No More Learning

Therefore the truly proud man must be good. And
greatness in every virtue would seem to be characteristic of a proud
man. And it would be most unbecoming for a proud man to fly from
danger, swinging his arms by his sides, or to wrong another; for to
what end should he do disgraceful acts, he to whom nothing is great?
If we consider him point by point we shall see the utter absurdity
of a proud man who is not good. Nor, again, would he be worthy of
honour if he were bad; for honour is the prize of virtue, and it is to
the good that it is rendered. Pride, then, seems to be a sort of crown
of the virtues; for it makes them greater, and it is not found without
them. Therefore it is hard to be truly proud; for it is impossible
without nobility and goodness of character. It is chiefly with honours
and dishonours, then, that the proud man is concerned; and at
honours that are great and conferred by good men he will be moderately
Pleased, thinking that he is coming by his own or even less than his
own; for there can be no honour that is worthy of perfect virtue,
yet he will at any rate accept it since they have nothing greater to
bestow on him; but honour from casual people and on trifling grounds
he will utterly despise, since it is not this that he deserves, and
dishonour too, since in his case it cannot be just. In the first
place, then, as has been said, the proud man is concerned with
honours; yet he will also bear himself with moderation towards
wealth and power and all good or evil fortune, whatever may befall
him, and will be neither over-joyed by good fortune nor over-pained by
evil. For not even towards honour does he bear himself as if it were a
very great thing. Power and wealth are desirable for the sake of
honour (at least those who have them wish to get honour by means of
them); and for him to whom even honour is a little thing the others
must be so too. Hence proud men are thought to be disdainful.

The goods of fortune also are thought to contribute towards pride.
For men who are well-born are thought worthy of honour, and so are
those who enjoy power or wealth; for they are in a superior
position, and everything that has a superiority in something good is
held in greater honour. Hence even such things make men prouder; for
they are honoured by some for having them; but in truth the good man
alone is to be honoured; he, however, who has both advantages is
thought the more worthy of honour. But those who without virtue have
such goods are neither justified in making great claims nor entitled
to the name of 'proud'; for these things imply perfect virtue.
Disdainful and insolent, however, even those who have such goods
become. For without virtue it is not easy to bear gracefully the goods
of fortune; and, being unable to bear them, and thinking themselves
superior to others, they despise others and themselves do what they
please. They imitate the proud man without being like him, and this
they do where they can; so they do not act virtuously, but they do
despise others. For the proud man despises justly (since he thinks
truly), but the many do so at random.

He does not run into trifling dangers, nor is he fond of danger,
because he honours few things; but he will face great dangers, and
when he is in danger he is unsparing of his life, knowing that there
are conditions on which life is not worth having. And he is the sort
of man to confer benefits, but he is ashamed of receiving them; for
the one is the mark of a superior, the other of an inferior. And he is
apt to confer greater benefits in return; for thus the original
benefactor besides being paid will incur a debt to him, and will be
the gainer by the transaction. They seem also to remember any
service they have done, but not those they have received (for he who
receives a service is inferior to him who has done it, but the proud
man wishes to be superior), and to hear of the former with pleasure,
of the latter with displeasure; this, it seems, is why Thetis did
not mention to Zeus the services she had done him, and why the
Spartans did not recount their services to the Athenians, but those
they had received. It is a mark of the proud man also to ask for
nothing or scarcely anything, but to give help readily, and to be
dignified towards people who enjoy high position and good fortune, but
unassuming towards those of the middle class; for it is a difficult
and lofty thing to be superior to the former, but easy to be so to the
latter, and a lofty bearing over the former is no mark of
ill-breeding, but among humble people it is as vulgar as a display
of strength against the weak. Again, it is characteristic of the proud
man not to aim at the things commonly held in honour, or the things in
which others excel; to be sluggish and to hold back except where great
honour or a great work is at stake, and to be a man of few deeds,
but of great and notable ones. He must also be open in his hate and in
his love (for to conceal one's feelings, i. e. to care less for truth
than for what people will think, is a coward's part), and must speak
and act openly; for he is free of speech because he is contemptuous,
and he is given to telling the truth, except when he speaks in irony
to the vulgar. He must be unable to make his life revolve round
another, unless it be a friend; for this is slavish, and for this
reason all flatterers are servile and people lacking in self-respect
are flatterers. Nor is he given to admiration; for nothing to him is
great. Nor is he mindful of wrongs; for it is not the part of a
proud man to have a long memory, especially for wrongs, but rather
to overlook them. Nor is he a gossip; for he will speak neither
about himself nor about another, since he cares not to be praised
nor for others to be blamed; nor again is he given to praise; and
for the same reason he is not an evil-speaker, even about his enemies,
except from haughtiness. With regard to necessary or small matters
he is least of all me given to lamentation or the asking of favours;
for it is the part of one who takes such matters seriously to behave
so with respect to them. He is one who will possess beautiful and
profitless things rather than profitable and useful ones; for this
is more proper to a character that suffices to itself.

Further, a slow step is thought proper to the proud man, a deep
voice, and a level utterance; for the man who takes few things
seriously is not likely to be hurried, nor the man who thinks
nothing great to be excited, while a shrill voice and a rapid gait are
the results of hurry and excitement.

Such, then, is the proud man; the man who falls short of him is
unduly humble, and the man who goes beyond him is vain. Now even these
are not thought to be bad (for they are not malicious), but only
mistaken. For the unduly humble man, being worthy of good things, robs
himself of what he deserves, and to have something bad about him
from the fact that he does not think himself worthy of good things,
and seems also not to know himself; else he would have desired the
things he was worthy of, since these were good. Yet such people are
not thought to be fools, but rather unduly retiring. Such a
reputation, however, seems actually to make them worse; for each class
of people aims at what corresponds to its worth, and these people
stand back even from noble actions and undertakings, deeming
themselves unworthy, and from external goods no less. Vain people,
on the other hand, are fools and ignorant of themselves, and that
manifestly; for, not being worthy of them, they attempt honourable
undertakings, and then are found out; and tetadorn themselves with
clothing and outward show and such things, and wish their strokes of
good fortune to be made public, and speak about them as if they
would be honoured for them. But undue humility is more opposed to
pride than vanity is; for it is both commoner and worse.

Pride, then, is concerned with honour on the grand scale, as has
been said.

