Therefore
all men do
not desire peace.
not desire peace.
Summa Theologica
.
manifest Myself to him.
" Secondly, the
comparison may be understood to be between the love of God alone on the
one side, and the love of one's neighbor for God's sake, on the other.
In this way love of our neighbor includes love of God, while love of
God does not include love of our neighbor. Hence the comparison will be
between perfect love of God, extending also to our neighbor, and
inadequate and imperfect love of God, for "this commandment we have
from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother" (1 Jn. 4:21).
Reply to Objection 1: According to one gloss, the Apostle did not
desire this, viz. to be severed from Christ for his brethren, when he
was in a state of grace, but had formerly desired it when he was in a
state of unbelief, so that we should not imitate him in this respect.
We may also reply, with Chrysostom (De Compunct. i, 8) [*Hom. xvi in
Ep. ad Rom. ] that this does not prove the Apostle to have loved his
neighbor more than God, but that he loved God more than himself. For he
wished to be deprived for a time of the Divine fruition which pertains
to love of one self, in order that God might be honored in his
neighbor, which pertains to the love of God.
Reply to Objection 2: A man's love for his friends is sometimes less
meritorious in so far as he loves them for their sake, so as to fall
short of the true reason for the friendship of charity, which is God.
Hence that God be loved for His own sake does not diminish the merit,
but is the entire reason for merit.
Reply to Objection 3: The "good" has, more than the "difficult," to do
with the reason of merit and virtue. Therefore it does not follow that
whatever is more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is more
difficult, and at the same time better.
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OF JOY (FOUR ARTICLES)
WE must now consider the effects which result from the principal act of
charity which is love, and (1) the interior effects, (2) the exterior
effects. As to the first, three things have to be considered: (1) Joy,
(2) Peace, (3) Mercy.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether joy is an effect of charity?
(2) Whether this kind of joy is compatible with sorrow?
(3) Whether this joy can be full?
(4) Whether it is a virtue?
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Whether joy is effected in us by charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that joy is not effected in us by charity.
For the absence of what we love causes sorrow rather than joy. But God,
Whom we love by charity, is absent from us, so long as we are in this
state of life, since "while we are in the body, we are absent from the
Lord" (2 Cor. 5:6). Therefore charity causes sorrow in us rather than
joy.
Objection 2: Further, it is chiefly through charity that we merit
happiness. Now mourning, which pertains to sorrow, is reckoned among
those things whereby we merit happiness, according to Mat. 5:5:
"Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted. " Therefore
sorrow, rather than joy, is an effect of charity.
Objection 3: Further, charity is a virtue distinct from hope, as shown
above ([2580]Q[17], A[6]). Now joy is the effect of hope, according to
Rom. 12:12: "Rejoicing in hope. " Therefore it is not the effect of
charity.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God is
poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us. " But
joy is caused in us by the Holy Ghost according to Rom. 14:17: "The
kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace, and joy in
the Holy Ghost. " Therefore charity is a cause of joy.
I answer that, As stated above ([2581]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2,3), when we
were treating of the passions, joy and sorrow proceed from love, but in
contrary ways. For joy is caused by love, either through the presence
of the thing loved, or because the proper good of the thing loved
exists and endures in it; and the latter is the case chiefly in the
love of benevolence, whereby a man rejoices in the well-being of his
friend, though he be absent. On the other hand sorrow arises from love,
either through the absence of the thing loved, or because the loved
object to which we wish well, is deprived of its good or afflicted with
some evil. Now charity is love of God, Whose good is unchangeable,
since He is His goodness, and from the very fact that He is loved, He
is in those who love Him by His most excellent effect, according to 1
Jn. 4:16: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him. "
Therefore spiritual joy, which is about God, is caused by charity.
Reply to Objection 1: So long as we are in the body, we are said to be
"absent from the Lord," in comparison with that presence whereby He is
present to some by the vision of "sight"; wherefore the Apostle goes on
to say (2 Cor. 5:6): "For we walk by faith and not by sight. "
Nevertheless, even in this life, He is present to those who love Him,
by the indwelling of His grace.
Reply to Objection 2: The mourning that merits happiness, is about
those things that are contrary to happiness. Wherefore it amounts to
the same that charity causes this mourning, and this spiritual joy
about God, since to rejoice in a certain good amounts to the same as to
grieve for things that are contrary to it.
Reply to Objection 3: There can be spiritual joy about God in two ways.
First, when we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself;
secondly, when we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us. The
former joy is the better, and proceeds from charity chiefly: while the
latter joy proceeds from hope also, whereby we look forward to enjoy
the Divine good, although this enjoyment itself, whether perfect or
imperfect, is obtained according to the measure of one's charity.
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Whether the spiritual joy, which results from charity, is compatible with an
admixture of sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy that results from
charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow. For it belongs to
charity to rejoice in our neighbor's good, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, 6:
"Charity . . . rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the
truth. " But this joy is compatible with an admixture of sorrow,
according to Rom. 12:15: "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with
them that weep. " Therefore the spiritual joy of charity is compatible
with an admixture of sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv),
"penance consists in deploring past sins, and in not committing again
those we have deplored. " But there is no true penance without charity.
Therefore the joy of charity has an admixture of sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, it is through charity that man desires to be with
Christ according to Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and to
be with Christ. " Now this desire gives rise, in man, to a certain
sadness, according to Ps. 119:5: "Woe is me that my sojourning is
prolonged! " Therefore the joy of charity admits of a seasoning of
sorrow.
On the contrary, The joy of charity is joy about the Divine wisdom. Now
such like joy has no admixture of sorrow, according to Wis. 8:16: "Her
conversation hath no bitterness. " Therefore the joy of charity is
incompatible with an admixture of sorrow.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), a twofold joy in God
arises from charity. One, the more excellent, is proper to charity; and
with this joy we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself. This
joy of charity is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow, even as the
good which is its object is incompatible with any admixture of evil:
hence the Apostle says (Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord always. "
The other is the joy of charity whereby we rejoice in the Divine good
as participated by us. This participation can be hindered by anything
contrary to it, wherefore, in this respect, the joy of charity is
compatible with an admixture of sorrow, in so far as a man grieves for
that which hinders the participation of the Divine good, either in us
or in our neighbor, whom we love as ourselves.
Reply to Objection 1: Our neighbor does not weep save on account of
some evil. Now every evil implies lack of participation in the
sovereign good: hence charity makes us weep with our neighbor in so far
as he is hindered from participating in the Divine good.
Reply to Objection 2: Our sins divide between us and God, according to
Is. 59:2; wherefore this is the reason why we grieve for our past sins,
or for those of others, in so far as they hinder us from participating
in the Divine good.
Reply to Objection 3: Although in this unhappy abode we participate,
after a fashion, in the Divine good, by knowledge and love, yet the
unhappiness of this life is an obstacle to a perfect participation in
the Divine good: hence this very sorrow, whereby a man grieves for the
delay of glory, is connected with the hindrance to a participation of
the Divine good.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the spiritual joy which proceeds from charity, can be filled?
Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy which proceeds from
charity cannot be filled. For the more we rejoice in God, the more is
our joy in Him filled. But we can never rejoice in Him as much as it is
meet that we should rejoice in God, since His goodness which is
infinite, surpasses the creature's joy which is finite. Therefore joy
in God can never be filled.
Objection 2: Further, that which is filled cannot be increased. But the
joy, even of the blessed, can be increased, since one's joy is greater
than another's. Therefore joy in God cannot be filled in a creature.
