At least the discipline to which Newton dedicated his life never pretended
anything
else.
Hegel Was Right_nodrm
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Logic and Natural Sciences 197
the meaning of necessity and liberty. The abstract intellect was the one that separated and isolated them, and in doing that it made them unintelligible; that abstraction was the cause of the antinomy; in con- crete, that is to say, in the spirit, these two concepts do not contradict each other; on the contrary, they have the same meaning.
2. Logic
We had to multiply the examples of real dialectic in rigorous analy- sis of the terms, because both scientists and superficial commentators believe that in Hegel the transition from one concept to another is ca- pricious and of a literary kind. For Hegel, on the contrary, "all logic consists in this" (WL II 495).
The logic consists in the 'it follows'. Everything else is accessory. Logic consists in this question: With what right is one concept inferred from another? With what right can one deduce a proposition in which the subject has a predicate another than the one he originally had be- fore? How can one justify the transition from one predicate to another, which is evidently a transition from one concept to another?
In the light of the above, it is enormously disquieting that scientists and philosophers do not realize the total revolution that Hegel intro- duced in this science, upon which the scientificity of all sciences de- pend, in spite of the fact that he specifically warns that the Aristotelian logic is useless and that he, Hegel, is founding the real logic:
The syllogism in the fashion of the abstract intellect --which is the one ren- dered by the traditional logic form-- has the meaning of a content joined with a different content. In contrast, the syllogism of reason has the content that the subject, etcetera, is joined to himself; the syllogism of reason is that some content, God etcetera, is united to Himself by means of distinguishing itself. This identity constitutes the essential element of the speculative con- tent, of nature's syllogism of reason. Aristotle is, therefore, the founder of traditional logic; his forms correspond only to the relation between finite to finite; truth cannot be understood under such forms (GP II 241).
The real logic is based on what this chapter has underlined: one concept 'follows' from another because they are not understood separately. The logical necessity is the exigency that a concept has meaning and is understood.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 198 Hegel was right
The implication between the concepts is what traditional logic as well as set logic ignore. But that implication is what allows a real in- ference of something new, of something that effectively increases our knowledge and is not tautologically reduced to what was said: what was said does not 'follow' because we had it already. For instance, the well-known syllogism: 'All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore, Socrates is mortal', does not teach us anything in the conclusion, for what it said was already stated in the first premise. The first premise could have not been stated had we not known that the content of the conclusion was true. Such reasoning does not make us wiser.
In contrast, the logic of Hegel begins with the concept of being, and because of the exigency of providing this term with a meaning, it leads us (cfr III, 3) to a new content: the activity of giving determinations to oneself. Being and existing can only consist in that. That really does increase our knowledge. The inference can be denied only by he who is able to provide the word being with another meaning, but we saw already that such thing is impossible.
We saw (III, 4) what happens with the initial concept of substance: it is not understandable that something can exist in itself if it doesn't give to itself the determinations of its existence; and then pass from the substantial content to the subjectivity content.
Tautology is the way-out of the abstract intellect that does not un- derstand. When it comes to understand the concepts, our knowledge actually increases.
The only path that fixational logics can go through in order to avoid becoming sheer tautologies is the hypothetical syllogism. I call here hypothetic not only the syllogism that has that explicit form, but also every syllogism in which one of the premises is taken as truth and is not demonstrated. This occurs extremely often, for the common logician thinks that, if every premise must be demonstrated, the syllogism con- tained in the demonstration would also need premises that need to be demonstrated, and so on indefinitely. When that happens the common logician takes a secure path and assumes some of the premises.
The point has a pivotal importance for the very concept of scientificity. Science is concrete and demonstrated knowledge; otherwise, one can 'choose' to accept it, just like the worldviews which are continuously advanced by pasquinade writers. Although the individual scientists is allowed to suppose some things because the life of a person has some limitations of time and energy, science as such cannot suppose anything;
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Logic and Natural Sciences 199
its obligation is to demonstrate. But if common logic replies that the premises of its syllogisms should not be demonstrated, what they are in fact telling us is that science does not exist, or, if anything, a very funny and easy thing to do. One can embrace any thesis, as arbitrary as it may be, for one does not need to demonstrate the premises that ground such thesis.
The traditional syllogism is a deceit. It simulates to demonstrate the propositions, but in the end it leaves them as uncertain as before, because its truth depends on the truth of the premises, precisely that which is left aside.
One can make a big mess which is apparently true because it is ex- pressed in conditional terms that are formally valid. But knowledge does not advance a single step by this procedure, since we do not know if the conditions are met or not. It would be a mental game with no relationship to reality and truth.
How was it possible that essayists and the users of traditional logic did not realize that, if premises are uncertain, concepts themselves are also so.
Indeed, one can build up a perfectly correct syllogism in which all the concepts are uncertain. In that case, we may ask: Where are they taken from? How can we know their meaning? And more importantly: How can we know that they correspond to reality?
The desire of obtaining some judgments by empirical experiences is, of course, an illusion. The judgment is never 'given'. The allegedly empirical judgment does not identify itself with the empirical data. Despite that they call it observational, the allegedly empirical presup- position consists in words, while seeing or touching does not consist in words but in shudders of the diverse parts of the nervous system. The basic and observational propositions is only an interpretation of sen- sible data, highly questionable because it is constituted by concepts, and no concept as such has empirical meaning, as we have repeatedly demonstrated. In order that logic starts working "what is perceived must have at least the meaning of a universal" (PG 185); and in fact "for us the object can be nothing else but our notions of it. " (WL I 15); "the syllogisms with which one demonstrates are concepts formed by the subject" (GP III 280).
