But if we consider predestination on the part of its term, thus
Christ's predestination is the cause of ours: for God, by
predestinating from eternity, so decreed our salvation, that it should
be achieved through Jesus Christ.
Christ's predestination is the cause of ours: for God, by
predestinating from eternity, so decreed our salvation, that it should
be achieved through Jesus Christ.
Summa Theologica
To this Word, therefore, something may be
likened in three ways. First, on the part of the form but not on the
part of its intelligibility: thus the form of a house already built is
like the mental word of the builder in its specific form, but not in
intelligibility, because the material form of a house is not
intelligible, as it was in the mind of the builder. In this way every
creature is like the Eternal Word; since it was made through the Word.
Secondly, the creature is likened to the Word, not only as to its form,
but also as to its intelligibility: thus the knowledge which is
begotten in the disciple's mind is likened to the word in the mind of
the master. In this way the rational creature, even in its nature, is
likened to the Word of God. Thirdly, a creature is likened to the
Eternal Word, as to the oneness of the Word with the Father, which is
by reason of grace and charity: wherefore our Lord prays (Jn.
17:21,22): "That they may be one in Us . . . as We also are one. " And
this likeness perfects the adoption: for to those who are thus like Him
the eternal inheritance is due. It is therefore clear that to be
adopted belongs to the rational creature alone: not indeed to all, but
only to those who have charity; which is "poured forth in our hearts by
the Holy Ghost" (Rom. 5:5); for which reason (Rom. 8:15) the Holy Ghost
is called "the Spirit of adoption of sons. "
Reply to Objection 1: God is called the Father of the irrational
creature, not properly speaking, by reason of adoption, but by reason
of creation; according to the first-mentioned participation of
likeness.
Reply to Objection 2: Angels are called sons of God by adoptive
sonship, not that it belongs to them first; but because they were the
first to receive the adoption of sons.
Reply to Objection 3: Adoption is a property resulting not from nature,
but from grace, of which the rational nature is capable. Therefore it
need not belong to every rational nature: but every rational creature
must needs be capable of adoption.
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Whether Christ as man is the adopted Son of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man is the adopted Son of
God. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii) speaking of Christ: "The dignity of
power is not forfeited when carnal humanity [*Some editions read
'humilitas'---'the humility or lowliness of the flesh'] is adopted. "
Therefore Christ as man is the adopted Son of God.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv) that "by
the same grace that Man is Christ, as from the birth of faith every man
is a Christian. " But other men are Christians by the grace of adoption.
Therefore this Man is Christ by adoption: and consequently He would
seem to be an adopted son.
Objection 3: Further, Christ, as man, is a servant. But it is of
greater dignity to be an adopted son than to be a servant. Therefore
much more is Christ, as man, an adopted Son.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Incarn. viii): "We do not call an
adopted son a natural son: the natural son is a true son. " But Christ
is the true and natural Son of God, according to 1 Jn. 5:20: "That we
may . . . be in His true Son, Jesus Christ. " Therefore Christ, as Man,
is not an adopted Son.
I answer that, Sonship belongs properly to the hypostasis or person,
not to the nature; whence in the [4112]FP, Q[32], A[3] we have stated
that Filiation is a personal property. Now in Christ there is no other
than the uncreated person or hypostasis, to Whom it belongs by nature
to be the Son. But it has been said above (A[1], ad 2), that the
sonship of adoption is a participated likeness of natural sonship: nor
can a thing be said to participate in what it has essentially.
Therefore Christ, Who is the natural Son of God, can nowise be called
an adopted Son.
But according to those who suppose two persons or two hypostases or two
supposita in Christ, no reason prevents Christ being called the adopted
Son of God.
Reply to Objection 1: As sonship does not properly belong to the
nature, so neither does adoption. Consequently, when it is said that
"carnal humanity is adopted," the expression is metaphorical: and
adoption is used to signify the union of human nature to the Person of
the Son.
Reply to Objection 2: This comparison of Augustine is to be referred to
the principle because, to wit, just as it is granted to any man without
meriting it to be a Christian, so did it happen that this man without
meriting it was Christ. But there is a difference on the part of the
term: because by the grace of union Christ is the natural Son; whereas
another man by habitual grace is an adopted son. Yet habitual grace in
Christ does not make one who was not a son to be an adopted son, but is
a certain effect of Filiation in the soul of Christ, according to Jn.
1:14: "We saw His glory . . . as it were of the Only-begotten of the
Father; full of grace and truth. "
Reply to Objection 3: To be a creature, as also to be subservient or
subject to God, regards not only the person, but also the nature: but
this cannot be said of sonship. Wherefore the comparison does not hold.
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OF THE PREDESTINATION OF CHRIST (FOUR ARTICLES)
We shall now consider the predestination of Christ. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ was predestinated?
(2) Whether He was predestinated as man?
(3) Whether His predestination is the exemplar of ours?
(4) Whether it is the cause of our predestination?
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Whether it is befitting that Christ should be predestinated?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should be
predestinated. For the term of anyone's predestination seems to be the
adoption of sons, according to Eph. 1:5: "Who hath predestinated us
unto the adoption of children. " But it is not befitting to Christ to be
an adopted Son, as stated above ([4113]Q[23], A[4]). Therefore it is
not fitting that Christ be predestinated.
Objection 2: Further, we may consider two things in Christ: His human
nature and His person. But it cannot be said that Christ is
predestinated by reason of His human nature; for this proposition is
false---"The human nature is Son of God. " In like manner neither by
reason of the person; for this person is the Son of God, not by grace,
but by nature: whereas predestination regards what is of grace, as
stated in the [4114]FP, Q[23], AA[2],5. Therefore Christ was not
predestinated to be the Son of God.
Objection 3: Further, just as that which has been made was not always,
so also that which was predestinated; since predestination implies a
certain antecedence. But, because Christ was always God and the Son of
God, it cannot be said that that Man was "made the Son of God. "
Therefore, for a like reason, we ought not to say that Christ was
"predestinated the Son of God. "
On the contrary, The Apostle says, speaking of Christ (Rom. 1:4): "Who
was predestinated the Son of God in power. "
I answer that, As is clear from what has been said in the [4115]FP,
Q[23], AA[1],2, predestination, in its proper sense, is a certain
Divine preordination from eternity of those things which are to be done
in time by the grace of God. Now, that man is God, and that God is man,
is something done in time by God through the grace of union. Nor can it
be said that God has not from eternity pre-ordained to do this in time:
since it would follow that something would come anew into the Divine
Mind. And we must needs admit that the union itself of natures in the
Person of Christ falls under the eternal predestination of God. For
this reason do we say that Christ was predestinated.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle there speaks of that predestination
by which we are predestinated to be adopted sons. And just as Christ in
a singular manner above all others is the natural Son of God, so in a
singular manner is He predestinated.
Reply to Objection 2: As a gloss [*From St. Augustine, De Praed. Sanct.
xv] says on Rom. 1:4, some understood that predestination to refer to
the nature and not to the Person---that is to say, that on human nature
was bestowed the grace of being united to the Son of God in unity of
Person.
But in that case the phrase of the Apostle would be improper, for two
reasons. First, for a general reason: for we do not speak of a person's
nature, but of his person, as being predestinated: because to be
predestinated is to be directed towards salvation, which belongs to a
suppositum acting for the end of beatitude. Secondly, for a special
reason. Because to be Son of God is not befitting to human nature; for
this proposition is false: "The human nature is the Son of God": unless
one were to force from it such an exposition as: "Who was predestinated
the Son of God in power"---that is, "It was predestinated that the
Human nature should be united to the Son of God in the Person. "
Hence we must attribute predestination to the Person of Christ: not,
indeed, in Himself or as subsisting in the Divine Nature, but as
subsisting in the human nature. Wherefore the Apostle, after saying,
"Who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh,"
added, "Who was predestinated the Son of God in power": so as to give
us to understand that in respect of His being of the seed of David
according to the flesh, He was predestinated the Son of God in power.
For although it is natural to that Person, considered in Himself, to be
the Son of God in power, yet this is not natural to Him, considered in
the human nature, in respect of which this befits Him according to the
grace of union.
Reply to Objection 3: Origen commenting on Rom. 1:4 says that the true
reading of this passage of the Apostle is: "Who was destined to be the
Son of God in power"; so that no antecedence is implied. And so there
would be no difficulty. Others refer the antecedence implied in the
participle "predestinated," not to the fact of being the Son of God,
but to the manifestation thereof, according to the customary way of
speaking in Holy Scripture, by which things are said to take place when
they are made known; so that the sense would be---"Christ was
predestinated to be made known as the Son of God. " But this is an
improper signification of predestination. For a person is properly said
to be predestinated by reason of his being directed to the end of
beatitude: but the beatitude of Christ does not depend on our knowledge
thereof.
