Objection
2: Further, "Virtue is about the difficult and the good"
[*Ethic.
[*Ethic.
Summa Theologica
" Therefore fortitude is not a gift.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that "it is
a sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures
of the passing show. " Now noisome pleasures and delights are the
concern of temperance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems that
fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of fortitude.
On the contrary, Fortitude is reckoned among the other gifts of the
Holy Ghost (Is. 11:2).
I answer that, Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of mind, as stated
above (Q[123], A[2]; [3417]FS, Q[61], A[3]): and this firmness of mind
is required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially with
regard to goods or evils that are difficult. Now man, according to his
proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in both these
respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of difficulties,
whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or in enduring grievous evil.
In this sense fortitude denotes a special or general virtue, as stated
above (Q[123], A[2]).
Yet furthermore man's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, in order that he
may attain the end of each work begun, and avoid whatever perils may
threaten. This surpasses human nature: for sometimes it is not in a
man's power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or
dangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the Holy
Ghost works this in man, by bringing him to everlasting life, which is
the end of all good deeds, and the release from all perils. A certain
confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy Ghost Who
expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that fortitude is
reckoned a gift of the Holy Ghost. For it has been stated above
([3418]FS, Q[68], AA[1],2) that the gifts regard the motion of the mind
by the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects the mind in the
endurance of all perils whatever; but it does not go so far as to give
confidence of overcoming all dangers: this belongs to the fortitude
that is a gift of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 2: The gifts have not the same acts in heaven as on
the way: for they exercise acts in connection with the enjoyment of the
end. Hence the act of fortitude there is to enjoy full security from
toil and evil.
Reply to Objection 3: The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of
fortitude not only because it consists in enduring dangers, but also
inasmuch as it consists in accomplishing any difficult work. Wherefore
the gift of fortitude is directed by the gift of counsel, which seems
to be concerned chiefly with the greater goods.
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Whether the fourth beatitude: "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after
justice," corresponds to the gift of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that the fourth beatitude, "Blessed are they that
hunger and thirst after justice," does not correspond to the gift of
fortitude. For the gift of piety and not the gift of fortitude
corresponds to the virtue of justice. Now hungering and thirsting after
justice pertain to the act of justice. Therefore this beatitude
corresponds to the gift of piety rather than to the gift of fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, hunger and thirst after justice imply a desire
for good. Now this belongs properly to charity, to which the gift of
wisdom, and not the gift of fortitude, corresponds, as stated above
([3419]Q[45]). Therefore this beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of
fortitude, but to the gift of wisdom.
Objection 3: Further, the fruits are consequent upon the beatitudes,
since delight is essential to beatitude, according to Ethic. i, 8. Now
the fruits, apparently, include none pertaining to fortitude. Therefore
neither does any beatitude correspond to it.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Fortitude
becomes the hungry and thirsty: since those who desire to enjoy true
goods, and wish to avoid loving earthly and material things, must
toil. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3420]Q[121], A[2]), Augustine makes
the beatitudes correspond to the gifts according to the order in which
they are set forth, observing at the same time a certain fittingness
between them. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning
the hunger and thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely
fortitude.
Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, as stated (A[1]
), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it is very difficult, not
merely to do virtuous deeds, which receive the common designation of
works of justice, but furthermore to do them with an unsatiable desire,
which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice.
Reply to Objection 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth. ), we may
understand here not only particular, but also universal justice, which
is related to all virtuous deeds according to Ethic. v, 1, wherein
whatever is hard is the object of that fortitude which is a gift.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity is the root of all the virtues and gifts,
as stated above (Q[23], A[8], ad 3; [3421]FS, Q[68], A[4], ad 3). Hence
whatever pertains to fortitude may also be referred to charity.
Reply to Objection 3: There are two of the fruits which correspond
sufficiently to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which regards
the enduring of evils: and longanimity, which may regard the long delay
and accomplishment of goods.
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OF THE PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider the precepts of fortitude:
(1) The precepts of fortitude itself;
(2) The precepts of its parts.
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Whether the precepts of fortitude are suitably given in the Divine Law?
Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of fortitude are not suitably
given in the Divine Law. For the New Law is more perfect than the Old
Law. Yet the Old Law contains precepts of fortitude (Dt. 20). Therefore
precepts of fortitude should have been given in the New Law also.
Objection 2: Further, affirmative precepts are of greater import than
negative precepts, since the affirmative include the negative, but not
vice versa. Therefore it is unsuitable for the Divine Law to contain
none but negative precepts in prohibition of fear.
Objection 3: Further, fortitude is one of the principal virtues, as
stated above (Q[123], A[2]; [3422]FS, Q[61], A[2]). Now the precepts
are directed to the virtues as to their end: wherefore they should be
proportionate to them. Therefore the precepts of fortitude should have
been placed among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the chief
precepts of the Law.
On the contrary, stands Holy Writ which contains these precepts.
I answer that, Precepts of law are directed to the end intended by the
lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must needs be framed in various
ways according to the various ends intended by lawgivers, so that even
in human affairs there are laws of democracies, others of kingdoms, and
others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of the Divine Law
is that man may adhere to God: wherefore the Divine Law contains
precepts both of fortitude and of the other virtues, with a view to
directing the mind to God. For this reason it is written (Dt. 20:3,4):
"Fear ye them not: because the Lord your God is in the midst of you,
and will fight for you against your enemies. "
As to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly goods, and among
them we find precepts of fortitude according to the requirements of
those goods.
Reply to Objection 1: The Old Testament contained temporal promises,
while the promises of the New Testament are spiritual and eternal,
according to Augustine (Contra Faust. iv). Hence in the Old Law there
was need for the people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily
contest, in order to obtain an earthly possession. But in the New
Testament men were to be taught how to come to the possession of
eternal life by fighting spiritually, according to Mat. 11:12, "The
kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent bear it away. "
Hence Peter commands (1 Pet. 5:8,9): "Your adversary the devil, as a
roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour: whom resist ye,
strong in faith," as also James 4:7: "Resist the devil, and he will fly
from you. " Since, however, men while tending to spiritual goods may be
withdrawn from them by corporal dangers, precepts of fortitude had to
be given even in the New Law, that they might bravely endure temporal
evils, according to Mat. 10:28, "Fear ye not them that kill the body. "
Reply to Objection 2: The law gives general directions in its precepts.
But the things that have to be done in cases of danger are not, like
the things to be avoided, reducible to some common thing. Hence the
precepts of fortitude are negative rather than affirmative.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3423]Q[122], A[1]), the
precepts of the decalogue are placed in the Law, as first principles,
which need to be known to all from the outset. Wherefore the precepts
of the decalogue had to be chiefly about those acts of justice in which
the notion of duty is manifest, and not about acts of fortitude,
because it is not so evident that it is a duty for a person not to fear
dangers of death.
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Whether the precepts of the parts of fortitude are suitably given in the
Divine Law?
Objection 1: It seems that the precept of the parts of fortitude are
unsuitably given in the Divine Law. For just as patience and
perseverance are parts of fortitude, so also are magnificence,
magnanimity, and confidence, as stated above ([3424]Q[128]). Now we
find precepts of patience in the Divine Law, as also of perseverance.
Therefore there should also have been precepts of magnificence and
magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, patience is a very necessary virtue, since it is
the guardian of the other virtues, as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang.
xxxv). Now the other virtues are commanded absolutely. Therefore
patience should not have been commanded merely, as Augustine says (De
Serm. Dom. in Monte i), as to the preparedness of the mind.
Objection 3: Further, patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude,
as stated above ([3425]Q[128];[3426] Q[136], A[4];[3427] Q[137], A[2]).
Now the precepts of fortitude are not affirmative but only negative, as
stated above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore the precepts of patience and
perseverance should have been negative and not affirmative.
The contrary, however, follows from the way in which they are given by
Holy Writ.
I answer that, The Divine Law instructs man perfectly about such things
as are necessary for right living. Now in order to live aright man
needs not only the principal virtues, but also the secondary and
annexed virtues. Wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts not only
about the acts of the principal virtues, but also about the acts of the
secondary and annexed virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Magnificence and magnanimity do not belong to the
genus of fortitude, except by reason of a certain excellence of
greatness which they regard in their respective matters. Now things
pertaining to excellence come under the counsels of perfection rather
than under precepts of obligation. Wherefore, there was need of
counsels, rather than of precepts about magnificence and magnanimity.
