Supposing that one single creature, - with its own relations and
standpoint
in regard to all things, were lacking, that thing would still
remain undefined.
remain undefined.
Nietzsche - Works - v15 - Will to Power - b
Question:
Is the design the cause of pheno menon Or that also illusion? Is not the phenomenon itself?
551
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
every phenomenon an action,--formerly inten tions were seen behind all phenomena, this our oldest habit. Has the. animal also this habit? I As living organism, not also compelled to interpret things through itself. The question
" why " always question concerning the causafinalis, and the general " purpose " of things. We have no sign of the "sense of the 6ffiCl? Ilt cause in this respect Hume quite right, habit (but not only that of the individual) allows us to expect that certain process, frequently observed, will follow upon another, but nothing more! That which gives us such an extraordinarily firm faith in
causality, not the rough habit of observing the sequence of processes; but our inahility to interpret a phenomenon otherwise than as the result of de sign. It the belief in living and thinking things,
as the only agents of causation; the belief in will, in design--the belief that all phenomena are actions, and that all actions presuppose an agent; the belief in the "subject. " Is not this belief in the concepts subject and object an
arrant absurdity?
? criticism of the concept "cause. '-'--We have absolutely no experience concerning cause; viewed psychologically we derive the whole concept from the subjective conviction, that we ourselves are
causes--that to say, that the arm moves. . . But
'
? ? A is
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it
is it
P'
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is
-- . -__. -_'-\, M,
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is is is a is
it
it is
is
? 56
THE WILL TO POWER.
that is an error. We distinguish ourselves, the agents, from the action, and everywhere we make use of this scheme--we try to discover an agent behind every phenomenon. What have we done ? We have misunderstood a feeling of power, tension, resistance, a muscular feeling, which is already the beginning of the action, and posited it as a cause; or we have understood the will to do this or that,
as a cause, because the action follows it. There is no such thing as "Cause," in those few cases in which it seemed to be given, and in which we pro
jected it out of ourselves in order to understand a phenomenon, it has been shown to be an illusion. Our understanding of a phenomenon consisted in
our inventing a subject who was responsible for something happening, and for the manner in which it happened. In our concept " cause " we have em braced our feeling of will, our feeling of " freedom,"
our feeling of responsibility and our design to do an action: causa efliciens and causa finalis are fundamentally one. - '
We believed that an effect was explained when we could point to a state in which it was inherent. As a matter of fact, we invent all causes according to the scheme of the effect: the latter is known to us. . . . On the other hand, we are not in a position to say of any particular thing how it will "act. " The thing, the subject the will, the design--all
inherent in the conception "cause. " We try to discover things in order to explain why something has changed. Even the "atom" is one of these
fanciful inventions like the "thing" and the
? " primitive subject. " . . .
'
? ? ? THE WILL 'ro POWER IN SCIENCE.
57
At last we understand that things--consequently also atoms--effect nothing: because they are non existent; and that the concept causality quite useless. Out of necessary sequence of states, the latter's causal relationship does not follow (that would be equivalent to extending their active
principle from to 2, to to 4, to 5). There
no such thing as a cause or an effect. From the standpoint of language we do not know how to
rid ourselves of them. But that does not matter. If imagine muscle separated from its "effects,"
have denied it.
In short: a phenomenon neither effected nor
capable of mf'ecting. Causa a faculty to effect
something, superadded fancifully to what hap
pens.
The interpretation of causality is an illusion.
A "thing" the sum of its effects, synthetically united by means of concept, an image. As matter of fact, science has robbed the concept caus ality of all meaning, and has reserved merely as an allegorical formula, which has made matter of indifference whether cause or effect be put on this side or on that. It asserted that in two complex states (centres of force) the quantities of energy remain constant.
The calmlability of a phenomenon does not lie in the fact that rule observed, or that neces sity obeyed, or that we have projected law of causality into every phenomenon: lies in the recurrence of " identical cases. "
There no such thing as sense of causality, as Kant would have us believe. We are aghast,
? ? ? is is
. . .
a
is is
it
it it a
,
a
a
is
a
. .
is
is
a
. __
. MWN. ? W_L_. M
is
I
a
.
a Iis
I
3,
58
THE WILL TO POWER.
we feel insecure, we will have something familiar, which can be relied upon. . . . As soon as we are shown the existence of something old in a new thing, we are pacified. The so-called instinct of causality is nothing more than the fear of the unfamiliar, and the attempt at finding something in it which is already known--It is not a search for causes, but for the familiar.
552
To combat determinism and teleology--From
the fact that something happens regularly, and that its occurrence may be reckoned upon, it does not follow that it happens necessarily. If a quantity of force determines and conducts itself in a certain way in every particular case, it does not prove that it has " no free will. " " Mechanical necessity " is not an established fact: it was we who first read it into the nature of all phenomena. We interpreted the possibility of formularising pheno mena as a result of the dominion of necessary law over all existence. But it does not follow, because I do a determined thing, that I am bound to do it. - Compulsion cannot be demonstrated in things: all that the rule proves is this, that one and the same phenomenon is not another phenomenon. Owing to the very fact that we fancied the ex istence of subjects "agents" in things, the notion arose that all phenomena are the consequence of a compulsory force exercised over the subject--exer cised by whom? once more by an "agent. " The concept "Cause and Effect" is a dangerous one,
? ? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
so long as people believe in something that causes, '
and something (a) Necessity
interpretation.
that caused.
not an established fact, but an
(b) When
nothing that acts, but only thing of fancy,
understood that the "subject"
there much that follows.
Only with the subject as model we invented
thingness and read into the pell-mell of sensa tions. If we cease from believing in the acting subject, the belief in acting. things, in reciprocal action, in cause and effect between phenomena which we call things, also falls to pieces.
In this case the world of acting atoms also dis
59
? ? for this world always assumed to exist on the pre-determined grounds that subjects are necessary. ,
Ultimately, of course, " the thing-in-itself" also
appears:
for'at bottom the conception of "subject-in-itself. " But we have seen that the subject an imaginary thing. The antithesis
"thing-in-itself" and "appearance" untenable; but in this way the concept " appearance " also disappears.