Objection 3: Further, comprehension seems to be nothing else than the
fulness of knowledge. Now, just as the cognitive power of a creature is
finite, so is its appetitive power. Since therefore God cannot be
comprehended by any creature, it seems that no creature's joy in God
can be filled.
On the contrary, Our Lord said to His disciples (Jn. 15:11): "That My
joy may be in you, and your joy may be filled. "
I answer that, Fulness of joy can be understood in two ways; first, on
the part of the thing rejoiced in, so that one rejoice in it as much as
it is meet that one should rejoice in it, and thus God's joy alone in
Himself is filled, because it is infinite; and this is condignly due to
the infinite goodness of God: but the joy of any creature must needs be
finite. Secondly, fulness of joy may be understood on the part of the
one who rejoices. Now joy is compared to desire, as rest to movement,
as stated above ([2582]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2), when we were treating of
the passions: and rest is full when there is no more movement. Hence
joy is full, when there remains nothing to be desired. But as long as
we are in this world, the movement of desire does not cease in us,
because it still remains possible for us to approach nearer to God by
grace, as was shown above (Q[24], AA[4],7). When once, however, perfect
happiness has been attained, nothing will remain to be desired, because
then there will be full enjoyment of God, wherein man will obtain
whatever he had desired, even with regard to other goods, according to
Ps. 102:5: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things. " Hence desire
will be at rest, not only our desire for God, but all our desires: so
that the joy of the blessed is full to perfection---indeed over-full,
since they will obtain more than they were capable of desiring: for
"neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath
prepared for them that love Him" (1 Cor. 2:9). This is what is meant by
the words of Lk. 6:38: "Good measure and pressed down, and shaken
together, and running over shall they give into your bosom. " Yet, since
no creature is capable of the joy condignly due to God, it follows that
this perfectly full joy is not taken into man, but, on the contrary,
man enters into it, according to Mat. 25:21: "Enter into the joy of thy
Lord. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes the fulness of joy in
reference to the thing in which we rejoice.
Reply to Objection 2: When each one attains to happiness he will reach
the term appointed to him by Divine predestination, and nothing further
will remain to which he may tend, although by reaching that term, some
will approach nearer to God than others. Hence each one's joy will be
full with regard to himself, because his desire will be fully set at
rest; yet one's joy will be greater than another's, on account of a
fuller participation of the Divine happiness.
Reply to Objection 3: Comprehension denotes fulness of knowledge in
respect of the thing known, so that it is known as much as it can be.
There is however a fulness of knowledge in respect of the knower, just
as we have said of joy. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:9): "That
you may be filled with the knowledge of His will, in all wisdom and
spiritual understanding. "
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Whether joy is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that joy is a virtue. For vice is contrary
to virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a vice, as in the case of sloth
and envy. Therefore joy also should be accounted a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, as love and hope are passions, the object of
which is "good," so also is joy. Now love and hope are reckoned to be
virtues. Therefore joy also should be reckoned a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue.
But we are commanded to rejoice in the Lord, according to Phil. 4:4:
"Rejoice in the Lord always. " Therefore joy is a virtue.
On the contrary, It is not numbered among the theological virtues, nor
among the moral, nor among the intellectual virtues, as is evident from
what has been said above (FS, QQ[57],60,62).
I answer that, As stated above ([2583]FS, Q[55], AA[2],4), virtue is an
operative habit, wherefore by its very nature it has an inclination to
a certain act. Now it may happen that from the same habit there proceed
several ordinate and homogeneous acts, each of which follows from
another. And since the subsequent acts do not proceed from the virtuous
habit except through the preceding act, hence it is that the virtue is
defined and named in reference to that preceding act, although those
other acts also proceed from the virtue. Now it is evident from what we
have said about the passions ([2584]FS, Q[25], AA[2],4) that love is
the first affection of the appetitive power, and that desire and joy
follow from it. Hence the same virtuous habit inclines us to love and
desire the beloved good, and to rejoice in it. But in as much as love
is the first of these acts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy,
nor from desire, but from love, and is called charity. Hence joy is not
a virtue distinct from charity, but an act, or effect, of charity: for
which reason it is numbered among the Fruits (Gal. 5:22).
Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow which is a vice is caused by
inordinate self-love, and this is not a special vice, but a general
source of the vices, as stated above ([2585]FS, Q[77], A[4]); so that
it was necessary to account certain particular sorrows as special
vices, because they do not arise from a special, but from a general
vice. On the other hand love of God is accounted a special virtue,
namely charity, to which joy must be referred, as its proper act, as
stated above (here and A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but
hope adds, on the part of the object, a special character, viz.
"difficult," and "possible to obtain"; for which reason it is accounted
a special virtue. On the other hand joy does not add to love any
special aspect, that might cause a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: The Law prescribes joy, as being an act of
charity, albeit not its first act.
__________________________________________________________________
OF PEACE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider Peace, under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether peace is the same as concord?
(2) Whether all things desire peace?
(3) Whether peace is an effect of charity?
(4) Whether peace is a virtue?
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Whether peace is the same as concord?
Objection 1: It would seem that peace is the same as concord. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Peace among men is well ordered
concord. " Now we are speaking here of no other peace than that of men.
Therefore peace is the same as concord.
Objection 2: Further, concord is union of wills. Now the nature of
peace consists in such like union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xi)
that peace unites all, and makes them of one mind. Therefore peace is
the same as concord.
Objection 3: Further, things whose opposites are identical are
themselves identical. Now the one same thing is opposed to concord and
peace, viz. dissension; hence it is written (1 Cor. 16:33): "God is not
the God of dissension but of peace. " Therefore peace is the same as
concord.
On the contrary, There can be concord in evil between wicked men. But
"there is no peace to the wicked" (Is. 48:22). Therefore peace is not
the same as concord.
I answer that, Peace includes concord and adds something thereto. Hence
wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace, wherever
there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning.
For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so
far as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to the
same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to diverse
things, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the diverse
appetitive powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends sometimes to that
which is opposed to the rational appetite, according to Gal. 5:17: "The
flesh lusteth against the spirit. " Secondly, in so far as one and the
same appetitive power tends to diverse objects of appetite, which it
cannot obtain all at the same time: so that there must needs be a
clashing of the movements of the appetite. Now the union of such
movements is essential to peace, because man's heart is not at peace,
so long as he has not what he wants, or if, having what he wants, there
still remains something for him to want, and which he cannot have at
the same time. On the other hand this union is not essential to
concord: wherefore concord denotes union of appetites among various
persons, while peace denotes, in addition to this union, the union of
the appetites even in one man.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there of that peace which
is between one man and another, and he says that this peace is concord,
not indeed any kind of concord, but that which is well ordered, through
one man agreeing with another in respect of something befitting to both
of them . For if one man concord with another, not of his own accord,
but through being forced, as it were, by the fear of some evil that
besets him, such concord is not really peace, because the order of each
concordant is not observed, but is disturbed by some fear-inspiring
cause. For this reason he premises that "peace is tranquillity of
order," which tranquillity consists in all the appetitive movements in
one man being set at rest together.
Reply to Objection 2: If one man consent to the same thing together
with another man, his consent is nevertheless not perfectly united to
himself, unless at the same time all his appetitive movements be in
agreement.
Reply to Objection 3: A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely
dissension between a man and himself, and dissension between one man
and another. The latter alone is opposed to concord.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether all things desire peace?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all things desire peace. For,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace "unites consent. " But
there cannot be unity of consent in things which are devoid of
knowledge. Therefore such things cannot desire peace.
Objection 2: Further, the appetite does not tend to opposite things at
the same time. Now many desire war and dissension.