4

There seems to be in the sphere of honour also, as was said in our
first remarks on the subject, a virtue which would appear to be
related to pride as liberality is to magnificence. For neither of
these has anything to do with the grand scale, but both dispose us
as is right with regard to middling and unimportant objects; as in
getting and giving of wealth there is a mean and an excess and defect,
so too honour may be desired more than is right, or less, or from
the right sources and in the right way. We blame both the ambitious
man as am at honour more than is right and from wrong sources, and the
unambitious man as not willing to be honoured even for noble
reasons. But sometimes we praise the ambitious man as being manly
and a lover of what is noble, and the unambitious man as being
moderate and self-controlled, as we said in our first treatment of the
subject. Evidently, since 'fond of such and such an object' has more
than one meaning, we do not assign the term 'ambition' or 'love of
honour' always to the same thing, but when we praise the quality we
think of the man who loves honour more than most people, and when we
blame it we think of him who loves it more than is right. The mean
being without a name, the extremes seem to dispute for its place as
though that were vacant by default. But where there is excess and
defect, there is also an intermediate; now men desire honour both more
than they should and less; therefore it is possible also to do so as
one should; at all events this is the state of character that is
praised, being an unnamed mean in respect of honour. Relatively to
ambition it seems to be unambitiousness, and relatively to
unambitiousness it seems to be ambition, while relatively to both
severally it seems in a sense to be both together. This appears to
be true of the other virtues also. But in this case the extremes
seem to be contradictories because the mean has not received a name.

5

Good temper is a mean with respect to anger; the middle state
being unnamed, and the extremes almost without a name as well, we
place good temper in the middle position, though it inclines towards
the deficiency, which is without a name. The excess might called a
sort of 'irascibility'. For the passion is anger, while its causes are
many and diverse.

The man who is angry at the right things and with the right
people, and, further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he
ought, is praised. This will be the good-tempered man, then, since
good temper is praised. For the good-tempered man tends to be
unperturbed and not to be led by passion, but to be angry in the
manner, at the things, and for the length of time, that the rule
dictates; but he is thought to err rather in the direction of
deficiency; for the good-tempered man is not revengeful, but rather
tends to make allowances.

The deficiency, whether it is a sort of 'inirascibility' or whatever
it is, is blamed. For those who are not angry at the things they
should be angry at are thought to be fools, and so are those who are
not angry in the right way, at the right time, or with the right
persons; for such a man is thought not to feel things nor to be pained
by them, and, since he does not get angry, he is thought unlikely to
defend himself; and to endure being insulted and put up with insult to
one's friends is slavish.

The excess can be manifested in all the points that have been
named (for one can be angry with the wrong persons, at the wrong
things, more than is right, too quickly, or too long); yet all are not
found in the same person. Indeed they could not; for evil destroys
even itself, and if it is complete becomes unbearable. Now
hot-tempered people get angry quickly and with the wrong persons and
at the wrong things and more than is right, but their anger ceases
quickly-which is the best point about them. This happens to them
because they do not restrain their anger but retaliate openly owing to
their quickness of temper, and then their anger ceases. By reason of
excess choleric people are quick-tempered and ready to be angry with
everything and on every occasion; whence their name. Sulky people
are hard to appease, and retain their anger long; for they repress
their passion. But it ceases when they retaliate; for revenge relieves
them of their anger, producing in them pleasure instead of pain. If
this does not happen they retain their burden; for owing to its not
being obvious no one even reasons with them, and to digest one's anger
in oneself takes time. Such people are most troublesome to
themselves and to their dearest friends. We call had-tempered those
who are angry at the wrong things, more than is right, and longer, and
cannot be appeased until they inflict vengeance or punishment.

To good temper we oppose the excess rather than the defect; for
not only is it commoner since revenge is the more human), but
bad-tempered people are worse to live with.

What we have said in our earlier treatment of the subject is plain
also from what we are now saying; viz. that it is not easy to define
how, with whom, at what, and how long one should be angry, and at what
point right action ceases and wrong begins. For the man who strays a
little from the path, either towards the more or towards the less,
is not blamed; since sometimes we praise those who exhibit the
deficiency, and call them good-tempered, and sometimes we call angry
people manly, as being capable of ruling. How far, therefore, and
how a man must stray before he becomes blameworthy, it is not easy
to state in words; for the decision depends on the particular facts
and on perception. But so much at least is plain, that the middle
state is praiseworthy- that in virtue of which we are angry with the
right people, at the right things, in the right way, and so on,
while the excesses and defects are blameworthy- slightly so if they
are present in a low degree, more if in a higher degree, and very
much if in a high degree. Evidently, then, we must cling to the
middle state. - Enough of the states relative to anger.

6

In gatherings of men, in social life and the interchange of words
and deeds, some men are thought to be obsequious, viz. those who to
give pleasure praise everything and never oppose, but think it their
duty 'to give no pain to the people they meet'; while those who, on
the contrary, oppose everything and care not a whit about giving
pain are called churlish and contentious. That the states we have
named are culpable is plain enough, and that the middle state is
laudable- that in virtue of which a man will put up with, and will
resent, the right things and in the right way; but no name has been
assigned to it, though it most resembles friendship. For the man who
corresponds to this middle state is very much what, with affection
added, we call a good friend. But the state in question differs from
friendship in that it implies no passion or affection for one's
associates; since it is not by reason of loving or hating that such
a man takes everything in the right way, but by being a man of a
certain kind. For he will behave so alike towards those he knows and
those he does not know, towards intimates and those who are not so,
except that in each of these cases he will behave as is befitting; for
it is not proper to have the same care for intimates and for
strangers, nor again is it the same conditions that make it right to
give pain to them. Now we have said generally that he will associate
with people in the right way; but it is by reference to what is
honourable and expedient that he will aim at not giving pain or at
contributing pleasure. For he seems to be concerned with the pleasures
and pains of social life; and wherever it is not honourable, or is
harmful, for him to contribute pleasure, he will refuse, and will
choose rather to give pain; also if his acquiescence in another's
action would bring disgrace, and that in a high degree, or injury,
on that other, while his opposition brings a little pain, he will
not acquiesce but will decline. He will associate differently with
people in high station and with ordinary people, with closer and
more distant acquaintances, and so too with regard to all other
differences, rendering to each class what is befitting, and while
for its own sake he chooses to contribute pleasure, and avoids the
giving of pain, he will be guided by the consequences, if these are
greater, i. e. honour and expediency. For the sake of a great future
pleasure, too, he will inflict small pains.

The man who attains the mean, then, is such as we have described,
but has not received a name; of those who contribute pleasure, the man
who aims at being pleasant with no ulterior object is obsequious,
but the man who does so in order that he may get some advantage in the
direction of money or the things that money buys is a flatterer; while
the man who quarrels with everything is, as has been said, churlish
and contentious. And the extremes seem to be contradictory to each
other because the mean is without a name.

