No More Learning

Objection 3: Further, the intellect understands things by a process of
assimilation to them. But composition and division are not in things,
for nothing is in things but what is signified by the predicate and the
subject, and which is one and the same, provided that the composition
be true, for "man" is truly what "animal" is. Therefore the intellect
does not act by composition and division.

On the contrary, Words signify the conceptions of the intellect, as the
Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i). But in words we find composition and
division, as appears in affirmative and negative propositions.
Therefore the intellect acts by composition and division.

I answer that, The human intellect must of necessity understand by
composition and division. For since the intellect passes from
potentiality to act, it has a likeness to things which are generated,
which do not attain to perfection all at once but acquire it by
degrees: so likewise the human intellect does not acquire perfect
knowledge by the first act of apprehension; but it first apprehends
something about its object, such as its quiddity, and this is its first
and proper object; and then it understands the properties, accidents,
and the various relations of the essence. Thus it necessarily compares
one thing with another by composition or division; and from one
composition and division it proceeds to another, which is the process
of reasoning.

But the angelic and the Divine intellect, like all incorruptible
things, have their perfection at once from the beginning. Hence the
angelic and the Divine intellect have the entire knowledge of a thing
at once and perfectly; and hence also in knowing the quiddity of a
thing they know at once whatever we can know by composition, division,
and reasoning. Therefore the human intellect knows by composition,
division and reasoning. But the Divine intellect and the angelic
intellect know, indeed, composition, division, and reasoning, not by
the process itself, but by understanding the simple essence.

Reply to Objection 1: Composition and division of the intellect are
made by differentiating and comparing. Hence the intellect knows many
things by composition and division, as by knowing the difference and
comparison of things.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the intellect abstracts from the
phantasms, it does not understand actually without turning to the
phantasms, as we have said [688](A[1]; [689]Q[84], A[7]). And forasmuch
as it turns to the phantasms, composition and division of the intellect
involve time.

Reply to Objection 3: The likeness of a thing is received into the
intellect according to the mode of the intellect, not according to the
mode of the thing. Wherefore something on the part of the thing
corresponds to the composition and division of the intellect; but it
does not exist in the same way in the intellect and in the thing. For
the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity of a material
thing, which comes under the action of the senses and the imagination.
Now in a material thing there is a twofold composition. First, there is
the composition of form with matter; and to this corresponds that
composition of the intellect whereby the universal whole is predicated
of its part: for the genus is derived from common matter, while the
difference that completes the species is derived from the form, and the
particular from individual matter. The second comparison is of accident
with subject: and to this real composition corresponds that composition
of the intellect, whereby accident is predicated of subject, as when we
say "the man is white. " Nevertheless composition of the intellect
differs from composition of things; for in the latter the things are
diverse, whereas composition of the intellect is a sign of the identity
of the components. For the above composition of the intellect does not
imply that "man" and "whiteness" are identical, but the assertion, "the
man is white," means that "the man is something having whiteness": and
the subject, which is a man, is identified with a subject having
whiteness. It is the same with the composition of form and matter: for
animal signifies that which has a sensitive nature; rational, that
which has an intellectual nature; man, that which has both; and
Socrates that which has all these things together with individual
matter; and according to this kind of identity our intellect predicates
the composition of one thing with another.
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Whether the intellect can be false?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect can be false; for the
Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 4) that "truth and falsehood are
in the mind. " But the mind and intellect are the same, as is shown
above ([690]Q[79], A[1]). Therefore falsehood may be in the mind.

Objection 2: Further, opinion and reasoning belong to the intellect.
But falsehood exists in both. Therefore falsehood can be in the
intellect.

Objection 3: Further, sin is in the intellectual faculty. But sin
involves falsehood: for "those err that work evil" (Prov. 14:22).
Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect.

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 32), that "everyone who is
deceived, does not rightly understand that wherein he is deceived. " And
the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10), that "the intellect is always
true. "

I answer that, The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 6) compares intellect
with sense on this point. For sense is not deceived in its proper
object, as sight in regard to color; has accidentally through some
hindrance occurring to the sensile organ---for example, the taste of a
fever-stricken person judges a sweet thing to be bitter, through his
tongue being vitiated by ill humors. Sense, however, may be deceived as
regards common sensible objects, as size or figure; when, for example,
it judges the sun to be only a foot in diameter, whereas in reality it
exceeds the earth in size. Much more is sense deceived concerning
accidental sensible objects, as when it judges that vinegar is honey by
reason of the color being the same. The reason of this is evident; for
every faculty, as such, is "per se" directed to its proper object; and
things of this kind are always the same. Hence, as long as the faculty
exists, its judgment concerning its own proper object does not fail.
Now the proper object of the intellect is the "quiddity" of a material
thing; and hence, properly speaking, the intellect is not at fault
concerning this quiddity; whereas it may go astray as regards the
surroundings of the thing in its essence or quiddity, in referring one
thing to another, as regards composition or division, or also in the
process of reasoning. Therefore, also in regard to those propositions,
which are understood, the intellect cannot err, as in the case of first
principles from which arises infallible truth in the certitude of
scientific conclusions.