It is therefore better to say that the antecedence implied in the
participle "predestinated" is to be referred to the Person not in
Himself, but by reason of the human nature: since, although that Person
was the Son of God from eternity, it was not always true that one
subsisting in human nature was the Son of God. Hence Augustine says (De
Praedest. Sanct. xv): "Jesus was predestinated, so that He Who
according to the flesh was to be the son of David, should be
nevertheless Son of God in power. "
Moreover, it must be observed that, although the participle
"predestinated," just as this participle "made," implies antecedence,
yet there is a difference. For "to be made" belongs to the thing in
itself: whereas "to be predestinated" belongs to someone as being in
the apprehension of one who pre-ordains. Now that which is the subject
of a form or nature in reality, can be apprehended either as under that
form or absolutely. And since it cannot be said absolutely of the
Person of Christ that He began to be the Son of God, yet this is
becoming to Him as understood or apprehended to exist in human nature,
because at one time it began to be true that one existing in human
nature was the Son of God; therefore this proposition---"Christ was
predestinated the Son of God"---is truer than this---"Christ was made
the Son of God. "
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Whether this proposition is false: "Christ as man was predestinated to be
the Son of God"?
Objection 1: It would seem that this proposition is false: "Christ as
man was predestinated to be the Son of God. " For at some time a man is
that which he was predestinated to be: since God's predestination does
not fail. If, therefore, Christ as man was predestinated the Son of
God, it seems to follow that as man He is the Son of God. But the
latter is false. Therefore the former is false.
Objection 2: Further, what is befitting to Christ as man is befitting
to any man; since He belongs to the same species as other men. If,
therefore, Christ, as man, was predestinated the Son of God, it will
follow that this is befitting to any other man. But the latter is
false. Therefore the former is false.
Objection 3: Further, that is predestinated from eternity which is to
take place at some time. But this proposition, "The Son of God was made
man," is truer than this, "Man was made the Son of God. " Therefore this
proposition, "Christ, as the Son of God, was predestinated to be man,"
is truer than this, "Christ as Man was predestinated to be the Son of
God. "
On the contrary, Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. xv) says: "Forasmuch as
God the Son was made Man, we say that the Lord of Glory was
predestinated. "
I answer that, Two things may be considered in predestination. One on
the part of eternal predestination itself: and in this respect it
implies a certain antecedence in regard to that which comes under
predestination. Secondly, predestination may be considered as regards
its temporal effect, which is some gratuitous gift of God. Therefore
from both points of view we must say that predestination is ascribed to
Christ by reason of His human nature alone: for human nature was not
always united to the Word; and by grace bestowed an it was it united in
Person to the Son of God. Consequently, by reason of human nature alone
can predestination be attributed to Christ. Wherefore Augustine says
(De Praedest. Sanct. xv): "This human nature of ours was predestinated
to be raised to so great, so lofty, so exalted a position, that it
would be impossible to raise it higher. " Now that is said to belong to
anyone as man which belongs to him by reason of human nature.
Consequently, we must say that "Christ, as Man, was predestinated the
Son of God. "
Reply to Objection 1: When we say, "Christ, as Man, was predestinated
the Son of God," this qualification, "as Man," can be referred in two
ways to the action signified by the participle. First, as regards what
comes under predestination materially, and thus it is false. For the
sense would be that it was predestinated that Christ, as Man, should be
the Son of God. And in this sense the objection takes it.
Secondly, it may be referred to the very nature of the action itself:
that is, forasmuch as predestination implies antecedence and gratuitous
effect. And thus predestination belongs to Christ by reason of His
human nature, as stated above. And in this sense He is said to be
predestinated as Man.
Reply to Objection 2: Something may be befitting to a man by reason of
human nature, in two ways. First, so that human nature be the cause
thereof: thus risibility is befitting to Socrates by reason of human
nature, being caused by its principles. In this manner predestination
is not befitting either to Christ or to any other man, by reason of
human nature. This is the sense of the objection. Secondly, a thing may
be befitting to someone by reason of human nature, because human nature
is susceptible of it. And in this sense we say that Christ was
predestinated by reason of human nature; because predestination refers
to the exaltation of human nature in Him, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Praedest. Sanct. xv): "The
Word of God assumed Man to Himself in such a singular and ineffable
manner that at the same time He may be truly and correctly called the
Son of Man, because He assumed Men to Himself; and the Son of God,
because it was the Only-begotten of God Who assumed human nature. "
Consequently, since this assumption comes under predestination by
reason of its being gratuitous, we can say both that the Son of God was
predestinated to be man, and that the Son of Man was predestinated to
be the Son of God. But because grace was not bestowed on the Son of God
that He might be man, but rather on human nature, that it might be
united to the Son of God; it is more proper to say that "Christ, as
Man, was predestinated to be the Son of God," than that, "Christ, as
Son of God, was predestinated to be Man. "
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Whether Christ's predestination is the exemplar of ours?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's predestination is not the
exemplar of ours. For the exemplar exists before the exemplate. But
nothing exists before the eternal. Since, therefore, our predestination
is eternal, it seems that Christ's predestination is not the exemplar
of ours.
Objection 2: Further, the exemplar leads us to knowledge of the
exemplate. But there was no need for God to be led from something else
to knowledge of our predestination; since it is written (Rom. 8:29):
"Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated. " Therefore Christ's
predestination is not the exemplar of ours.
Objection 3: Further, the exemplar is conformed to the exemplate. But
Christ's predestination seems to be of a different nature from ours:
because we are predestinated to the sonship of adoption, whereas Christ
was predestinated "Son of God in power," as is written (Rom. 1:4).
Therefore His predestination is not the exemplar of ours.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): "The Saviour
Himself, the Mediator of God and men, the Man Christ Jesus is the most
splendid light of predestination and grace. " Now He is called the light
of predestination and grace, inasmuch as our predestination is made
manifest by His predestination and grace; and this seems to pertain to
the nature of an exemplar. Therefore Christ's predestination is the
exemplar of ours.
I answer that, Predestination may be considered in two ways. First, on
the part of the act of predestination: and thus Christ's predestination
cannot be said to be the exemplar of ours: for in the same way and by
the same eternal act God predestinated us and Christ.
Secondly, predestination may be considered on the part of that to which
anyone is predestinated, and this is the term and effect of
predestination. In this sense Christ's predestination is the exemplar
of ours, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the good to which
we are predestinated: for He was predestinated to be the natural Son of
God, whereas we are predestinated to the adoption of sons, which is a
participated likeness of natural sonship. Whence it is written (Rom.
8:29): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable
to the image of His Son. " Secondly, in respect of the manner of
obtaining this good---that is, by grace. This is most manifest in
Christ; because human nature in Him, without any antecedent merits, was
united to the Son of God: and of the fulness of His grace we all have
received, as it is written (Jn. 1:16).
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the aforesaid act of the
predestinator.
The same is to be said of the second objection.
Reply to Objection 3: The exemplate need not be conformed to the
exemplar in all respects: it is sufficient that it imitate it in some.
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Whether Christ's predestination is the cause of ours?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's predestination is not the
cause of ours. For that which is eternal has no cause. But our
predestination is eternal. Therefore Christ's predestination is not the
cause of ours.
Objection 2: Further, that which depends on the simple will of God has
no other cause but God's will. Now, our predestination depends on the
simple will of God, for it is written (Eph. 1:11): "Being predestinated
according to the purpose of Him, Who worketh all things according to
the counsel of His will. " Therefore Christ's predestination is not the
cause of ours.
Objection 3: Further, if the cause be taken away, the effect is also
taken away. But if we take away Christ's predestination, ours is not
taken away; since even if the Son of God were not incarnate, our
salvation might yet have been achieved in a different manner, as
Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 10). Therefore Christ's predestination
is. not the cause of ours.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:5): "(Who) hath predestinated us
unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ. "
I answer that, if we consider predestination on the part of the very
act of predestinating, then Christ's predestination is not the cause of
ours; because by one and the same act God predestinated both Christ and
us.
But if we consider predestination on the part of its term, thus
Christ's predestination is the cause of ours: for God, by
predestinating from eternity, so decreed our salvation, that it should
be achieved through Jesus Christ. For eternal predestination covers not
only that which is to be accomplished in time, but also the mode and
order in which it is to be accomplished in time.
Replies OBJ 1 and 2: These arguments consider predestination on the
part of the act of predestinating.
Reply to Objection 3: If Christ were not to have been incarnate, God
would have decreed men's salvation by other means. But since He decreed
the Incarnation of Christ, He decreed at the same time that He should
be the cause of our salvation.
