egypt or France
in Tunis.
religieux latins, des ev? ques latins, etc. , puisque
T article 62 reconnaissait a chaque puissance le droit
de prot6ger ceux de sa nationalite. On pouvait
soutenir que le protectorat ne consistait plus que
dans les prerogatives honorifiques . . . " " Dans
ces trente dernieres annees, c'est la volonte du Saint-
Siege qui empeche notre protectorat de s'effriter
sous les efforts de nos rivaux. Mais aujourd'hui
la France a rompu avec le Saint-Siege j il pent en
resulter, un jour ou 1' autre, 1' abandon formel ou
tacite des instructions de 1888 et de 1898 \ ce jour-la
le protectorat, dans sa forme ancienne, aura vecu. " --
(Rene" Pinon, " L J Europe et 1' Empire Ottoman,"
1905, PP. 553 and 568. )
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
But the essential point which removes
the foundation itself of France's ideal
argument is the question of guardianship
of the Holy Places. In this matter it
would be idle and dangerous to cherish
any illusions. To avoid confusion, the
strictest distinction must be kept in mind
between Palestine as a whole, and the
Holy Places in particular. The latter in-
clude a large part of Jerusalem, Bethlehem,
Nazareth, and two or three minor locali-
ties. No arrangement is thinkable leaving
them in the hands of one Christian Power.
France in her Orient policy was and is
a Roman Catholic Power. It does not
seem that even Protestant States would
like, or simply tolerate, the establish-
ment of her one-sided control over cities
and villages considered as the common
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
property of all the Christian Churches.
But there is certainly one Power which
would oppose such a solution with all its
energy, and that is Russia. Militant Or-
thodoxy, jealously exclusive -- especially
in its relations to the Roman Church --
is an avowedly prominent factor in
Russia's inner and foreign politics. The
keen interest for the Holy Places shown
by the Russian Church is a well-known
fact, and it is supported by the unparal-
leled numbers of Russian pilgrims annually
flooding Jerusalem at Easter time. So far,
however, official Russia has shown no sign
of political intentions as regards Palestine ;
she is not one of France's competitors for
this portion of the Turkish heritage. But
any attempt to bring the Holy Places
under the rule of a Roman Catholic Power
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
would provoke very undesirable complica-
tions. We can scarcely imagine anything
so likely to imperil the harmony of the
Entente as the idea of a French Holy
Sepulchre. This idea is impracticable, and
we understand that it has already been
dropped. The Holy Places will form a
group of enclaves governed by an inter-
national commission.
Nothing remains then of the ideal value
which the possession of Palestine could
have for France. The two glorious titles
which make the fascination of the " crown
of Jerusalem " -- protector of Christians in
the Orient and defender of the Holy
Places -- have been irremediably cancelled
by time and the force of events. What
remains is the memory of the short-lived
Crusaders' kingdom of seven hundred years
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
ago. Is it enough to nourish a steadfast
enthusiasm for the idea of " Syrie inte-
grale " ? And is it enough to counter-
balance the heavy, the really vital military
reasons which force expert observers on
the English side to recognize in Palestine
the natural bulwark of the Suez Canal ?
As we said, this truth is only slowly
filtering through the minds of this country.
We remember having read, a little more
than a year ago, the following lines in the
Fortnightly : " . . . It is difficult to ima-
gine any British Government voluntarily
assuming such a burden (protectorate over
Palestine), unless as a proved military
necessity, and no one can seriously main-
tain that proposition. The desert may
not be an impregnable frontier, but it is
at least a formidable one, and the line of
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
the Suez Canal is much easier defended than
any frontier that could be drawn between
Palestine and Syria. . . . It has always
been British policy to avoid, wherever
possible, having land frontiers coterminous
with those of great military States. "*
The author expressed a view very com-
mon at that time, and not altogether
forgotten even now. It is worth closer
consideration. The Sinai campaign, though
poor in events, is rich in lessons. In the
following we quote a letter dealing with
these lessons, written by a foreign journa-
list who witnessed the engagements on
the Suez Canal in February, 1915.