The intellect, however, may be accidentally deceived in the quiddity of
composite things, not by the defect of its organ, for the intellect is
a faculty that is independent of an organ; but on the part of the
composition affecting the definition, when, for instance, the
definition of a thing is false in relation to something else, as the
definition of a circle applied to a triangle; or when a definition is
false in itself as involving the composition of things incompatible;
as, for instance, to describe anything as "a rational winged animal. "
Hence as regards simple objects not subject to composite definitions we
cannot be deceived unless, indeed, we understand nothing whatever about
them, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 10.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher says that falsehood is in the
intellect in regard to composition and division. The same answer
applies to the Second Objection concerning opinion and reasoning, and
to the Third Objection, concerning the error of the sinner, who errs in
the practical judgment of the appetible object. But in the absolute
consideration of the quiddity of a thing, and of those things which are
known thereby, the intellect is never deceived. In this sense are to be
understood the authorities quoted in proof of the opposite conclusion.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether one person can understand one and the same thing better than another
can?

Objection 1: It would seem that one person cannot understand one and
the same thing better than another can. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu.
32), "Whoever understands a thing otherwise than as it is, does not
understand it at all. Hence it is clear that there is a perfect
understanding, than which none other is more perfect: and therefore
there are not infinite degrees of understanding a thing: nor can one
person understand a thing better than another can. "

Objection 2: Further, the intellect is true in its act of
understanding. But truth, being a certain equality between thought and
thing, is not subject to more or less; for a thing cannot be said to be
more or less equal. Therefore a thing cannot be more or less
understood.

Objection 3: Further, the intellect is the most formal of all that is
in man. But different forms cause different species. Therefore if one
man understands better than another, it would seem that they do not
belong to the same species.

On the contrary, Experience shows that some understand more profoundly
than do others; as one who carries a conclusion to its first principles
and ultimate causes understands it better than the one who reduces it
only to its proximate causes.

I answer that, A thing being understood more by one than by another may
be taken in two senses. First, so that the word "more" be taken as
determining the act of understanding as regards the thing understood;
and thus, one cannot understand the same thing more than another,
because to understand it otherwise than as it is, either better or
worse, would entail being deceived, and such a one would not understand
it, as Augustine argues (QQ. 83, qu. 32). In another sense the word
"more" can be taken as determining the act of understanding on the part
of him who understands; and so one may understand the same thing better
than someone else, through having a greater power of understanding:
just as a man may see a thing better with his bodily sight, whose power
is greater, and whose sight is more perfect. The same applies to the
intellect in two ways. First, as regards the intellect itself, which is
more perfect. For it is plain that the better the disposition of a
body, the better the soul allotted to it; which clearly appears in
things of different species: and the reason thereof is that act and
form are received into matter according to matter's capacity: thus
because some men have bodies of better disposition, their souls have a
greater power of understanding, wherefore it is said (De Anima ii, 9),
that "it is to be observed that those who have soft flesh are of apt
mind. " Secondly, this occurs in regard to the lower powers of which the
intellect has need in its operation: for those in whom the imaginative,
cogitative, and memorative powers are of better disposition, are better
disposed to understand.

The reply to the First Objection is clear from the above; likewise the
reply to the Second, for the truth of the intellect consists in the
intellect understanding a thing as it is.

Reply to Objection 3: The difference of form which is due only to the
different disposition of matter, causes not a specific but only a
numerical difference: for different individuals have different forms,
diversified according to the difference of matter.
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Whether the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect understands the
indivisible before the divisible. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1)
that "we understand and know from the knowledge of principles and
elements. " But principles are indivisible, and elements are of
divisible things. Therefore the indivisible is known to us before the
divisible.

Objection 2: Further, the definition of a thing contains what is known
previously, for a definition "proceeds from the first and more known,"
as is said Topic. vi, 4. But the indivisible is part of the definition
of the divisible; as a point comes into the definition of a line; for
as Euclid says, "a line is length without breadth, the extremities of
which are points"; also unity comes into the definition of number, for
"number is multitude measured by one," as is said Metaph. x, Did. ix,
6. Therefore our intellect understands the indivisible before the
divisible.