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OF THE ADORATION OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)
We have now to consider things pertaining to Christ in reference to us;
and first, the adoration of Christ, by which we adore Him; secondly, we
must consider how He is our Mediator with God.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ's Godhead and humanity are to be adored with one and
the same adoration?
(2) Whether His flesh is to be adored with the adoration of "latria"?
(3) Whether the adoration of "latria" is to be given to the image of
Christ?
(4) Whether "latria" is to be given to the Cross of Christ?
(5) Whether to His Mother?
(6) Concerning the adoration of the relics of Saints.
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Whether Christ's humanity and Godhead are to be adored with the same
adoration?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's humanity and Godhead are not
to be adored with the same adoration. For Christ's Godhead is to be
adored, as being common to Father and Son; wherefore it is written (Jn.
5:23): "That all may honor the Son, as they honor the Father. " But
Christ's humanity is not common to Him and the Father. Therefore
Christ's humanity and Godhead are not to be adored with the same
adoration.
Objection 2: Further, honor is properly "the reward of virtue," as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). But virtue merits its reward by
action. Since, therefore, in Christ the action of the Divine Nature is
distinct from that of the human nature, as stated above ([4116]Q[19],
A[1]), it seems that Christ's humanity is to be adored with a different
adoration from that which is given to His Godhead.
Objection 3: Further, if the soul of Christ were not united to the
Word, it would have been worthy of veneration on account of the
excellence of its wisdom and grace. But by being united to the Word it
lost nothing of its worthiness. Therefore His human nature should
receive a certain veneration proper thereto, besides the veneration
which is given to His Godhead.
On the contrary, We read in the chapters of the Fifth Council [*Second
Council of Constantinople, coll. viii, can. 9]: "If anyone say that
Christ is adored in two natures, so as to introduce two distinct
adorations, and does not adore God the Word made flesh with the one and
the same adoration as His flesh, as the Church has handed down from the
beginning; let such a one be anathema. "
I answer that, We may consider two things in a person to whom honor is
given: the person himself, and the cause of his being honored. Now
properly speaking honor is given to a subsistent thing in its entirety:
for we do not speak of honoring a man's hand, but the man himself. And
if at any time it happen that we speak of honoring a man's hand or
foot, it is not by reason of these members being honored of themselves:
but by reason of the whole being honored in them. In this way a man may
be honored even in something external; for instance in his vesture, his
image, or his messenger.
The cause of honor is that by reason of which the person honored has a
certain excellence. for honor is reverence given to something on
account of its excellence, as stated in the [4117]SS, Q[103], A[1]. If
therefore in one man there are several causes of honor, for instance,
rank, knowledge, and virtue, the honor given to him will be one in
respect of the person honored, but several in respect of the causes of
honor: for it is the man that is honored, both on account of knowledge
and by reason of his virtue.
Since, therefore, in Christ there is but one Person of the Divine and
human natures, and one hypostasis, and one suppositum, He is given one
adoration and one honor on the part of the Person adored: but on the
part of the cause for which He is honored, we can say that there are
several adorations, for instance that He receives one honor on account
of His uncreated knowledge, and another on account of His created
knowledge.
But if it be said that there are several persons or hypostases in
Christ, it would follow that there would be, absolutely speaking,
several adorations. And this is what is condemned in the Councils. For
it is written in the chapters of Cyril [*Council of Ephesus, Part I,
ch. 26]: "If anyone dare to say that the man assumed should be adored
besides the Divine Word, as though these were distinct persons; and
does not rather honor the Emmanuel with one single adoration, inasmuch
as the Word was made flesh; let him be anathema. "
Reply to Objection 1: In the Trinity there are three Who are honored,
but only one cause of honor. In the mystery of the Incarnation it is
the reverse: and therefore only one honor is given to the Trinity and
only one to Christ, but in a different way.
Reply to Objection 2: Operation is not the object but the motive of
honor. And therefore there being two operations in Christ proves, not
two adorations, but two causes of adoration.
Reply to Objection 3: If the soul of Christ were not united to the Word
of God, it would be the principal thing in that Man. Wherefore honor
would be due to it principally, since man is that which is principal in
him [*Cf. Ethic. ix, 8]. But since Christ's soul is united to a Person
of greater dignity, to that Person is honor principally due to Whom
Christ's soul is united. Nor is the dignity of Christ's soul hereby
diminished, but rather increased, as stated above ([4118]Q[2], A[2], ad
2).
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Whether Christ's humanity should be adored with the adoration of "latria"?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's soul should not be adored with
the adoration of "latria. " For on the words of Ps. 98:5, "Adore His
foot-stool for it is holy," a gloss says: "The flesh assumed by the
Word of God is rightly adored by us: for no one partakes spiritually of
His flesh unless he first adore it; but not indeed with the adoration
called 'latria,' which is due to the Creator alone. " Now the flesh is
part of the humanity. Therefore Christ's humanity is not to be adored
with the adoration of "latria. "
Objection 2: Further, the worship of "latria" is not to be given to any
creature: since for this reason were the Gentiles reproved, that they
"worshiped and served the creature," as it is written (Rom. 1:25). But
Christ's humanity is a creature. Therefore it should not be adored with
the adoration of "latria. "
Objection 3: Further, the adoration of "latria" is due to God in
recognition of His supreme dominion, according to Dt. 6:13: "Thou shalt
adore [Vulg. : 'fear'; cf. Mat. 4:10] the Lord thy God, and shalt serve
Him only. " But Christ as man is less than the Father. Therefore His
humanity is not to be adored with the adoration of "latria. "
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 3): "On account of
the incarnation of the Divine Word, we adore the flesh of Christ not
for its own sake, but because the Word of God is united thereto in
person. " And on Ps. 98:5, "Adore His foot-stool," a gloss says: "He who
adores the body of Christ, regards not the earth, but rather Him whose
foot-stool it is, in Whose honor he adores the foot-stool. " But the
incarnate Word is adored with the adoration of "latria. " Therefore also
His body or His humanity.
I answer that, As stated above [4119](A[1]) adoration is due to the
subsisting hypostasis: yet the reason for honoring may be something
non-subsistent, on account of which the person, in whom it is, is
honored. And so the adoration of Christ's humanity may be understood in
two ways. First, so that the humanity is the thing adored: and thus to
adore the flesh of Christ is nothing else than to adore the incarnate
Word of God: just as to adore a King's robe is nothing else than to
adore a robed King. And in this sense the adoration of Christ's
humanity is the adoration of "latria. " Secondly, the adoration of
Christ's humanity may be taken as given by reason of its being
perfected with every gift of grace. And so in this sense the adoration
of Christ's humanity is the adoration not of "latria" but of "dulia. "
So that one and the same Person of Christ is adored with "latria" on
account of His Divinity, and with "dulia" on account of His perfect
humanity.
Nor is this unfitting. For the honor of "latria" is due to God the
Father Himself on account of His Godhead; and the honor of "dulia" on
account of the dominion by which He rules over creatures. Wherefore on
Ps. 7:1, "O Lord my God, in Thee have I hoped," a gloss says: "Lord of
all by power, to Whom 'dulia' is due: God of all by creation, to Whom
'latria' is due. "
Reply to Objection 1: That gloss is not to be understood as though the
flesh of Christ were adored separately from its Godhead: for this could
happen only, if there were one hypostasis of God, and another of man.
But since, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 3): "If by a subtle
distinction you divide what is seen from what is understood, it cannot
be adored because it is a creature"---that is, with adoration of
"latria. " And then thus understood as distinct from the Word of God, it
should be adored with the adoration of "dulia"; not any kind of
"dulia," such as is given to other creatures, but with a certain higher
adoration, which is called "hyperdulia. "
Hence appear the answers to the second and third objections. Because
the adoration of "latria" is not given to Christ's humanity in respect
of itself; but in respect of the Godhead to which it is united, by
reason of which Christ is not less than the Father.
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Whether the image of Christ should be adored with the adoration of "latria"?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's image should not be adored
with the adoration of "latria. " For it is written (Ex. 20:4): "Thou
shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of
anything. " But no adoration should be given against the commandment of
God. Therefore Christ's image should not be adored with the adoration
of "latria. "
Objection 2: Further, we should have nothing in common with the works
of the Gentiles, as the Apostle says (Eph. 5:11). But the Gentiles are
reproached principally for that "they changed the glory of the
incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man,"
as is written (Rom. 1:23). Therefore Christ's image is not to be adored
with the adoration of "latria. "
Objection 3: Further, to Christ the adoration of "latria" is due by
reason of His Godhead, not of His humanity. But the adoration of
"latria" is not due to the image of His Godhead, which is imprinted on
the rational soul. Much less, therefore, is it due to the material
image which represents the humanity of Christ Himself.