It is then when, with all its virulence, the problem of demonstrating premises indefinitely is posited, for it depends on the concepts. Some certainty has to be the condition of possibility of science; otherwise,
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 200 Hegel was right
one would have to define science as the 'uncertain', and there would be no distinction between it and ordinary knowledge, and hence science would not exist.
Let us repeat the question: how do we know if concepts capture reality or not? It is evident that the famous 'correspondence between mind and reality' has to consist in the 'identity between the mind and reality'. Hegel says: "Only in thought exists the true correspondence between the objective and the subjective: that is myself" (GP II 165).
There cannot be any separation between the spirit and the concept of spirit; there can be no distinction there, and in fact, there is not any. We saw before (III, 1) that the spirit consists in knowing itself. "The first thing one has to do when it comes to the concept is to quit believing that the concept is something that we have, something that we have in ourselves [. . . ] What we call soul is the concept; the concept as such becomes existing and is the spirit, the self-consciousness" (PR I 220).
In this is myself there is certainty as whether the concept adapts to reality or not, as whether the concept captures reality or not. What we have expressed in our previous chapters demonstrates that all concepts stem from the concept of the spirit. As Hegel says, "the knower [. . . ] has in its concept the whole essentiality of the objective world" (WL II 438). We have demonstrated that it is an illusion to define reality indepen- dently from the subject (II, 7), and that 'out of thought' is an expression lack of meaning.
The relations and interferences between concepts --in which logic consist-- are only then possible because all of them point towards the same reality: the spirit. Besides, that is what judgments affirm: that one is the other. Without Hegel's contribution, logic today faces a dead end: it deals with tautologies or with unjustifiable synthetic judgments.
By way of appendix, one should notice that set theory is a desperate attempt of evading the concept, by making everything visual, spatial and imaginary. It figures that, if an object is a part of a certain set of objects, and that set is the part of a larger set, it is a logically justified step to affirm that the object in the first set is also a part of the second one. It figures that in this 'it follows' one does not employ any concept whatsoever. But it is primal to state that --despite the opposite figu- rations--, when the set logician says 'the set of metallic objects' he is neither pointing out with his fingers to all the metallic objects, nor is he imagining them, nor he manages that we imagine them. Consequently, there is no such set. If we understand him it is because we both have
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Logic and Natural Sciences 201
the concept of a metallic object. The extentionalist does not have before him the set of metallic objects in imagination, in empirical perception or in the mind: the only thing that he has before him are concepts. And to affirm that a certain material object forms part of a concept is preposterous.
How can one know whether x belongs to set A, when we do not understand the word by which one is trying to encompass set A? It is not true that someone can designate by means of this word certain set of objects, for we do not know to which object --among the many ones there are in the world-- this word is referred. To designate is not a re- lation that exists between the word and the belonging objects without the intervention of the knowing subject.
Since the set logicist does not have before him either set A or B, if he is truly referring to them it is due to the fact that he has in mind the two belonging universal concepts, and the relationship between the both sets of which he speaks is a relation between concepts. Now, there can be no other thing between concepts as relations of content; any other relation between them would be a mere metaphor. But the relations of content are precisely those which are studied by the Hegelian logic.
3. force
In the fourth part of this present chapter we will show the most pervasive critique that has ever been done to the natural sciences, which is con- tained in the work titled The Science of Logic. Natural science disciplines had not attended to such devastating critique, not even after Einstein and Quantum theory, although in some way, both Relativity and Quan- tum physics confirm what Hegel said. Nevertheless, it happens that the intellection of the above mentioned work depends on understanding the message from, what Hegel calls, the second book, the essence book, in which the concept of force is so paradigmatic that deserves to be ex- amined by us in full detail. That second book is the one which contains the explicative concepts, in contrast to the merely descriptive ones; but among the explicative ones, force, according to Hegel, is 'the most no- table one' (GP III 84), while Hegel warns that it is not actually a concept but a certain 'mental way', certain 'way of thinking'.
It is true that General Relativity with its realm wants to delete from the world of Physics the gravitational force which is the key to
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 202 Hegel was right
the great Newtonian construction. During the eighties many physi- cists, following Einstein's example, pretended to delete every force by spaces formed up to eleven dimensions. But, in the first place, we will soon see that the Hegelian critique of force is perfectly valid against any other concept of explanatory intention. And in the second place, physicists continue e to speak carelessly about forces despite of Einstein and his imitators. Raymond A. Serway still enumerates as fundamental --besides gravity -- the electromagnetic force between charges, the strong nuclear force between subatomic particles and the weak nucle- ar force (1985, 72). In general, atomic physics draws explanation with forces as if nothing had ever happened: e. g. Rittenhouse (EB 14, 330,2), Ziman (EB 14,340,1), Cuninghame (EB 14,361,1). And one speaks even about the "London Forces" which are applied between the molecules (EB 23,690 ,2) and the Van der Waals force is appealed to explain the liquids and solids formation (EB 14,377,1). The four forces that Serway enumerates appear to continue unperturbed on their explicative task: cf. Rosenfeld (EB 28,252) and Brown (EB 25,819).
