Christianity
first laid
lit.
lit.
William Smith - 1844 - Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities - a
their very nature, cannot rise above the material
iii. 1. ) Motion is the means by which everything and reach real existence as such. The investi-
strives to advance from potentiality (matter) to that gations of this science are restricted to one part of
actuality, of which, according to its nature, it is material existence (nepi 71 mépos tñs oikelas üans
capable, i. e. to the form appropriate to it, which is TOLE Tai tiiv Jewplav, Met. xi. 4).
its purpose. The eloos is thus what is true in the The relation between the three theoretical sci-
visible object, but not apart from the process of be- ences, therefore, is this : the science of physics
coming; but it is the basis of this process of becom- busies itself indeed with the internal formative
ing itself, inasmuch as it is the active, fashioning principle, with that which has an absolute exist-
principle. The true principle of natural science, ence, but only in so far as this has passed into the
Therefore, lies in the dynamico-genetical method, material, and is accordingly not immoveable. (Met.
which looks upon nature as something continually vi. 1, xii. 7. )
becoming, as it strives to advance froin potentiality The science of mathematics, on the other hand,
to actuality. Motion itself is eternal and unpro- occupies itself indeed with that which is immove-
duced ; it is the life (olov {uni tis oùoa) in all able and at rest, as its definitions are fixed and
natural things. (Phys. viii. 1. ) Through this unalterable; but not with that which is absolutely
striving of all natural existences after the imper- immoveable, but immoveable in so far as it is con-
ishable, everything is in some sort filled with soul. nected with matter.
(De Gener. Anim. iii. 11. ) The elementary bodies, The science of metaphysics, lastly, occupies itsell
considered in themselves, have motion in them with that which exists really and absolutely, with
selves reciprocally produce each other, and so that which is cternal and immoveable.
3
z 2
## p. 340 (#360) ############################################
340
ARISTOTELES.
ARISTOTELES.
i
Mathematics, therefore, stand half-way between good circumstances as means of virtue. Virtnes
physics and metaphysics. (Met. i. 6, p. 20, 23, are of two kinds, either intellectual virtues (dia-
i. 9, p. 33, 23, xi. 1. p. 212, 22. ) Mathematical vontiral), or moral virtues (Hernal), according to
existence exists only Suvauet (according to poten- the distinction between the reasoning faculty, and
tiality) in the abstractive operation of the under that in the soul which obeys the reason. Accord-
standing, and is therefore no independent exist ing to this distinction, the origin of the virtues,
ence, nothing substantial. We arrive at the which Aristotle points out in the second book of
cognition of its peculiar definitions not from the the Ethics, is also different. The intellectual vir-
idea, but only by means of separation (c. g. auxili- tues may be learnt and taught, the ethical virtues
ary lines in figures for proof). On that account, are acquired by practice. In the case of these,
neither motion nor the idea of purpose occurs in therefore, we must have regard to the practice of
mathematics. (Met. iv. 2, Phys. ii. 9. ) In this them in particular cases; therefore, only quite
science, that which is simple, as an abstractum, general directions admit of being given respecting
forms the starting-point, and its necessity depends them. Youth must be accustoined and trained
on our advancing from the simple to the composite, “to rejoice and be sorry in the proper way," for
or from the basis to that which is based upon it. grief and joy are the criteria of virtue, inasmuch
(Phys. ii. 9. ) Respecting the axioms from which as it is the proper medium between excess and
the mathematical sciences proceed, mathematics deficiency. (Eth. Nic. ii. 2. ) To be able to
can therefore say nothing (Met. iv. 3), because refrain from sensual desires with pleasure is to be
these belong to every existing thing as such. " teinperate. The intemperate man experiences pain
Respecting the view taken by Aristotle of the at such abstinence, when he is compelled to prac-
mathematical sciences, see Biese, ii. pp. 225-234. tise it. By the practice of virtue the man becomes
good himself; and virtue is therefore a habit, and
B.
that too accompanied by fore-choice (étus poalpr)-
Tik), which keeps the medium in our subjective
THE PRACTICAL SCIENCES,
inclinations and impulses (Eth. Nic. ii. 6), and
Mathematics, restricted as the science is to the keeps the medium in that way in which the
quantitative, can exhibit the good and the beautiful rational man (ó opóropos) determines. This me
only as they manifest themselves in that immutabi- dium assumes different forms according to the
lity which consists in the fixed order and harmony several impulses, under the influence of which the
of the quantitative. But the way in which these actor has reference either solely to himself, or to
two, the good and the beautiful, acquire existence others also. The medium is opposed to the er-
in the department of the mind, is considered and tremes; they contradict each other, and the proper
pointed out by the practical sciences, Ethics, Poli- measure or degree depends on the particular incli-
tics (with Oeconomics as an appendix), and Poetics nations of the individual.
(Aesthetics, Philosophy of Art).
2. Special part. — Virtue is based upon free,
self-conscious action. Aristotle, therefore, before
1. Ethics.
developing the several virtues specially, defines
1. General Definitions. +- The highest and last the idea of responsibility (iii. 1-7), and then and
purpose of all action, according to Aristotle, is not before gives the development of the ethical
happiness (eudalunvia. Eth. Nic. i. 2—7, x. 6—8, (ii. 8, v. extr. ) and logical (vi. ) virtues. As now,
and elsewhere). This he defines to be the energy in the definition of happiness, virtues and the
(évépyela) of life existing for its own sake (perfect means of virtue formed the chief parts, so the
life), according to virtue existing by and for itself second section of the special part of ethics is de-
(perfect virtue). As the highest good, it must be voted to the internal and external circumstances of
pursued for its own sake; as the highest human life, which become the means of virtue through
good, its essence must be derived from the peculiar the good manifesting itself in them as the purpose.
