But when hope is voided in the blessed, whereby they hoped for
their own happiness, they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet
not by the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity.
their own happiness, they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet
not by the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity.
Summa Theologica
17:5): "Cursed be the man that
trusteth in man. "
I answer that, Hope, as stated above [2433](A[1]; [2434]FS, Q[40],
A[7]), regards two things, viz. the good which it intends to obtain,
and the help by which that good is obtained. Now the good which a man
hopes to obtain, has the aspect of a final cause, while the help by
which one hopes to obtain that good, has the character of an efficient
cause. Now in each of these kinds of cause we find a principal and a
secondary cause. For the principal end is the last end, while the
secondary end is that which is referred to an end. In like manner the
principal efficient cause is the first agent, while the secondary
efficient cause is the secondary and instrumental agent. Now hope
regards eternal happiness as its last end, and the Divine assistance as
the first cause leading to happiness.
Accordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any good save
happiness, as one's last end, but only as something referred to final
happiness, so too, it is unlawful to hope in any man, or any creature,
as though it were the first cause of movement towards happiness. It is,
however, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as being the secondary
and instrumental agent through whom one is helped to obtain any goods
that are ordained to happiness. It is in this way that we turn to the
saints, and that we ask men also for certain things; and for this
reason some are blamed in that they cannot be trusted to give help.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether hope is a theological virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For a
theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now hope has for
its object not only God but also other goods which we hope to obtain
from God. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
Objection 2: Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two
vices, as stated above ([2435]FS, Q[64], A[4]). But hope is a mean
between presumption and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a
species of fortitude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation, it
seems that hope is not a theological, but a moral virtue.
Objection 4: Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it
belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the
arduous. Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue.
On the contrary, Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13) together with faith and
charity, which are theological virtues.
I answer that, Since specific differences, by their very nature, divide
a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place hope, we
must observe whence it derives its character of virtue.
Now it has been stated above [2436](A[1]) that hope has the character
of virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human
actions: and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, in as
much as it leans on its assistance, and as its last final cause, in as
much as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is
evident that God is the principal object of hope, considered as a
virtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one that
has God for its object, as stated above ([2437]FS, Q[62], A[1]), it is
evident that hope is a theological virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes
for it in reference to God as the last end, or as the first efficient
cause, as stated above [2438](A[4]).
Reply to Objection 2: In things measured and ruled the mean consists in
the measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the rule, there is
excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the
rule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes.
Now a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and these
things are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to it to follow
the mean as regards its proper object. On the other hand, a theological
virtue is concerned with the First Rule not ruled by another rule, and
that Rule is its proper object. Wherefore it is not proper for a
theological virtue, with regard to its proper object, to follow the
mean, although this may happen to it accidentally with regard to
something that is referred to its principal object. Thus faith can have
no mean or extremes in the point of trusting to the First Truth, in
which it is impossible to trust too much; whereas on the part of the
things believed, it may have a mean and extremes; for instance one
truth is a mean between two falsehoods. So too, hope has no mean or
extremes, as regards its principal object, since it is impossible to
trust too much in the Divine assistance; yet it may have a mean and
extremes, as regards those things a man trusts to obtain, in so far as
he either presumes above his capability, or despairs of things of which
he is capable.
Reply to Objection 3: The expectation which is mentioned in the
definition of hope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which
belongs to longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine
assistance, whether that which we hope for be delayed or not.
Reply to Objection 4: Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the
hope of obtaining something that is within one's power, wherefore its
proper object is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope, as
a theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by
another's help, as stated above [2439](A[1]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope is distinct from the other theological virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not distinct from the other
theological virtues. For habits are distinguished by their objects, as
stated above ([2440]FS, Q[54], A[2]). Now the object of hope is the
same as of the other theological virtues. Therefore hope is not
distinct from the other theological virtues.
Objection 2: Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby we make
profession of faith, we say: "I expect the resurrection of the dead and
the life of the world to come. " Now expectation of future happiness
belongs to hope, as stated above [2441](A[5]). Therefore hope is not
distinct from faith.
Objection 3: Further, by hope man tends to God. But this belongs
properly to charity. Therefore hope is not distinct from charity.
On the contrary, There cannot be number without distinction. Now hope
is numbered with the other theological virtues: for Gregory says
(Moral. i, 16) that the three virtues are faith, hope, and charity.
Therefore hope is distinct from the theological virtues.
I answer that, A virtue is said to be theological from having God for
the object to which it adheres. Now one may adhere to a thing in two
ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because something else is
attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to God for His
own sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love.
On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to God as to a
principle wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we derive from God
both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness.
Accordingly faith makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we
derive the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God tells us
is true: while hope makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we
derive perfect goodness, i. e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to the
Divine assistance for obtaining happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: God is the object of these virtues under
different aspects, as stated above: and a different aspect of the
object suffices for the distinction of habits, as stated above
([2442]FS, Q[54], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Expectation is mentioned in the symbol of faith,
not as though it were the proper act of faith, but because the act of
hope presupposes the act of faith, as we shall state further on
[2443](A[7]). Hence an act of faith is expressed in the act of hope.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope makes us tend to God, as to a good to be
obtained finally, and as to a helper strong to assist: whereas charity,
properly speaking, makes us tend to God, by uniting our affections to
Him, so that we live, not for ourselves, but for God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope precedes faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope precedes faith. Because a gloss on
Ps. 36:3, "Trust in the Lord, and do good," says: "Hope is the entrance
to faith and the beginning of salvation. " But salvation is by faith
whereby we are justified. Therefore hope precedes faith.
Objection 2: Further, that which is included in a definition should
precede the thing defined and be more known. But hope is included in
the definition of faith (Heb. 11:1): "Faith is the substance of things
to be hoped for. " Therefore hope precedes faith.
Objection 3: Further, hope precedes a meritorious act, for the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 9:10): "He that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to
receive fruit. " But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore hope
precedes faith.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 1:2): "Abraham begot Isaac," i. e.
"Faith begot hope," according to a gloss.
I answer that, Absolutely speaking, faith precedes hope. For the object
of hope is a future good, arduous but possible to obtain. In order,
therefore, that we may hope, it is necessary for the object of hope to
be proposed to us as possible. Now the object of hope is, in one way,
eternal happiness, and in another way, the Divine assistance, as
explained above [2444](A[2]; A[6], ad 3): and both of these are
proposed to us by faith, whereby we come to know that we are able to
obtain eternal life, and that for this purpose the Divine assistance is
ready for us, according to Heb. 11:6: "He that cometh to God, must
believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him. " Therefore
it is evident that faith precedes hope.
Reply to Objection 1: As the same gloss observes further on, "hope" is
called "the entrance" to faith, i. e. of the thing believed, because by
hope we enter in to see what we believe. Or we may reply that it is
called the "entrance to faith," because thereby man begins to be
established and perfected in faith.
Reply to Objection 2: The thing to be hoped for is included in the
definition of faith, because the proper object of faith, is something
not apparent in itself. Hence it was necessary to express it in a
circumlocution by something resulting from faith.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope does not precede every meritorious act; but
it suffices for it to accompany or follow it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity precedes hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity precedes hope. For Ambrose says
on Lk. 27:6, "If you had faith like to a grain of mustard seed," etc. :
"Charity flows from faith, and hope from charity. " But faith precedes
charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "good
emotions and affections proceed from love and holy charity. " Now to
hope, considered as an act of hope, is a good emotion of the soul.