Therefore all men do
not desire peace.
Objection 3: Further, good alone is an object of appetite. But a
certain peace is, seemingly, evil, else Our Lord would not have said
(Mat. 10:34): "I came not to send peace. " Therefore all things do not
desire peace.
Objection 4: Further, that which all desire is, seemingly, the
sovereign good which is the last end. But this is not true of peace,
since it is attainable even by a wayfarer; else Our Lord would vainly
command (Mk. 9:49): "Have peace among you. " Therefore all things do not
desire peace.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12,14) that "all
things desire peace": and Dionysius says the same (Div. Nom. xi).
I answer that, From the very fact that a man desires a certain thing it
follows that he desires to obtain what he desires, and, in consequence,
to remove whatever may be an obstacle to his obtaining it. Now a man
may be hindered from obtaining the good he desires, by a contrary
desire either of his own or of some other, and both are removed by
peace, as stated above. Hence it follows of necessity that whoever
desires anything desires peace, in so far as he who desires anything,
desires to attain, with tranquillity and without hindrance, to that
which he desires: and this is what is meant by peace which Augustine
defines (De Civ. Dei xix, 13) "the tranquillity of order. "
Reply to Objection 1: Peace denotes union not only of the intellective
or rational appetite, or of the animal appetite, in both of which
consent may be found, but also of the natural appetite. Hence Dionysius
says that "peace is the cause of consent and of connaturalness," where
"consent" denotes the union of appetites proceeding from knowledge, and
"connaturalness," the union of natural appetites.
Reply to Objection 2: Even those who seek war and dissension, desire
nothing but peace, which they deem themselves not to have. For as we
stated above, there is no peace when a man concords with another man
counter to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war
to break this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that
they may obtain peace, where nothing is contrary to their will. Hence
all wars are waged that men may find a more perfect peace than that
which they had heretofore.
Reply to Objection 3: Peace gives calm and unity to the appetite. Now
just as the appetite may tend to what is good simply, or to what is
good apparently, so too, peace may be either true or apparent. There
can be no true peace except where the appetite is directed to what is
truly good, since every evil, though it may appear good in a way, so as
to calm the appetite in some respect, has, nevertheless many defects,
which cause the appetite to remain restless and disturbed. Hence true
peace is only in good men and about good things. The peace of the
wicked is not a true peace but a semblance thereof, wherefore it is
written (Wis. 14:22): "Whereas they lived in a great war of ignorance,
they call so many and so great evils peace. "
Reply to Objection 4: Since true peace is only about good things, as
the true good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so
there is a twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the
perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one's desires
by giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the rational
creature, according to Ps. 147:3: "Who hath placed peace in thy
borders. " The other is imperfect peace, which may be had in this world,
for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in God, yet there
are certain things within and without which disturb the peace.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether peace is the proper effect of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that peace is not the proper effect of
charity. For one cannot have charity without sanctifying grace. But
some have peace who have not sanctifying grace, thus heathens sometimes
have peace. Therefore peace is not the effect of charity.
Objection 2: Further, if a certain thing is caused by charity, its
contrary is not compatible with charity. But dissension, which is
contrary to peace, is compatible with charity, for we find that even
holy doctors, such as Jerome and Augustine, dissented in some of their
opinions. We also read that Paul and Barnabas dissented from one
another (Acts 15). Therefore it seems that peace is not the effect of
charity.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing is not the proper effect of
different things. Now peace is the effect of justice, according to Is.
32:17: "And the work of justice shall be peace. " Therefore it is not
the effect of charity.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:165): "Much peace have they
that love Thy Law. "
I answer that, Peace implies a twofold union, as stated above
[2586](A[1]). The first is the result of one's own appetites being
directed to one object; while the other results from one's own appetite
being united with the appetite of another: and each of these unions is
effected by charity---the first, in so far as man loves God with his
whole heart, by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires
tend to one object---the second, in so far as we love our neighbor as
ourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfil our neighbor's will
as though it were ours: hence it is reckoned a sign of friendship if
people "make choice of the same things" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Tully says
(De Amicitia) that friends "like and dislike the same things" (Sallust,
Catilin. )
Reply to Objection 1: Without sin no one falls from a state of
sanctifying grace, for it turns man away from his due end by making him
place his end in something undue: so that his appetite does not cleave
chiefly to the true final good, but to some apparent good. Hence,
without sanctifying grace, peace is not real but merely apparent.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 6) friends
need not agree in opinion, but only upon such goods as conduce to life,
and especially upon such as are important; because dissension in small
matters is scarcely accounted dissension. Hence nothing hinders those
who have charity from holding different opinions. Nor is this an
obstacle to peace, because opinions concern the intellect, which
precedes the appetite that is united by peace. In like manner if there
be concord as to goods of importance, dissension with regard to some
that are of little account is not contrary to charity: for such a
dissension proceeds from a difference of opinion, because one man
thinks that the particular good, which is the object of dissension,
belongs to the good about which they agree, while the other thinks that
it does not. Accordingly such like dissension about very slight matters
and about opinions is inconsistent with a state of perfect peace,
wherein the truth will be known fully, and every desire fulfilled; but
it is not inconsistent with the imperfect peace of the wayfarer.
Reply to Objection 3: Peace is the "work of justice" indirectly, in so
far as justice removes the obstacles to peace: but it is the work of
charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes
peace. For love is "a unitive force" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
and peace is the union of the appetite's inclinations.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether peace is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that peace is a virtue. For nothing is a
matter of precept, unless it be an act of virtue. But there are
precepts about keeping peace, for example: "Have peace among you" (Mk.
9:49). Therefore peace is a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. Now it
is meritorious to keep peace, according to Mat. 5:9: "Blessed are the
peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God. " Therefore
peace is a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. But dissensions,
which are contrary to peace, are numbered among the vices (Gal. 5:20).
Therefore peace is a virtue.
On the contrary, Virtue is not the last end, but the way thereto. But
peace is the last end, in a sense, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,
11). Therefore peace is not a virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([2587]Q[28], A[4]), when a number of
acts all proceeding uniformly from an agent, follow one from the other,
they all arise from the same virtue, nor do they each have a virtue
from which they proceed, as may be seen in corporeal things. For,
though fire by heating, both liquefies and rarefies, there are not two
powers in fire, one of liquefaction, the other of rarefaction: and fire
produces all such actions by its own power of calefaction.
Since then charity causes peace precisely because it is love of God and
of our neighbor, as shown above [2588](A[3]), there is no other virtue
except charity whose proper act is peace, as we have also said in
reference to joy (Q[28], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 1: We are commanded to keep peace because it is an
act of charity; and for this reason too it is a meritorious act. Hence
it is placed among the beatitudes, which are acts of perfect virtue, as
stated above ([2589]FS, Q[69], AA[1],3). It is also numbered among the
fruits, in so far as it is a final good, having spiritual sweetness.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: Several vices are opposed to one virtue in
respect of its various acts: so that not only is hatred opposed to
charity, in respect of its act which is love, but also sloth and envy,
in respect of joy, and dissension in respect of peace.
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OF MERCY (FOUR ARTICLES) [*The one Latin word "misericordia" signifies either
pity or mercy. The distinction between these two is that pity may stand either
for the act or for the virtue, whereas mercy stands only for the virtue. ]
We must now go on to consider Mercy, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether evil is the cause of mercy on the part of the person
pitied?
(2) To whom does it belong to pity?
(3) Whether mercy is a virtue?
(4) Whether it is the greatest of virtues?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether evil is properly the motive of mercy?
