]
Simias immediately .
Simias immediately .
Universal Anthology - v04
204, was son of Lycortas, a leader of the Achaean League in its latter days, and himself was one of its active officials from youth.
In b.
c.
167 the Romans deported him to Italy as one of a thousand political prison ers and kept him there sixteen years.
He, however, became tutor to the sons of -5Smilius Paulus, the conqueror of Macedonia, one of whom by adoption was the younger Scipio ; and so gained the high respect and friendship of the Scipio circle and all the foremost men in Rome, which he served in political and mili tary capacities.
In b.
c.
151 he returned to Greece, and as commissioner after its conquest in b.
c.
146 gained perhaps better terms for it.
He died about b.
c.
122.
His great literary work was the "Histories" of Roman affairs from the beginning of the Hannibalic war (b.
c.
220) to the final crushing of Greece and Carthage (b.
c.
146), with a lengthy introduction on the Achaean League and other matters.
Only five of its forty books are preserved in full, with several long fragments of others.
]
When at length the country did obtain leaders of suffi cient ability, it quickly manifested its intrinsic excellence by the accomplishment of that most glorious achievement, — the union of the Peloponnese. The originator of this policy in the first instance was Aratus of Sicyon ; its active promotion and con summation was due to Philopoemen of Megalopolis ; while Lycortas and his party must be looked upon as the authors of the permanence which it enjoyed.
For the first twenty-five years of the league, a secretary and two strategi for the whole union were elected by each city in turn. But after this period they determined to appoint one strategus only, and put the entire management of the affairs of the union in his hands. The first to obtain this honor was Margos of Caryneia (b. c. 255-254). In the fourth year after this man's tenure of the office, Aratus of Sicyon (born 271) caused his city to join the league, which, by his energy and courage, he had, when only twenty years of age, delivered from the yoke of its tyrant. In the eighth year again after this, Aratus, being elected strategus for the second time, laid a plot to seize the Acrocorinthus, then held by Antigonus ; and by his success freed the inhabitants of the Peloponnese from a source of serious alarm : and having thus
384 LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACILEAN LEAGUE.
liberated Corinth, he caused it to join the league. In his same term of office, he got Megara into his hands, and caused it to join also. These events occurred in the year before the decisive defeat of the Carthaginians (b. c. 241), in consequence of which they evacuated Sicily and consented for the first time to pay tribute to Rome.
Having made this remarkable progress in his design in so short a time, Aratus continued thenceforth in the position of leader of the Achaean League, and in the consistent direction of his whole policy to one single end: which was to expel Macedonians from the Peloponnese, to depose the despots, and to establish in each state the common freedom which their ancestors had enjoyed before them. So long, therefore, as Antigonus Gonatas was alive, he maintained a continual opposition to his interference, as well as to the encroaching spirit of the JStolians, and in both cases with signal skill and success ; although their presumption and contempt for jus tice had risen to such a pitch that they had actually made a formal compact with each other for the disruption of the Achaeans.
After the death of Antigonus, however, the Achaeans made terms with the iEtolians, and joined them energetically in the war against Demetrius; and, in place of the feelings of estrangement and hostility, there gradually grew up a senti ment of brotherhood and affection between the two peoples. Upon the death of Demetrius (B. C. 229), after a reign of only ten years, just about the time of the first invasion of Illyri- cum by the Romans, the Achaeans had a most excellent oppor tunity of establishing the policy which they had all along maintained. For the despots in the Peloponnese were in despair at the death of Demetrius. It was the loss to them of their chief supporter and paymaster. And now Aratus was forever impressing upon them that they ought to abdi cate, holding out rewards and honors for those of them who consented, and threatening those who refused with still greater vengeance from the Achaeans. There was therefore a general movement among them to voluntarily restore their several states to freedom and to join the league. I ought, however, to say that Ludiades of Megalopolis, in the lifetime of Deme trius, of his own deliberate choice, and foreseeing with great shrewdness and good sense what was going to happen, had abdicated his sovereignty and become a citizen of the national
LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACH^AN LEAGUE. 385
league. His example was followed by Aristomachus, tyrant of Argos, Xeno of Hermione, and Cleonymus of Phlius, who all likewise abdicated and joined the democratic league.
But the increased power and national advancement which these events brought to the Achaeans excited the envy of the ^tolians; who, besides their natural inclination to unjust and selfish aggrandizement, were inspired with the hope of breaking up the union of Achaean states, as they had before succeeded in partitioning those of Acarnania with Alexander, and had planned to do those of Achaia with Antigonus Gonatas. Instigated once more by similar expectations, they had now the assurance to enter into communication and close alliance at once with Antigonus (Doson — acceded B. C. 229)
(at that time ruling Macedonia as guardian of the young King Philip), and with Cleomenes, King of Sparta. They
saw that Antigonus had undisputed possession of the throne of Macedonia, while he was an open and avowed enemy of the Achaeans, owing to the surprise of the Acrocorinthus ; and they supposed that if they could get the Lacedaemonians to join them in their hostility to the league, they would easily subdue by selecting a favorable opportunity for their attack, and securing that should be assaulted on all sides at once. And they would in all probability have succeeded, but that they had left out the most important element in the calculation, namely, that in Aratus they had to reckon with an opponent to their plans of ability equal to almost any emergency. Accordingly, when they attempted this violent and unjust interference in Achaia, so far from succeeding in any of their devices, they, on the contrary, strengthened Aratus, the then president of the league, as well as the league itself. So consummate was the ability with which he foiled their plan and reduced them to impotence. The manner in which this was done will be made clear in what am about to relate.
There could be no doubt of the policy of the -35tolians. They were ashamed indeed to attack the Achaeans openly, be cause they could not ignore their recent obligations to them in the war with Demetrius but they were plotting with the Lace daemonians and showed their jealousy of the Achieans by not only conniving at the treacherous attack of Cleomenes upon Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenus (cities not only in alliance with them, but actually members of their league), but by con-
vol. iv. — 25
;
:
I
it
it,
386 LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACH^AN LEAGUE.
firming his occupation of those places. In old times they had thought almost any excuse good enough to justify an appeal to arms against those who, after all, had done them no wrong ; yet they now allowed themselves to be treated with such treachery, and submitted without remonstrance to the loss of the most im portant towns, solely with the view of creating in Cleomenes a formidable antagonist to the Achaeans. These facts were not lost upon Aratus and the other officers of the league ; and they resolved that without taking the initiative in going to war with any one, they would resist the attempts of the Lacedaemonians. Such was their determination, and for a time they persisted in it ; but immediately afterwards Cleomenes began to build the hostile fort in the territory of Megalopolis, called the Athe naeum, and showed an undisguised and bitter hostility. Aratus and his colleagues accordingly summoned a meeting of the league, and it was decided to proclaim war openly against Sparta.
[Aratus gave up to Antigonus the citadel of Corinth, making him master of Greece ; and Cleomenes was defeated at Sellasia. ]
This was the origin of what is called the Cleomenic War. At first the Achaeans were for depending on their own re sources for facing the Lacedaemonians. They looked upon it as more honorable not to look to others for preservation, but to guard their own territory and cities themselves ; and at the same time the remembrances of his former services made them desirous of keeping up their friendship with Ptolemy (Euerge- tes, B. C. 247-222), and averse from the appearance of seeking aid elsewhere. But when the war had lasted some time, and Cleomenes had revolutionized the constitution of his country, and had turned its constitutional monarchy into a despotism, and, moreover, was conducting the war with extraordinary skill and boldness, seeing clearly what would happen, and fear ing the reckless audacity of the jEtolians, Aratus determined that his first duty was to be well beforehand in frustrating their plans. He satisfied himself that Antigonus was a man of ac tivity and practical ability, with some pretensions to the charac ter of a man of honor ; he however knew perfectly well that kings look on no man as a friend or foe from personal consid erations, but ever measure friendships and enmities solely by the standard of expediency. He therefore conceived the idea
LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACH. EAN LEAGUE. 387
of addressing himself to this monarch, and entering into friendly relations with him, taking occasion to point out to him the cer tain result of his present policy. But to act openly in this mat ter he thought inexpedient for several reasons. By doing so he would not only incur the opposition of Cleomenes and the JEtolians, but would cause consternation among the Achaeans themselves, because his appeal to their enemies would give the impression that he had abandoned all the hopes he once had in them. This was the very last idea he desired should go abroad; and he therefore determined to conduct this intrigue in secrecy.
The Battle of Sellasia, b. o. 221.
Cleomenes had expected the attack, and had secured the passes into the country by posting garrisons, digging trenches, and felling trees ; while he took up position at a place called Sellasia, with an army amounting to twenty thousand, having calculated that the invading forces would take that direction : which turned out to be the case.
The sight of these preparations decided Antigonus not to make an immediate attack upon the position, or rashly hazard an engagement. He pitched his camp a short distance from it, covering his front by the stream called Gorgylus, and there re mained for some days ; informing himself by reconnaisances of the peculiarities of the ground and the character of the troops, and at the same time endeavoring by feigned movements to elicit the intentions of the enemy. But he could never find an unguarded point, or one where the troops were not entirely on the alert ; for Cleomenes was always ready at a moment's notice to be at any point that was attacked. He therefore gave up all thoughts of attacking the position ; and finally an under standing was come to between him and Cleomenes to bring the matter to the decision of battle. And indeed, fortune had there brought into competition two commanders equally endowed by nature with military skill.
