116 Hegel, by comparison, refers back to Plato's
Parmenides
in, e.
Hegel_nodrm
, 134.
85 Ibid. , 275. Cf. also the revised introduction to the Ideen (1803): (2)5-7 (II, 13 ff. ).
86 IV, 431.
87 IV, 441. With regard to the meaning of speculation, also see IV, 448.
88 Cf. IV, 432; 436; 439.
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 175
the godly and natural principle. "89 Still in the Bruno, to which he here refers, Schelling "calls with conviction on the earlier efforts of a friend" for the "speculative sense" of the laws of Kepler, for the cognition of these laws "in their purity," and for liberation from the "mechanical mindset. "90 In the Ferneren Darstellungen, therefore, Hegel's contribution was in large part limited to critique, while the positive - i. e. , speculative - standpoint would be reserved for the Bruno dialogue. 91 In addition to this, consider how Schelling in the second edition of the Ideen, in reference to the "laws of the planetary system," refers to the Bruno and the Ferneren Darstellungen, but fails to mention Hegel's Habilitationsschrift. 92 Schelling clearly believed that he had moved far beyond Hegel's initial suggestion. This example discloses a gradual transformation in Schelling and Hegel's collaborative enterprise.
Schelling's definition of absolute cognition as speculation, however, is more meaningful systematically than this limited natural-philosophical theme. There is, according to Schelling, an "immediate cognition of the absolute . . . and that is the first speculative cognition, the principle and ground of the possibility of all philosophy. "93 Schelling called this cognition "absolute knowledge" and the complete science, which accords to this principle, "absolute science";94 such knowledge of the absolute and the absolute itself are, for him, one and the same. 95 This concept of speculative cognition agrees completely with that of Hegel. Schelling clearly diverges from Hegel, however, when he identifies this cognition with "intellectual intuition" alone or when he defines "rational intuition" [Vernunftanschauung] or rather "speculative intuition" in opposition to reflection. 96 Indeed, for Hegel, speculation also contains a transcendental intuition, though nonetheless only as one side of speculation. 97 Hegel later dismisses, to the benefit of a pure thought of reason, the distinction
89 IV, 432.
90 IV, 330 ftn. .
91 Cf. also O. Closs: Kepler und Newton und das Problem der Gravitation in der Kantischen, Schellingshen und Hegelshen Naturphilosophie. Heidelberg, 1908, 66 ff. .
92 Cf. (2)262 ff (II, 190). Cf. also (2)278 (II, 200); V, 328 ff.
93 IV, 368.
94 IV, 345 ff. ftn. ; 369, ftn. ; 403 ff. ; also cf. IV, 326.
95 Cf. IV, 361; 369; 404; (2)68 (II, 59); (2)71 (II, 61).
96 IV, 368 ff. ; 361; 451. Also cf. VII, 158, where Schelling calls speculation ein "schauen," eine "Contemplation Gottes. " Schelling had already thought about such an intuition in the Darstellung.
97 Cf. Hegel: Gesammelte Werke. Bd 4, 27ff. ; 16; 29; 77.
? 176 Appendix
between concept and transcendental intuition. For Schelling, on the other hand, pure intuition and that which is intuited are always immediately absorbed into one another in speculation; thus, he tried to metaphorically represent the absolute as both the Light and an all seeing eye. 98 All [discursive] access is closed off from this intuition; in this, Schelling reasserts his original view of intellectual intuition.
In order to explain the possibility and necessity of the finite, Schelling developed the theory that the finite and the infinite coalesce completely within the absolute. The absolute as totality produces particularity and finitude from within itself as its ideal; but since the absolute intuits itself, the finite ideal as such is already infinite. The Platonic relationship between prototype and likeness, which Schelling also continued to utilize, was here transformed into the relationship between model and counterpart [Vorbild und Gegenbild] and the unity [Ineinsbildung] of both. 99 Schelling often called the finite determinations of reflection 'Reflexe' as well, the finite and imperfect counterparts to the absolute. This theory, too, is distinctive to - very distinct from Hegel--Schelling's design with regard to the realization of the Identita? tssystem. In the presentation of the image and unity, divine intuition is still presupposed. It is clearly very difficult, however, to unify indiscursivity and absolute indifference - in which all multiplicity, considered in itself, must be dissolved - with the conception of a systematic development of identity. Only now, through this formulation of intellectual intuition and indifference, is the thought of a splitting-off and falling-away from the absolute possible at all; indeed, this formulation of intellectual intuition and indifference is also the place to look for the reason for the later abandonment of the Identita? tsphilosophie.