One does not have the slightest idea when people like Rosenblueth say nowadays that science does not pretend to explain the phenomena. The concept of strength can only have the aim of explaining and nothing more.
At least the discipline to which Newton dedicated his life never pretended anything else. On the first page of his principal work Newton identifies physics with the force science: "the rational mechanics will be the science of movements that shall result out from any sort of strength, and from the strengths required to produce any sort of movement" (1977, 1).
Newton was not so much impressed by the attack that Leibnitz for- mulates against him on its fifth letter to Samuel Clarke, according to which those forces are not in any way different from the scholastic's 'hidden qualities', by means of which it is tremendously easy to explain any phenomena: e. g. if a liquid tastes acid, then that can be explained by the hidden quality called acidity. That is the way Newton's explanations are: if the apple falls down to the ground, that can be explained by a certain attraction force whose single definition is to be the movement's explanation that is intended to be explained. It is like ancient medicine: if an ill person suffers melancholy, then that can be explained by the melancholic fluids.
Hegel says that it was Newton who "contributed the most" (GP III 231) to the inclusion of those brilliant explanations to Physics. But
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apparently, this way of thinking is very widespread: one can explain that molecules do not disperse themselves forming gases by recur- ring to Van der Waals' forces that keep the molecules together, which by the way is the explanation to describe liquidity. However, one sees that the only definition of these forces ends up being the explanation of the phenomenon which we wanted to explain. Nothing is again defined.
With regard to the content, one does not say to us anything which the phenomenon itself did not have, that means to say, the phenomenon of the reciprocal reaction of these bodies in movement, only comes about in the form a determination reflected on itself, the form of force. If we then ask what kind of force is the force of attraction, the answer we are given is that it is the force that makes the Earth move around the Sun; that means, such explanation has exactly the same content which it had actually to ex- plain first [. . . ]. In ordinary life, these etiologies, which are the privilege of sciences, cannot remain unnoticed: they reveal themselves as empty chit- chat and tautologies. If we ask why does this man go to the city and one re- sponds us that there is a force that pulls that man there, we immediately see the absurdity of the answer, an absurdity which is not allowed in sciences (WL II 79).
In the same line that the Leibnizian critique, Hegel says that those qualities are not hidden at all: they are perfectly clear, since 'they do not have any other content than the phenomenon itself' which they intended to explain. Therefore they explain absolutely nothing.
"When someone inquires for an explanation, asks actually for the explicative factor a different content from the object whose explanation is being asked" (WL II 83).
However, "in the category of force there is not actually a concrete content" (VG 114); that is why "it has no other content than the phe- nomenon itself" (WL II 79), "it stems only from the same phenomenon's elements" (GP II 388). From this it follows that "the explanation by means of force is identical, formal, and with regard to the content is nothing" (NH 156).
The explanation is very generous: it postulates itself as explicative of an entity that cannot be seen, since that what can be seen is the phe- nomenon that is intended to be explained, and when someone asks for the definition of that entity in order to know what it is, then he is given the answer that nobody knows it. So, how can we understand
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 204 Hegel was right
what they are talking about if either sensibility or reason does no tell us? And what is the explicative capacity from a verbal maneuver that advances as an explanation an entity from which no one knows what it consist of?
This is why Hegel holds that, in balance, the only content that presents itself is the content from the phenomenon to be explained, since physicists are not capable of giving content to the entity called strength or force. With irony, Hegel calls these entities "determinations of reflection": not only because they are breed by the reflection of the abstract intellect that goes beyond what is observable, but because they are in themselves mere reflection or reflex of the phenomenon to be explained; they have exactly the same content; they are the "tranquil mimicry of the existing world of phenomena" (WL II 127). Whoever takes as valid such explanations, "wants to see doubled the same deter- mination that is the content"(WL II 78).
It is not very flattering that the human mind has ever taken as a valid explanation any supposed entity whose proposers do not know how to define: "ordinarily, one says that we do not know the nature of force" (NH 156). One openly acknowledges that what we perceive are the effects of the force, that is to say, the phenomenon that is intended to be explained, but not the strength itself; this one remains as something unknown.
It is frequent to say that the nature of force itself is unknown to us and can only be known in its manifestation. [. . . ]. The content's determination of force is precisely the same as that of the manifestation. Consequently, the explanation of a phenomenon by means of strength is a hollow tautology (EPW. 136 A).
The really incredible circularity of this entire explanatory maneuver reveals itself in the first law of Newton called the principle of inertia. On the one hand, one defines an inertial system as that in which no forces intervene. On the other hand, force is defined as something that does not intervene in an inertial system. It speaks badly about the hu- man mind that it formerly allowed these kinds of explanations.
And this is how Taylor and Wheeler keep speaking:
To understand the nature of the concept, 'force', try to imagine how one could get along without it! Force is most obviously needed to explain why
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Logic and Natural Sciences 205
a particle speeds up or slows down. A test particle, subject to no forces, is defined precisely by the fact that it does not speed up or slow down (1966, 101).
Let us clarify that. Strength is defined as something that explains that a particle modifies its speed. But a 'particle whose speed is not modified' is defined as a particle that is not subjected to forces. The emptiness and circularity of such lucubrations is manifest.
