But the pleasure of any particular social enjoyment out weighs very considerably the uneasiness caused by the want of that particular enjoyment; so that the strongest
sensations
relative to the habitudes ofpar ticular society are sensations of pleasure.
Edmund Burke
For previous to the pain, do not feel any actual pleasure, have no reason to judge that any such thing exists; since pleasure only pleasure as
felt. The same may be said of pain, and with equal
reason. can never persuade myself that pleasure and pain are mere relations, which can only exist as they are contrasted but think can discern clearly that there are positive pains and pleasures, which do not at all depend upon each other. Nothing more certain to my own feelings than this. There noth ing which can distinguish in my mind with more clearness than the three states, of indifference, of pleasure, and of pain. Every one of these can per ceive without any sort of idea of its relation to any thing else. Oaius afflicted with fit of the colic; this man actually in pain stretch Oaius upon the rack, he will feel much greater pain: but does this pain of the rack arise from the removal of any pleas ure? or the fit of the colic pleasure or pain
iust as we are pleased to consider it?
SECTION III.
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE REMOVAL OF PAIN AND POSITIVE PLEASURE.
WE shall carry this proposition yet step further. We shall venture to propose, that pain and pleasure are not only not necessarily dependent for their existence on their mutual diminution or removal, but that, in reality, the diminution or ceasing of pleasure does not
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operate like positive pain; and that the removal or diminution of pain, in its effect, has very little re semblance to positive pleasure! ' The former of these propositions will, I believe, be much more readily al lowed than the latter ; because it is very evident that
when it has run its career, sets us down very nearly where it found us. Pleasure of every kind quickly satisfies; and, when it is over, we re lapse into indiife_rence, or, rather, we fall into a soft tranquillity which is tinged with the agreeable color of the former sensation. I own it is not at first view so apparent that the removal of a great pain does not resemble positive pleasure : but let us recollect in what state we have found our minds upon escaping some im minent danger, or on being released from the severity of some cruel pain. _ We have on such occasions found, if I am not much mistaken, the temper of our minds in a tenor very remote from that which attends the pres ence of positive pleasure; we have found them in a state of much sobriety, impressed with a sense of awe, in a sort of tranquillity shadowed with horror. The fashion of the countenance and the gesture of the body on such occasions is so correspondent to this state of mind, that any person, a stranger to the cause of the appearance, would rather judge us under some consternation, than in the enjoyment of anything like positive pleasure.
'09 3' draw dvSp' tin; vrvxn/1'; )\e? B_r;, 50'1" ivl mirpy <I>(Ivra Karaxrsivas', ('1')\)\mv fgfxero dfipov,
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Iliad. S2. 480.
* Mr. Locke [Essay on Human Understanding, l. ii. c. 20, sect. 16,] thinks that the removal or lessening of a pain is considered and oper ates as a pleasure, and the loss or diminishing of pleasure as a pain It is this opinion which we consider here.
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" As when a wretch, who, conscious of his crime, Pursued for murder from his native clime,
Just gains some frontier, breathless, pale, amazed; All gaze, all wonder ! "
This striking appearance of the man whom Homer supposes to have just escaped an imminent danger, the sort of mixed passion of terror and surprise, with which he affects the spectators, paints very strongly the manner in which we find ourselves affected upon occasions any way similar. For when we have suf fered from any violent emotion, the mind naturally continues in something like the same condition, after the cause which first produced it has ceased to oper ate. The tossing of the sea remains after the storm; and when this remain of horror has entirely subsided, all the passion which the accident raised subsides along with it; and the mind returns to its usual state of indifference. In short, pleasure (I mean anything either in the inward sensation, or in the outward appearance, like pleasure from a positive cause) has never, I imagine, its origin from the re
moval of pain or danger.
SECTION IV.
OF DELIGHT AND PLEASURE, AS OPPOSED TO EACH OTHER.
BUT shall we therefore say, that the removal of pain or its diminution is always simply painful? or affirm that the cessation or the lessening of pleasure is always attended itself with a pleasure? By no means. What I advance is no more than this ; first, that there are pleasures and pains of a positive and
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independent nature; and, secondly, that the feeling which results from the ceasing or diminution of pain does not bear a sufficient resemblance to positive pleasure, to have it considered as of the same nature,
or to entitle it to be known by the same name ; and thirdly, that upon the same principle the removal or qualification of pleasure has no resemblance to posi tive pain. It is certain that the former feeling (the removal or moderation of pain) has something in it far from distressing, or disagreeable in its nature. This feeling, in many cases so agreeable, but in all so different from positive pleasure, has no name which I know; but that hinders not its being a very real one, and very different from all others. It is most cer tain, that every species of satisfaction or pleasure, how different soever in its manner of affecting, is of a positive nature in the mind of him who feels it. The affection is undoubtedly positive ; but the cause may be, as in this case it certainly sort of priva tion. And very reasonable that we should dis tinguish by some term two things so distinct in nature, as pleasure that such simply, and with out any relation, from that pleasure which cannot exist without relation, and that, too, relation to
pain. Very extraordinary would be, these affec tions, so distinguishable in their causes, so different in their effects, should be confounded with each other, because vulgar use has ranged them under the same general title. Whenever have occasion to speak of this species of relative pleasure, call delight and
shall take the best care can to use that word in no other sense. am satisfied the word not commonly used in this 'appropriated signification; but thought better to take up word already
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known, and to limit its signification, than to intro duce a new one, which would not perhaps incorpo rate so well with the language. I should never have presumed the least alteration in our words, if the nature of the language, framed for the purposes of business rather than those of philosophy, and the nature of my subject, that leads me out of the common track of discourse, did not in a manner necessitate me to it. I shall make use of this liberty with all possible caution. As I make use of the
word delight to express the sensation which accompa nies the removal of pain or danger, so, when I speak of positive pleasure, I shall for the most part call it simply pleasure.
SECTION V. JOY AND onmr.
IT must be observed, that the cessation of pleas ure affects the mind three ways. If it simply ceases after having continued a proper time, the effect is indiflerence ; if it be abruptly broken off, there ensues an uneasy sense called disappointment; if the object be so totally lost that there is no chance of enjoying it again, a passion arises in the mind which is called grief. Now there is none of these, not even grief, which is the most violent, that I think has any resemblance to positive pain. The person who grieves suffers his passion to grow upon him; he indulges he loves it: but this never happens in the case of actual pain, which no man ever willingly endured for any considerable time. That
grief should be willingly endured, though far from simply pleasing sensation, not so difficult to be
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understood. It is the nature of grief to keep its object perpetually in its eye, to present it in its most
pleasurable views, to repeat all the circumstances that attend even to the last minuteness; to go back to every particular enjoyment, to dwell upon each, and to find thousand new perfections in all, that were not sufficiently understood before; in grief, the pleasure still uppermost; and the affliction we
suffer has no resemblance to absolute pain, which always odious, and which we endeavor to shake off as soon as possible. The Odyssey of Homer, which abounds with so many natural and affecting images, has none more striking than those which Menelaus raises of the ealamitous fate of his friends, and his Own manner of feeling it. He owns, indeed, that he
often gives himself some intermission from such mel ancholy reflections; but he observes, to_o, that, mel ancholy as they are, they give him pleasure.
'AX7\' Pp. 1rr;: 1r:. ivras pi>> ddvpe? pcvos xal dxulaw, Hohhcixls ('ll peyripolzrc xafirjun/or ? ],uer? 'poun1/,
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Ha150p. aL' aid/qpoc 6% xe? pos xpvepoio ydoco.
Hom. Od. A. I00.
" Still in short intervals of pleasing woe, Regardful of the friendly dues owe, to the glorious dead, forever dear, Indulge the tribute of a graze;/id tear. "
On the other hand, when we recover our health, when we escape an imminent danger, with joy that we are affected? The sense on these occasions
far from that smooth and voluptuous satisfaction which the assured prospect of pleasure bestows. The delight which arises from the modifications of pain confesses the stock from whence sprung, in its solid, strong, and severe nature.
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SECTION VI.
or THE PASSIONS WHICH BELONG T0 SELF-PRESERVATION.