Since absolute rational cognition or speculation is pure intellectual intuition for Schelling, he can analogically refer to the philosophical method as a geometrical proof qua construction and a philosophical proof qua demonstration. 100 Every particular is to be construed within and known through the intuition of the absolute. This "absolute method" of philosophical construction is distinguished in reflection as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The synthesis, however, is "not the third, but rather the first,
98 Cf. IV, 404 ff.
99 Cf. IV, 394. The postscripts to the second edition of the Ideen attempt to develop in detail such a theory.
100 Cf. IV, 407 ff; cf. Schelling_s Journal essay: Ueber die Construction in der Philosophie in Hegel: Gesammelte Werke. Bd 4, 277 ff.
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 177
absolute unity. "101 This thought is also found in Hegel in the Kritischen Journal. 102 Schelling is alluding here to the form of triplicity presented earlier, e. g. the triplicity of powers in nature. 103 This new notion of synthesis distinguishes Schelling from the Fichtean notion of the synthesis through divisibility to which Schelling previously - regardless of ulterior motives - remained true. 104 The decisive foundation for this new notion of synthesis, in which totality is considered the first term, lay in the relationship of reflection to speculation. The question posed here, then, is whether one ought not to search for the original problem of dialectic in this relationship; if so, reflection must have a necessary, though certainly subordinate, function in the systematic cognition of the Absolute.
An answer to this question, which requires a specific definition of the correlation between reflection and speculation, is first suggested in Schelling's reference to true skepticism in the Ferneren Darstellungen, a passage which quite clearly goes back to Hegel's Skeptizismus essay. Schelling characterizes "criticism," as opposed to "true philosophy," as a "bad skepticism"105; this "bad skepticism" stands completely on the side of reflection and believes that "it has annihilated speculation. " "True skepticism is diametrically opposed to reflective cognition rather than the principle of true speculation - although he cannot say this categorically, since he would otherwise abandon his skepticism. "106 In the Skeptizismus essay, Hegel distinguishes genuine skepticism from the other varieties of skepticism; genuine skepticism is one with true philosophy and represents "the negative side" and presupposes that "unmediated reason is the positive side of the cognition of the absolute. "107 Schelling does not distinguish, as Hegel did, between a form of skepticism which is to be distinguished from philosophy and genuine skepticism which is not. For Schelling, therefore, skepticism in general is "something merely private";108 he also denies here the positive sense of the oppositions which reflection
101 IV, 399; cf. IV, 378 ff. ; cf. also in Bruno IV, 261; 267; 290; in the second edition of the Ideen (2)139 (II, 107).
102 Cf. Hegel: Gesammelte Werke. Bd. 4, 319; 335; 399.
103 Cf. , e. g. , III, 449 ff.
104 Cf. , e. g. , III, 394; 480 and others.
105 Hegel had already characterized Criticism in the Habilitationsthesen as the "imperfecta . . . Scepticismi forma" (Rosenkranz: Hegels Leben, 159). Cf. also Schelling IV, 350 ff.