"I am afraid you in England confuse
two things : the defence of Egypt and
* J. B. Firth, " The Partition of Asia Minor,"
The Fortnightly Review, April, 1915.
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
that of the Suez Canal. The former, of
course, is secure -- but not owing to the
desert. The desert did not prevent the
enemy from approaching El-Kantara and
Serapeum. But for the Canal, he could
have approached Zagazig as well. What
protects Egypt is the Suez Canal, and
not in the least the desert. I admit that
the Canal is an impregnable barrier : but
then you must consider it only as a means
of defence. That is what your generals
do. But can you forget that the Suez
Canal is by itself a value which must be
protected ? I always thought that the
Canal was the only reason why England
chose to keep Egypt -- that its value for
England is much greater than that of
Egypt. Now you treat the Canal simply
as a first-line trench, or an outpost of the
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
Egyptian fortress. First-line trenches and
advanced outposts are susceptible of being
seriously damaged even by an enemy who
is too feeble to take the fortress itself.
So it is in the case of the Suez Canal. An
enemy having Palestine for his base is
hardly likely to penetrate into Egypt ;
but are you sure he is not likely to make
your Canal useless and impracticable for
the whole time of the hostilities ?
England's past policy towards Russia was
ever inspired by the desire to prevent the
free development of her natural maritime
possibilities. We interpret the shade of
diffidence, felt and expressed on this matter
by the English public in days past and
forgotten, as a legitimate anxiety to keep
the control of the seas in the hands of a
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
nation to whom sea-power means every-
thing. We choose to believe that even
in those days English opinion would gladly
have agreed to any settlement conciliating
Russia's right to an access to the free sea
with England's natural jealousy of the
ocean. The Dardanelles solution serves
both purposes in a most admirablejway.
We use, indiscriminately, the names
Constantinople and the Dardanelles be-
cause they express the same thing. The
possession of the Golden Horn would be
of no use without that of Gallipoli. Timid
people suggest the compromise of sub-
mitting the Bosphorus to one rule and the
Dardanelles to another. But what is the
good of free traffic through the Bosphorus
if the Dardanelles shall remain liable to
be closed as before at the least shadow of
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? THE STRAITS
a quarrel in which Russia has nothing to
say ? The possession of the Straits im-
plies the possession of both passages on
both sides, Anatolian and Roumelian, in-
cluding Constantinople and Scutari, Princes'
and Marmora Isles, Gallipoli and Dar-
danelles-city.
We do not see why this scheme should
be considered an odious annexation
clashing with the principle of nationality,
holy to the Allies. This principle, as
already said, can be fully applied only
where there is a clear and decisive pre-
dominance of one race, in numbers as well
as in cultural value, over the others. Such
is by no means the case of the territories
indispensable to assure Russia's control
of the Straits. Here is an approximate, but
reliable, statistical estimate of the main
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
elements of the population in the region
including Constantinople with its Asiatic
dependencies (the suburbs of Kanlidja,
Scutari, Kadikeuy, the cazas of Princes'
Isles, Ghezb6, Beykos, Kartal, and Shile),
the sandjaks of Chataldja and Gallipoli,
and the mutessarriflik of Dardanelles :
Turks - 600,000
Greeks ------ 325,000
Armenians ----- 200,000
Levantines ----- 75,000
Jews 70,000
Bulgarians ----- 30,000
Foreigners - 130,000
Total (including smaller groups) - 1,450,000
This motley composition absolutely re-
fuses to support any claim based on ethnical
grounds. The Straits cannot be annexed
to a State " of their own race " because
they have no race of their own. Their
destinies can only be discussed and decided
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? THE STRAITS
from the standpoint of economical neces-
sity and political efficiency.
Of course we know that a strong party,
especially in Roumania, suggests a com-
promise : neutralization of the Straits and
of Constantinople. At the first glance this
project seems alluring as all compromises
do ; but, as almost all of them, it is an
utterly inefficient scheme, bound to create
a precarious and dangerous state of things.