On the other hand, the hardships and toils of the present life pertain
to patience and perseverance, not by reason of any greatness observable
in them, but on account of the very nature of those virtues. Hence the
need of precepts of patience and perseverance.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3428]Q[3], A[2]), although
affirmative precepts are always binding, they are not binding for
always, but according to place and time. Wherefore just as the
affirmative precepts about the other virtues are to be understood as to
the preparedness of the mind, in the sense that man be prepared to
fulfil them when necessary, so too are the precepts of patience to be
understood in the same way.
Reply to Objection 3: Fortitude, as distinct from patience and
perseverance, is about the greatest dangers wherein one must proceed
with caution; nor is it necessary to determine what is to be done in
particular. On the other hand, patience and perseverance are about
minor hardships and toils, wherefore there is less danger in
determining, especially in general, what is to be done in such cases.
__________________________________________________________________
OF TEMPERANCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider temperance: (1) Temperance itself;
(2) its parts; (3) its precepts. With regard to temperance we must
consider (1) temperance itself; (2) the contrary vices.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether temperance is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether it is only about desires and pleasures?
(4) Whether it is only about pleasures of touch?
(5) Whether it is about pleasures of taste, as such, or only as a kind
of touch?
(6) What is the rule of temperance?
(7) Whether it is a cardinal, or principal, virtue?
(8) Whether it is the greatest of virtues ?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether temperance is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that temperance is not a virtue. For no virtue
goes against the inclination of nature, since "there is in us a natural
aptitude for virtue," as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. Now temperance
withdraws us from pleasures to which nature inclines, according to
Ethic. ii, 3,8. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated
above ([3429]FS, Q[65], A[1]). But some people have temperance without
having the other virtues: for we find many who are temperate, and yet
covetous or timid. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, to every virtue there is a corresponding gift, as
appears from what we have said above ([3430]FS, Q[68], A[4]). But
seemingly no gift corresponds to temperance, since all the gifts have
been already ascribed to the other virtues (QQ[8],9,19,45,52, 71,139).
Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. vi, 15): "Temperance is the
name of a virtue. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3431]FS, Q[55], A[3]), it is essential
to virtue to incline man to good. Now the good of man is to be in
accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence human
virtue is that which inclines man to something in accordance with
reason. Now temperance evidently inclines man to this, since its very
name implies moderation or temperateness, which reason causes.
Therefore temperance is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Nature inclines everything to whatever is
becoming to it. Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are
becoming to him. Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it
follows that those pleasures are becoming to man which are in
accordance with reason. From such pleasures temperance does not
withdraw him, but from those which are contrary to reason. Wherefore it
is clear that temperance is not contrary to the inclination of human
nature, but is in accord with it. It is, however, contrary to the
inclination of the animal nature that is not subject to reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The temperance which fulfils the conditions of
perfect virtue is not without prudence, while this is lacking to all
who are in sin. Hence those who lack other virtues, through being
subject to the opposite vices, have not the temperance which is a
virtue, though they do acts of temperance from a certain natural
disposition, in so far as certain imperfect virtues are either natural
to man, as stated above ([3432]FS, Q[63], A[1]), or acquired by
habituation, which virtues, through lack of prudence, are not perfected
by reason, as stated above ([3433]FS, Q[65], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 3: Temperance also has a corresponding gift, namely,
fear, whereby man is withheld from the pleasures of the flesh,
according to Ps. 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear. " The
gift of fear has for its principal object God, Whom it avoids
offending, and in this respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as
stated above ([3434]Q[19], A[9], ad 1). But it may have for its
secondary object whatever a man shuns in order to avoid offending God.
Now man stands in the greatest need of the fear of God in order to shun
those things which are most seductive, and these are the matter of
temperance: wherefore the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether temperance is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a special virtue. For
Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "it belongs to temperance to
preserve one's integrity and freedom from corruption for God's sake. "
But this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a
special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 42) that "what we
observe and seek most in temperance is tranquillity of soul. " But this
is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) that "we cannot
separate the beautiful from the virtuous," and that "whatever is just
is beautiful. " Now the beautiful is considered as proper to temperance,
according to the same authority (Tully, De Offic. i, 27). Therefore
temperance is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 10) reckons it a
special virtue.
I answer that, It is customary in human speech to employ a common term
in a restricted sense in order to designate the principal things to
which that common term is applicable: thus the word "city" is used
antonomastically* to designate Rome. [*Antonomasia is the figure of
speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term; e. g.
The Philosopher for Aristotle]. Accordingly the word "temperance" has a
twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its common
signification: and thus temperance is not a special but a general
virtue, because the word "temperance" signifies a certain temperateness
or moderation, which reason appoints to human operations and passions:
and this is common to every moral virtue. Yet there is a logical
difference between temperance and fortitude, even if we take them both
as general virtues: since temperance withdraws man from things which
seduce the appetite from obeying reason, while fortitude incites him to
endure or withstand those things on account of which he forsakes the
good of reason.
On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomastically, as
withholding the appetite from those things which are most seductive to
man, it is a special virtue, for thus it has, like fortitude, a special
matter.
Reply to Objection 1: Man's appetite is corrupted chiefly by those
things which seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and Divine
law. Wherefore integrity, which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can,
like the latter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, and
secondly in a sense of excellence.
Reply to Objection 2: The things about which temperance is concerned
have a most disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason that they are
natural to man, as we shall state further on ([3435]AA[4],5). Hence
tranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence,
although it is a common property of all the virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it
is ascribed to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons.
First, in respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists
in a certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we
understand by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).
Secondly, because the things from which temperance withholds us, hold
the lowest place in man, and are becoming to him by reason of his
animal nature, as we shall state further on ([3436]AA[4],5; Q[142],
A[4]), wherefore it is natural that such things should defile him. In
consequence beauty is a foremost attribute of temperance which above
all hinders man from being defiled. In like manner honesty [*Honesty
must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral
goodness, from the point of view of decorum] is a special attribute of
temperance: for Isidore says (Etym. x): "An honest man is one who has
no defilement, for honesty means an honorable state. " This is most
applicable to temperance, which withstands the vices that bring most
dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (Q[142], A[4]).
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Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires
and pleasures. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that
"temperance is reason's firm and moderate mastery of lust and other
wanton emotions of the mind. " Now all the passions of the soul are
called emotions of the mind. Therefore it seems that temperance is not
only about desires and pleasures.
Objection 2: Further, "Virtue is about the difficult and the good"
[*Ethic. ii, 3]. Now it seems more difficult to temper fear, especially
with regard to dangers of death, than to moderate desires and
pleasures, which are despised on account of deadly pains and dangers,
according to Augustine (QQ[83], qu. 36). Therefore it seems that the
virtue of temperance is not chiefly about desires and pleasures.
Objection 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) "the grace
of moderation belongs to temperance": and Tully says (De Offic. ii, 27)
that "it is the concern of temperance to calm all disturbances of the
mind and to enforce moderation. " Now moderation is needed, not only in
desires and pleasures, but also in external acts and whatever pertains
to the exterior. Therefore temperance is not only about desires and
pleasures.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. ) [*The words quoted do not occur
in the work referred to; Cf. his De Summo Bono xxxvii, xlii, and De
Different. ii, 39]: that "it is temperance whereby lust and desire are
kept under control. "
I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[12]; Q[136], A[1]), it
belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against the
passions that rebel against reason. Now the movement of the soul's
passions is twofold, as stated above ([3437]FS, Q[23], A[2]), when we
were treating of the passions: the one, whereby the sensitive appetite
pursues sensible and bodily goods, the other whereby it flies from
sensible and bodily evils.
The first of these movements of the sensitive appetite rebels against
reason chiefly by lack of moderation. Because sensible and bodily
goods, considered in their species, are not in opposition to reason,
but are subject to it as instruments which reason employs in order to
attain its proper end: and that they are opposed to reason is owing to
the fact that the sensitive appetite fails to tend towards them in
accord with the mode of reason. Hence it belongs properly to moral
virtue to moderate those passions which denote a pursuit of the good.