106 IV, 365 ff. ; cf. also VII, 153 ftn. 2.
107 Hegel: Gesammelte Werke. Bd. 4, 207.
108 IV, 366.
? 178 Appendix
sets in finitudes, although these are the conditions for the possibility of genuine skepticism. 109
The positive sense of the opposition of the reflective determination seems to be recognized by Schelling, however, in a comment made in his Vorlesungen u? ber die Methode des akademischen Studiums (1803). He demands there that it is necessary to come "to the categorical knowledge of the nothingness" of finite perspectives; "this negative knowledge must become equal to the positive intuition of absoluteness, if it is ever to elevate itself to genuine skepticism. " This negative cognition can also be developed into a "science of form", "a pure aesthetic teaching of philosophy. " Were it to be a pure presentation of the form of finitude in its relationship to the Absolute, it must therefore also be a form of scientific skepticism. 110 One such teaching is logic, but not traditional logic nor Kant's transcendental logic - nor can he mean the logic contained in the Bruno; rather, "it still does not exist. "111 Schelling's claims correspond, however, with the program of Hegel's Logik-Vorlesung from his earlier Jena period - a program handed down to us only through Rosenkranz. The task of logic, from this lecture forward, is the systematic formulation and supersession of the forms of finitude and reflection. Logic should show that every finite determination of reflection has within it an opposite and that it is through its opposite that it is superseded [aufhebt]. The incremental supersession of these forms of reflection, though, is an introduction to the infinite - to the true, rational apprehension or speculation. Logic, therefore, is a systematically advancing introduction to the essential philosophy, a philosophy which begins with metaphysics. This formulation of logic, which can only be hinted at here, is not an early form of the later speculative Wissenschaft der Logik, but rather has a fundamentally different, systematic meaning. The formulation and supersession of the forms of finitude does not appear from the very beginning within the Absolute and is not to be identified with metaphysics, but instead claims to serve the function of an introduction to the true philosophy. Moreover, according to Hegel, reflection and speculation are not opposed to one another absolutely; instead, reflection merely abstacts "from the absolute identity that which is related to one another in rational cognition. "112
109 Cf. Hegel: Gesammelte Werke. Bd. 4, 208 ff. . Also cf. Rosenkranz: Hegels Leben, 156.
110 V, 269. Cf. also VI, 26.
111 V, 269.
112 Rosenkranz: Hegels Leben. 190; cf. also 191 ff.
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 179
Considered in relation to the rational, however, the fixed categories and forms of finitude can develop and simultaneously annul their onesidedness and finitude. Schelling called this kind of logic "scientific skepticism," an expression which is certainly not overlooked by Rozenkranz and surely presents the negative side of the rational cognition. The relation between speculation and reflection is characterized more clearly still in Schelling's explanations. The "artistic dimension" of philosophy - namely, logic - is that "which one could call common [allgemein] dialectic. Without the art of dialectic there is no scientific philosophy! " It tries to express the original truth [Urwissen] in the forms of "reflection. " "It is upon this relation between speculation and reflection that all dialectic depends. "113 Dialectic is, therefore, the method of rationally or speculatively relating isolated determinations of reflection; by this means, it is made clear that every finite determination is affected by its opposite and that it is itself the negation of its opposite; from the opposition, and the resultant antithesis of reflective determinations, however, must come - through the respective relations - a new concept which is itself the ground of the antithesis. With that in mind, the thought arises that that which is the third, the synthesis, considered reflectively, is the first when considered speculatively. In this way, dialectic makes possible - by means of the rational relationship between alleged antitheses - the systematic unfolding and supersession of the forms of finitude.
The implementation of dialectic in logic is first made available to us in Hegel's Logik, Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie of 1804. Nonetheless, Hegel speaks casually of dialectic already in the Kritischen Journal. 114 Schelling's mention of dialectic goes back to his own formulations in the summer of 1802. 115 Dialectic in this sense is evident here for the first time in Schelling. Although the term "dialectic" nowhere appears in the program of the Logik-Vorlesung, which was provided by Rosenkranz, it is
113 V, 267; cf. V, 269. Schelling adds there the thought that "the two contradictory opposite notions of each essence belong to only one" belonged to the "sphere of finitude," but not in the sphere of "speculation which has its beginning in the indifference of opposition alone. "
114 Cf. Hegel: Gesammelte Werke. Bd. 4, 446. The essay on natural right, in which this passage is found, appeared in late fall 1802. With regard the dating of the Logik, Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie at 1804, cf. H. Kimmerle: Zur Chronologie von Hegels Jenaer Schriften in Hegel-Studien, 4 (1967), 144; 164 ff. With regard to dialectic, the methods of logic as an introduction, cf. Jen. Logik, Metaphysik und Naturphilsophie. Hrsg. v. G. Lasson, Leipzig, 1923, 132.
115 Cf. V, 209.
? 180 Appendix
the only possible systematic and pertinent place for this dialectic of "scientific skepticism" which, in Hegel's earlier logic, still serves as a systematic introduction to the system. Indeed, Hegel had been trying to define in detail the structure of the relation between reflection and speculation since the Differenz essay. This systematic meaning can be traced back to Hegel - but not only that: the characterization of dialectic as the expression of the structure of this relationship within logic may well go back to him as well. In his Identita? tsphilosophie period, Schelling no longer employed the dialectic.