Mosr of the ideas which are capable of making a powerful impression on the mind, whether simply of pain or pleasure, or of the modifications of those, may be reduced very nearly to these two heads, seZ_f-pres ervation, and society ; to the ends of one or the other of which all our passions are calculated to answer. The passions which concern self-preservation, turn mostly on pain or danger. The ideas of pain, sick ness, and death, fill the mind with strong emotions of horror ; but life and health, though they put us in a capacity of being affected with pleasure, make no such impression by the simple enjoyment. The pas sions therefore which are conversant about the pres ervation of the individual turn chiefly on pain and danger, and they are the most powerful of all the
? passions.
SECTION VII.
OF THE SUBLIME.
WHATEVER is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime ; that productive of the strongest emotion which the mind capable of feel ing. say the strongest emotion, because am sat isfied the ideas of pain are much more powerful than those which enter on the part of pleasure. Without all doubt, the torments which we may be made to
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suffer are much greater in their effect on the body and mind, than any pleasures which the most learned voluptuary could suggest, or than_the liveliest imagi nation, and the most sound and exquisitely sensible body, could enjoy. Nay, I am in great doubt whether any man could be found, who would earn a life of the most perfect satisfaction at the price of ending it in the torments, which justice inflicted in a few hours on the late unfortunate regicide in France. But as pain is stronger in its operation than pleasure, so death is in general a much more affecting idea than pain ; because there are very few pains, however ex quisite, which are not preferred to death : nay, what generally makes pain itself, if I may say so, more painful, that considered as an emissary of this king of terrors. When danger or pain press too near ly, they are incapable of giving any delight, and are simply terrible; but at certain distances, and with certain modifications, they may be, and they are, de lightful, as we every day experience. The cause of this shall endeavor to investigate hereafter.
SECTION VIII.
or rm: PASSIONS wrncn snrono ro SOCIETY.
THE other head under which class our passions, is that of society, which may be divided into two sorts. 1. The society of the sexes, which answers the pur pose of propagation; and next, that more general society, which we have with men and with other animals, and which we may in some sort be said to have even with the inanimate world. The passions
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belonging to the preservation of the individual turn wholly on pain and danger: those which belong to generation have their origin in gratifications and pleas ures ; the pleasure most directly belonging to this pur pose is of a lively character, rapturous and violent, and confessedly the highest pleasure of sense; yet the absence of this so great an enjoyment scarce amounts to an uneasiness; and, except at particular times, I do not think it aifects at all. When men describe in what manner they are affected by pain and danger, they do not dwell on the pleasure of health and the comfort of security, and then lament the loss of these satisfactions: the whole turns upon the actual pains and horrors which they endure. But if you listen to the complaints of a forsaken lover, you observe that he insists largely on the pleasures which he enjoyed, or hoped to enjoy, and on the perfection of the ob
ject of his desires; it is the loss which is always up permost in his mind. The violent effects produced by love, which has sometimes been even wrought up to madness, is no objection to the rule which we seek to establish. When men have suffered their imagi nations to be long affected with any idea, it so wholly engrosses them as to shut out by degrees almost every other, and to break down every partition of the mind which would confine it. Any idea is sufficient for the purpose, as is evident from the infinite variety of causes, which give rise to madness: but this at most can only prove, that the passion of love is capa ble of producing very extraordinary effects, not that
its extraordinary emotions have any connection with "
positive pain.
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SECTION IX.
THE FINAL CAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PASSIONS BELONGING TO SELF-PRESERVATION, AND THOSE WHICH REGARD THE SOCIETY OF THE BEXES.
THE final cause of the difference in character be tween the passions which regard self-preservation, and those which are directed to the multiplication of the species, will illustrate the foregoing remarks yet further; and it imagine, worthy of observation even upon its own account. As the performance of our duties of every kind depends upon life, and the performing them with vigor and efficacy depends upon health, we are very strongly affected with whatever threatens the destruction of either: but as we were not made to acquiesce in life and health, the simple enjoyment of them not attended with any real pleasure, lest, satisfied with that, we should give our selves over to indolencc and inaction. On the other hand, the generation of mankind great purpose, and requisite that men should be animated to
the pursuit of by some great incentive. It there fore attended with very high pleasure; but as
by no means designed to be our constant business,
not fit that the absence of this pleasure should be attended with any considerable pain. The difference between men and brutes, in this point, seems to be remarkable. Men are at all times pretty equally dis posed to the pleasures of love, because they are to be guided by reason in the time and manner of indulg
ing them. Had any great pain arisen from the want
of this satisfaction, reason, am afraid, would find
great difficulties in the performance of its office. But vor. . 1.
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brutes that obey laws, in the execution of which their own reason has but little share, have their stated seasons; at such times it is not improbable that the sensation from the want is very troublesome, because the end must be then answered, or be missed in many, perhaps forever ; as the inclination returns only with
its season.
SECTION X. or BEAUTY.
THE passion which belongs to generation, merely as such, is lust only. This is evident in brutes, whose passions are more unmixed, and which pursue their purposes more directly than ours. The only distinction they observe with regard to their mates, is that of sex. It is true, that they stick severally to their own species in preference to all others. But this preference, I imagine, does not arise from any sense of beauty which they find in their species, as Mr. Addison supposes, but from a law of some other kind, to which they are subject; and this we may fairly conclude, from their apparent want of choice amongst those objects to which the barriers of their
species have confined them. But man, who is a crea ture adapted to a greater variety and intricacy of relation, connects with the general passion the idea of some social qualities, which direct and heighten the appetite which he has in common with all other animals; and as he is not designed like them to live at large, it is fit that he should have some thing to create a preference, and fix his choice ; and this in general should be some sensible quality; as no other can so quickly, so powerfully, or so surely
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produce its effect. The object therefore of this mixed passion, which we call love, is the beauty of the sex. Men are carried to the sex in general, as it is the sex, and by the common law of nature ; but they are attached to particulars by personal beauty. I call beauty a social quality; for where women and men, and not only they, but when other animals give us a sense of joy and pleasure in beholding them
(and there are many that do so), they inspire us with sen
timents of tenderness and affection towards their persons ; we like to have them near us, and we enter willingly into a kind of relation with them, unless we should have strong reasons to the contrary. But to what end, in many cases, this was designed, I am unable to discover; for I see no greater reason for a connection between man and several animals who are attired in so engaging a manner, than between him and some others who entirely want this attraction, or possess it in a far weaker degree. But it is probable that Providence did not make even this distinction, but with a view to some great end ; though we can not perceive distinctly what it as his wisdom
not our wisdom, nor our ways his ways.
T N XI. SOCIETY AND SOLITUDE.
THE second branch of the social passions that which administers to society in general. With regard to this, observe, that society, merely as society,
without any" particular heightenings, gives us no pos itive pleasure in the enjoyment; but absolute and entire solitude, that the total and perpetual exclu
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sion from all society, is as great a positive pain as can almost be conceived. Therefore in the balance be tween the pleasure of general society, and the pain of absolute solitude, pain is the predominant idea.
But the pleasure of any particular social enjoyment out weighs very considerably the uneasiness caused by the want of that particular enjoyment; so that the strongest sensations relative to the habitudes ofpar ticular society are sensations of pleasure. Good com pany, lively conversations, and the endearments of friendship, fill the mind with great pleasure ; a tem porary solitude, on the other hand, is itself agreeable. This may perhaps prove that we are creatures de signed for contemplation as well as action; since solitude as well as society has its pleasures; as from the former observation we may discern, that an entire life of solitude contradicts the purposes of our being, since death itself is scarcely an idea of more terror.
'
UNDER this denomination of society, the passions are of a complicated kind, and branch out into a vari ety of forms, agreeably to that variety of ends they are to serve in the great chain of society. The three principal links in this chain are sympathy, imitation, and ambition.
? SECTION XII. SYMPATHY, IMITATION, AND A'MIBITION
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SECTION XIII. BYMPATHY.