The moment for beginning the battle had come : the signal was given to the Illyrians, and the word passed by the officers to their men to do their duty ; and in a moment they started into view of the enemy and began assaulting the hill. But the light-armed troops who were stationed with Cleomenes' cav alry, observing that the Achaean lines were not covered by any
388 LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACHLEAN LEAGUE.
other troops behind them, charged them on the rear ; and thus reduced the division while endeavoring to carry the hill of Evas to a state of great peril, — being met as they were on their front by Eucleidas from the top of the hill, and being charged and vigorously attacked by the light-armed mercenaries on their rear. It was at this point that Philopoemen of Megalopolis, with a clear understanding of the situation and a foresight of what would happen, vainly endeavored to point out the cer tain result to his superior officers. They disregarded him for his want of experience in command and his extreme youth ; and accordingly he acted for himself, and cheering on the men of his own city made a vigorous charge on the enemy. This ef fected a diversion ; for the light-armed mercenaries, who were engaged in harassing the rear of the party ascending Evas, hear ing the shouting and seeing the cavalry engaged, abandoned their attack upon this party and hurried back to their original position to render assistance to the cavalry. The result was that the division of Illyrians, Macedonians, and the rest who were advancing with them, no longer had their attention di verted by an attack upon their rear, and so continued their advance upon the enemy with high spirits and renewed confi dence. This afterwards caused it to be acknowledged that to Philopoemen was due the honor of the success against Eucleidas.
It is clear that Antigonus at any rate entertained that opinion; for after the battle he asked Alexander, the com mander of the cavalry, with the view of convicting him of his shortcoming, "Why he had engaged before the signal was given ? " And upon Alexander answering that " He had not done so, but that a young officer from Megalopolis "had pre sumed to anticipate the signal, contrary to his wish : Antigo nus replied, " That young man acted like a good general in grasping the situation ; you, general, were the youngster. "
What Eucleidas ought to have done, when he saw the ene my's lines advancing, was to have rushed down at once upon them, thrown their ranks into disorder, and then retired him self step by step to continually higher ground into a safe posi tion ; for by thus breaking them up, and depriving them to begin with of the advantages of their peculiar armor and dis position, he would have secured the victory by the superiority of his position. But he did the very opposite of all this, and thereby forfeited the advantages of the ground. As though
LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACH^AN LEAGUE. 389
victory were assured, he kept his original position on the sum mit of the hill, with the view of catching the enemy at as great an elevation as possible, that their flight might be all the longer over steep and precipitous ground. The result, as might have been anticipated, was exactly the reverse. For he left himself no place of retreat, and by allowing the enemy to reach his position, unharmed and in unbroken order, he was placed at the disadvantage of having to give them battle on the very summit of the hill : and so, as soon as he was forced by the weight of their heavy armor and their close order to give any ground, it was immediately occupied by the Illyrians ; while his own men were obliged to take lower ground, because they had no space for maneuvering on the top. The result was not long in arriv ing : they suffered a repulse, which the difficult and precipitous nature of the ground over which they had to retire turned into a disastrous flight.
Simultaneously with these events the cavalry engagement was also being brought to a decision, in which all the Achaean cav alry, and especially Philopoemen, fought with conspicuous gal lantry, for to them it was a contest for freedom. Philopoemen himself had his horse killed under him, and while fighting accordingly on foot received a severe wound through both his thighs. Meanwhile the two kings on the other hill, Olympus, began by bringing their light-armed troops and mercenaries into action, of which each of them had five thousand. Both the kings and their entire armies had a full view of this action, which was fought with great gallantry on both sides : the charges taking place sometimes in detachments, and at other times along the whole line, and an eager emulation being dis played between the several ranks, and even between individuals. But when Cleomenes saw that his brother's division was retreat ing, and that the cavalry in the low ground were on the point of doing the same, alarmed at the prospect of an attack at all points at once, he was compelled to demolish the palisade in his front, and to lead out his whole force in line by one side of his position. A recall was sounded on the bugle for the light- armed troops of both sides, who were on the ground between the two armies ; and the phalanxes shouting their war cries, and with spears couched, charged each other. Then a fierce struggle arose : the Macedonians sometimes slowly giving ground and yielding to the superior courage of the soldiers of Sparta, and at another time the Lacedaemonians being forced to give
390 LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACH^AN LEAGUE.
way before the overpowering weight of the Macedonian pha lanx. At length Antigonus ordered a charge in close order and in double phalanx ; the enormous weight of this peculiar formation proved sufficient to finally dislodge the Lacedaemo nians from their strongholds, and they fled in disorder and suf fering severely as they went. Cleomenes himself, with a guard of cavalry, effected his retreat to Sparta ; but the same night he went down to Gythium, where all preparations for crossing the sea had been made long before in case of mishap, and with his friends sailed to Alexandria.
After the expulsion of Cleomenes (B. C. 222-221) the Pelo- ponnesians, weary of the wars that had taken place, and trust ing to the peaceful arrangement that had been come to, neglected all warlike preparations. Aratus, however, indignant and in censed at the audacity of the j5£tolian8 was not inclined to take things so calmly, for he had, in fact, a grudge of long standing against these people. Wherefore he was for instantly summon ing the Achaeans to an armed levy, and was all eagerness to attack the jEtolians. Eventually he took over from Timoxe- nus the seal of the league (b. c. 220) five days before the proper time, and wrote to the various cities summoning a meeting in arms of all those who were of the military age, at Megalopolis.
Aratus had many of the qualities of a great ruler. He could speak, and contrive, and conceal his purpose : no one surpassed him in the moderation which he showed in political contests, or in his power of attaching friends and gaining allies : in intrigue, stratagem, and laying plots against a foe, and in bringing them to a successful termination by personal endurance and courage, he was preeminent. Many clear instances of these qualities may be found ; but none more convincing than the episodes of the capture of Sicyon and Mantinea, of the expulsion of the iEto- lians from Pellene, and especially of the surprise of the Acroco- rinthus. On the other hand, whenever he attempted a campaign in the field, he was slow in conception and timid in execution, and without personal gallantry in the presence of danger. The result was that the Peloponnese was full of trophies which marked reverses sustained by him ; and that in this particular department he was always easily defeated.
[He died in 213, at fifty-eight, and believed himself poisoned by Philip V. , probably without reason. ]
LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACELaSAN LEAGUE. 391
In consequence of having been so often elected Strategus of the Achaean League, and of having performed so many splendid services for that people, Aratus after his death met with the honors he deserved, both in his own native city and from the league as a body. They voted him sacrifices and the honors of heroship, and, in a word, everything calculated to perpetuate his memory ; so that, if the departed have any consciousness, it is but reasonable to think that he feels pleas ure at the gratitude of the Achaeans, and at the thought of the hardships and dangers he endured in his life.
Philopcemen.
Philopoemen was of good birth (born B. C. 252), descended from one of the noblest families in Arcadia. He was also educated under that most distinguished Mantinean, Oleander, who had been his father's friend before, and happened at that time to be in exile. When he came to man's estate, he attached himself to Ecdemus and Demophanes, who were by birth natives of Megalopolis, but who, having been exiled by the tyrant, and having associated with the philosopher Arce- silaus during their exile, not only set their own country free by entering into an intrigue against Aristodemus the tyrant, but also helped in conjunction with Aratus to put down Nicocles, the tyrant of Sicyon. On another occasion, also, on the invitation of the people of Cyrene, they stood forward as their champions and preserved their freedom for them. Such were the men with whom he passed his early life ; and he at once began to show a superiority to his contemporaries by his power of enduring hardships in hunting, and by his acts of daring in war. He was, moreover, careful in his manner of life, and moderate in the outward show which he maintained ; for he had imbibed from these men the conviction, that it was impossible for a man to take the lead in public business with honor who neglected his own private affairs ; nor again to abstain from embezzling public money if he lived beyond his private income.
Being then appointed Hipparch by the Achaean league at this time (210), and finding the squadrons in a state of utter demoralization, and the men thoroughly dispirited, he not only restored them to a better state than they were, but in a short
392 LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE.
time made them even superior to the enemy's cavalry, by bring ing them all to adopt habits of real training and genuine emu lation.
[An account of his military reforms is given. He had also rebuked dandy ism in the officers, and urged them to transfer the care of their persons to their armor, which they do. ]
So true it is that a single word spoken by a man of credit is often sufficient not only to turn men from the worst courses, but even to incite them to the noblest. But when such a speaker can appeal to his own life as in harmony with his words, then indeed his exhortation carries a weight which noth ing can exceed. And this was above all others the case with Philopoemen. For in his dress and eating, as well as in all that concerned his bodily wants, he was plain and simple ; in his manners to others without ceremony or pretense ; and through out his life he made it his chief aim to be absolutely sincere. Consequently a few unstudied words from him were sufficient to raise a firm conviction in the minds of his hearers ; for as he could point to his own life as an example, they wanted little more to convince them. Thus it happened, on several occasions, that the confidence he inspired, and the consciousness of his achieve ments, enabled him in a few words to overthrow long and, as his opponents thought, skillfully argued speeches.
So on this occasion, as soon as the council of the league separated, all returned to their cities deeply impressed both by the words and the man himself, and convinced that no harm could happen to them with him at their head.
afterwards Philopoemen set out on a visitation of the cities, which he performed with great energy and speed. He then summoned a levy of citizens (B. C. 208), and began forming them into companies and drilling them ; and at last, after eight months of this preparation and training, he mustered his forces at Mantinea, prepared to fight the tyrant Machanidas in behalf of the freedom of all the Peloponnesians.
Second Battle of Mantinea.