116 Hegel, by comparison, refers back to Plato's Parmenides in, e. g. , his Skeptizmus essay; above all else, he refers to the Kantian concept of antinomy where the dialectic of pure reason appears in its most pregnant form. Hegel claims, retrospectively, that the antinomies help Kant "establish in particular the conviction of the invalidity of the categories of finitude" and encourages a "more correct path" to the new philosophy than subjective idealism. 117 Hegel himself follows this path in his early logic; beginning with Kant's concept of the antinomy (which is then taken to be the principle of truth and cognition within the dialectic of antithesis), Hegel tries to suspend - in systematic order and thus within the scope of knowledge - the categories of finitude and the finitude of self-consciousness. One must never forget, however, that Schelling may have made certain suggestions conversationally which correspond completely to the Hegelian conception. Schelling and Hegel collaborated closely not only on editing the Kritischen Journals; their solidarity can also be documented, e. g. , in the Disputatorium which they held in the WS of 1801/2: "Introduction to the Idea and Limitations of True Philosophy. "118 There were at any rate ample opportunities, both
116 In the workings to the Weltaltern, Schelling used "dialectic" in another sense and warned against the over-estimation of dialectic - a remark which one can well understand to be a hidden critique of the developmental method of Hegel (cf. VIII, 201 ff; 205). Schelling claimed, in the Mu? nchener lectures, to be the inventor of a method which someone else, namely, Hegel, subscribes; Schelling cites his System des transzendentalen Idealismus and letter in reference to the Identita? tssystem as proof of this (cf. X, 96; also 138 ff; 147 ftn. 2 and others). He does not, however, speaking there of dialectic in the sense characterized above. With regard to dialectic in the later Schelling moreover, see E. Oeser: Die antike Dialektik in der Spa? tphilosophie Schellings, Wein u. Mu? nschen, 1965.
117 Wissenschaft der Logik. Hrsg. v. G. Lasson. Leipzig, 1934. T. 1. 183. Cf. already the appendixes to a new concept of antinomy in Hegels theologische Jugendschriften, 382 ff.
118 The "disputatorium" did, contrary to Rosenkranz's report, take place. Cf. also: Dokumente zu Hegels Jenaer Dozententa? tigkeit (1801 - 1807). Hrsg. v. H. Kimmerle in Hegel-Studien, 4 (1967), 53, 76.
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 181
public and private, for discussion of these philosophical themes and their common philosophical foundations. In spite of the multifarious and mutual stimulation which came from their collaborative work, the preserved texts tend to suggest the thesis that it was initially Hegel who not only thought through systematically the specific context of reflection and speculation, but also designated it as "dialectic" in logic.
This study should well show not only that the new sense of speculation qua rational cognition of the absolute, but also actually the foundation for the possibility of a rational system of absolute identity, originally traces back to Hegel. Schelling immediately seized hold of this new meaning and developed the first Identita? tssystem. The possibility for such a receptivity surely lay in their shared philosophical and theological heritage; one need only to be reminded in this case of the Tubinger Stift, of their critique of orthodox theology with an interest in a new philosophical theology, as well as their discussion of Schelling's first philosophical publications in the correspondence between 1794 and 1796. In his Frankfurterzeit (1797- 1800), however, Hegel broke off all direct contact with Schelling; in these years, Schelling and Hegel's philosophical development progressed, essentially, independently of one another. Hegel had, however, as the Differenz essay shows, digested Schelling's central works in natural and transcendental philosophy and integrated that into his own systematic- speculative constructions (from 1801). Thus, Schelling detected new possibilities in Hegel's account for the clarification of and eventually the solution to certain systematic problems with which he was at that time confronted - problems made more poignant still by his split with Fichte.
Schelling then, in the following period, became more involved still with the systematic themes in Hegel; at the same time, however, Schelling undertook certain characteristic revisions within which one may well recognize certain propositions which later motivated Schelling's abandonment of the Identita? tsphilosophie and, in a certain way, the resumption of his earlier thoughts. Most importantly, the necessary connection between reflection and speculation remained - despite certain references by Schelling in the period of his Identita? tsphilosophie - without systematic meaning. The positive sense of the opposition and the dialectic of the reflective determinations were not, at bottom, accepted by him.
From the previously discussed specification of the relation between reflection and speculation arises the thesis, which cannot be discussed further here, in the interpretation of Hegel: viz. , that the dialectic is
182 Appendix
developed as a method for the systematic development and self- suspending of the forms of finite reflection in Hegel's early logic, which exercises a limited function as an introduction to the system, and only later - in another part of the system - was promoted as a general method.