7

The mean opposed to boastfulness is found in almost the same sphere;
and this also is without a name. It will be no bad plan to describe
these states as well; for we shall both know the facts about character
better if we go through them in detail, and we shall be convinced that
the virtues are means if we see this to be so in all cases. In the
field of social life those who make the giving of pleasure or pain
their object in associating with others have been described; let us
now describe those who pursue truth or falsehood alike in words and
deeds and in the claims they put forward. The boastful man, then, is
thought to be apt to claim the things that bring glory, when he has
not got them, or to claim more of them than he has, and the
mock-modest man on the other hand to disclaim what he has or
belittle it, while the man who observes the mean is one who calls a
thing by its own name, being truthful both in life and in word, owning
to what he has, and neither more nor less. Now each of these courses
may be adopted either with or without an object. But each man speaks
and acts and lives in accordance with his character, if he is not
acting for some ulterior object. And falsehood is in itself mean and
culpable, and truth noble and worthy of praise. Thus the truthful
man is another case of a man who, being in the mean, is worthy of
praise, and both forms of untruthful man are culpable, and
particularly the boastful man.

Let us discuss them both, but first of all the truthful man. We
are not speaking of the man who keeps faith in his agreements, i. e. in
the things that pertain to justice or injustice (for this would belong
to another virtue), but the man who in the matters in which nothing of
this sort is at stake is true both in word and in life because his
character is such. But such a man would seem to be as a matter of fact
equitable. For the man who loves truth, and is truthful where
nothing is at stake, will still more be truthful where something is at
stake; he will avoid falsehood as something base, seeing that he
avoided it even for its own sake; and such a man is worthy of
praise. He inclines rather to understate the truth; for this seems
in better taste because exaggerations are wearisome.

He who claims more than he has with no ulterior object is a
contemptible sort of fellow (otherwise he would not have delighted
in falsehood), but seems futile rather than bad; but if he does it for
an object, he who does it for the sake of reputation or honour is (for
a boaster) not very much to be blamed, but he who does it for money,
or the things that lead to money, is an uglier character (it is not
the capacity that makes the boaster, but the purpose; for it is in
virtue of his state of character and by being a man of a certain
kind that he is boaster); as one man is a liar because he enjoys the
lie itself, and another because he desires reputation or gain. Now
those who boast for the sake of reputation claim such qualities as
will praise or congratulation, but those whose object is gain claim
qualities which are of value to one's neighbours and one's lack of
which is not easily detected, e. g. the powers of a seer, a sage, or
a physician. For this reason it is such things as these that most
people claim and boast about; for in them the above-mentioned
qualities are found.

Mock-modest people, who understate things, seem more attractive in
character; for they are thought to speak not for gain but to avoid
parade; and here too it is qualities which bring reputation that
they disclaim, as Socrates used to do. Those who disclaim trifling and
obvious qualities are called humbugs and are more contemptible; and
sometimes this seems to be boastfulness, like the Spartan dress; for
both excess and great deficiency are boastful. But those who use
understatement with moderation and understate about matters that do
not very much force themselves on our notice seem attractive. And it
is the boaster that seems to be opposed to the truthful man; for he is
the worse character.

8

Since life includes rest as well as activity, and in this is
included leisure and amusement, there seems here also to be a kind
of intercourse which is tasteful; there is such a thing as saying-
and again listening to- what one should and as one should. The
kind of people one is speaking or listening to will also make a
difference. Evidently here also there is both an excess and a
deficiency as compared with the mean. Those who carry humour to excess
are thought to be vulgar buffoons, striving after humour at all costs,
and aiming rather at raising a laugh than at saying what is becoming
and at avoiding pain to the object of their fun; while those who can
neither make a joke themselves nor put up with those who do are
thought to be boorish and unpolished. But those who joke in a tasteful
way are called ready-witted, which implies a sort of readiness to turn
this way and that; for such sallies are thought to be movements of the
character, and as bodies are discriminated by their movements, so
too are characters. The ridiculous side of things is not far to
seek, however, and most people delight more than they should in
amusement and in jestinly. and so even buffoons are called
ready-witted because they are found attractive; but that they differ
from the ready-witted man, and to no small extent, is clear from
what has been said.

To the middle state belongs also tact; it is the mark of a tactful
man to say and listen to such things as befit a good and well-bred
man; for there are some things that it befits such a man to say and to
hear by way of jest, and the well-bred man's jesting differs from that
of a vulgar man, and the joking of an educated man from that of an
uneducated. One may see this even from the old and the new comedies;
to the authors of the former indecency of language was amusing, to
those of the latter innuendo is more so; and these differ in no
small degree in respect of propriety. Now should we define the man who
jokes well by his saying what is not unbecoming to a well-bred man, or
by his not giving pain, or even giving delight, to the hearer? Or is
the latter definition, at any rate, itself indefinite, since different
things are hateful or pleasant to different people? The kind of
jokes he will listen to will be the same; for the kind he can put up
with are also the kind he seems to make. There are, then, jokes he
will not make; for the jest is a sort of abuse, and there are things
that lawgivers forbid us to abuse; and they should, perhaps, have
forbidden us even to make a jest of such. The refined and well-bred
man, therefore, will be as we have described, being as it were a law
to himself.

Such, then, is the man who observes the mean, whether he be called
tactful or ready-witted. The buffoon, on the other hand, is the slave
of his sense of humour, and spares neither himself nor others if he
can raise a laugh, and says things none of which a man of refinement
would say, and to some of which he would not even listen. The boor,
again, is useless for such social intercourse; for he contributes
nothing and finds fault with everything. But relaxation and
amusement are thought to be a necessary element in life.

The means in life that have been described, then, are three in
number, and are all concerned with an interchange of words and deeds
of some kind. They differ, however, in that one is concerned with
truth; and the other two with pleasantness. Of those concerned with
pleasure, one is displayed in jests, the other in the general social
intercourse of life.

9

Shame should not be described as a virtue; for it is more like a
feeling than a state of character. It is defined, at any rate, as a
kind of fear of dishonour, and produces an effect similar to that
produced by fear of danger; for people who feel disgraced blush, and
those who fear death turn pale. Both, therefore, seem to be in a sense
bodily conditions, which is thought to be characteristic of feeling
rather than of a state of character.