destination of man. Accordingly, happiness is the Continuance in a course of virtue is connected
activity of the sonl in accordance with virtue dur-chiefly with firmness of character, which exhibits
ing a separate independent period of existence. itself as well in abstinence (eykpátela) which re-
(Eth. Nic. i. 7. ) The two principal component sists pleasure, as in endurance (kaptepia, a Platonic
parts of this definition are virtue, and external idea : see Plat. Laches), which remains unshaken,
even by the attacks of pain. (Eth. Nic. vii. 1-12. )
• The only mathematical work of Aristotle This firmness therefore manifests itself especially
(uaðnuatikóv, Diog. Laërt. v. 24) quoted by an- in the manner in which a man demeans himself
cient writers is lost. The method which was fol. towards pleasure and pain. This leads to the
lowed at a later time for mathematics, rests alto investigation of the essential nature of pleasure and
gether on the doctrine of proof given in the Ana- puin. (Eth. Nic. vii. 12, &c. ) Farther, in the
lytics. Aristotle probably composed no separate social life of men, friendship, which is itself a
treatises on arithmetic and geometry. In his virtue (viii. 1), and indeed the crown of all vir-
Organon he frequently borrows examples from tues, is a principal means for a steady continuance
geometry. Aristotle, as an opponent of the Pytha- in virtue. Aristotle, therefore, in the 8th and 9th
goreans, laid great stress on the separation books, treats of friendship with the most careful
arithmetic and geometry. (Anul. post. i. 27, Met. explicitness. He shews that it forms the founda-
v. 6. )
tion for all kinds of unions, and contributes to the
+ In this review of the ethical system of Aris- realization of the good in the smaller and larger
totle we follow of course the progress of the Nica circles of social life. Lastly, the unrestricted exer-
machean Ethics, as being the principal work. The cise of each species of activity directed towards the
first two books contain the general part of ethics, good is accompanied by the feeling of an undis-
the remaining eight books carry out the definitions turbed energy, and this harmony, in which the
of this portion more closely.
external and the internal are in accordance, pro-
## p. 341 (#361) ############################################
ARISTOTELES.
341
ARISTOTELES.
duces a pleasure, which excrcises a powerful influ- pertain to it. This, however, is to be obtained
ence in urging the man on to virtuous activity, not in isolated or family life, but only in the state,
besides being the constant attendant of the latter. which is the union of all other circles of social life.
In this point of view Aristotle, in the 10th book Man therefore, as a being created by nature
(Eth. Nic
. x. 1-6), treats of pleasure as a powerful for the state and for life in the state (šov Tods-
ineans of virtue.
Twóv, Polit. i. 2, iii. 6, and elsewhere), strives
After the principal elements of the definition of after it. The state, inoreover, as a totality con-
virtue have been thus gone through, the happiness sisting of organically connected members, is by
of the theoretical life of reason, i. . c. of the life nature prior to the individual and the family; it
devoted to philosophical contemplation, is brought is the absolute prius. As the hand of a corpse is
prominently into view; which, as a divine kind of no more a hand, so the annihilation of the state is
life, is accorded to but few men. (El. Nic. x. 8. ) at the same time the annihilation of the individual;
In contrast with this stands the happiness of for only a wild beast or a god can live out of the
active, practical life, which has its finn basis in bounds of the state, or without it. (Polit. i. 2, extr. )
the ethical virtues, and in external good circum- It is only through the state that avrápkeia, self-
stances the means of carrying out and accomplish- sufficiency, not merely for the preservation of bare
ing the higher ends of life. This, however, can life, but also for happy life, is rendered possible.
only take place IN THE STATE; and so Ethics of Happiness, however, is only the consequence of an
themselves conduct us to the doctrine of the state, activity of the soul consisting in complete virtue
to politics.
(åpetn); consequently, in the state, and in nothing
The ethics of Aristotle preserved the most com- short of it, does virtue itself attain complete reality.
plete development of the doctrine of virtue, re- And the object of the political art is the most ho-
garded from the point of view chosen by the an- nourable, in as far as the statesman directs all his
cients. The problem wbich he here proposed to care to the training of such citizens as are morally
himself was no other than this : to exhibit the good and actively promote everything honourable
good in the process of becoming, in that way in and noble. (Eth. i. 10, 13, init. ) The science of
which it is a thing attainable by man, and indiri- politics therefore is the necessary completion of
dualizes itself most immediately in the bents or ethics, and it is only in reference to the state that
inclinations of men (the existence of which as such the latter can attain its full development. The
in their natural condition, according to the view two sciences, therefore, in Aristotle's view, stand
taken by the ancients, cannot be denied). Then, in such close connexion, that in the Politics by
secondly, by means of practical wisdom, to deter- Apótepov he refers to the Ethics, and in the latter
mine the proper medium for these manifold bents, by yotepov to the Politics.
and so to lay down the rule for action. Farther, According to the method of genetic develop
to shew that the obligation to live according to this ment (Katå triv donymuévny pédodov, Polit. i. 1),
rule, is founded in the essential nature of the Aristotle begins in the politics with the considera-
higher rationality, and that in this those sentiments tion of the first and most simple human associa-
which are firm and immoveable form the immuta- tion, the family (oria). A marriage of free men
ble basis of action.
and women is known only by the Hellenes, not
2. Politics.
by the barbarians, among whom not free men and
The ethics of Aristotle contain the fundamental women, but male and female slaves unite them-
elements (otoixeian Polit. iv. 11, ed. Stahr) of selves together. The distinction between Hellenes
politics, of which the former science is itself a and barbarians, free men and slaves, in Aristotle's
particular part (TONITIKT TIS, Eth. Nic. i. 1, Magn. view is still a primary distinction, because the
Mor. i. 1. ) Both have the same end—bappiness, natural determining circumstance of birth (as
only that it is far more noble and more divine to Hellen or barbarian) is still an essential element
conduct whole peoples and states to this end. (Po in the idea of freedom.
Christianity first laid
lit. iii. 12. ) Practical wisdom and politics are one down the principle, that freedom is founded on the
and the same species of habit (Ed. Nic. vi. 8); spiritual entity of man, without regard to the na-
all they differ in is this: that the object of the one tural determining circumstance of birth.
is to promote the happiness of an individual, the Out of the component parts of the family
object of the other to promote that of a community. (slaves and free persons, master and slaves, man
In the latter point of view, practical wisdom is : and wife, father and children) arise three relations:
a. The management of the family- oeconomics. the despotic (SEO TOTIKN), nuptial (gauinn', and
b. In the management of the state. - a. Legislative parental (TEKVOTOINTIKT), with which is associated
power (VOMODeTunt), which regulates the general besides the oikovouIKT. These Aristotle treats of
relations ( LPXITEKTOVI). B. Administrative power in the first book of the Politics. The arrangement
(TTON1TIKK) in the government of the state, where of the whole domestic system resembles monarchy
action, or the special application of the laws under ! (Polit. i. 7), but at the same time the family is the
particular circumstances, is concerned. The admi- | image of political life generally, for in it lie the
uistrative power realizes itself first in that part of germs of friendship, constitution, and all that is
the state which deliberates on the public concerns just. (Eth. Eudem. vii. 10, p. 1242. 6, Bekk. )
(Bouleurin), and which possesses the power of After this, in the second book, he considers the
applying the laws to public relations; secondly, in purpose of the state, as the unity of a whole con-
the judicial power (OIKAOTIKN), with the applica- sisting of mutually dependent and connected mem
tion of the laws to private concerns.
bers, with reference as well to imaginary (Plato),
As the highest good is something absolutely as to actually existing constitutions. He calle
perfect, i. e, a thing of such a nature that it is attention to their points of superiority and inferi-
striven after purely for its own sake, happiness, ority, and so indicates the essential conditions,
as it is a good of this kind, cannot be in perfect, which are necessary for the foundation and realisa-
but the quality of self-sufficiency (ajTaskELa) must | tion of the idea of a state. Thereupon in the
## p. 342 (#362) ############################################
342
ARISTOTELES.
