You tik it nothing that you appeared very
ignorant
of at relates to Valour, provided I appear, as igno- t as you j you, regard nothing but that, and you eve your selfto be.
Plato - 1701 - Works - a
Laches: Or, of Valour.
3:13
thingsofourFriendDamon,andthatDamonisthe intimate Friend oSHrodicus the ablest of all the So phists for that kind of Distinctions.
Lac. Oh, Socrates, itbecomesaSophistverywell to make Ostentation of his vain Subtilties; but for a ManlikeNicias,whomtheAthenianshavechosen f0 fitattheHelm of theRepublick
Soc. MydearLaches,itwellbecomesaManwho hathsogreatAffairsupon hisHands,tostudytobe more learned and more wife than others; wherefore I-thinkthatNiciasdeservestobeheard, and thatwe ought at least to enquire into his Reasons why he defines Valour thus.
Lac. Enquire then as much as you please, So crates.
Soc. 'TiswhatIamgoingtodo;butdon'tthink that I acquit you of it, and that you sliall not assist meinsomethings:Listenalittlethen,andtake heedto'WhatIamgoingtofay.
Lac. I stiall do so, since it pleases you.
Soc. That issofarwell:Now come on, Nicias-, Eray you tell us, in resuming the Matter from the eginning ; Is it not true, that at first w e considered
Valour * as a part of Virtue?
Nic 'Tistrue.
Sac. Did not you answer, that Valour was certain
ly but one part, and that there were other parts, whichalltogetherwerecalledbytheName ofVir tue ?
Nic. How couldIfayotherwise?
Soc. You say then as I do: for, besides Valour, I acknowledge there are other parts of Virtue, as Temperance, Justice, and many others? , don't you
also acknowledge them ?
Nic. DoubtlessIdo.
Soc. That's good, we are agreed upon this Point:
* Socrates would prove, that Virtue being one, he, w h o has
not all the parts that compose it, cannot brag of being vir tuous. m T
003 Let
? ? ai$
Ladies: Or, of Vahw.
Let us go then to thoie things which you call ter
rible? ,andwhereinyoufayaManmayshewsome
A s s u r a n c e a n d C o n f i d e n c e ; let u s e x a m i n e t h e m w e l l ,
lest it happen that you understand them one w a y a n d w e a n o t h e r ? , w e a r e g o i n g t o t e l l y o u w h a t w e
thinkofthem. Ifyoudon'tagreewithusyouwill correctus. We believethethingswhichyou call
terrible are iuch as inspire People with Terror and Fear? ,andthatthosewhereinyousaywemay shew
some Assurance are such as do not inspire us with thatFear: Now thosethatcauseFear,areneither things that have already happened, nor things that actuallyhappen,butsuchaswe expectj forFear
isonlytheExpectationofanEviltocome. Are notyouofthisOpinion,Laches? >>-:<<? ? ? -> *? -
Lac. Yes,yesperfectly.
Soc. ThisthenisourSentiment,Nicks. Bythose things that are terrible, we understand the Evils to come j and by the things wherein one may shew some assurance, we understand those things which arealsotocome, and which appear good, or,at least,don'tappeartobeil* Do youadmitourDe> finition or not? > ,;. . . :. -.
Nic. Yes, yes, I admit it.
Soc. Then it is the Knowledge ofthose things whichyoucallValour? . ? . -. . <? ? ;<?
Nic. Yes, it is.
Soc. Let us go to a third Point, and see if w e can agreeuponthattoo. . ? . ;,. ? . ? . . ? ,;?
,Nic, What isthat?
Soc Youshallhearitpresently. We fay,thatis,
Laches and I, that in all things * Science never dis-. fers from it self3 it is not one thing, as to things past,
* Socrates would make tycias understand, that in defining Valour to be the Knowledge of things^ that are terrible, that is to fay, of Evils to come, he has not been large enough in his Pefinition; for Knowledge extending itselfto what ispast, whatispresent,andwhatisto,come,Valourmusthaveall thatextentifitbetrulyaScience. ThenWe mustfay,that itistheKnowledgeofalltheEvilandofalltheGoodthat
. . . . . . . ha*
? ? Laches : Or> of Pahar.
a 15
? ? past,toknowhowtheypassed? ,another,astothe
thingspresent,toknowhowtheyareandhowthey happen -, and another upon the things to come, to knowhowtheywillbeandhowtheywillfallout; but it is always the lame : For example as to Health, Let the Time be what itwill,Phisick never differs from it self, it is always the fame Art of Phi- lick that judges of it* and that fees what has been, what is and what will be healthfei-etunhealthful.
Husbandry in the lame manner judges of what has come,ofwhatisnowcomeandofwhatwi^come. And, as to War, you can very well testifie, and will
bebelieved, thattheArtofaGeneralextendst,self
to all, to what is past, what is present and to what istocome*thathehasnooccasionfortheArtof Divination, and that on the contrary he has it at command, asknowingbetterthanit,whathappens? ''Jj>> andwhat oughttohappen. IsnottheLaw it:selftmmtmUL expressinthat? ForitcommandsnotthattheDivi-tbeGmtrd,
nershallcommand theGeneral, but that theGene-hewoM
ralshallcommandtheDiviner. Isnotthiswhat'? ? ? ?
w e fay, Laches ? pis. Lac. Yes certainly, Socrates.
Soc. And you, Mcia*, do you also say as we do,
and do you agree, that Knowledge, being always the fame, judges equally of what ispast, what ispre
sent,andwhattocome? Me. Yes,Ifayasyoufay? ,forIthinkitcannot
be otherwise. ? __. . , Soc. You say then, most excellent Nicias, that
Valour is the Knowledge of things that are terrible,
andofthosethatarenotso? Isnotthatwhatyou
fey> . '-: . ?
Nic. Yes. ?
Soc. Havenotweagreed,thatthoset|pgsthat areterribleareEvilstocome-, andthosethingsthat Oo4 ? are
hath been, that is, and that shallbe ; forValour ought no less tojudgeofwhathasbeen,apdofwhatis,thanofwhatwill b e . B m ;o f w h a t u s e is it? T h a t S << rat a w i l l n a i f g p l a i n b y a n d
by.
? ? a16 Laches:Or,ofValour.
arenotterrible,andinwhichwecanshewsomeas
surance^ issome Good thatwe expect? <,jV/s. We areagreeduponit.
Son. And that Knowledge does not extend itse^f onlytowhat isto. come, butalsotothingspresent andtowhatispast;. . ', . i,
JV? V. Iagreeinthat. ,', . ? '. ,
i&? A Then it,isnot true, that Valour is only the Knowledge of 'things that are terrible, and of those thatarenotterribler,foritdoesnotonlyknow the GoodandtheEvilthatistocome,butitsJurisdi ction,extends as far as that of other Sciences, and it also judges of what ispast an4 of what ispresent, and,inaword, ofallthingswhethertheybenearat hand, or at a distance.
? A7v. That seems to be true.
Soc. Then you have only defined to us the third
part of Valopr, but w e desir'd you to give us a full definitionofit:Atpresentitseemstome, that,ac cording to,your Principles, 'tis the Knowledge not only of things that are terrible and not terrible, * but alsoofalmostalltheGood and alltheEvilatwhat distancesoevertheybefromusbeforeorafter. Have you then changed your Sentiment, Niciaf ? what do youfay? '. ',. , . . .
. ? Njc. _Itappearstome, thatValourhasalltheex tent you fay.
Sac. That being so, do you think that a valiant M a n wants any part of Virtue, if it be true, that he knows alltheGood andalltheEvilsthathavebeen, that aje, and that may be? and do you believe, that such a M a n can want Temperance, Justice, and
^//f/<</;eSa;. ctiry>hetowhom aloneitbelongstousea vouUmt piiidentPrecautionagainstalltheEvilsthatmay
* focrates will have ys understand that Valour puts us in 4 condition to attract the Good and to avoid the Evil that may happentousonthepartofManandonthepartofGod; foritmay servetocorrectwhatispair,todisposewellof what ispresent, and to use wise Precautions against what ii tocome. ItissosolidaPrinciplethatnothingcanshakeit. "
"? hap. :
? ? Laches:Qr, ofValour. 217
happentohimonthepartofManand vdow consiststhenin m thepastofGod, andtoputhimself P>>>nnins. **<<**K <<*
inaconditiontodrawfromthenceall S ^ l ^ t theGoodthatcanbeexpected, seeing w,mtonlyonthepartof heknowshowheoughttobehavehim- -m>>i>malsoo>>thefart
selfbothtawardsManandtowardsGcd. ? fGod-
Nic,Whatyoulaynow, Socrates-seemstohave somethinginit. '? '? * ?