On the other hand, the movement of the sensitive appetite in flying
from sensible evil is mostly in opposition to reason, not through being
immoderate, but chiefly in respect of its flight: because, when a man
flies from sensible and bodily evils, which sometimes accompany the
good of reason, the result is that he flies from the good of reason.
Hence it belongs to moral virtue to make man while flying from evil to
remain firm in the good of reason.
Accordingly, just as the virtue of fortitude, which by its very nature
bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with the passion, viz. fear,
which regards flight from bodily evils, and consequently with daring,
which attacks the objects of fear in the hope of attaining some good,
so, too, temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation, is chiefly
concerned with those passions that tend towards sensible goods, viz.
desire and pleasure, and consequently with the sorrows that arise from
the absence of those pleasures. For just as daring presupposes objects
of fear, so too such like sorrow arises from the absence of the
aforesaid pleasures.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3438]FS, Q[23], AA[1],2;
[3439]FS, Q[25], A[1]), when we were treating of the passions, those
passions which pertain to avoidance of evil, presuppose the passions
pertaining to the pursuit of good; and the passions of the irascible
presuppose the passions of the concupiscible. Hence, while temperance
directly moderates the passions of the concupiscible which tend towards
good, as a consequence, it moderates all the other passions, inasmuch
as moderation of the passions that precede results in moderation of the
passions that follow: since he that is not immoderate in desire is
moderate in hope, and grieves moderately for the absence of the things
he desires.
Reply to Objection 2: Desire denotes an impulse of the appetite towards
the object of pleasure and this impulse needs control, which belongs to
temperance. on the other hand fear denotes a withdrawal of the mind
from certain evils, against which man needs firmness of mind, which
fortitude bestows. Hence temperance is properly about desires, and
fortitude about fears.
Reply to Objection 3: External acts proceed from the internal passions
of the soul: wherefore their moderation depends on the moderation of
the internal passions.
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Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures of touch?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires
and pleasures of touch. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xix) that
"the function of temperance is to control and quell the desires which
draw us to the things which withdraw us from the laws of God and from
the fruit of His goodness"; and a little further on he adds that "it is
the duty of temperance to spurn all bodily allurements and popular
praise. " Now we are withdrawn from God's laws not only by the desire
for pleasures of touch, but also by the desire for pleasures of the
other senses, for these, too, belong to the bodily allurements, and
again by the desire for riches or for worldly glory: wherefore it is
written (1 Tim. 6:10). "Desire [*'Cupiditas,' which is the Douay
version following the Greek {philargyria} renders 'desire of money'] is
the root of all evils. " Therefore temperance is not only about desires
of pleasures of touch.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "one who
is worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is
temperate, but he is not magnificent. " Now honors, whether small or
great, of which he is speaking there, are an object of pleasure, not of
touch, but in the soul's apprehension. Therefore temperance is not only
about desires for pleasures of touch.
Objection 3: Further, things that are of the same genus would seem to
pertain to the matter of a particular virtue under one same aspect. Now
all pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus. Therefore they
all equally belong to the matter of temperance.
Objection 4: Further, spiritual pleasures are greater than the
pleasures of the body, as stated above ([3440]FS, Q[31], A[5]) in the
treatise on the passions. Now sometimes men forsake God's laws and the
state of virtue through desire for spiritual pleasures, for instance,
through curiosity in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised
man knowledge, saying (Gn. 3:5): "Ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and
evil. " Therefore temperance is not only about pleasures of touch.
Objection 5: Further, if pleasures of touch were the proper matter of
temperance, it would follow that temperance is about all pleasures of
touch. But it is not about all, for instance, about those which occur
in games. Therefore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of
temperance.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "temperance
is properly about desires of pleasures of touch. "
I answer that, As stated above [3441](A[3]), temperance is about
desires and pleasures in the same way as fortitude is about fear and
daring. Now fortitude is about fear and daring with respect to the
greatest evils whereby nature itself is dissolved; and such are dangers
of death. Wherefore in like manner temperance must needs be about
desires for the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a
natural operation, it is so much the greater according as it results
from a more natural operation. Now to animals the most natural
operations are those which preserve the nature of the individual by
means of meat and drink, and the nature of the species by the union of
the sexes. Hence temperance is properly about pleasures of meat and
drink and sexual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the sense
of touch. Wherefore it follows that temperance is about pleasures of
touch.
Reply to Objection 1: In the passage quoted Augustine apparently takes
temperance, not as a special virtue having a determinate matter, but as
concerned with the moderation of reason, in any matter whatever: and
this is a general condition of every virtue. However, we may also reply
that if a man can control the greatest pleasures, much more can he
control lesser ones. Wherefore it belongs chiefly and properly to
temperance to moderate desires and pleasures of touch, and secondarily
other pleasures.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher takes temperance as denoting
moderation in external things, when, to wit, a man tends to that which
is proportionate to him, but not as denoting moderation in the soul's
emotions, which pertains to the virtue of temperance.
Reply to Objection 3: The pleasures of the other senses play a
different part in man and in other animals. For in other animals
pleasures do not result from the other senses save in relation to
sensibles of touch: thus the lion is pleased to see the stag, or to
hear its voice, in relation to his food. On the other hand man derives
pleasure from the other senses, not only for this reason, but also on
account of the becomingness of the sensible object. Wherefore
temperance is about the pleasures of the other senses, in relation to
pleasures of touch, not principally but consequently: while in so far
as the sensible objects of the other senses are pleasant on account of
their becomingness, as when a man is pleased at a well-harmonized
sound, this pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of nature.
Hence these passions are not of such importance that temperance can be
referred to them antonomastically.
Reply to Objection 4: Although spiritual pleasures are by their nature
greater than bodily pleasures, they are not so perceptible to the
senses, and consequently they do not so strongly affect the sensitive
appetite, against whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded by
moral virtue. We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly
speaking, are in accordance with reason, wherefore they need no
control, save accidentally, in so far as one spiritual pleasure is a
hindrance to another greater and more binding.
Reply to Objection 5: Not all pleasures of touch regard the
preservation of nature, and consequently it does not follow that
temperance is about all pleasures of touch.
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Whether temperance is about the pleasures proper to the taste?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is about pleasures proper to
the taste. For pleasures of the taste result from food and drink, which
are more necessary to man's life than sexual pleasures, which regard
the touch. But according to what has been said [3442](A[4]), temperance
is about pleasures in things that are necessary to human life.
Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste rather than
about those proper to the touch.
Objection 2: Further, temperance is about the passions rather than
about things themselves. Now, according to De Anima ii, 3, "the touch
is the sense of food," as regards the very substance of the food,
whereas "savor" which is the proper object of the taste, is "the
pleasing quality of the food. " Therefore temperance is about the taste
rather than about the touch.
Objection 3: Further, according to Ethic. vii, 4,7: "temperance and
intemperance are about the same things, and so are continence and
incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy," to which delicacy
pertains. Now delicacy seems to regard the delight taken in savors
which are the object of the taste. Therefore temperance is about
pleasures proper to the taste.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "seemingly
temperance and intemperance have little if anything to do with the
taste. "
I answer that, As stated above [3443](A[4]), temperance is about the
greatest pleasures, which chiefly regard the preservation of human life
either in the species or in the individual. In these matters certain
things are to be considered as principal and others as secondary. The
principal thing is the use itself of the necessary means, of the woman
who is necessary for the preservation of the species, or of food and
drink which are necessary for the preservation of the individual: while
the very use of these necessary things has a certain essential pleasure
annexed thereto.
In regard to either use we consider as secondary whatever makes the use
more pleasurable, such as beauty and adornment in woman, and a pleasing
savor and likewise odor in food. Hence temperance is chiefly about the
pleasure of touch, that results essentially from the use of these
necessary things, which use is in all cases attained by the touch.
Secondarily, however, temperance and intemperance are about pleasures
of the taste, smell, or sight, inasmuch as the sensible objects of
these senses conduce to the pleasurable use of the necessary things
that have relation to the touch. But since the taste is more akin to
the touch than the other senses are, it follows that temperance is more
about the taste than about the other senses.