Of course, the attempt to define force as the product from the mass by the acceleration is equally circular and null, because it has been already stated that mass is defined as the resistance that an object opposes to the application of a certain force. Look how the Encyclopedia Britannica defines mass: ". . . the resistance that a body of matter offers to a change in its speed or position upon the application of a force. The greater the mass of a body, the smaller the change produced by an applied force. " (EB 7, 915, 2). In fact, the mass is the quantifica- tion of the inertia, the quantitive measure of inertia, so that the defini- tory circularity between mass and strength is exactly the same that the one indicated between inertia and force: inertia is defined as a state in which no forces intervene, and force is defined as something that does not intervene in inertial states.
It is interesting to notice that the first law of Newton --the whole foundation of Physics- is one of the most metaphysic constructions ever formulated. It speaks about resting objects, but there has never been a resting object, since we know that lamp located over my table is travelling along with our entire planet and with ourselves at a speed of thirty km per second. It speaks about rectilinear movement but every movement we know are elliptic or parabolic orbits, and if something like a rectilinear movement existed, we would have no way of proving that it is indeed so, since the ruler or stick with which we would compare it is not evidently straight, and in order to verify that it is straight we would use another stick whose straightness is also unknown to us, and so on in indefinitum. Newton's defenders would say that we are dealing with relative rest and relative movement, e. g. everything is relative to the objects of the surroundings; but with such a statement they definitely ruin the law, because if there are any objects in our surroundings, they exert the attraction or repulsion strengths upon an object about which the law refers, and this law cannot speak about an object upon which no forces are exerted.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 206 Hegel was right
In fact, Newton thought in absolute movement and in absolute rest, assuming the myth of absolute space. But we already said (II, 1) with Hegel that it is not possible to speak about rest or movement, "since the movement is necessarily [directed] towards some place" (GP II 193). And that was in fact one of Einstein's first considerations: "Does it make any sense to speak about a movement which we consider to be unique in the universe? No, because one considers that an object is in motion when it changes position with respect to another one" (1984, 182). We must say the same about rest: An object is considered to be at rest when it does not change position with respect to other objects. That is why Hegel says that Newton's first law is "an empty mental monster" (GP II, 193).
That first law tells us that there is a pair of phenomena that need no explanation: rest and uniform rectilinear movement. But these two phenomena do not exist! It can only be brilliant that they tell us that no explanation is needed for everything that does not exist!
The circularity and the absolute uselessness of the first law trans- forms the pseudo-concept of force into something absolutely circular and uselessness, because only that law could give any meaning to the word force.
Undoubtedly, the general omission of a genuine definition of strength has been present: it is the delusion that we have already denounced many times: one believes that a meaning can be provided to "force" by only pointing out to some empirical data. In the combat to this de- ceit, Einstein's contribution has proved to be particularly valuable. It is true, however, that the decisive and scientific warning had already been stated by Hegel a century before: "Force [. . . ] is not something perceptible; therefore, empiricists surrender themselves to such de- terminations in an uncritical and unconscious way" (GP III, 84). But Einstein managed to reach the wide public, or at least, the public who fears Philosophy but not Physics. Einstein ? s argumentation proves one out of two issues which for our practical effects are equivalent: either that force is not empirical data, or that the empirical data that some call force does not correspond in the physical world to any reality
It would have been enough to indicate that the experience of effort is introspective; therefore, it is not empirical, since one understands by empirical what one perceives by means by some of the external five senses.
Besides, it would also have been enough to indicate that one under- stands by 'force' the 'capacity' of producing certain effects, that means
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Logic and Natural Sciences 207
to say, the power of causing certain manifestations. But we have already stated (III, 9) that a power is not an empirical data. Capacity means that something can produce certain effects, but sensibility witnesses, at best, that things are, but not that they can. If we want, we will infer that they can, but this demonstrates that a power is not an empirical data, for it needs to be inferred. Therefore, the only capacity and power that we actually perceive is the self-determination of spirit: its real capacity of producing determinations that did not previously exist. We will get back to this point. We will return to this point, because the causality concept had imposed the same result to us: Whoever wants to explain what the 'becoming' of something new in the world is, cannot do with- out the only cause that makes exists what did not exist before. It actu- ally does not do without anything: the proof thereof is that the concept of force is explanatory to us --a concept that stems not from empirical data but from self-consciousness.
The first of these two observations --which would have been enough to prove the others wrong-- had already been made by the most rea- sonable physicists. Max Born affirms this: "The fundamental concept of statics is force. It is derived from the subjective feeling of exertion experienced when we perform work with our bodies" (1962, 14). And Eddington completes:
The primary conception of force is associated with the muscular sensation felt when we make an effort to cause or prevent the motion of matter. Simi- lar effects on the motion of matter can be caused by non-living agency, and these also are regarded as due to forces (1978, 57; orig. 1920).
Neither Born nor Eddington seems to ponder on the fact that attribut- ing effort to material things is animism and primitive mentality. Now, the only content that these two authors are indicating as the meaning of force is precisely effort. This is the reason why the Leibnizian critic of Newtonian strengths mentioned the 'hidden qualities'.