Sot. Valour then is not a part of Virtue , but is Virtueinallitsparts? 'T ', :
Mr. Soitseemstome.
5"ctr. Y e t w e s a i d , t h a t i t w a s b u t a p a r t o f i t . Nic. W e did so.
Soc. And what we said then does not new appear 0 be true.
Me Iownit.
Soc- And consequently, Nicias, w e have not yet i)und out what Valour is?
Nic. * Iam of your mind.
Lac. Yet I should have thought, m y dear J^icias^ rtheContemptyoushew'dofme,whenIwasan?
reringSocm^ thatyouwouldhavefounditout
tterthananother,andIhadgreathopes, that,with
2assistanceofDamon'shighWisdom, you would ve accomplished itvery well. '.
Nic. Cheerup,Lacbes,thatisadmirable.
You tik it nothing that you appeared very ignorant of at relates to Valour, provided I appear, as igno- t as you j you, regard nothing but that, and you eve your selfto be. no way blameahle, when you, 3me for aCompanion,'inthatIgnorancewhich
X'das does not comprehend, that which Socrates makes almost touch with his Finger , that Virtue cannot be di- ,and thateveryoneofitspartsisVirtueintire. Valour :without Temperance,SanctityandJustice,andthereis leofthosewithoutValour. Buthowcomesitaboutthat
and LachesdonotunderstandthisLanguage? Tis be- they were us'dtotheunhappyDistinctionsofSophists, ad filled theirMindswiththeirfalseIdea's,andwho had
Virtue bydividingitandcuttingitinpieces. Thiswilj lained more atlarge inthefollowingDialogue,
? ? ii t Laches: Or, of Faker.
? issoscandalous. toMen ofQuality: But that'sthe
humour of Men, they never look to themselves, hot jkrffa? healwaystoothers. Formypart,IthinkIamanswer- *>>$*rti edindifferentlywell1. IfIamdeceivedinanything, Uttn that j ,jon>>t pretend t0 be infallible, I shall undeceive m y
f^Cself, bytakingInstruaions,whetheritbefromD* <<fcMath, mon,whomyouwouldIbwillinglyridicule,tho'you neversaw,norknewhimjorfromanyothers*and
whenIamwellinstructed,Iwillcommunicatemy knowledgetoyou? ,forIam notenvious,andyouseem
tome tohavegreatneedofInstruction.
Lac. And foryou, Niciat, ifwe may believeyou, you'll suddenly be the eighth wife M a n : In the mean
time,for all this fine Reaibning,I advise Lysimacbvx & Melesiasto sendusandourgoodCouncils for the Education of their Children, a going, and if they'll believe me, as I have just now said, they'll fix only upon Socrates$ for, asformy part, ifmy Children
were old enough, I would do so.
Nic Oh! asforthatIagreewithyou. IfSocrates
will take care of our Children, w e need not look out foranotherMaster, andIam readytogivehim my Son Niceratus, if he will be so good as to take chargeofhim:Butalways,when1speaktohimof that, he recommends me to other Masters and refu sesme hisAssistance. Try thenLy/imacbus, ifyou can have any more Power over him, and if he will
have so much Complaisance foryou.
Lys. It would bean Act of Justice: * Because, for
mypart,IwoulddoforhimwhatIwouldnotdo formanyothers. Whatdoyoufaythen,Soerates? will you suffer your self to be prevailed upon, and
willyou takechargeoftheseChildrentomake them virtuous ?
8oc. HemustbeaverystrangeandcruelMan that
* This Passage must not be translated as des Serres translated it,/Utouldgivehimmore. Lysimachtuhadnothoughtsof(peak ingofaSalary:Thatwould havetoomuch offendedSocrates, who didnotteachforMoneyjnordoestheGreekExpression bear more than I have said.
? will
? ? Laches : Or, of Vahttr. lig
will not contribute to make Children as honest as theycanbe. Formypart,ifintheConversation We have now had together, I had appeared more
learned and the rest more ignorant, I would have thought you had reason to chuse me preferably to others: But you fee very well, that we labour all underthefameUncertaintyandPerplexity. Then why shouldIbepreferred> Ithinkthatneitherone nor other of us deserves preference: And, if it be
Ib,considerifIamnotgoingtogiveyougoodAd vice:Iamofopinion(wearealone,andwewill notdiscoverourselves)Iam ofopinion,thatwe should all seek the best Master, first for our selves, and then for these Children, and for that end not to
spare Expences, nor any thing else in the World:
for I shall never advise our remaining in the state whereinwenoware. Ifanybodyderideusforgo
ing still to School at these Years, we will defend
our selves by the Authority of Homer, who fays mintf>eT7lt someplace, That9tmverybadforthePoortobeBosk? /L
Shame-faced. Andthus,bylaughingatalltheycanodyAE fay, we shall take care of our selves and of these Children.
\ys- That Council, Socrates, pleasesme infinitely weir* and,formypart,theolderIam,themore desire I shall have to instruct m y self at the same timewithourChildren. Dothenasyouhavelaid,
come toMorrow-morning early to my Housej do not fail therein, I pray you, that w e m a y advise how toputinpracticewhatwehaveresolvedupon. Tis time that this Conversation should break up
Soc. I will not fail therein, Lysimacbus, I will be with you to Morrow-morning very early, ifitplease
THE
? ? I1?
;. ; . v. -;". the
INTRODUCTION TO
P R O f A Q O R A S.
fA FtertljajtPlatohad,intheforegoingDialogue, jfjL giv'n,asit\yerp,aSpecimenofthefalseNo tions that prevail'd in his Time , and had infected thechiefPersonsoftheRepublics, herehediscovers their Authors, and attacks them with abundance of force. He therefore introduces Socrates disputing with Protagoras, who was the most considerable of all die Sophists, and the Person who, by the Art of feoyioning Meris Minds, had acquired the greatest Reputation, and most Riches.
At first he (hews, with a natural Simplicity, the Veneration M e n had throughout all Greece for those Impostors. They were followed where-ever they w e n t , a n d t h e y n o s o o n e r a r r i v e d i n a n y C i t y b u t the. News of it was spread abroad all over-, People floqk'd to tbepn with all possible eagerness, and their
Houseswere;fliledbetimesintheMorning. Men that were so followed could not be without Ibme fort of Merit, and particularly in such a discerning ftgeasthat. Tisalsoevident,thatProtagoraswas aMan ofgreatWit, andexpress'dhimselfwithwon derfulease. WhatisittholetwoQualitiescould notdo, especiallywhen supportedby adealofPre sumption,whichrarelyfailstoattendthem? Instan ces of it are seen daily, so that it is needless to cite 'em. 'Whoisitthatgoestoexaminewhetherthose
Do.
? ? sheinirbduftiontoProtagoras. iafj
DoctorsventfalseMaxims? Who isitthatisable to distinguish the false Gloss of Opinion from the trueLightofKnowledge> Theyspeakagreeably; they flatter our Passions and Prejudices j they pro miseusKnowledgeandVirtue,andfilluswithan highConceitofourselves. Whatheedstheremore to make them be followed ?
ThiswastheProfessionoftheSophists. Asno thing is so opposite to that Spirit of Error as true Philosophy, Socrates was a mortal Enemy to those false Teachers, and Plato, who trod in his Foot steps, could not vex them worse than by preserving theMemory ofalltheDisputesthatthatwifeMan had with them on several Occasions, and of all the Bantersheputuponthem. Thisiswhathedoesin several Dialogues, as the Sophist:, Euthydeme, Gor-
gids, Hippias, arid Protagoras.