Therefore it flows from charity.
Objection 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. iii, D, 26) that hope
proceeds from merits, which precede not only the thing hoped for, but
also hope itself, which, in the order of nature, is preceded by
charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the
commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience," i. e.
"from hope," according to a gloss. Therefore hope precedes charity.
I answer that, Order is twofold. One is the order of generation and of
matter, in respect of which the imperfect precedes the perfect: the
other is the order of perfection and form, in respect of which the
perfect naturally precedes the imperfect. In respect of the first order
hope precedes charity: and this is clear from the fact that hope and
all movements of the appetite flow from love, as stated above
([2445]FS, Q[27], A[4]; [2446]FS, Q[28], A[6], ad 2; [2447]FS, Q[40],
A[7]) in the treatise on the passions.
Now there is a perfect, and an imperfect love. Perfect love is that
whereby a man is loved in himself, as when someone wishes a person some
good for his own sake; thus a man loves his friend. Imperfect love is
that whereby a man love something, not for its own sake, but that he
may obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves what he desires. The
first love of God pertains to charity, which adheres to God for His own
sake; while hope pertains to the second love, since he that hopes,
intends to obtain possession of something for himself.
Hence in the order of generation, hope precedes charity. For just as a
man is led to love God, through fear of being punished by Him for his
sins, as Augustine states (In primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so too,
hope leads to charity, in as much as a man through hoping to be
rewarded by God, is encouraged to love God and obey His commandments.
On the other hand, in the order of perfection charity naturally
precedes hope, wherefore, with the advent of charity, hope is made more
perfect, because we hope chiefly in our friends. It is in this sense
that Ambrose states (OBJ[1]) that charity flows from hope: so that this
suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope and every movement of the appetite proceed
from some kind of love, whereby the expected good is loved. But not
every kind of hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of
living hope, viz. that whereby man hopes to obtain good from God, as
from a friend.
Reply to Objection 3: The Master is speaking of living hope, which is
naturally preceded by charity and the merits caused by charity.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SUBJECT OF HOPE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subject of hope, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the virtue of hope is in the will as its subject?
(2) Whether it is in the blessed?
(3) Whether it is in the damned?
(4) Whether there is certainty in the hope of the wayfarer?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope is in the will as its subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not in the will as its subject.
For the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above (Q[17],
A[1]; [2448]FS, Q[40], A[1]). Now the arduous is the object, not of the
will, but of the irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will but in
the irascible.
Objection 2: Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add
another. Now charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which is
the most perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the will.
Objection 3: Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts at
the same time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things
simultaneously. Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act
of charity. Since, then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the
will, it follows that the act of hope does not belong to that power: so
that, therefore, hope is not in the will.
On the contrary, The soul is not apprehensive of God save as regards
the mind in which is memory, intellect and will, as Augustine declares
(De Trin. xiv, 3,6). Now hope is a theological virtue having God for
its object. Since therefore it is neither in the memory, nor in the
intellect, which belong to the cognitive faculty, it follows that it is
in the will as its subject.
I answer that, As shown above ([2449]FP, Q[87], A[2]), habits are known
by their acts. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive
faculty, since its object is a good. And, since there is a twofold
appetite in man, namely, the sensitive which is divided into irascible
and concupiscible, and the intellective appetite, called the will, as
stated in the [2450]FP, Q[82], A[5], those movements which occur in the
lower appetite, are with passion, while those in the higher appetite
are without passion, as shown above ([2451]FP, Q[87], A[2], ad 1;
[2452]FS, Q[22], A[3], ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of hope cannot
belong to the sensitive appetite, since the good which is the principal
object of this virtue, is not a sensible but a Divine good. Therefore
hope resides in the higher appetite called the will, and not in the
lower appetite, of which the irascible is a part.
Reply to Objection 1: The object of the irascible is an arduous
sensible: whereas the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous
intelligible, or rather superintelligible.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity perfects the will sufficiently with
regard to one act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is
required in order to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is
that of hoping.
Reply to Objection 3: The movement of hope and the movement of charity
are mutually related, as was shown above (Q[17], A[8]). Hence there is
no reason why both movements should not belong at the same time to the
same power: even as the intellect can understand many things at the
same time if they be related to one another, as stated in the [2453]FP,
Q[85], A[4].
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in the blessed there is hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the blessed there is hope. For
Christ was a perfect comprehensor from the first moment of His
conception. Now He had hope, since, according to a gloss, the words of
Ps. 30:2, "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped," are said in His person.
Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.
Objection 2: Further, even as the obtaining of happiness is an arduous
good, so is its continuation. Now, before they obtain happiness, men
hope to obtain it. Therefore, after they have obtained it, they can
hope to continue in its possession.
Objection 3: Further, by the virtue of hope, a man can hope for
happiness, not only for himself, but also for others, as stated above
([2454]Q[17], A[3]). But the blessed who are in heaven hope for the
happiness of others, else they would not pray for them. Therefore there
can be hope in them.
Objection 4: Further, the happiness of the saints implies not only
glory of the soul but also glory of the body. Now the souls of the
saints in heaven, look yet for the glory of their bodies (Apoc. 6:10;
Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore in the blessed there can be
hope.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "What a man seeth, why
doth he hope for? " Now the blessed enjoy the sight of God. Therefore
hope has no place in them.
I answer that, If what gives a thing its species be removed, the
species is destroyed, and that thing cannot remain the same; just as
when a natural body loses its form, it does not remain the same
specifically. Now hope takes its species from its principal object,
even as the other virtues do, as was shown above (Q[17], AA[5],6;
[2455]FS, Q[54], A[2]): and its principal object is eternal happiness
as being possible to obtain by the assistance of God, as stated above
(Q[17], A[2]).
Since then the arduous possible good cannot be an object of hope except
in so far as it is something future, it follows that when happiness is
no longer future, but present, it is incompatible with the virtue of
hope. Consequently hope, like faith, is voided in heaven, and neither
of them can be in the blessed.
Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ was a comprehensor and therefore
blessed as to the enjoyment of God, nevertheless He was, at the same
time, a wayfarer, as regards the passibility of nature, to which He was
still subject. Hence it was possible for Him to hope for the glory of
impassibility and immortality, yet not so as to the virtue of hope, the
principal object of which is not the glory of the body but the
enjoyment of God.
Reply to Objection 2: The happiness of the saints is called eternal
life, because through enjoying God they become partakers, as it were,
of God's eternity which surpasses all time: so that the continuation of
happiness does not differ in respect of present, past and future. Hence
the blessed do not hope for the continuation of their happiness (for as
regards this there is no future), but are in actual possession thereof.
Reply to Objection 3: So long as the virtue of hope lasts, it is by the
same hope that one hopes for one's own happiness, and for that of
others.
But when hope is voided in the blessed, whereby they hoped for
their own happiness, they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet
not by the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity. Even so,
he that has Divine charity, by that same charity loves his neighbor,
without having the virtue of charity, but by some other love.
Reply to Objection 4: Since hope is a theological virtue having God for
its object, its principal object is the glory of the soul, which
consists in the enjoyment of God, and not the glory of the body.