Reply to Objection 1: The use of food and the pleasure that essentially
results therefrom pertain to the touch. Hence the Philosopher says (De
Anima ii, 3) that "touch is the sense of food, for food is hot or cold,
wet or dry. " To the taste belongs the discernment of savors, which make
the food pleasant to eat, in so far as they are signs of its being
suitable for nourishment.
Reply to Objection 2: The pleasure resulting from savor is additional,
so to speak, whereas the pleasure of touch results essentially from the
use of food and drink.
Reply to Objection 3: Delicacy regards principally the substance of the
food, but secondarily it regards its delicious savor and the way in
which it is served.
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Whether the rule of temperance depends on the need of the present life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the rule of temperance does not depend
on the needs of the present life. For higher things are not regulated
according to lower. Now, as temperance is a virtue of the soul, it is
above the needs of the body. Therefore the rule of temperance does not
depend on the needs of the body.
Objection 2: Further, whoever exceeds a rule sins. Therefore if the
needs of the body were the rule of temperance, it would be a sin
against temperance to indulge in any other pleasure than those required
by nature, which is content with very little. But this would seem
unreasonable.
Objection 3: Further, no one sins in observing a rule. Therefore if the
need of the body were the rule of temperance, there would be no sin in
using any pleasure for the needs of the body, for instance, for the
sake of health. But this is apparently false. Therefore the need of the
body is not the rule of temperance.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi): "In both
Testaments the temperate man finds confirmation of the rule forbidding
him to love the things of this life, or to deem any of them desirable
for its own sake, and commanding him to avail himself of those things
with the moderation of a user not the attachment of a lover, in so far
as they are requisite for the needs of this life and of his station. "
I answer that, As stated above [3444](A[1]; Q[109], A[2]; Q[123],
A[12]), the good of moral virtue consists chiefly in the order of
reason: because "man's good is to be in accord with reason," as
Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now the principal order of reason is
that by which it directs certain things towards their end, and the good
of reason consists chiefly in this order; since good has the aspect of
end, and the end is the rule of whatever is directed to the end. Now
all the pleasurable objects that are at man's disposal, are directed to
some necessity of this life as to their end. Wherefore temperance takes
the need of this life, as the rule of the pleasurable objects of which
it makes use, and uses them only for as much as the need of this life
requires.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, the need of this life is
regarded as a rule in so far as it is an end. Now it must be observed
that sometimes the end of the worker differs from the end of the work,
thus it is clear that the end of building is a house, whereas sometimes
the end of the builder is profit. Accordingly the end and rule of
temperance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of the thing it
makes use of is the need of human life, to which whatever is useful for
life is subordinate.
Reply to Objection 2: The need of human life may be taken in two ways.
First, it may be taken in the sense in which we apply the term
"necessary" to that without which a thing cannot be at all; thus food
is necessary to an animal. Secondly, it may be taken for something
without which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance regards not
only the former of these needs, but also the latter. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man desires
pleasant things for the sake of health, or for the sake of a sound
condition of body. " Other things that are not necessary for this
purpose may be divided into two classes. For some are a hindrance to
health and a sound condition of body; and these temperance makes not
use of whatever, for this would be a sin against temperance. But others
are not a hindrance to those things, and these temperance uses
moderately, according to the demands of place and time, and in keeping
with those among whom one dwells. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,
11) says that the "temperate man also desires other pleasant things,"
those namely that are not necessary for health or a sound condition of
body, "so long as they are not prejudicial to these things. "
Reply to Objection 3: As stated (ad 2), temperance regards need
according to the requirements of life, and this depends not only on the
requirements of the body, but also on the requirements of external
things, such as riches and station, and more still on the requirements
of good conduct. Hence the Philosopher adds (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the
temperate man makes use of pleasant things provided that not only they
be not prejudicial to health and a sound bodily condition, but also
that they be not inconsistent with good," i. e. good conduct, nor
"beyond his substance," i. e. his means. And Augustine says (De Morib.
Eccl. xxi) that the "temperate man considers the need" not only "of
this life" but also "of his station. "
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Whether temperance is a cardinal virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a cardinal virtue.
For the good of moral virtue depends on reason. But temperance is about
those things that are furthest removed from reason, namely about
pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated in Ethic. iii,
10. Therefore temperance, seemingly, is not a principal virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the impetus the more difficult is it
to control. Now anger, which is controlled by meekness, seems to be
more impetuous than desire, which is controlled by temperance. For it
is written (Prov. 27:4): "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it
breaketh forth; and who can bear the violence [impetum] of one
provoked? " Therefore meekness is a principal virtue rather than
temperance.
Objection 3: Further, hope as a movement of the soul takes precedence
of desire and concupiscence, as stated above ([3445]FS, Q[25], A[4]).
But humility controls the presumption of immoderate hope. Therefore,
seemingly, humility is a principal virtue rather than temperance which
controls concupiscence.
On the contrary, Gregory reckons temperance among the principal virtues
(Moral. ii, 49).
I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[11]; Q[61], A[3]), a
principal or cardinal virtue is so called because it has a foremost
claim to praise on account of one of those things that are requisite
for the notion of virtue in general. Now moderation, which is requisite
in every virtue, deserves praise principally in pleasures of touch,
with which temperance is concerned, both because these pleasures are
most natural to us, so that it is more difficult to abstain from them,
and to control the desire for them, and because their objects are more
necessary to the present life, as stated above [3446](A[4]). For this
reason temperance is reckoned a principal or cardinal virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The longer the range of its operation, the
greater is the agent's power [virtus] shown to be: wherefore the very
fact that the reason is able to moderate desires and pleasures that are
furthest removed from it, proves the greatness of reason's power. This
is how temperance comes to be a principal virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: The impetuousness of anger is caused by an
accident, for instance, a painful hurt; wherefore it soon passes,
although its impetus be great. On the other hand, the impetuousness of
the desire for pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause,
wherefore it is more lasting and more general, and consequently its
control regards a more principal virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of hope is higher than the object of
desire, wherefore hope is accounted the principal passion in the
irascible. But the objects of desires and pleasures of touch move the
appetite with greater force, since they are more natural. Therefore
temperance, which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal
virtue.
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Whether temperance is the greatest of the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is the greatest of the
virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "what we observe and
seek most in temperance is the safeguarding of what is honorable, and
the regard for what is beautiful. " Now virtue deserves praise for being
honorable and beautiful. Therefore temperance is the greatest of the
virtues.
Objection 2: Further, the more difficult the deed the greater the
virtue. Now it is more difficult to control desires and pleasures of
touch than to regulate external actions, the former pertaining to
temperance and the latter to justice. Therefore temperance is a greater
virtue than justice.
Objection 3: Further, seemingly the more general a thing is, the more
necessary and the better it is. Now fortitude is about dangers of death
which occur less frequently than pleasures of touch, for these occur
every day; so that temperance is in more general use than fortitude.
Therefore temperance is a more excellent virtue than fortitude.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that the "greatest
virtues are those which are most profitable to others, for which reason
we give the greatest honor to the brave and the just. "
I answer that, As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 2) "the good of
the many is more of the godlike than the good of the individual,"
wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better it
is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the many more than
temperance does, since justice regards the relations between one man
and another, while fortitude regards dangers of battle which are
endured for the common weal: whereas temperance moderates only the
desires and pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident
that justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than temperance:
while prudence and the theological virtues are more excellent still.
Reply to Objection 1: Honor and beauty are especially ascribed to
temperance, not on account of the excellence of the good proper to
temperance, but on account of the disgrace of the contrary evil from
which it withdraws us, by moderating the pleasures common to us and the
lower animals.
Reply to Objection 2: Since virtue is about the difficult and the good,
the excellence of a virtue is considered more under the aspect of good,
wherein justice excels, than under the aspect of difficult, wherein
temperance excels.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is general because it regards the many
conduces more to the excellence of goodness than that which is general
because it occurs frequently: fortitude excels in the former way,
temperance in the latter. Hence fortitude is greater simply, although
in some respects temperance may be described as greater not only than
fortitude but also than justice.
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OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TEMPERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to temperance. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether insensibility is a sin?
(2) Whether intemperance is a childish sin?
(3) Of the comparison between intemperance and timidity;
(4) Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of vices?
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Whether insensibility is a vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that insensibility is not a vice.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that "it is
a sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures
of the passing show. " Now noisome pleasures and delights are the
concern of temperance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems that
fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of fortitude.