I have put this last after Laches, because it is ?
n a t u r a l C o n t i n u a t i o n o f it ; f o r h e r e is e x a m i n e d t h a t famousQuestion, IfVirtuecanbetaught? andwhat Valour is, properly speaking.
Nothing is more natural than the Plan of that Dialogue^ and nothing more solid than the Manner inwhich itisperformed.
A young Man become fond of the Sophists, goes toSocratesbeforebreakofDay, tobegofhimto conduct him to Protagoras, who was just arrived at Athens. Socratesagrees. TheygototheHouseof Callias, where he lodged ; and Callias, was one of the Chiefs of the Republick.
They find Protagoras walking in the midst of a. Crowd ofAthenians and Foreigners, who listened to himastoanOracle. ProdicusofCeo'sandHippias of Elee, two of the greatest Sophists of the Age, Werealsothere. AndthereforetheVictorywhich Socrates obtains in this famous Dispute, ought to be lookt upon as the defeat of all the Party of the Sophists, whoassistedthereinbytheirLeaders;
:'. - At
? ? %%%
. t? %l>e lntrodu&ion to Protagoras.
A t first P r o t a g o r a s T e e m s t o b e a n a d m i r a b l e M a n - , to prove that Vertqe can be taught, he tells a very ingenious Story, and it must be confessed, that he gives his Opinion the most specious Colours that could be, he omits nothing that can be said, and whathefaysiseveryDay repeatedbyPeoplewho are far from thinking themselves to be Sophists.
Socrates confutes him with a dexterity that can notbesufficientlypraised;andbyhis way of treat ing them he teaches us, that at all times, when one has to do with that fort of People, the true Secret, to get the depth of them, is not to suffer them to speak so much as they would , and to make their chimerical Systems-, for they avoid and sliift ofFall your Arguments, and escape from you at last by theirlong Discourses. You must then oblige them to answer positively, and without rambling, to all youaskthem: withthisPrecautiontheDisputewill soonbeatanend. ThatveryManwhowhensuf fered to Harangue and make Orationsupon any thing has many times confounded every Body, seems to be Weakness it self when he is kept close and confined totheLimitsofaregularDispute. Inshort,Visseen thatProtagorashas nothing butsomeconfusedNo tions, that which he hath scrap'd up by his undigest ed Reading, and that instead of Knowledge he has nothing but a monstrous Heap of Opinions which contradict and destroy one another when they are sounded to the bottom and compared together.
The Aim of Socrates, in this Dialogue, is not to confound and triumph over the Sophists , he has a more noble prospect ; he would cure the Athenians of affecting them so much , and teach important Truths, the Ignorance of which is the only Source of all the Evils that happen to Men, not only in this Life but also in that which isto come.
The firstTruth is, That there is nothing more dangerous than to submit our selves to all forts of Teachers, and that it is not the fame with Sciences which nourish the Soul , as with Food that nou
? ? rishes
? ? The Introduction to Protagoras. 223
rishestheBody. Thelattermaybeboughtbyeve r y o n e ? , f o r , a f t e r t h e y h a v e b o u g h t i t , t h e y m a y
cany ithome in Vessels of small value, and, before t h e y u s e it, t h e y h a v e t i m e t o a d v i s e w i t h t h o s e w h o knowwhetheritbegoodorbad,andcanteachthem how to use it: Whereas if one buy Knowledge of thefirstthatcomes, heexposeshimselftoverygreat danger $ for in buying it he has no other Vessel to putitintobuttheSoulitsel? whichalwaysfavours ofthatwhichisputintoit,andwhich,fromthe veryMinutethatitreceivestheDoctriu, iscured or poysoned for ever, unless some good Physician be found to restore it to its former state, which is very hard to do.
The second Truth is, That those false Teachers, by teaching that Virtue is composed of different Parts which have no dependance upon one another, do entirely destroy it, and corrupt the Mind and the Heart oftheirDisciples; forthey bring them tovain Aflurance, that they may have some Parts of Virtue without having the rest, and be, for example, tem perate without being justj just without being tem perate or pious, and valiant tho' impious 5 and thereby put them out of condition ofever becoming virtuous. TodivideVirtuethus,andtotearit,if w e m a y venture to fay so, to pieces, is absolutely to
a n n i h i l a t e it a n d d e s t r o y it.
Virtue is one in its Principle and Object j it is in
divisible and eternal as they are, and all its Acts de pend upon it self5 tho' each of them have certain distinguishing Characters, yet they are inseperable and indivisible; they always hold together by some commontye;theycanneitherbelimitednormo mentary, but are all eternal as Virtue that produ- ceth them, and as the Soul whereof they are the Life : In a word , Virtue is intire in every Act, and no Act of Virtue perishes, for all that perishes is notVirtue. ADemonstrationofthismightbemade; WheretheSpiritofGodisnot,thereisnoVirtuej a n d w h e r e t h e S p i r i t o f G o d is, t h e r e V i r t u e is n e c e s
sarily
? ? ii4
the Introdu&ien to Protagoras.
sarilywithallitsPans, andbyconsequenceajust
Man istemperate aridpious; a temperate Man is valiantandjust? ,and hewho isvaliantisneitherim
pious;debauched,norunjust. Thesearenaturaland incontestable Truths in lpight of the Illusions of our Prejudices.
The third Truth that Socrates would teach is, That it does riot belong to every body to explain the Poets, and that the Sophists, who boasted of
great learning in thit, could do nothing but spoil
the finest Passages of the Poets, and those that con
tained the soundest Theology and the greatest M a x
imsofMorality. HereisfoundasmallDisserta
tion upon a Passage of Simonides, who, in one of
his Poems, which Time has robb'd us of, quarelled
with that famous Sentence of Pittacus, It is a diffi
cultthingtobevirtuous. Simonidesfindsfaultwith
that? ,he would havehad him fay,itisadifficult
thing to become virtuous, arid at the lame time that
it is slot impossible, but that it is absolutely impos sibletobesoalways? ,forthereisnoManupon
Earthwho isinnocentandjustallhisLife-time,and wemustnothopetofindanysuch. Godaloneis unchangeable and constant in the perfection of Vir tue,andthosewhom hesupportsandfavours. This Theology, which is so agreeable to the Christian Doctrine, pleases Socrates, and- 'tis he himself w h o draws' pure Light from out of the middle of the Darkness wherein those Sophists had wrapt it up, bytheirbadCriticismsandfalseExplications. We may thereby see what profound Judgment a Man must have, to enable him to explain the Poets with success, that is to iky for the publick good.
This Passage of Simonides leads Socrates to touch
upon a fifth Truth, which isthis, That in order to Pmersust^omegoodonenwsthavebeenwicked,sotobe-
nisiqulde- come wicked one must have been good. For no body pravatusi can be called perverse bur he who from a good M a n rectoest. isbecomewicked. ThisMaximedoesnotappearat s. nerom. fyfaj0fewii. dtltreaUy}s;jtisveryprofound and
~u''at-u - draws
? ? The lntrvduZtion to Protagoras aaj
draws into the knowledge of this first Truths which
is one of the solid Foundations of Platonick Philoso
phy, that Men were created perfect, and that they
have fallen from that perfection by the unhappy use
theymadeoftheirliberty. Thereforewemustnot
expect a perfect M a n in this W o r l d : and, as Simoni-
desdid,we must,withallourtHeart,loveandpraise,
those who have fewest Failings, and who commit nothingthatisshameful. ?
From thisSentiment of Simomdes^ Socrates also draws the Explication of this sixth Troth, That the InjusticeofMen oughtnottoobliterateinusthole certain Sentiments which Nature has ingraven in our Heart,and which this PoetcallsbytheName of Necejfity\ because we must absolutely submit uritd andobeythem,orceasetobeMen. Forexample, all the Causes of Complaint that an ill-humoured Father and Mother, an unjust Country, or a cruel
Master can give us, will never Justine our Aversion to them, nor authorise a Spirit of Disobedience, Ven
geanceorRevolt. Letthemtreatusneversoill, we oughttolovethem,praisethem,servethem,&a And upon this Subject Socrates does, with an Elo^ quence, that may be called Christian, shew the dif ference there is in those Occasions between the Con ductofagoodandabadMan.