Moreover, although the glory of the body is something arduous in
comparison with human nature, yet it is not so for one who has the
glory of the soul; both because the glory of the body is a very small
thing as compared with the glory of the soul, and because one who has
the glory of the soul has already the sufficient cause of the glory of
the body.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope is in the damned?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is hope in the damned. For the
devil is damned and prince of the damned, according to Mat. 25:41:
"Depart . . . you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for
the devil and his angels. " But the devil has hope, according to Job
40:28, "Behold his hope shall fail him. " Therefore it seems that the
damned have hope.
Objection 2: Further, just as faith is either living or dead, so is
hope. But lifeless faith can be in the devils and the damned, according
to James 2:19: "The devils . . . believe and tremble. " Therefore it
seems that lifeless hope also can be in the damned.
Objection 3: Further, after death there accrues to man no merit or
demerit that he had not before, according to Eccles. 11:3, "If the tree
fall to the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall,
there shall it be. " Now many who are damned, in this life hoped and
never despaired. Therefore they will hope in the future life also.
On the contrary, Hope causes joy, according to Rom. 12:12, "Rejoicing
in hope. " Now the damned have no joy, but sorrow and grief, according
to Is. 65:14, "My servants shall praise for joyfulness of heart, and
you shall cry for sorrow of heart, and shall howl for grief of spirit. "
Therefore no hope is in the damned.
I answer that, Just as it is a condition of happiness that the will
should find rest therein, so is it a condition of punishment, that what
is inflicted in punishment, should go against the will. Now that which
is not known can neither be restful nor repugnant to the will:
wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 17) that the angels could
not be perfectly happy in their first state before their confirmation,
or unhappy before their fall, since they had no foreknowledge of what
would happen to them. For perfect and true happiness requires that one
should be certain of being happy for ever, else the will would not
rest.
In like manner, since the everlastingness of damnation is a necessary
condition of the punishment of the damned, it would not be truly penal
unless it went against the will; and this would be impossible if they
were ignorant of the everlastingness of their damnation. Hence it
belongs to the unhappy state of the damned, that they should know that
they cannot by any means escape from damnation and obtain happiness.
Wherefore it is written (Job 15:22): "He believeth not that he may
return from darkness to light. " It is, therefore, evident that they
cannot apprehend happiness as a possible good, as neither can the
blessed apprehend it as a future good. Consequently there is no hope
either in the blessed or in the damned. On the other hand, hope can be
in wayfarers, whether of this life or in purgatory, because in either
case they apprehend happiness as a future possible thing.
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 20) this is said
of the devil as regards his members, whose hope will fail utterly: or,
if it be understood of the devil himself, it may refer to the hope
whereby he expects to vanquish the saints, in which sense we read just
before (Job 40:18): "He trusteth that the Jordan may run into his
mouth": this is not, however, the hope of which we are speaking.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), "faith is
about things, bad or good, past, present, or future, one's own or
another's; whereas hope is only about good things, future and
concerning oneself. " Hence it is possible for lifeless faith to be in
the damned, but not hope, since the Divine goods are not for them
future possible things, but far removed from them.
Reply to Objection 3: Lack of hope in the damned does not change their
demerit, as neither does the voiding of hope in the blessed increase
their merit: but both these things are due to the change in their
respective states.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is certainty in the hope of a wayfarer?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no certainty in the hope of a
wayfarer. For hope resides in the will. But certainty pertains not to
the will but to the intellect. Therefore there is no certainty in hope.
Objection 2: Further, hope is based on grace and merits, as stated
above (Q[17], A[1]). Now it is impossible in this life to know for
certain that we are in a state of grace, as stated above ([2456]FS,
Q[112], A[5]). Therefore there is no certainty in the hope of a
wayfarer.
Objection 3: Further, there can be no certainty about that which may
fail. Now many a hopeful wayfarer fails to obtain happiness. Therefore
wayfarer's hope has no certainty.
On the contrary, "Hope is the certain expectation of future happiness,"
as the Master states (Sent. iii, D, 26): and this may be gathered from
2 Tim. 1:12, "I know Whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is
able to keep that which I have committed to Him. "
I answer that, Certainty is found in a thing in two ways, essentially
and by participation. It is found essentially in the cognitive power;
by participation in whatever is moved infallibly to its end by the
cognitive power. In this way we say that nature works with certainty,
since it is moved by the Divine intellect which moves everything with
certainty to its end. In this way too, the moral virtues are said to
work with greater certainty than art, in as much as, like a second
nature, they are moved to their acts by the reason: and thus too, hope
tends to its end with certainty, as though sharing in the certainty of
faith which is in the cognitive faculty.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope does not trust chiefly in grace already
received, but on God's omnipotence and mercy, whereby even he that has
not grace, can obtain it, so as to come to eternal life. Now whoever
has faith is certain of God's omnipotence and mercy.
Reply to Objection 3: That some who have hope fail to obtain happiness,
is due to a fault of the free will in placing the obstacle of sin, but
not to any deficiency in God's power or mercy, in which hope places its
trust. Hence this does not prejudice the certainty of hope.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE GIFT OF FEAR (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift of fear, about which there are twelve
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is to be feared?
(2) Of the division of fear into filial, initial, servile and worldly;
(3) Whether worldly fear is always evil?
(4) Whether servile fear is good?
(5) Whether it is substantially the same as filial fear?
(6) Whether servile fear departs when charity comes?
(7) Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?
(8) Whether initial fear is substantially the same as filial fear?
(9) Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
(10) Whether it grows when charity grows?
(11) Whether it remains in heaven?
(12) Which of the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God can be feared?
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be feared. For the object of
fear is a future evil, as stated above ([2457]FS, Q[41], AA[2],3). But
God is free of all evil, since He is goodness itself. Therefore God
cannot be feared.
Objection 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. Now we hope in God.
Therefore we cannot fear Him at the same time.
Objection 3: Further, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 5), "we fear
those things whence evil comes to us. " But evil comes to us, not from
God, but from ourselves, according to Osee 13:9: "Destruction is thy
own, O Israel: thy help is . . . in Me. " Therefore God is not to be
feared.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 10:7): "Who shall not fear Thee, O
King of nations? " and (Malachi 1:6): "If I be a master, where is My
fear? "
I answer that, Just as hope has two objects, one of which is the future
good itself, that one expects to obtain, while the other is someone's
help, through whom one expects to obtain what one hopes for, so, too,
fear may have two objects, one of which is the very evil which a man
shrinks from, while the other is that from which the evil may come.
Accordingly, in the first way God, Who is goodness itself, cannot be an
object of fear; but He can be an object of fear in the second way, in
so far as there may come to us some evil either from Him or in relation
to Him.
From Him there comes the evil of punishment, but this is evil not
absolutely but relatively, and, absolutely speaking, is a good.
Because, since a thing is said to be good through being ordered to an
end, while evil implies lack of this order, that which excludes the
order to the last end is altogether evil, and such is the evil of
fault. On the other hand the evil of punishment is indeed an evil, in
so far as it is the privation of some particular good, yet absolutely
speaking, it is a good, in so far as it is ordained to the last end.
In relation to God the evil of fault can come to us, if we be separated
from Him: and in this way God can and ought to be feared.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection considers the object of fear as
being the evil which a man shuns.
Reply to Objection 2: In God, we may consider both His justice, in
respect of which He punishes those who sin, and His mercy, in respect
of which He sets us free: in us the consideration of His justice gives
rise to fear, but the consideration of His mercy gives rise to hope, so
that, accordingly, God is the object of both hope and fear, but under
different aspects.