Objection 4: Further, it seems that nothing should be done in the
Divine worship that is not instituted by God; wherefore the Apostle (1
Cor. 11:23) when about to lay down the doctrine of the sacrifice of the
Church, says: "I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered
unto you. " But Scripture does not lay down anything concerning the
adoration of images. Therefore Christ's image is not to be adored with
the adoration of "latria. "
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 16) quotes Basil as
saying: "The honor given to an image reaches to the prototype," i. e.
the exemplar. But the exemplar itself---namely, Christ---is to be
adored with the adoration of "latria"; therefore also His image.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. i), there
is a twofold movement of the mind towards an image: one indeed towards
the image itself as a certain thing; another, towards the image in so
far as it is the image of something else. And between these movements
there is this difference; that the former, by which one is moved
towards an image as a certain thing, is different from the movement
towards the thing: whereas the latter movement, which is towards the
image as an image, is one and the same as that which is towards the
thing. Thus therefore we must say that no reverence is shown to
Christ's image, as a thing---for instance, carved or painted wood:
because reverence is not due save to a rational creature. It follow
therefore that reverence should be shown to it, in so far only as it is
an image. Consequently the same reverence should be shown to Christ's
image as to Christ Himself. Since, therefore, Christ is adored with the
adoration of "latria," it follows that His image should be adored with
the adoration of "latria. "
Reply to Objection 1: This commandment does not forbid the making of
any graven thing or likeness, but the making thereof for the purpose of
adoration, wherefore it is added: "Thou shalt not adore them nor serve
them. " And because, as stated above, the movement towards the image is
the same as the movement towards the thing, adoration thereof is
forbidden in the same way as adoration of the thing whose image it is.
Wherefore in the passage quoted we are to understand the prohibition to
adore those images which the Gentiles made for the purpose of
venerating their own gods, i. e. the demons, and so it is premised:
"Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me. " But no corporeal image
could be raised to the true God Himself, since He is incorporeal;
because, as Damascene observes (De Fide Orth. iv, 16): "It is the
highest absurdity and impiety to fashion a figure of what is Divine. "
But because in the New Testament God was made man, He can be adored in
His corporeal image.
Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle forbids us to have anything in common
with the "unfruitful works" of the Gentiles, but not with their useful
works. Now the adoration of images must be numbered among the
unfruitful works in two respects. First, because some of the Gentiles
used to adore the images themselves, as things, believing that there
was something Divine therein, on account of the answers which the
demons used to give in them, and on account of other such like
wonderful effects. Secondly on account of the things of which they were
images; for they set up images to certain creatures, to whom in these
images they gave the veneration of "latria. " Whereas we give the
adoration of "latria" to the image of Christ, Who is true God, not for
the sake of the image, but for the sake of the thing whose image it is,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Reverence is due to the rational creature for its
own sake. Consequently, if the adoration of "latria" were shown to the
rational creature in which this image is, there might be an occasion of
error---namely, lest the movement of adoration might stop short at the
man, as a thing, and not be carried on to God, Whose image he is. This
cannot happen in the case of a graven or painted image in insensible
material.
Reply to Objection 4: The Apostles, led by the inward instinct of the
Holy Ghost, handed down to the churches certain instructions which they
did not put in writing, but which have been ordained, in accordance
with the observance of the Church as practiced by the faithful as time
went on. Wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thess. 2:14): "Stand fast; and
hold the traditions which you have learned, whether by word"---that is
by word of mouth---"or by our epistle"---that is by word put into
writing. Among these traditions is the worship of Christ's image.
Wherefore it is said that Blessed Luke painted the image of Christ,
which is in Rome.
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Whether Christ's cross should be worshipped with the adoration of "latria"?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's cross should not be worshiped
with the adoration of "latria. " For no dutiful son honors that which
dishonors his father, as the scourge with which he was scourged, or the
gibbet on which he was hanged; rather does he abhor it. Now Christ
underwent the most shameful death on the cross; according to Wis. 2:20:
"Let us condemn Him to a most shameful death. " Therefore we should not
venerate the cross but rather we should abhor it.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's humanity is worshiped with the adoration
of "latria," inasmuch as it is united to the Son of God in Person. But
this cannot be said of the cross. Therefore Christ's cross should not
be worshiped with the adoration of "latria. "
Objection 3: Further, as Christ's cross was the instrument of His
passion and death, so were also many other things, for instance, the
nails, the crown, the lance; yet to these we do not show the worship of
"latria. " It seems, therefore, that Christ's cross should not be
worshiped with the adoration of "latria. "
On the contrary, We show the worship of "latria" to that in which we
place our hope of salvation. But we place our hope in Christ's cross,
for the Church sings:
"Dear Cross, best hope o'er all beside,
That cheers the solemn passion-tide:
Give to the just increase of grace,
Give to each contrite sinner peace. "
[*Hymn Vexilla Regis: translation of Father Aylward, O. P. ]
Therefore Christ's cross should be worshiped with the adoration of
"latria. "
I answer that, As stated above [4120](A[3]), honor or reverence is due
to a rational creature only; while to an insensible creature, no honor
or reverence is due save by reason of a rational nature. And this in
two ways. First, inasmuch as it represents a rational nature: secondly,
inasmuch as it is united to it in any way whatsoever. In the first way
men are wont to venerate the king's image; in the second way, his robe.
And both are venerated by men with the same veneration as they show to
the king.
If, therefore, we speak of the cross itself on which Christ was
crucified, it is to be venerated by us in both ways---namely, in one
way in so far as it represents to us the figure of Christ extended
thereon; in the other way, from its contact with the limbs of Christ,
and from its being saturated with His blood. Wherefore in each way it
is worshiped with the same adoration as Christ, viz. the adoration of
"latria. " And for this reason also we speak to the cross and pray to
it, as to the Crucified Himself. But if we speak of the effigy of
Christ's cross in any other material whatever---for instance, in stone
or wood, silver or gold---thus we venerate the cross merely as Christ's
image, which we worship with the adoration of "latria," as stated above
[4121](A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: If in Christ's cross we consider the point of
view and intention of those who did not believe in Him, it will appear
as His shame: but if we consider its effect, which is our salvation, it
will appear as endowed with Divine power, by which it triumphed over
the enemy, according to Col. 2:14,15: "He hath taken the same out of
the way, fastening it to the cross, and despoiling the principalities
and powers, He hath exposed them confidently, in open show, triumphing
over them in Himself. " Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 1:18): "The
Word of the cross to them indeed that perish is foolishness; but to
them that are saved---that is, to us---it is the power of God. "
Reply to Objection 2: Although Christ's cross was not united to the
Word of God in Person, yet it was united to Him in some other way, viz.
by representation and contact. And for this sole reason reverence is
shown to it.
Reply to Objection 3: By reason of the contact of Christ's limbs we
worship not only the cross, but all that belongs to Christ. Wherefore
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 11): "The precious wood, as having
been sanctified by the contact of His holy body and blood, should be
meetly worshiped; as also His nails, His lance, and His sacred
dwelling-places, such as the manger, the cave and so forth. " Yet these
very things do not represent Christ's image as the cross does, which is
called "the Sign of the Son of Man" that "will appear in heaven," as it
is written (Mat. 24:30). Wherefore the angel said to the women (Mk.
16:6): "You seek Jesus of Nazareth, Who was crucified": he said not
"pierced," but "crucified. " For this reason we worship the image of
Christ's cross in any material, but not the image of the nails or of
any such thing.
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Whether the Mother of God should be worshipped with the adoration of
"latria"?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Mother of God is to be worshiped
with the adoration of "latria. " For it seems that the same honor is due
to the king's mother as to the king: whence it is written (3 Kings
2:19) that "a throne was set for the king's mother, and she sat on His
right hand. " Moreover, Augustine [*Sermon on the Assumption, work of an
anonymous author] says: "It is right that the throne of God, the
resting-place of the Lord of Heaven, the abode of Christ, should be
there where He is Himself. " But Christ is worshiped with the adoration
of "latria. " Therefore His Mother also should be.
Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 16): "The honor
of the Mother reflects on the Son. " But the Son is worshiped with the
adoration of "latria. " Therefore the Mother also.
Objection 3: Further, Christ's Mother is more akin to Him than the
cross. But the cross is worshiped with the adoration of "latria. "
Therefore also His Mother is to be worshiped with the same adoration.
On the contrary, The Mother of God is a mere creature. Therefore the
worship of "latria" is not due to her.