Russia needs a passage completely and
absolutely free, independent of the good
will of her neighbours, big and small, near
and far. What neutralization means, the
world has learnt on the first day of this
war. This lesson will never be forgotten.
The " neutralized " Straits could be seized
and occupied in spite of scraps of paper
before Russia could oppose it by force,
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
and all that would remain to her would
be the moral comfort of writing diplomatic
notes. Would England ever agree to a
neutralization of the Suez Canal without
having secured for herself the control --
the military control -- of its approaches ?
The situation at the Dardanelles is quite
analogous. Even more : the Suez Canal
after all is not the only way to India, whilst
the Dardanelles are indeed the only access
to Russia's South. Some international
agreement concerning the free use of the
Straits may prove indispensable and would
certainly not be opposed by Russian opinion
in principle ; but Russia could accept it
only as a corollary in a settlement which
should leave to her the full sovereignty,
the military and administrative control of
the two shores of the Bosphorus and of the
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? THE STRAITS
two shores of the Dardanelles. * Any other
decision of the half-way sort would in-
evitably lead to this one result : that
Russia would seize the first opportunity
to help herself out of a precarious " neutral-
ization" which would leave her, just as
now, under the sword of Damocles.
On the other side, there is no need to
complicate the question by alleging that,
in order to secure her future position on
* The Rech of Petrograd, the leading daily of the
Constitutional-Democratic Party, wrote in 1915 :
" With the idea of neutralization the discussion is
not yet closed for us. . . . The forms and degrees of
neutralization can be extremely various, from that
applied to the Strait of Magellan to that of the
Panama Canal where the United States has the
right to raise fortifications just for the security of
the Canal. . . . If this problem has been settled for
Panama, there is no reason to think that it could
not be settled with the same success for the Bosphorus
and the Dardanelles. " -- (Quoted, in a French transla-
tion, by M. N. Dascovici, " La question du Bosphore
et des Dardanelles," 1915, p. 293. )
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
the Straits, Russia must claim an unin-
terrupted land approach from Batum to
Scutari. England and France keep their
over-sea dominions without land ap-
proaches. The Russian Black Sea fleet,
under future conditions, will be completely
equal to the task of connecting the little
colony to the great metropolis.
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? XII-- SYRIA AND PALESTINE
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? XII
Syria and Palestine
If we eliminate the Drang nach Osten,
France has practically no competitors as
far as Syria is concerned. True, Colonel
Churchill wrote in the 'sixties that Syria
is geographically and historically the
indispensable corollary of Egypt, and that
both ought to belong to England. But,
although one-half of this prophetic wish
has been fulfilled, we think that nobody
in Britain would press for the execution
of the second moiety.
If such a tendency can be discovered
anywhere in our days, it is perhaps among
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
a section of Arab Nationalists in Egypt
and Syria. Their argument may be
worth mentioning. It presents a new
feature in the development of Arab political
opinion. Until recent times the Arabs,
especially those of Syria, were understood
to be strongly Francophil -- inasmuch as
they did not consider the possibility of
complete independence. It was a natural
result of their education, as most of the
modern-taught Arabs passed through the
numerous French schools of Syria. But
since the beginning of this war several
symptoms pointed to a notable change in
this attitude, at least among a section of
Syrian leaders. One of them, who lives
in Paris, gave us the following explanation
of this new departure.
" Before the war broke out it had always
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
been an axiom with us that England did
not want Syria. So the only alternative
to Turkish rule, for those who did not
believe in independence, was France. The
Turkish menace to Egypt changed the
whole situation. My friends from Cairo
write me that now on all sides the con-
viction is growing that England will not
be able to remain indifferent to the future
of Syria. They think England will claim
for herself the southern part of the Syrian
coast, if not the whole of it. If it is true,
then we Arabs have to reconsider our
attitude. If we really have a choice be-
tween France and England, many of us
would prefer England. We do not feel
any particular love for either ; as a matter
of feeling, our instinctive sympathy goes
rather to the French than to the English.