On the contrary, Fortitude is reckoned among the other gifts of the
Holy Ghost (Is. 11:2).
I answer that, Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of mind, as stated
above (Q[123], A[2]; [3417]FS, Q[61], A[3]): and this firmness of mind
is required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially with
regard to goods or evils that are difficult. Now man, according to his
proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in both these
respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of difficulties,
whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or in enduring grievous evil.
In this sense fortitude denotes a special or general virtue, as stated
above (Q[123], A[2]).
Yet furthermore man's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, in order that he
may attain the end of each work begun, and avoid whatever perils may
threaten. This surpasses human nature: for sometimes it is not in a
man's power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or
dangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the Holy
Ghost works this in man, by bringing him to everlasting life, which is
the end of all good deeds, and the release from all perils. A certain
confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy Ghost Who
expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that fortitude is
reckoned a gift of the Holy Ghost. For it has been stated above
([3418]FS, Q[68], AA[1],2) that the gifts regard the motion of the mind
by the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects the mind in the
endurance of all perils whatever; but it does not go so far as to give
confidence of overcoming all dangers: this belongs to the fortitude
that is a gift of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 2: The gifts have not the same acts in heaven as on
the way: for they exercise acts in connection with the enjoyment of the
end. Hence the act of fortitude there is to enjoy full security from
toil and evil.
Reply to Objection 3: The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of
fortitude not only because it consists in enduring dangers, but also
inasmuch as it consists in accomplishing any difficult work. Wherefore
the gift of fortitude is directed by the gift of counsel, which seems
to be concerned chiefly with the greater goods.
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Whether the fourth beatitude: "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after
justice," corresponds to the gift of fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that the fourth beatitude, "Blessed are they that
hunger and thirst after justice," does not correspond to the gift of
fortitude. For the gift of piety and not the gift of fortitude
corresponds to the virtue of justice. Now hungering and thirsting after
justice pertain to the act of justice. Therefore this beatitude
corresponds to the gift of piety rather than to the gift of fortitude.
Objection 2: Further, hunger and thirst after justice imply a desire
for good. Now this belongs properly to charity, to which the gift of
wisdom, and not the gift of fortitude, corresponds, as stated above
([3419]Q[45]). Therefore this beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of
fortitude, but to the gift of wisdom.
Objection 3: Further, the fruits are consequent upon the beatitudes,
since delight is essential to beatitude, according to Ethic. i, 8. Now
the fruits, apparently, include none pertaining to fortitude. Therefore
neither does any beatitude correspond to it.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Fortitude
becomes the hungry and thirsty: since those who desire to enjoy true
goods, and wish to avoid loving earthly and material things, must
toil. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3420]Q[121], A[2]), Augustine makes
the beatitudes correspond to the gifts according to the order in which
they are set forth, observing at the same time a certain fittingness
between them. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning
the hunger and thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely
fortitude.
Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, as stated (A[1]
), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it is very difficult, not
merely to do virtuous deeds, which receive the common designation of
works of justice, but furthermore to do them with an unsatiable desire,
which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice.
Reply to Objection 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth. ), we may
understand here not only particular, but also universal justice, which
is related to all virtuous deeds according to Ethic. v, 1, wherein
whatever is hard is the object of that fortitude which is a gift.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity is the root of all the virtues and gifts,
as stated above (Q[23], A[8], ad 3; [3421]FS, Q[68], A[4], ad 3). Hence
whatever pertains to fortitude may also be referred to charity.
Reply to Objection 3: There are two of the fruits which correspond
sufficiently to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which regards
the enduring of evils: and longanimity, which may regard the long delay
and accomplishment of goods.
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OF THE PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)
We must next consider the precepts of fortitude:
(1) The precepts of fortitude itself;
(2) The precepts of its parts.
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Whether the precepts of fortitude are suitably given in the Divine Law?
Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of fortitude are not suitably
given in the Divine Law. For the New Law is more perfect than the Old
Law. Yet the Old Law contains precepts of fortitude (Dt. 20). Therefore
precepts of fortitude should have been given in the New Law also.
Objection 2: Further, affirmative precepts are of greater import than
negative precepts, since the affirmative include the negative, but not
vice versa. Therefore it is unsuitable for the Divine Law to contain
none but negative precepts in prohibition of fear.
Objection 3: Further, fortitude is one of the principal virtues, as
stated above (Q[123], A[2]; [3422]FS, Q[61], A[2]). Now the precepts
are directed to the virtues as to their end: wherefore they should be
proportionate to them. Therefore the precepts of fortitude should have
been placed among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the chief
precepts of the Law.
On the contrary, stands Holy Writ which contains these precepts.
I answer that, Precepts of law are directed to the end intended by the
lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must needs be framed in various
ways according to the various ends intended by lawgivers, so that even
in human affairs there are laws of democracies, others of kingdoms, and
others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of the Divine Law
is that man may adhere to God: wherefore the Divine Law contains
precepts both of fortitude and of the other virtues, with a view to
directing the mind to God. For this reason it is written (Dt. 20:3,4):
"Fear ye them not: because the Lord your God is in the midst of you,
and will fight for you against your enemies. "
As to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly goods, and among
them we find precepts of fortitude according to the requirements of
those goods.
Reply to Objection 1: The Old Testament contained temporal promises,
while the promises of the New Testament are spiritual and eternal,
according to Augustine (Contra Faust. iv). Hence in the Old Law there
was need for the people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily
contest, in order to obtain an earthly possession. But in the New
Testament men were to be taught how to come to the possession of
eternal life by fighting spiritually, according to Mat. 11:12, "The
kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent bear it away. "
Hence Peter commands (1 Pet. 5:8,9): "Your adversary the devil, as a
roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour: whom resist ye,
strong in faith," as also James 4:7: "Resist the devil, and he will fly
from you. " Since, however, men while tending to spiritual goods may be
withdrawn from them by corporal dangers, precepts of fortitude had to
be given even in the New Law, that they might bravely endure temporal
evils, according to Mat. 10:28, "Fear ye not them that kill the body. "
Reply to Objection 2: The law gives general directions in its precepts.
But the things that have to be done in cases of danger are not, like
the things to be avoided, reducible to some common thing. Hence the
precepts of fortitude are negative rather than affirmative.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3423]Q[122], A[1]), the
precepts of the decalogue are placed in the Law, as first principles,
which need to be known to all from the outset. Wherefore the precepts
of the decalogue had to be chiefly about those acts of justice in which
the notion of duty is manifest, and not about acts of fortitude,
because it is not so evident that it is a duty for a person not to fear
dangers of death.
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Whether the precepts of the parts of fortitude are suitably given in the
Divine Law?
Objection 1: It seems that the precept of the parts of fortitude are
unsuitably given in the Divine Law. For just as patience and
perseverance are parts of fortitude, so also are magnificence,
magnanimity, and confidence, as stated above ([3424]Q[128]). Now we
find precepts of patience in the Divine Law, as also of perseverance.
Therefore there should also have been precepts of magnificence and
magnanimity.
Objection 2: Further, patience is a very necessary virtue, since it is
the guardian of the other virtues, as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang.
xxxv). Now the other virtues are commanded absolutely. Therefore
patience should not have been commanded merely, as Augustine says (De
Serm. Dom. in Monte i), as to the preparedness of the mind.
Objection 3: Further, patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude,
as stated above ([3425]Q[128];[3426] Q[136], A[4];[3427] Q[137], A[2]).
Now the precepts of fortitude are not affirmative but only negative, as
stated above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore the precepts of patience and
perseverance should have been negative and not affirmative.
The contrary, however, follows from the way in which they are given by
Holy Writ.
I answer that, The Divine Law instructs man perfectly about such things
as are necessary for right living. Now in order to live aright man
needs not only the principal virtues, but also the secondary and
annexed virtues. Wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts not only
about the acts of the principal virtues, but also about the acts of the
secondary and annexed virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Magnificence and magnanimity do not belong to the
genus of fortitude, except by reason of a certain excellence of
greatness which they regard in their respective matters. Now things
pertaining to excellence come under the counsels of perfection rather
than under precepts of obligation. Wherefore, there was need of
counsels, rather than of precepts about magnificence and magnanimity.