I answer that, Since "latria" is due to God alone, it is not due to a
creature so far as we venerate a creature for its own sake. For though
insensible creatures are not capable of being venerated for their own
sake, yet the rational creature is capable of being venerated for its
own sake. Consequently the worship of "latria" is not due to any mere
rational creature for its own sake.
likened in three ways. First, on the part of the form but not on the
part of its intelligibility: thus the form of a house already built is
like the mental word of the builder in its specific form, but not in
intelligibility, because the material form of a house is not
intelligible, as it was in the mind of the builder. In this way every
creature is like the Eternal Word; since it was made through the Word.
Secondly, the creature is likened to the Word, not only as to its form,
but also as to its intelligibility: thus the knowledge which is
begotten in the disciple's mind is likened to the word in the mind of
the master. In this way the rational creature, even in its nature, is
likened to the Word of God. Thirdly, a creature is likened to the
Eternal Word, as to the oneness of the Word with the Father, which is
by reason of grace and charity: wherefore our Lord prays (Jn.
17:21,22): "That they may be one in Us . . . as We also are one. " And
this likeness perfects the adoption: for to those who are thus like Him
the eternal inheritance is due. It is therefore clear that to be
adopted belongs to the rational creature alone: not indeed to all, but
only to those who have charity; which is "poured forth in our hearts by
the Holy Ghost" (Rom. 5:5); for which reason (Rom. 8:15) the Holy Ghost
is called "the Spirit of adoption of sons. "
Reply to Objection 1: God is called the Father of the irrational
creature, not properly speaking, by reason of adoption, but by reason
of creation; according to the first-mentioned participation of
likeness.
Reply to Objection 2: Angels are called sons of God by adoptive
sonship, not that it belongs to them first; but because they were the
first to receive the adoption of sons.
Reply to Objection 3: Adoption is a property resulting not from nature,
but from grace, of which the rational nature is capable. Therefore it
need not belong to every rational nature: but every rational creature
must needs be capable of adoption.
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Whether Christ as man is the adopted Son of God?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man is the adopted Son of
God. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii) speaking of Christ: "The dignity of
power is not forfeited when carnal humanity [*Some editions read
'humilitas'---'the humility or lowliness of the flesh'] is adopted. "
Therefore Christ as man is the adopted Son of God.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv) that "by
the same grace that Man is Christ, as from the birth of faith every man
is a Christian. " But other men are Christians by the grace of adoption.
Therefore this Man is Christ by adoption: and consequently He would
seem to be an adopted son.
Objection 3: Further, Christ, as man, is a servant. But it is of
greater dignity to be an adopted son than to be a servant. Therefore
much more is Christ, as man, an adopted Son.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Incarn. viii): "We do not call an
adopted son a natural son: the natural son is a true son. " But Christ
is the true and natural Son of God, according to 1 Jn. 5:20: "That we
may . . . be in His true Son, Jesus Christ. " Therefore Christ, as Man,
is not an adopted Son.
I answer that, Sonship belongs properly to the hypostasis or person,
not to the nature; whence in the [4112]FP, Q[32], A[3] we have stated
that Filiation is a personal property. Now in Christ there is no other
than the uncreated person or hypostasis, to Whom it belongs by nature
to be the Son. But it has been said above (A[1], ad 2), that the
sonship of adoption is a participated likeness of natural sonship: nor
can a thing be said to participate in what it has essentially.
Therefore Christ, Who is the natural Son of God, can nowise be called
an adopted Son.
But according to those who suppose two persons or two hypostases or two
supposita in Christ, no reason prevents Christ being called the adopted
Son of God.
Reply to Objection 1: As sonship does not properly belong to the
nature, so neither does adoption. Consequently, when it is said that
"carnal humanity is adopted," the expression is metaphorical: and
adoption is used to signify the union of human nature to the Person of
the Son.
Reply to Objection 2: This comparison of Augustine is to be referred to
the principle because, to wit, just as it is granted to any man without
meriting it to be a Christian, so did it happen that this man without
meriting it was Christ. But there is a difference on the part of the
term: because by the grace of union Christ is the natural Son; whereas
another man by habitual grace is an adopted son. Yet habitual grace in
Christ does not make one who was not a son to be an adopted son, but is
a certain effect of Filiation in the soul of Christ, according to Jn.
1:14: "We saw His glory . . . as it were of the Only-begotten of the
Father; full of grace and truth. "
Reply to Objection 3: To be a creature, as also to be subservient or
subject to God, regards not only the person, but also the nature: but
this cannot be said of sonship. Wherefore the comparison does not hold.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PREDESTINATION OF CHRIST (FOUR ARTICLES)
We shall now consider the predestination of Christ. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ was predestinated?
(2) Whether He was predestinated as man?
(3) Whether His predestination is the exemplar of ours?
(4) Whether it is the cause of our predestination?
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Whether it is befitting that Christ should be predestinated?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should be
predestinated. For the term of anyone's predestination seems to be the
adoption of sons, according to Eph. 1:5: "Who hath predestinated us
unto the adoption of children. " But it is not befitting to Christ to be
an adopted Son, as stated above ([4113]Q[23], A[4]). Therefore it is
not fitting that Christ be predestinated.
Objection 2: Further, we may consider two things in Christ: His human
nature and His person. But it cannot be said that Christ is
predestinated by reason of His human nature; for this proposition is
false---"The human nature is Son of God. " In like manner neither by
reason of the person; for this person is the Son of God, not by grace,
but by nature: whereas predestination regards what is of grace, as
stated in the [4114]FP, Q[23], AA[2],5. Therefore Christ was not
predestinated to be the Son of God.
Objection 3: Further, just as that which has been made was not always,
so also that which was predestinated; since predestination implies a
certain antecedence. But, because Christ was always God and the Son of
God, it cannot be said that that Man was "made the Son of God. "
Therefore, for a like reason, we ought not to say that Christ was
"predestinated the Son of God. "
On the contrary, The Apostle says, speaking of Christ (Rom. 1:4): "Who
was predestinated the Son of God in power. "
I answer that, As is clear from what has been said in the [4115]FP,
Q[23], AA[1],2, predestination, in its proper sense, is a certain
Divine preordination from eternity of those things which are to be done
in time by the grace of God. Now, that man is God, and that God is man,
is something done in time by God through the grace of union. Nor can it
be said that God has not from eternity pre-ordained to do this in time:
since it would follow that something would come anew into the Divine
Mind. And we must needs admit that the union itself of natures in the
Person of Christ falls under the eternal predestination of God. For
this reason do we say that Christ was predestinated.
Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle there speaks of that predestination
by which we are predestinated to be adopted sons. And just as Christ in
a singular manner above all others is the natural Son of God, so in a
singular manner is He predestinated.
Reply to Objection 2: As a gloss [*From St. Augustine, De Praed. Sanct.
xv] says on Rom. 1:4, some understood that predestination to refer to
the nature and not to the Person---that is to say, that on human nature
was bestowed the grace of being united to the Son of God in unity of
Person.
But in that case the phrase of the Apostle would be improper, for two
reasons. First, for a general reason: for we do not speak of a person's
nature, but of his person, as being predestinated: because to be
predestinated is to be directed towards salvation, which belongs to a
suppositum acting for the end of beatitude. Secondly, for a special
reason. Because to be Son of God is not befitting to human nature; for
this proposition is false: "The human nature is the Son of God": unless
one were to force from it such an exposition as: "Who was predestinated
the Son of God in power"---that is, "It was predestinated that the
Human nature should be united to the Son of God in the Person. "
Hence we must attribute predestination to the Person of Christ: not,
indeed, in Himself or as subsisting in the Divine Nature, but as
subsisting in the human nature. Wherefore the Apostle, after saying,
"Who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh,"
added, "Who was predestinated the Son of God in power": so as to give
us to understand that in respect of His being of the seed of David
according to the flesh, He was predestinated the Son of God in power.
For although it is natural to that Person, considered in Himself, to be
the Son of God in power, yet this is not natural to Him, considered in
the human nature, in respect of which this befits Him according to the
grace of union.
Reply to Objection 3: Origen commenting on Rom. 1:4 says that the true
reading of this passage of the Apostle is: "Who was destined to be the
Son of God in power"; so that no antecedence is implied. And so there
would be no difficulty. Others refer the antecedence implied in the
participle "predestinated," not to the fact of being the Son of God,
but to the manifestation thereof, according to the customary way of
speaking in Holy Scripture, by which things are said to take place when
they are made known; so that the sense would be---"Christ was
predestinated to be made known as the Son of God. " But this is an
improper signification of predestination. For a person is properly said
to be predestinated by reason of his being directed to the end of
beatitude: but the beatitude of Christ does not depend on our knowledge
thereof.