117
IT is by the first of these passions that we enter into the concerns of others; that we are moved as they are moved, and are never suffered to be indif ferent spectators of almost anything which men can do or suffer. For sympathy must be considered as a sort of substitution, by which we are put into the place of another man, and affected in many respects as he is affected : so that this passion may either par take of the nature of those which regard self-preser vation, and turning upon pain may be a source of the sublime; or it may turn upon ideas of
and then whatever has been said of the social affec tions, whether they regard society in general, or only
some particular modes of may be applicable here. by this principle chiefly that poetry, painting,
and other affecting arts, transfuse their passions from one breast to another, and are often capable of graft ing delight on wretchedness, misery, and death itself. It common observation, that objects which in the reality would shock, are in tragical, and such like representations, the source of very high species of
? This, taken as fact, has been the cause of much reasoning. The satisfaction has been com monly attributed, first, to the comfort we receive in
considering that so melancholy story no more than fiction and, next, to the contemplation of our own freedom from the evils which we see represented.
am afraid practice much too common in in quiries of this nature, to attribute the cause of feel ings which merely arise from the mechanical struc
pleasure.
pleasure;
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ture of our bodies, or from the natural frame and constitution of our minds, to certain conclusions of the reasoning faculty on the objects presented to us; for I should imagine, that the influence of reason in producing our passions is nothing near so extensive as it is commonly believed.
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SECTION XIV.
THE EFFECTS OF SYMPATHY IN THE DISTRESSES OF OTHERS
T0 examine this point concerning the effect of tragedy in a proper manner, we must previously con sider 11ow we are affected by the feelings of our fel low-creatures in circumstances of real distress. I am convinced we have a degree of delight, and that no small one, in the real misfortunes and pains of others; for let the affection be what it will in ap pearance, if it does not make us shun such objects, if on the contrary it induces us to approach them, if it makes us dwell upon them, in this case I conceive we must have a delight or pleasure of some species or other in contemplating objects of this kind. Do we not read the authentic histories of scenes of this nature with as much pleasure as romances or poems, where the incidents are fictitious? The prosperity of no empire, nor the grandeur of no king, can so agreeably affect in the reading, as the ruin of the state of Macedon, and the distress of its unhappy prince. Such a catastrophe touches us in history as much as the destruction of Troy does in fable. Our
delight, in cases of this kind, is very greatly height ened, if the sufferer be some excellent person who
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sinks under an unworthy fortune. Scipio and Cato are both virtuous characters ; but we are more deeply affected by the violent death of the one, and the ruin of the great cause he adhered to, than with the de served triumphs and uninterrupted prosperity of the other : for terror is a passion which always produces delight when it does not press too closely; and pity is a passion accompanied with pleasure, because it arises from love and social affection. Whenever we are formed by nature to any active purpose, the pas sion which animates us to it is attended with delight, or a pleasure of some kind, let the subject-matter be what it will; and as our Creator has designed that we shouldbe united by the bond of sympathy, he has
? that bond by a proportionable delight; and there most where our sympathy is most wanted,
-_---in the distresses of others. If this passion was
simply painful, we would shun with the greatest care all persons and places that could excite such a pas sion; as some, who are so far gone in indolence as not to endure any strong impression, actually do. But the case is widely different with the greater part of mankind ; there is no spectacle we so eagerly pur sue, as that of some uncommon and grievous calam ity ; so that whether the misfortune is before our eyes, or whether they are turned back to it in history,
it always touches with delight. This is not an un mixed delight, but blended with no small uneasiness. The delight we have in such things hinders us from shunning scenes of misery ; and the pain we feel prompts us to relieve ourselves in relieving those who suffer; and all this antecedent to any reasoning,
by an instinct that works us to its own purposes with out our concurrence.
strengthened
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SECTION XV.
OF THE EFFECTS OF TRAGEDY
IT is thus in real calamities. In imitated dis tresses the only difference is the pleasure resulting from the effects of imitation; for it is never so per fect, but we can perceive it is imitation, and on that principle are somewhat pleased with it. And indeed in some cases we derive as much or more pleasure from that source than from the thing itself. But then I imagine we shall be much mistaken if we attribute any considerable part of our satisfaction in tragedy to the consideration that tragedy is a deceit, and its representations no realities. The nearer it approaches the reality, and the further it removes us from all idea of fiction, the more perfect is its
? But be its power of what kind it will, it never
power.
approaches to what it represents. Choose a day on which to represent the most sublime and affecting tragedy 'we have; appoint the most favorite actors; spare no cost upon the scenes and decorations; unite the greatest efforts of poetry, painting, and music; and when you have collected your audience, just at the moment when their minds are erect with expec tation, let it be reported that a state criminal of high rank is on the point of being executed in the adjoin ing square; in a moment the emptiness of the thea tre would demonstrate the comparative weakness of the imitative arts, and proclaim the triumph of the real sympathy. I believe that this notion of our having a simple pain in the reality, yet a delight in the representation, arises from hence, that we do not sufficiently distinguish what we would by no means
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choose to do, from what we should be eager enough to see if it was once done. We delight in seeing things, which so far from doing, our heartiest wishes would be to see redressed. This noble capital, the pride of England and of Europe, I believe no man is so strangely wicked as to desire to see destroyed by a conflagration or an earthquake, though he should be
removed himself to the greatest distance from the danger. But suppose such a fatal accident to have happened, what numbers from all parts would crowd to behold the ruins, and amongst them many who
would have been content never to have seen London in its glory! Nor is either in real or fictitious distresses, our immunity from them which produces our delight; in my own mind can discover nothing like it. apprehend that this mistake owing to sort of sophism, by which we are frequently imposed upon arises from our not distinguishing between what indeed necessary condition to our doing or suffering anything in general, and what the cause of some particular act. If man kills me with sword, necessary condition to this that we should have been both of us alive before the fact; and yet would be absurd to say that our being both living creatures was the cause of his crime and of my death. So certain that absolutely necessary my life should be out of any imminent hazard, before
can take delight in the sulferings of others, real or imaginary, or indeed in anything else from any cause whatsoever. But then sophism to argue from thence that this immunity the cause of my delight either on these or on any occasions. No one can distinguish such cause of satisfaction in his own mind,I believe nay, when we do not suffer any very
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acute pain, nor are exposed to any imminent danger of our lives, we can feel for others, whilst we suffer ourselves ; and often then most when we are softened by affliction ; we see with pity even distresses which we would accept in the place of our own.
SEOTION XVI. IMITATION.
THE second passion belonging to society is imita tion, or, if you will, a desire of imitating, and conse quently a pleasure in it. This passion arises from much the same cause with sympathy. For as sym pathy makes us take a concern in whatever men feel, so this affection prompts us to copy whatever they do; and consequently we have a pleasure in imitat ing, and in whatever belongs to imitation merely as it is such, without any intervention of the reasoning faculty, but solely from our natural constitution, which Providence has framed in such a manner as to find either pleasure or delight, according to the nature of the object, in whatever regards the pur poses of our being. It is by imitation far more than by precept, that we learn everything; and what we learn thus, we acquire not only more effectually, but more pleasantly. This forms our manners, our opinions, our lives. It is one of the strongest links of society; it is a species of mutual compliance, which all men yield to each other, without con straint to themselves, and which is extremely flatter ing to al_l. Herein it is that painting and many other agreeable arts have laid one of the principal founda tions of their power. And since, by its influence on
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our manners and our passions, it is of such great consequence, I shall here venture to lay down a rule, which may inform us with a good degree of certainty when we are to attribute the power of the arts to imitation, or to our pleasure in the skill of the imita tor merely, and when to sympathy, or some other cause in conjunction with it. When the object repre sented in poetry or painting is such as we could have
no desire of seeing in the reality, then I may be sure that its power in poetry or painting is owing to the
power of imitation, and to no cause operating in the thing itself. So it is with most of the pieces which the painters call still-life. In these a cottage, a dung-hill, the meanest and most ordinary utensils of the kitchen, are capable of giving us pleasure. But when the object of the painting or poem is such as we should run to see if real, let it affect us with what odd sort of sense it will, we may rely upon it that the power of the poem or picture is more owing to the nature of the thing itself than to the mere effect of imitation, or to a consideration of the skill of the imitator, however excellent. Aristotle has spoken so much and so solidly upon the force of imitation in his Poetics, that it makes any further discourse upon this subject the less necessary.