Reply to Objection 3: The evil of fault is not from God as its author
but from us, in for far as we forsake God: while the evil of punishment
is from God as its author, in so far as it has character of a good,
since it is something just, through being inflicted on us justly;
although originally this is due to the demerit of sin: thus it is
written (Wis. 1:13, 16): "God made not death . . . but the wicked with
works and words have called it to them. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether fear is fittingly divided into filial, initial, servile and worldly
fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is unfittingly divided into
filial, initial, servile and worldly fear. For Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 15) that there are six kinds of fear, viz. "laziness,
shamefacedness," etc. of which we have treated above ([2458]FS, Q[41],
A[4]), and which are not mentioned in the division in question.
Therefore this division of fear seems unfitting.
Objection 2: Further, each of these fears is either good or evil. But
there is a fear, viz. natural fear, which is neither morally good,
since it is in the demons, according to James 2:19, "The devils . . .
believe and tremble," nor evil, since it is in Christ, according to Mk.
14:33, Jesus "began to fear and be heavy. " Therefore the aforesaid
division of fear is insufficient.
Objection 3: Further, the relation of son to father differs from that
of wife to husband, and this again from that of servant to master. Now
filial fear, which is that of the son in comparison with his father, is
distinct from servile fear, which is that of the servant in comparison
with his master. Therefore chaste fear, which seems to be that of the
wife in comparison with her husband, ought to be distinguished from all
these other fears.
Objection 4: Further, even as servile fear fears punishment, so do
initial and worldly fear. Therefore no distinction should be made
between them.
Objection 5: Further, even as concupiscence is about some good, so is
fear about some evil. Now "concupiscence of the eyes," which is the
desire for things of this world, is distinct from "concupiscence of the
flesh," which is the desire for one's own pleasure. Therefore "worldly
fear," whereby one fears to lose external goods, is distinct from
"human fear," whereby one fears harm to one's own person.
On the contrary stands the authority of the Master (Sent. iii, D, 34).
I answer that, We are speaking of fear now, in so far as it makes us
turn, so to speak, to God or away from Him. For, since the object of
fear is an evil, sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, man
withdraws from God, and this is called human fear; while sometimes, on
account of the evils he fears, he turns to God and adheres to Him. This
latter evil is twofold, viz. evil of punishment, and evil of fault.
Accordingly if a man turn to God and adhere to Him, through fear of
punishment, it will be servile fear; but if it be on account of fear of
committing a fault, it will be filial fear, for it becomes a child to
fear offending its father. If, however, it be on account of both, it
will be initial fear, which is between both these fears. As to whether
it is possible to fear the evil of fault, the question has been treated
above ([2459]FS, Q[42], A[3]) when we were considering the passion of
fear.
Reply to Objection 1: Damascene divides fear as a passion of the soul:
whereas this division of fear is taken from its relation to God, as
explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Moral good consists chiefly in turning to God,
while moral evil consists chiefly in turning away from Him: wherefore
all the fears mentioned above imply either moral evil or moral good.
Now natural fear is presupposed to moral good and evil, and so it is
not numbered among these kinds of fear.
Reply to Objection 3: The relation of servant to master is based on the
power which the master exercises over the servant; whereas, on the
contrary, the relation of a son to his father or of a wife to her
husband is based on the son's affection towards his father to whom he
submits himself, or on the wife's affection towards her husband to whom
she binds herself in the union of love. Hence filial and chaste fear
amount to the same, because by the love of charity God becomes our
Father, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the spirit of
adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]"; and by this same
charity He is called our spouse, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, "I have
espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin
to Christ": whereas servile fear has no connection with these, since it
does not include charity in its definition.
Reply to Objection 4: These three fears regard punishment but in
different ways. For worldly or human fear regards a punishment which
turns man away from God, and which God's enemies sometimes inflict or
threaten: whereas servile and initial fear regard a punishment whereby
men are drawn to God, and which is inflicted or threatened by God.
Servile fear regards this punishment chiefly, while initial fear
regards it secondarily.
Reply to Objection 5: It amounts to the same whether man turns away
from God through fear of losing his worldly goods, or through fear of
forfeiting the well-being of his body, since external goods belong to
the body. Hence both these fears are reckoned as one here, although
they fear different evils, even as they correspond to the desire of
different goods. This diversity causes a specific diversity of sins,
all of which alike however lead man away from God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether worldly fear is always evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that worldly fear is not always evil.
Because regard for men seems to be a kind of human fear. Now some are
blamed for having no regard for man, for instance, the unjust judge of
whom we read (Lk. 18:2) that he "feared not God, nor regarded man. "
Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.
Objection 2: Further, worldly fear seems to have reference to the
punishments inflicted by the secular power. Now such like punishments
incite us to good actions, according to Rom. 13:3, "Wilt thou not be
afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise
from the same. " Therefore worldly fear is not always evil.
Objection 3: Further, it seems that what is in us naturally, is not
evil, since our natural gifts are from God. Now it is natural to man to
fear detriment to his body, and loss of his worldly goods, whereby the
present life is supported. Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not
always evil.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 10:28): "Fear ye not them that
kill the body," thus forbidding worldly fear. Now nothing but what is
evil is forbidden by God. Therefore worldly fear is evil.
I answer that, As shown above ([2460]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [2461]FS, Q[18],
A[1]; [2462]FS, Q[54], A[2]) moral acts and habits take their name and
species from their objects. Now the proper object of the appetite's
movement is the final good: so that, in consequence, every appetitive
movement is both specified and named from its proper end. For if anyone
were to describe covetousness as love of work because men work on
account of covetousness, this description would be incorrect, since the
covetous man seeks work not as end but as a means: the end that he
seeks is wealth, wherefore covetousness is rightly described as the
desire or the love of wealth, and this is evil. Accordingly worldly
love is, properly speaking, the love whereby a man trusts in the world
as his end, so that worldly love is always evil. Now fear is born of
love, since man fears the loss of what he loves, as Augustine states
(Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Now worldly fear is that which arises from
worldly love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear is
always evil.
Reply to Objection 1: One may have regard for men in two ways. First in
so far as there is in them something divine, for instance, the good of
grace or of virtue, or at least of the natural image of God: and in
this way those are blamed who have no regard for man. Secondly, one may
have regard for men as being in opposition to God, and thus it is
praiseworthy to have no regard for men, according as we read of Elias
or Eliseus (Ecclus. 48:13): "In his days he feared not the prince. "
Reply to Objection 2: When the secular power inflicts punishment in
order to withdraw men from sin, it is acting as God's minister,
according to Rom. 13:4, "For he is God's minister, an avenger to
execute wrath upon him that doth evil. " To fear the secular power in
this way is part, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear.
Reply to Objection 3: It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to
his own body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that
account is contrary to natural reason. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iii, 1) that there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds, which
no fear should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse than to
suffer any punishment whatever.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether servile fear is good?
Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is not good. For if the
use of a thing is evil, the thing itself is evil. Now the use of
servile fear is evil, for according to a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "if a man
do anything through fear, although the deed be good, it is not well
done. " Therefore servile fear is not good.