These great Truths which Socrates draws from
the Poem of Sitfionides, do not hinder him from ac*
knowledging, that Philosophers, who treat of diffi
cult and important Questions, ought to have re
course to the Poets, and to change the Dispute into
a Dissertation upon the Sense that ought to be given
to a Verse-, for w e cannot address our selves to them
todemandthereasonOfwhattheysay. Themost
Ignorant will dispute with the most Learned even to the end of Time ? , for what will you do to convince
him? hisWilfulriessaridIgnorancearemuchstronger thanyourReasons. Andifyoudisputewithalearn ed Man, he will not always have the Courage ro confess that he is in the wrong : private Interest, or
P p Jea-
? ? 2z6
she Introduction to Protagoras.
Jealousie and Vanity, too frequent Companions of that fort of Knowledge, will hinder him from sub mitting to the clearest of Truths, even tho'he hirn- ielf be secretly convinced of them : Where then
will be the end of the Dispute ? The surest way is to leave the Poets there, and to press your Man upon his own Principles, for which he is obliged to give,a Reason.
AfterthisPrecautionSocrates, todecide theQue- stiopthatistheSubjectoftheDispute, wouldhave it a g r e e d o n w h a t K n o w l e d g e p r o p e r l y is, a n d w o u l d have itdeterminedifitbe the. Slaveof thePassi ons, as People fansie itto be^ or, ifit be strong enough togovern Men surely:And 'tisinthisalso that-Socratesappears to be adivine Man, for he makes it appear that Knowledge is the strongest
thingintheWorld, that italonecanputMan ina statenever to be overcome by hisPassions, and that italone will always deliver him from the greatest Dangers, and will make him triumph over all the Powers of the Earth, that shall arm themselves to
Et cognos-force him to commit any thing contrary to the light cecisveri-ofthisScience. Thisagreesexactlywith thosead-
verltas U- m^ra^e Words of our Lord spoken to the Jews, Te berabit fidl^novo^}e Truth,and theTruthJhallmakeyou vos,S. }ohn/ree. Socratesmighthave drawnthisgreatNotion 9-32- from the Words ofSolomon, who fays, that the Scientia knowledgeofWisdomwillgiveLifetohimthathas sapientiae it. For by Knowledge Socrates means the Know- habSm ledSeofGod'andofthe*ruth- Knowledge,which
Ecdef. 7. '14 the Source of all Vertues, and which makes T e m perance, Justice, Valour, Sanctity, Strength, Use The Proposition- of Socrates, applied to other Sciences, would be perfectly ridiculous.
The cause ofVertue bekig known, so is also that ofVice,byreasontheyareContraries. 'Tisthere fore Ignorance that occasions Vice : From whence it follows by necessary Consequence, that those w h o commit Wickedness, do it whether they will or not.
Most
? ? The Inm&u&ioh toProtagoras. 7
. MostMen willnotagreetothisPrinciple;on the contrary, they maintain that we commit Evil whenwe knowit,andthatitdependsup? nour
selvestoshunit,andthatwerefusetodoGood with an intire Knowledge and with a full Power' tofollowit. AndwhentheyareaskedtheReason of this strange Conduct, they fay that it is because
Man isenslav'dbyhissensualPleasures.
Tis thereforeproper to enquireintothis vulgar and ill understood Reason , for when once thatfc
wellclear'd up, itwill be evidentlyknown what Vertue is the resemblance that Valour has with al! the other Parts of that Vertue, will appear, and t will be agreed that this Principle of Socrates is sd
S2? ,? f1'Ihaievei? thosew^othinkthem selves the furthest from it,and that contradict it
molt, comply therewith without perceiving it and' allow it, contrary to their Design, in terms of which they know not the Sense and Force.
These are the indisputable Maxims that Socrates establishes,and whicharenecessaryforthedecision or the Question.
PleasureisaGood,andGriefisanEvil. Plea- lurewhich leadstoGriefisanEvil,andGriefwhich leads to Pleasure is a Good. '
ThereisnoBody butwho seeksafterGood, and fleesfrom Evil.
These Principles being supposed, when 'us gfct aManknowing Evil,willnotwithstandingcommit it;andthatknowingGood,he dothnotceaseto flee Irom it , because he is enslav'd by his sensual rieaiure, it is not meant there of Pleasure which leads to Grief, for that is an Evil -,neither is it meant ofGriefwhichleadstoPleasure,fornoBo dycommitsEvilforthefakeofGrief:Itisspoke ofPleasuresynonymousofGood. Whichisas rrtuch as to fay, that thisMan shunsGood and fol lows Evil because he is thereunto inclin'd by Good ? which every Body will own to be ridiculous.
Ppi IJut
2,27
? ? 2,a8
the lntrodu&ion to Protagoras.
Butwhy isnottheGood thatinclinesuscapable to surmount the Evil? And why are the Evils the strongest, even when Goodness inclines us ? There is a manifest Contradiction there. Some will fay itisbecausetheEvilsaregreaterand morenumei rousthantheGood, Butthisisstillmoreri* diculous, for from thence it will follow, that to
be overcome by the Good, is to chuse the greatest Evilsin room of theleastGood.
? FromwhencecomessostrangeaChoice? Itcan proceed only from this, that we cannot measure the greatness oftheGood and oftheEvil,and cannot distinguish the one from the other. Then we do hot deceive our selves but for want of Knowledge j thatisto fay,throughIgnorance:And thisiswhat Socratesdesignstoprove. Therefore'tisKnowledge thatbringsforthTemperance, Justice,Sanctity,Va lour,Strength,&c. Or,father,allthoseVertuesare nothing but Knowledge it self; and consequently Knowledge, far from being overcome by thePassi
ons, is on the other hand able alone' to triumph over them ; always Mistress where everitis:Know ledge alone can deliver us , and Ignorance albne can destroy us. This Doctrine isaltogether conso-
Kon. 1. 28. nant to what the Christian Religion teaches us, That
Men notbeingwillingtoretainGodintheirknow~
ledge,Godgavethemovertoareprobatemind. And aThess. Godshallfendthem aSpiritosError.
z:"?
But how comes it thatSocrates asserting that
Vertue is a Science,maintains at the fame time that it can't be taught > For it is certain that all Sciences canbetaught. How then dothSocratesagreewith himself? This Contradiction is not so difficult to reconcile as that of Protagoras, who would have Vertue to be quite another thing than Science, and w h o notwithstanding pretends that it m a y be taught* There aresomeScienceswhich Men teach;but thereisonethatMen donotteach,andthatcan be,learntfromnootherbutGod. ThisiswhatSo crates would have us to understand, and what
thole
? ? the lntrodu&ion to Protagoras. 22^
thole false Teachers, who are accustomed to make illuse of human Sciences, could not perceive.
Since Science is Vertue, Valour can be nothing but Science;and consequently,allBoldness,thatisnot accompanied with Prudence, can't be calsd Valour j for,on thecontrary,itisIgnorance. Valour isthe Science of Things that are terrible ; that is to fay, that of two Things that are terrible, it induceth us to chuse that which is the least, and to chuse it even with the hazard of our Life ; as we have seen in Laches.
Ishallnot enterupontheparticularBeautiesof this Dialogue, which consist in the variety, and in the liveliness of the Characters ; in the Mirth and pleasant Humours of Socrates, in the Simplicity and Nobleness of the Narratives, and in the Knowledge of Antiquitythereindiscovered;thoseBeautiesare perceptible enough.
But I can't but relate a Passage here which seems tome very remarkable,and which Socrates only touches en pajj'ant,Without insisting upon it,asfinding ittooSublimeforthosewithwhom heconvers'd. It is when he fays, That even though the Pleasures oftheWorldwere notattendedby any kindofEvil in this Life, yet they would be no less bad, because theycauseMen torejoyce;and toreJoyceinVice,is the most deplorable of all States, and the Punishment ofSin.