(c) If we abandon the idea of the acting subject, we also abandon the object acted upon. Duration, equality to self, Being, are inherent neither in what called subject, nor in what called object: they are complex phenomena, and in regard to other phenomena are apparently durable--they are
. disappears:
? ? is
is is
a
is
l l l l l i i l a
. v. "a" r
>|<
>|<
is
it is
a
is is
_'-H\mn_=
it
it is
is
is
60 THE WILL TO POWER.
distinguishable, for instance, by the different tempo
with which they happen (repose--movement, fixed --loose: all'antitheses which do not exist in them selves and by means of which difi'erences of degree only are expressed; from a certain limited point of view, though, they seem to be antitheses. There are no such things as antitheses; it is from logic that we derive our concept of contrasts--and starting out from its standpoint we spread the error over all things).
" (d) If we abandon the ideas "subject" and object "; then we must also abandon the idea
"substance"--and therefore its various modifications too; for instance: "matter," "spirit," and other hypothetical things, "eternity and the immuta bility of matter," etc. We are then rid of materi ality.
? ? From moral standpoint the world
But inasmuch as morality itself part of this world, morality also false. The will to truth
process of establishing things; process of making things true and lasting, total elimination of that false character, transvaluation of into being-:2" Thus," truth " not something which present and which has to be found and discovered
something which has to be created and which gives its name to a process, or, better still, to the n
Will to overpower, which in itself has no purpose to introduce truth frocessus in infinitum, an active determining--it not process of be
false.
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a
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it is
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free )int
ere vic nd be
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE. 61
coming conscious of something, which in itself fixed and determined. It merely a word for " The Will to Power. "
Life based on the hypothesis of belief in stable and regularly recurring things the mightier
the more vast must be the world of know ledge and the world called being. Logicising, rationalising, and systematising are of assistance as means of existence.
Man projects his instinct of truth, his "aim," to certain extent beyond himself, in the form of
metaphysical world of Being, "thing-in-itself," world already to hand. His requirements as creator make him invent the world in which he
works in advance; he anticipates it: this anticipa tion (this faith in truth) his mainstay.
All phenomena, movement, Becoming, regarded as the establishment of relations of degree and of force, as contest.
As soon as we fancy that some one responsible for the fact that we are thus and thus, etc. (God,
WV
-v
? and that we ascribe our existence, our happiness, our misery, our destiny, to that some one, we corrupt the innocence of Becoming for ourselves. We then have some one who wishes to attain to something by means of us and with us.
The " welfare of the individual " just as fanci ful as the "welfare of the species": the first not sacrificed to the last; seen from afar, the species
Nature), a,
? ? is
-,. ,~. 'v--~'
_.
* *. *is
a
is
. .
is ; is
aa
it is,
a
aa is
a
is
62 THE err. TO POWER.
is just as fluid as the individual. " The preserva tion of the species " is only a result of the growth of the species--that is to say, of the overcoming of the species on the road to a stronger kind.
*
Theses :--The apparent conformity of means to end ("the conformity of means to end which far surpasses the art of man ") is merely the result of that " Will to Power " which manifests itself in all phenomena :--T0 become stronger involves a pro cess of ordering, which may well be mistaken for an attempted conformity of means to end :--The ends which are apparent are not intended; but, as soon as a superior power prevails over an inferior power, and the latter proceeds to work as a function of the former, an order of rank is established, an organisation which must give rise to the idea that there is an arrangement of means and ends.
Against apparent " necessity " :--
This is only an expression for the fact that a certain power is not also something else.
Against the apparent " conformity of means to ends " :--
The latter is only an expression for the order among the spheres of power and their interplay.
(2) THE THING-IN-ITSELF AND APPEARANCE.
553
The foul blemish on Kant's criticism has at last become visible even to the coarsest eyes: Kant
? ? ? ? servo rowth
reef
IS to 1 far t of I all
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
had no right to his distinction "appearance" and " thing-in-itself"---in his own writings he had deprived himself of the right of differentiating any longer in this old and hackneyed manner, seeing that he had condemned the practice of drawing any conclusions concerning the cause of an appear ance from the appearance itself, as unallowable-- in accordance with his conception of the idea of causality and its purely intraphenomenal validity: and this conception, on the other' hand, already anticipates that diferentiation, as the " thing-in itself were not only inferred but actually given.
554
obvious that neither things-in-themselves nor appearances can be related to each other in the form of cause and effect: and from this follows that the concept " cause and effect " not applicable in philosophy which believes in things in-themselves and in appearances. Kant's mis take-- . As a matter of fact, from psycho " logical standpoint, the concept " cause and effect
derived from an attitude of mind which believes
sees the action of will upon will everywhere,-- which believes only in living things, and at bottom only in souls (not in things). Within the mechani cal view of the world (which logic and its appli cation to space and time) that concept reduced to the mathematical formula with which-and this fact which cannot be sufficiently em phasised--nothing ever understood, but rather
defined--deformed.
63
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is a
It is
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is a
it is
.
a
H55
is
it
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if
64
THE WILL T0 rowan.
? 555
The greatest of all fables is the one relating to knowledge. People would like to know how things-in-themselves are constituted: but behold, there are no things-in-themselves! But even
supposing there were an "in-itself," an uncon ditional thing, it could on that very account not be known! Something unconditioned cannot be known: otherwise it would not be unconditioned! Knowing, however, is always a process of "coming into relation with something "; the knowledge seeker, on this principle, wants the thing, which he would know, to be nothing to him, and to be nothingto anybody at all: and from this there results a contradiction,--in the first place, between this will to know, and this desire that the thing to be known should be nothing to him (wherefore know at all then? ); and secondly, because something which is nothing to anybody, does not even exist, and therefore cannot be known. Knowing means:
" to place one's self in relation with something," to feel one's self conditioned by something and one's self conditioning it--under all circumstances, then, it is a process of making stable or fixed, of defining, of making conditions conscious (not a process of sounding things, creatures, or objects "in-them selves
555
A " thing-in-itself " just as absurd as " sense in-itself," " meaning-in-itself. " There no such
? ? ? "). a
is a
is
g to how old, vcn an not be i ! lg
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w n,
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
thing as a "fact-in-itself," for a meaning must always be given to it before it can become a fact.
The answer to the question, "What is that? " is a process of fixing a meaning from a different standpoint. The "essence," the "essential factor," is something which is only seen as a whole in perspective, and which presupposes a basis which is multifarious. Fundamentally the question is " What is that for me? " (for us, for everything that lives, etc. etc. ).