Objection 2: Further, no good grows from a sinful root. Now servile
fear grows from a sinful root, because when commenting on Job 3:11,
"Why did I not die in the womb? " Gregory says (Moral. iv, 25): "When a
man dreads the punishment which confronts him for his sin and no longer
loves the friendship of God which he has lost, his fear is born of
pride, not of humility.
trusteth in man. "
I answer that, Hope, as stated above [2433](A[1]; [2434]FS, Q[40],
A[7]), regards two things, viz. the good which it intends to obtain,
and the help by which that good is obtained. Now the good which a man
hopes to obtain, has the aspect of a final cause, while the help by
which one hopes to obtain that good, has the character of an efficient
cause. Now in each of these kinds of cause we find a principal and a
secondary cause. For the principal end is the last end, while the
secondary end is that which is referred to an end. In like manner the
principal efficient cause is the first agent, while the secondary
efficient cause is the secondary and instrumental agent. Now hope
regards eternal happiness as its last end, and the Divine assistance as
the first cause leading to happiness.
Accordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any good save
happiness, as one's last end, but only as something referred to final
happiness, so too, it is unlawful to hope in any man, or any creature,
as though it were the first cause of movement towards happiness. It is,
however, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as being the secondary
and instrumental agent through whom one is helped to obtain any goods
that are ordained to happiness. It is in this way that we turn to the
saints, and that we ask men also for certain things; and for this
reason some are blamed in that they cannot be trusted to give help.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether hope is a theological virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For a
theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now hope has for
its object not only God but also other goods which we hope to obtain
from God. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
Objection 2: Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two
vices, as stated above ([2435]FS, Q[64], A[4]). But hope is a mean
between presumption and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a
species of fortitude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation, it
seems that hope is not a theological, but a moral virtue.
Objection 4: Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it
belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the
arduous. Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue.
On the contrary, Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13) together with faith and
charity, which are theological virtues.
I answer that, Since specific differences, by their very nature, divide
a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place hope, we
must observe whence it derives its character of virtue.
Now it has been stated above [2436](A[1]) that hope has the character
of virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human
actions: and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, in as
much as it leans on its assistance, and as its last final cause, in as
much as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is
evident that God is the principal object of hope, considered as a
virtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one that
has God for its object, as stated above ([2437]FS, Q[62], A[1]), it is
evident that hope is a theological virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes
for it in reference to God as the last end, or as the first efficient
cause, as stated above [2438](A[4]).
Reply to Objection 2: In things measured and ruled the mean consists in
the measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the rule, there is
excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the
rule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes.
Now a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and these
things are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to it to follow
the mean as regards its proper object. On the other hand, a theological
virtue is concerned with the First Rule not ruled by another rule, and
that Rule is its proper object. Wherefore it is not proper for a
theological virtue, with regard to its proper object, to follow the
mean, although this may happen to it accidentally with regard to
something that is referred to its principal object. Thus faith can have
no mean or extremes in the point of trusting to the First Truth, in
which it is impossible to trust too much; whereas on the part of the
things believed, it may have a mean and extremes; for instance one
truth is a mean between two falsehoods. So too, hope has no mean or
extremes, as regards its principal object, since it is impossible to
trust too much in the Divine assistance; yet it may have a mean and
extremes, as regards those things a man trusts to obtain, in so far as
he either presumes above his capability, or despairs of things of which
he is capable.
Reply to Objection 3: The expectation which is mentioned in the
definition of hope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which
belongs to longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine
assistance, whether that which we hope for be delayed or not.
Reply to Objection 4: Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the
hope of obtaining something that is within one's power, wherefore its
proper object is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope, as
a theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by
another's help, as stated above [2439](A[1]).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope is distinct from the other theological virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not distinct from the other
theological virtues. For habits are distinguished by their objects, as
stated above ([2440]FS, Q[54], A[2]). Now the object of hope is the
same as of the other theological virtues. Therefore hope is not
distinct from the other theological virtues.
Objection 2: Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby we make
profession of faith, we say: "I expect the resurrection of the dead and
the life of the world to come. " Now expectation of future happiness
belongs to hope, as stated above [2441](A[5]). Therefore hope is not
distinct from faith.
Objection 3: Further, by hope man tends to God. But this belongs
properly to charity. Therefore hope is not distinct from charity.
On the contrary, There cannot be number without distinction. Now hope
is numbered with the other theological virtues: for Gregory says
(Moral. i, 16) that the three virtues are faith, hope, and charity.
Therefore hope is distinct from the theological virtues.
I answer that, A virtue is said to be theological from having God for
the object to which it adheres. Now one may adhere to a thing in two
ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because something else is
attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to God for His
own sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love.
On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to God as to a
principle wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we derive from God
both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness.
Accordingly faith makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we
derive the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God tells us
is true: while hope makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we
derive perfect goodness, i. e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to the
Divine assistance for obtaining happiness.
Reply to Objection 1: God is the object of these virtues under
different aspects, as stated above: and a different aspect of the
object suffices for the distinction of habits, as stated above
([2442]FS, Q[54], A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Expectation is mentioned in the symbol of faith,
not as though it were the proper act of faith, but because the act of
hope presupposes the act of faith, as we shall state further on
[2443](A[7]). Hence an act of faith is expressed in the act of hope.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope makes us tend to God, as to a good to be
obtained finally, and as to a helper strong to assist: whereas charity,
properly speaking, makes us tend to God, by uniting our affections to
Him, so that we live, not for ourselves, but for God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope precedes faith?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope precedes faith. Because a gloss on
Ps. 36:3, "Trust in the Lord, and do good," says: "Hope is the entrance
to faith and the beginning of salvation. " But salvation is by faith
whereby we are justified. Therefore hope precedes faith.
Objection 2: Further, that which is included in a definition should
precede the thing defined and be more known. But hope is included in
the definition of faith (Heb. 11:1): "Faith is the substance of things
to be hoped for. " Therefore hope precedes faith.
Objection 3: Further, hope precedes a meritorious act, for the Apostle
says (1 Cor. 9:10): "He that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to
receive fruit. " But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore hope
precedes faith.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 1:2): "Abraham begot Isaac," i. e.
"Faith begot hope," according to a gloss.
I answer that, Absolutely speaking, faith precedes hope. For the object
of hope is a future good, arduous but possible to obtain. In order,
therefore, that we may hope, it is necessary for the object of hope to
be proposed to us as possible. Now the object of hope is, in one way,
eternal happiness, and in another way, the Divine assistance, as
explained above [2444](A[2]; A[6], ad 3): and both of these are
proposed to us by faith, whereby we come to know that we are able to
obtain eternal life, and that for this purpose the Divine assistance is
ready for us, according to Heb. 11:6: "He that cometh to God, must
believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him. " Therefore
it is evident that faith precedes hope.
Reply to Objection 1: As the same gloss observes further on, "hope" is
called "the entrance" to faith, i. e. of the thing believed, because by
hope we enter in to see what we believe. Or we may reply that it is
called the "entrance to faith," because thereby man begins to be
established and perfected in faith.
Reply to Objection 2: The thing to be hoped for is included in the
definition of faith, because the proper object of faith, is something
not apparent in itself. Hence it was necessary to express it in a
circumlocution by something resulting from faith.
Reply to Objection 3: Hope does not precede every meritorious act; but
it suffices for it to accompany or follow it.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether charity precedes hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity precedes hope. For Ambrose says
on Lk. 27:6, "If you had faith like to a grain of mustard seed," etc. :
"Charity flows from faith, and hope from charity. " But faith precedes
charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "good
emotions and affections proceed from love and holy charity. " Now to
hope, considered as an act of hope, is a good emotion of the soul.
Therefore it flows from charity.