We mustnotfinishthisArgumentwithout speak ing of the Date of this Dialogue, as to which A- theneus accuseth Plato to have committed very con siderableFaultsinChronology.
thingsofourFriendDamon,andthatDamonisthe intimate Friend oSHrodicus the ablest of all the So phists for that kind of Distinctions.
Lac. Oh, Socrates, itbecomesaSophistverywell to make Ostentation of his vain Subtilties; but for a ManlikeNicias,whomtheAthenianshavechosen f0 fitattheHelm of theRepublick
Soc. MydearLaches,itwellbecomesaManwho hathsogreatAffairsupon hisHands,tostudytobe more learned and more wife than others; wherefore I-thinkthatNiciasdeservestobeheard, and thatwe ought at least to enquire into his Reasons why he defines Valour thus.
Lac. Enquire then as much as you please, So crates.
Soc. 'TiswhatIamgoingtodo;butdon'tthink that I acquit you of it, and that you sliall not assist meinsomethings:Listenalittlethen,andtake heedto'WhatIamgoingtofay.
Lac. I stiall do so, since it pleases you.
Soc. That issofarwell:Now come on, Nicias-, Eray you tell us, in resuming the Matter from the eginning ; Is it not true, that at first w e considered
Valour * as a part of Virtue?
Nic 'Tistrue.
Sac. Did not you answer, that Valour was certain
ly but one part, and that there were other parts, whichalltogetherwerecalledbytheName ofVir tue ?
Nic. How couldIfayotherwise?
Soc. You say then as I do: for, besides Valour, I acknowledge there are other parts of Virtue, as Temperance, Justice, and many others? , don't you
also acknowledge them ?
Nic. DoubtlessIdo.
Soc. That's good, we are agreed upon this Point:
* Socrates would prove, that Virtue being one, he, w h o has
not all the parts that compose it, cannot brag of being vir tuous. m T
003 Let
? ? ai$
Ladies: Or, of Vahw.
Let us go then to thoie things which you call ter
rible? ,andwhereinyoufayaManmayshewsome
A s s u r a n c e a n d C o n f i d e n c e ; let u s e x a m i n e t h e m w e l l ,
lest it happen that you understand them one w a y a n d w e a n o t h e r ? , w e a r e g o i n g t o t e l l y o u w h a t w e
thinkofthem. Ifyoudon'tagreewithusyouwill correctus. We believethethingswhichyou call
terrible are iuch as inspire People with Terror and Fear? ,andthatthosewhereinyousaywemay shew
some Assurance are such as do not inspire us with thatFear: Now thosethatcauseFear,areneither things that have already happened, nor things that actuallyhappen,butsuchaswe expectj forFear
isonlytheExpectationofanEviltocome. Are notyouofthisOpinion,Laches? >>-:<<? ? ? -> *? -
Lac. Yes,yesperfectly.
Soc. ThisthenisourSentiment,Nicks. Bythose things that are terrible, we understand the Evils to come j and by the things wherein one may shew some assurance, we understand those things which arealsotocome, and which appear good, or,at least,don'tappeartobeil* Do youadmitourDe> finition or not? > ,;. . . :. -.
Nic. Yes, yes, I admit it.
Soc. Then it is the Knowledge ofthose things whichyoucallValour? . ? . -. . <? ? ;<?
Nic. Yes, it is.
Soc. Let us go to a third Point, and see if w e can agreeuponthattoo. . ? . ;,. ? . ? . . ? ,;?
,Nic, What isthat?
Soc Youshallhearitpresently. We fay,thatis,
Laches and I, that in all things * Science never dis-. fers from it self3 it is not one thing, as to things past,
* Socrates would make tycias understand, that in defining Valour to be the Knowledge of things^ that are terrible, that is to fay, of Evils to come, he has not been large enough in his Pefinition; for Knowledge extending itselfto what ispast, whatispresent,andwhatisto,come,Valourmusthaveall thatextentifitbetrulyaScience. ThenWe mustfay,that itistheKnowledgeofalltheEvilandofalltheGoodthat
. . . . . . . ha*
? ? Laches : Or> of Pahar.
a 15
? ? past,toknowhowtheypassed? ,another,astothe
thingspresent,toknowhowtheyareandhowthey happen -, and another upon the things to come, to knowhowtheywillbeandhowtheywillfallout; but it is always the lame : For example as to Health, Let the Time be what itwill,Phisick never differs from it self, it is always the fame Art of Phi- lick that judges of it* and that fees what has been, what is and what will be healthfei-etunhealthful.
Husbandry in the lame manner judges of what has come,ofwhatisnowcomeandofwhatwi^come. And, as to War, you can very well testifie, and will
bebelieved, thattheArtofaGeneralextendst,self
to all, to what is past, what is present and to what istocome*thathehasnooccasionfortheArtof Divination, and that on the contrary he has it at command, asknowingbetterthanit,whathappens? ''Jj>> andwhat oughttohappen. IsnottheLaw it:selftmmtmUL expressinthat? ForitcommandsnotthattheDivi-tbeGmtrd,
nershallcommand theGeneral, but that theGene-hewoM
ralshallcommandtheDiviner. Isnotthiswhat'? ? ? ?
w e fay, Laches ? pis. Lac. Yes certainly, Socrates.
Soc. And you, Mcia*, do you also say as we do,
and do you agree, that Knowledge, being always the fame, judges equally of what ispast, what ispre
sent,andwhattocome? Me. Yes,Ifayasyoufay? ,forIthinkitcannot
be otherwise. ? __. . , Soc. You say then, most excellent Nicias, that
Valour is the Knowledge of things that are terrible,
andofthosethatarenotso? Isnotthatwhatyou
fey> . '-: . ?
Nic. Yes. ?
Soc. Havenotweagreed,thatthoset|pgsthat areterribleareEvilstocome-, andthosethingsthat Oo4 ? are
hath been, that is, and that shallbe ; forValour ought no less tojudgeofwhathasbeen,apdofwhatis,thanofwhatwill b e . B m ;o f w h a t u s e is it? T h a t S << rat a w i l l n a i f g p l a i n b y a n d
by.
? ? a16 Laches:Or,ofValour.
arenotterrible,andinwhichwecanshewsomeas
surance^ issome Good thatwe expect? <,jV/s. We areagreeduponit.
Son. And that Knowledge does not extend itse^f onlytowhat isto. come, butalsotothingspresent andtowhatispast;. . ', . i,
JV? V. Iagreeinthat. ,', . ? '. ,
i&? A Then it,isnot true, that Valour is only the Knowledge of 'things that are terrible, and of those thatarenotterribler,foritdoesnotonlyknow the GoodandtheEvilthatistocome,butitsJurisdi ction,extends as far as that of other Sciences, and it also judges of what ispast an4 of what ispresent, and,inaword, ofallthingswhethertheybenearat hand, or at a distance.
? A7v. That seems to be true.
Soc. Then you have only defined to us the third
part of Valopr, but w e desir'd you to give us a full definitionofit:Atpresentitseemstome, that,ac cording to,your Principles, 'tis the Knowledge not only of things that are terrible and not terrible, * but alsoofalmostalltheGood and alltheEvilatwhat distancesoevertheybefromusbeforeorafter. Have you then changed your Sentiment, Niciaf ? what do youfay? '. ',. , . . .
. ? Njc. _Itappearstome, thatValourhasalltheex tent you fay.
Sac. That being so, do you think that a valiant M a n wants any part of Virtue, if it be true, that he knows alltheGood andalltheEvilsthathavebeen, that aje, and that may be? and do you believe, that such a M a n can want Temperance, Justice, and
^//f/<</;eSa;. ctiry>hetowhom aloneitbelongstousea vouUmt piiidentPrecautionagainstalltheEvilsthatmay
* focrates will have ys understand that Valour puts us in 4 condition to attract the Good and to avoid the Evil that may happentousonthepartofManandonthepartofGod; foritmay servetocorrectwhatispair,todisposewellof what ispresent, and to use wise Precautions against what ii tocome. ItissosolidaPrinciplethatnothingcanshakeit. "
"? hap. :
? ? Laches:Qr, ofValour. 217
happentohimonthepartofManand vdow consiststhenin m thepastofGod, andtoputhimself P>>>nnins. **<<**K <<*
inaconditiontodrawfromthenceall S ^ l ^ t theGoodthatcanbeexpected, seeing w,mtonlyonthepartof heknowshowheoughttobehavehim- -m>>i>malsoo>>thefart
selfbothtawardsManandtowardsGcd. ? fGod-
Nic,Whatyoulaynow, Socrates-seemstohave somethinginit. '? '? * ?