ARISTOTELES.
}
third book he develops the idea of the state ac-
3. Rhetoric and Aesthetics.
cording to its separation into different forms of 1. Rhetoric. Here we need say but little ;
government; in the fourth book he considers the partly because the works of Aristotle, which relate
several constitutions according to their differences to this subject, are more generally known and
in kind, because these exercise an influence on read than the properly philosophical writings, and
legislation. For legislation is dependent on the con- partly because the subject itself is of considerably
stitution, not vice versa. That is to say, constitution less difficulty. We therefore make only some
is the arrangement of the powers in the state, ac- general observations.
cording to which the sovereignty (T) kúprov) is Rhetoric stands side by side (avtíotpodos) with
determined. The constitution is thus the soul of dialectics, for both have to do with subjects, with
the state. (Polit. iv. 1, iii. 4. ) The laws, on the which, as pertaining to no particular science, every
other hand, are the determining principles, accord- one may make himself acquainted, and respecting
ing to which the governing body governs, and holds which every one decms himself capable of forming
in check those who transgress them. Aristotle a judgment. Every one considers himself, and is
distinguishes aristocracy, kingdom, and republic to a certain extent, an orator and dialectician.
(πολιτεία και το κοινό προσαγορευομένη ονοματι), Rhetoric raises this routine to an artistic know-
and sets by the side of these the three perversions ledge, by means of theory, which arrives at the
(Tapexbáveis) of them: oligarchy, tyrunny, demo perception of the causes why, and the means by
cracy. These constitutions arise out of the three which, the orator, who has not been theoretically
principles, 1, of equality, founded on the prepon- trained, attains his object. (Rhet. i. 1. ) The
derance number; 2, of inequality, which is kernel of such a theory is the argumentation by
founded either, a. on the preponderance of exter- which conviction is produced. Enthymemes are
nal strength and wealth (tyranny, oligarchy), or b. the foundation (owua aris rhotews) of argu-
on the preponderance of internal or spiritual mentation. Aristotle, as he himself says, first
strength (monarchy, aristocracy). Aristotle then, directed his attention to the fundamental prin-
in the 5th book, considers the disturbing and pre- ciples of these. The olject of Rnetoric is convic-
serving causes in the different constitutions, always tion, but its business (épyov) consists in dis-
having regard to reality and experience (Polit. iii. covering that which awakens belief with respect to
17, iv. 1); and, for the determination of that form the subject in hand. (Rhet. i. 1, où tò neidai éprou
of government which is best adapted for the great- αυτής, αλλά το ιδείν τα υπάρχοντα πιθανά περί
est number of states, gets this result, that in it éndotov. Comp. Quintil. i. 15, 13; Max.
democratical and oligarchical principles must be in- Schmidt. de tempore quo ab Arist. libri de arte
termixed and united. (Polit. iv. 12. ) From such a rhet. editi, p. 8, &c. ) The means of proof (whaters)
mixture of the elements of constitutions result therefore are what we are mainly concerned with.
new forms of mixed constitutions (ouvovao uoi), | These are partly external (witnesses, &c. ), partly
which Aristotle characterizes more closely accord artistical, to be created by the orator ; to these
ing to the three essential functions of political belong the personal qualities (100s) of the orator
power. (Polit. iv. 14, vi. ) Having thus prepared himself
, and the disposition of the hearers, and the
the way, the philosopher proceeds to the real mode itself in which the arguments are exhibited.
problem, to shew how a state can be so perfect- From the means of proof we discover what is re-
ly constituted, as to answer to the requisitions quisite in the orator: he must understand how to
of human nature. He shews that the question, form conclusions, must possess an insignt into the
What is the best constitution ? is connected with moral nature and virtues of man, as well as an
the question, What is the most desirable mode of acquaintance with the passions. (Rhet. ii. 22. )
life? (Polit
. vii. l) he develops the external conditions Accordingly rhetoric grows as it were out of the
for the realisation of the best constitution (Polit. roots of dialectics and ethics. (i. 4. ) For argu-
vii. 4, &c. ), which are dependent on fortune, –and mentation, example and enthymeme are in rhetoric,
then passes to the internal conditions of such a what induction and conclusion are in dialectics.
constitution, which are independent of fortune. As regards their subject matter, most enthymemes
(Polit. vii. 13, &c. ) For these latter he finds the are taken from the special departments of the
central point in the education of youth, which he sciences. In the laying down of the general and par-
therefore considers as a public concern of the state. ticular points of view the excellence of the genuine
(Polit. viii. 1. ) Its object is the harmonious cul- empiricism of Aristotle, which is united with the
ture of all the physical and mental powers, which most acute sagacity, amply displays itself, and,
lays the foundation for that harmony of perfect particularly in the treatment of the then, unfolds
virtue both in the man and in the citizen, in which a rich treasure of psychological experience, which
the purely human develops itself in all its fulness lays bare the most secret recesses of the human
and power. By the individual citizens of the heart.
state (Polit. vii. 13) being trained to a virtuous, The several species of oratory develop themselves
moral life, virtue and morality become predominant out of the different dispositions which may exist
in all the spheres of political life, and accordingly in the hearer of a speech. The hearer, namely, is
by means of politics that is completely realised, for either a fewpos, i. e. listens only for the sake of
which ethics form the ground-work, viz. human artistic enjoyment, or he is one who forms a
happiness depending on a life in accordance with judgment respecting what is to come, or what is
virtue. Thus on the one hand the science of poli- past. In accordance with these different charac-
tics is again reflected to the point from which it ters in which the hearer appears, there result
started—ethics, while on the other hand, inasmuch three species of oratory: the deliberative (yevos
as art and oratory are included in the circle of the ovubovaeutikÓV), the forensic (9. Jikavior), the
means by which the citizen is to be trained, it cmicictic (%. éADELKTIKOV). Aristotle then deter-
points beyond what is immediately connected with mines what are the essential elements of these
itself to the departinents of
1 species, and further the occasion and purposes of
## p. 343 (#363) ############################################
ARISTOTELES.