Objection 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. iii, D, 26) that hope
proceeds from merits, which precede not only the thing hoped for, but
also hope itself, which, in the order of nature, is preceded by
charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the
commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience," i. e.
"from hope," according to a gloss. Therefore hope precedes charity.
I answer that, Order is twofold. One is the order of generation and of
matter, in respect of which the imperfect precedes the perfect: the
other is the order of perfection and form, in respect of which the
perfect naturally precedes the imperfect. In respect of the first order
hope precedes charity: and this is clear from the fact that hope and
all movements of the appetite flow from love, as stated above
([2445]FS, Q[27], A[4]; [2446]FS, Q[28], A[6], ad 2; [2447]FS, Q[40],
A[7]) in the treatise on the passions.
Now there is a perfect, and an imperfect love. Perfect love is that
whereby a man is loved in himself, as when someone wishes a person some
good for his own sake; thus a man loves his friend. Imperfect love is
that whereby a man love something, not for its own sake, but that he
may obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves what he desires. The
first love of God pertains to charity, which adheres to God for His own
sake; while hope pertains to the second love, since he that hopes,
intends to obtain possession of something for himself.
Hence in the order of generation, hope precedes charity. For just as a
man is led to love God, through fear of being punished by Him for his
sins, as Augustine states (In primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so too,
hope leads to charity, in as much as a man through hoping to be
rewarded by God, is encouraged to love God and obey His commandments.
On the other hand, in the order of perfection charity naturally
precedes hope, wherefore, with the advent of charity, hope is made more
perfect, because we hope chiefly in our friends. It is in this sense
that Ambrose states (OBJ[1]) that charity flows from hope: so that this
suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope and every movement of the appetite proceed
from some kind of love, whereby the expected good is loved. But not
every kind of hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of
living hope, viz. that whereby man hopes to obtain good from God, as
from a friend.
Reply to Objection 3: The Master is speaking of living hope, which is
naturally preceded by charity and the merits caused by charity.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE SUBJECT OF HOPE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the subject of hope, under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the virtue of hope is in the will as its subject?
(2) Whether it is in the blessed?
(3) Whether it is in the damned?
(4) Whether there is certainty in the hope of the wayfarer?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether hope is in the will as its subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not in the will as its subject.
For the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above (Q[17],
A[1]; [2448]FS, Q[40], A[1]). Now the arduous is the object, not of the
will, but of the irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will but in
the irascible.
Objection 2: Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add
another. Now charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which is
the most perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the will.
Objection 3: Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts at
the same time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things
simultaneously. Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act
of charity. Since, then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the
will, it follows that the act of hope does not belong to that power: so
that, therefore, hope is not in the will.
On the contrary, The soul is not apprehensive of God save as regards
the mind in which is memory, intellect and will, as Augustine declares
(De Trin. xiv, 3,6). Now hope is a theological virtue having God for
its object. Since therefore it is neither in the memory, nor in the
intellect, which belong to the cognitive faculty, it follows that it is
in the will as its subject.
I answer that, As shown above ([2449]FP, Q[87], A[2]), habits are known
by their acts. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive
faculty, since its object is a good. And, since there is a twofold
appetite in man, namely, the sensitive which is divided into irascible
and concupiscible, and the intellective appetite, called the will, as
stated in the [2450]FP, Q[82], A[5], those movements which occur in the
lower appetite, are with passion, while those in the higher appetite
are without passion, as shown above ([2451]FP, Q[87], A[2], ad 1;
[2452]FS, Q[22], A[3], ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of hope cannot
belong to the sensitive appetite, since the good which is the principal
object of this virtue, is not a sensible but a Divine good. Therefore
hope resides in the higher appetite called the will, and not in the
lower appetite, of which the irascible is a part.
Reply to Objection 1: The object of the irascible is an arduous
sensible: whereas the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous
intelligible, or rather superintelligible.
Reply to Objection 2: Charity perfects the will sufficiently with
regard to one act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is
required in order to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is
that of hoping.
Reply to Objection 3: The movement of hope and the movement of charity
are mutually related, as was shown above (Q[17], A[8]). Hence there is
no reason why both movements should not belong at the same time to the
same power: even as the intellect can understand many things at the
same time if they be related to one another, as stated in the [2453]FP,
Q[85], A[4].
__________________________________________________________________
Whether in the blessed there is hope?
Objection 1: It would seem that in the blessed there is hope. For
Christ was a perfect comprehensor from the first moment of His
conception. Now He had hope, since, according to a gloss, the words of
Ps. 30:2, "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped," are said in His person.
Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.
Objection 2: Further, even as the obtaining of happiness is an arduous
good, so is its continuation. Now, before they obtain happiness, men
hope to obtain it. Therefore, after they have obtained it, they can
hope to continue in its possession.
Objection 3: Further, by the virtue of hope, a man can hope for
happiness, not only for himself, but also for others, as stated above
([2454]Q[17], A[3]). But the blessed who are in heaven hope for the
happiness of others, else they would not pray for them. Therefore there
can be hope in them.
Objection 4: Further, the happiness of the saints implies not only
glory of the soul but also glory of the body. Now the souls of the
saints in heaven, look yet for the glory of their bodies (Apoc. 6:10;
Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore in the blessed there can be
hope.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "What a man seeth, why
doth he hope for? " Now the blessed enjoy the sight of God. Therefore
hope has no place in them.
I answer that, If what gives a thing its species be removed, the
species is destroyed, and that thing cannot remain the same; just as
when a natural body loses its form, it does not remain the same
specifically. Now hope takes its species from its principal object,
even as the other virtues do, as was shown above (Q[17], AA[5],6;
[2455]FS, Q[54], A[2]): and its principal object is eternal happiness
as being possible to obtain by the assistance of God, as stated above
(Q[17], A[2]).
Since then the arduous possible good cannot be an object of hope except
in so far as it is something future, it follows that when happiness is
no longer future, but present, it is incompatible with the virtue of
hope. Consequently hope, like faith, is voided in heaven, and neither
of them can be in the blessed.
Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ was a comprehensor and therefore
blessed as to the enjoyment of God, nevertheless He was, at the same
time, a wayfarer, as regards the passibility of nature, to which He was
still subject. Hence it was possible for Him to hope for the glory of
impassibility and immortality, yet not so as to the virtue of hope, the
principal object of which is not the glory of the body but the
enjoyment of God.
Reply to Objection 2: The happiness of the saints is called eternal
life, because through enjoying God they become partakers, as it were,
of God's eternity which surpasses all time: so that the continuation of
happiness does not differ in respect of present, past and future. Hence
the blessed do not hope for the continuation of their happiness (for as
regards this there is no future), but are in actual possession thereof.
Reply to Objection 3: So long as the virtue of hope lasts, it is by the
same hope that one hopes for one's own happiness, and for that of
others.
But when hope is voided in the blessed, whereby they hoped for
their own happiness, they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet
not by the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity. Even so,
he that has Divine charity, by that same charity loves his neighbor,
without having the virtue of charity, but by some other love.
Reply to Objection 4: Since hope is a theological virtue having God for
its object, its principal object is the glory of the soul, which
consists in the enjoyment of God, and not the glory of the body.
Moreover, although the glory of the body is something arduous in
comparison with human nature, yet it is not so for one who has the
glory of the soul; both because the glory of the body is a very small
thing as compared with the glory of the soul, and because one who has
the glory of the soul has already the sufficient cause of the glory of
the body.