Objection 3: Further, "Like is known by like. " But the indivisible is
more like to the intellect than is the divisible; because "the
intellect is simple" (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore our intellect first
knows the indivisible.

On the contrary, It is said (De Anima iii, 6) that "the indivisible is
expressed as a privation. " But privation is known secondarily.
Therefore likewise is the indivisible.

I answer that, The object of our intellect in its present state is the
quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts from the phantasms, as
above stated ([691]Q[84], A[7]). And since that which is known first
and of itself by our cognitive power is its proper object, we must
consider its relationship to that quiddity in order to discover in what
order the indivisible is known. Now the indivisible is threefold, as is
said De Anima iii, 6. First, the continuous is indivisible, since
actually it is undivided, although potentially divisible: and this
indivisible is known to us before its division, which is a division
into parts: because confused knowledge is prior to distinct knowledge,
as we have said above [692](A[3]). Secondly, the indivisible is so
called in relation to species, as man's reason is something
indivisible. This way, also, the indivisible is understood before its
division into logical parts, as we have said above (De Anima iii, 6);
and again before the intellect disposes and divides by affirmation and
negation. The reason of this is that both these kinds of indivisible
are understood by the intellect of itself, as being its proper object.
The third kind of indivisible is what is altogether indivisible, as a
point and unity, which cannot be divided either actually or
potentially. And this indivisible is known secondarily, through the
privation of divisibility. Wherefore a point is defined by way of
privation "as that which has no parts"; and in like manner the notion
of "one" is that is "indivisible," as stated in Metaph. x, Did. ix, 1.
And the reason of this is that this indivisible has a certain
opposition to a corporeal being, the quiddity of which is the primary
and proper object of the intellect.

But if our intellect understood by participation of certain separate
indivisible (forms), as the Platonists maintained, it would follow that
a like indivisible is understood primarily; for according to the
Platonists what is first is first participated by things.

Reply to Objection 1: In the acquisition of knowledge, principles and
elements are not always (known) first: for sometimes from sensible
effects we arrive at the knowledge of principles and intelligible
causes. But in perfect knowledge, the knowledge of effects always
depends on the knowledge of principles and elements: for as the
Philosopher says in the same passage: "Then do we consider that we
know, when we can resolve principles into their causes. "

Reply to Objection 2: A point is not included in the definition of a
line in general: for it is manifest that in a line of indefinite
length, and in a circular line, there is no point, save potentially.
Euclid defines a finite straight line: and therefore he mentions a
point in the definition, as the limit in the definition of that which
is limited. Unity is the measure of number: wherefore it is included in
the definition of a measured number. But it is not included in the
definition of the divisible, but rather conversely.

Reply to Objection 3: The likeness through which we understand is the
species of the known in the knower; therefore a thing is known first,
not on account of its natural likeness to the cognitive power, but on
account of the power's aptitude for the object: otherwise sight would
perceive hearing rather than color.
__________________________________________________________________

WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We now have to consider what our intellect knows in material things.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it knows singulars?

(2) Whether it knows the infinite?

(3) Whether it knows contingent things?

(4) Whether it knows future things?
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Whether our intellect knows singulars?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows singulars. For
whoever knows composition, knows the terms of composition. But our
intellect knows this composition; "Socrates is a man": for it belongs
to the intellect to form a proposition. Therefore our intellect knows
this singular, Socrates.

Objection 2: Further, the practical intellect directs to action. But
action has relation to singular things. Therefore the intellect knows
the singular.

Objection 3: Further, our intellect understands itself. But in itself
it is a singular, otherwise it would have no action of its own; for
actions belong to singulars. Therefore our intellect knows singulars.

Objection 4: Further, a superior power can do whatever is done by an
inferior power. But sense knows the singular. Much more, therefore, can
the intellect know it.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. i, 5), that "the universal
is known by reason; and the singular is known by sense. "

I answer that, Our intellect cannot know the singular in material
things directly and primarily. The reason of this is that the principle
of singularity in material things is individual matter, whereas our
intellect, as have said above ([693]Q[85], A[1]), understands by
abstracting the intelligible species from such matter. Now what is
abstracted from individual matter is the universal. Hence our intellect
knows directly the universal only. But indirectly, and as it were by a
kind of reflection, it can know the singular, because, as we have said
above ([694]Q[85], A[7]), even after abstracting the intelligible
species, the intellect, in order to understand, needs to turn to the
phantasms in which it understands the species, as is said De Anima iii,
7. Therefore it understands the universal directly through the
intelligible species, and indirectly the singular represented by the
phantasm. And thus it forms the proposition "Socrates is a man. "
Wherefore the reply to the first objection is clear.