Machanidas had now acquired great confidence, and looked upon the determination of the Achaeans as extremely favorable to his plans. As soon as he heard of their being in force at Mantinea (b. o. 207), he duly harangued his Lacedaemonians at Tegea, and the very next morning at daybreak advanced upon
Immediately
LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACH^AN LEAGUE. 393
Mantinea. He led the right wing of the phalanx himself ; his mercenaries marched in two parallel columns on each side of his front, and behind them were carts carrying quantities of field artillery and bolts for the catapults. Meanwhile Philopoe- men, too, had arranged his army in three divisions, and was leading them out of Mantinea.
Machanidas at first looked as though he meant to attack the enemy's right wing in column ; but when he got within moder ate distance he deployed into line by the right, and by this ex tension movement made his right wing cover the same amount of ground as the left wing of the Achaeans, and fixed his cata pults in front of the whole force at intervals. Philopoemen understood that the enemy's plan was, by pouring volleys from the catapults into his phalanx, to throw the ranks into confu sion ; he therefore gave him no time or interval of repose, but opened the engagement by a vigorous charge of his Tarentines close to the temple of Poseidon, where the ground was flat and suitable for cavalry. Whereupon Machanidas was constrained to follow suit by sending his Tarentines forward also.
At first the struggle was confined to these two forces, and was maintained with spirit. But the light-armed troops com ing gradually to the support of such of them as were wavering, in a very short time the whole of the mercenaries on either side were engaged. They fought sometimes in close order, some times in pairs ; and for a long time so entirely without decisive result that the rest of the two armies, who were watching in which direction the cloud of dust inclined, could come to no conclusion, because both sides maintained for a long while exactly their original ground. But after a time the mercenaries of the tyrant began to get the better of the struggle, from their numbers, and the superiority in skill obtained by long prac tice, the Illyrians and men with body armor, who formed the reserve supporting the mercenaries of the Achaean army, were unable to withstand their assault ; but were all driven from their position, and fled in confusion towards the city of Man tinea, which was about seven stades distant.
And now there occurred an undoubted instance of what some doubt, namely, that the issues in war are for the most part decided by the skill or want of skill of the commanders. For though perhaps it is a great thing to be able to follow up afirst success properly, it is a greater thing still that, when the first step has proved a failure, a man should retain his presence of
394 LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACHJ3AN LEAGUE.
mind, keep a good lookout for any error of judgment on the part of the victors, and avail himself of their mistakes. At any rate one often sees the side, which imagines itself to have obtained a clear victory, ultimately lose the day ; while those who seemed at first to have failed recover themselves by pres ence of mind, and ultimately win an unexpected victory. Both happened on this occasion to the respective leaders.
The whole of the Achaean mercenaries having been driven from their ground, and their left wing having been thoroughly broken up, Machanidas abandoned his original plan of winning the day by outflanking the enemy with some of his forces and charging their front with others, and did neither ; but, quite losing his head, rushed forward heedlessly with all his mer cenaries in pursuit of the fugitives, as though the panic was not in itself sufficient to drive those who had once given way up to the town gates.
Meanwhile the Achaean general was doing all he could to rally the mercenaries, addressing the officers by name, and urg ing them to stand ; but when he saw that they were hopelessly beaten, he did not run away in a panic nor give up the battle in despair, but, withdrawing under cover of his phalanx, waited until the enemy had passed him in their pursuit, and left the ground on which the fighting had taken place empty, and then immediately gave the word to the front companies of the pha lanx to wheel to the left, and advance at the double, without breaking their ranks. He thus swiftly occupied the ground abandoned by his mercenaries, and at once cut off the pursuers from returning, and got on higher ground than the enemy's right wing. He exhorted the men to keep up their courage, and remain where they were, until he gave the word for a gen eral advance ; and he ordered Polybius of Megalopolis to collect such of the Illyrians and body armor men and mercenaries as remained behind and had not taken part in the flight, and form a reserve on the flank of the phalanx, to keep a lookout against the return of the pursuers.
excited by the victory gained by the light-armed contingent, without waiting for the word of command, brought their sarissae to the charge and rushed upon the enemy. But when in the course of their advance they reached the edge of the dike, being unable at that point to change their purpose and retreat when at such close quarters with the enemy, and partly because they did not consider the dike a serious obstacle, as the slope
Thereupon the Lacedaemonians,
LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACILEAN LEAGUE. 395
down to it was very gradual, and it was entirely without water or underwood growing in they continued their advance through without stopping to think.
The opportunity for attack which Philopoemen had long foreseen had now arrived. He at once ordered the phalanx to bring their sarissae to the charge and advance. The men obeyed with enthusiasm, and accompanied their charge with ringing cheer. The ranks of the Lacedaemonians had been disorganized by the passage of the dike, and as they ascended the opposite bank, they found the enemy above them. They lost courage and tried to fly but the greater number of them were killed in the ditch itself, partly by the Achaeans, and partly by trampling on each other. Now this result was not unpremeditated or accidental, but strictly owing to the acuteness of the general. For Philopoemen originally took ground behind the dike, not to avoid fighting, as some supposed, but from very accurate and scientific calculation of strategical advantages. He reck oned either that Machanidas when he arrived would advance without thinking of the dike, and that then his phalanx would get entangled, just as have described their actually doing or that he advanced with full apprehension of the difficulty presented by the dike, and then changing his mind and decid ing to shrink from the attempt, were to retire in loose order and
long straggling column, the victory would be his, without general engagement, and the defeat his adversary's. For this has happened to many commanders, who having drawn up their men for battle, and then concluded that they were not strong enough to meet their opponents, either from the nature of the ground, the disparity of their numbers, or for other reasons have drawn off in too long line of march, and hoped in the course of the retreat to win victory, or at least get safe away from the enemy, by means of their rear guard alone.
However, Philopoemen was not deceived in his prognosti cation of what would happen for the Lacedaemonians were thoroughly routed. Seeing therefore that his phalanx was vic torious, and that he had gained complete and brilliant success, he set himself vigorously to secure the only thing wanting to complete that is, to prevent the escape of Machanidas. See ing, therefore, that, in the course of the pursuit, he was caught between the dike and the town with his mercenaries, he waited for him to attempt return. But when Machanidas saw that his army was in full retreat, with the enemy at their heels, he
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396 LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACBLSAN LEAGUE.
knew that he had advanced too far, and had lost his chance of victory ; he therefore rallied the mercenaries that he had with him, and tried to form close order, and cut his way through the enemy, while they were still scattered and engaged in the pur suit. Some of his men, understanding his plan and seeing no other hope of safety, kept by him at first ; but when they came upon the ground, and saw the Achaeans guarding the bridge over the dike, they lost heart, and the whole company began falling away from him, each doing the best he could to preserve his own life. Thereupon the tyrant gave up all hope of mak ing his way over the bridge, and rode along the edge of the dike, trying with all his might to find a place he could cross.
[Philopoemen kills him in a hand-to-hand encounter.
]
Simias immediately . . . carried off the tyrant's head, and then hurried off to overtake the pursuing party, being eager to give the soldiers ocular evidence of the fall of the enemy's commander, that they might continue the pursuit of their opponents with all the more confidence and spirit right up to Tegea. And this, in fact, added so greatly to the spirit of the men that it contributed more than anything else to their carry ing Tegea by assault, and pitching their camp next day on the Eurotas, undisputed masters of all the open country. For many years past they had been vainly trying to drive the enemy from their own borders, but now they were themselves devastating Laconia without resistance, without having lost any great num ber of their own men in the battle ; while they had killed not less than four thousand Lacedaemonians, taken even more prison ers, and possessed themselves of all their baggage and arms.
Philopoemen and Aristaenus, the Achaeans, were unlike both in character and policy. Philopoemen was formed by nature in body and mind for the life of a soldier, Aristaenus for a states man and debater. In politics they differed in this, that whereas during the periods of the wars with Philip and Antiochus, Roman influence having become supreme in Greece, Aristaenus directed his policy with the idea of carrying out with alacrity every order from Rome, and sometimes even of anticipating it, still he endeavored to keep up the appearance of abiding by the laws, and did in fact maintain the reputation of doing so, only giving way when any one of them proved to plainly mili tate against the rescripts from Rome, — but Philopoemen ac cepted, and loyally performed, all Roman orders which were in
LEADERS AND FORTUNES OP THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE. 397
harmony with the laws and the terms of their alliance ; but when such orders exceeded these limits, he could not make up his mind to yield a willing obedience, but was wont first to de mand an arbitration, and to repeat the demand a second time ; and if this proved unavailing, to give in at length under protest, and so finally carry out the order. . . .
Aristaenus used to defend his policy before the Achaeans by some such arguments as these : " It was impossible to maintain the Roman friendship by holding out the spear and the herald's staff together. If we have the resolution to withstand them face to face, and can do so, well and good. But Philopoemen himself does not venture to assert this : why should we lose what is possible in striving for the impossible ? There are but two marks that every policy must aim at, — honor and expedi ency. Those to whom honor is a possible attainment should stick to that, if they have political wisdom ; those to whom it is not, must take refuge in expediency. To miss both is the surest proof of unwisdom ; and the men to do that are clearly those who, while ostensibly consenting to obey orders, carry them out with reluctance and hesitation. Therefore we must either show that we are strong enough to refuse obedience, or, if we dare not venture even to suggest that, we must give a ready submission to orders. "
Philopoemen, however, said that "People should not sup pose him so stupid as not to be able to estimate the difference between the Achaean and Roman states, or the superiority of the power of the latter. But as it is the inevitable tendency of the stronger to oppress the weaker, can it be expedient to assist the designs of the superior power, and to put no obstacle in their way, so as to experience as soon as possible the utmost of their tyranny ? Is it not, on the contrary, better to resist and struggle to the utmost of our power ? And if they persist in forcing their injunctions upon us, and if by reminding them of the facts we do something to soften their resolution, we shall at any rate mitigate the harshness of their rule to a certain ex tent, especially as up to this time the Romans, as you yourself say, Aristaenus, have always made a great point of fidelity to oaths, treaties, and promises to allies. But if we at once con demn the justice of our own cause, and, like captives of the spear, offer an unquestioning submission to every order, what will be the difference between the Achaeans and the Sicilians or Capuans, who have been notoriously slaves this long time past ?