A thing would be defined when all creatures had ' asked and answered this question, " What is that P "
concerning it.
Supposing that one single creature, - with its own relations and standpoint in regard to all things, were lacking, that thing would still
remain undefined.
In short: the essence of a thing is really only
An opinion concerning that "thing. " Or, better still; " it is worth" is actually what is meant by " it is," or by "that is. "
One may not ask : " Who interprets, then? " for the act of interpreting itself, as a form of the Will to Power, manifests itself (not as " Being," but as a process, as Becoming) as a passion.
The origin of "things" is wholly the work of the idealising, thinking, willing, and feeling subject. The concept " thing " as well as all its attributes. -- Even " the subject" is a creation of this order, a " thing " like all others: a simplification, aiming at a definition of the power that fixes, invents, and thinks, as such, as distinct from all isolated fixing, inventing, and thinking. Thus a capacity defined or distinct from all other individual capacities: at
VOL. 11. E
65
? ? ? ? ? 66 THE WILL T0 POWER.
bottom action conceived collectively in regard to all the action which has yet to come (action and the probability of similar action).
557
The qualities of a thing are its effects upon other " things. "
If one imagines other " things " to be non existent, a thing has no qualities.
That is to say: there is nothing without other things.
That is to say: there is no " thing-in-itself. "
553
The thing-in-itself is nonsense. If I think all the "relations," all the "qualities," all the " activi ties " of a thing, away, the thing itself does not remain: for " thingness " was only inventedfanci
fully by us to meet certain logical needs--that is to say, for the purposes of definition and compre hension (in order to correlate that multitude of relations, qualities, and activities).
\
"Things which have a nature in themselves " --a dogmatic idea, which must be absolutely abandoned.
560.
That things should have a nature in themselves, quite apart from interpretation and subjectivity, is a perfectly idle hypothesis: it would presuppose
? 559
? ? ? i to and
her )Il 2er
that interpretation and the act of being subjective are not essential, that a thing divorced from all its relations can still be a thing.
Or, the other way round: the apparent objective character of things; might it not be merely the result of a diference of degree within the subject perceiving P--could not that which changes slowly strike us as being " objective," lasting, Being, " in itself"? --could not the objective view be only a false way of conceiving things and a contrast within the perceiving subject?
56 I.
If all unity "were only unity as organisation. But the " thing in which we believe was invented only as a substratum to the various attributes. If the thing "acts," it means: we regard all the other qualities which are to hand, and which are momentarily latent, as the cause accounting for the fact that one individual quality steps forward--that is to say, we take the sum of its qualities--x-- as the cause of the quality x; which is obviously quite absurd and imbecile!
All unity is only so in the form of organisation and collective action: in the same way as a human community is a unity--that is to say, the reverse of atomic anarch ; thus it is a body politic, which stands for one, yet is not one.
562.
" At some time in the development of thought, a point must have been reached when man became conscious of the fact that what he called
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
67
? ? ? ? 68 THE WILL TO POWER.
the qualities of a thing were merely the sensations of the feeling subject: and thus the qualities ceased from belonging to the thing. " The " thing in-itself" remained over. The distinction between the thing-in-itself and the thing-for-us, is based
that older and artless observation which would fain grant energy to things: but analysis revealed that even force was only ascribed to them by our fancy, as was also--substance. " The thing affects a subject ? " Thus the root of the idea of substance is in language, not in things outside our selves! The thing-in-itself is not a problem at all!
Being will have to be conceived as a sensation which is no longer based upon anything quite devoid of sensation.
In movement no new meaning is given to feel ing. That which cannot be the substance of movement: therefore fOrm of Being.
MR--The explanation of life may be sought, in the first place, through mental images of phenomena which precede (purposes);
Secondly, through mental images of pheno mena which follow behind (the mathe matico-physical explanation).
The two should not be confounded. Thus: the physical explanation, which the symbolisation of the world by means Of feeling and thought, cannot in itself make feeling and thinking originate again and show its derivation physics must rather construct the world of feeling, consistently without
feeling or purpose--right up to the highest man. And teleology only history of purposes, and never physical.
upon
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is, a
is
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it
it
"ons
ties
ng :en ;ed
ich sis :m
13' of
I!
563
Our method of acquiring "knowledge " limited to a process of establishing quantities but we can by no means help feeling the differences of quantity as differences of quality. Quality merely
relative truth for us; not " thing-in-itself. " Our senses have certain definite quantum as
mean, within the limits of which they perform their functions--that to say, we become conscious of bigness and smallness in accordance with the con ditions of our existence. If we sharpened or blunted our senses tenfold, we should perish--that to say, we feel even proportions as qualities in regard to
our possibilities of existence.
564
But could not all quantities be merely tokens of qualities? Another consciousness and scale of desires must correspond to greater power--in fact, another point of view; growth in itself the ex pression of desire to become more; the desire for
greater quantum springs from certain guale; in purely quantitative world, everything would be dead, stiff, and motionless. ---The reduction of all
qualities to quantities nonsense: discovered that they can only stand together, an analogy
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
69
? ? v565
are our insurmountable barriers; we
Qualities
cannot possibly help feeling mere ""
quantity as something firnd=m=-'-" -'--\L:L__
of
diferences '
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4
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70
THE WILL TO POWER.
can no longer reduce to terms of quantity. But everything in regard to which the word "know ledge " has any sense at all, belongs to the realm of reckoning, weighing, and measuring, to quantity: whereas, conversely, all our valuations (that is to say, our sensations) belong precisely to the realm of qualities, i. e. to those truths which belong to us alone and to our point of view, and which absolutely cannot be " known. " It is obvious that
? one of us, different creatures, must different qualities, and must therefore live in a different world from the rest. Qualities are an idiosyncrasy proper to human nature; the demand that these our human interpretations and values,
should- be general and perhaps real values, belongs to the hereditary madnesses of human pride.
566.
The "real world," in whatever form it has been conceived hitherto--was always the world of ap pearance over again.
567
The world of appearance, i. e. a world regarded in the light of values; ordered, selected according to values--that is to say, in this case, according to
the standpoint of utility in regard to the preserva tion and the increase of power of a certain species of animals.