Sot. Valour then is not a part of Virtue , but is Virtueinallitsparts? 'T ', :
Mr. Soitseemstome.
5"ctr. Y e t w e s a i d , t h a t i t w a s b u t a p a r t o f i t . Nic. W e did so.
Soc. And what we said then does not new appear 0 be true.
Me Iownit.
Soc- And consequently, Nicias, w e have not yet i)und out what Valour is?
Nic. * Iam of your mind.
Lac. Yet I should have thought, m y dear J^icias^ rtheContemptyoushew'dofme,whenIwasan?
reringSocm^ thatyouwouldhavefounditout
tterthananother,andIhadgreathopes, that,with
2assistanceofDamon'shighWisdom, you would ve accomplished itvery well. '.
Nic. Cheerup,Lacbes,thatisadmirable.
You tik it nothing that you appeared very ignorant of at relates to Valour, provided I appear, as igno- t as you j you, regard nothing but that, and you eve your selfto be. no way blameahle, when you, 3me for aCompanion,'inthatIgnorancewhich
X'das does not comprehend, that which Socrates makes almost touch with his Finger , that Virtue cannot be di- ,and thateveryoneofitspartsisVirtueintire. Valour :without Temperance,SanctityandJustice,andthereis leofthosewithoutValour. Buthowcomesitaboutthat
and LachesdonotunderstandthisLanguage? Tis be- they were us'dtotheunhappyDistinctionsofSophists, ad filled theirMindswiththeirfalseIdea's,andwho had
Virtue bydividingitandcuttingitinpieces. Thiswilj lained more atlarge inthefollowingDialogue,
? ? ii t Laches: Or, of Faker.
? issoscandalous. toMen ofQuality: But that'sthe
humour of Men, they never look to themselves, hot jkrffa? healwaystoothers. Formypart,IthinkIamanswer- *>>$*rti edindifferentlywell1. IfIamdeceivedinanything, Uttn that j ,jon>>t pretend t0 be infallible, I shall undeceive m y
f^Cself, bytakingInstruaions,whetheritbefromD* <<fcMath, mon,whomyouwouldIbwillinglyridicule,tho'you neversaw,norknewhimjorfromanyothers*and
whenIamwellinstructed,Iwillcommunicatemy knowledgetoyou? ,forIam notenvious,andyouseem
tome tohavegreatneedofInstruction.
Lac. And foryou, Niciat, ifwe may believeyou, you'll suddenly be the eighth wife M a n : In the mean
time,for all this fine Reaibning,I advise Lysimacbvx & Melesiasto sendusandourgoodCouncils for the Education of their Children, a going, and if they'll believe me, as I have just now said, they'll fix only upon Socrates$ for, asformy part, ifmy Children
were old enough, I would do so.
Nic Oh! asforthatIagreewithyou. IfSocrates
will take care of our Children, w e need not look out foranotherMaster, andIam readytogivehim my Son Niceratus, if he will be so good as to take chargeofhim:Butalways,when1speaktohimof that, he recommends me to other Masters and refu sesme hisAssistance. Try thenLy/imacbus, ifyou can have any more Power over him, and if he will
have so much Complaisance foryou.
Lys. It would bean Act of Justice: * Because, for
mypart,IwoulddoforhimwhatIwouldnotdo formanyothers. Whatdoyoufaythen,Soerates? will you suffer your self to be prevailed upon, and
willyou takechargeoftheseChildrentomake them virtuous ?
8oc. HemustbeaverystrangeandcruelMan that
* This Passage must not be translated as des Serres translated it,/Utouldgivehimmore. Lysimachtuhadnothoughtsof(peak ingofaSalary:Thatwould havetoomuch offendedSocrates, who didnotteachforMoneyjnordoestheGreekExpression bear more than I have said.
? will
? ? Laches : Or, of Vahttr. lig
will not contribute to make Children as honest as theycanbe. Formypart,ifintheConversation We have now had together, I had appeared more
learned and the rest more ignorant, I would have thought you had reason to chuse me preferably to others: But you fee very well, that we labour all underthefameUncertaintyandPerplexity. Then why shouldIbepreferred> Ithinkthatneitherone nor other of us deserves preference: And, if it be
Ib,considerifIamnotgoingtogiveyougoodAd vice:Iamofopinion(wearealone,andwewill notdiscoverourselves)Iam ofopinion,thatwe should all seek the best Master, first for our selves, and then for these Children, and for that end not to
spare Expences, nor any thing else in the World:
for I shall never advise our remaining in the state whereinwenoware. Ifanybodyderideusforgo
ing still to School at these Years, we will defend
our selves by the Authority of Homer, who fays mintf>eT7lt someplace, That9tmverybadforthePoortobeBosk? /L
Shame-faced. Andthus,bylaughingatalltheycanodyAE fay, we shall take care of our selves and of these Children.
\ys- That Council, Socrates, pleasesme infinitely weir* and,formypart,theolderIam,themore desire I shall have to instruct m y self at the same timewithourChildren. Dothenasyouhavelaid,
come toMorrow-morning early to my Housej do not fail therein, I pray you, that w e m a y advise how toputinpracticewhatwehaveresolvedupon. Tis time that this Conversation should break up
Soc. I will not fail therein, Lysimacbus, I will be with you to Morrow-morning very early, ifitplease
THE
? ? I1?
;. ; . v. -;". the
INTRODUCTION TO
P R O f A Q O R A S.
fA FtertljajtPlatohad,intheforegoingDialogue, jfjL giv'n,asit\yerp,aSpecimenofthefalseNo tions that prevail'd in his Time , and had infected thechiefPersonsoftheRepublics, herehediscovers their Authors, and attacks them with abundance of force. He therefore introduces Socrates disputing with Protagoras, who was the most considerable of all die Sophists, and the Person who, by the Art of feoyioning Meris Minds, had acquired the greatest Reputation, and most Riches.
At first he (hews, with a natural Simplicity, the Veneration M e n had throughout all Greece for those Impostors. They were followed where-ever they w e n t , a n d t h e y n o s o o n e r a r r i v e d i n a n y C i t y b u t the. News of it was spread abroad all over-, People floqk'd to tbepn with all possible eagerness, and their
Houseswere;fliledbetimesintheMorning. Men that were so followed could not be without Ibme fort of Merit, and particularly in such a discerning ftgeasthat. Tisalsoevident,thatProtagoraswas aMan ofgreatWit, andexpress'dhimselfwithwon derfulease. WhatisittholetwoQualitiescould notdo, especiallywhen supportedby adealofPre sumption,whichrarelyfailstoattendthem? Instan ces of it are seen daily, so that it is needless to cite 'em. 'Whoisitthatgoestoexaminewhetherthose
Do.
? ? sheinirbduftiontoProtagoras. iafj
DoctorsventfalseMaxims? Who isitthatisable to distinguish the false Gloss of Opinion from the trueLightofKnowledge> Theyspeakagreeably; they flatter our Passions and Prejudices j they pro miseusKnowledgeandVirtue,andfilluswithan highConceitofourselves. Whatheedstheremore to make them be followed ?
ThiswastheProfessionoftheSophists. Asno thing is so opposite to that Spirit of Error as true Philosophy, Socrates was a mortal Enemy to those false Teachers, and Plato, who trod in his Foot steps, could not vex them worse than by preserving theMemory ofalltheDisputesthatthatwifeMan had with them on several Occasions, and of all the Bantersheputuponthem. Thisiswhathedoesin several Dialogues, as the Sophist:, Euthydeme, Gor-
gids, Hippias, arid Protagoras.