398 HELLAS AND ROME.
Therefore, it must either be admitted that the justice of a cause has no weight with the Romans, or, if we do not venture to say that, we must stand by our rights, and not abandon our own cause, especially as our position in regard to Rome is exceed ingly strong and honorable. That the time will come when the Greeks will be forced to give unlimited obedience, I know full well. But would one wish to see this time as soon or as late as possible ? Surely as late as possible ! In this, then, my policy differs from that of Aristaenus. He wishes to see the inevitable arrive as quickly as possible, and even to help it to
I wish to the best of my power to resist and ward it off. " From these speeches it was made clear that while the policy of the one was honorable, of the other undignified, both were
come :
founded on considerations of safety. Wherefore, while both Romans and Greeks were at that time threatened vith serious dangers from Philip and Antiochus, yet both these statesmen maintained the rights of the Achaeans in regard to the Romans undiminished ; though a report found its way about that Aris taenus was better affected to the Romans than Philopoemen.
—TM-roi°° —
HELLAS AND ROME. By LORD DE TABLEY.
[John Byrne Leicester Wabren, Lord de Tabley, was"born in 1835, died in 1897. He gained great note as a collector of and writer on book plates," but was also a poet of fine talent. His books were " Eclogues and Monodramas " (1864), "Rehearsals" (1870). ]
Of Greece the Muse of Glory sings, Of Greece in furious onset brave ;
Whose mighty fleets, on falcon wings, To vengeance sweep across the wave.
There on the mounded flats of Troy The hero captains of the morn
Come forth and conquer, though the boy Of Thetis keeps his tent in scorn.
There in the sweet Ionian prime The much enduring sailor goes,
And from the thorny paths of time He plucks adventure like a rose.
Rome
_______ __ _
HELLAS AND ROME.
There sits Atrides, grave and great,
Grim king of blood and lust-deeds done,
Caught in the iron wheels of Fate
To hand the curse from sire to son.
A fated race ! And who are these With viper locks and scorpion rods,
Dim shades of ruin and disease,
Who float around his household gods ?
Alas, for wife and children small :
Blood comes, as from the rosebush bloom
The very dogs about his hall
Are conscious of their master's doom.
Or see the fleet victorious steed
In Pindar's whirlwind sweep along,
To whom a more than mortal meed Remains, the bard's eternal song.
What are the statues Phidias cast,
But dust between the palms of Fate ?
A thousand winters cannot blast Their leaf ; if Pindar celebrate.
Great Hiero, Lord of Syracuse, Or Theron, chief of Acragas,
These despots wisely may refuse Record in unending brass.
For Pindar sang the sinewy frame, The nimble athlete's supple grip ;
He gave the gallant horse to fame, Who passed the goal without a whip,
The coursers of the island kings Jove-born, magnanimously calm : When gathered Greece at Elis rings
In paean of the victor's palm.
Or hear the shepherd bard divine Transfuse the music of his lay
With echoes from the mountain pine,
And wave-wash from the answering bay.
And all around in pasturing flocks
His goatherds flute with plaintive reeds,
HELLAS AND ROME.
His lovers whisper from the rocks,
His halcyons flit o'er flowery meads :
Where galingale with iris blends In plumy fringe of lady fern ;
And sweet the Dorian wave descends From topmost ^Etna's snowbright urn.
Or gentle Arethusa lies,
Beside her brimming fountain sweet,
With lovely brow and languid eyes, And river lilies at her feet.
Or listen to the lordly hymn,
The weird Adonis, pealing new,
Full of the crimson twilight dim, Bathed in Astarte's fiery dew.
In splendid shrine without a breath The wounded lonely hunter lies ;
And who has decked the couch of death ? The sister-spouse of Ptolemies.
We seem to hear a god's lament, The sobbing pathos of despair ;
We seem to see her garments rent, And ashes in ambrosial hair.
Clouds gather where the mystic Nile, Seven-headed, stains the ambient deep,
The chidden sun forgets to smile, Where lilies on Lake Mceris sleep.
Slumber and silence cloud the face Of Isis in gold-ivory shrine,
And silence seems to reach the race
Whose youth was more than half divine.
'Tis gone — the chords no longer glow ; The bards of Greece forget to sing ;
Their hands are numb, their hearts are slow ; Their numbers creep without a wing.
Their ebbing Helicons refuse
The droplet of a droughty tide.
The fleeting footsteps of the Muse We follow to the Tiber side.
HELLAS AND ROME.
The Dorian Muse with Cypris ends ; With Cypris wakes the Latian lyre ;
And, sternly sweet, Lucretius blends Her praise inspired with epic fire.
To thee, my Themmius, amply swells Rich prelude to her genial power,
Her world-renewing force, which dwells In man, bird, insect, fish, or flower.
Supremely fair, serenely sweet,
The wondering waves beheld her birth,
The power whose regal pulses beat Through every fiber of the earth.
Why should we tax the gods with woe ? They sit outside, they bear no part ;
They never wove the rainbow's glow, They never built the human heart.
These careless idlers who can blame ? If Chance and Nature govern men :
The universe from atoms came, And back to atoms rolls again.
As earthly kings they keep their state, The cup of joy is in their hands ;
The war note deepens at their gate, They hear a wail of hungry lands.
They feast, they let the turmoil drive, And Nature scorns their fleeting sway :
She ruled before they were alive,
She rules when they are passed away.
Before the poet's wistful face
The flaming walls of ether glow :
He sees the lurid brink of space, Nor trembles at the gulf below.
He feels himself a foundering bark, Tossed on the tides of time alone ;
Blindly he rushes on the dark,
Nor waits his summons to be gone.
Wake, mighty Virgil, nor refuse
Some glimpses of thy laureled face :
vol. iv. — 26
HELLAS AND ROME.
Sound westward, wise Ausonian Muse, The epic of a martial race.
Grim warriors, whom the wolf dug rears, Strong legions, patient, steadfast, brave,
Who meet the shock of hostile spears, As sea walls meet the trivial wave.
Justice and Peace their highest good, By sacred law they held their sway ;
The ruler's instinct in their blood Taught them to govern and obey.
They crushed the proud, the weak they spared, They loosed the prostrate captive's chain
And civic rights and birthright shared Made him respect their equal reign.
They grappled in their nervous hands The natives as a lump of dough ; To Calpe came their gleaming bands,
To Ister grinding reefs of snow.
And where the reedy Mincius rolled By Manto's marsh the crystal swan,
There Maro smote his harp of gold, And on the chords fierce glory shone.
The crested meter clomb and fell ;
The sounding word, the burnished phrase
Rocked on like ocean's tidal swell, With sunbeams on the waterways.
He sang the armored man of fate, The father of eternal Rome, The great begetter of the great,
Who piled the empire yet to come.
He sang of Daphnis, rapt to heaven, At threshold of Olympian doors,
Who sees below the cloud-rack driven, And wonders at the gleaming floors.
He sang the babe whose wondrous birth, By Cumae's sibyl long foretold,
Should rule a renovated earth, An empire and an age of gold.
THE MILLENNIAL GREECE.
He sang great Gallus, wrapt in woe, When sweet Lycoris dared depart
To follow in the Rhineland snow The soldier of her fickle heart.
The nectared lips that sang are mute, And dust the pale Virgilian brows,
And dust the wonder of the lute,
And dust around the charnel-house.
Above the aloes spiring tall, Among the oleander's bloom,
Umed in a craggy mountain hall,
The peasant points to Virgil's tomb.
The empire, which oppressed the world, Has vanished like a bead of foam ;
And down the rugged Goths have hurled The slender roseleaf sons of Rome.
For ages in some northern cave
The plaintive Muse of herdsmen slept,
Till, waking by the Cam's wise wave, Once more her Lycid lost she wept.
As pilgrims to thy realm of death, Great Maro, we are humbly come,
To breathe one hour thy native breath, To scan the lordly wreck of Rome.
And though thy muses all are fled To some uncouth Teutonic town,
Sleep, minstrel of the mighty dead, Sleep in the fields of thy renown.
THE MILLENNIAL GREECE. By PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY.
(From "Hellas. ")
[Tor biographical sketch, see Vol. 3, p. 311. ]
The world's great age begins anew, The golden years return,
404
THE MILLENNIAL GREECE.
The earth doth like a snake renew Her winter weeds outworn:
Heaven smiles, and faiths and empires gleam Like wrecks of a dissolving dream.
A brighter Hellas rears its mountains From waves serener far ;
A new Peneus rolls his fountains Against the morning star ;
Where fairer Tempes bloom, there sleep Young Cyclads on a sunnier deep.
A loftier Argo cleaves the main, Fraught with a later prize ; Another Orpheus sighs again,
And loves, and weeps, and dies ; A new Ulysses leaves once more Calypso for his native shore.
Oh, write no more the tale of Troy, If earth Death's scroll must be —
Nor mix with Laian rage the joy Which dawns upon the free, Although a subtler Sphinx renew
Riddles of death Thebes never knew.
Another Athens shall arise, And to remoter time
Bequeath, like sunset to the skies, The splendor of its prime ;
And leave, if naught so bright may live, All earth can take or heaven can give.