It is the point of view, then, which accounts for the character of " appearance. " As if a world could remain over, when the point of view is cancelled! a" such means relativity would also be cancelled !
every
feel
? ? ? But Ilm
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
Every centre of energy has its point of view of the whole of the remainder of the world--that is to say, its perfectly definite valuation, its mode of action, its mode of resistance. The " world of ap pearance" is thus reduced to a specific kind of action on the world proceeding from a centre.
But there is no other kind of action: and the "world " is only a word for the collective play Of these actions. Reality consists precisely in this
particular action and reaction of every isolated factor against the whole.
There no longer remains a shadow of a right to speak here of " appearance. " . .
The specific way of reacting is the only way of reacting; we do not know how many kinds and what sort of kinds there are.
But there is no "other," no " real," no essential being,--for thus a world without action and re action would be expressed. . . .
The antithesis: world of appearance and real world, is thus reduced to the antitheses " world " and " nonentity. "
568.
A criticism of the concept "real and apparent world. "----Of these two the first is a mere fiction, formed out Of a host of imaginary things.
" Appearance " itself belongs to reality: it is a form of its being; i. e. in a world where there is no such thing as being, a certain calculable world of identical cases must first be created through appear
71
? ? --
' ' L aL-Abnaaiaa. a. . . -'| --m--- A'
? ? 72 THE WILL TO POWER.
" Appearance " is an adjusted and simplified world, in which our practical instincts have worked: for us it is perfectly true: for we live in we can live in it: this the proof of its truth as far as we are concerned. . .
The world, apart from the fact that we have to live in it--the world, which we have not adjusted to our being, our logic, and our psychological preju dices--does not exist as world " in-itself essentially a world of relations: under certain cir cumstances has diferent aspect from every differ ent point at which seen: presses against every point, and every point resists it~--and these collective relations are in every case incongruent.
The measure of power determines what being possesses the other measure of power: under what form, force, or constraint, acts or resists.
Our particular case interesting enough: we have created conception in order to be able to live in a world, in order to perceive just enough to enable us to endure life in that world. .
569
The nature of our psychological vision deter mined by the fact--
(1) That communication necessary, and that for communication to be possible something must be stable, simplified, and capable of being stated pre cisely (above all, in the so-called identical case). In order that may be communicable, must be felt as
something adjusted, as "recognisable. " The material L"'4:n~ rp
? ? ? ? '
it
it
is it
it
is
.
it,
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.
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it is
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
73
? duced to coarse leading features, made similar to other things, and classified with its like. Thus: the indefiniteness and the chaos of sense-impres sions are, as were, made logical.
(2) The phenomenal world the adjusted world Which we believe to be real. Its "reality" lies in the constant return of similar, familiar, and related things, in their rationalised character, and in the be lief that we are here able to reckon and determine.
(3) The opposite of this phenomenal world not " the real world," but the amorphous and un adjustable world consisting of the chaos of sensa tions--that to say, another kind of phenomenal world, world which to us " unknowable. "
(4) The question how "things-in-themselves" are constituted, quite apart from our sense--receptivity and from the activity of our understanding, must be answered by the further question: how were we able to know that things existed? " Thingness "
one of our own inventions. The question whether there are not good many more ways of creating such world of appearance--and whether this creating, rationalising, adjusting, and falsifying be not the best-guaranteed reality itself: in short, whether that which "fixes the meaning of things "
not the only reality: and whether the "effect of environment upon us " be not merely the result of such will-exercising subjects. . . The other "creatures" act upon us; our adjusted world of
? an arrangement and an overpowering of its activities: sort of defensive measure. The ~--l"--I n/nrll; demonstrable; the hypothesis might
appearance
? ? .
is is
isis a is a
it
a
is
is
. ~. . ,-. 1~ v
a
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? THE WILL TO POWER.
"object" is only a form of action of subject upon subject . . . a modus cyf the subject.
(12) THE METAPHYSICAL NEED.
570.
If one resembles all the philosophers that have gonebefore, one can have no eyes for what has existed and what will exist--one sees only what is. But as there is no such thing as Being; all that the philosophers had to deal with was a host of fancies, this was their " world. "
571.
To assert the existence as a whole of things con cerning which we know nothing, simply because there is an advantage in not being able to know anything of them, was a piece of artlessness on Kant's part, and the result of the recoil-stroke of certain needs--especially in the realm of morals and metaphysics.
57 2'
An artist cannot endure reality; he turns away or back from it: his earnest opinion is that the worth of a thing consists in that nebulous residue of it which one derives from colour, form, sound, - and thought; he believes that the more subtle, at
tenuated, and volatile, a thing or a man becomes, the more valuable he becomes: the less real, the greater the worth. This is Platonism: but Plato was guilty of yet further audacity in the matter of
74'
? ? ? ? THE WILL 'ro POWER IN SCIENCE.
75
turning tables--he measured the degree of reality according to the degree of value, and said: The more there is of " idea " the more there is of Being. He twisted the concept " reality" round and said: "What ye regard as real is an error, and the nearer we get to the ,idea' the nearer we are to ,truth. ' "-- Is this understood? It was the greatest of all re christenings: and because Christianity adopted
we are blind to its astounding features. At bottom, Plato, like the artist he was, placed appearance before Being! and therefore lies and fiction before truth! unreality before actuality ! --He was, however, so convinced of the value of appearance, that he granted the attributes of " Being," " causality," "goodness," and " truth," and, in short, all those things which are associated with value.
The concept value itself regarded as cause: first standpoint.
The ideal granted all attributes, conferring honour: second standpoint.
573
The idea of the "true world" or of " God" as
? an measure to the extent to which the
absolutely spiritual, intellectuahand good,
emergency
antagonistic instincts are all-powerful. . .
and existing humanity reflected in the humanisation of the gods. The Greeks of the strongest period, who entertained no
fear whatever of themselves, but on the contrary were pleased with themselves, brought down their gods to all their emotions.
Moderation exactly
? ? . is
a
is
it
it,
? 76
THE WILL TO POWER.
The spiritualisation of the idea of God is thus very far from being a sign of progress: one is heartily conscious of this when one reads Goethe --in his works the vaporisation of God into virtue and spirit is felt as being upon a lower plane.