343
ARISTOTELES.
them. The difference of purpose again involves capable of inspiration (oiò cúpuolls Ý TOINTIK)
attention to the appropriate arguments, according &OTIV yavisov, Rhet. ii. 15 extr. ) make the
as these are common to all, or particular.
poct, who at the same time cannot dispense with
The power of convincing, however, depends not discretion. The external form of the representa-
merely on oratorical conclusions, but also on tion, the metre, is not decisive as to whether
the credibility of the orator, and the disposition of anything is poetry or not. The history of Hero-
the hearers. Therefore it is necessary to shew dotus reduced to metre would still remain a his
how the favourable disposition requisite on every tory. (Poct. 9. ) A subject becomes poetical only
occasion is to be produced in the mind of the through a lively, vivid mode of representation,
hearer. But a person must know not only whut and the principal point is the composition and ar-
to say, but also how to say it. Therefore rhetoric rangement of the matter, the cúvbedis (or ouotaois)
has, by way of conclusion, to treat of oratorical Tüv #payuatwv (Poel. 7), in other words, the
expression and arrangement.
invention or idea, which has assumed a lively forin
2. Poetics. -—" Thou, O man, alone possessest in the poet; and this is the starting-point, and as
art! ” This dictum of Schiller's is already ex- it were the soul of poetry (αρχή και οίον ψυχή
pressed by Aristotle. (Met. i. 1. ) In art the ó uūdos mais 7paynõias, Poet. 7*). Poetry is
production of a work is the main matter and the more coniprehensive and philosophical than his-
main
purpose, whilst the purpose of oratory, tory; for whilst history is restricted to individual
which is throughout practical, is extraneous to actual facts, the poet takes higher ground, and re-
speech itself.
The relation of art to morality and presents in the particular that which, considered
virline is, on the side of the artist, a very slight in itself, can happen at any time; that which is
one ;, for, with dispositions and sentiments, universally applicable and necessary. The univer-
which in actions form the most important point, sal in poetry, however, is not an abstract, in-
we have nothing to do in the practice of art, definite something, but manifests itself in the
where the main thing is the production (TOLEîv) of characteristic individuality of person by means of
a work. On the other hand, however, every art, language and action in accordance with internal
and every work of art, exerts a moral influence, probability and necessity. (Poet. 9. ) Whilst
purifies and purges the stronger emotions of the therefore in poetry everything individual, as im-
soul, strengthens and elevates the mind.
porting something universal, is thoroughly signifi-
Art, like nature, produces by fashioning organic-cant, history, on the other hand, relates in chrono-
ally, but, with consciousness (Phys. ii. 8), and its logical succession what the individual has really
creative efforts, as well as the contemplation of done, and wbat has happened to him. The bis-
these efforts, and of the work of art produced, be torian is restricted as to the order, arrangement, and
long to those higher exertions of the mind (td succession of the facts which he describes; the
TepITTá) which have their purpose in themselves. poet has these unrestrictedly under his dominion.
Aristotle, indeed, in accordance with the light in With these individual features of Aristotle's
which the matter was generally viewed by the Poetics we must here content ourselves, as a com-
ancients, reckons art amongst the higher purposes plete examination of his theory of the epos and of
of the state and of religion (Polit. viii. ); but with the drama might easily lead us beyond the limits
him it has also already the signification of an inde to which we are restricted.
pendent creation of the mind, which ennobles
IX. APPENDIX.
reality, and which again draws within its sphere The main sources for the life of Aristotle are
religion and morality likewise.
lost to us. The number of works on biography
All the several arts find a common bond of union and literary history extant in antiquity, from
in this, that they are all imitations (ueuro eis), which information" might have been obtained
i. e. all arts, epic poetry, tragedy, comedy, lyric respecting Aristotle, must have been immense,
poetry, music, orchestic (the art of dancing), since out of Diogenes Laërtius alone the names of
painting, and statuary, strive after truth, the real nearly 40 such writers may be collected, whose
essence of things, which they represent. That works, with the exception of single quotations, have
which distinguishes the arts from each other lies
disappeared.
partly in the diversity of the means by which they
With respect to Aristotle in particular, ve
represent, partly in the object of representation, have to regret the loss of the works of Hermippus
partly in the mode of representation. According of Smyrna, Timotheus of Athens, Demetrius of
to this diversity arise the distinct differences in Magnesia (ó Máyyns), Pseudo-Aristippus, Apollo
the arts, the species of art, and the different styles dorus of Athens, Eumelus, Phavorinus, &c. , as well
of art. How, according to Aristotle's view, the as those of Aristoxenus of Tarentum, Apellicon of
beautiful developed and manifested itself in the Teos, Sotion, Aristocles of Messene, Damascius,
separate arts, can be pointed out only with reference Andronicus of Rhodes, and Ptolemaeus Philadel-
to poetry, because this is the only art that Aris-phus.
totle (in his work hep mointiKÍs) has treated of. The scanty and confused sources still extant
Poetry is the product of inspiration (Rhet. iii. 7), are the following :- 1. Diogenes Laërtius, v. l-
and its means of representation is language, metri- 35 ; 2. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Epistola ad
cal as well as unmetrical. (Poet. 1. ) Improvisa- Ammaeum de Demosthene et Aristotele; 3. Pseudo-
tions form the historical starting point for all Ammonius, + rita Aristotelis, by a later com-
poetry, which from its very commencement divides
itself into two principal directions, that which Aristotle, indeed, is there speaking only of
follows the more bomely, and that which follows tragedy, but what he says of the mythus with re-
the more exalted. This depended on the peculiar ference to tragedy applies to all poetry.
character of the poet. A delicate perception of + Victor Cousin, in the Journal des Suvans,
what is correct and appropriate, an acute faculty December, 1832, p. 747, maintains the authenticity
of observation, and a mind easily excitable and of this little biography.
## p. 344 (#364) ############################################
344
ARISTOTELES.