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
But the French rule is centralistic and
tends to impose on the native population
the French language and customs. Eng-
land is incomparably more liberal. We
have two examples before our eyes : Tunis
and Egypt were occupied at the same time.
Tunis has been completely " frenchified *
in everything -- administration, tribunals,
schools, even religious education ; whilst
in Egypt our national language plays a
prominent role in schools and public life.
This difference is eloquent enough. Be-
sides, there is another consideration of no
less importance. The populations of the
southern and eastern Mediterranean coasts,
who all speak Arab dialects and could
form in the future a great united nation,
have been cut up into sections under
different rule : Morocco, Algeria and Tunis
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
are French, Tripoli is Italian, Egypt is
British, and now they are speaking of
Syria about to become French. I think
it is trop de morcellement. Many of us
will certainly prefer Egypt and Syria to
be one, under the same rule, and so to
constitute a powerful nucleus of Arab
nationhood. " *
* Cf. also the impressions of a French observer
close at the eve of the war : "De toutes les puissances
qui cherchent a ? tendre leur influence sur la Syrie
et la Palestine, l'Angleterre est avec la France la
seule vers qui aillent les aspirations des populations
desireuses d'echapper de quelque maniere an gou-
vernement des Turcs. . . . Sans vouloir mettre en
doute la bonne foi du gouvernement anglais lorsqu'il
declara l'annee derniere n'avoir ' ni intention d'agir,
ni dessein, ni aspiration politique dans ces regions,'
il n'en est pas moins vrai que les musulmans se tour-
nent vers lui et qu'il ne fait rien pour les decourager.
Certes, aucune propagande omcielle n'est faite par
l'Angleterre en Syrie, mais il faut que les musulmans
aient ete, comme on dit, fortement ' travailles '
precddemment par ses agents pour qu'ils la regardent
comme leur protect rice naturelle. On vit au prin-
temps dernier les notables musulmans reclamer au
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
These ideas did not 'pass unnoticed. In
the early spring of 1915 they formed the
subject of a lively polemic between some
leading vernacular papers of Cairo. A
little later, one of the most important
Paris dailies spoke with some anxiety of
" a section among the Syrian Arabs who
are said to turn their eyes towards a
Power other than France/' and tried to
persuade them that France is still the
fittest alternative for them.
We think that this last opinion is en-
tirely shared by all responsible men in
consul d'Angleterre a Beyrouth aide et assistance
contre les autorit6s ottomanes, et les journaux de
France epiloguerent longuement sur l'incident. Que
les diplomates anglais n'agissent plus aujourd'hui
sur les musulmans de Palestine et de Syrie, il n'en
reste pas moins que l'Angleterre a conserve sur eux
une influence politique dont ils sont devenus eux-
memes les propagateurs. " -- (Andre Dubosq, " Syrie,
Tripolitaine, Albanie," 1914, pp. 32, 33. )
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
British politics and press. The only ques-
tion that remains and really concerns
vital English interests is to know where
the southern frontier of the future French
Syria should be drawn. In other terms :
Syria must unquestionably go to France,
but what shall be the fate of that southern
part of the Syrian coast which bears the
historic name of Palestine ?
This question has met with little interest
on the part of the British public, with the
exception of some official circles in this
country and in Egypt. Not so in France.
The question of Palestine is vividly dis-
cussed in papers and at public meetings ;
the battlecry is " il nous faut la Syrie
integrate. " Among the leaders of this pro-
paganda we find many prominent names --
for one instance, that of Senator Leygues.
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
Although not in the least supported by
the Government, which keeps a correct
silence on the whole matter, this movement
shows that French political sentiment is
almost as keen on Palestine as on the
rest of Syria.