One must have in mind that when Margenau affirms that "No- body has seen this force of physical attraction, and no one ever will. " (1978, 335), he is properly saying something that any reflexive person could deny: by definition, what is seen are the effects of force, while force itself cannot be seen. And what is said about seeing must be said about touching too: the tactile sensation itself is the effect from the force one assumes to exist; force is conceived as the capacity to produce these
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 208 Hegel was right
effects, and the capacity cannot be touched. No physical force is em- pirical data. It is a mental construction that we imaginarily project on the physical world, for which it is required that the content of the projected concept is extracted from somewhere else.
the meaning of necessity and liberty. The abstract intellect was the one that separated and isolated them, and in doing that it made them unintelligible; that abstraction was the cause of the antinomy; in con- crete, that is to say, in the spirit, these two concepts do not contradict each other; on the contrary, they have the same meaning.
2. Logic
We had to multiply the examples of real dialectic in rigorous analy- sis of the terms, because both scientists and superficial commentators believe that in Hegel the transition from one concept to another is ca- pricious and of a literary kind. For Hegel, on the contrary, "all logic consists in this" (WL II 495).
The logic consists in the 'it follows'. Everything else is accessory. Logic consists in this question: With what right is one concept inferred from another? With what right can one deduce a proposition in which the subject has a predicate another than the one he originally had be- fore? How can one justify the transition from one predicate to another, which is evidently a transition from one concept to another?
In the light of the above, it is enormously disquieting that scientists and philosophers do not realize the total revolution that Hegel intro- duced in this science, upon which the scientificity of all sciences de- pend, in spite of the fact that he specifically warns that the Aristotelian logic is useless and that he, Hegel, is founding the real logic:
The syllogism in the fashion of the abstract intellect --which is the one ren- dered by the traditional logic form-- has the meaning of a content joined with a different content. In contrast, the syllogism of reason has the content that the subject, etcetera, is joined to himself; the syllogism of reason is that some content, God etcetera, is united to Himself by means of distinguishing itself. This identity constitutes the essential element of the speculative con- tent, of nature's syllogism of reason. Aristotle is, therefore, the founder of traditional logic; his forms correspond only to the relation between finite to finite; truth cannot be understood under such forms (GP II 241).
The real logic is based on what this chapter has underlined: one concept 'follows' from another because they are not understood separately. The logical necessity is the exigency that a concept has meaning and is understood.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 198 Hegel was right
The implication between the concepts is what traditional logic as well as set logic ignore. But that implication is what allows a real in- ference of something new, of something that effectively increases our knowledge and is not tautologically reduced to what was said: what was said does not 'follow' because we had it already. For instance, the well-known syllogism: 'All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore, Socrates is mortal', does not teach us anything in the conclusion, for what it said was already stated in the first premise. The first premise could have not been stated had we not known that the content of the conclusion was true. Such reasoning does not make us wiser.
In contrast, the logic of Hegel begins with the concept of being, and because of the exigency of providing this term with a meaning, it leads us (cfr III, 3) to a new content: the activity of giving determinations to oneself. Being and existing can only consist in that. That really does increase our knowledge. The inference can be denied only by he who is able to provide the word being with another meaning, but we saw already that such thing is impossible.
We saw (III, 4) what happens with the initial concept of substance: it is not understandable that something can exist in itself if it doesn't give to itself the determinations of its existence; and then pass from the substantial content to the subjectivity content.
Tautology is the way-out of the abstract intellect that does not un- derstand. When it comes to understand the concepts, our knowledge actually increases.
The only path that fixational logics can go through in order to avoid becoming sheer tautologies is the hypothetical syllogism. I call here hypothetic not only the syllogism that has that explicit form, but also every syllogism in which one of the premises is taken as truth and is not demonstrated. This occurs extremely often, for the common logician thinks that, if every premise must be demonstrated, the syllogism con- tained in the demonstration would also need premises that need to be demonstrated, and so on indefinitely. When that happens the common logician takes a secure path and assumes some of the premises.
The point has a pivotal importance for the very concept of scientificity. Science is concrete and demonstrated knowledge; otherwise, one can 'choose' to accept it, just like the worldviews which are continuously advanced by pasquinade writers. Although the individual scientists is allowed to suppose some things because the life of a person has some limitations of time and energy, science as such cannot suppose anything;
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Logic and Natural Sciences 199
its obligation is to demonstrate. But if common logic replies that the premises of its syllogisms should not be demonstrated, what they are in fact telling us is that science does not exist, or, if anything, a very funny and easy thing to do. One can embrace any thesis, as arbitrary as it may be, for one does not need to demonstrate the premises that ground such thesis.
The traditional syllogism is a deceit. It simulates to demonstrate the propositions, but in the end it leaves them as uncertain as before, because its truth depends on the truth of the premises, precisely that which is left aside.
One can make a big mess which is apparently true because it is ex- pressed in conditional terms that are formally valid. But knowledge does not advance a single step by this procedure, since we do not know if the conditions are met or not. It would be a mental game with no relationship to reality and truth.
How was it possible that essayists and the users of traditional logic did not realize that, if premises are uncertain, concepts themselves are also so.
Indeed, one can build up a perfectly correct syllogism in which all the concepts are uncertain. In that case, we may ask: Where are they taken from? How can we know their meaning? And more importantly: How can we know that they correspond to reality?
The desire of obtaining some judgments by empirical experiences is, of course, an illusion. The judgment is never 'given'. The allegedly empirical judgment does not identify itself with the empirical data. Despite that they call it observational, the allegedly empirical presup- position consists in words, while seeing or touching does not consist in words but in shudders of the diverse parts of the nervous system. The basic and observational propositions is only an interpretation of sen- sible data, highly questionable because it is constituted by concepts, and no concept as such has empirical meaning, as we have repeatedly demonstrated. In order that logic starts working "what is perceived must have at least the meaning of a universal" (PG 185); and in fact "for us the object can be nothing else but our notions of it. " (WL I 15); "the syllogisms with which one demonstrates are concepts formed by the subject" (GP III 280).