Saturn and Love their long repose Shall burst, more bright and good
Than all who fell, than one who rose, Than many unsubdued :
Not gold, not blood, their altar dowers, But votive tears and symbol flowers.
Oh cease ! must hate and death return ? Cease ! must men kill and die ?
Cease ! drain not to its dregs the urn Of bitter prophecy !
The world is weary of the past, — Oh, might it die or rest at last !
When at length the country did obtain leaders of suffi cient ability, it quickly manifested its intrinsic excellence by the accomplishment of that most glorious achievement, — the union of the Peloponnese. The originator of this policy in the first instance was Aratus of Sicyon ; its active promotion and con summation was due to Philopoemen of Megalopolis ; while Lycortas and his party must be looked upon as the authors of the permanence which it enjoyed.
For the first twenty-five years of the league, a secretary and two strategi for the whole union were elected by each city in turn. But after this period they determined to appoint one strategus only, and put the entire management of the affairs of the union in his hands. The first to obtain this honor was Margos of Caryneia (b. c. 255-254). In the fourth year after this man's tenure of the office, Aratus of Sicyon (born 271) caused his city to join the league, which, by his energy and courage, he had, when only twenty years of age, delivered from the yoke of its tyrant. In the eighth year again after this, Aratus, being elected strategus for the second time, laid a plot to seize the Acrocorinthus, then held by Antigonus ; and by his success freed the inhabitants of the Peloponnese from a source of serious alarm : and having thus
384 LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACILEAN LEAGUE.
liberated Corinth, he caused it to join the league. In his same term of office, he got Megara into his hands, and caused it to join also. These events occurred in the year before the decisive defeat of the Carthaginians (b. c. 241), in consequence of which they evacuated Sicily and consented for the first time to pay tribute to Rome.
Having made this remarkable progress in his design in so short a time, Aratus continued thenceforth in the position of leader of the Achaean League, and in the consistent direction of his whole policy to one single end: which was to expel Macedonians from the Peloponnese, to depose the despots, and to establish in each state the common freedom which their ancestors had enjoyed before them. So long, therefore, as Antigonus Gonatas was alive, he maintained a continual opposition to his interference, as well as to the encroaching spirit of the JStolians, and in both cases with signal skill and success ; although their presumption and contempt for jus tice had risen to such a pitch that they had actually made a formal compact with each other for the disruption of the Achaeans.
After the death of Antigonus, however, the Achaeans made terms with the iEtolians, and joined them energetically in the war against Demetrius; and, in place of the feelings of estrangement and hostility, there gradually grew up a senti ment of brotherhood and affection between the two peoples. Upon the death of Demetrius (B. C. 229), after a reign of only ten years, just about the time of the first invasion of Illyri- cum by the Romans, the Achaeans had a most excellent oppor tunity of establishing the policy which they had all along maintained. For the despots in the Peloponnese were in despair at the death of Demetrius. It was the loss to them of their chief supporter and paymaster. And now Aratus was forever impressing upon them that they ought to abdi cate, holding out rewards and honors for those of them who consented, and threatening those who refused with still greater vengeance from the Achaeans. There was therefore a general movement among them to voluntarily restore their several states to freedom and to join the league. I ought, however, to say that Ludiades of Megalopolis, in the lifetime of Deme trius, of his own deliberate choice, and foreseeing with great shrewdness and good sense what was going to happen, had abdicated his sovereignty and become a citizen of the national
LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACH^AN LEAGUE. 385
league. His example was followed by Aristomachus, tyrant of Argos, Xeno of Hermione, and Cleonymus of Phlius, who all likewise abdicated and joined the democratic league.
But the increased power and national advancement which these events brought to the Achaeans excited the envy of the ^tolians; who, besides their natural inclination to unjust and selfish aggrandizement, were inspired with the hope of breaking up the union of Achaean states, as they had before succeeded in partitioning those of Acarnania with Alexander, and had planned to do those of Achaia with Antigonus Gonatas. Instigated once more by similar expectations, they had now the assurance to enter into communication and close alliance at once with Antigonus (Doson — acceded B. C. 229)
(at that time ruling Macedonia as guardian of the young King Philip), and with Cleomenes, King of Sparta. They
saw that Antigonus had undisputed possession of the throne of Macedonia, while he was an open and avowed enemy of the Achaeans, owing to the surprise of the Acrocorinthus ; and they supposed that if they could get the Lacedaemonians to join them in their hostility to the league, they would easily subdue by selecting a favorable opportunity for their attack, and securing that should be assaulted on all sides at once. And they would in all probability have succeeded, but that they had left out the most important element in the calculation, namely, that in Aratus they had to reckon with an opponent to their plans of ability equal to almost any emergency. Accordingly, when they attempted this violent and unjust interference in Achaia, so far from succeeding in any of their devices, they, on the contrary, strengthened Aratus, the then president of the league, as well as the league itself. So consummate was the ability with which he foiled their plan and reduced them to impotence. The manner in which this was done will be made clear in what am about to relate.
There could be no doubt of the policy of the -35tolians. They were ashamed indeed to attack the Achaeans openly, be cause they could not ignore their recent obligations to them in the war with Demetrius but they were plotting with the Lace daemonians and showed their jealousy of the Achieans by not only conniving at the treacherous attack of Cleomenes upon Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenus (cities not only in alliance with them, but actually members of their league), but by con-
vol. iv. — 25
;
:
I
it
it,
386 LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACH^AN LEAGUE.
firming his occupation of those places. In old times they had thought almost any excuse good enough to justify an appeal to arms against those who, after all, had done them no wrong ; yet they now allowed themselves to be treated with such treachery, and submitted without remonstrance to the loss of the most im portant towns, solely with the view of creating in Cleomenes a formidable antagonist to the Achaeans. These facts were not lost upon Aratus and the other officers of the league ; and they resolved that without taking the initiative in going to war with any one, they would resist the attempts of the Lacedaemonians. Such was their determination, and for a time they persisted in it ; but immediately afterwards Cleomenes began to build the hostile fort in the territory of Megalopolis, called the Athe naeum, and showed an undisguised and bitter hostility. Aratus and his colleagues accordingly summoned a meeting of the league, and it was decided to proclaim war openly against Sparta.
[Aratus gave up to Antigonus the citadel of Corinth, making him master of Greece ; and Cleomenes was defeated at Sellasia. ]
This was the origin of what is called the Cleomenic War. At first the Achaeans were for depending on their own re sources for facing the Lacedaemonians. They looked upon it as more honorable not to look to others for preservation, but to guard their own territory and cities themselves ; and at the same time the remembrances of his former services made them desirous of keeping up their friendship with Ptolemy (Euerge- tes, B. C. 247-222), and averse from the appearance of seeking aid elsewhere. But when the war had lasted some time, and Cleomenes had revolutionized the constitution of his country, and had turned its constitutional monarchy into a despotism, and, moreover, was conducting the war with extraordinary skill and boldness, seeing clearly what would happen, and fear ing the reckless audacity of the jEtolians, Aratus determined that his first duty was to be well beforehand in frustrating their plans. He satisfied himself that Antigonus was a man of ac tivity and practical ability, with some pretensions to the charac ter of a man of honor ; he however knew perfectly well that kings look on no man as a friend or foe from personal consid erations, but ever measure friendships and enmities solely by the standard of expediency. He therefore conceived the idea
LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACH. EAN LEAGUE. 387
of addressing himself to this monarch, and entering into friendly relations with him, taking occasion to point out to him the cer tain result of his present policy. But to act openly in this mat ter he thought inexpedient for several reasons. By doing so he would not only incur the opposition of Cleomenes and the JEtolians, but would cause consternation among the Achaeans themselves, because his appeal to their enemies would give the impression that he had abandoned all the hopes he once had in them. This was the very last idea he desired should go abroad; and he therefore determined to conduct this intrigue in secrecy.
The Battle of Sellasia, b. o. 221.
Cleomenes had expected the attack, and had secured the passes into the country by posting garrisons, digging trenches, and felling trees ; while he took up position at a place called Sellasia, with an army amounting to twenty thousand, having calculated that the invading forces would take that direction : which turned out to be the case.
The sight of these preparations decided Antigonus not to make an immediate attack upon the position, or rashly hazard an engagement. He pitched his camp a short distance from it, covering his front by the stream called Gorgylus, and there re mained for some days ; informing himself by reconnaisances of the peculiarities of the ground and the character of the troops, and at the same time endeavoring by feigned movements to elicit the intentions of the enemy. But he could never find an unguarded point, or one where the troops were not entirely on the alert ; for Cleomenes was always ready at a moment's notice to be at any point that was attacked. He therefore gave up all thoughts of attacking the position ; and finally an under standing was come to between him and Cleomenes to bring the matter to the decision of battle. And indeed, fortune had there brought into competition two commanders equally endowed by nature with military skill.