574
The nonsense of all metaphysics shown to reside in the derivation of the conditioned out of the unconditioned.
It belongs to the nature of thinking that it adds the unconditioned to the conditioned, that it invents it--just as it thought of and invented the "ego " to cover the multifariousness of its processes : it meas ures the world according to a host ,of self-devised measurements -- according to its fundamental fictions " the unconditioned," "end and means," "things," "substances," and according to logical laws, figures, and forms.
Is the design the cause of pheno menon Or that also illusion? Is not the phenomenon itself?
551
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
every phenomenon an action,--formerly inten tions were seen behind all phenomena, this our oldest habit. Has the. animal also this habit? I As living organism, not also compelled to interpret things through itself. The question
" why " always question concerning the causafinalis, and the general " purpose " of things. We have no sign of the "sense of the 6ffiCl? Ilt cause in this respect Hume quite right, habit (but not only that of the individual) allows us to expect that certain process, frequently observed, will follow upon another, but nothing more! That which gives us such an extraordinarily firm faith in
causality, not the rough habit of observing the sequence of processes; but our inahility to interpret a phenomenon otherwise than as the result of de sign. It the belief in living and thinking things,
as the only agents of causation; the belief in will, in design--the belief that all phenomena are actions, and that all actions presuppose an agent; the belief in the "subject. " Is not this belief in the concepts subject and object an
arrant absurdity?
? criticism of the concept "cause. '-'--We have absolutely no experience concerning cause; viewed psychologically we derive the whole concept from the subjective conviction, that we ourselves are
causes--that to say, that the arm moves. . . But
'
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? 56
THE WILL TO POWER.
that is an error. We distinguish ourselves, the agents, from the action, and everywhere we make use of this scheme--we try to discover an agent behind every phenomenon. What have we done ? We have misunderstood a feeling of power, tension, resistance, a muscular feeling, which is already the beginning of the action, and posited it as a cause; or we have understood the will to do this or that,
as a cause, because the action follows it. There is no such thing as "Cause," in those few cases in which it seemed to be given, and in which we pro
jected it out of ourselves in order to understand a phenomenon, it has been shown to be an illusion. Our understanding of a phenomenon consisted in
our inventing a subject who was responsible for something happening, and for the manner in which it happened. In our concept " cause " we have em braced our feeling of will, our feeling of " freedom,"
our feeling of responsibility and our design to do an action: causa efliciens and causa finalis are fundamentally one. - '
We believed that an effect was explained when we could point to a state in which it was inherent. As a matter of fact, we invent all causes according to the scheme of the effect: the latter is known to us. . . . On the other hand, we are not in a position to say of any particular thing how it will "act. " The thing, the subject the will, the design--all
inherent in the conception "cause. " We try to discover things in order to explain why something has changed. Even the "atom" is one of these
fanciful inventions like the "thing" and the
? " primitive subject. " . . .
'
? ? ? THE WILL 'ro POWER IN SCIENCE.
57
At last we understand that things--consequently also atoms--effect nothing: because they are non existent; and that the concept causality quite useless. Out of necessary sequence of states, the latter's causal relationship does not follow (that would be equivalent to extending their active
principle from to 2, to to 4, to 5). There
no such thing as a cause or an effect. From the standpoint of language we do not know how to
rid ourselves of them. But that does not matter. If imagine muscle separated from its "effects,"
have denied it.
In short: a phenomenon neither effected nor
capable of mf'ecting. Causa a faculty to effect
something, superadded fancifully to what hap
pens.
The interpretation of causality is an illusion.
A "thing" the sum of its effects, synthetically united by means of concept, an image. As matter of fact, science has robbed the concept caus ality of all meaning, and has reserved merely as an allegorical formula, which has made matter of indifference whether cause or effect be put on this side or on that. It asserted that in two complex states (centres of force) the quantities of energy remain constant.
The calmlability of a phenomenon does not lie in the fact that rule observed, or that neces sity obeyed, or that we have projected law of causality into every phenomenon: lies in the recurrence of " identical cases. "
There no such thing as sense of causality, as Kant would have us believe. We are aghast,
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. . .
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it
it it a
,
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a
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is
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3,
58
THE WILL TO POWER.
we feel insecure, we will have something familiar, which can be relied upon. . . . As soon as we are shown the existence of something old in a new thing, we are pacified. The so-called instinct of causality is nothing more than the fear of the unfamiliar, and the attempt at finding something in it which is already known--It is not a search for causes, but for the familiar.
552
To combat determinism and teleology--From
the fact that something happens regularly, and that its occurrence may be reckoned upon, it does not follow that it happens necessarily. If a quantity of force determines and conducts itself in a certain way in every particular case, it does not prove that it has " no free will. " " Mechanical necessity " is not an established fact: it was we who first read it into the nature of all phenomena. We interpreted the possibility of formularising pheno mena as a result of the dominion of necessary law over all existence. But it does not follow, because I do a determined thing, that I am bound to do it. - Compulsion cannot be demonstrated in things: all that the rule proves is this, that one and the same phenomenon is not another phenomenon. Owing to the very fact that we fancied the ex istence of subjects "agents" in things, the notion arose that all phenomena are the consequence of a compulsory force exercised over the subject--exer cised by whom? once more by an "agent. " The concept "Cause and Effect" is a dangerous one,
? ? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
so long as people believe in something that causes, '
and something (a) Necessity
interpretation.
that caused.
not an established fact, but an
(b) When
nothing that acts, but only thing of fancy,
understood that the "subject"
there much that follows.
Only with the subject as model we invented
thingness and read into the pell-mell of sensa tions. If we cease from believing in the acting subject, the belief in acting. things, in reciprocal action, in cause and effect between phenomena which we call things, also falls to pieces.
In this case the world of acting atoms also dis
59
? ? for this world always assumed to exist on the pre-determined grounds that subjects are necessary. ,
Ultimately, of course, " the thing-in-itself" also
appears:
for'at bottom the conception of "subject-in-itself. " But we have seen that the subject an imaginary thing. The antithesis
"thing-in-itself" and "appearance" untenable; but in this way the concept " appearance " also disappears.