The feeling is not becoming to every age, but only to youth. For
we think young people should be prone to the feeling of shame
because they live by feeling and therefore commit many errors, but are
restrained by shame; and we praise young people who are prone to
this feeling, but an older person no one would praise for being
prone to the sense of disgrace, since we think he should not do
anything that need cause this sense. For the sense of disgrace is
not even characteristic of a good man, since it is consequent on bad
actions (for such actions should not be done; and if some actions
are disgraceful in very truth and others only according to common
opinion, this makes no difference; for neither class of actions should
be done, so that no disgrace should be felt); and it is a mark of a
bad man even to be such as to do any disgraceful action. To be so
constituted as to feel disgraced if one does such an action, and for
this reason to think oneself good, is absurd; for it is for
voluntary actions that shame is felt, and the good man will never
voluntarily do bad actions. But shame may be said to be
conditionally a good thing; if a good man does such actions, he will
feel disgraced; but the virtues are not subject to such a
qualification. And if shamelessness-not to be ashamed of doing base
actions-is bad, that does not make it good to be ashamed of doing such
actions. Continence too is not virtue, but a mixed sort of state; this
will be shown later. Now, however, let us discuss justice.

BOOK V

1

WITH regards to justice and injustice we must (1) consider what kind
of actions they are concerned with, (2) what sort of mean justice
is, and (3) between what extremes the just act is intermediate. Our
investigation shall follow the same course as the preceding
discussions.

We see that all men mean by justice that kind of state of
character which makes people disposed to do what is just and makes
them act justly and wish for what is just; and similarly by
injustice that state which makes them act unjustly and wish for what
is unjust. Let us too, then, lay this down as a general basis. For the
same is not true of the sciences and the faculties as of states of
character. A faculty or a science which is one and the same is held to
relate to contrary objects, but a state of character which is one of
two contraries does not produce the contrary results; e. g. as a result
of health we do not do what is the opposite of healthy, but only
what is healthy; for we say a man walks healthily, when he walks as
a healthy man would.

Now often one contrary state is recognized from its contrary, and
often states are recognized from the subjects that exhibit them; for
(A) if good condition is known, bad condition also becomes known,
and (B) good condition is known from the things that are in good
condition, and they from it. If good condition is firmness of flesh,
it is necessary both that bad condition should be flabbiness of
flesh and that the wholesome should be that which causes firmness in
flesh. And it follows for the most part that if one contrary is
ambiguous the other also will be ambiguous; e. g. if 'just' is so, that
'unjust' will be so too.

Now 'justice' and 'injustice' seem to be ambiguous, but because
their different meanings approach near to one another the ambiguity
escapes notice and is not obvious as it is, comparatively, when the
meanings are far apart, e. g. (for here the difference in outward
form is great) as the ambiguity in the use of kleis for the
collar-bone of an animal and for that with which we lock a door. Let
us take as a starting-point, then, the various meanings of 'an
unjust man'. Both the lawless man and the grasping and unfair man
are thought to be unjust, so that evidently both the law-abiding and
the fair man will be just. The just, then, is the lawful and the fair,
the unjust the unlawful and the unfair.

Since the unjust man is grasping, he must be concerned with
goods-not all goods, but those with which prosperity and adversity
have to do, which taken absolutely are always good, but for a
particular person are not always good. Now men pray for and pursue
these things; but they should not, but should pray that the things
that are good absolutely may also be good for them, and should
choose the things that are good for them. The unjust man does not
always choose the greater, but also the less-in the case of things bad
absolutely; but because the lesser evil is itself thought to be in a
sense good, and graspingness is directed at the good, therefore he
is thought to be grasping. And he is unfair; for this contains and
is common to both.

Since the lawless man was seen to be unjust and the law-abiding
man just, evidently all lawful acts are in a sense just acts; for
the acts laid down by the legislative art are lawful, and each of
these, we say, is just. Now the laws in their enactments on all
subjects aim at the common advantage either of all or of the best or
of those who hold power, or something of the sort; so that in one
sense we call those acts just that tend to produce and preserve
happiness and its components for the political society. And the law
bids us do both the acts of a brave man (e. g. not to desert our post
nor take to flight nor throw away our arms), and those of a
temperate man (e. g. not to commit adultery nor to gratify one's lust),
and those of a good-tempered man (e. g. not to strike another nor to
speak evil), and similarly with regard to the other virtues and
forms of wickedness, commanding some acts and forbidding others; and
the rightly-framed law does this rightly, and the hastily conceived
one less well. This form of justice, then, is complete virtue, but not
absolutely, but in relation to our neighbour. And therefore justice is
often thought to be the greatest of virtues, and 'neither evening
nor morning star' is so wonderful; and proverbially 'in justice is
every virtue comprehended'. And it is complete virtue in its fullest
sense, because it is the actual exercise of complete virtue. It is
complete because he who possesses it can exercise his virtue not
only in himself but towards his neighbour also; for many men can
exercise virtue in their own affairs, but not in their relations to
their neighbour. This is why the saying of Bias is thought to be true,
that 'rule will show the man'; for a ruler is necessarily in
relation to other men and a member of a society. For this same
reason justice, alone of the virtues, is thought to be 'another's
good', because it is related to our neighbour; for it does what is
advantageous to another, either a ruler or a copartner. Now the
worst man is he who exercises his wickedness both towards himself
and towards his friends, and the best man is not he who exercises
his virtue towards himself but he who exercises it towards another;
for this is a difficult task. Justice in this sense, then, is not part
of virtue but virtue entire, nor is the contrary injustice a part of
vice but vice entire. What the difference is between virtue and
justice in this sense is plain from what we have said; they are the
same but their essence is not the same; what, as a relation to one's
neighbour, is justice is, as a certain kind of state without
qualification, virtue.

2

But at all events what we are investigating is the justice which
is a part of virtue; for there is a justice of this kind, as we
maintain. Similarly it is with injustice in the particular sense
that we are concerned.

That there is such a thing is indicated by the fact that while the
man who exhibits in action the other forms of wickedness acts
wrongly indeed, but not graspingly (e. g. the man who throws away his
shield through cowardice or speaks harshly through bad temper or fails
to help a friend with money through meanness), when a man acts
graspingly he often exhibits none of these vices,-no, nor all
together, but certainly wickedness of some kind (for we blame him) and
injustice. There is, then, another kind of injustice which is a part
of injustice in the wide sense, and a use of the word 'unjust' which
answers to a part of what is unjust in the wide sense of 'contrary
to the law'. Again if one man commits adultery for the sake of gain
and makes money by it, while another does so at the bidding of
appetite though he loses money and is penalized for it, the latter
would be held to be self-indulgent rather than grasping, but the
former is unjust, but not self-indulgent; evidently, therefore, he
is unjust by reason of his making gain by his act. Again, all other
unjust acts are ascribed invariably to some particular kind of
wickedness, e. g.
adultery to self-indulgence, the desertion of a
comrade in battle to cowardice, physical violence to anger; but if a
man makes gain, his action is ascribed to no form of wickedness but
injustice. Evidently, therefore, there is apart from injustice in
the wide sense another, 'particular', injustice which shares the
name and nature of the first, because its definition falls within
the same genus; for the significance of both consists in a relation to
one's neighbour, but the one is concerned with honour or money or
safety-or that which includes all these, if we had a single name for
it-and its motive is the pleasure that arises from gain; while the
other is concerned with all the objects with which the good man is
concerned.