It is therefore better to say that the antecedence implied in the
participle "predestinated" is to be referred to the Person not in
Himself, but by reason of the human nature: since, although that Person
was the Son of God from eternity, it was not always true that one
subsisting in human nature was the Son of God. Hence Augustine says (De
Praedest. Sanct. xv): "Jesus was predestinated, so that He Who
according to the flesh was to be the son of David, should be
nevertheless Son of God in power. "
Moreover, it must be observed that, although the participle
"predestinated," just as this participle "made," implies antecedence,
yet there is a difference. For "to be made" belongs to the thing in
itself: whereas "to be predestinated" belongs to someone as being in
the apprehension of one who pre-ordains. Now that which is the subject
of a form or nature in reality, can be apprehended either as under that
form or absolutely. And since it cannot be said absolutely of the
Person of Christ that He began to be the Son of God, yet this is
becoming to Him as understood or apprehended to exist in human nature,
because at one time it began to be true that one existing in human
nature was the Son of God; therefore this proposition---"Christ was
predestinated the Son of God"---is truer than this---"Christ was made
the Son of God. "
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Whether this proposition is false: "Christ as man was predestinated to be
the Son of God"?
Objection 1: It would seem that this proposition is false: "Christ as
man was predestinated to be the Son of God. " For at some time a man is
that which he was predestinated to be: since God's predestination does
not fail. If, therefore, Christ as man was predestinated the Son of
God, it seems to follow that as man He is the Son of God. But the
latter is false. Therefore the former is false.
Objection 2: Further, what is befitting to Christ as man is befitting
to any man; since He belongs to the same species as other men. If,
therefore, Christ, as man, was predestinated the Son of God, it will
follow that this is befitting to any other man. But the latter is
false. Therefore the former is false.
Objection 3: Further, that is predestinated from eternity which is to
take place at some time. But this proposition, "The Son of God was made
man," is truer than this, "Man was made the Son of God. " Therefore this
proposition, "Christ, as the Son of God, was predestinated to be man,"
is truer than this, "Christ as Man was predestinated to be the Son of
God. "
On the contrary, Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. xv) says: "Forasmuch as
God the Son was made Man, we say that the Lord of Glory was
predestinated. "
I answer that, Two things may be considered in predestination. One on
the part of eternal predestination itself: and in this respect it
implies a certain antecedence in regard to that which comes under
predestination. Secondly, predestination may be considered as regards
its temporal effect, which is some gratuitous gift of God. Therefore
from both points of view we must say that predestination is ascribed to
Christ by reason of His human nature alone: for human nature was not
always united to the Word; and by grace bestowed an it was it united in
Person to the Son of God. Consequently, by reason of human nature alone
can predestination be attributed to Christ. Wherefore Augustine says
(De Praedest. Sanct. xv): "This human nature of ours was predestinated
to be raised to so great, so lofty, so exalted a position, that it
would be impossible to raise it higher. " Now that is said to belong to
anyone as man which belongs to him by reason of human nature.
Consequently, we must say that "Christ, as Man, was predestinated the
Son of God. "
Reply to Objection 1: When we say, "Christ, as Man, was predestinated
the Son of God," this qualification, "as Man," can be referred in two
ways to the action signified by the participle. First, as regards what
comes under predestination materially, and thus it is false. For the
sense would be that it was predestinated that Christ, as Man, should be
the Son of God. And in this sense the objection takes it.
Secondly, it may be referred to the very nature of the action itself:
that is, forasmuch as predestination implies antecedence and gratuitous
effect. And thus predestination belongs to Christ by reason of His
human nature, as stated above. And in this sense He is said to be
predestinated as Man.
Reply to Objection 2: Something may be befitting to a man by reason of
human nature, in two ways. First, so that human nature be the cause
thereof: thus risibility is befitting to Socrates by reason of human
nature, being caused by its principles. In this manner predestination
is not befitting either to Christ or to any other man, by reason of
human nature. This is the sense of the objection. Secondly, a thing may
be befitting to someone by reason of human nature, because human nature
is susceptible of it. And in this sense we say that Christ was
predestinated by reason of human nature; because predestination refers
to the exaltation of human nature in Him, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Praedest. Sanct. xv): "The
Word of God assumed Man to Himself in such a singular and ineffable
manner that at the same time He may be truly and correctly called the
Son of Man, because He assumed Men to Himself; and the Son of God,
because it was the Only-begotten of God Who assumed human nature. "
Consequently, since this assumption comes under predestination by
reason of its being gratuitous, we can say both that the Son of God was
predestinated to be man, and that the Son of Man was predestinated to
be the Son of God. But because grace was not bestowed on the Son of God
that He might be man, but rather on human nature, that it might be
united to the Son of God; it is more proper to say that "Christ, as
Man, was predestinated to be the Son of God," than that, "Christ, as
Son of God, was predestinated to be Man. "
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Whether Christ's predestination is the exemplar of ours?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's predestination is not the
exemplar of ours. For the exemplar exists before the exemplate. But
nothing exists before the eternal. Since, therefore, our predestination
is eternal, it seems that Christ's predestination is not the exemplar
of ours.
Objection 2: Further, the exemplar leads us to knowledge of the
exemplate. But there was no need for God to be led from something else
to knowledge of our predestination; since it is written (Rom. 8:29):
"Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated. " Therefore Christ's
predestination is not the exemplar of ours.
Objection 3: Further, the exemplar is conformed to the exemplate. But
Christ's predestination seems to be of a different nature from ours:
because we are predestinated to the sonship of adoption, whereas Christ
was predestinated "Son of God in power," as is written (Rom. 1:4).
Therefore His predestination is not the exemplar of ours.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): "The Saviour
Himself, the Mediator of God and men, the Man Christ Jesus is the most
splendid light of predestination and grace. " Now He is called the light
of predestination and grace, inasmuch as our predestination is made
manifest by His predestination and grace; and this seems to pertain to
the nature of an exemplar. Therefore Christ's predestination is the
exemplar of ours.
I answer that, Predestination may be considered in two ways. First, on
the part of the act of predestination: and thus Christ's predestination
cannot be said to be the exemplar of ours: for in the same way and by
the same eternal act God predestinated us and Christ.
Secondly, predestination may be considered on the part of that to which
anyone is predestinated, and this is the term and effect of
predestination. In this sense Christ's predestination is the exemplar
of ours, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the good to which
we are predestinated: for He was predestinated to be the natural Son of
God, whereas we are predestinated to the adoption of sons, which is a
participated likeness of natural sonship. Whence it is written (Rom.
8:29): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable
to the image of His Son. " Secondly, in respect of the manner of
obtaining this good---that is, by grace. This is most manifest in
Christ; because human nature in Him, without any antecedent merits, was
united to the Son of God: and of the fulness of His grace we all have
received, as it is written (Jn. 1:16).
Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the aforesaid act of the
predestinator.
The same is to be said of the second objection.
Reply to Objection 3: The exemplate need not be conformed to the
exemplar in all respects: it is sufficient that it imitate it in some.
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Whether Christ's predestination is the cause of ours?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's predestination is not the
cause of ours. For that which is eternal has no cause. But our
predestination is eternal. Therefore Christ's predestination is not the
cause of ours.
Objection 2: Further, that which depends on the simple will of God has
no other cause but God's will. Now, our predestination depends on the
simple will of God, for it is written (Eph. 1:11): "Being predestinated
according to the purpose of Him, Who worketh all things according to
the counsel of His will. " Therefore Christ's predestination is not the
cause of ours.
Objection 3: Further, if the cause be taken away, the effect is also
taken away. But if we take away Christ's predestination, ours is not
taken away; since even if the Son of God were not incarnate, our
salvation might yet have been achieved in a different manner, as
Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 10). Therefore Christ's predestination
is. not the cause of ours.
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:5): "(Who) hath predestinated us
unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ. "
I answer that, if we consider predestination on the part of the very
act of predestinating, then Christ's predestination is not the cause of
ours; because by one and the same act God predestinated both Christ and
us.
But if we consider predestination on the part of its term, thus
Christ's predestination is the cause of ours: for God, by
predestinating from eternity, so decreed our salvation, that it should
be achieved through Jesus Christ. For eternal predestination covers not
only that which is to be accomplished in time, but also the mode and
order in which it is to be accomplished in time.
Replies OBJ 1 and 2: These arguments consider predestination on the
part of the act of predestinating.
Reply to Objection 3: If Christ were not to have been incarnate, God
would have decreed men's salvation by other means. But since He decreed
the Incarnation of Christ, He decreed at the same time that He should
be the cause of our salvation.
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OF THE ADORATION OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)
We have now to consider things pertaining to Christ in reference to us;
and first, the adoration of Christ, by which we adore Him; secondly, we
must consider how He is our Mediator with God.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ's Godhead and humanity are to be adored with one and
the same adoration?