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Whether hope is in the damned?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is hope in the damned. For the
devil is damned and prince of the damned, according to Mat. 25:41:
"Depart . . . you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for
the devil and his angels. " But the devil has hope, according to Job
40:28, "Behold his hope shall fail him. " Therefore it seems that the
damned have hope.
Objection 2: Further, just as faith is either living or dead, so is
hope. But lifeless faith can be in the devils and the damned, according
to James 2:19: "The devils . . . believe and tremble. " Therefore it
seems that lifeless hope also can be in the damned.
Objection 3: Further, after death there accrues to man no merit or
demerit that he had not before, according to Eccles. 11:3, "If the tree
fall to the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall,
there shall it be. " Now many who are damned, in this life hoped and
never despaired. Therefore they will hope in the future life also.
On the contrary, Hope causes joy, according to Rom. 12:12, "Rejoicing
in hope. " Now the damned have no joy, but sorrow and grief, according
to Is. 65:14, "My servants shall praise for joyfulness of heart, and
you shall cry for sorrow of heart, and shall howl for grief of spirit. "
Therefore no hope is in the damned.
I answer that, Just as it is a condition of happiness that the will
should find rest therein, so is it a condition of punishment, that what
is inflicted in punishment, should go against the will. Now that which
is not known can neither be restful nor repugnant to the will:
wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 17) that the angels could
not be perfectly happy in their first state before their confirmation,
or unhappy before their fall, since they had no foreknowledge of what
would happen to them. For perfect and true happiness requires that one
should be certain of being happy for ever, else the will would not
rest.
In like manner, since the everlastingness of damnation is a necessary
condition of the punishment of the damned, it would not be truly penal
unless it went against the will; and this would be impossible if they
were ignorant of the everlastingness of their damnation. Hence it
belongs to the unhappy state of the damned, that they should know that
they cannot by any means escape from damnation and obtain happiness.
Wherefore it is written (Job 15:22): "He believeth not that he may
return from darkness to light. " It is, therefore, evident that they
cannot apprehend happiness as a possible good, as neither can the
blessed apprehend it as a future good. Consequently there is no hope
either in the blessed or in the damned. On the other hand, hope can be
in wayfarers, whether of this life or in purgatory, because in either
case they apprehend happiness as a future possible thing.
Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 20) this is said
of the devil as regards his members, whose hope will fail utterly: or,
if it be understood of the devil himself, it may refer to the hope
whereby he expects to vanquish the saints, in which sense we read just
before (Job 40:18): "He trusteth that the Jordan may run into his
mouth": this is not, however, the hope of which we are speaking.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), "faith is
about things, bad or good, past, present, or future, one's own or
another's; whereas hope is only about good things, future and
concerning oneself. " Hence it is possible for lifeless faith to be in
the damned, but not hope, since the Divine goods are not for them
future possible things, but far removed from them.
Reply to Objection 3: Lack of hope in the damned does not change their
demerit, as neither does the voiding of hope in the blessed increase
their merit: but both these things are due to the change in their
respective states.
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Whether there is certainty in the hope of a wayfarer?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no certainty in the hope of a
wayfarer. For hope resides in the will. But certainty pertains not to
the will but to the intellect. Therefore there is no certainty in hope.
Objection 2: Further, hope is based on grace and merits, as stated
above (Q[17], A[1]). Now it is impossible in this life to know for
certain that we are in a state of grace, as stated above ([2456]FS,
Q[112], A[5]). Therefore there is no certainty in the hope of a
wayfarer.
Objection 3: Further, there can be no certainty about that which may
fail. Now many a hopeful wayfarer fails to obtain happiness. Therefore
wayfarer's hope has no certainty.
On the contrary, "Hope is the certain expectation of future happiness,"
as the Master states (Sent. iii, D, 26): and this may be gathered from
2 Tim. 1:12, "I know Whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is
able to keep that which I have committed to Him. "
I answer that, Certainty is found in a thing in two ways, essentially
and by participation. It is found essentially in the cognitive power;
by participation in whatever is moved infallibly to its end by the
cognitive power. In this way we say that nature works with certainty,
since it is moved by the Divine intellect which moves everything with
certainty to its end. In this way too, the moral virtues are said to
work with greater certainty than art, in as much as, like a second
nature, they are moved to their acts by the reason: and thus too, hope
tends to its end with certainty, as though sharing in the certainty of
faith which is in the cognitive faculty.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: Hope does not trust chiefly in grace already
received, but on God's omnipotence and mercy, whereby even he that has
not grace, can obtain it, so as to come to eternal life. Now whoever
has faith is certain of God's omnipotence and mercy.
Reply to Objection 3: That some who have hope fail to obtain happiness,
is due to a fault of the free will in placing the obstacle of sin, but
not to any deficiency in God's power or mercy, in which hope places its
trust. Hence this does not prejudice the certainty of hope.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE GIFT OF FEAR (TWELVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the gift of fear, about which there are twelve
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is to be feared?
(2) Of the division of fear into filial, initial, servile and worldly;
(3) Whether worldly fear is always evil?
(4) Whether servile fear is good?
(5) Whether it is substantially the same as filial fear?
(6) Whether servile fear departs when charity comes?
(7) Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?
(8) Whether initial fear is substantially the same as filial fear?
(9) Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
(10) Whether it grows when charity grows?
(11) Whether it remains in heaven?
(12) Which of the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether God can be feared?
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be feared. For the object of
fear is a future evil, as stated above ([2457]FS, Q[41], AA[2],3). But
God is free of all evil, since He is goodness itself. Therefore God
cannot be feared.
Objection 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. Now we hope in God.
Therefore we cannot fear Him at the same time.
Objection 3: Further, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 5), "we fear
those things whence evil comes to us. " But evil comes to us, not from
God, but from ourselves, according to Osee 13:9: "Destruction is thy
own, O Israel: thy help is . . . in Me. " Therefore God is not to be
feared.
On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 10:7): "Who shall not fear Thee, O
King of nations? " and (Malachi 1:6): "If I be a master, where is My
fear? "
I answer that, Just as hope has two objects, one of which is the future
good itself, that one expects to obtain, while the other is someone's
help, through whom one expects to obtain what one hopes for, so, too,
fear may have two objects, one of which is the very evil which a man
shrinks from, while the other is that from which the evil may come.
Accordingly, in the first way God, Who is goodness itself, cannot be an
object of fear; but He can be an object of fear in the second way, in
so far as there may come to us some evil either from Him or in relation
to Him.
From Him there comes the evil of punishment, but this is evil not
absolutely but relatively, and, absolutely speaking, is a good.
Because, since a thing is said to be good through being ordered to an
end, while evil implies lack of this order, that which excludes the
order to the last end is altogether evil, and such is the evil of
fault. On the other hand the evil of punishment is indeed an evil, in
so far as it is the privation of some particular good, yet absolutely
speaking, it is a good, in so far as it is ordained to the last end.
In relation to God the evil of fault can come to us, if we be separated
from Him: and in this way God can and ought to be feared.
Reply to Objection 1: This objection considers the object of fear as
being the evil which a man shuns.
Reply to Objection 2: In God, we may consider both His justice, in
respect of which He punishes those who sin, and His mercy, in respect
of which He sets us free: in us the consideration of His justice gives
rise to fear, but the consideration of His mercy gives rise to hope, so
that, accordingly, God is the object of both hope and fear, but under
different aspects.