The moment for beginning the battle had come : the signal was given to the Illyrians, and the word passed by the officers to their men to do their duty ; and in a moment they started into view of the enemy and began assaulting the hill. But the light-armed troops who were stationed with Cleomenes' cav alry, observing that the Achaean lines were not covered by any
388 LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACHLEAN LEAGUE.
other troops behind them, charged them on the rear ; and thus reduced the division while endeavoring to carry the hill of Evas to a state of great peril, — being met as they were on their front by Eucleidas from the top of the hill, and being charged and vigorously attacked by the light-armed mercenaries on their rear. It was at this point that Philopoemen of Megalopolis, with a clear understanding of the situation and a foresight of what would happen, vainly endeavored to point out the cer tain result to his superior officers. They disregarded him for his want of experience in command and his extreme youth ; and accordingly he acted for himself, and cheering on the men of his own city made a vigorous charge on the enemy. This ef fected a diversion ; for the light-armed mercenaries, who were engaged in harassing the rear of the party ascending Evas, hear ing the shouting and seeing the cavalry engaged, abandoned their attack upon this party and hurried back to their original position to render assistance to the cavalry. The result was that the division of Illyrians, Macedonians, and the rest who were advancing with them, no longer had their attention di verted by an attack upon their rear, and so continued their advance upon the enemy with high spirits and renewed confi dence. This afterwards caused it to be acknowledged that to Philopoemen was due the honor of the success against Eucleidas.
It is clear that Antigonus at any rate entertained that opinion; for after the battle he asked Alexander, the com mander of the cavalry, with the view of convicting him of his shortcoming, "Why he had engaged before the signal was given ? " And upon Alexander answering that " He had not done so, but that a young officer from Megalopolis "had pre sumed to anticipate the signal, contrary to his wish : Antigo nus replied, " That young man acted like a good general in grasping the situation ; you, general, were the youngster. "
What Eucleidas ought to have done, when he saw the ene my's lines advancing, was to have rushed down at once upon them, thrown their ranks into disorder, and then retired him self step by step to continually higher ground into a safe posi tion ; for by thus breaking them up, and depriving them to begin with of the advantages of their peculiar armor and dis position, he would have secured the victory by the superiority of his position. But he did the very opposite of all this, and thereby forfeited the advantages of the ground. As though
LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACH^AN LEAGUE. 389
victory were assured, he kept his original position on the sum mit of the hill, with the view of catching the enemy at as great an elevation as possible, that their flight might be all the longer over steep and precipitous ground. The result, as might have been anticipated, was exactly the reverse. For he left himself no place of retreat, and by allowing the enemy to reach his position, unharmed and in unbroken order, he was placed at the disadvantage of having to give them battle on the very summit of the hill : and so, as soon as he was forced by the weight of their heavy armor and their close order to give any ground, it was immediately occupied by the Illyrians ; while his own men were obliged to take lower ground, because they had no space for maneuvering on the top. The result was not long in arriv ing : they suffered a repulse, which the difficult and precipitous nature of the ground over which they had to retire turned into a disastrous flight.
Simultaneously with these events the cavalry engagement was also being brought to a decision, in which all the Achaean cav alry, and especially Philopoemen, fought with conspicuous gal lantry, for to them it was a contest for freedom. Philopoemen himself had his horse killed under him, and while fighting accordingly on foot received a severe wound through both his thighs. Meanwhile the two kings on the other hill, Olympus, began by bringing their light-armed troops and mercenaries into action, of which each of them had five thousand. Both the kings and their entire armies had a full view of this action, which was fought with great gallantry on both sides : the charges taking place sometimes in detachments, and at other times along the whole line, and an eager emulation being dis played between the several ranks, and even between individuals. But when Cleomenes saw that his brother's division was retreat ing, and that the cavalry in the low ground were on the point of doing the same, alarmed at the prospect of an attack at all points at once, he was compelled to demolish the palisade in his front, and to lead out his whole force in line by one side of his position. A recall was sounded on the bugle for the light- armed troops of both sides, who were on the ground between the two armies ; and the phalanxes shouting their war cries, and with spears couched, charged each other. Then a fierce struggle arose : the Macedonians sometimes slowly giving ground and yielding to the superior courage of the soldiers of Sparta, and at another time the Lacedaemonians being forced to give
390 LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACH^AN LEAGUE.
way before the overpowering weight of the Macedonian pha lanx. At length Antigonus ordered a charge in close order and in double phalanx ; the enormous weight of this peculiar formation proved sufficient to finally dislodge the Lacedaemo nians from their strongholds, and they fled in disorder and suf fering severely as they went. Cleomenes himself, with a guard of cavalry, effected his retreat to Sparta ; but the same night he went down to Gythium, where all preparations for crossing the sea had been made long before in case of mishap, and with his friends sailed to Alexandria.
After the expulsion of Cleomenes (B. C. 222-221) the Pelo- ponnesians, weary of the wars that had taken place, and trust ing to the peaceful arrangement that had been come to, neglected all warlike preparations. Aratus, however, indignant and in censed at the audacity of the j5£tolian8 was not inclined to take things so calmly, for he had, in fact, a grudge of long standing against these people. Wherefore he was for instantly summon ing the Achaeans to an armed levy, and was all eagerness to attack the jEtolians. Eventually he took over from Timoxe- nus the seal of the league (b. c. 220) five days before the proper time, and wrote to the various cities summoning a meeting in arms of all those who were of the military age, at Megalopolis.
Aratus had many of the qualities of a great ruler. He could speak, and contrive, and conceal his purpose : no one surpassed him in the moderation which he showed in political contests, or in his power of attaching friends and gaining allies : in intrigue, stratagem, and laying plots against a foe, and in bringing them to a successful termination by personal endurance and courage, he was preeminent. Many clear instances of these qualities may be found ; but none more convincing than the episodes of the capture of Sicyon and Mantinea, of the expulsion of the iEto- lians from Pellene, and especially of the surprise of the Acroco- rinthus. On the other hand, whenever he attempted a campaign in the field, he was slow in conception and timid in execution, and without personal gallantry in the presence of danger. The result was that the Peloponnese was full of trophies which marked reverses sustained by him ; and that in this particular department he was always easily defeated.
[He died in 213, at fifty-eight, and believed himself poisoned by Philip V. , probably without reason. ]
LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACELaSAN LEAGUE. 391
In consequence of having been so often elected Strategus of the Achaean League, and of having performed so many splendid services for that people, Aratus after his death met with the honors he deserved, both in his own native city and from the league as a body. They voted him sacrifices and the honors of heroship, and, in a word, everything calculated to perpetuate his memory ; so that, if the departed have any consciousness, it is but reasonable to think that he feels pleas ure at the gratitude of the Achaeans, and at the thought of the hardships and dangers he endured in his life.
Philopcemen.
Philopoemen was of good birth (born B. C. 252), descended from one of the noblest families in Arcadia. He was also educated under that most distinguished Mantinean, Oleander, who had been his father's friend before, and happened at that time to be in exile. When he came to man's estate, he attached himself to Ecdemus and Demophanes, who were by birth natives of Megalopolis, but who, having been exiled by the tyrant, and having associated with the philosopher Arce- silaus during their exile, not only set their own country free by entering into an intrigue against Aristodemus the tyrant, but also helped in conjunction with Aratus to put down Nicocles, the tyrant of Sicyon. On another occasion, also, on the invitation of the people of Cyrene, they stood forward as their champions and preserved their freedom for them. Such were the men with whom he passed his early life ; and he at once began to show a superiority to his contemporaries by his power of enduring hardships in hunting, and by his acts of daring in war. He was, moreover, careful in his manner of life, and moderate in the outward show which he maintained ; for he had imbibed from these men the conviction, that it was impossible for a man to take the lead in public business with honor who neglected his own private affairs ; nor again to abstain from embezzling public money if he lived beyond his private income.
Being then appointed Hipparch by the Achaean league at this time (210), and finding the squadrons in a state of utter demoralization, and the men thoroughly dispirited, he not only restored them to a better state than they were, but in a short
392 LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE.
time made them even superior to the enemy's cavalry, by bring ing them all to adopt habits of real training and genuine emu lation.
[An account of his military reforms is given. He had also rebuked dandy ism in the officers, and urged them to transfer the care of their persons to their armor, which they do. ]
So true it is that a single word spoken by a man of credit is often sufficient not only to turn men from the worst courses, but even to incite them to the noblest. But when such a speaker can appeal to his own life as in harmony with his words, then indeed his exhortation carries a weight which noth ing can exceed. And this was above all others the case with Philopoemen. For in his dress and eating, as well as in all that concerned his bodily wants, he was plain and simple ; in his manners to others without ceremony or pretense ; and through out his life he made it his chief aim to be absolutely sincere. Consequently a few unstudied words from him were sufficient to raise a firm conviction in the minds of his hearers ; for as he could point to his own life as an example, they wanted little more to convince them. Thus it happened, on several occasions, that the confidence he inspired, and the consciousness of his achieve ments, enabled him in a few words to overthrow long and, as his opponents thought, skillfully argued speeches.
So on this occasion, as soon as the council of the league separated, all returned to their cities deeply impressed both by the words and the man himself, and convinced that no harm could happen to them with him at their head.
afterwards Philopoemen set out on a visitation of the cities, which he performed with great energy and speed. He then summoned a levy of citizens (B. C. 208), and began forming them into companies and drilling them ; and at last, after eight months of this preparation and training, he mustered his forces at Mantinea, prepared to fight the tyrant Machanidas in behalf of the freedom of all the Peloponnesians.
Second Battle of Mantinea.
Machanidas had now acquired great confidence, and looked upon the determination of the Achaeans as extremely favorable to his plans. As soon as he heard of their being in force at Mantinea (b. o. 207), he duly harangued his Lacedaemonians at Tegea, and the very next morning at daybreak advanced upon
Immediately
LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACH^AN LEAGUE. 393
Mantinea. He led the right wing of the phalanx himself ; his mercenaries marched in two parallel columns on each side of his front, and behind them were carts carrying quantities of field artillery and bolts for the catapults. Meanwhile Philopoe- men, too, had arranged his army in three divisions, and was leading them out of Mantinea.