It is clear, then, that there is more than one kind of justice,
and that there is one which is distinct from virtue entire; we must
try to grasp its genus and differentia.

The unjust has been divided into the unlawful and the unfair, and
the just into the lawful and the fair. To the unlawful answers the
afore-mentioned sense of injustice. But since unfair and the
unlawful are not the same, but are different as a part is from its
whole (for all that is unfair is unlawful, but not all that is
unlawful is unfair), the unjust and injustice in the sense of the
unfair are not the same as but different from the former kind, as part
from whole; for injustice in this sense is a part of injustice in
the wide sense, and similarly justice in the one sense of justice in
the other. Therefore we must speak also about particular justice and
particular and similarly about the just and the unjust. The justice,
then, which answers to the whole of virtue, and the corresponding
injustice, one being the exercise of virtue as a whole, and the
other that of vice as a whole, towards one's neighbour, we may leave
on one side. And how the meanings of 'just' and 'unjust' which
answer to these are to be distinguished is evident; for practically
the majority of the acts commanded by the law are those which are
prescribed from the point of view of virtue taken as a whole; for
the law bids us practise every virtue and forbids us to practise any
vice. And the things that tend to produce virtue taken as a whole
are those of the acts prescribed by the law which have been prescribed
with a view to education for the common good. But with regard to the
education of the individual as such, which makes him without
qualification a good man, we must determine later whether this is
the function of the political art or of another; for perhaps it is not
the same to be a good man and a good citizen of any state taken at
random.

Of particular justice and that which is just in the corresponding
sense, (A) one kind is that which is manifested in distributions of
honour or money or the other things that fall to be divided among
those who have a share in the constitution (for in these it is
possible for one man to have a share either unequal or equal to that
of another), and (B) one is that which plays a rectifying part in
transactions between man and man. Of this there are two divisions;
of transactions (1) some are voluntary and (2) others
involuntary- voluntary such transactions as sale, purchase, loan for
consumption, pledging, loan for use, depositing, letting (they are
called voluntary because the origin of these transactions is
voluntary), while of the involuntary (a) some are clandestine, such as
theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves,
assassination, false witness, and (b) others are violent, such as
assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery with violence, mutilation,
abuse, insult.

3

(A) We have shown that both the unjust man and the unjust act are
unfair or unequal; now it is clear that there is also an
intermediate between the two unequals involved in either case. And
this is the equal; for in any kind of action in which there's a more
and a less there is also what is equal. If, then, the unjust is
unequal, just is equal, as all men suppose it to be, even apart from
argument. And since the equal is intermediate, the just will be an
intermediate. Now equality implies at least two things. The just,
then, must be both intermediate and equal and relative (i. e. for
certain persons). And since the equall intermediate it must be between
certain things (which are respectively greater and less); equal, it
involves two things; qua just, it is for certain people. The just,
therefore, involves at least four terms; for the persons for whom it
is in fact just are two, and the things in which it is manifested, the
objects distributed, are two. And the same equality will exist between
the persons and between the things concerned; for as the latter the
things concerned-are related, so are the former; if they are not
equal, they will not have what is equal, but this is the origin of
quarrels and complaints-when either equals have and are awarded
unequal shares, or unequals equal shares. Further, this is plain
from the fact that awards should be 'according to merit'; for all
men agree that what is just in distribution must be according to merit
in some sense, though they do not all specify the same sort of
merit, but democrats identify it with the status of freeman,
supporters of oligarchy with wealth (or with noble birth), and
supporters of aristocracy with excellence.

The just, then, is a species of the proportionate (proportion
being not a property only of the kind of number which consists of
abstract units, but of number in general). For proportion is
equality of ratios, and involves four terms at least (that discrete
proportion involves four terms is plain, but so does continuous
proportion, for it uses one term as two and mentions it twice; e. g.
'as the line A is to the line B, so is the line B to the line C';
the line B, then, has been mentioned twice, so that if the line B be
assumed twice, the proportional terms will be four); and the just,
too, involves at least four terms, and the ratio between one pair is
the same as that between the other pair; for there is a similar
distinction between the persons and between the things. As the term A,
then, is to B, so will C be to D, and therefore, alternando, as A is
to C, B will be to D. Therefore also the whole is in the same ratio to
the whole; and this coupling the distribution effects, and, if the
terms are so combined, effects justly. The conjunction, then, of the
term A with C and of B with D is what is just in distribution, and
this species of the just is intermediate, and the unjust is what
violates the proportion; for the proportional is intermediate, and the
just is proportional. (Mathematicians call this kind of proportion
geometrical; for it is in geometrical proportion that it follows
that the whole is to the whole as either part is to the
corresponding part. ) This proportion is not continuous; for we
cannot get a single term standing for a person and a thing.

This, then, is what the just is-the proportional; the unjust is what
violates the proportion. Hence one term becomes too great, the other
too small, as indeed happens in practice; for the man who acts
unjustly has too much, and the man who is unjustly treated too little,
of what is good. In the case of evil the reverse is true; for the
lesser evil is reckoned a good in comparison with the greater evil,
since the lesser evil is rather to be chosen than the greater, and
what is worthy of choice is good, and what is worthier of choice a
greater good.

This, then, is one species of the just.