(c) If we abandon the idea of the acting subject, we also abandon the object acted upon. Duration, equality to self, Being, are inherent neither in what called subject, nor in what called object: they are complex phenomena, and in regard to other phenomena are apparently durable--they are
. disappears:
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is is
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is
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. v. "a" r
>|<
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is
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60 THE WILL TO POWER.
distinguishable, for instance, by the different tempo
with which they happen (repose--movement, fixed --loose: all'antitheses which do not exist in them selves and by means of which difi'erences of degree only are expressed; from a certain limited point of view, though, they seem to be antitheses. There are no such things as antitheses; it is from logic that we derive our concept of contrasts--and starting out from its standpoint we spread the error over all things).
" (d) If we abandon the ideas "subject" and object "; then we must also abandon the idea
"substance"--and therefore its various modifications too; for instance: "matter," "spirit," and other hypothetical things, "eternity and the immuta bility of matter," etc. We are then rid of materi ality.
? ? From moral standpoint the world
But inasmuch as morality itself part of this world, morality also false. The will to truth
process of establishing things; process of making things true and lasting, total elimination of that false character, transvaluation of into being-:2" Thus," truth " not something which present and which has to be found and discovered
something which has to be created and which gives its name to a process, or, better still, to the n
Will to overpower, which in itself has no purpose to introduce truth frocessus in infinitum, an active determining--it not process of be
false.
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free )int
ere vic nd be
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE. 61
coming conscious of something, which in itself fixed and determined. It merely a word for " The Will to Power. "
Life based on the hypothesis of belief in stable and regularly recurring things the mightier
the more vast must be the world of know ledge and the world called being. Logicising, rationalising, and systematising are of assistance as means of existence.
Man projects his instinct of truth, his "aim," to certain extent beyond himself, in the form of
metaphysical world of Being, "thing-in-itself," world already to hand. His requirements as creator make him invent the world in which he
works in advance; he anticipates it: this anticipa tion (this faith in truth) his mainstay.
All phenomena, movement, Becoming, regarded as the establishment of relations of degree and of force, as contest.
As soon as we fancy that some one responsible for the fact that we are thus and thus, etc. (God,
WV
-v
? and that we ascribe our existence, our happiness, our misery, our destiny, to that some one, we corrupt the innocence of Becoming for ourselves. We then have some one who wishes to attain to something by means of us and with us.
The " welfare of the individual " just as fanci ful as the "welfare of the species": the first not sacrificed to the last; seen from afar, the species
Nature), a,
? ? is
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_.
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a
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is ; is
aa
it is,
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62 THE err. TO POWER.
is just as fluid as the individual. " The preserva tion of the species " is only a result of the growth of the species--that is to say, of the overcoming of the species on the road to a stronger kind.
*
Theses :--The apparent conformity of means to end ("the conformity of means to end which far surpasses the art of man ") is merely the result of that " Will to Power " which manifests itself in all phenomena :--T0 become stronger involves a pro cess of ordering, which may well be mistaken for an attempted conformity of means to end :--The ends which are apparent are not intended; but, as soon as a superior power prevails over an inferior power, and the latter proceeds to work as a function of the former, an order of rank is established, an organisation which must give rise to the idea that there is an arrangement of means and ends.
Against apparent " necessity " :--
This is only an expression for the fact that a certain power is not also something else.
Against the apparent " conformity of means to ends " :--
The latter is only an expression for the order among the spheres of power and their interplay.
(2) THE THING-IN-ITSELF AND APPEARANCE.
553
The foul blemish on Kant's criticism has at last become visible even to the coarsest eyes: Kant
? ? ? ? servo rowth
reef
IS to 1 far t of I all
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
had no right to his distinction "appearance" and " thing-in-itself"---in his own writings he had deprived himself of the right of differentiating any longer in this old and hackneyed manner, seeing that he had condemned the practice of drawing any conclusions concerning the cause of an appear ance from the appearance itself, as unallowable-- in accordance with his conception of the idea of causality and its purely intraphenomenal validity: and this conception, on the other' hand, already anticipates that diferentiation, as the " thing-in itself were not only inferred but actually given.
554
obvious that neither things-in-themselves nor appearances can be related to each other in the form of cause and effect: and from this follows that the concept " cause and effect " not applicable in philosophy which believes in things in-themselves and in appearances. Kant's mis take-- . As a matter of fact, from psycho " logical standpoint, the concept " cause and effect
derived from an attitude of mind which believes
sees the action of will upon will everywhere,-- which believes only in living things, and at bottom only in souls (not in things). Within the mechani cal view of the world (which logic and its appli cation to space and time) that concept reduced to the mathematical formula with which-and this fact which cannot be sufficiently em phasised--nothing ever understood, but rather
defined--deformed.
63
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it is
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a
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if
64
THE WILL T0 rowan.
? 555
The greatest of all fables is the one relating to knowledge. People would like to know how things-in-themselves are constituted: but behold, there are no things-in-themselves! But even
supposing there were an "in-itself," an uncon ditional thing, it could on that very account not be known! Something unconditioned cannot be known: otherwise it would not be unconditioned! Knowing, however, is always a process of "coming into relation with something "; the knowledge seeker, on this principle, wants the thing, which he would know, to be nothing to him, and to be nothingto anybody at all: and from this there results a contradiction,--in the first place, between this will to know, and this desire that the thing to be known should be nothing to him (wherefore know at all then? ); and secondly, because something which is nothing to anybody, does not even exist, and therefore cannot be known. Knowing means:
" to place one's self in relation with something," to feel one's self conditioned by something and one's self conditioning it--under all circumstances, then, it is a process of making stable or fixed, of defining, of making conditions conscious (not a process of sounding things, creatures, or objects "in-them selves
555
A " thing-in-itself " just as absurd as " sense in-itself," " meaning-in-itself. " There no such
? ? ? "). a
is a
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g to how old, vcn an not be i ! lg
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THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
thing as a "fact-in-itself," for a meaning must always be given to it before it can become a fact.
The answer to the question, "What is that? " is a process of fixing a meaning from a different standpoint. The "essence," the "essential factor," is something which is only seen as a whole in perspective, and which presupposes a basis which is multifarious. Fundamentally the question is " What is that for me? " (for us, for everything that lives, etc. etc. ).
A thing would be defined when all creatures had ' asked and answered this question, " What is that P "
concerning it.
Supposing that one single creature, - with its own relations and standpoint in regard to all things, were lacking, that thing would still
remain undefined.