Machanidas at first looked as though he meant to attack the enemy's right wing in column ; but when he got within moder ate distance he deployed into line by the right, and by this ex tension movement made his right wing cover the same amount of ground as the left wing of the Achaeans, and fixed his cata pults in front of the whole force at intervals. Philopoemen understood that the enemy's plan was, by pouring volleys from the catapults into his phalanx, to throw the ranks into confu sion ; he therefore gave him no time or interval of repose, but opened the engagement by a vigorous charge of his Tarentines close to the temple of Poseidon, where the ground was flat and suitable for cavalry. Whereupon Machanidas was constrained to follow suit by sending his Tarentines forward also.
At first the struggle was confined to these two forces, and was maintained with spirit. But the light-armed troops com ing gradually to the support of such of them as were wavering, in a very short time the whole of the mercenaries on either side were engaged. They fought sometimes in close order, some times in pairs ; and for a long time so entirely without decisive result that the rest of the two armies, who were watching in which direction the cloud of dust inclined, could come to no conclusion, because both sides maintained for a long while exactly their original ground. But after a time the mercenaries of the tyrant began to get the better of the struggle, from their numbers, and the superiority in skill obtained by long prac tice, the Illyrians and men with body armor, who formed the reserve supporting the mercenaries of the Achaean army, were unable to withstand their assault ; but were all driven from their position, and fled in confusion towards the city of Man tinea, which was about seven stades distant.
And now there occurred an undoubted instance of what some doubt, namely, that the issues in war are for the most part decided by the skill or want of skill of the commanders. For though perhaps it is a great thing to be able to follow up afirst success properly, it is a greater thing still that, when the first step has proved a failure, a man should retain his presence of
394 LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACHJ3AN LEAGUE.
mind, keep a good lookout for any error of judgment on the part of the victors, and avail himself of their mistakes. At any rate one often sees the side, which imagines itself to have obtained a clear victory, ultimately lose the day ; while those who seemed at first to have failed recover themselves by pres ence of mind, and ultimately win an unexpected victory. Both happened on this occasion to the respective leaders.
The whole of the Achaean mercenaries having been driven from their ground, and their left wing having been thoroughly broken up, Machanidas abandoned his original plan of winning the day by outflanking the enemy with some of his forces and charging their front with others, and did neither ; but, quite losing his head, rushed forward heedlessly with all his mer cenaries in pursuit of the fugitives, as though the panic was not in itself sufficient to drive those who had once given way up to the town gates.
Meanwhile the Achaean general was doing all he could to rally the mercenaries, addressing the officers by name, and urg ing them to stand ; but when he saw that they were hopelessly beaten, he did not run away in a panic nor give up the battle in despair, but, withdrawing under cover of his phalanx, waited until the enemy had passed him in their pursuit, and left the ground on which the fighting had taken place empty, and then immediately gave the word to the front companies of the pha lanx to wheel to the left, and advance at the double, without breaking their ranks. He thus swiftly occupied the ground abandoned by his mercenaries, and at once cut off the pursuers from returning, and got on higher ground than the enemy's right wing. He exhorted the men to keep up their courage, and remain where they were, until he gave the word for a gen eral advance ; and he ordered Polybius of Megalopolis to collect such of the Illyrians and body armor men and mercenaries as remained behind and had not taken part in the flight, and form a reserve on the flank of the phalanx, to keep a lookout against the return of the pursuers.
excited by the victory gained by the light-armed contingent, without waiting for the word of command, brought their sarissae to the charge and rushed upon the enemy. But when in the course of their advance they reached the edge of the dike, being unable at that point to change their purpose and retreat when at such close quarters with the enemy, and partly because they did not consider the dike a serious obstacle, as the slope
Thereupon the Lacedaemonians,
LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACILEAN LEAGUE. 395
down to it was very gradual, and it was entirely without water or underwood growing in they continued their advance through without stopping to think.
The opportunity for attack which Philopoemen had long foreseen had now arrived. He at once ordered the phalanx to bring their sarissae to the charge and advance. The men obeyed with enthusiasm, and accompanied their charge with ringing cheer. The ranks of the Lacedaemonians had been disorganized by the passage of the dike, and as they ascended the opposite bank, they found the enemy above them. They lost courage and tried to fly but the greater number of them were killed in the ditch itself, partly by the Achaeans, and partly by trampling on each other. Now this result was not unpremeditated or accidental, but strictly owing to the acuteness of the general. For Philopoemen originally took ground behind the dike, not to avoid fighting, as some supposed, but from very accurate and scientific calculation of strategical advantages. He reck oned either that Machanidas when he arrived would advance without thinking of the dike, and that then his phalanx would get entangled, just as have described their actually doing or that he advanced with full apprehension of the difficulty presented by the dike, and then changing his mind and decid ing to shrink from the attempt, were to retire in loose order and
long straggling column, the victory would be his, without general engagement, and the defeat his adversary's. For this has happened to many commanders, who having drawn up their men for battle, and then concluded that they were not strong enough to meet their opponents, either from the nature of the ground, the disparity of their numbers, or for other reasons have drawn off in too long line of march, and hoped in the course of the retreat to win victory, or at least get safe away from the enemy, by means of their rear guard alone.
However, Philopoemen was not deceived in his prognosti cation of what would happen for the Lacedaemonians were thoroughly routed. Seeing therefore that his phalanx was vic torious, and that he had gained complete and brilliant success, he set himself vigorously to secure the only thing wanting to complete that is, to prevent the escape of Machanidas. See ing, therefore, that, in the course of the pursuit, he was caught between the dike and the town with his mercenaries, he waited for him to attempt return. But when Machanidas saw that his army was in full retreat, with the enemy at their heels, he
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396 LEADERS AND FORTUNES OF THE ACBLSAN LEAGUE.
knew that he had advanced too far, and had lost his chance of victory ; he therefore rallied the mercenaries that he had with him, and tried to form close order, and cut his way through the enemy, while they were still scattered and engaged in the pur suit. Some of his men, understanding his plan and seeing no other hope of safety, kept by him at first ; but when they came upon the ground, and saw the Achaeans guarding the bridge over the dike, they lost heart, and the whole company began falling away from him, each doing the best he could to preserve his own life. Thereupon the tyrant gave up all hope of mak ing his way over the bridge, and rode along the edge of the dike, trying with all his might to find a place he could cross.
[Philopoemen kills him in a hand-to-hand encounter.
]
Simias immediately . . . carried off the tyrant's head, and then hurried off to overtake the pursuing party, being eager to give the soldiers ocular evidence of the fall of the enemy's commander, that they might continue the pursuit of their opponents with all the more confidence and spirit right up to Tegea. And this, in fact, added so greatly to the spirit of the men that it contributed more than anything else to their carry ing Tegea by assault, and pitching their camp next day on the Eurotas, undisputed masters of all the open country. For many years past they had been vainly trying to drive the enemy from their own borders, but now they were themselves devastating Laconia without resistance, without having lost any great num ber of their own men in the battle ; while they had killed not less than four thousand Lacedaemonians, taken even more prison ers, and possessed themselves of all their baggage and arms.
Philopoemen and Aristaenus, the Achaeans, were unlike both in character and policy. Philopoemen was formed by nature in body and mind for the life of a soldier, Aristaenus for a states man and debater. In politics they differed in this, that whereas during the periods of the wars with Philip and Antiochus, Roman influence having become supreme in Greece, Aristaenus directed his policy with the idea of carrying out with alacrity every order from Rome, and sometimes even of anticipating it, still he endeavored to keep up the appearance of abiding by the laws, and did in fact maintain the reputation of doing so, only giving way when any one of them proved to plainly mili tate against the rescripts from Rome, — but Philopoemen ac cepted, and loyally performed, all Roman orders which were in
LEADERS AND FORTUNES OP THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE. 397
harmony with the laws and the terms of their alliance ; but when such orders exceeded these limits, he could not make up his mind to yield a willing obedience, but was wont first to de mand an arbitration, and to repeat the demand a second time ; and if this proved unavailing, to give in at length under protest, and so finally carry out the order. . . .
Aristaenus used to defend his policy before the Achaeans by some such arguments as these : " It was impossible to maintain the Roman friendship by holding out the spear and the herald's staff together. If we have the resolution to withstand them face to face, and can do so, well and good. But Philopoemen himself does not venture to assert this : why should we lose what is possible in striving for the impossible ? There are but two marks that every policy must aim at, — honor and expedi ency. Those to whom honor is a possible attainment should stick to that, if they have political wisdom ; those to whom it is not, must take refuge in expediency. To miss both is the surest proof of unwisdom ; and the men to do that are clearly those who, while ostensibly consenting to obey orders, carry them out with reluctance and hesitation. Therefore we must either show that we are strong enough to refuse obedience, or, if we dare not venture even to suggest that, we must give a ready submission to orders. "
Philopoemen, however, said that "People should not sup pose him so stupid as not to be able to estimate the difference between the Achaean and Roman states, or the superiority of the power of the latter. But as it is the inevitable tendency of the stronger to oppress the weaker, can it be expedient to assist the designs of the superior power, and to put no obstacle in their way, so as to experience as soon as possible the utmost of their tyranny ? Is it not, on the contrary, better to resist and struggle to the utmost of our power ? And if they persist in forcing their injunctions upon us, and if by reminding them of the facts we do something to soften their resolution, we shall at any rate mitigate the harshness of their rule to a certain ex tent, especially as up to this time the Romans, as you yourself say, Aristaenus, have always made a great point of fidelity to oaths, treaties, and promises to allies. But if we at once con demn the justice of our own cause, and, like captives of the spear, offer an unquestioning submission to every order, what will be the difference between the Achaeans and the Sicilians or Capuans, who have been notoriously slaves this long time past ?