Objection 1: It would seem that, properly speaking, evil is not the
motive of mercy. For, as shown above (Q[19], A[1]; [2590]FS, Q[79],
A[1], ad 4; [2591]FP, Q[48] , A[6]), fault is an evil rather than
punishment. Now fault provokes indignation rather than mercy. Therefore
evil does not excite mercy.
Objection 2: Further, cruelty and harshness seem to excel other evils.
Now the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "harshness does not call
for pity but drives it away. " Therefore evil, as such, is not the
motive of mercy.
Objection 3: Further, signs of evils are not true evils. But signs of
evils excite one to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 8).
Therefore evil, properly speaking, is not an incentive to mercy.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 2) that mercy is a
kind of sorrow. Now evil is the motive of sorrow. Therefore it is the
motive of mercy.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5), mercy is
heartfelt sympathy for another's distress, impelling us to succor him
if we can. For mercy takes its name "misericordia" from denoting a
man's compassionate heart [miserum cor] for another's unhappiness. Now
unhappiness is opposed to happiness: and it is essential to beatitude
or happiness that one should obtain what one wishes; for, according to
Augustine (De Trin. xiii, 5), "happy is he who has whatever he desires,
and desires nothing amiss. " Hence, on the other hand, it belongs to
unhappiness that a man should suffer what he wishes not.
Now a man wishes a thing in three ways: first, by his natural appetite;
thus all men naturally wish to be and to live: secondly, a man wishes a
thing from deliberate choice: thirdly, a man wishes a thing, not in
itself, but in its cause, thus, if a man wishes to eat what is bad for
him, we say that, in a way, he wishes to be ill.
Accordingly the motive of "mercy," being something pertaining to
"misery," is, in the first way, anything contrary to the will's natural
appetite, namely corruptive or distressing evils, the contrary of which
man desires naturally, wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8)
that "pity is sorrow for a visible evil, whether corruptive or
distressing. " Secondly, such like evils are yet more provocative of
pity if they are contrary to deliberate choice, wherefore the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that evil excites our pity "when it is
the result of an accident, as when something turns out ill, whereas we
hoped well of it. " Thirdly, they cause yet greater pity, if they are
entirely contrary to the will, as when evil befalls a man who has
always striven to do well: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8)
that "we pity most the distress of one who suffers undeservedly. "
Reply to Objection 1: It is essential to fault that it be voluntary;
and in this respect it deserves punishment rather than mercy. Since,
however, fault may be, in a way, a punishment, through having something
connected with it that is against the sinner's will, it may, in this
respect, call for mercy. It is in this sense that we pity and
commiserate sinners. Thus Gregory says in a homily (Hom. in Evang.
xxxiv) that "true godliness is not disdainful but compassionate," and
again it is written (Mat. 9:36) that Jesus "seeing the multitudes, had
compassion on them: because they were distressed, and lying like sheep
that have no shepherd. "
Reply to Objection 2: Since pity is sympathy for another's distress, it
is directed, properly speaking, towards another, and not to oneself,
except figuratively, like justice, according as a man is considered to
have various parts (Ethic. v, 11). Thus it is written (Ecclus. 30:24):
"Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God" [*Cf. [2592] Q[106], A[3], ad
1].
Accordingly just as, properly speaking, a man does not pity himself,
but suffers in himself, as when we suffer cruel treatment in ourselves,
so too, in the case of those who are so closely united to us, as to be
part of ourselves, such as our children or our parents, we do not pity
their distress, but suffer as for our own sores; in which sense the
Philosopher says that "harshness drives pity away. "
Reply to Objection 3: Just as pleasure results from hope and memory of
good things, so does sorrow arise from the prospect or the recollection
of evil things; though not so keenly as when they are present to the
senses. Hence the signs of evil move us to pity, in so far as they
represent as present, the evil that excites our pity.
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Whether the reason for taking pity is a defect in the person who pities?
Objection 1: It would seem that the reason for taking pity is not a
defect in the person who takes pity. For it is proper to God to be
merciful, wherefore it is written (Ps. 144:9): "His tender mercies are
over all His works. " But there is no defect in God. Therefore a defect
cannot be the reason for taking pity.
Objection 2: Further, if a defect is the reason for taking pity, those
in whom there is most defect, must needs take most pity. But this is
false: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are in a
desperate state are pitiless. " Therefore it seems that the reason for
taking pity is not a defect in the person who pities.
Objection 3: Further, to be treated with contempt is to be defective.
But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are disposed to
contumely are pitiless. " Therefore the reason for taking pity, is not a
defect in the person who pities.
On the contrary, Pity is a kind of sorrow. But a defect is the reason
of sorrow, wherefore those who are in bad health give way to sorrow
more easily, as we shall say further on ([2593]Q[35], A[1], ad 2).
Therefore the reason why one takes pity is a defect in oneself.
I answer that, Since pity is grief for another's distress, as stated
above [2594](A[1]), from the very fact that a person takes pity on
anyone, it follows that another's distress grieves him. And since
sorrow or grief is about one's own ills, one grieves or sorrows for
another's distress, in so far as one looks upon another's distress as
one's own.
Now this happens in two ways: first, through union of the affections,
which is the effect of love. For, since he who loves another looks upon
his friend as another self, he counts his friend's hurt as his own, so
that he grieves for his friend's hurt as though he were hurt himself.
Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 4) reckons "grieving with one's
friend" as being one of the signs of friendship, and the Apostle says
(Rom. 12:15): "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with them that
weep. "
Secondly, it happens through real union, for instance when another's
evil comes near to us, so as to pass to us from him. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that men pity such as are akin to them,
and the like, because it makes them realize that the same may happen to
themselves. This also explains why the old and the wise who consider
that they may fall upon evil times, as also feeble and timorous
persons, are more inclined to pity: whereas those who deem themselves
happy, and so far powerful as to think themselves in no danger of
suffering any hurt, are not so inclined to pity.
Accordingly a defect is always the reason for taking pity, either
because one looks upon another's defect as one's own, through being
united to him by love, or on account of the possibility of suffering in
the same way.
Reply to Objection 1: God takes pity on us through love alone, in as
much as He loves us as belonging to Him.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who are already in infinite distress, do
not fear to suffer more, wherefore they are without pity. In like
manner this applies to those also who are in great fear, for they are
so intent on their own passion, that they pay no attention to the
suffering of others.
Reply to Objection 3: Those who are disposed to contumely, whether
through having been contemned, or because they wish to contemn others,
are incited to anger and daring, which are manly passions and arouse
the human spirit to attempt difficult things. Hence they make a man
think that he is going to suffer something in the future, so that while
they are disposed in that way they are pitiless, according to Prov.
27:4: "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth. " For the
same reason the proud are without pity, because they despise others,
and think them wicked, so that they account them as suffering
deservedly whatever they suffer. Hence Gregory says (Hom. in Evang.
xxxiv) that "false godliness," i. e. of the proud, "is not compassionate
but disdainful. "
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Whether mercy is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that mercy is not a virtue. For the chief
part of virtue is choice as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5). Now
choice is "the desire of what has been already counselled" (Ethic. iii,
2). Therefore whatever hinders counsel cannot be called a virtue. But
mercy hinders counsel, according to the saying of Sallust (Catilin. ):
"All those that take counsel about matters of doubt, should be free
from . . . anger . . . and mercy, because the mind does not easily see
aright, when these things stand in the way. " Therefore mercy is not a
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, nothing contrary to virtue is praiseworthy. But
nemesis is contrary to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet.
comparison may be understood to be between the love of God alone on the
one side, and the love of one's neighbor for God's sake, on the other.