On the other hand, the hardships and toils of the present life pertain
to patience and perseverance, not by reason of any greatness observable
in them, but on account of the very nature of those virtues. Hence the
need of precepts of patience and perseverance.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3428]Q[3], A[2]), although
affirmative precepts are always binding, they are not binding for
always, but according to place and time. Wherefore just as the
affirmative precepts about the other virtues are to be understood as to
the preparedness of the mind, in the sense that man be prepared to
fulfil them when necessary, so too are the precepts of patience to be
understood in the same way.
Reply to Objection 3: Fortitude, as distinct from patience and
perseverance, is about the greatest dangers wherein one must proceed
with caution; nor is it necessary to determine what is to be done in
particular. On the other hand, patience and perseverance are about
minor hardships and toils, wherefore there is less danger in
determining, especially in general, what is to be done in such cases.
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OF TEMPERANCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
In the next place we must consider temperance: (1) Temperance itself;
(2) its parts; (3) its precepts. With regard to temperance we must
consider (1) temperance itself; (2) the contrary vices.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether temperance is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a special virtue?
(3) Whether it is only about desires and pleasures?
(4) Whether it is only about pleasures of touch?
(5) Whether it is about pleasures of taste, as such, or only as a kind
of touch?
(6) What is the rule of temperance?
(7) Whether it is a cardinal, or principal, virtue?
(8) Whether it is the greatest of virtues ?
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Whether temperance is a virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that temperance is not a virtue. For no virtue
goes against the inclination of nature, since "there is in us a natural
aptitude for virtue," as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. Now temperance
withdraws us from pleasures to which nature inclines, according to
Ethic. ii, 3,8. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated
above ([3429]FS, Q[65], A[1]). But some people have temperance without
having the other virtues: for we find many who are temperate, and yet
covetous or timid. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, to every virtue there is a corresponding gift, as
appears from what we have said above ([3430]FS, Q[68], A[4]). But
seemingly no gift corresponds to temperance, since all the gifts have
been already ascribed to the other virtues (QQ[8],9,19,45,52, 71,139).
Therefore temperance is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. vi, 15): "Temperance is the
name of a virtue. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3431]FS, Q[55], A[3]), it is essential
to virtue to incline man to good. Now the good of man is to be in
accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence human
virtue is that which inclines man to something in accordance with
reason. Now temperance evidently inclines man to this, since its very
name implies moderation or temperateness, which reason causes.
Therefore temperance is a virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Nature inclines everything to whatever is
becoming to it. Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are
becoming to him. Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it
follows that those pleasures are becoming to man which are in
accordance with reason. From such pleasures temperance does not
withdraw him, but from those which are contrary to reason. Wherefore it
is clear that temperance is not contrary to the inclination of human
nature, but is in accord with it. It is, however, contrary to the
inclination of the animal nature that is not subject to reason.
Reply to Objection 2: The temperance which fulfils the conditions of
perfect virtue is not without prudence, while this is lacking to all
who are in sin. Hence those who lack other virtues, through being
subject to the opposite vices, have not the temperance which is a
virtue, though they do acts of temperance from a certain natural
disposition, in so far as certain imperfect virtues are either natural
to man, as stated above ([3432]FS, Q[63], A[1]), or acquired by
habituation, which virtues, through lack of prudence, are not perfected
by reason, as stated above ([3433]FS, Q[65], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 3: Temperance also has a corresponding gift, namely,
fear, whereby man is withheld from the pleasures of the flesh,
according to Ps. 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear. " The
gift of fear has for its principal object God, Whom it avoids
offending, and in this respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as
stated above ([3434]Q[19], A[9], ad 1). But it may have for its
secondary object whatever a man shuns in order to avoid offending God.
Now man stands in the greatest need of the fear of God in order to shun
those things which are most seductive, and these are the matter of
temperance: wherefore the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also.
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Whether temperance is a special virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a special virtue. For
Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "it belongs to temperance to
preserve one's integrity and freedom from corruption for God's sake. "
But this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a
special virtue.
Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 42) that "what we
observe and seek most in temperance is tranquillity of soul. " But this
is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) that "we cannot
separate the beautiful from the virtuous," and that "whatever is just
is beautiful. " Now the beautiful is considered as proper to temperance,
according to the same authority (Tully, De Offic. i, 27). Therefore
temperance is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 10) reckons it a
special virtue.
I answer that, It is customary in human speech to employ a common term
in a restricted sense in order to designate the principal things to
which that common term is applicable: thus the word "city" is used
antonomastically* to designate Rome. [*Antonomasia is the figure of
speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term; e. g.
The Philosopher for Aristotle]. Accordingly the word "temperance" has a
twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its common
signification: and thus temperance is not a special but a general
virtue, because the word "temperance" signifies a certain temperateness
or moderation, which reason appoints to human operations and passions:
and this is common to every moral virtue. Yet there is a logical
difference between temperance and fortitude, even if we take them both
as general virtues: since temperance withdraws man from things which
seduce the appetite from obeying reason, while fortitude incites him to
endure or withstand those things on account of which he forsakes the
good of reason.
On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomastically, as
withholding the appetite from those things which are most seductive to
man, it is a special virtue, for thus it has, like fortitude, a special
matter.
Reply to Objection 1: Man's appetite is corrupted chiefly by those
things which seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and Divine
law. Wherefore integrity, which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can,
like the latter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, and
secondly in a sense of excellence.
Reply to Objection 2: The things about which temperance is concerned
have a most disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason that they are
natural to man, as we shall state further on ([3435]AA[4],5). Hence
tranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence,
although it is a common property of all the virtues.
Reply to Objection 3: Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it
is ascribed to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons.
First, in respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists
in a certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we
understand by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).
Secondly, because the things from which temperance withholds us, hold
the lowest place in man, and are becoming to him by reason of his
animal nature, as we shall state further on ([3436]AA[4],5; Q[142],
A[4]), wherefore it is natural that such things should defile him. In
consequence beauty is a foremost attribute of temperance which above
all hinders man from being defiled. In like manner honesty [*Honesty
must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral
goodness, from the point of view of decorum] is a special attribute of
temperance: for Isidore says (Etym. x): "An honest man is one who has
no defilement, for honesty means an honorable state. " This is most
applicable to temperance, which withstands the vices that bring most
dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (Q[142], A[4]).
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Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires
and pleasures. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that
"temperance is reason's firm and moderate mastery of lust and other
wanton emotions of the mind. " Now all the passions of the soul are
called emotions of the mind. Therefore it seems that temperance is not
only about desires and pleasures.
Objection 2: Further, "Virtue is about the difficult and the good"
[*Ethic. ii, 3]. Now it seems more difficult to temper fear, especially
with regard to dangers of death, than to moderate desires and
pleasures, which are despised on account of deadly pains and dangers,
according to Augustine (QQ[83], qu. 36). Therefore it seems that the
virtue of temperance is not chiefly about desires and pleasures.
Objection 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) "the grace
of moderation belongs to temperance": and Tully says (De Offic. ii, 27)
that "it is the concern of temperance to calm all disturbances of the
mind and to enforce moderation. " Now moderation is needed, not only in
desires and pleasures, but also in external acts and whatever pertains
to the exterior. Therefore temperance is not only about desires and
pleasures.
On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. ) [*The words quoted do not occur
in the work referred to; Cf. his De Summo Bono xxxvii, xlii, and De
Different. ii, 39]: that "it is temperance whereby lust and desire are
kept under control. "
I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[12]; Q[136], A[1]), it
belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against the
passions that rebel against reason. Now the movement of the soul's
passions is twofold, as stated above ([3437]FS, Q[23], A[2]), when we
were treating of the passions: the one, whereby the sensitive appetite
pursues sensible and bodily goods, the other whereby it flies from
sensible and bodily evils.
The first of these movements of the sensitive appetite rebels against
reason chiefly by lack of moderation. Because sensible and bodily
goods, considered in their species, are not in opposition to reason,
but are subject to it as instruments which reason employs in order to
attain its proper end: and that they are opposed to reason is owing to
the fact that the sensitive appetite fails to tend towards them in
accord with the mode of reason. Hence it belongs properly to moral
virtue to moderate those passions which denote a pursuit of the good.