I have put this last after Laches, because it is ?
n a t u r a l C o n t i n u a t i o n o f it ; f o r h e r e is e x a m i n e d t h a t famousQuestion, IfVirtuecanbetaught? andwhat Valour is, properly speaking.
Nothing is more natural than the Plan of that Dialogue^ and nothing more solid than the Manner inwhich itisperformed.
A young Man become fond of the Sophists, goes toSocratesbeforebreakofDay, tobegofhimto conduct him to Protagoras, who was just arrived at Athens. Socratesagrees. TheygototheHouseof Callias, where he lodged ; and Callias, was one of the Chiefs of the Republick.
They find Protagoras walking in the midst of a. Crowd ofAthenians and Foreigners, who listened to himastoanOracle. ProdicusofCeo'sandHippias of Elee, two of the greatest Sophists of the Age, Werealsothere. AndthereforetheVictorywhich Socrates obtains in this famous Dispute, ought to be lookt upon as the defeat of all the Party of the Sophists, whoassistedthereinbytheirLeaders;
:'. - At
? ? %%%
. t? %l>e lntrodu&ion to Protagoras.
A t first P r o t a g o r a s T e e m s t o b e a n a d m i r a b l e M a n - , to prove that Vertqe can be taught, he tells a very ingenious Story, and it must be confessed, that he gives his Opinion the most specious Colours that could be, he omits nothing that can be said, and whathefaysiseveryDay repeatedbyPeoplewho are far from thinking themselves to be Sophists.
Socrates confutes him with a dexterity that can notbesufficientlypraised;andbyhis way of treat ing them he teaches us, that at all times, when one has to do with that fort of People, the true Secret, to get the depth of them, is not to suffer them to speak so much as they would , and to make their chimerical Systems-, for they avoid and sliift ofFall your Arguments, and escape from you at last by theirlong Discourses. You must then oblige them to answer positively, and without rambling, to all youaskthem: withthisPrecautiontheDisputewill soonbeatanend. ThatveryManwhowhensuf fered to Harangue and make Orationsupon any thing has many times confounded every Body, seems to be Weakness it self when he is kept close and confined totheLimitsofaregularDispute. Inshort,Visseen thatProtagorashas nothing butsomeconfusedNo tions, that which he hath scrap'd up by his undigest ed Reading, and that instead of Knowledge he has nothing but a monstrous Heap of Opinions which contradict and destroy one another when they are sounded to the bottom and compared together.
The Aim of Socrates, in this Dialogue, is not to confound and triumph over the Sophists , he has a more noble prospect ; he would cure the Athenians of affecting them so much , and teach important Truths, the Ignorance of which is the only Source of all the Evils that happen to Men, not only in this Life but also in that which isto come.
The firstTruth is, That there is nothing more dangerous than to submit our selves to all forts of Teachers, and that it is not the fame with Sciences which nourish the Soul , as with Food that nou
? ? rishes
? ? The Introduction to Protagoras. 223
rishestheBody. Thelattermaybeboughtbyeve r y o n e ? , f o r , a f t e r t h e y h a v e b o u g h t i t , t h e y m a y
cany ithome in Vessels of small value, and, before t h e y u s e it, t h e y h a v e t i m e t o a d v i s e w i t h t h o s e w h o knowwhetheritbegoodorbad,andcanteachthem how to use it: Whereas if one buy Knowledge of thefirstthatcomes, heexposeshimselftoverygreat danger $ for in buying it he has no other Vessel to putitintobuttheSoulitsel? whichalwaysfavours ofthatwhichisputintoit,andwhich,fromthe veryMinutethatitreceivestheDoctriu, iscured or poysoned for ever, unless some good Physician be found to restore it to its former state, which is very hard to do.
The second Truth is, That those false Teachers, by teaching that Virtue is composed of different Parts which have no dependance upon one another, do entirely destroy it, and corrupt the Mind and the Heart oftheirDisciples; forthey bring them tovain Aflurance, that they may have some Parts of Virtue without having the rest, and be, for example, tem perate without being justj just without being tem perate or pious, and valiant tho' impious 5 and thereby put them out of condition ofever becoming virtuous. TodivideVirtuethus,andtotearit,if w e m a y venture to fay so, to pieces, is absolutely to
a n n i h i l a t e it a n d d e s t r o y it.
Virtue is one in its Principle and Object j it is in
divisible and eternal as they are, and all its Acts de pend upon it self5 tho' each of them have certain distinguishing Characters, yet they are inseperable and indivisible; they always hold together by some commontye;theycanneitherbelimitednormo mentary, but are all eternal as Virtue that produ- ceth them, and as the Soul whereof they are the Life : In a word , Virtue is intire in every Act, and no Act of Virtue perishes, for all that perishes is notVirtue. ADemonstrationofthismightbemade; WheretheSpiritofGodisnot,thereisnoVirtuej a n d w h e r e t h e S p i r i t o f G o d is, t h e r e V i r t u e is n e c e s
sarily
? ? ii4
the Introdu&ien to Protagoras.
sarilywithallitsPans, andbyconsequenceajust
Man istemperate aridpious; a temperate Man is valiantandjust? ,and hewho isvaliantisneitherim
pious;debauched,norunjust. Thesearenaturaland incontestable Truths in lpight of the Illusions of our Prejudices.
The third Truth that Socrates would teach is, That it does riot belong to every body to explain the Poets, and that the Sophists, who boasted of
great learning in thit, could do nothing but spoil
the finest Passages of the Poets, and those that con
tained the soundest Theology and the greatest M a x
imsofMorality. HereisfoundasmallDisserta
tion upon a Passage of Simonides, who, in one of
his Poems, which Time has robb'd us of, quarelled
with that famous Sentence of Pittacus, It is a diffi
cultthingtobevirtuous. Simonidesfindsfaultwith
that? ,he would havehad him fay,itisadifficult
thing to become virtuous, arid at the lame time that
it is slot impossible, but that it is absolutely impos sibletobesoalways? ,forthereisnoManupon
Earthwho isinnocentandjustallhisLife-time,and wemustnothopetofindanysuch. Godaloneis unchangeable and constant in the perfection of Vir tue,andthosewhom hesupportsandfavours. This Theology, which is so agreeable to the Christian Doctrine, pleases Socrates, and- 'tis he himself w h o draws' pure Light from out of the middle of the Darkness wherein those Sophists had wrapt it up, bytheirbadCriticismsandfalseExplications. We may thereby see what profound Judgment a Man must have, to enable him to explain the Poets with success, that is to iky for the publick good.
This Passage of Simonides leads Socrates to touch
upon a fifth Truth, which isthis, That in order to Pmersust^omegoodonenwsthavebeenwicked,sotobe-
nisiqulde- come wicked one must have been good. For no body pravatusi can be called perverse bur he who from a good M a n rectoest. isbecomewicked. ThisMaximedoesnotappearat s. nerom. fyfaj0fewii. dtltreaUy}s;jtisveryprofound and
~u''at-u - draws
? ? The lntrvduZtion to Protagoras aaj
draws into the knowledge of this first Truths which
is one of the solid Foundations of Platonick Philoso
phy, that Men were created perfect, and that they
have fallen from that perfection by the unhappy use
theymadeoftheirliberty. Thereforewemustnot
expect a perfect M a n in this W o r l d : and, as Simoni-
desdid,we must,withallourtHeart,loveandpraise,
those who have fewest Failings, and who commit nothingthatisshameful. ?
From thisSentiment of Simomdes^ Socrates also draws the Explication of this sixth Troth, That the InjusticeofMen oughtnottoobliterateinusthole certain Sentiments which Nature has ingraven in our Heart,and which this PoetcallsbytheName of Necejfity\ because we must absolutely submit uritd andobeythem,orceasetobeMen. Forexample, all the Causes of Complaint that an ill-humoured Father and Mother, an unjust Country, or a cruel
Master can give us, will never Justine our Aversion to them, nor authorise a Spirit of Disobedience, Ven
geanceorRevolt. Letthemtreatusneversoill, we oughttolovethem,praisethem,servethem,&a And upon this Subject Socrates does, with an Elo^ quence, that may be called Christian, shew the dif ference there is in those Occasions between the Con ductofagoodandabadMan.