In this way love of our neighbor includes love of God, while love of
God does not include love of our neighbor. Hence the comparison will be
between perfect love of God, extending also to our neighbor, and
inadequate and imperfect love of God, for "this commandment we have
from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother" (1 Jn. 4:21).
Reply to Objection 1: According to one gloss, the Apostle did not
desire this, viz. to be severed from Christ for his brethren, when he
was in a state of grace, but had formerly desired it when he was in a
state of unbelief, so that we should not imitate him in this respect.
We may also reply, with Chrysostom (De Compunct. i, 8) [*Hom. xvi in
Ep. ad Rom. ] that this does not prove the Apostle to have loved his
neighbor more than God, but that he loved God more than himself. For he
wished to be deprived for a time of the Divine fruition which pertains
to love of one self, in order that God might be honored in his
neighbor, which pertains to the love of God.
Reply to Objection 2: A man's love for his friends is sometimes less
meritorious in so far as he loves them for their sake, so as to fall
short of the true reason for the friendship of charity, which is God.
Hence that God be loved for His own sake does not diminish the merit,
but is the entire reason for merit.
Reply to Objection 3: The "good" has, more than the "difficult," to do
with the reason of merit and virtue. Therefore it does not follow that
whatever is more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is more
difficult, and at the same time better.
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OF JOY (FOUR ARTICLES)
WE must now consider the effects which result from the principal act of
charity which is love, and (1) the interior effects, (2) the exterior
effects. As to the first, three things have to be considered: (1) Joy,
(2) Peace, (3) Mercy.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether joy is an effect of charity?
(2) Whether this kind of joy is compatible with sorrow?
(3) Whether this joy can be full?
(4) Whether it is a virtue?
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Whether joy is effected in us by charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that joy is not effected in us by charity.
For the absence of what we love causes sorrow rather than joy. But God,
Whom we love by charity, is absent from us, so long as we are in this
state of life, since "while we are in the body, we are absent from the
Lord" (2 Cor. 5:6). Therefore charity causes sorrow in us rather than
joy.
Objection 2: Further, it is chiefly through charity that we merit
happiness. Now mourning, which pertains to sorrow, is reckoned among
those things whereby we merit happiness, according to Mat. 5:5:
"Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted. " Therefore
sorrow, rather than joy, is an effect of charity.
Objection 3: Further, charity is a virtue distinct from hope, as shown
above ([2580]Q[17], A[6]). Now joy is the effect of hope, according to
Rom. 12:12: "Rejoicing in hope. " Therefore it is not the effect of
charity.
On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God is
poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us. " But
joy is caused in us by the Holy Ghost according to Rom. 14:17: "The
kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace, and joy in
the Holy Ghost. " Therefore charity is a cause of joy.
I answer that, As stated above ([2581]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2,3), when we
were treating of the passions, joy and sorrow proceed from love, but in
contrary ways. For joy is caused by love, either through the presence
of the thing loved, or because the proper good of the thing loved
exists and endures in it; and the latter is the case chiefly in the
love of benevolence, whereby a man rejoices in the well-being of his
friend, though he be absent. On the other hand sorrow arises from love,
either through the absence of the thing loved, or because the loved
object to which we wish well, is deprived of its good or afflicted with
some evil. Now charity is love of God, Whose good is unchangeable,
since He is His goodness, and from the very fact that He is loved, He
is in those who love Him by His most excellent effect, according to 1
Jn. 4:16: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him. "
Therefore spiritual joy, which is about God, is caused by charity.
Reply to Objection 1: So long as we are in the body, we are said to be
"absent from the Lord," in comparison with that presence whereby He is
present to some by the vision of "sight"; wherefore the Apostle goes on
to say (2 Cor. 5:6): "For we walk by faith and not by sight. "
Nevertheless, even in this life, He is present to those who love Him,
by the indwelling of His grace.
Reply to Objection 2: The mourning that merits happiness, is about
those things that are contrary to happiness. Wherefore it amounts to
the same that charity causes this mourning, and this spiritual joy
about God, since to rejoice in a certain good amounts to the same as to
grieve for things that are contrary to it.
Reply to Objection 3: There can be spiritual joy about God in two ways.
First, when we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself;
secondly, when we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us. The
former joy is the better, and proceeds from charity chiefly: while the
latter joy proceeds from hope also, whereby we look forward to enjoy
the Divine good, although this enjoyment itself, whether perfect or
imperfect, is obtained according to the measure of one's charity.
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Whether the spiritual joy, which results from charity, is compatible with an
admixture of sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy that results from
charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow. For it belongs to
charity to rejoice in our neighbor's good, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, 6:
"Charity . . . rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the
truth. " But this joy is compatible with an admixture of sorrow,
according to Rom. 12:15: "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with
them that weep. " Therefore the spiritual joy of charity is compatible
with an admixture of sorrow.
Objection 2: Further, according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv),
"penance consists in deploring past sins, and in not committing again
those we have deplored. " But there is no true penance without charity.
Therefore the joy of charity has an admixture of sorrow.
Objection 3: Further, it is through charity that man desires to be with
Christ according to Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and to
be with Christ. " Now this desire gives rise, in man, to a certain
sadness, according to Ps. 119:5: "Woe is me that my sojourning is
prolonged! " Therefore the joy of charity admits of a seasoning of
sorrow.
On the contrary, The joy of charity is joy about the Divine wisdom. Now
such like joy has no admixture of sorrow, according to Wis. 8:16: "Her
conversation hath no bitterness. " Therefore the joy of charity is
incompatible with an admixture of sorrow.
I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), a twofold joy in God
arises from charity. One, the more excellent, is proper to charity; and
with this joy we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself. This
joy of charity is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow, even as the
good which is its object is incompatible with any admixture of evil:
hence the Apostle says (Phil. 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord always. "
The other is the joy of charity whereby we rejoice in the Divine good
as participated by us. This participation can be hindered by anything
contrary to it, wherefore, in this respect, the joy of charity is
compatible with an admixture of sorrow, in so far as a man grieves for
that which hinders the participation of the Divine good, either in us
or in our neighbor, whom we love as ourselves.
Reply to Objection 1: Our neighbor does not weep save on account of
some evil. Now every evil implies lack of participation in the
sovereign good: hence charity makes us weep with our neighbor in so far
as he is hindered from participating in the Divine good.
Reply to Objection 2: Our sins divide between us and God, according to
Is. 59:2; wherefore this is the reason why we grieve for our past sins,
or for those of others, in so far as they hinder us from participating
in the Divine good.
Reply to Objection 3: Although in this unhappy abode we participate,
after a fashion, in the Divine good, by knowledge and love, yet the
unhappiness of this life is an obstacle to a perfect participation in
the Divine good: hence this very sorrow, whereby a man grieves for the
delay of glory, is connected with the hindrance to a participation of
the Divine good.
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Whether the spiritual joy which proceeds from charity, can be filled?
Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy which proceeds from
charity cannot be filled. For the more we rejoice in God, the more is
our joy in Him filled. But we can never rejoice in Him as much as it is
meet that we should rejoice in God, since His goodness which is
infinite, surpasses the creature's joy which is finite. Therefore joy
in God can never be filled.
Objection 2: Further, that which is filled cannot be increased. But the
joy, even of the blessed, can be increased, since one's joy is greater
than another's. Therefore joy in God cannot be filled in a creature.
Objection 3: Further, comprehension seems to be nothing else than the
fulness of knowledge. Now, just as the cognitive power of a creature is
finite, so is its appetitive power. Since therefore God cannot be
comprehended by any creature, it seems that no creature's joy in God
can be filled.