ARISTOXENUS.
piler, according to others by Philoponus, edited | persons of the name of Aristoteles, respecting
by J.
iii. 1. ) Motion is the means by which everything and reach real existence as such. The investi-
strives to advance from potentiality (matter) to that gations of this science are restricted to one part of
actuality, of which, according to its nature, it is material existence (nepi 71 mépos tñs oikelas üans
capable, i. e. to the form appropriate to it, which is TOLE Tai tiiv Jewplav, Met. xi. 4).
its purpose. The eloos is thus what is true in the The relation between the three theoretical sci-
visible object, but not apart from the process of be- ences, therefore, is this : the science of physics
coming; but it is the basis of this process of becom- busies itself indeed with the internal formative
ing itself, inasmuch as it is the active, fashioning principle, with that which has an absolute exist-
principle. The true principle of natural science, ence, but only in so far as this has passed into the
Therefore, lies in the dynamico-genetical method, material, and is accordingly not immoveable. (Met.
which looks upon nature as something continually vi. 1, xii. 7. )
becoming, as it strives to advance froin potentiality The science of mathematics, on the other hand,
to actuality. Motion itself is eternal and unpro- occupies itself indeed with that which is immove-
duced ; it is the life (olov {uni tis oùoa) in all able and at rest, as its definitions are fixed and
natural things. (Phys. viii. 1. ) Through this unalterable; but not with that which is absolutely
striving of all natural existences after the imper- immoveable, but immoveable in so far as it is con-
ishable, everything is in some sort filled with soul. nected with matter.
(De Gener. Anim. iii. 11. ) The elementary bodies, The science of metaphysics, lastly, occupies itsell
considered in themselves, have motion in them with that which exists really and absolutely, with
selves reciprocally produce each other, and so that which is cternal and immoveable.
3
z 2
## p. 340 (#360) ############################################
340
ARISTOTELES.
ARISTOTELES.
i
Mathematics, therefore, stand half-way between good circumstances as means of virtue. Virtnes
physics and metaphysics. (Met. i. 6, p. 20, 23, are of two kinds, either intellectual virtues (dia-
i. 9, p. 33, 23, xi. 1. p. 212, 22. ) Mathematical vontiral), or moral virtues (Hernal), according to
existence exists only Suvauet (according to poten- the distinction between the reasoning faculty, and
tiality) in the abstractive operation of the under that in the soul which obeys the reason. Accord-
standing, and is therefore no independent exist ing to this distinction, the origin of the virtues,
ence, nothing substantial. We arrive at the which Aristotle points out in the second book of
cognition of its peculiar definitions not from the the Ethics, is also different. The intellectual vir-
idea, but only by means of separation (c. g. auxili- tues may be learnt and taught, the ethical virtues
ary lines in figures for proof). On that account, are acquired by practice. In the case of these,
neither motion nor the idea of purpose occurs in therefore, we must have regard to the practice of
mathematics. (Met. iv. 2, Phys. ii. 9. ) In this them in particular cases; therefore, only quite
science, that which is simple, as an abstractum, general directions admit of being given respecting
forms the starting-point, and its necessity depends them. Youth must be accustoined and trained
on our advancing from the simple to the composite, “to rejoice and be sorry in the proper way," for
or from the basis to that which is based upon it. grief and joy are the criteria of virtue, inasmuch
(Phys. ii. 9. ) Respecting the axioms from which as it is the proper medium between excess and
the mathematical sciences proceed, mathematics deficiency. (Eth. Nic. ii. 2. ) To be able to
can therefore say nothing (Met. iv. 3), because refrain from sensual desires with pleasure is to be
these belong to every existing thing as such. " teinperate. The intemperate man experiences pain
Respecting the view taken by Aristotle of the at such abstinence, when he is compelled to prac-
mathematical sciences, see Biese, ii. pp. 225-234. tise it. By the practice of virtue the man becomes
good himself; and virtue is therefore a habit, and
B.
that too accompanied by fore-choice (étus poalpr)-
Tik), which keeps the medium in our subjective
THE PRACTICAL SCIENCES,
inclinations and impulses (Eth. Nic. ii. 6), and
Mathematics, restricted as the science is to the keeps the medium in that way in which the
quantitative, can exhibit the good and the beautiful rational man (ó opóropos) determines. This me
only as they manifest themselves in that immutabi- dium assumes different forms according to the
lity which consists in the fixed order and harmony several impulses, under the influence of which the
of the quantitative. But the way in which these actor has reference either solely to himself, or to
two, the good and the beautiful, acquire existence others also. The medium is opposed to the er-
in the department of the mind, is considered and tremes; they contradict each other, and the proper
pointed out by the practical sciences, Ethics, Poli- measure or degree depends on the particular incli-
tics (with Oeconomics as an appendix), and Poetics nations of the individual.
(Aesthetics, Philosophy of Art).
2. Special part. — Virtue is based upon free,
self-conscious action. Aristotle, therefore, before
1. Ethics.
developing the several virtues specially, defines
1. General Definitions. +- The highest and last the idea of responsibility (iii. 1-7), and then and
purpose of all action, according to Aristotle, is not before gives the development of the ethical
happiness (eudalunvia. Eth. Nic. i. 2—7, x. 6—8, (ii. 8, v. extr. ) and logical (vi. ) virtues. As now,
and elsewhere). This he defines to be the energy in the definition of happiness, virtues and the
(évépyela) of life existing for its own sake (perfect means of virtue formed the chief parts, so the
life), according to virtue existing by and for itself second section of the special part of ethics is de-
(perfect virtue). As the highest good, it must be voted to the internal and external circumstances of
pursued for its own sake; as the highest human life, which become the means of virtue through
good, its essence must be derived from the peculiar the good manifesting itself in them as the purpose.