(2) Whether His flesh is to be adored with the adoration of "latria"?
(3) Whether the adoration of "latria" is to be given to the image of
Christ?
(4) Whether "latria" is to be given to the Cross of Christ?
(5) Whether to His Mother?
(6) Concerning the adoration of the relics of Saints.
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Whether Christ's humanity and Godhead are to be adored with the same
adoration?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's humanity and Godhead are not
to be adored with the same adoration. For Christ's Godhead is to be
adored, as being common to Father and Son; wherefore it is written (Jn.
5:23): "That all may honor the Son, as they honor the Father. " But
Christ's humanity is not common to Him and the Father. Therefore
Christ's humanity and Godhead are not to be adored with the same
adoration.
Objection 2: Further, honor is properly "the reward of virtue," as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). But virtue merits its reward by
action. Since, therefore, in Christ the action of the Divine Nature is
distinct from that of the human nature, as stated above ([4116]Q[19],
A[1]), it seems that Christ's humanity is to be adored with a different
adoration from that which is given to His Godhead.
Objection 3: Further, if the soul of Christ were not united to the
Word, it would have been worthy of veneration on account of the
excellence of its wisdom and grace. But by being united to the Word it
lost nothing of its worthiness. Therefore His human nature should
receive a certain veneration proper thereto, besides the veneration
which is given to His Godhead.
On the contrary, We read in the chapters of the Fifth Council [*Second
Council of Constantinople, coll. viii, can. 9]: "If anyone say that
Christ is adored in two natures, so as to introduce two distinct
adorations, and does not adore God the Word made flesh with the one and
the same adoration as His flesh, as the Church has handed down from the
beginning; let such a one be anathema. "
I answer that, We may consider two things in a person to whom honor is
given: the person himself, and the cause of his being honored. Now
properly speaking honor is given to a subsistent thing in its entirety:
for we do not speak of honoring a man's hand, but the man himself. And
if at any time it happen that we speak of honoring a man's hand or
foot, it is not by reason of these members being honored of themselves:
but by reason of the whole being honored in them. In this way a man may
be honored even in something external; for instance in his vesture, his
image, or his messenger.
The cause of honor is that by reason of which the person honored has a
certain excellence. for honor is reverence given to something on
account of its excellence, as stated in the [4117]SS, Q[103], A[1]. If
therefore in one man there are several causes of honor, for instance,
rank, knowledge, and virtue, the honor given to him will be one in
respect of the person honored, but several in respect of the causes of
honor: for it is the man that is honored, both on account of knowledge
and by reason of his virtue.
Since, therefore, in Christ there is but one Person of the Divine and
human natures, and one hypostasis, and one suppositum, He is given one
adoration and one honor on the part of the Person adored: but on the
part of the cause for which He is honored, we can say that there are
several adorations, for instance that He receives one honor on account
of His uncreated knowledge, and another on account of His created
knowledge.
But if it be said that there are several persons or hypostases in
Christ, it would follow that there would be, absolutely speaking,
several adorations. And this is what is condemned in the Councils. For
it is written in the chapters of Cyril [*Council of Ephesus, Part I,
ch. 26]: "If anyone dare to say that the man assumed should be adored
besides the Divine Word, as though these were distinct persons; and
does not rather honor the Emmanuel with one single adoration, inasmuch
as the Word was made flesh; let him be anathema. "
Reply to Objection 1: In the Trinity there are three Who are honored,
but only one cause of honor. In the mystery of the Incarnation it is
the reverse: and therefore only one honor is given to the Trinity and
only one to Christ, but in a different way.
Reply to Objection 2: Operation is not the object but the motive of
honor. And therefore there being two operations in Christ proves, not
two adorations, but two causes of adoration.
Reply to Objection 3: If the soul of Christ were not united to the Word
of God, it would be the principal thing in that Man. Wherefore honor
would be due to it principally, since man is that which is principal in
him [*Cf. Ethic. ix, 8]. But since Christ's soul is united to a Person
of greater dignity, to that Person is honor principally due to Whom
Christ's soul is united. Nor is the dignity of Christ's soul hereby
diminished, but rather increased, as stated above ([4118]Q[2], A[2], ad
2).
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Whether Christ's humanity should be adored with the adoration of "latria"?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's soul should not be adored with
the adoration of "latria. " For on the words of Ps. 98:5, "Adore His
foot-stool for it is holy," a gloss says: "The flesh assumed by the
Word of God is rightly adored by us: for no one partakes spiritually of
His flesh unless he first adore it; but not indeed with the adoration
called 'latria,' which is due to the Creator alone. " Now the flesh is
part of the humanity. Therefore Christ's humanity is not to be adored
with the adoration of "latria. "
Objection 2: Further, the worship of "latria" is not to be given to any
creature: since for this reason were the Gentiles reproved, that they
"worshiped and served the creature," as it is written (Rom. 1:25). But
Christ's humanity is a creature. Therefore it should not be adored with
the adoration of "latria. "
Objection 3: Further, the adoration of "latria" is due to God in
recognition of His supreme dominion, according to Dt. 6:13: "Thou shalt
adore [Vulg. : 'fear'; cf. Mat. 4:10] the Lord thy God, and shalt serve
Him only. " But Christ as man is less than the Father. Therefore His
humanity is not to be adored with the adoration of "latria. "
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 3): "On account of
the incarnation of the Divine Word, we adore the flesh of Christ not
for its own sake, but because the Word of God is united thereto in
person. " And on Ps. 98:5, "Adore His foot-stool," a gloss says: "He who
adores the body of Christ, regards not the earth, but rather Him whose
foot-stool it is, in Whose honor he adores the foot-stool. " But the
incarnate Word is adored with the adoration of "latria. " Therefore also
His body or His humanity.
I answer that, As stated above [4119](A[1]) adoration is due to the
subsisting hypostasis: yet the reason for honoring may be something
non-subsistent, on account of which the person, in whom it is, is
honored. And so the adoration of Christ's humanity may be understood in
two ways. First, so that the humanity is the thing adored: and thus to
adore the flesh of Christ is nothing else than to adore the incarnate
Word of God: just as to adore a King's robe is nothing else than to
adore a robed King. And in this sense the adoration of Christ's
humanity is the adoration of "latria. " Secondly, the adoration of
Christ's humanity may be taken as given by reason of its being
perfected with every gift of grace. And so in this sense the adoration
of Christ's humanity is the adoration not of "latria" but of "dulia. "
So that one and the same Person of Christ is adored with "latria" on
account of His Divinity, and with "dulia" on account of His perfect
humanity.
Nor is this unfitting. For the honor of "latria" is due to God the
Father Himself on account of His Godhead; and the honor of "dulia" on
account of the dominion by which He rules over creatures. Wherefore on
Ps. 7:1, "O Lord my God, in Thee have I hoped," a gloss says: "Lord of
all by power, to Whom 'dulia' is due: God of all by creation, to Whom
'latria' is due. "
Reply to Objection 1: That gloss is not to be understood as though the
flesh of Christ were adored separately from its Godhead: for this could
happen only, if there were one hypostasis of God, and another of man.
But since, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 3): "If by a subtle
distinction you divide what is seen from what is understood, it cannot
be adored because it is a creature"---that is, with adoration of
"latria. " And then thus understood as distinct from the Word of God, it
should be adored with the adoration of "dulia"; not any kind of
"dulia," such as is given to other creatures, but with a certain higher
adoration, which is called "hyperdulia. "
Hence appear the answers to the second and third objections. Because
the adoration of "latria" is not given to Christ's humanity in respect
of itself; but in respect of the Godhead to which it is united, by
reason of which Christ is not less than the Father.
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Whether the image of Christ should be adored with the adoration of "latria"?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's image should not be adored
with the adoration of "latria. " For it is written (Ex. 20:4): "Thou
shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of
anything. " But no adoration should be given against the commandment of
God. Therefore Christ's image should not be adored with the adoration
of "latria. "
Objection 2: Further, we should have nothing in common with the works
of the Gentiles, as the Apostle says (Eph. 5:11). But the Gentiles are
reproached principally for that "they changed the glory of the
incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man,"
as is written (Rom. 1:23). Therefore Christ's image is not to be adored
with the adoration of "latria. "
Objection 3: Further, to Christ the adoration of "latria" is due by
reason of His Godhead, not of His humanity. But the adoration of
"latria" is not due to the image of His Godhead, which is imprinted on
the rational soul. Much less, therefore, is it due to the material
image which represents the humanity of Christ Himself.