Analysing, however, this part of the
French claim, one cannot help seeing that
it is hardly supported by anything but
sentiment. Palestine occupies less than a
sixth of the total surface of Syria, and
includes less than a sixth of Syria's total
population. In the present conditions it
is the poorest part of Syria. The large
commercial towns, Beyrouth, Damascus and
Aleppo lie outside of Palestine ; compared
with them Jerusalem is small and poor.
Palestine has no natural harbour com-
parable to Alexandretta or Beyrouth. And
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
indeed commercial arguments do not play
any noticeable part in the agitation in
favour of a French Palestine, whilst they
predominate in any expose of the French
case concerning the rest of Syria. The
case for Palestine is supported exclusively
by motives of an ideal sort, such as recol-
lections of the first Crusade when Godfrey
of Bouillon and Baudoin of Flanders
founded the kingdom of Jerusalem, doomed
to disappear in one century, or the tradi-
tion which from 1535 and 1604 to 1878
entrusted to France the protection of all
the Christians in the Orient and particu-
larly of the pilgrims going to the Holy
Places.
It would be cynical to underrate the
value of ideal motives. Supposing that
after the partition of Turkey there could
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
arise a question of entrusting the " pro-
tection of Christians/' or the guardianship
of the Holy Places, to one Power, no
nation would be better entitled to perform
this honourable task than France. But
the protection of Christians has been as-
sumed long ago by all the Christian Powers
for their respective dependents, reducing
the French privilege to practically nothing. *
* M. Delcasse said in the French Chamber, on
January 19th, 1903 : " Le protectorat de la France
(i. e. the protectorate over the Christians in Turkey)
ne s'etend pas ? il s'etend de moins en moins a des
Strangers. Depuis quelques annees, il a evolue.
Tout en gardant son caractere universel (? ), il tend
de plus en plus . . . a ne s'exercer qu'en faveur des
Francais et a leur benefice exclusif. " -- (Quoted by
M. A. Cheradame, " Le chemin de fer de Bagdad et
les Puissances/' 1903, p. 309. ) " C'est surtout depuis
le traite de Berlin que les droits de la France furent
contestes et battus en breche. . . . Le protectorat,
ce n'etait plus, en effet, comme jadis, la protection
des marchands et des pelerins, chaque nation se
chargeant aujourd'hui de proteger les siens. On
pouvait meme contester qu'il fut question des ordres
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
Besides, such protection was needed only
as long as Palestine was under Moham-
medan rule. The partition of Turkey will
remove this state of things purely and
simply, leaving no ground even for the
slightest fiction of ex-territorial protection.
Whichever be the State that will inherit
Palestine, it will be just as able to protect
Christians as England in Egypt or France
in Tunis.
religieux latins, des ev? ques latins, etc. , puisque
T article 62 reconnaissait a chaque puissance le droit
de prot6ger ceux de sa nationalite. On pouvait
soutenir que le protectorat ne consistait plus que
dans les prerogatives honorifiques . . . " " Dans
ces trente dernieres annees, c'est la volonte du Saint-
Siege qui empeche notre protectorat de s'effriter
sous les efforts de nos rivaux. Mais aujourd'hui
la France a rompu avec le Saint-Siege j il pent en
resulter, un jour ou 1' autre, 1' abandon formel ou
tacite des instructions de 1888 et de 1898 \ ce jour-la
le protectorat, dans sa forme ancienne, aura vecu. " --
(Rene" Pinon, " L J Europe et 1' Empire Ottoman,"
1905, PP. 553 and 568. )
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
But the essential point which removes
the foundation itself of France's ideal
argument is the question of guardianship
of the Holy Places. In this matter it
would be idle and dangerous to cherish
any illusions. To avoid confusion, the
strictest distinction must be kept in mind
between Palestine as a whole, and the
Holy Places in particular. The latter in-
clude a large part of Jerusalem, Bethlehem,
Nazareth, and two or three minor locali-
ties. No arrangement is thinkable leaving
them in the hands of one Christian Power.