4

(B) The remaining one is the rectificatory, which arises in
connexion with transactions both voluntary and involuntary. This
form of the just has a different specific character from the former.
For the justice which distributes common possessions is always in
accordance with the kind of proportion mentioned above (for in the
case also in which the distribution is made from the common funds of a
partnership it will be according to the same ratio which the funds put
into the business by the partners bear to one another); and the
injustice opposed to this kind of justice is that which violates the
proportion. But the justice in transactions between man and man is a
sort of equality indeed, and the injustice a sort of inequality; not
according to that kind of proportion, however, but according to
arithmetical proportion. For it makes no difference whether a good man
has defrauded a bad man or a bad man a good one, nor whether it is a
good or a bad man that has committed adultery; the law looks only to
the distinctive character of the injury, and treats the parties as
equal, if one is in the wrong and the other is being wronged, and if
one inflicted injury and the other has received it. Therefore, this
kind of injustice being an inequality, the judge tries to equalize it;
for in the case also in which one has received and the other has
inflicted a wound, or one has slain and the other been slain, the
suffering and the action have been unequally distributed; but the
judge tries to equalize by means of the penalty, taking away from
the gain of the assailant. For the term 'gain' is applied generally to
such cases, even if it be not a term appropriate to certain cases,
e. g. to the person who inflicts a woundand 'loss' to the sufferer;
at all events when the suffering has been estimated, the one is called
loss and the other gain. Therefore the equal is intermediate between
the greater and the less, but the gain and the loss are respectively
greater and less in contrary ways; more of the good and less of the
evil are gain, and the contrary is loss; intermediate between them is,
as we saw, equal, which we say is just; therefore corrective justice
will be the intermediate between loss and gain. This is why, when
people dispute, they take refuge in the judge; and to go to the
judge is to go to justice; for the nature of the judge is to be a sort
of animate justice; and they seek the judge as an intermediate, and in
some states they call judges mediators, on the assumption that if they
get what is intermediate they will get what is just. The just, then,
is an intermediate, since the judge is so. Now the judge restores
equality; it is as though there were a line divided into unequal
parts, and he took away that by which the greater segment exceeds
the half, and added it to the smaller segment. And when the whole
has been equally divided, then they say they have 'their own'-i. e.
when they have got what is equal. The equal is intermediate between
the greater and the lesser line according to arithmetical
proportion. It is for this reason also that it is called just
(sikaion), because it is a division into two equal parts (sicha), just
as if one were to call it sichaion; and the judge (sikastes) is one
who bisects (sichastes). For when something is subtracted from one
of two equals and added to the other, the other is in excess by
these two; since if what was taken from the one had not been added
to the other, the latter would have been in excess by one only. It
therefore exceeds the intermediate by one, and the intermediate
exceeds by one that from which something was taken. By this, then,
we shall recognize both what we must subtract from that which has
more, and what we must add to that which has less; we must add to
the latter that by which the intermediate exceeds it, and subtract
from the greatest that by which it exceeds the intermediate. Let the
lines AA', BB', CC' be equal to one another; from the line AA' let the
segment AE have been subtracted, and to the line CC' let the segment
CD have been added, so that the whole line DCC' exceeds the line EA'
by the segment CD and the segment CF; therefore it exceeds the line
BB' by the segment CD. (See diagram. )

These names, both loss and gain, have come from voluntary
exchange; for to have more than one's own is called gaining, and to
have less than one's original share is called losing, e. g. in buying
and selling and in all other matters in which the law has left
people free to make their own terms; but when they get neither more
nor less but just what belongs to themselves, they say that they
have their own and that they neither lose nor gain.

Therefore the just is intermediate between a sort of gain and a sort
of loss, viz. those which are involuntary; it consists in having an
equal amount before and after the transaction.

5

Some think that reciprocity is without qualification just, as the
Pythagoreans said; for they defined justice without qualification as
reciprocity. Now 'reciprocity' fits neither distributive nor
rectificatory justice-yet people want even the justice of Rhadamanthus
to mean this:

Should a man suffer what he did, right justice would be done

-for in many cases reciprocity and rectificatory justice are not in
accord; e. g. (1) if an official has inflicted a wound, he should not
be wounded in return, and if some one has wounded an official, he
ought not to be wounded only but punished in addition. Further (2)
there is a great difference between a voluntary and an involuntary
act. But in associations for exchange this sort of justice does hold
men together-reciprocity in accordance with a proportion and not on
the basis of precisely equal return. For it is by proportionate
requital that the city holds together. Men seek to return either
evil for evil-and if they cana not do so, think their position mere
slavery-or good for good-and if they cannot do so there is no
exchange, but it is by exchange that they hold together. This is why
they give a prominent place to the temple of the Graces-to promote the
requital of services; for this is characteristic of grace-we should
serve in return one who has shown grace to us, and should another time
take the initiative in showing it.

Now proportionate return is secured by cross-conjunction. Let A be a
builder, B a shoemaker, C a house, D a shoe. The builder, then, must
get from the shoemaker the latter's work, and must himself give him in
return his own. If, then, first there is proportionate equality of
goods, and then reciprocal action takes place, the result we mention
will be effected. If not, the bargain is not equal, and does not hold;
for there is nothing to prevent the work of the one being better
than that of the other; they must therefore be equated. (And this is
true of the other arts also; for they would have been destroyed if
what the patient suffered had not been just what the agent did, and of
the same amount and kind. ) For it is not two doctors that associate
for exchange, but a doctor and a farmer, or in general people who
are different and unequal; but these must be equated. This is why
all things that are exchanged must be somehow comparable. It is for
this end that money has been introduced, and it becomes in a sense
an intermediate; for it measures all things, and therefore the
excess and the defect-how many shoes are equal to a house or to a
given amount of food. The number of shoes exchanged for a house (or
for a given amount of food) must therefore correspond to the ratio
of builder to shoemaker. For if this be not so, there will be no
exchange and no intercourse. And this proportion will not be
effected unless the goods are somehow equal. All goods must
therefore be measured by some one thing, as we said before. Now this
unit is in truth demand, which holds all things together (for if men
did not need one another's goods at all, or did not need them equally,
there would be either no exchange or not the same exchange); but money
has become by convention a sort of representative of demand; and
this is why it has the name 'money' (nomisma)-because it exists not by
nature but by law (nomos) and it is in our power to change it and make
it useless. There will, then, be reciprocity when the terms have
been equated so that as farmer is to shoemaker, the amount of the
shoemaker's work is to that of the farmer's work for which it
exchanges. But we must not bring them into a figure of proportion when
they have already exchanged (otherwise one extreme will have both
excesses), but when they still have their own goods. Thus they are
equals and associates just because this equality can be effected in
their case. Let A be a farmer, C food, B a shoemaker, D his product
equated to C. If it had not been possible for reciprocity to be thus
effected, there would have been no association of the parties. That
demand holds things together as a single unit is shown by the fact
that when men do not need one another, i. e. when neither needs the
other or one does not need the other, they do not exchange, as we do
when some one wants what one has oneself, e. g. when people permit
the exportation of corn in exchange for wine. This equation
therefore must be established. And for the future exchange-that if
we do not need a thing now we shall have it if ever we do need
it-money is as it were our surety; for it must be possible for us to
get what we want by bringing the money. Now the same thing happens
to money itself as to goods-it is not always worth the same; yet it
tends to be steadier. This is why all goods must have a price set on
them; for then there will always be exchange, and if so, association
of man with man. Money, then, acting as a measure, makes goods
commensurate and equates them; for neither would there have been
association if there were not exchange, nor exchange if there were not
equality, nor equality if there were not commensurability. Now in
truth it is impossible that things differing so much should become
commensurate, but with reference to demand they may become so
sufficiently. There must, then, be a unit, and that fixed by agreement
(for which reason it is called money); for it is this that makes all
things commensurate, since all things are measured by money. Let A
be a house, B ten minae, C a bed. A is half of B, if the house is
worth five minae or equal to them; the bed, C, is a tenth of B; it
is plain, then, how many beds are equal to a house, viz. five. That
exchange took place thus before there was money is plain; for it makes
no difference whether it is five beds that exchange for a house, or
the money value of five beds.