It is then when, with all its virulence, the problem of demonstrating premises indefinitely is posited, for it depends on the concepts. Some certainty has to be the condition of possibility of science; otherwise,
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 200 Hegel was right
one would have to define science as the 'uncertain', and there would be no distinction between it and ordinary knowledge, and hence science would not exist.
Let us repeat the question: how do we know if concepts capture reality or not? It is evident that the famous 'correspondence between mind and reality' has to consist in the 'identity between the mind and reality'. Hegel says: "Only in thought exists the true correspondence between the objective and the subjective: that is myself" (GP II 165).
There cannot be any separation between the spirit and the concept of spirit; there can be no distinction there, and in fact, there is not any. We saw before (III, 1) that the spirit consists in knowing itself. "The first thing one has to do when it comes to the concept is to quit believing that the concept is something that we have, something that we have in ourselves [. . . ] What we call soul is the concept; the concept as such becomes existing and is the spirit, the self-consciousness" (PR I 220).
In this is myself there is certainty as whether the concept adapts to reality or not, as whether the concept captures reality or not. What we have expressed in our previous chapters demonstrates that all concepts stem from the concept of the spirit. As Hegel says, "the knower [. . . ] has in its concept the whole essentiality of the objective world" (WL II 438). We have demonstrated that it is an illusion to define reality indepen- dently from the subject (II, 7), and that 'out of thought' is an expression lack of meaning.
The relations and interferences between concepts --in which logic consist-- are only then possible because all of them point towards the same reality: the spirit. Besides, that is what judgments affirm: that one is the other. Without Hegel's contribution, logic today faces a dead end: it deals with tautologies or with unjustifiable synthetic judgments.
By way of appendix, one should notice that set theory is a desperate attempt of evading the concept, by making everything visual, spatial and imaginary. It figures that, if an object is a part of a certain set of objects, and that set is the part of a larger set, it is a logically justified step to affirm that the object in the first set is also a part of the second one. It figures that in this 'it follows' one does not employ any concept whatsoever. But it is primal to state that --despite the opposite figu- rations--, when the set logician says 'the set of metallic objects' he is neither pointing out with his fingers to all the metallic objects, nor is he imagining them, nor he manages that we imagine them. Consequently, there is no such set. If we understand him it is because we both have
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the concept of a metallic object. The extentionalist does not have before him the set of metallic objects in imagination, in empirical perception or in the mind: the only thing that he has before him are concepts. And to affirm that a certain material object forms part of a concept is preposterous.
How can one know whether x belongs to set A, when we do not understand the word by which one is trying to encompass set A? It is not true that someone can designate by means of this word certain set of objects, for we do not know to which object --among the many ones there are in the world-- this word is referred. To designate is not a re- lation that exists between the word and the belonging objects without the intervention of the knowing subject.
Since the set logicist does not have before him either set A or B, if he is truly referring to them it is due to the fact that he has in mind the two belonging universal concepts, and the relationship between the both sets of which he speaks is a relation between concepts. Now, there can be no other thing between concepts as relations of content; any other relation between them would be a mere metaphor. But the relations of content are precisely those which are studied by the Hegelian logic.
3. force
In the fourth part of this present chapter we will show the most pervasive critique that has ever been done to the natural sciences, which is con- tained in the work titled The Science of Logic. Natural science disciplines had not attended to such devastating critique, not even after Einstein and Quantum theory, although in some way, both Relativity and Quan- tum physics confirm what Hegel said. Nevertheless, it happens that the intellection of the above mentioned work depends on understanding the message from, what Hegel calls, the second book, the essence book, in which the concept of force is so paradigmatic that deserves to be ex- amined by us in full detail. That second book is the one which contains the explicative concepts, in contrast to the merely descriptive ones; but among the explicative ones, force, according to Hegel, is 'the most no- table one' (GP III 84), while Hegel warns that it is not actually a concept but a certain 'mental way', certain 'way of thinking'.
It is true that General Relativity with its realm wants to delete from the world of Physics the gravitational force which is the key to
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the great Newtonian construction. During the eighties many physi- cists, following Einstein's example, pretended to delete every force by spaces formed up to eleven dimensions. But, in the first place, we will soon see that the Hegelian critique of force is perfectly valid against any other concept of explanatory intention. And in the second place, physicists continue e to speak carelessly about forces despite of Einstein and his imitators. Raymond A. Serway still enumerates as fundamental --besides gravity -- the electromagnetic force between charges, the strong nuclear force between subatomic particles and the weak nucle- ar force (1985, 72). In general, atomic physics draws explanation with forces as if nothing had ever happened: e. g. Rittenhouse (EB 14, 330,2), Ziman (EB 14,340,1), Cuninghame (EB 14,361,1). And one speaks even about the "London Forces" which are applied between the molecules (EB 23,690 ,2) and the Van der Waals force is appealed to explain the liquids and solids formation (EB 14,377,1). The four forces that Serway enumerates appear to continue unperturbed on their explicative task: cf. Rosenfeld (EB 28,252) and Brown (EB 25,819).