Reply to Objection 3: The evil of fault is not from God as its author
but from us, in for far as we forsake God: while the evil of punishment
is from God as its author, in so far as it has character of a good,
since it is something just, through being inflicted on us justly;
although originally this is due to the demerit of sin: thus it is
written (Wis. 1:13, 16): "God made not death . . . but the wicked with
works and words have called it to them. "
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Whether fear is fittingly divided into filial, initial, servile and worldly
fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is unfittingly divided into
filial, initial, servile and worldly fear. For Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 15) that there are six kinds of fear, viz. "laziness,
shamefacedness," etc. of which we have treated above ([2458]FS, Q[41],
A[4]), and which are not mentioned in the division in question.
Therefore this division of fear seems unfitting.
Objection 2: Further, each of these fears is either good or evil. But
there is a fear, viz. natural fear, which is neither morally good,
since it is in the demons, according to James 2:19, "The devils . . .
believe and tremble," nor evil, since it is in Christ, according to Mk.
14:33, Jesus "began to fear and be heavy. " Therefore the aforesaid
division of fear is insufficient.
Objection 3: Further, the relation of son to father differs from that
of wife to husband, and this again from that of servant to master. Now
filial fear, which is that of the son in comparison with his father, is
distinct from servile fear, which is that of the servant in comparison
with his master. Therefore chaste fear, which seems to be that of the
wife in comparison with her husband, ought to be distinguished from all
these other fears.
Objection 4: Further, even as servile fear fears punishment, so do
initial and worldly fear. Therefore no distinction should be made
between them.
Objection 5: Further, even as concupiscence is about some good, so is
fear about some evil. Now "concupiscence of the eyes," which is the
desire for things of this world, is distinct from "concupiscence of the
flesh," which is the desire for one's own pleasure. Therefore "worldly
fear," whereby one fears to lose external goods, is distinct from
"human fear," whereby one fears harm to one's own person.
On the contrary stands the authority of the Master (Sent. iii, D, 34).
I answer that, We are speaking of fear now, in so far as it makes us
turn, so to speak, to God or away from Him. For, since the object of
fear is an evil, sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, man
withdraws from God, and this is called human fear; while sometimes, on
account of the evils he fears, he turns to God and adheres to Him. This
latter evil is twofold, viz. evil of punishment, and evil of fault.
Accordingly if a man turn to God and adhere to Him, through fear of
punishment, it will be servile fear; but if it be on account of fear of
committing a fault, it will be filial fear, for it becomes a child to
fear offending its father. If, however, it be on account of both, it
will be initial fear, which is between both these fears. As to whether
it is possible to fear the evil of fault, the question has been treated
above ([2459]FS, Q[42], A[3]) when we were considering the passion of
fear.
Reply to Objection 1: Damascene divides fear as a passion of the soul:
whereas this division of fear is taken from its relation to God, as
explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Moral good consists chiefly in turning to God,
while moral evil consists chiefly in turning away from Him: wherefore
all the fears mentioned above imply either moral evil or moral good.
Now natural fear is presupposed to moral good and evil, and so it is
not numbered among these kinds of fear.
Reply to Objection 3: The relation of servant to master is based on the
power which the master exercises over the servant; whereas, on the
contrary, the relation of a son to his father or of a wife to her
husband is based on the son's affection towards his father to whom he
submits himself, or on the wife's affection towards her husband to whom
she binds herself in the union of love. Hence filial and chaste fear
amount to the same, because by the love of charity God becomes our
Father, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the spirit of
adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]"; and by this same
charity He is called our spouse, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, "I have
espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin
to Christ": whereas servile fear has no connection with these, since it
does not include charity in its definition.
Reply to Objection 4: These three fears regard punishment but in
different ways. For worldly or human fear regards a punishment which
turns man away from God, and which God's enemies sometimes inflict or
threaten: whereas servile and initial fear regard a punishment whereby
men are drawn to God, and which is inflicted or threatened by God.
Servile fear regards this punishment chiefly, while initial fear
regards it secondarily.
Reply to Objection 5: It amounts to the same whether man turns away
from God through fear of losing his worldly goods, or through fear of
forfeiting the well-being of his body, since external goods belong to
the body. Hence both these fears are reckoned as one here, although
they fear different evils, even as they correspond to the desire of
different goods. This diversity causes a specific diversity of sins,
all of which alike however lead man away from God.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether worldly fear is always evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that worldly fear is not always evil.
Because regard for men seems to be a kind of human fear. Now some are
blamed for having no regard for man, for instance, the unjust judge of
whom we read (Lk. 18:2) that he "feared not God, nor regarded man. "
Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.
Objection 2: Further, worldly fear seems to have reference to the
punishments inflicted by the secular power. Now such like punishments
incite us to good actions, according to Rom. 13:3, "Wilt thou not be
afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise
from the same. " Therefore worldly fear is not always evil.
Objection 3: Further, it seems that what is in us naturally, is not
evil, since our natural gifts are from God. Now it is natural to man to
fear detriment to his body, and loss of his worldly goods, whereby the
present life is supported. Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not
always evil.
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 10:28): "Fear ye not them that
kill the body," thus forbidding worldly fear. Now nothing but what is
evil is forbidden by God. Therefore worldly fear is evil.
I answer that, As shown above ([2460]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [2461]FS, Q[18],
A[1]; [2462]FS, Q[54], A[2]) moral acts and habits take their name and
species from their objects. Now the proper object of the appetite's
movement is the final good: so that, in consequence, every appetitive
movement is both specified and named from its proper end. For if anyone
were to describe covetousness as love of work because men work on
account of covetousness, this description would be incorrect, since the
covetous man seeks work not as end but as a means: the end that he
seeks is wealth, wherefore covetousness is rightly described as the
desire or the love of wealth, and this is evil. Accordingly worldly
love is, properly speaking, the love whereby a man trusts in the world
as his end, so that worldly love is always evil. Now fear is born of
love, since man fears the loss of what he loves, as Augustine states
(Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Now worldly fear is that which arises from
worldly love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear is
always evil.
Reply to Objection 1: One may have regard for men in two ways. First in
so far as there is in them something divine, for instance, the good of
grace or of virtue, or at least of the natural image of God: and in
this way those are blamed who have no regard for man. Secondly, one may
have regard for men as being in opposition to God, and thus it is
praiseworthy to have no regard for men, according as we read of Elias
or Eliseus (Ecclus. 48:13): "In his days he feared not the prince. "
Reply to Objection 2: When the secular power inflicts punishment in
order to withdraw men from sin, it is acting as God's minister,
according to Rom. 13:4, "For he is God's minister, an avenger to
execute wrath upon him that doth evil. " To fear the secular power in
this way is part, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear.
Reply to Objection 3: It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to
his own body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that
account is contrary to natural reason. Hence the Philosopher says
(Ethic. iii, 1) that there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds, which
no fear should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse than to
suffer any punishment whatever.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether servile fear is good?
Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is not good. For if the
use of a thing is evil, the thing itself is evil. Now the use of
servile fear is evil, for according to a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "if a man
do anything through fear, although the deed be good, it is not well
done. " Therefore servile fear is not good.
Objection 2: Further, no good grows from a sinful root. Now servile
fear grows from a sinful root, because when commenting on Job 3:11,
"Why did I not die in the womb? " Gregory says (Moral. iv, 25): "When a
man dreads the punishment which confronts him for his sin and no longer
loves the friendship of God which he has lost, his fear is born of
pride, not of humility.