Objection 4: Further, it seems that nothing should be done in the
Divine worship that is not instituted by God; wherefore the Apostle (1
Cor. 11:23) when about to lay down the doctrine of the sacrifice of the
Church, says: "I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered
unto you. " But Scripture does not lay down anything concerning the
adoration of images. Therefore Christ's image is not to be adored with
the adoration of "latria. "
On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 16) quotes Basil as
saying: "The honor given to an image reaches to the prototype," i. e.
the exemplar. But the exemplar itself---namely, Christ---is to be
adored with the adoration of "latria"; therefore also His image.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. i), there
is a twofold movement of the mind towards an image: one indeed towards
the image itself as a certain thing; another, towards the image in so
far as it is the image of something else. And between these movements
there is this difference; that the former, by which one is moved
towards an image as a certain thing, is different from the movement
towards the thing: whereas the latter movement, which is towards the
image as an image, is one and the same as that which is towards the
thing. Thus therefore we must say that no reverence is shown to
Christ's image, as a thing---for instance, carved or painted wood:
because reverence is not due save to a rational creature. It follow
therefore that reverence should be shown to it, in so far only as it is
an image. Consequently the same reverence should be shown to Christ's
image as to Christ Himself. Since, therefore, Christ is adored with the
adoration of "latria," it follows that His image should be adored with
the adoration of "latria. "
Reply to Objection 1: This commandment does not forbid the making of
any graven thing or likeness, but the making thereof for the purpose of
adoration, wherefore it is added: "Thou shalt not adore them nor serve
them. " And because, as stated above, the movement towards the image is
the same as the movement towards the thing, adoration thereof is
forbidden in the same way as adoration of the thing whose image it is.
Wherefore in the passage quoted we are to understand the prohibition to
adore those images which the Gentiles made for the purpose of
venerating their own gods, i. e. the demons, and so it is premised:
"Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me. " But no corporeal image
could be raised to the true God Himself, since He is incorporeal;
because, as Damascene observes (De Fide Orth. iv, 16): "It is the
highest absurdity and impiety to fashion a figure of what is Divine. "
But because in the New Testament God was made man, He can be adored in
His corporeal image.
Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle forbids us to have anything in common
with the "unfruitful works" of the Gentiles, but not with their useful
works. Now the adoration of images must be numbered among the
unfruitful works in two respects. First, because some of the Gentiles
used to adore the images themselves, as things, believing that there
was something Divine therein, on account of the answers which the
demons used to give in them, and on account of other such like
wonderful effects. Secondly on account of the things of which they were
images; for they set up images to certain creatures, to whom in these
images they gave the veneration of "latria. " Whereas we give the
adoration of "latria" to the image of Christ, Who is true God, not for
the sake of the image, but for the sake of the thing whose image it is,
as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Reverence is due to the rational creature for its
own sake. Consequently, if the adoration of "latria" were shown to the
rational creature in which this image is, there might be an occasion of
error---namely, lest the movement of adoration might stop short at the
man, as a thing, and not be carried on to God, Whose image he is. This
cannot happen in the case of a graven or painted image in insensible
material.
Reply to Objection 4: The Apostles, led by the inward instinct of the
Holy Ghost, handed down to the churches certain instructions which they
did not put in writing, but which have been ordained, in accordance
with the observance of the Church as practiced by the faithful as time
went on. Wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thess. 2:14): "Stand fast; and
hold the traditions which you have learned, whether by word"---that is
by word of mouth---"or by our epistle"---that is by word put into
writing. Among these traditions is the worship of Christ's image.
Wherefore it is said that Blessed Luke painted the image of Christ,
which is in Rome.
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Whether Christ's cross should be worshipped with the adoration of "latria"?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's cross should not be worshiped
with the adoration of "latria. " For no dutiful son honors that which
dishonors his father, as the scourge with which he was scourged, or the
gibbet on which he was hanged; rather does he abhor it. Now Christ
underwent the most shameful death on the cross; according to Wis. 2:20:
"Let us condemn Him to a most shameful death. " Therefore we should not
venerate the cross but rather we should abhor it.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's humanity is worshiped with the adoration
of "latria," inasmuch as it is united to the Son of God in Person. But
this cannot be said of the cross. Therefore Christ's cross should not
be worshiped with the adoration of "latria. "
Objection 3: Further, as Christ's cross was the instrument of His
passion and death, so were also many other things, for instance, the
nails, the crown, the lance; yet to these we do not show the worship of
"latria. " It seems, therefore, that Christ's cross should not be
worshiped with the adoration of "latria. "
On the contrary, We show the worship of "latria" to that in which we
place our hope of salvation. But we place our hope in Christ's cross,
for the Church sings:
"Dear Cross, best hope o'er all beside,
That cheers the solemn passion-tide:
Give to the just increase of grace,
Give to each contrite sinner peace. "
[*Hymn Vexilla Regis: translation of Father Aylward, O. P. ]
Therefore Christ's cross should be worshiped with the adoration of
"latria. "
I answer that, As stated above [4120](A[3]), honor or reverence is due
to a rational creature only; while to an insensible creature, no honor
or reverence is due save by reason of a rational nature. And this in
two ways. First, inasmuch as it represents a rational nature: secondly,
inasmuch as it is united to it in any way whatsoever. In the first way
men are wont to venerate the king's image; in the second way, his robe.
And both are venerated by men with the same veneration as they show to
the king.
If, therefore, we speak of the cross itself on which Christ was
crucified, it is to be venerated by us in both ways---namely, in one
way in so far as it represents to us the figure of Christ extended
thereon; in the other way, from its contact with the limbs of Christ,
and from its being saturated with His blood. Wherefore in each way it
is worshiped with the same adoration as Christ, viz. the adoration of
"latria. " And for this reason also we speak to the cross and pray to
it, as to the Crucified Himself. But if we speak of the effigy of
Christ's cross in any other material whatever---for instance, in stone
or wood, silver or gold---thus we venerate the cross merely as Christ's
image, which we worship with the adoration of "latria," as stated above
[4121](A[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: If in Christ's cross we consider the point of
view and intention of those who did not believe in Him, it will appear
as His shame: but if we consider its effect, which is our salvation, it
will appear as endowed with Divine power, by which it triumphed over
the enemy, according to Col. 2:14,15: "He hath taken the same out of
the way, fastening it to the cross, and despoiling the principalities
and powers, He hath exposed them confidently, in open show, triumphing
over them in Himself. " Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 1:18): "The
Word of the cross to them indeed that perish is foolishness; but to
them that are saved---that is, to us---it is the power of God. "
Reply to Objection 2: Although Christ's cross was not united to the
Word of God in Person, yet it was united to Him in some other way, viz.
by representation and contact. And for this sole reason reverence is
shown to it.
Reply to Objection 3: By reason of the contact of Christ's limbs we
worship not only the cross, but all that belongs to Christ. Wherefore
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 11): "The precious wood, as having
been sanctified by the contact of His holy body and blood, should be
meetly worshiped; as also His nails, His lance, and His sacred
dwelling-places, such as the manger, the cave and so forth. " Yet these
very things do not represent Christ's image as the cross does, which is
called "the Sign of the Son of Man" that "will appear in heaven," as it
is written (Mat. 24:30). Wherefore the angel said to the women (Mk.
16:6): "You seek Jesus of Nazareth, Who was crucified": he said not
"pierced," but "crucified. " For this reason we worship the image of
Christ's cross in any material, but not the image of the nails or of
any such thing.
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Whether the Mother of God should be worshipped with the adoration of
"latria"?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Mother of God is to be worshiped
with the adoration of "latria. " For it seems that the same honor is due
to the king's mother as to the king: whence it is written (3 Kings
2:19) that "a throne was set for the king's mother, and she sat on His
right hand. " Moreover, Augustine [*Sermon on the Assumption, work of an
anonymous author] says: "It is right that the throne of God, the
resting-place of the Lord of Heaven, the abode of Christ, should be
there where He is Himself. " But Christ is worshiped with the adoration
of "latria. " Therefore His Mother also should be.
Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 16): "The honor
of the Mother reflects on the Son. " But the Son is worshiped with the
adoration of "latria. " Therefore the Mother also.
Objection 3: Further, Christ's Mother is more akin to Him than the
cross. But the cross is worshiped with the adoration of "latria. "
Therefore also His Mother is to be worshiped with the same adoration.
On the contrary, The Mother of God is a mere creature. Therefore the
worship of "latria" is not due to her.
I answer that, Since "latria" is due to God alone, it is not due to a
creature so far as we venerate a creature for its own sake. For though
insensible creatures are not capable of being venerated for their own
sake, yet the rational creature is capable of being venerated for its
own sake. Consequently the worship of "latria" is not due to any mere
rational creature for its own sake.