We have now defined the unjust and the just. These having been
marked off from each other, it is plain that just action is
intermediate between acting unjustly and being unjustly treated; for
the one is to have too much and the other to have too little.
Justice is a kind of mean, but not in the same way as the other
virtues, but because it relates to an intermediate amount, while
injustice relates to the extremes. And justice is that in virtue of
which the just man is said to be a doer, by choice, of that which is
just, and one who will distribute either between himself and another
or between two others not so as to give more of what is desirable to
himself and less to his neighbour (and conversely with what is
harmful), but so as to give what is equal in accordance with
proportion; and similarly in distributing between two other persons.
Injustice on the other hand is similarly related to the unjust,
which is excess and defect, contrary to proportion, of the useful or
hurtful. For which reason injustice is excess and defect, viz. because
it is productive of excess and defect-in one's own case excess of what
is in its own nature useful and defect of what is hurtful, while in
the case of others it is as a whole like what it is in one's own case,
but proportion may be violated in either direction. In the unjust
act to have too little is to be unjustly treated; to have too much
is to act unjustly.

Let this be taken as our account of the nature of justice and
injustice, and similarly of the just and the unjust in general.

6

Since acting unjustly does not necessarily imply being unjust, we
must ask what sort of unjust acts imply that the doer is unjust with
respect to each type of injustice, e. g. a thief, an adulterer, or a
brigand. Surely the answer does not turn on the difference between
these types. For a man might even lie with a woman knowing who she
was, but the origin of his might be not deliberate choice but passion.
He acts unjustly, then, but is not unjust; e. g. a man is not a
thief, yet he stole, nor an adulterer, yet he committed adultery;
and similarly in all other cases.

Now we have previously stated how the reciprocal is related to the
just; but we must not forget that what we are looking for is not
only what is just without qualification but also political justice.
This is found among men who share their life with a view to
selfsufficiency, men who are free and either proportionately or
arithmetically equal, so that between those who do not fulfil this
condition there is no political justice but justice in a special sense
and by analogy. For justice exists only between men whose mutual
relations are governed by law; and law exists for men between whom
there is injustice; for legal justice is the discrimination of the
just and the unjust. And between men between whom there is injustice
there is also unjust action (though there is not injustice between all
between whom there is unjust action), and this is assigning too much
to oneself of things good in themselves and too little of things
evil in themselves. This is why we do not allow a man to rule, but
rational principle, because a man behaves thus in his own interests
and becomes a tyrant. The magistrate on the other hand is the guardian
of justice, and, if of justice, then of equality also. And since he is
assumed to have no more than his share, if he is just (for he does not
assign to himself more of what is good in itself, unless such a
share is proportional to his merits-so that it is for others that he
labours, and it is for this reason that men, as we stated
previously, say that justice is 'another's good'), therefore a
reward must be given him, and this is honour and privilege; but
those for whom such things are not enough become tyrants.

The justice of a master and that of a father are not the same as the
justice of citizens, though they are like it; for there can be no
injustice in the unqualified sense towards thing that are one's own,
but a man's chattel, and his child until it reaches a certain age
and sets up for itself, are as it were part of himself, and no one
chooses to hurt himself (for which reason there can be no injustice
towards oneself). Therefore the justice or injustice of citizens is
not manifested in these relations; for it was as we saw according to
law, and between people naturally subject to law, and these as we saw'
are people who have an equal share in ruling and being ruled. Hence
justice can more truly be manifested towards a wife than towards
children and chattels, for the former is household justice; but even
this is different from political justice.

7

Of political justice part is natural, part legal, natural, that
which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's
thinking this or that; legal, that which is originally indifferent,
but when it has been laid down is not indifferent, e. g. that a
prisoner's ransom shall be a mina, or that a goat and not two sheep
shall be sacrificed, and again all the laws that are passed for
particular cases, e. g. that sacrifice shall be made in honour of
Brasidas, and the provisions of decrees. Now some think that all
justice is of this sort, because that which is by nature is
unchangeable and has everywhere the same force (as fire burns both
here and in Persia), while they see change in the things recognized as
just. This, however, is not true in this unqualified way, but is
true in a sense; or rather, with the gods it is perhaps not true at
all, while with us there is something that is just even by nature, yet
all of it is changeable; but still some is by nature, some not by
nature. It is evident which sort of thing, among things capable of
being otherwise, is by nature, and which is not but is legal and
conventional, assuming that both are equally changeable. And in all
other things the same distinction will apply; by nature the right hand
is stronger, yet it is possible that all men should come to be
ambidextrous. The things which are just by virtue of convention and
expediency are like measures; for wine and corn measures are not
everywhere equal, but larger in wholesale and smaller in retail
markets. Similarly, the things which are just not by nature but by
human enactment are not everywhere the same, since constitutions
also are not the same, though there is but one which is everywhere
by nature the best. Of things just and lawful each is related as the
universal to its particulars; for the things that are done are many,
but of them each is one, since it is universal.

There is a difference between the act of injustice and what is
unjust, and between the act of justice and what is just; for a thing
is unjust by nature or by enactment; and this very thing, when it
has been done, is an act of injustice, but before it is done is not
yet that but is unjust. So, too, with an act of justice (though the
general term is rather 'just action', and 'act of justice' is
applied to the correction of the act of injustice).

Each of these must later be examined separately with regard to the
nature and number of its species and the nature of the things with
which it is concerned.