In short: the essence of a thing is really only
An opinion concerning that "thing. " Or, better still; " it is worth" is actually what is meant by " it is," or by "that is. "
One may not ask : " Who interprets, then? " for the act of interpreting itself, as a form of the Will to Power, manifests itself (not as " Being," but as a process, as Becoming) as a passion.
The origin of "things" is wholly the work of the idealising, thinking, willing, and feeling subject. The concept " thing " as well as all its attributes. -- Even " the subject" is a creation of this order, a " thing " like all others: a simplification, aiming at a definition of the power that fixes, invents, and thinks, as such, as distinct from all isolated fixing, inventing, and thinking. Thus a capacity defined or distinct from all other individual capacities: at
VOL. 11. E
65
? ? ? ? ? 66 THE WILL T0 POWER.
bottom action conceived collectively in regard to all the action which has yet to come (action and the probability of similar action).
557
The qualities of a thing are its effects upon other " things. "
If one imagines other " things " to be non existent, a thing has no qualities.
That is to say: there is nothing without other things.
That is to say: there is no " thing-in-itself. "
553
The thing-in-itself is nonsense. If I think all the "relations," all the "qualities," all the " activi ties " of a thing, away, the thing itself does not remain: for " thingness " was only inventedfanci
fully by us to meet certain logical needs--that is to say, for the purposes of definition and compre hension (in order to correlate that multitude of relations, qualities, and activities).
\
"Things which have a nature in themselves " --a dogmatic idea, which must be absolutely abandoned.
560.
That things should have a nature in themselves, quite apart from interpretation and subjectivity, is a perfectly idle hypothesis: it would presuppose
? 559
? ? ? i to and
her )Il 2er
that interpretation and the act of being subjective are not essential, that a thing divorced from all its relations can still be a thing.
Or, the other way round: the apparent objective character of things; might it not be merely the result of a diference of degree within the subject perceiving P--could not that which changes slowly strike us as being " objective," lasting, Being, " in itself"? --could not the objective view be only a false way of conceiving things and a contrast within the perceiving subject?
56 I.
If all unity "were only unity as organisation. But the " thing in which we believe was invented only as a substratum to the various attributes. If the thing "acts," it means: we regard all the other qualities which are to hand, and which are momentarily latent, as the cause accounting for the fact that one individual quality steps forward--that is to say, we take the sum of its qualities--x-- as the cause of the quality x; which is obviously quite absurd and imbecile!
All unity is only so in the form of organisation and collective action: in the same way as a human community is a unity--that is to say, the reverse of atomic anarch ; thus it is a body politic, which stands for one, yet is not one.
562.
" At some time in the development of thought, a point must have been reached when man became conscious of the fact that what he called
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
67
? ? ? ? 68 THE WILL TO POWER.
the qualities of a thing were merely the sensations of the feeling subject: and thus the qualities ceased from belonging to the thing. " The " thing in-itself" remained over. The distinction between the thing-in-itself and the thing-for-us, is based
that older and artless observation which would fain grant energy to things: but analysis revealed that even force was only ascribed to them by our fancy, as was also--substance. " The thing affects a subject ? " Thus the root of the idea of substance is in language, not in things outside our selves! The thing-in-itself is not a problem at all!
Being will have to be conceived as a sensation which is no longer based upon anything quite devoid of sensation.
In movement no new meaning is given to feel ing. That which cannot be the substance of movement: therefore fOrm of Being.
MR--The explanation of life may be sought, in the first place, through mental images of phenomena which precede (purposes);
Secondly, through mental images of pheno mena which follow behind (the mathe matico-physical explanation).
The two should not be confounded. Thus: the physical explanation, which the symbolisation of the world by means Of feeling and thought, cannot in itself make feeling and thinking originate again and show its derivation physics must rather construct the world of feeling, consistently without
feeling or purpose--right up to the highest man. And teleology only history of purposes, and never physical.
upon
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ties
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ich sis :m
13' of
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563
Our method of acquiring "knowledge " limited to a process of establishing quantities but we can by no means help feeling the differences of quantity as differences of quality. Quality merely
relative truth for us; not " thing-in-itself. " Our senses have certain definite quantum as
mean, within the limits of which they perform their functions--that to say, we become conscious of bigness and smallness in accordance with the con ditions of our existence. If we sharpened or blunted our senses tenfold, we should perish--that to say, we feel even proportions as qualities in regard to
our possibilities of existence.
564
But could not all quantities be merely tokens of qualities? Another consciousness and scale of desires must correspond to greater power--in fact, another point of view; growth in itself the ex pression of desire to become more; the desire for
greater quantum springs from certain guale; in purely quantitative world, everything would be dead, stiff, and motionless. ---The reduction of all
qualities to quantities nonsense: discovered that they can only stand together, an analogy
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
69
? ? v565
are our insurmountable barriers; we
Qualities
cannot possibly help feeling mere ""
quantity as something firnd=m=-'-" -'--\L:L__
of
diferences '
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70
THE WILL TO POWER.
can no longer reduce to terms of quantity. But everything in regard to which the word "know ledge " has any sense at all, belongs to the realm of reckoning, weighing, and measuring, to quantity: whereas, conversely, all our valuations (that is to say, our sensations) belong precisely to the realm of qualities, i. e. to those truths which belong to us alone and to our point of view, and which absolutely cannot be " known. " It is obvious that
? one of us, different creatures, must different qualities, and must therefore live in a different world from the rest. Qualities are an idiosyncrasy proper to human nature; the demand that these our human interpretations and values,
should- be general and perhaps real values, belongs to the hereditary madnesses of human pride.
566.
The "real world," in whatever form it has been conceived hitherto--was always the world of ap pearance over again.
567
The world of appearance, i. e. a world regarded in the light of values; ordered, selected according to values--that is to say, in this case, according to
the standpoint of utility in regard to the preserva tion and the increase of power of a certain species of animals.
It is the point of view, then, which accounts for the character of " appearance. " As if a world could remain over, when the point of view is cancelled! a" such means relativity would also be cancelled !
every
feel
? ? ? But Ilm
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
Every centre of energy has its point of view of the whole of the remainder of the world--that is to say, its perfectly definite valuation, its mode of action, its mode of resistance. The " world of ap pearance" is thus reduced to a specific kind of action on the world proceeding from a centre.