France in her Orient policy was and is
a Roman Catholic Power. It does not
seem that even Protestant States would
like, or simply tolerate, the establish-
ment of her one-sided control over cities
and villages considered as the common
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
property of all the Christian Churches.
But there is certainly one Power which
would oppose such a solution with all its
energy, and that is Russia. Militant Or-
thodoxy, jealously exclusive -- especially
in its relations to the Roman Church --
is an avowedly prominent factor in
Russia's inner and foreign politics. The
keen interest for the Holy Places shown
by the Russian Church is a well-known
fact, and it is supported by the unparal-
leled numbers of Russian pilgrims annually
flooding Jerusalem at Easter time. So far,
however, official Russia has shown no sign
of political intentions as regards Palestine ;
she is not one of France's competitors for
this portion of the Turkish heritage. But
any attempt to bring the Holy Places
under the rule of a Roman Catholic Power
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
would provoke very undesirable complica-
tions. We can scarcely imagine anything
so likely to imperil the harmony of the
Entente as the idea of a French Holy
Sepulchre. This idea is impracticable, and
we understand that it has already been
dropped. The Holy Places will form a
group of enclaves governed by an inter-
national commission.
Nothing remains then of the ideal value
which the possession of Palestine could
have for France. The two glorious titles
which make the fascination of the " crown
of Jerusalem " -- protector of Christians in
the Orient and defender of the Holy
Places -- have been irremediably cancelled
by time and the force of events. What
remains is the memory of the short-lived
Crusaders' kingdom of seven hundred years
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
ago. Is it enough to nourish a steadfast
enthusiasm for the idea of " Syrie inte-
grale " ? And is it enough to counter-
balance the heavy, the really vital military
reasons which force expert observers on
the English side to recognize in Palestine
the natural bulwark of the Suez Canal ?
As we said, this truth is only slowly
filtering through the minds of this country.
We remember having read, a little more
than a year ago, the following lines in the
Fortnightly : " . . . It is difficult to ima-
gine any British Government voluntarily
assuming such a burden (protectorate over
Palestine), unless as a proved military
necessity, and no one can seriously main-
tain that proposition. The desert may
not be an impregnable frontier, but it is
at least a formidable one, and the line of
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
the Suez Canal is much easier defended than
any frontier that could be drawn between
Palestine and Syria. . . . It has always
been British policy to avoid, wherever
possible, having land frontiers coterminous
with those of great military States. "*
The author expressed a view very com-
mon at that time, and not altogether
forgotten even now. It is worth closer
consideration. The Sinai campaign, though
poor in events, is rich in lessons. In the
following we quote a letter dealing with
these lessons, written by a foreign journa-
list who witnessed the engagements on
the Suez Canal in February, 1915.
"I am afraid you in England confuse
two things : the defence of Egypt and
* J. B. Firth, " The Partition of Asia Minor,"
The Fortnightly Review, April, 1915.
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? SYRIA AND PALESTINE
that of the Suez Canal. The former, of
course, is secure -- but not owing to the
desert. The desert did not prevent the
enemy from approaching El-Kantara and
Serapeum. But for the Canal, he could
have approached Zagazig as well. What
protects Egypt is the Suez Canal, and
not in the least the desert. I admit that
the Canal is an impregnable barrier : but
then you must consider it only as a means
of defence. That is what your generals
do. But can you forget that the Suez
Canal is by itself a value which must be
protected ? I always thought that the
Canal was the only reason why England
chose to keep Egypt -- that its value for
England is much greater than that of
Egypt. Now you treat the Canal simply
as a first-line trench, or an outpost of the
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? TURKEY AND THE WAR
Egyptian fortress. First-line trenches and
advanced outposts are susceptible of being
seriously damaged even by an enemy who
is too feeble to take the fortress itself.
So it is in the case of the Suez Canal. An
enemy having Palestine for his base is
hardly likely to penetrate into Egypt ;
but are you sure he is not likely to make
your Canal useless and impracticable for
the whole time of the hostilities ?