85 Ibid. , 275. Cf. also the revised introduction to the Ideen (1803): (2)5-7 (II, 13 ff. ).
86 IV, 431.
87 IV, 441. With regard to the meaning of speculation, also see IV, 448.
88 Cf. IV, 432; 436; 439.
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 175
the godly and natural principle. "89 Still in the Bruno, to which he here refers, Schelling "calls with conviction on the earlier efforts of a friend" for the "speculative sense" of the laws of Kepler, for the cognition of these laws "in their purity," and for liberation from the "mechanical mindset. "90 In the Ferneren Darstellungen, therefore, Hegel's contribution was in large part limited to critique, while the positive - i. e. , speculative - standpoint would be reserved for the Bruno dialogue. 91 In addition to this, consider how Schelling in the second edition of the Ideen, in reference to the "laws of the planetary system," refers to the Bruno and the Ferneren Darstellungen, but fails to mention Hegel's Habilitationsschrift. 92 Schelling clearly believed that he had moved far beyond Hegel's initial suggestion. This example discloses a gradual transformation in Schelling and Hegel's collaborative enterprise.
Schelling's definition of absolute cognition as speculation, however, is more meaningful systematically than this limited natural-philosophical theme. There is, according to Schelling, an "immediate cognition of the absolute . . . and that is the first speculative cognition, the principle and ground of the possibility of all philosophy. "93 Schelling called this cognition "absolute knowledge" and the complete science, which accords to this principle, "absolute science";94 such knowledge of the absolute and the absolute itself are, for him, one and the same. 95 This concept of speculative cognition agrees completely with that of Hegel. Schelling clearly diverges from Hegel, however, when he identifies this cognition with "intellectual intuition" alone or when he defines "rational intuition" [Vernunftanschauung] or rather "speculative intuition" in opposition to reflection. 96 Indeed, for Hegel, speculation also contains a transcendental intuition, though nonetheless only as one side of speculation. 97 Hegel later dismisses, to the benefit of a pure thought of reason, the distinction
89 IV, 432.
90 IV, 330 ftn. .
91 Cf. also O. Closs: Kepler und Newton und das Problem der Gravitation in der Kantischen, Schellingshen und Hegelshen Naturphilosophie. Heidelberg, 1908, 66 ff. .
92 Cf. (2)262 ff (II, 190). Cf. also (2)278 (II, 200); V, 328 ff.
93 IV, 368.
94 IV, 345 ff. ftn. ; 369, ftn. ; 403 ff. ; also cf. IV, 326.
95 Cf. IV, 361; 369; 404; (2)68 (II, 59); (2)71 (II, 61).
96 IV, 368 ff. ; 361; 451. Also cf. VII, 158, where Schelling calls speculation ein "schauen," eine "Contemplation Gottes. " Schelling had already thought about such an intuition in the Darstellung.
97 Cf. Hegel: Gesammelte Werke. Bd 4, 27ff. ; 16; 29; 77.
? 176 Appendix
between concept and transcendental intuition. For Schelling, on the other hand, pure intuition and that which is intuited are always immediately absorbed into one another in speculation; thus, he tried to metaphorically represent the absolute as both the Light and an all seeing eye. 98 All [discursive] access is closed off from this intuition; in this, Schelling reasserts his original view of intellectual intuition.
In order to explain the possibility and necessity of the finite, Schelling developed the theory that the finite and the infinite coalesce completely within the absolute. The absolute as totality produces particularity and finitude from within itself as its ideal; but since the absolute intuits itself, the finite ideal as such is already infinite. The Platonic relationship between prototype and likeness, which Schelling also continued to utilize, was here transformed into the relationship between model and counterpart [Vorbild und Gegenbild] and the unity [Ineinsbildung] of both. 99 Schelling often called the finite determinations of reflection 'Reflexe' as well, the finite and imperfect counterparts to the absolute. This theory, too, is distinctive to - very distinct from Hegel--Schelling's design with regard to the realization of the Identita? tssystem. In the presentation of the image and unity, divine intuition is still presupposed. It is clearly very difficult, however, to unify indiscursivity and absolute indifference - in which all multiplicity, considered in itself, must be dissolved - with the conception of a systematic development of identity. Only now, through this formulation of intellectual intuition and indifference, is the thought of a splitting-off and falling-away from the absolute possible at all; indeed, this formulation of intellectual intuition and indifference is also the place to look for the reason for the later abandonment of the Identita? tsphilosophie.