destination of man. Accordingly, happiness is the Continuance in a course of virtue is connected
activity of the sonl in accordance with virtue dur-chiefly with firmness of character, which exhibits
ing a separate independent period of existence. itself as well in abstinence (eykpátela) which re-
(Eth. Nic. i. 7. ) The two principal component sists pleasure, as in endurance (kaptepia, a Platonic
parts of this definition are virtue, and external idea : see Plat. Laches), which remains unshaken,
even by the attacks of pain. (Eth. Nic. vii. 1-12. )
• The only mathematical work of Aristotle This firmness therefore manifests itself especially
(uaðnuatikóv, Diog. Laërt. v. 24) quoted by an- in the manner in which a man demeans himself
cient writers is lost. The method which was fol. towards pleasure and pain. This leads to the
lowed at a later time for mathematics, rests alto investigation of the essential nature of pleasure and
gether on the doctrine of proof given in the Ana- puin. (Eth. Nic. vii. 12, &c. ) Farther, in the
lytics. Aristotle probably composed no separate social life of men, friendship, which is itself a
treatises on arithmetic and geometry. In his virtue (viii. 1), and indeed the crown of all vir-
Organon he frequently borrows examples from tues, is a principal means for a steady continuance
geometry. Aristotle, as an opponent of the Pytha- in virtue. Aristotle, therefore, in the 8th and 9th
goreans, laid great stress on the separation books, treats of friendship with the most careful
arithmetic and geometry. (Anul. post. i. 27, Met. explicitness. He shews that it forms the founda-
v. 6. )
tion for all kinds of unions, and contributes to the
+ In this review of the ethical system of Aris- realization of the good in the smaller and larger
totle we follow of course the progress of the Nica circles of social life. Lastly, the unrestricted exer-
machean Ethics, as being the principal work. The cise of each species of activity directed towards the
first two books contain the general part of ethics, good is accompanied by the feeling of an undis-
the remaining eight books carry out the definitions turbed energy, and this harmony, in which the
of this portion more closely.
external and the internal are in accordance, pro-
## p. 341 (#361) ############################################
ARISTOTELES.
341
ARISTOTELES.
duces a pleasure, which excrcises a powerful influ- pertain to it. This, however, is to be obtained
ence in urging the man on to virtuous activity, not in isolated or family life, but only in the state,
besides being the constant attendant of the latter. which is the union of all other circles of social life.
In this point of view Aristotle, in the 10th book Man therefore, as a being created by nature
(Eth. Nic
. x. 1-6), treats of pleasure as a powerful for the state and for life in the state (šov Tods-
ineans of virtue.
Twóv, Polit. i. 2, iii. 6, and elsewhere), strives
After the principal elements of the definition of after it. The state, inoreover, as a totality con-
virtue have been thus gone through, the happiness sisting of organically connected members, is by
of the theoretical life of reason, i. . c. of the life nature prior to the individual and the family; it
devoted to philosophical contemplation, is brought is the absolute prius. As the hand of a corpse is
prominently into view; which, as a divine kind of no more a hand, so the annihilation of the state is
life, is accorded to but few men. (El. Nic. x. 8. ) at the same time the annihilation of the individual;
In contrast with this stands the happiness of for only a wild beast or a god can live out of the
active, practical life, which has its finn basis in bounds of the state, or without it. (Polit. i. 2, extr. )
the ethical virtues, and in external good circum- It is only through the state that avrápkeia, self-
stances the means of carrying out and accomplish- sufficiency, not merely for the preservation of bare
ing the higher ends of life. This, however, can life, but also for happy life, is rendered possible.
only take place IN THE STATE; and so Ethics of Happiness, however, is only the consequence of an
themselves conduct us to the doctrine of the state, activity of the soul consisting in complete virtue
to politics.
(åpetn); consequently, in the state, and in nothing
The ethics of Aristotle preserved the most com- short of it, does virtue itself attain complete reality.
plete development of the doctrine of virtue, re- And the object of the political art is the most ho-
garded from the point of view chosen by the an- nourable, in as far as the statesman directs all his
cients. The problem wbich he here proposed to care to the training of such citizens as are morally
himself was no other than this : to exhibit the good and actively promote everything honourable
good in the process of becoming, in that way in and noble. (Eth. i. 10, 13, init. ) The science of
which it is a thing attainable by man, and indiri- politics therefore is the necessary completion of
dualizes itself most immediately in the bents or ethics, and it is only in reference to the state that
inclinations of men (the existence of which as such the latter can attain its full development. The
in their natural condition, according to the view two sciences, therefore, in Aristotle's view, stand
taken by the ancients, cannot be denied). Then, in such close connexion, that in the Politics by
secondly, by means of practical wisdom, to deter- Apótepov he refers to the Ethics, and in the latter
mine the proper medium for these manifold bents, by yotepov to the Politics.
and so to lay down the rule for action. Farther, According to the method of genetic develop
to shew that the obligation to live according to this ment (Katå triv donymuévny pédodov, Polit. i. 1),
rule, is founded in the essential nature of the Aristotle begins in the politics with the considera-
higher rationality, and that in this those sentiments tion of the first and most simple human associa-
which are firm and immoveable form the immuta- tion, the family (oria). A marriage of free men
ble basis of action.
and women is known only by the Hellenes, not
2. Politics.
by the barbarians, among whom not free men and
The ethics of Aristotle contain the fundamental women, but male and female slaves unite them-
elements (otoixeian Polit. iv. 11, ed. Stahr) of selves together. The distinction between Hellenes
politics, of which the former science is itself a and barbarians, free men and slaves, in Aristotle's
particular part (TONITIKT TIS, Eth. Nic. i. 1, Magn. view is still a primary distinction, because the
Mor. i. 1. ) Both have the same end—bappiness, natural determining circumstance of birth (as
only that it is far more noble and more divine to Hellen or barbarian) is still an essential element
conduct whole peoples and states to this end. (Po in the idea of freedom.
Christianity first laid
lit. iii. 12. ) Practical wisdom and politics are one down the principle, that freedom is founded on the
and the same species of habit (Ed. Nic. vi. 8); spiritual entity of man, without regard to the na-
all they differ in is this: that the object of the one tural determining circumstance of birth.
is to promote the happiness of an individual, the Out of the component parts of the family
object of the other to promote that of a community. (slaves and free persons, master and slaves, man
In the latter point of view, practical wisdom is : and wife, father and children) arise three relations:
a. The management of the family- oeconomics. the despotic (SEO TOTIKN), nuptial (gauinn', and
b. In the management of the state. - a. Legislative parental (TEKVOTOINTIKT), with which is associated
power (VOMODeTunt), which regulates the general besides the oikovouIKT. These Aristotle treats of
relations ( LPXITEKTOVI). B. Administrative power in the first book of the Politics. The arrangement
(TTON1TIKK) in the government of the state, where of the whole domestic system resembles monarchy
action, or the special application of the laws under ! (Polit. i. 7), but at the same time the family is the
particular circumstances, is concerned. The admi- | image of political life generally, for in it lie the
uistrative power realizes itself first in that part of germs of friendship, constitution, and all that is
the state which deliberates on the public concerns just. (Eth. Eudem. vii. 10, p. 1242. 6, Bekk. )
(Bouleurin), and which possesses the power of After this, in the second book, he considers the
applying the laws to public relations; secondly, in purpose of the state, as the unity of a whole con-
the judicial power (OIKAOTIKN), with the applica- sisting of mutually dependent and connected mem
tion of the laws to private concerns.
bers, with reference as well to imaginary (Plato),
As the highest good is something absolutely as to actually existing constitutions. He calle
perfect, i. e, a thing of such a nature that it is attention to their points of superiority and inferi-
striven after purely for its own sake, happiness, ority, and so indicates the essential conditions,
as it is a good of this kind, cannot be in perfect, which are necessary for the foundation and realisa-
but the quality of self-sufficiency (ajTaskELa) must | tion of the idea of a state. Thereupon in the
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ARISTOTELES.