398 HELLAS AND ROME.
Therefore, it must either be admitted that the justice of a cause has no weight with the Romans, or, if we do not venture to say that, we must stand by our rights, and not abandon our own cause, especially as our position in regard to Rome is exceed ingly strong and honorable. That the time will come when the Greeks will be forced to give unlimited obedience, I know full well. But would one wish to see this time as soon or as late as possible ? Surely as late as possible ! In this, then, my policy differs from that of Aristaenus. He wishes to see the inevitable arrive as quickly as possible, and even to help it to
I wish to the best of my power to resist and ward it off. " From these speeches it was made clear that while the policy of the one was honorable, of the other undignified, both were
come :
founded on considerations of safety. Wherefore, while both Romans and Greeks were at that time threatened vith serious dangers from Philip and Antiochus, yet both these statesmen maintained the rights of the Achaeans in regard to the Romans undiminished ; though a report found its way about that Aris taenus was better affected to the Romans than Philopoemen.
—TM-roi°° —
HELLAS AND ROME. By LORD DE TABLEY.
[John Byrne Leicester Wabren, Lord de Tabley, was"born in 1835, died in 1897. He gained great note as a collector of and writer on book plates," but was also a poet of fine talent. His books were " Eclogues and Monodramas " (1864), "Rehearsals" (1870). ]
Of Greece the Muse of Glory sings, Of Greece in furious onset brave ;
Whose mighty fleets, on falcon wings, To vengeance sweep across the wave.
There on the mounded flats of Troy The hero captains of the morn
Come forth and conquer, though the boy Of Thetis keeps his tent in scorn.
There in the sweet Ionian prime The much enduring sailor goes,
And from the thorny paths of time He plucks adventure like a rose.
Rome
_______ __ _
HELLAS AND ROME.
There sits Atrides, grave and great,
Grim king of blood and lust-deeds done,
Caught in the iron wheels of Fate
To hand the curse from sire to son.
A fated race ! And who are these With viper locks and scorpion rods,
Dim shades of ruin and disease,
Who float around his household gods ?
Alas, for wife and children small :
Blood comes, as from the rosebush bloom
The very dogs about his hall
Are conscious of their master's doom.
Or see the fleet victorious steed
In Pindar's whirlwind sweep along,
To whom a more than mortal meed Remains, the bard's eternal song.
What are the statues Phidias cast,
But dust between the palms of Fate ?
A thousand winters cannot blast Their leaf ; if Pindar celebrate.
Great Hiero, Lord of Syracuse, Or Theron, chief of Acragas,
These despots wisely may refuse Record in unending brass.
For Pindar sang the sinewy frame, The nimble athlete's supple grip ;
He gave the gallant horse to fame, Who passed the goal without a whip,
The coursers of the island kings Jove-born, magnanimously calm : When gathered Greece at Elis rings
In paean of the victor's palm.
Or hear the shepherd bard divine Transfuse the music of his lay
With echoes from the mountain pine,
And wave-wash from the answering bay.
And all around in pasturing flocks
His goatherds flute with plaintive reeds,
HELLAS AND ROME.
His lovers whisper from the rocks,
His halcyons flit o'er flowery meads :
Where galingale with iris blends In plumy fringe of lady fern ;
And sweet the Dorian wave descends From topmost ^Etna's snowbright urn.
Or gentle Arethusa lies,
Beside her brimming fountain sweet,
With lovely brow and languid eyes, And river lilies at her feet.
Or listen to the lordly hymn,
The weird Adonis, pealing new,
Full of the crimson twilight dim, Bathed in Astarte's fiery dew.
In splendid shrine without a breath The wounded lonely hunter lies ;
And who has decked the couch of death ? The sister-spouse of Ptolemies.
We seem to hear a god's lament, The sobbing pathos of despair ;
We seem to see her garments rent, And ashes in ambrosial hair.
Clouds gather where the mystic Nile, Seven-headed, stains the ambient deep,
The chidden sun forgets to smile, Where lilies on Lake Mceris sleep.
Slumber and silence cloud the face Of Isis in gold-ivory shrine,
And silence seems to reach the race
Whose youth was more than half divine.
'Tis gone — the chords no longer glow ; The bards of Greece forget to sing ;
Their hands are numb, their hearts are slow ; Their numbers creep without a wing.
Their ebbing Helicons refuse
The droplet of a droughty tide.
The fleeting footsteps of the Muse We follow to the Tiber side.
HELLAS AND ROME.
The Dorian Muse with Cypris ends ; With Cypris wakes the Latian lyre ;
And, sternly sweet, Lucretius blends Her praise inspired with epic fire.
To thee, my Themmius, amply swells Rich prelude to her genial power,
Her world-renewing force, which dwells In man, bird, insect, fish, or flower.
Supremely fair, serenely sweet,
The wondering waves beheld her birth,
The power whose regal pulses beat Through every fiber of the earth.
Why should we tax the gods with woe ? They sit outside, they bear no part ;
They never wove the rainbow's glow, They never built the human heart.
These careless idlers who can blame ? If Chance and Nature govern men :
The universe from atoms came, And back to atoms rolls again.
As earthly kings they keep their state, The cup of joy is in their hands ;
The war note deepens at their gate, They hear a wail of hungry lands.
They feast, they let the turmoil drive, And Nature scorns their fleeting sway :
She ruled before they were alive,
She rules when they are passed away.
Before the poet's wistful face
The flaming walls of ether glow :
He sees the lurid brink of space, Nor trembles at the gulf below.
He feels himself a foundering bark, Tossed on the tides of time alone ;
Blindly he rushes on the dark,
Nor waits his summons to be gone.
Wake, mighty Virgil, nor refuse
Some glimpses of thy laureled face :
vol. iv. — 26
HELLAS AND ROME.
Sound westward, wise Ausonian Muse, The epic of a martial race.
Grim warriors, whom the wolf dug rears, Strong legions, patient, steadfast, brave,
Who meet the shock of hostile spears, As sea walls meet the trivial wave.
Justice and Peace their highest good, By sacred law they held their sway ;
The ruler's instinct in their blood Taught them to govern and obey.
They crushed the proud, the weak they spared, They loosed the prostrate captive's chain
And civic rights and birthright shared Made him respect their equal reign.
They grappled in their nervous hands The natives as a lump of dough ; To Calpe came their gleaming bands,
To Ister grinding reefs of snow.
And where the reedy Mincius rolled By Manto's marsh the crystal swan,
There Maro smote his harp of gold, And on the chords fierce glory shone.
The crested meter clomb and fell ;
The sounding word, the burnished phrase
Rocked on like ocean's tidal swell, With sunbeams on the waterways.
He sang the armored man of fate, The father of eternal Rome, The great begetter of the great,
Who piled the empire yet to come.
He sang of Daphnis, rapt to heaven, At threshold of Olympian doors,
Who sees below the cloud-rack driven, And wonders at the gleaming floors.
He sang the babe whose wondrous birth, By Cumae's sibyl long foretold,
Should rule a renovated earth, An empire and an age of gold.
THE MILLENNIAL GREECE.
He sang great Gallus, wrapt in woe, When sweet Lycoris dared depart
To follow in the Rhineland snow The soldier of her fickle heart.
The nectared lips that sang are mute, And dust the pale Virgilian brows,
And dust the wonder of the lute,
And dust around the charnel-house.
Above the aloes spiring tall, Among the oleander's bloom,
Umed in a craggy mountain hall,
The peasant points to Virgil's tomb.
The empire, which oppressed the world, Has vanished like a bead of foam ;
And down the rugged Goths have hurled The slender roseleaf sons of Rome.
For ages in some northern cave
The plaintive Muse of herdsmen slept,
Till, waking by the Cam's wise wave, Once more her Lycid lost she wept.
As pilgrims to thy realm of death, Great Maro, we are humbly come,
To breathe one hour thy native breath, To scan the lordly wreck of Rome.
And though thy muses all are fled To some uncouth Teutonic town,
Sleep, minstrel of the mighty dead, Sleep in the fields of thy renown.
THE MILLENNIAL GREECE. By PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY.
(From "Hellas. ")
[Tor biographical sketch, see Vol. 3, p. 311. ]
The world's great age begins anew, The golden years return,
404
THE MILLENNIAL GREECE.
The earth doth like a snake renew Her winter weeds outworn:
Heaven smiles, and faiths and empires gleam Like wrecks of a dissolving dream.
A brighter Hellas rears its mountains From waves serener far ;
A new Peneus rolls his fountains Against the morning star ;
Where fairer Tempes bloom, there sleep Young Cyclads on a sunnier deep.
A loftier Argo cleaves the main, Fraught with a later prize ; Another Orpheus sighs again,
And loves, and weeps, and dies ; A new Ulysses leaves once more Calypso for his native shore.
Oh, write no more the tale of Troy, If earth Death's scroll must be —
Nor mix with Laian rage the joy Which dawns upon the free, Although a subtler Sphinx renew
Riddles of death Thebes never knew.
Another Athens shall arise, And to remoter time
Bequeath, like sunset to the skies, The splendor of its prime ;
And leave, if naught so bright may live, All earth can take or heaven can give.
Saturn and Love their long repose Shall burst, more bright and good
Than all who fell, than one who rose, Than many unsubdued :
Not gold, not blood, their altar dowers, But votive tears and symbol flowers.
Oh cease ! must hate and death return ? Cease ! must men kill and die ?
Cease ! drain not to its dregs the urn Of bitter prophecy !
The world is weary of the past, — Oh, might it die or rest at last !