Since absolute rational cognition or speculation is pure intellectual intuition for Schelling, he can analogically refer to the philosophical method as a geometrical proof qua construction and a philosophical proof qua demonstration. 100 Every particular is to be construed within and known through the intuition of the absolute. This "absolute method" of philosophical construction is distinguished in reflection as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The synthesis, however, is "not the third, but rather the first,
98 Cf. IV, 404 ff.
99 Cf. IV, 394. The postscripts to the second edition of the Ideen attempt to develop in detail such a theory.
100 Cf. IV, 407 ff; cf. Schelling_s Journal essay: Ueber die Construction in der Philosophie in Hegel: Gesammelte Werke. Bd 4, 277 ff.
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 177
absolute unity. "101 This thought is also found in Hegel in the Kritischen Journal. 102 Schelling is alluding here to the form of triplicity presented earlier, e. g. the triplicity of powers in nature. 103 This new notion of synthesis distinguishes Schelling from the Fichtean notion of the synthesis through divisibility to which Schelling previously - regardless of ulterior motives - remained true. 104 The decisive foundation for this new notion of synthesis, in which totality is considered the first term, lay in the relationship of reflection to speculation. The question posed here, then, is whether one ought not to search for the original problem of dialectic in this relationship; if so, reflection must have a necessary, though certainly subordinate, function in the systematic cognition of the Absolute.
An answer to this question, which requires a specific definition of the correlation between reflection and speculation, is first suggested in Schelling's reference to true skepticism in the Ferneren Darstellungen, a passage which quite clearly goes back to Hegel's Skeptizismus essay. Schelling characterizes "criticism," as opposed to "true philosophy," as a "bad skepticism"105; this "bad skepticism" stands completely on the side of reflection and believes that "it has annihilated speculation. " "True skepticism is diametrically opposed to reflective cognition rather than the principle of true speculation - although he cannot say this categorically, since he would otherwise abandon his skepticism. "106 In the Skeptizismus essay, Hegel distinguishes genuine skepticism from the other varieties of skepticism; genuine skepticism is one with true philosophy and represents "the negative side" and presupposes that "unmediated reason is the positive side of the cognition of the absolute. "107 Schelling does not distinguish, as Hegel did, between a form of skepticism which is to be distinguished from philosophy and genuine skepticism which is not. For Schelling, therefore, skepticism in general is "something merely private";108 he also denies here the positive sense of the oppositions which reflection
101 IV, 399; cf. IV, 378 ff. ; cf. also in Bruno IV, 261; 267; 290; in the second edition of the Ideen (2)139 (II, 107).
102 Cf. Hegel: Gesammelte Werke. Bd. 4, 319; 335; 399.
103 Cf. , e. g. , III, 449 ff.
104 Cf. , e. g. , III, 394; 480 and others.
105 Hegel had already characterized Criticism in the Habilitationsthesen as the "imperfecta . . . Scepticismi forma" (Rosenkranz: Hegels Leben, 159). Cf. also Schelling IV, 350 ff.
106 IV, 365 ff. ; cf. also VII, 153 ftn. 2.
107 Hegel: Gesammelte Werke. Bd. 4, 207.
108 IV, 366.
? 178 Appendix
sets in finitudes, although these are the conditions for the possibility of genuine skepticism. 109
The positive sense of the opposition of the reflective determination seems to be recognized by Schelling, however, in a comment made in his Vorlesungen u? ber die Methode des akademischen Studiums (1803). He demands there that it is necessary to come "to the categorical knowledge of the nothingness" of finite perspectives; "this negative knowledge must become equal to the positive intuition of absoluteness, if it is ever to elevate itself to genuine skepticism. " This negative cognition can also be developed into a "science of form", "a pure aesthetic teaching of philosophy. " Were it to be a pure presentation of the form of finitude in its relationship to the Absolute, it must therefore also be a form of scientific skepticism. 110 One such teaching is logic, but not traditional logic nor Kant's transcendental logic - nor can he mean the logic contained in the Bruno; rather, "it still does not exist. "111 Schelling's claims correspond, however, with the program of Hegel's Logik-Vorlesung from his earlier Jena period - a program handed down to us only through Rosenkranz. The task of logic, from this lecture forward, is the systematic formulation and supersession of the forms of finitude and reflection. Logic should show that every finite determination of reflection has within it an opposite and that it is through its opposite that it is superseded [aufhebt]. The incremental supersession of these forms of reflection, though, is an introduction to the infinite - to the true, rational apprehension or speculation. Logic, therefore, is a systematically advancing introduction to the essential philosophy, a philosophy which begins with metaphysics. This formulation of logic, which can only be hinted at here, is not an early form of the later speculative Wissenschaft der Logik, but rather has a fundamentally different, systematic meaning. The formulation and supersession of the forms of finitude does not appear from the very beginning within the Absolute and is not to be identified with metaphysics, but instead claims to serve the function of an introduction to the true philosophy. Moreover, according to Hegel, reflection and speculation are not opposed to one another absolutely; instead, reflection merely abstacts "from the absolute identity that which is related to one another in rational cognition. "112