One does not have the slightest idea when people like Rosenblueth say nowadays that science does not pretend to explain the phenomena. The concept of strength can only have the aim of explaining and nothing more.
At least the discipline to which Newton dedicated his life never pretended anything else. On the first page of his principal work Newton identifies physics with the force science: "the rational mechanics will be the science of movements that shall result out from any sort of strength, and from the strengths required to produce any sort of movement" (1977, 1).
Newton was not so much impressed by the attack that Leibnitz for- mulates against him on its fifth letter to Samuel Clarke, according to which those forces are not in any way different from the scholastic's 'hidden qualities', by means of which it is tremendously easy to explain any phenomena: e. g. if a liquid tastes acid, then that can be explained by the hidden quality called acidity. That is the way Newton's explanations are: if the apple falls down to the ground, that can be explained by a certain attraction force whose single definition is to be the movement's explanation that is intended to be explained. It is like ancient medicine: if an ill person suffers melancholy, then that can be explained by the melancholic fluids.
Hegel says that it was Newton who "contributed the most" (GP III 231) to the inclusion of those brilliant explanations to Physics. But
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apparently, this way of thinking is very widespread: one can explain that molecules do not disperse themselves forming gases by recur- ring to Van der Waals' forces that keep the molecules together, which by the way is the explanation to describe liquidity. However, one sees that the only definition of these forces ends up being the explanation of the phenomenon which we wanted to explain. Nothing is again defined.
With regard to the content, one does not say to us anything which the phenomenon itself did not have, that means to say, the phenomenon of the reciprocal reaction of these bodies in movement, only comes about in the form a determination reflected on itself, the form of force. If we then ask what kind of force is the force of attraction, the answer we are given is that it is the force that makes the Earth move around the Sun; that means, such explanation has exactly the same content which it had actually to ex- plain first [. . . ]. In ordinary life, these etiologies, which are the privilege of sciences, cannot remain unnoticed: they reveal themselves as empty chit- chat and tautologies. If we ask why does this man go to the city and one re- sponds us that there is a force that pulls that man there, we immediately see the absurdity of the answer, an absurdity which is not allowed in sciences (WL II 79).
In the same line that the Leibnizian critique, Hegel says that those qualities are not hidden at all: they are perfectly clear, since 'they do not have any other content than the phenomenon itself' which they intended to explain. Therefore they explain absolutely nothing.
"When someone inquires for an explanation, asks actually for the explicative factor a different content from the object whose explanation is being asked" (WL II 83).
However, "in the category of force there is not actually a concrete content" (VG 114); that is why "it has no other content than the phe- nomenon itself" (WL II 79), "it stems only from the same phenomenon's elements" (GP II 388). From this it follows that "the explanation by means of force is identical, formal, and with regard to the content is nothing" (NH 156).
The explanation is very generous: it postulates itself as explicative of an entity that cannot be seen, since that what can be seen is the phe- nomenon that is intended to be explained, and when someone asks for the definition of that entity in order to know what it is, then he is given the answer that nobody knows it. So, how can we understand
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what they are talking about if either sensibility or reason does no tell us? And what is the explicative capacity from a verbal maneuver that advances as an explanation an entity from which no one knows what it consist of?
This is why Hegel holds that, in balance, the only content that presents itself is the content from the phenomenon to be explained, since physicists are not capable of giving content to the entity called strength or force. With irony, Hegel calls these entities "determinations of reflection": not only because they are breed by the reflection of the abstract intellect that goes beyond what is observable, but because they are in themselves mere reflection or reflex of the phenomenon to be explained; they have exactly the same content; they are the "tranquil mimicry of the existing world of phenomena" (WL II 127). Whoever takes as valid such explanations, "wants to see doubled the same deter- mination that is the content"(WL II 78).
It is not very flattering that the human mind has ever taken as a valid explanation any supposed entity whose proposers do not know how to define: "ordinarily, one says that we do not know the nature of force" (NH 156). One openly acknowledges that what we perceive are the effects of the force, that is to say, the phenomenon that is intended to be explained, but not the strength itself; this one remains as something unknown.
It is frequent to say that the nature of force itself is unknown to us and can only be known in its manifestation. [. . . ]. The content's determination of force is precisely the same as that of the manifestation. Consequently, the explanation of a phenomenon by means of strength is a hollow tautology (EPW. 136 A).
The really incredible circularity of this entire explanatory maneuver reveals itself in the first law of Newton called the principle of inertia. On the one hand, one defines an inertial system as that in which no forces intervene. On the other hand, force is defined as something that does not intervene in an inertial system. It speaks badly about the hu- man mind that it formerly allowed these kinds of explanations.
And this is how Taylor and Wheeler keep speaking:
To understand the nature of the concept, 'force', try to imagine how one could get along without it! Force is most obviously needed to explain why
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a particle speeds up or slows down. A test particle, subject to no forces, is defined precisely by the fact that it does not speed up or slow down (1966, 101).
Let us clarify that. Strength is defined as something that explains that a particle modifies its speed. But a 'particle whose speed is not modified' is defined as a particle that is not subjected to forces. The emptiness and circularity of such lucubrations is manifest.