On the contrary, Our Lord said to His disciples (Jn. 15:11): "That My
joy may be in you, and your joy may be filled. "
I answer that, Fulness of joy can be understood in two ways; first, on
the part of the thing rejoiced in, so that one rejoice in it as much as
it is meet that one should rejoice in it, and thus God's joy alone in
Himself is filled, because it is infinite; and this is condignly due to
the infinite goodness of God: but the joy of any creature must needs be
finite. Secondly, fulness of joy may be understood on the part of the
one who rejoices. Now joy is compared to desire, as rest to movement,
as stated above ([2582]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2), when we were treating of
the passions: and rest is full when there is no more movement. Hence
joy is full, when there remains nothing to be desired. But as long as
we are in this world, the movement of desire does not cease in us,
because it still remains possible for us to approach nearer to God by
grace, as was shown above (Q[24], AA[4],7). When once, however, perfect
happiness has been attained, nothing will remain to be desired, because
then there will be full enjoyment of God, wherein man will obtain
whatever he had desired, even with regard to other goods, according to
Ps. 102:5: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things. " Hence desire
will be at rest, not only our desire for God, but all our desires: so
that the joy of the blessed is full to perfection---indeed over-full,
since they will obtain more than they were capable of desiring: for
"neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath
prepared for them that love Him" (1 Cor. 2:9). This is what is meant by
the words of Lk. 6:38: "Good measure and pressed down, and shaken
together, and running over shall they give into your bosom. " Yet, since
no creature is capable of the joy condignly due to God, it follows that
this perfectly full joy is not taken into man, but, on the contrary,
man enters into it, according to Mat. 25:21: "Enter into the joy of thy
Lord. "
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes the fulness of joy in
reference to the thing in which we rejoice.
Reply to Objection 2: When each one attains to happiness he will reach
the term appointed to him by Divine predestination, and nothing further
will remain to which he may tend, although by reaching that term, some
will approach nearer to God than others. Hence each one's joy will be
full with regard to himself, because his desire will be fully set at
rest; yet one's joy will be greater than another's, on account of a
fuller participation of the Divine happiness.
Reply to Objection 3: Comprehension denotes fulness of knowledge in
respect of the thing known, so that it is known as much as it can be.
There is however a fulness of knowledge in respect of the knower, just
as we have said of joy. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:9): "That
you may be filled with the knowledge of His will, in all wisdom and
spiritual understanding. "
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Whether joy is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that joy is a virtue. For vice is contrary
to virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a vice, as in the case of sloth
and envy. Therefore joy also should be accounted a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, as love and hope are passions, the object of
which is "good," so also is joy. Now love and hope are reckoned to be
virtues. Therefore joy also should be reckoned a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue.
But we are commanded to rejoice in the Lord, according to Phil. 4:4:
"Rejoice in the Lord always. " Therefore joy is a virtue.
On the contrary, It is not numbered among the theological virtues, nor
among the moral, nor among the intellectual virtues, as is evident from
what has been said above (FS, QQ[57],60,62).
I answer that, As stated above ([2583]FS, Q[55], AA[2],4), virtue is an
operative habit, wherefore by its very nature it has an inclination to
a certain act. Now it may happen that from the same habit there proceed
several ordinate and homogeneous acts, each of which follows from
another. And since the subsequent acts do not proceed from the virtuous
habit except through the preceding act, hence it is that the virtue is
defined and named in reference to that preceding act, although those
other acts also proceed from the virtue. Now it is evident from what we
have said about the passions ([2584]FS, Q[25], AA[2],4) that love is
the first affection of the appetitive power, and that desire and joy
follow from it. Hence the same virtuous habit inclines us to love and
desire the beloved good, and to rejoice in it. But in as much as love
is the first of these acts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy,
nor from desire, but from love, and is called charity. Hence joy is not
a virtue distinct from charity, but an act, or effect, of charity: for
which reason it is numbered among the Fruits (Gal. 5:22).
Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow which is a vice is caused by
inordinate self-love, and this is not a special vice, but a general
source of the vices, as stated above ([2585]FS, Q[77], A[4]); so that
it was necessary to account certain particular sorrows as special
vices, because they do not arise from a special, but from a general
vice. On the other hand love of God is accounted a special virtue,
namely charity, to which joy must be referred, as its proper act, as
stated above (here and A[2]).
Reply to Objection 2: Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but
hope adds, on the part of the object, a special character, viz.
"difficult," and "possible to obtain"; for which reason it is accounted
a special virtue. On the other hand joy does not add to love any
special aspect, that might cause a special virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: The Law prescribes joy, as being an act of
charity, albeit not its first act.
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OF PEACE (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider Peace, under which head there are four points of
inquiry:
(1) Whether peace is the same as concord?
(2) Whether all things desire peace?
(3) Whether peace is an effect of charity?
(4) Whether peace is a virtue?
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Whether peace is the same as concord?
Objection 1: It would seem that peace is the same as concord. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Peace among men is well ordered
concord. " Now we are speaking here of no other peace than that of men.
Therefore peace is the same as concord.
Objection 2: Further, concord is union of wills. Now the nature of
peace consists in such like union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xi)
that peace unites all, and makes them of one mind. Therefore peace is
the same as concord.
Objection 3: Further, things whose opposites are identical are
themselves identical. Now the one same thing is opposed to concord and
peace, viz. dissension; hence it is written (1 Cor. 16:33): "God is not
the God of dissension but of peace. " Therefore peace is the same as
concord.
On the contrary, There can be concord in evil between wicked men. But
"there is no peace to the wicked" (Is. 48:22). Therefore peace is not
the same as concord.
I answer that, Peace includes concord and adds something thereto. Hence
wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace, wherever
there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning.
For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so
far as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to the
same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to diverse
things, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the diverse
appetitive powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends sometimes to that
which is opposed to the rational appetite, according to Gal. 5:17: "The
flesh lusteth against the spirit. " Secondly, in so far as one and the
same appetitive power tends to diverse objects of appetite, which it
cannot obtain all at the same time: so that there must needs be a
clashing of the movements of the appetite. Now the union of such
movements is essential to peace, because man's heart is not at peace,
so long as he has not what he wants, or if, having what he wants, there
still remains something for him to want, and which he cannot have at
the same time. On the other hand this union is not essential to
concord: wherefore concord denotes union of appetites among various
persons, while peace denotes, in addition to this union, the union of
the appetites even in one man.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there of that peace which
is between one man and another, and he says that this peace is concord,
not indeed any kind of concord, but that which is well ordered, through
one man agreeing with another in respect of something befitting to both
of them . For if one man concord with another, not of his own accord,
but through being forced, as it were, by the fear of some evil that
besets him, such concord is not really peace, because the order of each
concordant is not observed, but is disturbed by some fear-inspiring
cause. For this reason he premises that "peace is tranquillity of
order," which tranquillity consists in all the appetitive movements in
one man being set at rest together.
Reply to Objection 2: If one man consent to the same thing together
with another man, his consent is nevertheless not perfectly united to
himself, unless at the same time all his appetitive movements be in
agreement.
Reply to Objection 3: A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely
dissension between a man and himself, and dissension between one man
and another. The latter alone is opposed to concord.
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Whether all things desire peace?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all things desire peace. For,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace "unites consent. " But
there cannot be unity of consent in things which are devoid of
knowledge. Therefore such things cannot desire peace.
Objection 2: Further, the appetite does not tend to opposite things at
the same time. Now many desire war and dissension.
Therefore all men do
not desire peace.