109 Cf. Hegel: Gesammelte Werke. Bd. 4, 208 ff. . Also cf. Rosenkranz: Hegels Leben, 156.
110 V, 269. Cf. also VI, 26.
111 V, 269.
112 Rosenkranz: Hegels Leben. 190; cf. also 191 ff.
? Hegel: Hovering Over the Corpse of Faith and Reason 179
Considered in relation to the rational, however, the fixed categories and forms of finitude can develop and simultaneously annul their onesidedness and finitude. Schelling called this kind of logic "scientific skepticism," an expression which is certainly not overlooked by Rozenkranz and surely presents the negative side of the rational cognition. The relation between speculation and reflection is characterized more clearly still in Schelling's explanations. The "artistic dimension" of philosophy - namely, logic - is that "which one could call common [allgemein] dialectic. Without the art of dialectic there is no scientific philosophy! " It tries to express the original truth [Urwissen] in the forms of "reflection. " "It is upon this relation between speculation and reflection that all dialectic depends. "113 Dialectic is, therefore, the method of rationally or speculatively relating isolated determinations of reflection; by this means, it is made clear that every finite determination is affected by its opposite and that it is itself the negation of its opposite; from the opposition, and the resultant antithesis of reflective determinations, however, must come - through the respective relations - a new concept which is itself the ground of the antithesis. With that in mind, the thought arises that that which is the third, the synthesis, considered reflectively, is the first when considered speculatively. In this way, dialectic makes possible - by means of the rational relationship between alleged antitheses - the systematic unfolding and supersession of the forms of finitude.
The implementation of dialectic in logic is first made available to us in Hegel's Logik, Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie of 1804. Nonetheless, Hegel speaks casually of dialectic already in the Kritischen Journal. 114 Schelling's mention of dialectic goes back to his own formulations in the summer of 1802. 115 Dialectic in this sense is evident here for the first time in Schelling. Although the term "dialectic" nowhere appears in the program of the Logik-Vorlesung, which was provided by Rosenkranz, it is
113 V, 267; cf. V, 269. Schelling adds there the thought that "the two contradictory opposite notions of each essence belong to only one" belonged to the "sphere of finitude," but not in the sphere of "speculation which has its beginning in the indifference of opposition alone. "
114 Cf. Hegel: Gesammelte Werke. Bd. 4, 446. The essay on natural right, in which this passage is found, appeared in late fall 1802. With regard the dating of the Logik, Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie at 1804, cf. H. Kimmerle: Zur Chronologie von Hegels Jenaer Schriften in Hegel-Studien, 4 (1967), 144; 164 ff. With regard to dialectic, the methods of logic as an introduction, cf. Jen. Logik, Metaphysik und Naturphilsophie. Hrsg. v. G. Lasson, Leipzig, 1923, 132.
115 Cf. V, 209.
? 180 Appendix
the only possible systematic and pertinent place for this dialectic of "scientific skepticism" which, in Hegel's earlier logic, still serves as a systematic introduction to the system. Indeed, Hegel had been trying to define in detail the structure of the relation between reflection and speculation since the Differenz essay. This systematic meaning can be traced back to Hegel - but not only that: the characterization of dialectic as the expression of the structure of this relationship within logic may well go back to him as well. In his Identita? tsphilosophie period, Schelling no longer employed the dialectic.