Of course, the attempt to define force as the product from the mass by the acceleration is equally circular and null, because it has been already stated that mass is defined as the resistance that an object opposes to the application of a certain force. Look how the Encyclopedia Britannica defines mass: ". . . the resistance that a body of matter offers to a change in its speed or position upon the application of a force. The greater the mass of a body, the smaller the change produced by an applied force. " (EB 7, 915, 2). In fact, the mass is the quantifica- tion of the inertia, the quantitive measure of inertia, so that the defini- tory circularity between mass and strength is exactly the same that the one indicated between inertia and force: inertia is defined as a state in which no forces intervene, and force is defined as something that does not intervene in inertial states.
It is interesting to notice that the first law of Newton --the whole foundation of Physics- is one of the most metaphysic constructions ever formulated. It speaks about resting objects, but there has never been a resting object, since we know that lamp located over my table is travelling along with our entire planet and with ourselves at a speed of thirty km per second. It speaks about rectilinear movement but every movement we know are elliptic or parabolic orbits, and if something like a rectilinear movement existed, we would have no way of proving that it is indeed so, since the ruler or stick with which we would compare it is not evidently straight, and in order to verify that it is straight we would use another stick whose straightness is also unknown to us, and so on in indefinitum. Newton's defenders would say that we are dealing with relative rest and relative movement, e. g. everything is relative to the objects of the surroundings; but with such a statement they definitely ruin the law, because if there are any objects in our surroundings, they exert the attraction or repulsion strengths upon an object about which the law refers, and this law cannot speak about an object upon which no forces are exerted.
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In fact, Newton thought in absolute movement and in absolute rest, assuming the myth of absolute space. But we already said (II, 1) with Hegel that it is not possible to speak about rest or movement, "since the movement is necessarily [directed] towards some place" (GP II 193). And that was in fact one of Einstein's first considerations: "Does it make any sense to speak about a movement which we consider to be unique in the universe? No, because one considers that an object is in motion when it changes position with respect to another one" (1984, 182). We must say the same about rest: An object is considered to be at rest when it does not change position with respect to other objects. That is why Hegel says that Newton's first law is "an empty mental monster" (GP II, 193).
That first law tells us that there is a pair of phenomena that need no explanation: rest and uniform rectilinear movement. But these two phenomena do not exist! It can only be brilliant that they tell us that no explanation is needed for everything that does not exist!
The circularity and the absolute uselessness of the first law trans- forms the pseudo-concept of force into something absolutely circular and uselessness, because only that law could give any meaning to the word force.
Undoubtedly, the general omission of a genuine definition of strength has been present: it is the delusion that we have already denounced many times: one believes that a meaning can be provided to "force" by only pointing out to some empirical data. In the combat to this de- ceit, Einstein's contribution has proved to be particularly valuable. It is true, however, that the decisive and scientific warning had already been stated by Hegel a century before: "Force [. . . ] is not something perceptible; therefore, empiricists surrender themselves to such de- terminations in an uncritical and unconscious way" (GP III, 84). But Einstein managed to reach the wide public, or at least, the public who fears Philosophy but not Physics. Einstein ? s argumentation proves one out of two issues which for our practical effects are equivalent: either that force is not empirical data, or that the empirical data that some call force does not correspond in the physical world to any reality
It would have been enough to indicate that the experience of effort is introspective; therefore, it is not empirical, since one understands by empirical what one perceives by means by some of the external five senses.
Besides, it would also have been enough to indicate that one under- stands by 'force' the 'capacity' of producing certain effects, that means
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to say, the power of causing certain manifestations. But we have already stated (III, 9) that a power is not an empirical data. Capacity means that something can produce certain effects, but sensibility witnesses, at best, that things are, but not that they can. If we want, we will infer that they can, but this demonstrates that a power is not an empirical data, for it needs to be inferred. Therefore, the only capacity and power that we actually perceive is the self-determination of spirit: its real capacity of producing determinations that did not previously exist. We will get back to this point. We will return to this point, because the causality concept had imposed the same result to us: Whoever wants to explain what the 'becoming' of something new in the world is, cannot do with- out the only cause that makes exists what did not exist before. It actu- ally does not do without anything: the proof thereof is that the concept of force is explanatory to us --a concept that stems not from empirical data but from self-consciousness.
The first of these two observations --which would have been enough to prove the others wrong-- had already been made by the most rea- sonable physicists. Max Born affirms this: "The fundamental concept of statics is force. It is derived from the subjective feeling of exertion experienced when we perform work with our bodies" (1962, 14). And Eddington completes:
The primary conception of force is associated with the muscular sensation felt when we make an effort to cause or prevent the motion of matter. Simi- lar effects on the motion of matter can be caused by non-living agency, and these also are regarded as due to forces (1978, 57; orig. 1920).
Neither Born nor Eddington seems to ponder on the fact that attribut- ing effort to material things is animism and primitive mentality. Now, the only content that these two authors are indicating as the meaning of force is precisely effort. This is the reason why the Leibnizian critic of Newtonian strengths mentioned the 'hidden qualities'.
One must have in mind that when Margenau affirms that "No- body has seen this force of physical attraction, and no one ever will. " (1978, 335), he is properly saying something that any reflexive person could deny: by definition, what is seen are the effects of force, while force itself cannot be seen. And what is said about seeing must be said about touching too: the tactile sensation itself is the effect from the force one assumes to exist; force is conceived as the capacity to produce these
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effects, and the capacity cannot be touched. No physical force is em- pirical data. It is a mental construction that we imaginarily project on the physical world, for which it is required that the content of the projected concept is extracted from somewhere else.