But there is no other kind of action: and the "world " is only a word for the collective play Of these actions. Reality consists precisely in this
particular action and reaction of every isolated factor against the whole.
There no longer remains a shadow of a right to speak here of " appearance. " . .
The specific way of reacting is the only way of reacting; we do not know how many kinds and what sort of kinds there are.
But there is no "other," no " real," no essential being,--for thus a world without action and re action would be expressed. . . .
The antithesis: world of appearance and real world, is thus reduced to the antitheses " world " and " nonentity. "
568.
A criticism of the concept "real and apparent world. "----Of these two the first is a mere fiction, formed out Of a host of imaginary things.
" Appearance " itself belongs to reality: it is a form of its being; i. e. in a world where there is no such thing as being, a certain calculable world of identical cases must first be created through appear
71
? ? --
' ' L aL-Abnaaiaa. a. . . -'| --m--- A'
? ? 72 THE WILL TO POWER.
" Appearance " is an adjusted and simplified world, in which our practical instincts have worked: for us it is perfectly true: for we live in we can live in it: this the proof of its truth as far as we are concerned. . .
The world, apart from the fact that we have to live in it--the world, which we have not adjusted to our being, our logic, and our psychological preju dices--does not exist as world " in-itself essentially a world of relations: under certain cir cumstances has diferent aspect from every differ ent point at which seen: presses against every point, and every point resists it~--and these collective relations are in every case incongruent.
The measure of power determines what being possesses the other measure of power: under what form, force, or constraint, acts or resists.
Our particular case interesting enough: we have created conception in order to be able to live in a world, in order to perceive just enough to enable us to endure life in that world. .
569
The nature of our psychological vision deter mined by the fact--
(1) That communication necessary, and that for communication to be possible something must be stable, simplified, and capable of being stated pre cisely (above all, in the so-called identical case). In order that may be communicable, must be felt as
something adjusted, as "recognisable. " The material L"'4:n~ rp
? ? ? ? '
it
it
is it
it
is
.
it,
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it is
THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
73
? duced to coarse leading features, made similar to other things, and classified with its like. Thus: the indefiniteness and the chaos of sense-impres sions are, as were, made logical.
(2) The phenomenal world the adjusted world Which we believe to be real. Its "reality" lies in the constant return of similar, familiar, and related things, in their rationalised character, and in the be lief that we are here able to reckon and determine.
(3) The opposite of this phenomenal world not " the real world," but the amorphous and un adjustable world consisting of the chaos of sensa tions--that to say, another kind of phenomenal world, world which to us " unknowable. "
(4) The question how "things-in-themselves" are constituted, quite apart from our sense--receptivity and from the activity of our understanding, must be answered by the further question: how were we able to know that things existed? " Thingness "
one of our own inventions. The question whether there are not good many more ways of creating such world of appearance--and whether this creating, rationalising, adjusting, and falsifying be not the best-guaranteed reality itself: in short, whether that which "fixes the meaning of things "
not the only reality: and whether the "effect of environment upon us " be not merely the result of such will-exercising subjects. . . The other "creatures" act upon us; our adjusted world of
? an arrangement and an overpowering of its activities: sort of defensive measure. The ~--l"--I n/nrll; demonstrable; the hypothesis might
appearance
? ? .
is is
isis a is a
it
a
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is
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? THE WILL TO POWER.
"object" is only a form of action of subject upon subject . . . a modus cyf the subject.
(12) THE METAPHYSICAL NEED.
570.
If one resembles all the philosophers that have gonebefore, one can have no eyes for what has existed and what will exist--one sees only what is. But as there is no such thing as Being; all that the philosophers had to deal with was a host of fancies, this was their " world. "
571.
To assert the existence as a whole of things con cerning which we know nothing, simply because there is an advantage in not being able to know anything of them, was a piece of artlessness on Kant's part, and the result of the recoil-stroke of certain needs--especially in the realm of morals and metaphysics.
57 2'
An artist cannot endure reality; he turns away or back from it: his earnest opinion is that the worth of a thing consists in that nebulous residue of it which one derives from colour, form, sound, - and thought; he believes that the more subtle, at
tenuated, and volatile, a thing or a man becomes, the more valuable he becomes: the less real, the greater the worth. This is Platonism: but Plato was guilty of yet further audacity in the matter of
74'
? ? ? ? THE WILL 'ro POWER IN SCIENCE.
75
turning tables--he measured the degree of reality according to the degree of value, and said: The more there is of " idea " the more there is of Being. He twisted the concept " reality" round and said: "What ye regard as real is an error, and the nearer we get to the ,idea' the nearer we are to ,truth. ' "-- Is this understood? It was the greatest of all re christenings: and because Christianity adopted
we are blind to its astounding features. At bottom, Plato, like the artist he was, placed appearance before Being! and therefore lies and fiction before truth! unreality before actuality ! --He was, however, so convinced of the value of appearance, that he granted the attributes of " Being," " causality," "goodness," and " truth," and, in short, all those things which are associated with value.
The concept value itself regarded as cause: first standpoint.
The ideal granted all attributes, conferring honour: second standpoint.
573
The idea of the "true world" or of " God" as
? an measure to the extent to which the
absolutely spiritual, intellectuahand good,
emergency
antagonistic instincts are all-powerful. . .
and existing humanity reflected in the humanisation of the gods. The Greeks of the strongest period, who entertained no
fear whatever of themselves, but on the contrary were pleased with themselves, brought down their gods to all their emotions.
Moderation exactly
? ? . is
a
is
it
it,
? 76
THE WILL TO POWER.
The spiritualisation of the idea of God is thus very far from being a sign of progress: one is heartily conscious of this when one reads Goethe --in his works the vaporisation of God into virtue and spirit is felt as being upon a lower plane.
574
The nonsense of all metaphysics shown to reside in the derivation of the conditioned out of the unconditioned.
It belongs to the nature of thinking that it adds the unconditioned to the conditioned, that it invents it--just as it thought of and invented the "ego " to cover the multifariousness of its processes : it meas ures the world according to a host ,of self-devised measurements -- according to its fundamental fictions " the unconditioned," "end and means," "things," "substances," and according to logical laws, figures, and forms.