ARISTOTELES.
}
third book he develops the idea of the state ac-
3. Rhetoric and Aesthetics.
cording to its separation into different forms of 1. Rhetoric. Here we need say but little ;
government; in the fourth book he considers the partly because the works of Aristotle, which relate
several constitutions according to their differences to this subject, are more generally known and
in kind, because these exercise an influence on read than the properly philosophical writings, and
legislation. For legislation is dependent on the con- partly because the subject itself is of considerably
stitution, not vice versa. That is to say, constitution less difficulty. We therefore make only some
is the arrangement of the powers in the state, ac- general observations.
cording to which the sovereignty (T) kúprov) is Rhetoric stands side by side (avtíotpodos) with
determined. The constitution is thus the soul of dialectics, for both have to do with subjects, with
the state. (Polit. iv. 1, iii. 4. ) The laws, on the which, as pertaining to no particular science, every
other hand, are the determining principles, accord- one may make himself acquainted, and respecting
ing to which the governing body governs, and holds which every one decms himself capable of forming
in check those who transgress them. Aristotle a judgment. Every one considers himself, and is
distinguishes aristocracy, kingdom, and republic to a certain extent, an orator and dialectician.
(πολιτεία και το κοινό προσαγορευομένη ονοματι), Rhetoric raises this routine to an artistic know-
and sets by the side of these the three perversions ledge, by means of theory, which arrives at the
(Tapexbáveis) of them: oligarchy, tyrunny, demo perception of the causes why, and the means by
cracy. These constitutions arise out of the three which, the orator, who has not been theoretically
principles, 1, of equality, founded on the prepon- trained, attains his object. (Rhet. i. 1. ) The
derance number; 2, of inequality, which is kernel of such a theory is the argumentation by
founded either, a. on the preponderance of exter- which conviction is produced. Enthymemes are
nal strength and wealth (tyranny, oligarchy), or b. the foundation (owua aris rhotews) of argu-
on the preponderance of internal or spiritual mentation. Aristotle, as he himself says, first
strength (monarchy, aristocracy). Aristotle then, directed his attention to the fundamental prin-
in the 5th book, considers the disturbing and pre- ciples of these. The olject of Rnetoric is convic-
serving causes in the different constitutions, always tion, but its business (épyov) consists in dis-
having regard to reality and experience (Polit. iii. covering that which awakens belief with respect to
17, iv. 1); and, for the determination of that form the subject in hand. (Rhet. i. 1, où tò neidai éprou
of government which is best adapted for the great- αυτής, αλλά το ιδείν τα υπάρχοντα πιθανά περί
est number of states, gets this result, that in it éndotov. Comp. Quintil. i. 15, 13; Max.
democratical and oligarchical principles must be in- Schmidt. de tempore quo ab Arist. libri de arte
termixed and united. (Polit. iv. 12. ) From such a rhet. editi, p. 8, &c. ) The means of proof (whaters)
mixture of the elements of constitutions result therefore are what we are mainly concerned with.
new forms of mixed constitutions (ouvovao uoi), | These are partly external (witnesses, &c. ), partly
which Aristotle characterizes more closely accord artistical, to be created by the orator ; to these
ing to the three essential functions of political belong the personal qualities (100s) of the orator
power. (Polit. iv. 14, vi. ) Having thus prepared himself
, and the disposition of the hearers, and the
the way, the philosopher proceeds to the real mode itself in which the arguments are exhibited.
problem, to shew how a state can be so perfect- From the means of proof we discover what is re-
ly constituted, as to answer to the requisitions quisite in the orator: he must understand how to
of human nature. He shews that the question, form conclusions, must possess an insignt into the
What is the best constitution ? is connected with moral nature and virtues of man, as well as an
the question, What is the most desirable mode of acquaintance with the passions. (Rhet. ii. 22. )
life? (Polit
. vii. l) he develops the external conditions Accordingly rhetoric grows as it were out of the
for the realisation of the best constitution (Polit. roots of dialectics and ethics. (i. 4. ) For argu-
vii. 4, &c. ), which are dependent on fortune, –and mentation, example and enthymeme are in rhetoric,
then passes to the internal conditions of such a what induction and conclusion are in dialectics.
constitution, which are independent of fortune. As regards their subject matter, most enthymemes
(Polit. vii. 13, &c. ) For these latter he finds the are taken from the special departments of the
central point in the education of youth, which he sciences. In the laying down of the general and par-
therefore considers as a public concern of the state. ticular points of view the excellence of the genuine
(Polit. viii. 1. ) Its object is the harmonious cul- empiricism of Aristotle, which is united with the
ture of all the physical and mental powers, which most acute sagacity, amply displays itself, and,
lays the foundation for that harmony of perfect particularly in the treatment of the then, unfolds
virtue both in the man and in the citizen, in which a rich treasure of psychological experience, which
the purely human develops itself in all its fulness lays bare the most secret recesses of the human
and power. By the individual citizens of the heart.
state (Polit. vii. 13) being trained to a virtuous, The several species of oratory develop themselves
moral life, virtue and morality become predominant out of the different dispositions which may exist
in all the spheres of political life, and accordingly in the hearer of a speech. The hearer, namely, is
by means of politics that is completely realised, for either a fewpos, i. e. listens only for the sake of
which ethics form the ground-work, viz. human artistic enjoyment, or he is one who forms a
happiness depending on a life in accordance with judgment respecting what is to come, or what is
virtue. Thus on the one hand the science of poli- past. In accordance with these different charac-
tics is again reflected to the point from which it ters in which the hearer appears, there result
started—ethics, while on the other hand, inasmuch three species of oratory: the deliberative (yevos
as art and oratory are included in the circle of the ovubovaeutikÓV), the forensic (9. Jikavior), the
means by which the citizen is to be trained, it cmicictic (%. éADELKTIKOV). Aristotle then deter-
points beyond what is immediately connected with mines what are the essential elements of these
itself to the departinents of
1 species, and further the occasion and purposes of
## p. 343 (#363) ############################################
ARISTOTELES.