8

Acts just and unjust being as we have described them, a man acts
unjustly or justly whenever he does such acts voluntarily; when
involuntarily, he acts neither unjustly nor justly except in an
incidental way; for he does things which happen to be just or
unjust. Whether an act is or is not one of injustice (or of justice)
is determined by its voluntariness or involuntariness; for when it
is voluntary it is blamed, and at the same time is then an act of
injustice; so that there will be things that are unjust but not yet
acts of injustice, if voluntariness be not present as well. By the
voluntary I mean, as has been said before, any of the things in a
man's own power which he does with knowledge, i. e. not in ignorance
either of the person acted on or of the instrument used or of the
end that will be attained (e. g. whom he is striking, with what, and to
what end), each such act being done not incidentally nor under
compulsion (e. g. if A takes B's hand and therewith strikes C, B does
not act voluntarily; for the act was not in his own power). The person
struck may be the striker's father, and the striker may know that it
is a man or one of the persons present, but not know that it is his
father; a similar distinction may be made in the case of the end,
and with regard to the whole action. Therefore that which is done in
ignorance, or though not done in ignorance is not in the agent's
power, or is done under compulsion, is involuntary (for many natural
processes, even, we knowingly both perform and experience, none of
which is either voluntary or involuntary; e. g. growing old or
dying). But in the case of unjust and just acts alike the injustice or
justice may be only incidental; for a man might return a deposit
unwillingly and from fear, and then he must not be said either to do
what is just or to act justly, except in an incidental way.
Similarly the man who under compulsion and unwillingly fails to return
the deposit must be said to act unjustly, and to do what is unjust,
only incidentally. Of voluntary acts we do some by choice, others
not by choice; by choice those which we do after deliberation, not
by choice those which we do without previous deliberation. Thus
there are three kinds of injury in transactions between man and man;
those done in ignorance are mistakes when the person acted on, the
act, the instrument, or the end that will be attained is other than
the agent supposed; the agent thought either that he was not hiting
any one or that he was not hitting with this missile or not hitting
this person or to this end, but a result followed other than that
which he thought likely (e. g. he threw not with intent to wound but
only to prick), or the person hit or the missile was other than he
supposed. Now when (1) the injury takes place contrary to reasonable
expectation, it is a misadventure. When (2) it is not contrary to
reasonable expectation, but does not imply vice, it is a mistake
(for a man makes a mistake when the fault originates in him, but is
the victim of accident when the origin lies outside him). When (3)
he acts with knowledge but not after deliberation, it is an act of
injustice-e. g. the acts due to anger or to other passions necessary or
natural to man; for when men do such harmful and mistaken acts they
act unjustly, and the acts are acts of injustice, but this does not
imply that the doers are unjust or wicked; for the injury is not due
to vice. But when (4) a man acts from choice, he is an unjust man
and a vicious man.

Hence acts proceeding from anger are rightly judged not to be done
of malice aforethought; for it is not the man who acts in anger but he
who enraged him that starts the mischief. Again, the matter in dispute
is not whether the thing happened or not, but its justice; for it is
apparent injustice that occasions rage. For they do not dispute
about the occurrence of the act-as in commercial transactions where
one of the two parties must be vicious-unless they do so owing to
forgetfulness; but, agreeing about the fact, they dispute on which
side justice lies (whereas a man who has deliberately injured
another cannot help knowing that he has done so), so that the one
thinks he is being treated unjustly and the other disagrees.

But if a man harms another by choice, he acts unjustly; and these
are the acts of injustice which imply that the doer is an unjust
man, provided that the act violates proportion or equality. Similarly,
a man is just when he acts justly by choice; but he acts justly if
he merely acts voluntarily.

Of involuntary acts some are excusable, others not. For the mistakes
which men make not only in ignorance but also from ignorance are
excusable, while those which men do not from ignorance but (though
they do them in ignorance) owing to a passion which is neither natural
nor such as man is liable to, are not excusable.

9

Assuming that we have sufficiently defined the suffering and doing
of injustice, it may be asked (1) whether the truth in expressed in
Euripides' paradoxical words:

I slew my mother, that's my tale in brief.

Were you both willing, or unwilling both?

Is it truly possible to be willingly treated unjustly, or is all
suffering of injustice the contrary involuntary, as all unjust
action is voluntary? And is all suffering of injustice of the latter
kind or else all of the former, or is it sometimes voluntary,
sometimes involuntary? So, too, with the case of being justly treated;
all just action is voluntary, so that it is reasonable that there
should be a similar opposition in either case-that both being unjustly
and being justly treated should be either alike voluntary or alike
involuntary. But it would be thought paradoxical even in the case of
being justly treated, if it were always voluntary; for some are
unwillingly treated justly. (2) One might raise this question also,
whether every one who has suffered what is unjust is being unjustly
treated, or on the other hand it is with suffering as with acting.
In action and in passivity alike it is possible to partake of
justice incidentally, and similarly (it is plain) of injustice; for to
do what is unjust is not the same as to act unjustly, nor to suffer
what is unjust as to be treated unjustly, and similarly in the case of
acting justly and being justly treated; for it is impossible to be
unjustly treated if the other does not act unjustly, or justly treated
unless he acts justly. Now if to act unjustly is simply to harm some
one voluntarily, and 'voluntarily' means 'knowing the person acted on,
the instrument, and the manner of one's acting', and the incontinent
man voluntarily harms himself, not only will he voluntarily be
unjustly treated but it will be possible to treat oneself unjustly.
(This also is one of the questions in doubt, whether a man can treat
himself unjustly. ) Again, a man may voluntarily, owing to
incontinence, be harmed by another who acts voluntarily, so that it
would be possible to be voluntarily treated unjustly. Or is our
definition incorrect; must we to 'harming another, with knowledge both
of the person acted on, of the instrument, and of the manner' add
'contrary to the wish of the person acted on'? Then a man may be
voluntarily harmed and voluntarily suffer what is unjust, but no one
is voluntarily treated unjustly; for no one wishes to be unjustly
treated, not even the incontinent man. He acts contrary to his wish;
for no one wishes for what he does not think to be good, but the
incontinent man does do things that he does not think he ought to
do. Again, one who gives what is his own, as Homer says Glaucus gave
Diomede

Armour of gold for brazen, the price of a hundred beeves for nine,

is not unjustly treated; for though to give is in his power, to be
unjustly treated is not, but there must be some one to treat him
unjustly. It is plain, then, that being unjustly treated is not
voluntary.

Of the questions we intended to discuss two still remain for
discussion; (3) whether it is the man who has assigned to another more
than his share that acts unjustly, or he who has the excessive
share, and (4) whether it is possible to treat oneself unjustly.