SECTION XVII. AMBITION.
ALTHOUGH imitation is one of the great instruments used by Providence in bringing our nature towards its perfection, yet if men gave themselves up to imita tion entirely, and each followed the other, and so on
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in an eternal circle, it is easy to see that there never could be any improvement amongst them. Men must remain as brutes do, the same at the end that they are at this day, and that they were in the begin ning of the world. To prevent this, God has planted
in man a sense of ambition, and a satisfaction
from the contemplation of his excelling his fellows in something deemed valuable amongst them. It is this passion that drives men to all the ways we see in use of signalizing themselves, and that tends to make whatever excites in a man the idea of this distinction so very pleasant. It has been so strong as to make very miserable men take comfort, that they were su preme in misery; and certain it is that, where we cannot distinguish ourselves by something excellent, we begin to take a complacency in some singular infirmities, follies, or defects of one kind or other. It is on this principle that flattery is so prevalent; for flattery is no more than what raises in a man's mind an idea of a preference which he has not. Now, whatever, either on good or upon bad grounds, tends to raise a man in his own opinion, produces a sort of swelling and triumph, that is extremely grate ful to the human mind; and this swelling is never more perceived, nor operates with more force, than when without danger we are conversant with terrible objects ; the mind always claiming to itself some part of the dignity and importance of the things which it contemplates. Hence proceeds what Longinus has observed of that glorying and sense of inward great ness, that always fills the reader of such passages in poets and orators as are sublime: it is what every man must have felt in himself upon such occasions.
arising
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SE CTIO N XVIII. THE REOAPITULATION.
To draw the whole of what has been said into a few distinct p0ints:--The passions which belong to self-preservation turn on pain and danger; they are simply painful when their causes immediately affect us ; they are delightful when we have an idea of pain and danger, without being actually in such circum stances; this delight I have not called pleasure, be cause it turns on pain, and because it is different enough from any idea of positive pleasure. What ever excites this delight, I call mblinw. The pas sions belonging to self-preservation are the strongest of all the passions.
The second head to which the passions are referred with relation to their final cause, is society. There are two sorts of societies. The first the society of sex. The passion belonging to this called love, and contains mixture of lust; its object the beauty of women. The other the great society with man and all other animals. The passion sub servient to this called likewise love, but has no mixture of lust, and its object beauty; which name shall apply to all such qualities in things as
induce in us sense of affection and tenderness, or some other passion the most nearly resembling these. The passion of love has its rise in positive pleasure;
like all things which grow out of pleasure, capa ble of being mixed with mode of uneasiness, that is, when an idea of its object excited in the mind with an idea at the same time of having irretrievably lost
it. This mixed sense of pleasure have not called
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pain, because it turns upon actual pleasure, and be cause it both in its cause and in most of its effects, of nature altogether different.
Next to the general passion we have for society, to choice in which we are directed by the pleasure we have in the object, the particular passion under this head called sympathy has the greatest extent. The
nature of this passion to put us in the place of an other in whatever circumstance he in, and to affect us in like manner; so that this passion may, as the occasion requires, turn either on pain or pleasure; but with the modifications mentioned in some cases in Sect. 11. As to imitation and preference, nothing more need be said.
N X X. THE CoNCLUsIoN.
BELIEVED that an attempt to range and methodize some of our most leading passions would be good preparative to such an inquiry as we are going to make in the ensuing discourse. The passions have mentioned are almost the only ones which can be necessary to consider in our present design; though the variety of the passions great, and worthy, in every branch of that variety, of an attentive investi gation. The more accurately we search into the hu man mind, the stronger traces we everywhere find of His wisdom who made it. If discourse on the use of the parts of the body may be considered as hymn to the Creator the use of the passions, which are the organs of the mind, cannot be barren of praise to hiin, nor unproductive to ourselves of that noble and un_
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common union of science and admiration, which a con templation of the works of infinite wisdom alone can afford to a rational mind; whilst, referring to him whatever we find of right or good or fair in ourselves, discovering his strength and wisdom even in our own weakness and imperfection, honoring them where we discover them clearly, and adoring their profundity
where we are lost in our search, we may be inquis itive without impertinence, and elevated without pride; we may be admitted, if I may dare to say so, into the counsels of the Almighty by a consideration of his works. The elevation of the mind ought to be the principal end of all our studios ; which, if they do not in some measure effect, they are of very little ser vice to us. But, besides this great purpose, a consid eration of the rationale of our passions seems to me very necessary for all who would affcct them upon solid and sure principles. It is not enough to know
them in general; to affect them after a delicate man ner, or to judge properly of any work designed to af fect them, we should know the exact boundaries of their several jurisdictions; we should pursue them tluough all their variety of operations, and pierce into the inmost, and what might appear inaccessible
parts of our nature,
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Quod latet arcane non enarrabile fibrfi.
Without all this it is possible for a man, after a con fused manner sometimes to satisfy his own mind of the truth of his work; but he can never have a cer tain determinate rule to go by, nor can he ever make his propositions sufficiently clear to others. Poets, and orators, and painters, and those who cultivate other branches of the liberal arts, have, without this
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critical knowledge, succeeded well in their several provinces, and will succeed: as among artificers there are many machines made and even invented without any exact knowledge of the principles they are governed by. It own, not uncommon to be wrong in theory, and right in practice: and we are happy that so. Men often act right from their feelings, who afterwards reason but ill on them from principle but as impossible to avoid an attempt at such reasoning, and equally impossible to prevent its having some influence on our practice, surely worth taking some pains to have just, and founded on the basis of sure experience. We might expect that the artists themselves would have been our surest guides; but the artists have been too much occupied in the practice: the philosophers have done little; and what they have done, was mostly with view to their own schemes and systems; and as for those called critics, they have generally sought the rule of the arts in the wrong place; they sought among poems, pictures, engravings, statues, and
But art can never give the rules that make an art. This believe, the reason why art ists in general, and poets, principally, have been con fined in so narrow circle: they have been rather imitators of one another than of nature; and this with so faithful an uniformity, and to so remote an antiquity, that hard to say who gave the first model. Critics follow them, and therefore can do lit tle as guides. can judge but poorly of anything, whilst measure by no other standard than itself. The true standard of the arts in every man's pow er; and an easy observation of the most common, sometimes of the meanest things in nature, will give
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the truest lights, where the greatest sagacity and in dustry, that slights such observation, must leave us in the dark, or, what is worse, amuse and mislead us by false lights. In an inquiry it is almost everything
to be once in a right road. I am satisfied I have done but little by these observations considered in them selves; and I never should have taken the pains to digest them, much less should I have ever ventured to publish them, if I was not convinced that nothing tends more to the corruption of science than to suffer it to stagnate. These waters must be troubled, be tbre they can exert their virtues. A man who works beyond the surface of things, though he may be wrong himself, yet he clears the way for others, and may chance to make even his errors subservient to the cause of truth. In the following parts I shall inquire what things they are that cause in us the affections of the sublime and beautiful, as in this I have consid ered the affections themselves. I only desire one fa vor,--that no part of this discourse may be judged of by itself, and independently of the rest; for I am sensible I have not disposed my materials to abide the test of a captions controversy, but of a sober and even forgiving examination ; that they are not armed at all points for battle, but dressed to visit those who are willing to give a peaceful entrance to truth.
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PART II.
SECTION I.
or THE PASSION causnn BY THE SUBLIME.
THE passion caused by the great and sublime in nature, when those causes operate most powerfully, is astonishment: and astonishment is that state of the soul in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horror. * In this case the mind is so entirely filled with its object, that it cannot entertain any other, nor by consequence reason on that object which employs it. Hence arises the great power of the sublime, that, far from being produced by them, it anticipates our reasonings, and hurries us on by an irresistible force. Astonishment, as I have said, is the eifect of the sublime in its highest degree; the inferior effects are admiration, reverence, and respect
SECTION II. TERROR.
No passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear. '[For fear being an apprehension of pain or death, it operates in a manner that resembles actual pain. Whateve1' therefore is terrible, with regard to sight, is sublirne too, whether this cause of terror be endued with greatness of dimensions or not; for it is impossible to look on anything as trifling, or contemptible, that
"' Part I. sect. 3, 4, 7. T Part IV. sect.
felt. The same may be said of pain, and with equal
reason. can never persuade myself that pleasure and pain are mere relations, which can only exist as they are contrasted but think can discern clearly that there are positive pains and pleasures, which do not at all depend upon each other. Nothing more certain to my own feelings than this. There noth ing which can distinguish in my mind with more clearness than the three states, of indifference, of pleasure, and of pain. Every one of these can per ceive without any sort of idea of its relation to any thing else. Oaius afflicted with fit of the colic; this man actually in pain stretch Oaius upon the rack, he will feel much greater pain: but does this pain of the rack arise from the removal of any pleas ure? or the fit of the colic pleasure or pain
iust as we are pleased to consider it?
SECTION III.
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE REMOVAL OF PAIN AND POSITIVE PLEASURE.
WE shall carry this proposition yet step further. We shall venture to propose, that pain and pleasure are not only not necessarily dependent for their existence on their mutual diminution or removal, but that, in reality, the diminution or ceasing of pleasure does not
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operate like positive pain; and that the removal or diminution of pain, in its effect, has very little re semblance to positive pleasure! ' The former of these propositions will, I believe, be much more readily al lowed than the latter ; because it is very evident that
when it has run its career, sets us down very nearly where it found us. Pleasure of every kind quickly satisfies; and, when it is over, we re lapse into indiife_rence, or, rather, we fall into a soft tranquillity which is tinged with the agreeable color of the former sensation. I own it is not at first view so apparent that the removal of a great pain does not resemble positive pleasure : but let us recollect in what state we have found our minds upon escaping some im minent danger, or on being released from the severity of some cruel pain. _ We have on such occasions found, if I am not much mistaken, the temper of our minds in a tenor very remote from that which attends the pres ence of positive pleasure; we have found them in a state of much sobriety, impressed with a sense of awe, in a sort of tranquillity shadowed with horror. The fashion of the countenance and the gesture of the body on such occasions is so correspondent to this state of mind, that any person, a stranger to the cause of the appearance, would rather judge us under some consternation, than in the enjoyment of anything like positive pleasure.
'09 3' draw dvSp' tin; vrvxn/1'; )\e? B_r;, 50'1" ivl mirpy <I>(Ivra Karaxrsivas', ('1')\)\mv fgfxero dfipov,
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Iliad. S2. 480.
* Mr. Locke [Essay on Human Understanding, l. ii. c. 20, sect. 16,] thinks that the removal or lessening of a pain is considered and oper ates as a pleasure, and the loss or diminishing of pleasure as a pain It is this opinion which we consider here.
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" As when a wretch, who, conscious of his crime, Pursued for murder from his native clime,
Just gains some frontier, breathless, pale, amazed; All gaze, all wonder ! "
This striking appearance of the man whom Homer supposes to have just escaped an imminent danger, the sort of mixed passion of terror and surprise, with which he affects the spectators, paints very strongly the manner in which we find ourselves affected upon occasions any way similar. For when we have suf fered from any violent emotion, the mind naturally continues in something like the same condition, after the cause which first produced it has ceased to oper ate. The tossing of the sea remains after the storm; and when this remain of horror has entirely subsided, all the passion which the accident raised subsides along with it; and the mind returns to its usual state of indifference. In short, pleasure (I mean anything either in the inward sensation, or in the outward appearance, like pleasure from a positive cause) has never, I imagine, its origin from the re
moval of pain or danger.
SECTION IV.
OF DELIGHT AND PLEASURE, AS OPPOSED TO EACH OTHER.
BUT shall we therefore say, that the removal of pain or its diminution is always simply painful? or affirm that the cessation or the lessening of pleasure is always attended itself with a pleasure? By no means. What I advance is no more than this ; first, that there are pleasures and pains of a positive and
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independent nature; and, secondly, that the feeling which results from the ceasing or diminution of pain does not bear a sufficient resemblance to positive pleasure, to have it considered as of the same nature,
or to entitle it to be known by the same name ; and thirdly, that upon the same principle the removal or qualification of pleasure has no resemblance to posi tive pain. It is certain that the former feeling (the removal or moderation of pain) has something in it far from distressing, or disagreeable in its nature. This feeling, in many cases so agreeable, but in all so different from positive pleasure, has no name which I know; but that hinders not its being a very real one, and very different from all others. It is most cer tain, that every species of satisfaction or pleasure, how different soever in its manner of affecting, is of a positive nature in the mind of him who feels it. The affection is undoubtedly positive ; but the cause may be, as in this case it certainly sort of priva tion. And very reasonable that we should dis tinguish by some term two things so distinct in nature, as pleasure that such simply, and with out any relation, from that pleasure which cannot exist without relation, and that, too, relation to
pain. Very extraordinary would be, these affec tions, so distinguishable in their causes, so different in their effects, should be confounded with each other, because vulgar use has ranged them under the same general title. Whenever have occasion to speak of this species of relative pleasure, call delight and
shall take the best care can to use that word in no other sense. am satisfied the word not commonly used in this 'appropriated signification; but thought better to take up word already
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known, and to limit its signification, than to intro duce a new one, which would not perhaps incorpo rate so well with the language. I should never have presumed the least alteration in our words, if the nature of the language, framed for the purposes of business rather than those of philosophy, and the nature of my subject, that leads me out of the common track of discourse, did not in a manner necessitate me to it. I shall make use of this liberty with all possible caution. As I make use of the
word delight to express the sensation which accompa nies the removal of pain or danger, so, when I speak of positive pleasure, I shall for the most part call it simply pleasure.
SECTION V. JOY AND onmr.
IT must be observed, that the cessation of pleas ure affects the mind three ways. If it simply ceases after having continued a proper time, the effect is indiflerence ; if it be abruptly broken off, there ensues an uneasy sense called disappointment; if the object be so totally lost that there is no chance of enjoying it again, a passion arises in the mind which is called grief. Now there is none of these, not even grief, which is the most violent, that I think has any resemblance to positive pain. The person who grieves suffers his passion to grow upon him; he indulges he loves it: but this never happens in the case of actual pain, which no man ever willingly endured for any considerable time. That
grief should be willingly endured, though far from simply pleasing sensation, not so difficult to be
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understood. It is the nature of grief to keep its object perpetually in its eye, to present it in its most
pleasurable views, to repeat all the circumstances that attend even to the last minuteness; to go back to every particular enjoyment, to dwell upon each, and to find thousand new perfections in all, that were not sufficiently understood before; in grief, the pleasure still uppermost; and the affliction we
suffer has no resemblance to absolute pain, which always odious, and which we endeavor to shake off as soon as possible. The Odyssey of Homer, which abounds with so many natural and affecting images, has none more striking than those which Menelaus raises of the ealamitous fate of his friends, and his Own manner of feeling it. He owns, indeed, that he
often gives himself some intermission from such mel ancholy reflections; but he observes, to_o, that, mel ancholy as they are, they give him pleasure.
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" Still in short intervals of pleasing woe, Regardful of the friendly dues owe, to the glorious dead, forever dear, Indulge the tribute of a graze;/id tear. "
On the other hand, when we recover our health, when we escape an imminent danger, with joy that we are affected? The sense on these occasions
far from that smooth and voluptuous satisfaction which the assured prospect of pleasure bestows. The delight which arises from the modifications of pain confesses the stock from whence sprung, in its solid, strong, and severe nature.
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SECTION VI.
or THE PASSIONS WHICH BELONG T0 SELF-PRESERVATION.