On the other hand, the movement of the sensitive appetite in flying
from sensible evil is mostly in opposition to reason, not through being
immoderate, but chiefly in respect of its flight: because, when a man
flies from sensible and bodily evils, which sometimes accompany the
good of reason, the result is that he flies from the good of reason.
Hence it belongs to moral virtue to make man while flying from evil to
remain firm in the good of reason.
Accordingly, just as the virtue of fortitude, which by its very nature
bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with the passion, viz. fear,
which regards flight from bodily evils, and consequently with daring,
which attacks the objects of fear in the hope of attaining some good,
so, too, temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation, is chiefly
concerned with those passions that tend towards sensible goods, viz.
desire and pleasure, and consequently with the sorrows that arise from
the absence of those pleasures. For just as daring presupposes objects
of fear, so too such like sorrow arises from the absence of the
aforesaid pleasures.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3438]FS, Q[23], AA[1],2;
[3439]FS, Q[25], A[1]), when we were treating of the passions, those
passions which pertain to avoidance of evil, presuppose the passions
pertaining to the pursuit of good; and the passions of the irascible
presuppose the passions of the concupiscible. Hence, while temperance
directly moderates the passions of the concupiscible which tend towards
good, as a consequence, it moderates all the other passions, inasmuch
as moderation of the passions that precede results in moderation of the
passions that follow: since he that is not immoderate in desire is
moderate in hope, and grieves moderately for the absence of the things
he desires.
Reply to Objection 2: Desire denotes an impulse of the appetite towards
the object of pleasure and this impulse needs control, which belongs to
temperance. on the other hand fear denotes a withdrawal of the mind
from certain evils, against which man needs firmness of mind, which
fortitude bestows. Hence temperance is properly about desires, and
fortitude about fears.
Reply to Objection 3: External acts proceed from the internal passions
of the soul: wherefore their moderation depends on the moderation of
the internal passions.
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Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures of touch?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires
and pleasures of touch. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xix) that
"the function of temperance is to control and quell the desires which
draw us to the things which withdraw us from the laws of God and from
the fruit of His goodness"; and a little further on he adds that "it is
the duty of temperance to spurn all bodily allurements and popular
praise. " Now we are withdrawn from God's laws not only by the desire
for pleasures of touch, but also by the desire for pleasures of the
other senses, for these, too, belong to the bodily allurements, and
again by the desire for riches or for worldly glory: wherefore it is
written (1 Tim. 6:10). "Desire [*'Cupiditas,' which is the Douay
version following the Greek {philargyria} renders 'desire of money'] is
the root of all evils. " Therefore temperance is not only about desires
of pleasures of touch.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "one who
is worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is
temperate, but he is not magnificent. " Now honors, whether small or
great, of which he is speaking there, are an object of pleasure, not of
touch, but in the soul's apprehension. Therefore temperance is not only
about desires for pleasures of touch.
Objection 3: Further, things that are of the same genus would seem to
pertain to the matter of a particular virtue under one same aspect. Now
all pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus. Therefore they
all equally belong to the matter of temperance.
Objection 4: Further, spiritual pleasures are greater than the
pleasures of the body, as stated above ([3440]FS, Q[31], A[5]) in the
treatise on the passions. Now sometimes men forsake God's laws and the
state of virtue through desire for spiritual pleasures, for instance,
through curiosity in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised
man knowledge, saying (Gn. 3:5): "Ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and
evil. " Therefore temperance is not only about pleasures of touch.
Objection 5: Further, if pleasures of touch were the proper matter of
temperance, it would follow that temperance is about all pleasures of
touch. But it is not about all, for instance, about those which occur
in games. Therefore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of
temperance.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "temperance
is properly about desires of pleasures of touch. "
I answer that, As stated above [3441](A[3]), temperance is about
desires and pleasures in the same way as fortitude is about fear and
daring. Now fortitude is about fear and daring with respect to the
greatest evils whereby nature itself is dissolved; and such are dangers
of death. Wherefore in like manner temperance must needs be about
desires for the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a
natural operation, it is so much the greater according as it results
from a more natural operation. Now to animals the most natural
operations are those which preserve the nature of the individual by
means of meat and drink, and the nature of the species by the union of
the sexes. Hence temperance is properly about pleasures of meat and
drink and sexual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the sense
of touch. Wherefore it follows that temperance is about pleasures of
touch.
Reply to Objection 1: In the passage quoted Augustine apparently takes
temperance, not as a special virtue having a determinate matter, but as
concerned with the moderation of reason, in any matter whatever: and
this is a general condition of every virtue. However, we may also reply
that if a man can control the greatest pleasures, much more can he
control lesser ones. Wherefore it belongs chiefly and properly to
temperance to moderate desires and pleasures of touch, and secondarily
other pleasures.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher takes temperance as denoting
moderation in external things, when, to wit, a man tends to that which
is proportionate to him, but not as denoting moderation in the soul's
emotions, which pertains to the virtue of temperance.
Reply to Objection 3: The pleasures of the other senses play a
different part in man and in other animals. For in other animals
pleasures do not result from the other senses save in relation to
sensibles of touch: thus the lion is pleased to see the stag, or to
hear its voice, in relation to his food. On the other hand man derives
pleasure from the other senses, not only for this reason, but also on
account of the becomingness of the sensible object. Wherefore
temperance is about the pleasures of the other senses, in relation to
pleasures of touch, not principally but consequently: while in so far
as the sensible objects of the other senses are pleasant on account of
their becomingness, as when a man is pleased at a well-harmonized
sound, this pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of nature.
Hence these passions are not of such importance that temperance can be
referred to them antonomastically.
Reply to Objection 4: Although spiritual pleasures are by their nature
greater than bodily pleasures, they are not so perceptible to the
senses, and consequently they do not so strongly affect the sensitive
appetite, against whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded by
moral virtue. We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly
speaking, are in accordance with reason, wherefore they need no
control, save accidentally, in so far as one spiritual pleasure is a
hindrance to another greater and more binding.
Reply to Objection 5: Not all pleasures of touch regard the
preservation of nature, and consequently it does not follow that
temperance is about all pleasures of touch.
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Whether temperance is about the pleasures proper to the taste?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is about pleasures proper to
the taste. For pleasures of the taste result from food and drink, which
are more necessary to man's life than sexual pleasures, which regard
the touch. But according to what has been said [3442](A[4]), temperance
is about pleasures in things that are necessary to human life.
Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste rather than
about those proper to the touch.
Objection 2: Further, temperance is about the passions rather than
about things themselves. Now, according to De Anima ii, 3, "the touch
is the sense of food," as regards the very substance of the food,
whereas "savor" which is the proper object of the taste, is "the
pleasing quality of the food. " Therefore temperance is about the taste
rather than about the touch.
Objection 3: Further, according to Ethic. vii, 4,7: "temperance and
intemperance are about the same things, and so are continence and
incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy," to which delicacy
pertains. Now delicacy seems to regard the delight taken in savors
which are the object of the taste. Therefore temperance is about
pleasures proper to the taste.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "seemingly
temperance and intemperance have little if anything to do with the
taste. "
I answer that, As stated above [3443](A[4]), temperance is about the
greatest pleasures, which chiefly regard the preservation of human life
either in the species or in the individual. In these matters certain
things are to be considered as principal and others as secondary. The
principal thing is the use itself of the necessary means, of the woman
who is necessary for the preservation of the species, or of food and
drink which are necessary for the preservation of the individual: while
the very use of these necessary things has a certain essential pleasure
annexed thereto.
In regard to either use we consider as secondary whatever makes the use
more pleasurable, such as beauty and adornment in woman, and a pleasing
savor and likewise odor in food. Hence temperance is chiefly about the
pleasure of touch, that results essentially from the use of these
necessary things, which use is in all cases attained by the touch.
Secondarily, however, temperance and intemperance are about pleasures
of the taste, smell, or sight, inasmuch as the sensible objects of
these senses conduce to the pleasurable use of the necessary things
that have relation to the touch. But since the taste is more akin to
the touch than the other senses are, it follows that temperance is more
about the taste than about the other senses.