Objection 3: Further, good alone is an object of appetite. But a
certain peace is, seemingly, evil, else Our Lord would not have said
(Mat. 10:34): "I came not to send peace. " Therefore all things do not
desire peace.
Objection 4: Further, that which all desire is, seemingly, the
sovereign good which is the last end. But this is not true of peace,
since it is attainable even by a wayfarer; else Our Lord would vainly
command (Mk. 9:49): "Have peace among you. " Therefore all things do not
desire peace.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12,14) that "all
things desire peace": and Dionysius says the same (Div. Nom. xi).
I answer that, From the very fact that a man desires a certain thing it
follows that he desires to obtain what he desires, and, in consequence,
to remove whatever may be an obstacle to his obtaining it. Now a man
may be hindered from obtaining the good he desires, by a contrary
desire either of his own or of some other, and both are removed by
peace, as stated above. Hence it follows of necessity that whoever
desires anything desires peace, in so far as he who desires anything,
desires to attain, with tranquillity and without hindrance, to that
which he desires: and this is what is meant by peace which Augustine
defines (De Civ. Dei xix, 13) "the tranquillity of order. "
Reply to Objection 1: Peace denotes union not only of the intellective
or rational appetite, or of the animal appetite, in both of which
consent may be found, but also of the natural appetite. Hence Dionysius
says that "peace is the cause of consent and of connaturalness," where
"consent" denotes the union of appetites proceeding from knowledge, and
"connaturalness," the union of natural appetites.
Reply to Objection 2: Even those who seek war and dissension, desire
nothing but peace, which they deem themselves not to have. For as we
stated above, there is no peace when a man concords with another man
counter to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war
to break this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that
they may obtain peace, where nothing is contrary to their will. Hence
all wars are waged that men may find a more perfect peace than that
which they had heretofore.
Reply to Objection 3: Peace gives calm and unity to the appetite. Now
just as the appetite may tend to what is good simply, or to what is
good apparently, so too, peace may be either true or apparent. There
can be no true peace except where the appetite is directed to what is
truly good, since every evil, though it may appear good in a way, so as
to calm the appetite in some respect, has, nevertheless many defects,
which cause the appetite to remain restless and disturbed. Hence true
peace is only in good men and about good things. The peace of the
wicked is not a true peace but a semblance thereof, wherefore it is
written (Wis. 14:22): "Whereas they lived in a great war of ignorance,
they call so many and so great evils peace. "
Reply to Objection 4: Since true peace is only about good things, as
the true good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so
there is a twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the
perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one's desires
by giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the rational
creature, according to Ps. 147:3: "Who hath placed peace in thy
borders. " The other is imperfect peace, which may be had in this world,
for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in God, yet there
are certain things within and without which disturb the peace.
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Whether peace is the proper effect of charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that peace is not the proper effect of
charity. For one cannot have charity without sanctifying grace. But
some have peace who have not sanctifying grace, thus heathens sometimes
have peace. Therefore peace is not the effect of charity.
Objection 2: Further, if a certain thing is caused by charity, its
contrary is not compatible with charity. But dissension, which is
contrary to peace, is compatible with charity, for we find that even
holy doctors, such as Jerome and Augustine, dissented in some of their
opinions. We also read that Paul and Barnabas dissented from one
another (Acts 15). Therefore it seems that peace is not the effect of
charity.
Objection 3: Further, the same thing is not the proper effect of
different things. Now peace is the effect of justice, according to Is.
32:17: "And the work of justice shall be peace. " Therefore it is not
the effect of charity.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:165): "Much peace have they
that love Thy Law. "
I answer that, Peace implies a twofold union, as stated above
[2586](A[1]). The first is the result of one's own appetites being
directed to one object; while the other results from one's own appetite
being united with the appetite of another: and each of these unions is
effected by charity---the first, in so far as man loves God with his
whole heart, by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires
tend to one object---the second, in so far as we love our neighbor as
ourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfil our neighbor's will
as though it were ours: hence it is reckoned a sign of friendship if
people "make choice of the same things" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Tully says
(De Amicitia) that friends "like and dislike the same things" (Sallust,
Catilin. )
Reply to Objection 1: Without sin no one falls from a state of
sanctifying grace, for it turns man away from his due end by making him
place his end in something undue: so that his appetite does not cleave
chiefly to the true final good, but to some apparent good. Hence,
without sanctifying grace, peace is not real but merely apparent.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 6) friends
need not agree in opinion, but only upon such goods as conduce to life,
and especially upon such as are important; because dissension in small
matters is scarcely accounted dissension. Hence nothing hinders those
who have charity from holding different opinions. Nor is this an
obstacle to peace, because opinions concern the intellect, which
precedes the appetite that is united by peace. In like manner if there
be concord as to goods of importance, dissension with regard to some
that are of little account is not contrary to charity: for such a
dissension proceeds from a difference of opinion, because one man
thinks that the particular good, which is the object of dissension,
belongs to the good about which they agree, while the other thinks that
it does not. Accordingly such like dissension about very slight matters
and about opinions is inconsistent with a state of perfect peace,
wherein the truth will be known fully, and every desire fulfilled; but
it is not inconsistent with the imperfect peace of the wayfarer.
Reply to Objection 3: Peace is the "work of justice" indirectly, in so
far as justice removes the obstacles to peace: but it is the work of
charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes
peace. For love is "a unitive force" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
and peace is the union of the appetite's inclinations.
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Whether peace is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that peace is a virtue. For nothing is a
matter of precept, unless it be an act of virtue. But there are
precepts about keeping peace, for example: "Have peace among you" (Mk.
9:49). Therefore peace is a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. Now it
is meritorious to keep peace, according to Mat. 5:9: "Blessed are the
peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God. " Therefore
peace is a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. But dissensions,
which are contrary to peace, are numbered among the vices (Gal. 5:20).
Therefore peace is a virtue.
On the contrary, Virtue is not the last end, but the way thereto. But
peace is the last end, in a sense, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,
11). Therefore peace is not a virtue.
I answer that, As stated above ([2587]Q[28], A[4]), when a number of
acts all proceeding uniformly from an agent, follow one from the other,
they all arise from the same virtue, nor do they each have a virtue
from which they proceed, as may be seen in corporeal things. For,
though fire by heating, both liquefies and rarefies, there are not two
powers in fire, one of liquefaction, the other of rarefaction: and fire
produces all such actions by its own power of calefaction.
Since then charity causes peace precisely because it is love of God and
of our neighbor, as shown above [2588](A[3]), there is no other virtue
except charity whose proper act is peace, as we have also said in
reference to joy (Q[28], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 1: We are commanded to keep peace because it is an
act of charity; and for this reason too it is a meritorious act. Hence
it is placed among the beatitudes, which are acts of perfect virtue, as
stated above ([2589]FS, Q[69], AA[1],3). It is also numbered among the
fruits, in so far as it is a final good, having spiritual sweetness.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: Several vices are opposed to one virtue in
respect of its various acts: so that not only is hatred opposed to
charity, in respect of its act which is love, but also sloth and envy,
in respect of joy, and dissension in respect of peace.
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OF MERCY (FOUR ARTICLES) [*The one Latin word "misericordia" signifies either
pity or mercy. The distinction between these two is that pity may stand either
for the act or for the virtue, whereas mercy stands only for the virtue. ]
We must now go on to consider Mercy, under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether evil is the cause of mercy on the part of the person
pitied?
(2) To whom does it belong to pity?
(3) Whether mercy is a virtue?
(4) Whether it is the greatest of virtues?
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Whether evil is properly the motive of mercy?