Mosr of the ideas which are capable of making a powerful impression on the mind, whether simply of pain or pleasure, or of the modifications of those, may be reduced very nearly to these two heads, seZ_f-pres ervation, and society ; to the ends of one or the other of which all our passions are calculated to answer. The passions which concern self-preservation, turn mostly on pain or danger. The ideas of pain, sick ness, and death, fill the mind with strong emotions of horror ; but life and health, though they put us in a capacity of being affected with pleasure, make no such impression by the simple enjoyment. The pas sions therefore which are conversant about the pres ervation of the individual turn chiefly on pain and danger, and they are the most powerful of all the
? passions.
SECTION VII.
OF THE SUBLIME.
WHATEVER is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime ; that productive of the strongest emotion which the mind capable of feel ing. say the strongest emotion, because am sat isfied the ideas of pain are much more powerful than those which enter on the part of pleasure. Without all doubt, the torments which we may be made to
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suffer are much greater in their effect on the body and mind, than any pleasures which the most learned voluptuary could suggest, or than_the liveliest imagi nation, and the most sound and exquisitely sensible body, could enjoy. Nay, I am in great doubt whether any man could be found, who would earn a life of the most perfect satisfaction at the price of ending it in the torments, which justice inflicted in a few hours on the late unfortunate regicide in France. But as pain is stronger in its operation than pleasure, so death is in general a much more affecting idea than pain ; because there are very few pains, however ex quisite, which are not preferred to death : nay, what generally makes pain itself, if I may say so, more painful, that considered as an emissary of this king of terrors. When danger or pain press too near ly, they are incapable of giving any delight, and are simply terrible; but at certain distances, and with certain modifications, they may be, and they are, de lightful, as we every day experience. The cause of this shall endeavor to investigate hereafter.
SECTION VIII.
or rm: PASSIONS wrncn snrono ro SOCIETY.
THE other head under which class our passions, is that of society, which may be divided into two sorts. 1. The society of the sexes, which answers the pur pose of propagation; and next, that more general society, which we have with men and with other animals, and which we may in some sort be said to have even with the inanimate world. The passions
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belonging to the preservation of the individual turn wholly on pain and danger: those which belong to generation have their origin in gratifications and pleas ures ; the pleasure most directly belonging to this pur pose is of a lively character, rapturous and violent, and confessedly the highest pleasure of sense; yet the absence of this so great an enjoyment scarce amounts to an uneasiness; and, except at particular times, I do not think it aifects at all. When men describe in what manner they are affected by pain and danger, they do not dwell on the pleasure of health and the comfort of security, and then lament the loss of these satisfactions: the whole turns upon the actual pains and horrors which they endure. But if you listen to the complaints of a forsaken lover, you observe that he insists largely on the pleasures which he enjoyed, or hoped to enjoy, and on the perfection of the ob
ject of his desires; it is the loss which is always up permost in his mind. The violent effects produced by love, which has sometimes been even wrought up to madness, is no objection to the rule which we seek to establish. When men have suffered their imagi nations to be long affected with any idea, it so wholly engrosses them as to shut out by degrees almost every other, and to break down every partition of the mind which would confine it. Any idea is sufficient for the purpose, as is evident from the infinite variety of causes, which give rise to madness: but this at most can only prove, that the passion of love is capa ble of producing very extraordinary effects, not that
its extraordinary emotions have any connection with "
positive pain.
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SECTION IX.
THE FINAL CAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PASSIONS BELONGING TO SELF-PRESERVATION, AND THOSE WHICH REGARD THE SOCIETY OF THE BEXES.
THE final cause of the difference in character be tween the passions which regard self-preservation, and those which are directed to the multiplication of the species, will illustrate the foregoing remarks yet further; and it imagine, worthy of observation even upon its own account. As the performance of our duties of every kind depends upon life, and the performing them with vigor and efficacy depends upon health, we are very strongly affected with whatever threatens the destruction of either: but as we were not made to acquiesce in life and health, the simple enjoyment of them not attended with any real pleasure, lest, satisfied with that, we should give our selves over to indolencc and inaction. On the other hand, the generation of mankind great purpose, and requisite that men should be animated to
the pursuit of by some great incentive. It there fore attended with very high pleasure; but as
by no means designed to be our constant business,
not fit that the absence of this pleasure should be attended with any considerable pain. The difference between men and brutes, in this point, seems to be remarkable. Men are at all times pretty equally dis posed to the pleasures of love, because they are to be guided by reason in the time and manner of indulg
ing them. Had any great pain arisen from the want
of this satisfaction, reason, am afraid, would find
great difficulties in the performance of its office. But vor. . 1.
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brutes that obey laws, in the execution of which their own reason has but little share, have their stated seasons; at such times it is not improbable that the sensation from the want is very troublesome, because the end must be then answered, or be missed in many, perhaps forever ; as the inclination returns only with
its season.
SECTION X. or BEAUTY.
THE passion which belongs to generation, merely as such, is lust only. This is evident in brutes, whose passions are more unmixed, and which pursue their purposes more directly than ours. The only distinction they observe with regard to their mates, is that of sex. It is true, that they stick severally to their own species in preference to all others. But this preference, I imagine, does not arise from any sense of beauty which they find in their species, as Mr. Addison supposes, but from a law of some other kind, to which they are subject; and this we may fairly conclude, from their apparent want of choice amongst those objects to which the barriers of their
species have confined them. But man, who is a crea ture adapted to a greater variety and intricacy of relation, connects with the general passion the idea of some social qualities, which direct and heighten the appetite which he has in common with all other animals; and as he is not designed like them to live at large, it is fit that he should have some thing to create a preference, and fix his choice ; and this in general should be some sensible quality; as no other can so quickly, so powerfully, or so surely
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produce its effect. The object therefore of this mixed passion, which we call love, is the beauty of the sex. Men are carried to the sex in general, as it is the sex, and by the common law of nature ; but they are attached to particulars by personal beauty. I call beauty a social quality; for where women and men, and not only they, but when other animals give us a sense of joy and pleasure in beholding them
(and there are many that do so), they inspire us with sen
timents of tenderness and affection towards their persons ; we like to have them near us, and we enter willingly into a kind of relation with them, unless we should have strong reasons to the contrary. But to what end, in many cases, this was designed, I am unable to discover; for I see no greater reason for a connection between man and several animals who are attired in so engaging a manner, than between him and some others who entirely want this attraction, or possess it in a far weaker degree. But it is probable that Providence did not make even this distinction, but with a view to some great end ; though we can not perceive distinctly what it as his wisdom
not our wisdom, nor our ways his ways.
T N XI. SOCIETY AND SOLITUDE.
THE second branch of the social passions that which administers to society in general. With regard to this, observe, that society, merely as society,
without any" particular heightenings, gives us no pos itive pleasure in the enjoyment; but absolute and entire solitude, that the total and perpetual exclu
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sion from all society, is as great a positive pain as can almost be conceived. Therefore in the balance be tween the pleasure of general society, and the pain of absolute solitude, pain is the predominant idea.
But the pleasure of any particular social enjoyment out weighs very considerably the uneasiness caused by the want of that particular enjoyment; so that the strongest sensations relative to the habitudes ofpar ticular society are sensations of pleasure. Good com pany, lively conversations, and the endearments of friendship, fill the mind with great pleasure ; a tem porary solitude, on the other hand, is itself agreeable. This may perhaps prove that we are creatures de signed for contemplation as well as action; since solitude as well as society has its pleasures; as from the former observation we may discern, that an entire life of solitude contradicts the purposes of our being, since death itself is scarcely an idea of more terror.
'
UNDER this denomination of society, the passions are of a complicated kind, and branch out into a vari ety of forms, agreeably to that variety of ends they are to serve in the great chain of society. The three principal links in this chain are sympathy, imitation, and ambition.
? SECTION XII. SYMPATHY, IMITATION, AND A'MIBITION
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SECTION XIII. BYMPATHY.