Reply to Objection 1: The use of food and the pleasure that essentially
results therefrom pertain to the touch. Hence the Philosopher says (De
Anima ii, 3) that "touch is the sense of food, for food is hot or cold,
wet or dry. " To the taste belongs the discernment of savors, which make
the food pleasant to eat, in so far as they are signs of its being
suitable for nourishment.
Reply to Objection 2: The pleasure resulting from savor is additional,
so to speak, whereas the pleasure of touch results essentially from the
use of food and drink.
Reply to Objection 3: Delicacy regards principally the substance of the
food, but secondarily it regards its delicious savor and the way in
which it is served.
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Whether the rule of temperance depends on the need of the present life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the rule of temperance does not depend
on the needs of the present life. For higher things are not regulated
according to lower. Now, as temperance is a virtue of the soul, it is
above the needs of the body. Therefore the rule of temperance does not
depend on the needs of the body.
Objection 2: Further, whoever exceeds a rule sins. Therefore if the
needs of the body were the rule of temperance, it would be a sin
against temperance to indulge in any other pleasure than those required
by nature, which is content with very little. But this would seem
unreasonable.
Objection 3: Further, no one sins in observing a rule. Therefore if the
need of the body were the rule of temperance, there would be no sin in
using any pleasure for the needs of the body, for instance, for the
sake of health. But this is apparently false. Therefore the need of the
body is not the rule of temperance.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi): "In both
Testaments the temperate man finds confirmation of the rule forbidding
him to love the things of this life, or to deem any of them desirable
for its own sake, and commanding him to avail himself of those things
with the moderation of a user not the attachment of a lover, in so far
as they are requisite for the needs of this life and of his station. "
I answer that, As stated above [3444](A[1]; Q[109], A[2]; Q[123],
A[12]), the good of moral virtue consists chiefly in the order of
reason: because "man's good is to be in accord with reason," as
Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now the principal order of reason is
that by which it directs certain things towards their end, and the good
of reason consists chiefly in this order; since good has the aspect of
end, and the end is the rule of whatever is directed to the end. Now
all the pleasurable objects that are at man's disposal, are directed to
some necessity of this life as to their end. Wherefore temperance takes
the need of this life, as the rule of the pleasurable objects of which
it makes use, and uses them only for as much as the need of this life
requires.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, the need of this life is
regarded as a rule in so far as it is an end. Now it must be observed
that sometimes the end of the worker differs from the end of the work,
thus it is clear that the end of building is a house, whereas sometimes
the end of the builder is profit. Accordingly the end and rule of
temperance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of the thing it
makes use of is the need of human life, to which whatever is useful for
life is subordinate.
Reply to Objection 2: The need of human life may be taken in two ways.
First, it may be taken in the sense in which we apply the term
"necessary" to that without which a thing cannot be at all; thus food
is necessary to an animal. Secondly, it may be taken for something
without which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance regards not
only the former of these needs, but also the latter. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the temperate man desires
pleasant things for the sake of health, or for the sake of a sound
condition of body. " Other things that are not necessary for this
purpose may be divided into two classes. For some are a hindrance to
health and a sound condition of body; and these temperance makes not
use of whatever, for this would be a sin against temperance. But others
are not a hindrance to those things, and these temperance uses
moderately, according to the demands of place and time, and in keeping
with those among whom one dwells. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,
11) says that the "temperate man also desires other pleasant things,"
those namely that are not necessary for health or a sound condition of
body, "so long as they are not prejudicial to these things. "
Reply to Objection 3: As stated (ad 2), temperance regards need
according to the requirements of life, and this depends not only on the
requirements of the body, but also on the requirements of external
things, such as riches and station, and more still on the requirements
of good conduct. Hence the Philosopher adds (Ethic. iii, 11) that "the
temperate man makes use of pleasant things provided that not only they
be not prejudicial to health and a sound bodily condition, but also
that they be not inconsistent with good," i. e. good conduct, nor
"beyond his substance," i. e. his means. And Augustine says (De Morib.
Eccl. xxi) that the "temperate man considers the need" not only "of
this life" but also "of his station. "
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Whether temperance is a cardinal virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a cardinal virtue.
For the good of moral virtue depends on reason. But temperance is about
those things that are furthest removed from reason, namely about
pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated in Ethic. iii,
10. Therefore temperance, seemingly, is not a principal virtue.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the impetus the more difficult is it
to control. Now anger, which is controlled by meekness, seems to be
more impetuous than desire, which is controlled by temperance. For it
is written (Prov. 27:4): "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it
breaketh forth; and who can bear the violence [impetum] of one
provoked? " Therefore meekness is a principal virtue rather than
temperance.
Objection 3: Further, hope as a movement of the soul takes precedence
of desire and concupiscence, as stated above ([3445]FS, Q[25], A[4]).
But humility controls the presumption of immoderate hope. Therefore,
seemingly, humility is a principal virtue rather than temperance which
controls concupiscence.
On the contrary, Gregory reckons temperance among the principal virtues
(Moral. ii, 49).
I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[11]; Q[61], A[3]), a
principal or cardinal virtue is so called because it has a foremost
claim to praise on account of one of those things that are requisite
for the notion of virtue in general. Now moderation, which is requisite
in every virtue, deserves praise principally in pleasures of touch,
with which temperance is concerned, both because these pleasures are
most natural to us, so that it is more difficult to abstain from them,
and to control the desire for them, and because their objects are more
necessary to the present life, as stated above [3446](A[4]). For this
reason temperance is reckoned a principal or cardinal virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: The longer the range of its operation, the
greater is the agent's power [virtus] shown to be: wherefore the very
fact that the reason is able to moderate desires and pleasures that are
furthest removed from it, proves the greatness of reason's power. This
is how temperance comes to be a principal virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: The impetuousness of anger is caused by an
accident, for instance, a painful hurt; wherefore it soon passes,
although its impetus be great. On the other hand, the impetuousness of
the desire for pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause,
wherefore it is more lasting and more general, and consequently its
control regards a more principal virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: The object of hope is higher than the object of
desire, wherefore hope is accounted the principal passion in the
irascible. But the objects of desires and pleasures of touch move the
appetite with greater force, since they are more natural. Therefore
temperance, which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal
virtue.
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Whether temperance is the greatest of the virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is the greatest of the
virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "what we observe and
seek most in temperance is the safeguarding of what is honorable, and
the regard for what is beautiful. " Now virtue deserves praise for being
honorable and beautiful. Therefore temperance is the greatest of the
virtues.
Objection 2: Further, the more difficult the deed the greater the
virtue. Now it is more difficult to control desires and pleasures of
touch than to regulate external actions, the former pertaining to
temperance and the latter to justice. Therefore temperance is a greater
virtue than justice.
Objection 3: Further, seemingly the more general a thing is, the more
necessary and the better it is. Now fortitude is about dangers of death
which occur less frequently than pleasures of touch, for these occur
every day; so that temperance is in more general use than fortitude.
Therefore temperance is a more excellent virtue than fortitude.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that the "greatest
virtues are those which are most profitable to others, for which reason
we give the greatest honor to the brave and the just. "
I answer that, As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 2) "the good of
the many is more of the godlike than the good of the individual,"
wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better it
is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the many more than
temperance does, since justice regards the relations between one man
and another, while fortitude regards dangers of battle which are
endured for the common weal: whereas temperance moderates only the
desires and pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident
that justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than temperance:
while prudence and the theological virtues are more excellent still.
Reply to Objection 1: Honor and beauty are especially ascribed to
temperance, not on account of the excellence of the good proper to
temperance, but on account of the disgrace of the contrary evil from
which it withdraws us, by moderating the pleasures common to us and the
lower animals.
Reply to Objection 2: Since virtue is about the difficult and the good,
the excellence of a virtue is considered more under the aspect of good,
wherein justice excels, than under the aspect of difficult, wherein
temperance excels.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is general because it regards the many
conduces more to the excellence of goodness than that which is general
because it occurs frequently: fortitude excels in the former way,
temperance in the latter. Hence fortitude is greater simply, although
in some respects temperance may be described as greater not only than
fortitude but also than justice.
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OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TEMPERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the vices opposed to temperance. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether insensibility is a sin?
(2) Whether intemperance is a childish sin?
(3) Of the comparison between intemperance and timidity;
(4) Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of vices?
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Whether insensibility is a vice?
Objection 1: It would seem that insensibility is not a vice.