343
ARISTOTELES.
them. The difference of purpose again involves capable of inspiration (oiò cúpuolls Ý TOINTIK)
attention to the appropriate arguments, according &OTIV yavisov, Rhet. ii. 15 extr. ) make the
as these are common to all, or particular.
poct, who at the same time cannot dispense with
The power of convincing, however, depends not discretion. The external form of the representa-
merely on oratorical conclusions, but also on tion, the metre, is not decisive as to whether
the credibility of the orator, and the disposition of anything is poetry or not. The history of Hero-
the hearers. Therefore it is necessary to shew dotus reduced to metre would still remain a his
how the favourable disposition requisite on every tory. (Poct. 9. ) A subject becomes poetical only
occasion is to be produced in the mind of the through a lively, vivid mode of representation,
hearer. But a person must know not only whut and the principal point is the composition and ar-
to say, but also how to say it. Therefore rhetoric rangement of the matter, the cúvbedis (or ouotaois)
has, by way of conclusion, to treat of oratorical Tüv #payuatwv (Poel. 7), in other words, the
expression and arrangement.
invention or idea, which has assumed a lively forin
2. Poetics. -—" Thou, O man, alone possessest in the poet; and this is the starting-point, and as
art! ” This dictum of Schiller's is already ex- it were the soul of poetry (αρχή και οίον ψυχή
pressed by Aristotle. (Met. i. 1. ) In art the ó uūdos mais 7paynõias, Poet. 7*). Poetry is
production of a work is the main matter and the more coniprehensive and philosophical than his-
main
purpose, whilst the purpose of oratory, tory; for whilst history is restricted to individual
which is throughout practical, is extraneous to actual facts, the poet takes higher ground, and re-
speech itself.
The relation of art to morality and presents in the particular that which, considered
virline is, on the side of the artist, a very slight in itself, can happen at any time; that which is
one ;, for, with dispositions and sentiments, universally applicable and necessary. The univer-
which in actions form the most important point, sal in poetry, however, is not an abstract, in-
we have nothing to do in the practice of art, definite something, but manifests itself in the
where the main thing is the production (TOLEîv) of characteristic individuality of person by means of
a work. On the other hand, however, every art, language and action in accordance with internal
and every work of art, exerts a moral influence, probability and necessity. (Poet. 9. ) Whilst
purifies and purges the stronger emotions of the therefore in poetry everything individual, as im-
soul, strengthens and elevates the mind.
porting something universal, is thoroughly signifi-
Art, like nature, produces by fashioning organic-cant, history, on the other hand, relates in chrono-
ally, but, with consciousness (Phys. ii. 8), and its logical succession what the individual has really
creative efforts, as well as the contemplation of done, and wbat has happened to him. The bis-
these efforts, and of the work of art produced, be torian is restricted as to the order, arrangement, and
long to those higher exertions of the mind (td succession of the facts which he describes; the
TepITTá) which have their purpose in themselves. poet has these unrestrictedly under his dominion.
Aristotle, indeed, in accordance with the light in With these individual features of Aristotle's
which the matter was generally viewed by the Poetics we must here content ourselves, as a com-
ancients, reckons art amongst the higher purposes plete examination of his theory of the epos and of
of the state and of religion (Polit. viii. ); but with the drama might easily lead us beyond the limits
him it has also already the signification of an inde to which we are restricted.
pendent creation of the mind, which ennobles
IX. APPENDIX.
reality, and which again draws within its sphere The main sources for the life of Aristotle are
religion and morality likewise.
lost to us. The number of works on biography
All the several arts find a common bond of union and literary history extant in antiquity, from
in this, that they are all imitations (ueuro eis), which information" might have been obtained
i. e. all arts, epic poetry, tragedy, comedy, lyric respecting Aristotle, must have been immense,
poetry, music, orchestic (the art of dancing), since out of Diogenes Laërtius alone the names of
painting, and statuary, strive after truth, the real nearly 40 such writers may be collected, whose
essence of things, which they represent. That works, with the exception of single quotations, have
which distinguishes the arts from each other lies
disappeared.
partly in the diversity of the means by which they
With respect to Aristotle in particular, ve
represent, partly in the object of representation, have to regret the loss of the works of Hermippus
partly in the mode of representation. According of Smyrna, Timotheus of Athens, Demetrius of
to this diversity arise the distinct differences in Magnesia (ó Máyyns), Pseudo-Aristippus, Apollo
the arts, the species of art, and the different styles dorus of Athens, Eumelus, Phavorinus, &c. , as well
of art. How, according to Aristotle's view, the as those of Aristoxenus of Tarentum, Apellicon of
beautiful developed and manifested itself in the Teos, Sotion, Aristocles of Messene, Damascius,
separate arts, can be pointed out only with reference Andronicus of Rhodes, and Ptolemaeus Philadel-
to poetry, because this is the only art that Aris-phus.
totle (in his work hep mointiKÍs) has treated of. The scanty and confused sources still extant
Poetry is the product of inspiration (Rhet. iii. 7), are the following :- 1. Diogenes Laërtius, v. l-
and its means of representation is language, metri- 35 ; 2. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Epistola ad
cal as well as unmetrical. (Poet. 1. ) Improvisa- Ammaeum de Demosthene et Aristotele; 3. Pseudo-
tions form the historical starting point for all Ammonius, + rita Aristotelis, by a later com-
poetry, which from its very commencement divides
itself into two principal directions, that which Aristotle, indeed, is there speaking only of
follows the more bomely, and that which follows tragedy, but what he says of the mythus with re-
the more exalted. This depended on the peculiar ference to tragedy applies to all poetry.
character of the poet. A delicate perception of + Victor Cousin, in the Journal des Suvans,
what is correct and appropriate, an acute faculty December, 1832, p. 747, maintains the authenticity
of observation, and a mind easily excitable and of this little biography.
## p. 344 (#364) ############################################
344
ARISTOTELES.
ARISTOXENUS.
piler, according to others by Philoponus, edited | persons of the name of Aristoteles, respecting
by J.