117
IT is by the first of these passions that we enter into the concerns of others; that we are moved as they are moved, and are never suffered to be indif ferent spectators of almost anything which men can do or suffer. For sympathy must be considered as a sort of substitution, by which we are put into the place of another man, and affected in many respects as he is affected : so that this passion may either par take of the nature of those which regard self-preser vation, and turning upon pain may be a source of the sublime; or it may turn upon ideas of
and then whatever has been said of the social affec tions, whether they regard society in general, or only
some particular modes of may be applicable here. by this principle chiefly that poetry, painting,
and other affecting arts, transfuse their passions from one breast to another, and are often capable of graft ing delight on wretchedness, misery, and death itself. It common observation, that objects which in the reality would shock, are in tragical, and such like representations, the source of very high species of
? This, taken as fact, has been the cause of much reasoning. The satisfaction has been com monly attributed, first, to the comfort we receive in
considering that so melancholy story no more than fiction and, next, to the contemplation of our own freedom from the evils which we see represented.
am afraid practice much too common in in quiries of this nature, to attribute the cause of feel ings which merely arise from the mechanical struc
pleasure.
pleasure;
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ture of our bodies, or from the natural frame and constitution of our minds, to certain conclusions of the reasoning faculty on the objects presented to us; for I should imagine, that the influence of reason in producing our passions is nothing near so extensive as it is commonly believed.
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SECTION XIV.
THE EFFECTS OF SYMPATHY IN THE DISTRESSES OF OTHERS
T0 examine this point concerning the effect of tragedy in a proper manner, we must previously con sider 11ow we are affected by the feelings of our fel low-creatures in circumstances of real distress. I am convinced we have a degree of delight, and that no small one, in the real misfortunes and pains of others; for let the affection be what it will in ap pearance, if it does not make us shun such objects, if on the contrary it induces us to approach them, if it makes us dwell upon them, in this case I conceive we must have a delight or pleasure of some species or other in contemplating objects of this kind. Do we not read the authentic histories of scenes of this nature with as much pleasure as romances or poems, where the incidents are fictitious? The prosperity of no empire, nor the grandeur of no king, can so agreeably affect in the reading, as the ruin of the state of Macedon, and the distress of its unhappy prince. Such a catastrophe touches us in history as much as the destruction of Troy does in fable. Our
delight, in cases of this kind, is very greatly height ened, if the sufferer be some excellent person who
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sinks under an unworthy fortune. Scipio and Cato are both virtuous characters ; but we are more deeply affected by the violent death of the one, and the ruin of the great cause he adhered to, than with the de served triumphs and uninterrupted prosperity of the other : for terror is a passion which always produces delight when it does not press too closely; and pity is a passion accompanied with pleasure, because it arises from love and social affection. Whenever we are formed by nature to any active purpose, the pas sion which animates us to it is attended with delight, or a pleasure of some kind, let the subject-matter be what it will; and as our Creator has designed that we shouldbe united by the bond of sympathy, he has
? that bond by a proportionable delight; and there most where our sympathy is most wanted,
-_---in the distresses of others. If this passion was
simply painful, we would shun with the greatest care all persons and places that could excite such a pas sion; as some, who are so far gone in indolence as not to endure any strong impression, actually do. But the case is widely different with the greater part of mankind ; there is no spectacle we so eagerly pur sue, as that of some uncommon and grievous calam ity ; so that whether the misfortune is before our eyes, or whether they are turned back to it in history,
it always touches with delight. This is not an un mixed delight, but blended with no small uneasiness. The delight we have in such things hinders us from shunning scenes of misery ; and the pain we feel prompts us to relieve ourselves in relieving those who suffer; and all this antecedent to any reasoning,
by an instinct that works us to its own purposes with out our concurrence.
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SECTION XV.
OF THE EFFECTS OF TRAGEDY
IT is thus in real calamities. In imitated dis tresses the only difference is the pleasure resulting from the effects of imitation; for it is never so per fect, but we can perceive it is imitation, and on that principle are somewhat pleased with it. And indeed in some cases we derive as much or more pleasure from that source than from the thing itself. But then I imagine we shall be much mistaken if we attribute any considerable part of our satisfaction in tragedy to the consideration that tragedy is a deceit, and its representations no realities. The nearer it approaches the reality, and the further it removes us from all idea of fiction, the more perfect is its
? But be its power of what kind it will, it never
power.
approaches to what it represents. Choose a day on which to represent the most sublime and affecting tragedy 'we have; appoint the most favorite actors; spare no cost upon the scenes and decorations; unite the greatest efforts of poetry, painting, and music; and when you have collected your audience, just at the moment when their minds are erect with expec tation, let it be reported that a state criminal of high rank is on the point of being executed in the adjoin ing square; in a moment the emptiness of the thea tre would demonstrate the comparative weakness of the imitative arts, and proclaim the triumph of the real sympathy. I believe that this notion of our having a simple pain in the reality, yet a delight in the representation, arises from hence, that we do not sufficiently distinguish what we would by no means
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choose to do, from what we should be eager enough to see if it was once done. We delight in seeing things, which so far from doing, our heartiest wishes would be to see redressed. This noble capital, the pride of England and of Europe, I believe no man is so strangely wicked as to desire to see destroyed by a conflagration or an earthquake, though he should be
removed himself to the greatest distance from the danger. But suppose such a fatal accident to have happened, what numbers from all parts would crowd to behold the ruins, and amongst them many who
would have been content never to have seen London in its glory! Nor is either in real or fictitious distresses, our immunity from them which produces our delight; in my own mind can discover nothing like it. apprehend that this mistake owing to sort of sophism, by which we are frequently imposed upon arises from our not distinguishing between what indeed necessary condition to our doing or suffering anything in general, and what the cause of some particular act. If man kills me with sword, necessary condition to this that we should have been both of us alive before the fact; and yet would be absurd to say that our being both living creatures was the cause of his crime and of my death. So certain that absolutely necessary my life should be out of any imminent hazard, before
can take delight in the sulferings of others, real or imaginary, or indeed in anything else from any cause whatsoever. But then sophism to argue from thence that this immunity the cause of my delight either on these or on any occasions. No one can distinguish such cause of satisfaction in his own mind,I believe nay, when we do not suffer any very
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acute pain, nor are exposed to any imminent danger of our lives, we can feel for others, whilst we suffer ourselves ; and often then most when we are softened by affliction ; we see with pity even distresses which we would accept in the place of our own.
SEOTION XVI. IMITATION.
THE second passion belonging to society is imita tion, or, if you will, a desire of imitating, and conse quently a pleasure in it. This passion arises from much the same cause with sympathy. For as sym pathy makes us take a concern in whatever men feel, so this affection prompts us to copy whatever they do; and consequently we have a pleasure in imitat ing, and in whatever belongs to imitation merely as it is such, without any intervention of the reasoning faculty, but solely from our natural constitution, which Providence has framed in such a manner as to find either pleasure or delight, according to the nature of the object, in whatever regards the pur poses of our being. It is by imitation far more than by precept, that we learn everything; and what we learn thus, we acquire not only more effectually, but more pleasantly. This forms our manners, our opinions, our lives. It is one of the strongest links of society; it is a species of mutual compliance, which all men yield to each other, without con straint to themselves, and which is extremely flatter ing to al_l. Herein it is that painting and many other agreeable arts have laid one of the principal founda tions of their power. And since, by its influence on
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our manners and our passions, it is of such great consequence, I shall here venture to lay down a rule, which may inform us with a good degree of certainty when we are to attribute the power of the arts to imitation, or to our pleasure in the skill of the imita tor merely, and when to sympathy, or some other cause in conjunction with it. When the object repre sented in poetry or painting is such as we could have
no desire of seeing in the reality, then I may be sure that its power in poetry or painting is owing to the
power of imitation, and to no cause operating in the thing itself. So it is with most of the pieces which the painters call still-life. In these a cottage, a dung-hill, the meanest and most ordinary utensils of the kitchen, are capable of giving us pleasure. But when the object of the painting or poem is such as we should run to see if real, let it affect us with what odd sort of sense it will, we may rely upon it that the power of the poem or picture is more owing to the nature of the thing itself than to the mere effect of imitation, or to a consideration of the skill of the imitator, however excellent. Aristotle has spoken so much and so solidly upon the force of imitation in his Poetics, that it makes any further discourse upon this subject the less necessary.
SECTION XVII. AMBITION.