116 Hegel, by comparison, refers back to Plato's Parmenides in, e. g. , his Skeptizmus essay; above all else, he refers to the Kantian concept of antinomy where the dialectic of pure reason appears in its most pregnant form. Hegel claims, retrospectively, that the antinomies help Kant "establish in particular the conviction of the invalidity of the categories of finitude" and encourages a "more correct path" to the new philosophy than subjective idealism. 117 Hegel himself follows this path in his early logic; beginning with Kant's concept of the antinomy (which is then taken to be the principle of truth and cognition within the dialectic of antithesis), Hegel tries to suspend - in systematic order and thus within the scope of knowledge - the categories of finitude and the finitude of self-consciousness. One must never forget, however, that Schelling may have made certain suggestions conversationally which correspond completely to the Hegelian conception. Schelling and Hegel collaborated closely not only on editing the Kritischen Journals; their solidarity can also be documented, e. g. , in the Disputatorium which they held in the WS of 1801/2: "Introduction to the Idea and Limitations of True Philosophy. "118 There were at any rate ample opportunities, both
116 In the workings to the Weltaltern, Schelling used "dialectic" in another sense and warned against the over-estimation of dialectic - a remark which one can well understand to be a hidden critique of the developmental method of Hegel (cf. VIII, 201 ff; 205). Schelling claimed, in the Mu? nchener lectures, to be the inventor of a method which someone else, namely, Hegel, subscribes; Schelling cites his System des transzendentalen Idealismus and letter in reference to the Identita? tssystem as proof of this (cf. X, 96; also 138 ff; 147 ftn. 2 and others). He does not, however, speaking there of dialectic in the sense characterized above. With regard to dialectic in the later Schelling moreover, see E. Oeser: Die antike Dialektik in der Spa? tphilosophie Schellings, Wein u. Mu? nschen, 1965.
117 Wissenschaft der Logik. Hrsg. v. G. Lasson. Leipzig, 1934. T. 1. 183. Cf. already the appendixes to a new concept of antinomy in Hegels theologische Jugendschriften, 382 ff.
118 The "disputatorium" did, contrary to Rosenkranz's report, take place. Cf. also: Dokumente zu Hegels Jenaer Dozententa? tigkeit (1801 - 1807). Hrsg. v. H. Kimmerle in Hegel-Studien, 4 (1967), 53, 76.
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public and private, for discussion of these philosophical themes and their common philosophical foundations. In spite of the multifarious and mutual stimulation which came from their collaborative work, the preserved texts tend to suggest the thesis that it was initially Hegel who not only thought through systematically the specific context of reflection and speculation, but also designated it as "dialectic" in logic.
This study should well show not only that the new sense of speculation qua rational cognition of the absolute, but also actually the foundation for the possibility of a rational system of absolute identity, originally traces back to Hegel. Schelling immediately seized hold of this new meaning and developed the first Identita? tssystem. The possibility for such a receptivity surely lay in their shared philosophical and theological heritage; one need only to be reminded in this case of the Tubinger Stift, of their critique of orthodox theology with an interest in a new philosophical theology, as well as their discussion of Schelling's first philosophical publications in the correspondence between 1794 and 1796. In his Frankfurterzeit (1797- 1800), however, Hegel broke off all direct contact with Schelling; in these years, Schelling and Hegel's philosophical development progressed, essentially, independently of one another. Hegel had, however, as the Differenz essay shows, digested Schelling's central works in natural and transcendental philosophy and integrated that into his own systematic- speculative constructions (from 1801). Thus, Schelling detected new possibilities in Hegel's account for the clarification of and eventually the solution to certain systematic problems with which he was at that time confronted - problems made more poignant still by his split with Fichte.
Schelling then, in the following period, became more involved still with the systematic themes in Hegel; at the same time, however, Schelling undertook certain characteristic revisions within which one may well recognize certain propositions which later motivated Schelling's abandonment of the Identita? tsphilosophie and, in a certain way, the resumption of his earlier thoughts. Most importantly, the necessary connection between reflection and speculation remained - despite certain references by Schelling in the period of his Identita? tsphilosophie - without systematic meaning. The positive sense of the opposition and the dialectic of the reflective determinations were not, at bottom, accepted by him.
From the previously discussed specification of the relation between reflection and speculation arises the thesis, which cannot be discussed further here, in the interpretation of Hegel: viz. , that the dialectic is
182 Appendix
developed as a method for the systematic development and self- suspending of the forms of finite reflection in Hegel's early logic, which exercises a limited function as an introduction to the system, and only later - in another part of the system - was promoted as a general method.