Objection 1: It would seem that, properly speaking, evil is not the
motive of mercy. For, as shown above (Q[19], A[1]; [2590]FS, Q[79],
A[1], ad 4; [2591]FP, Q[48] , A[6]), fault is an evil rather than
punishment. Now fault provokes indignation rather than mercy. Therefore
evil does not excite mercy.
Objection 2: Further, cruelty and harshness seem to excel other evils.
Now the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "harshness does not call
for pity but drives it away. " Therefore evil, as such, is not the
motive of mercy.
Objection 3: Further, signs of evils are not true evils. But signs of
evils excite one to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 8).
Therefore evil, properly speaking, is not an incentive to mercy.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 2) that mercy is a
kind of sorrow. Now evil is the motive of sorrow. Therefore it is the
motive of mercy.
I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5), mercy is
heartfelt sympathy for another's distress, impelling us to succor him
if we can. For mercy takes its name "misericordia" from denoting a
man's compassionate heart [miserum cor] for another's unhappiness. Now
unhappiness is opposed to happiness: and it is essential to beatitude
or happiness that one should obtain what one wishes; for, according to
Augustine (De Trin. xiii, 5), "happy is he who has whatever he desires,
and desires nothing amiss. " Hence, on the other hand, it belongs to
unhappiness that a man should suffer what he wishes not.
Now a man wishes a thing in three ways: first, by his natural appetite;
thus all men naturally wish to be and to live: secondly, a man wishes a
thing from deliberate choice: thirdly, a man wishes a thing, not in
itself, but in its cause, thus, if a man wishes to eat what is bad for
him, we say that, in a way, he wishes to be ill.
Accordingly the motive of "mercy," being something pertaining to
"misery," is, in the first way, anything contrary to the will's natural
appetite, namely corruptive or distressing evils, the contrary of which
man desires naturally, wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8)
that "pity is sorrow for a visible evil, whether corruptive or
distressing. " Secondly, such like evils are yet more provocative of
pity if they are contrary to deliberate choice, wherefore the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that evil excites our pity "when it is
the result of an accident, as when something turns out ill, whereas we
hoped well of it. " Thirdly, they cause yet greater pity, if they are
entirely contrary to the will, as when evil befalls a man who has
always striven to do well: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8)
that "we pity most the distress of one who suffers undeservedly. "
Reply to Objection 1: It is essential to fault that it be voluntary;
and in this respect it deserves punishment rather than mercy. Since,
however, fault may be, in a way, a punishment, through having something
connected with it that is against the sinner's will, it may, in this
respect, call for mercy. It is in this sense that we pity and
commiserate sinners. Thus Gregory says in a homily (Hom. in Evang.
xxxiv) that "true godliness is not disdainful but compassionate," and
again it is written (Mat. 9:36) that Jesus "seeing the multitudes, had
compassion on them: because they were distressed, and lying like sheep
that have no shepherd. "
Reply to Objection 2: Since pity is sympathy for another's distress, it
is directed, properly speaking, towards another, and not to oneself,
except figuratively, like justice, according as a man is considered to
have various parts (Ethic. v, 11). Thus it is written (Ecclus. 30:24):
"Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God" [*Cf. [2592] Q[106], A[3], ad
1].
Accordingly just as, properly speaking, a man does not pity himself,
but suffers in himself, as when we suffer cruel treatment in ourselves,
so too, in the case of those who are so closely united to us, as to be
part of ourselves, such as our children or our parents, we do not pity
their distress, but suffer as for our own sores; in which sense the
Philosopher says that "harshness drives pity away. "
Reply to Objection 3: Just as pleasure results from hope and memory of
good things, so does sorrow arise from the prospect or the recollection
of evil things; though not so keenly as when they are present to the
senses. Hence the signs of evil move us to pity, in so far as they
represent as present, the evil that excites our pity.
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Whether the reason for taking pity is a defect in the person who pities?
Objection 1: It would seem that the reason for taking pity is not a
defect in the person who takes pity. For it is proper to God to be
merciful, wherefore it is written (Ps. 144:9): "His tender mercies are
over all His works. " But there is no defect in God. Therefore a defect
cannot be the reason for taking pity.
Objection 2: Further, if a defect is the reason for taking pity, those
in whom there is most defect, must needs take most pity. But this is
false: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are in a
desperate state are pitiless. " Therefore it seems that the reason for
taking pity is not a defect in the person who pities.
Objection 3: Further, to be treated with contempt is to be defective.
But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are disposed to
contumely are pitiless. " Therefore the reason for taking pity, is not a
defect in the person who pities.
On the contrary, Pity is a kind of sorrow. But a defect is the reason
of sorrow, wherefore those who are in bad health give way to sorrow
more easily, as we shall say further on ([2593]Q[35], A[1], ad 2).
Therefore the reason why one takes pity is a defect in oneself.
I answer that, Since pity is grief for another's distress, as stated
above [2594](A[1]), from the very fact that a person takes pity on
anyone, it follows that another's distress grieves him. And since
sorrow or grief is about one's own ills, one grieves or sorrows for
another's distress, in so far as one looks upon another's distress as
one's own.
Now this happens in two ways: first, through union of the affections,
which is the effect of love. For, since he who loves another looks upon
his friend as another self, he counts his friend's hurt as his own, so
that he grieves for his friend's hurt as though he were hurt himself.
Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 4) reckons "grieving with one's
friend" as being one of the signs of friendship, and the Apostle says
(Rom. 12:15): "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with them that
weep. "
Secondly, it happens through real union, for instance when another's
evil comes near to us, so as to pass to us from him. Hence the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that men pity such as are akin to them,
and the like, because it makes them realize that the same may happen to
themselves. This also explains why the old and the wise who consider
that they may fall upon evil times, as also feeble and timorous
persons, are more inclined to pity: whereas those who deem themselves
happy, and so far powerful as to think themselves in no danger of
suffering any hurt, are not so inclined to pity.
Accordingly a defect is always the reason for taking pity, either
because one looks upon another's defect as one's own, through being
united to him by love, or on account of the possibility of suffering in
the same way.
Reply to Objection 1: God takes pity on us through love alone, in as
much as He loves us as belonging to Him.
Reply to Objection 2: Those who are already in infinite distress, do
not fear to suffer more, wherefore they are without pity. In like
manner this applies to those also who are in great fear, for they are
so intent on their own passion, that they pay no attention to the
suffering of others.
Reply to Objection 3: Those who are disposed to contumely, whether
through having been contemned, or because they wish to contemn others,
are incited to anger and daring, which are manly passions and arouse
the human spirit to attempt difficult things. Hence they make a man
think that he is going to suffer something in the future, so that while
they are disposed in that way they are pitiless, according to Prov.
27:4: "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth. " For the
same reason the proud are without pity, because they despise others,
and think them wicked, so that they account them as suffering
deservedly whatever they suffer. Hence Gregory says (Hom. in Evang.
xxxiv) that "false godliness," i. e. of the proud, "is not compassionate
but disdainful. "
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Whether mercy is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that mercy is not a virtue. For the chief
part of virtue is choice as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5). Now
choice is "the desire of what has been already counselled" (Ethic. iii,
2). Therefore whatever hinders counsel cannot be called a virtue. But
mercy hinders counsel, according to the saying of Sallust (Catilin. ):
"All those that take counsel about matters of doubt, should be free
from . . . anger . . . and mercy, because the mind does not easily see
aright, when these things stand in the way. " Therefore mercy is not a
virtue.
Objection 2: Further, nothing contrary to virtue is praiseworthy. But
nemesis is contrary to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet.