ALTHOUGH imitation is one of the great instruments used by Providence in bringing our nature towards its perfection, yet if men gave themselves up to imita tion entirely, and each followed the other, and so on
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in an eternal circle, it is easy to see that there never could be any improvement amongst them. Men must remain as brutes do, the same at the end that they are at this day, and that they were in the begin ning of the world. To prevent this, God has planted
in man a sense of ambition, and a satisfaction
from the contemplation of his excelling his fellows in something deemed valuable amongst them. It is this passion that drives men to all the ways we see in use of signalizing themselves, and that tends to make whatever excites in a man the idea of this distinction so very pleasant. It has been so strong as to make very miserable men take comfort, that they were su preme in misery; and certain it is that, where we cannot distinguish ourselves by something excellent, we begin to take a complacency in some singular infirmities, follies, or defects of one kind or other. It is on this principle that flattery is so prevalent; for flattery is no more than what raises in a man's mind an idea of a preference which he has not. Now, whatever, either on good or upon bad grounds, tends to raise a man in his own opinion, produces a sort of swelling and triumph, that is extremely grate ful to the human mind; and this swelling is never more perceived, nor operates with more force, than when without danger we are conversant with terrible objects ; the mind always claiming to itself some part of the dignity and importance of the things which it contemplates. Hence proceeds what Longinus has observed of that glorying and sense of inward great ness, that always fills the reader of such passages in poets and orators as are sublime: it is what every man must have felt in himself upon such occasions.
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SE CTIO N XVIII. THE REOAPITULATION.
To draw the whole of what has been said into a few distinct p0ints:--The passions which belong to self-preservation turn on pain and danger; they are simply painful when their causes immediately affect us ; they are delightful when we have an idea of pain and danger, without being actually in such circum stances; this delight I have not called pleasure, be cause it turns on pain, and because it is different enough from any idea of positive pleasure. What ever excites this delight, I call mblinw. The pas sions belonging to self-preservation are the strongest of all the passions.
The second head to which the passions are referred with relation to their final cause, is society. There are two sorts of societies. The first the society of sex. The passion belonging to this called love, and contains mixture of lust; its object the beauty of women. The other the great society with man and all other animals. The passion sub servient to this called likewise love, but has no mixture of lust, and its object beauty; which name shall apply to all such qualities in things as
induce in us sense of affection and tenderness, or some other passion the most nearly resembling these. The passion of love has its rise in positive pleasure;
like all things which grow out of pleasure, capa ble of being mixed with mode of uneasiness, that is, when an idea of its object excited in the mind with an idea at the same time of having irretrievably lost
it. This mixed sense of pleasure have not called
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pain, because it turns upon actual pleasure, and be cause it both in its cause and in most of its effects, of nature altogether different.
Next to the general passion we have for society, to choice in which we are directed by the pleasure we have in the object, the particular passion under this head called sympathy has the greatest extent. The
nature of this passion to put us in the place of an other in whatever circumstance he in, and to affect us in like manner; so that this passion may, as the occasion requires, turn either on pain or pleasure; but with the modifications mentioned in some cases in Sect. 11. As to imitation and preference, nothing more need be said.
N X X. THE CoNCLUsIoN.
BELIEVED that an attempt to range and methodize some of our most leading passions would be good preparative to such an inquiry as we are going to make in the ensuing discourse. The passions have mentioned are almost the only ones which can be necessary to consider in our present design; though the variety of the passions great, and worthy, in every branch of that variety, of an attentive investi gation. The more accurately we search into the hu man mind, the stronger traces we everywhere find of His wisdom who made it. If discourse on the use of the parts of the body may be considered as hymn to the Creator the use of the passions, which are the organs of the mind, cannot be barren of praise to hiin, nor unproductive to ourselves of that noble and un_
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common union of science and admiration, which a con templation of the works of infinite wisdom alone can afford to a rational mind; whilst, referring to him whatever we find of right or good or fair in ourselves, discovering his strength and wisdom even in our own weakness and imperfection, honoring them where we discover them clearly, and adoring their profundity
where we are lost in our search, we may be inquis itive without impertinence, and elevated without pride; we may be admitted, if I may dare to say so, into the counsels of the Almighty by a consideration of his works. The elevation of the mind ought to be the principal end of all our studios ; which, if they do not in some measure effect, they are of very little ser vice to us. But, besides this great purpose, a consid eration of the rationale of our passions seems to me very necessary for all who would affcct them upon solid and sure principles. It is not enough to know
them in general; to affect them after a delicate man ner, or to judge properly of any work designed to af fect them, we should know the exact boundaries of their several jurisdictions; we should pursue them tluough all their variety of operations, and pierce into the inmost, and what might appear inaccessible
parts of our nature,
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Quod latet arcane non enarrabile fibrfi.
Without all this it is possible for a man, after a con fused manner sometimes to satisfy his own mind of the truth of his work; but he can never have a cer tain determinate rule to go by, nor can he ever make his propositions sufficiently clear to others. Poets, and orators, and painters, and those who cultivate other branches of the liberal arts, have, without this
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critical knowledge, succeeded well in their several provinces, and will succeed: as among artificers there are many machines made and even invented without any exact knowledge of the principles they are governed by. It own, not uncommon to be wrong in theory, and right in practice: and we are happy that so. Men often act right from their feelings, who afterwards reason but ill on them from principle but as impossible to avoid an attempt at such reasoning, and equally impossible to prevent its having some influence on our practice, surely worth taking some pains to have just, and founded on the basis of sure experience. We might expect that the artists themselves would have been our surest guides; but the artists have been too much occupied in the practice: the philosophers have done little; and what they have done, was mostly with view to their own schemes and systems; and as for those called critics, they have generally sought the rule of the arts in the wrong place; they sought among poems, pictures, engravings, statues, and
But art can never give the rules that make an art. This believe, the reason why art ists in general, and poets, principally, have been con fined in so narrow circle: they have been rather imitators of one another than of nature; and this with so faithful an uniformity, and to so remote an antiquity, that hard to say who gave the first model. Critics follow them, and therefore can do lit tle as guides. can judge but poorly of anything, whilst measure by no other standard than itself. The true standard of the arts in every man's pow er; and an easy observation of the most common, sometimes of the meanest things in nature, will give
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the truest lights, where the greatest sagacity and in dustry, that slights such observation, must leave us in the dark, or, what is worse, amuse and mislead us by false lights. In an inquiry it is almost everything
to be once in a right road. I am satisfied I have done but little by these observations considered in them selves; and I never should have taken the pains to digest them, much less should I have ever ventured to publish them, if I was not convinced that nothing tends more to the corruption of science than to suffer it to stagnate. These waters must be troubled, be tbre they can exert their virtues. A man who works beyond the surface of things, though he may be wrong himself, yet he clears the way for others, and may chance to make even his errors subservient to the cause of truth. In the following parts I shall inquire what things they are that cause in us the affections of the sublime and beautiful, as in this I have consid ered the affections themselves. I only desire one fa vor,--that no part of this discourse may be judged of by itself, and independently of the rest; for I am sensible I have not disposed my materials to abide the test of a captions controversy, but of a sober and even forgiving examination ; that they are not armed at all points for battle, but dressed to visit those who are willing to give a peaceful entrance to truth.
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PART II.
SECTION I.
or THE PASSION causnn BY THE SUBLIME.
THE passion caused by the great and sublime in nature, when those causes operate most powerfully, is astonishment: and astonishment is that state of the soul in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horror. * In this case the mind is so entirely filled with its object, that it cannot entertain any other, nor by consequence reason on that object which employs it. Hence arises the great power of the sublime, that, far from being produced by them, it anticipates our reasonings, and hurries us on by an irresistible force. Astonishment, as I have said, is the eifect of the sublime in its highest degree; the inferior effects are admiration, reverence, and respect
SECTION II. TERROR.
No passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear. '[For fear being an apprehension of pain or death, it operates in a manner that resembles actual pain. Whateve1' therefore is terrible, with regard to sight, is sublirne too, whether this cause of terror be endued with greatness of dimensions or not; for it is impossible to look on anything as trifling, or contemptible, that
"' Part I. sect. 3, 4, 7. T Part IV. sect.