These great Truths which Socrates draws from
the Poem of Sitfionides, do not hinder him from ac*
knowledging, that Philosophers, who treat of diffi
cult and important Questions, ought to have re
course to the Poets, and to change the Dispute into
a Dissertation upon the Sense that ought to be given
to a Verse-, for w e cannot address our selves to them
todemandthereasonOfwhattheysay. Themost
Ignorant will dispute with the most Learned even to the end of Time ? , for what will you do to convince
him? hisWilfulriessaridIgnorancearemuchstronger thanyourReasons. Andifyoudisputewithalearn ed Man, he will not always have the Courage ro confess that he is in the wrong : private Interest, or
P p Jea-
? ? 2z6
she Introduction to Protagoras.
Jealousie and Vanity, too frequent Companions of that fort of Knowledge, will hinder him from sub mitting to the clearest of Truths, even tho'he hirn- ielf be secretly convinced of them : Where then
will be the end of the Dispute ? The surest way is to leave the Poets there, and to press your Man upon his own Principles, for which he is obliged to give,a Reason.
AfterthisPrecautionSocrates, todecide theQue- stiopthatistheSubjectoftheDispute, wouldhave it a g r e e d o n w h a t K n o w l e d g e p r o p e r l y is, a n d w o u l d have itdeterminedifitbe the. Slaveof thePassi ons, as People fansie itto be^ or, ifit be strong enough togovern Men surely:And 'tisinthisalso that-Socratesappears to be adivine Man, for he makes it appear that Knowledge is the strongest
thingintheWorld, that italonecanputMan ina statenever to be overcome by hisPassions, and that italone will always deliver him from the greatest Dangers, and will make him triumph over all the Powers of the Earth, that shall arm themselves to
Et cognos-force him to commit any thing contrary to the light cecisveri-ofthisScience. Thisagreesexactlywith thosead-
verltas U- m^ra^e Words of our Lord spoken to the Jews, Te berabit fidl^novo^}e Truth,and theTruthJhallmakeyou vos,S. }ohn/ree. Socratesmighthave drawnthisgreatNotion 9-32- from the Words ofSolomon, who fays, that the Scientia knowledgeofWisdomwillgiveLifetohimthathas sapientiae it. For by Knowledge Socrates means the Know- habSm ledSeofGod'andofthe*ruth- Knowledge,which
Ecdef. 7. '14 the Source of all Vertues, and which makes T e m perance, Justice, Valour, Sanctity, Strength, Use The Proposition- of Socrates, applied to other Sciences, would be perfectly ridiculous.
The cause ofVertue bekig known, so is also that ofVice,byreasontheyareContraries. 'Tisthere fore Ignorance that occasions Vice : From whence it follows by necessary Consequence, that those w h o commit Wickedness, do it whether they will or not.
Most
? ? The Inm&u&ioh toProtagoras. 7
. MostMen willnotagreetothisPrinciple;on the contrary, they maintain that we commit Evil whenwe knowit,andthatitdependsup? nour
selvestoshunit,andthatwerefusetodoGood with an intire Knowledge and with a full Power' tofollowit. AndwhentheyareaskedtheReason of this strange Conduct, they fay that it is because
Man isenslav'dbyhissensualPleasures.
Tis thereforeproper to enquireintothis vulgar and ill understood Reason , for when once thatfc
wellclear'd up, itwill be evidentlyknown what Vertue is the resemblance that Valour has with al! the other Parts of that Vertue, will appear, and t will be agreed that this Principle of Socrates is sd
S2? ,? f1'Ihaievei? thosew^othinkthem selves the furthest from it,and that contradict it
molt, comply therewith without perceiving it and' allow it, contrary to their Design, in terms of which they know not the Sense and Force.
These are the indisputable Maxims that Socrates establishes,and whicharenecessaryforthedecision or the Question.
PleasureisaGood,andGriefisanEvil. Plea- lurewhich leadstoGriefisanEvil,andGriefwhich leads to Pleasure is a Good. '
ThereisnoBody butwho seeksafterGood, and fleesfrom Evil.
These Principles being supposed, when 'us gfct aManknowing Evil,willnotwithstandingcommit it;andthatknowingGood,he dothnotceaseto flee Irom it , because he is enslav'd by his sensual rieaiure, it is not meant there of Pleasure which leads to Grief, for that is an Evil -,neither is it meant ofGriefwhichleadstoPleasure,fornoBo dycommitsEvilforthefakeofGrief:Itisspoke ofPleasuresynonymousofGood. Whichisas rrtuch as to fay, that thisMan shunsGood and fol lows Evil because he is thereunto inclin'd by Good ? which every Body will own to be ridiculous.
Ppi IJut
2,27
? ? 2,a8
the lntrodu&ion to Protagoras.
Butwhy isnottheGood thatinclinesuscapable to surmount the Evil? And why are the Evils the strongest, even when Goodness inclines us ? There is a manifest Contradiction there. Some will fay itisbecausetheEvilsaregreaterand morenumei rousthantheGood, Butthisisstillmoreri* diculous, for from thence it will follow, that to
be overcome by the Good, is to chuse the greatest Evilsin room of theleastGood.
? FromwhencecomessostrangeaChoice? Itcan proceed only from this, that we cannot measure the greatness oftheGood and oftheEvil,and cannot distinguish the one from the other. Then we do hot deceive our selves but for want of Knowledge j thatisto fay,throughIgnorance:And thisiswhat Socratesdesignstoprove. Therefore'tisKnowledge thatbringsforthTemperance, Justice,Sanctity,Va lour,Strength,&c. Or,father,allthoseVertuesare nothing but Knowledge it self; and consequently Knowledge, far from being overcome by thePassi
ons, is on the other hand able alone' to triumph over them ; always Mistress where everitis:Know ledge alone can deliver us , and Ignorance albne can destroy us. This Doctrine isaltogether conso-
Kon. 1. 28. nant to what the Christian Religion teaches us, That
Men notbeingwillingtoretainGodintheirknow~
ledge,Godgavethemovertoareprobatemind. And aThess. Godshallfendthem aSpiritosError.
z:"?
But how comes it thatSocrates asserting that
Vertue is a Science,maintains at the fame time that it can't be taught > For it is certain that all Sciences canbetaught. How then dothSocratesagreewith himself? This Contradiction is not so difficult to reconcile as that of Protagoras, who would have Vertue to be quite another thing than Science, and w h o notwithstanding pretends that it m a y be taught* There aresomeScienceswhich Men teach;but thereisonethatMen donotteach,andthatcan be,learntfromnootherbutGod. ThisiswhatSo crates would have us to understand, and what
thole
? ? the lntrodu&ion to Protagoras. 22^
thole false Teachers, who are accustomed to make illuse of human Sciences, could not perceive.
Since Science is Vertue, Valour can be nothing but Science;and consequently,allBoldness,thatisnot accompanied with Prudence, can't be calsd Valour j for,on thecontrary,itisIgnorance. Valour isthe Science of Things that are terrible ; that is to fay, that of two Things that are terrible, it induceth us to chuse that which is the least, and to chuse it even with the hazard of our Life ; as we have seen in Laches.
Ishallnot enterupontheparticularBeautiesof this Dialogue, which consist in the variety, and in the liveliness of the Characters ; in the Mirth and pleasant Humours of Socrates, in the Simplicity and Nobleness of the Narratives, and in the Knowledge of Antiquitythereindiscovered;thoseBeautiesare perceptible enough.
But I can't but relate a Passage here which seems tome very remarkable,and which Socrates only touches en pajj'ant,Without insisting upon it,asfinding ittooSublimeforthosewithwhom heconvers'd. It is when he fays, That even though the Pleasures oftheWorldwere notattendedby any kindofEvil in this Life, yet they would be no less bad, because theycauseMen torejoyce;and toreJoyceinVice,is the most deplorable of all States, and the Punishment ofSin.
We mustnotfinishthisArgumentwithout speak ing of the Date of this Dialogue, as to which A- theneus accuseth Plato to have committed very con siderableFaultsinChronology.