Reply to Objection 2: The choice of a particular thing to be done is as
the conclusion of a syllogism formed by the practical intellect, as is
said Ethic. vii, 3. But a singular proposition cannot be directly
concluded from a universal proposition, except through the medium of a
singular proposition. Therefore the universal principle of the
practical intellect does not move save through the medium of the
particular apprehension of the sensitive part, as is said De Anima iii,
11.

Reply to Objection 3: Intelligibility is incompatible with the singular
not as such, but as material, for nothing can be understood otherwise
than immaterially. Therefore if there be an immaterial singular such as
the intellect, there is no reason why it should not be intelligible.

Reply to Objection 4: The higher power can do what the lower power can,
but in a more eminent way. Wherefore what the sense knows materially
and concretely, which is to know the singular directly, the intellect
knows immaterially and in the abstract, which is to know the universal.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether our intellect can know the infinite?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect can know the infinite.
For God excels all infinite things. But our intellect can know God, as
we have said above ([695]Q[12], A[1]). Much more, therefore, can our
intellect know all other infinite things.

Objection 2: Further, our intellect can naturally know "genera" and
"species. " But there is an infinity of species in some genera, as in
number, proportion, and figure. Therefore our intellect can know the
infinite.

Objection 3: Further, if one body can coexist with another in the same
place, there is nothing to prevent an infinite number of bodies being
in one place. But one intelligible species can exist with another in
the same intellect, for many things can be habitually known at the same
time. Therefore our intellect can have an habitual knowledge of an
infinite number of things.

Objection 4: Further, as the intellect is not a corporeal faculty, as
we have said ([696]Q[76], A[1]), it appears to be an infinite power.
But an infinite power has a capacity for an infinite object. Therefore
our intellect can know the infinite.

On the contrary, It is said (Phys. i, 4) that "the infinite, considered
as such, is unknown. "

I answer that, Since a faculty and its object are proportional to each
other, the intellect must be related to the infinite, as is its object,
which is the quiddity of a material thing. Now in material things the
infinite does not exist actually, but only potentially, in the sense of
one succeeding another, as is said Phys. iii, 6. Therefore infinity is
potentially in our mind through its considering successively one thing
after another: because never does our intellect understand so many
things, that it cannot understand more.

On the other hand, our intellect cannot understand the infinite either
actually or habitually. Not actually, for our intellect cannot know
actually at the same time, except what it knows through one species.
But the infinite is not represented by one species, for if it were it
would be something whole and complete. Consequently it cannot be
understood except by a successive consideration of one part after
another, as is clear from its definition (Phys. iii, 6): for the
infinite is that "from which, however much we may take, there always
remains something to be taken. " Thus the infinite could not be known
actually, unless all its parts were counted: which is impossible.

For the same reason we cannot have habitual knowledge of the infinite:
because in us habitual knowledge results from actual consideration:
since by understanding we acquire knowledge, as is said Ethic. ii, 1.
Wherefore it would not be possible for us to have a habit of an
infinity of things distinctly known, unless we had already considered
the entire infinity thereof, counting them according to the succession
of our knowledge: which is impossible. And therefore neither actually
nor habitually can our intellect know the infinite, but only
potentially as explained above.

Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above ([697]Q[7], A[1]), God is
called infinite, because He is a form unlimited by matter; whereas in
material things, the term 'infinite' is applied to that which is
deprived of any formal term. And form being known in itself, whereas
matter cannot be known without form, it follows that the material
infinite is in itself unknowable. But the formal infinite, God, is of
Himself known; but He is unknown to us by reason of our feeble
intellect, which in its present state has a natural aptitude for
material objects only. Therefore we cannot know God in our present life
except through material effects. In the future life this defect of
intellect will be removed by the state of glory, when we shall be able
to see the Essence of God Himself, but without being able to comprehend
Him.

Reply to Objection 2: The nature of our mind is to know species
abstracted from phantasms; therefore it cannot know actually or
habitually species of numbers or figures that are not in the
imagination, except in a general way and in their universal principles;
and this is to know them potentially and confusedly.

Reply to Objection 3: If two or more bodies were in the same place,
there would be no need for them to occupy the place successively, in
order for the things placed to be counted according to this succession
of occupation. On the other hand, the intelligible species enter into
our intellect successively; since many things cannot be actually
understood at the same time: and therefore there must be a definite and
not an infinite number of species in our intellect.

Reply to Objection 4: As our intellect is infinite in power, so does it
know the infinite. For its power is indeed infinite inasmuch as it is
not terminated by corporeal matter.
Moreover it can know the universal,
which is abstracted from individual matter, and which consequently is
not limited to one individual, but, considered in itself, extends to an
infinite number of individuals.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether our intellect can know contingent things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect cannot know contingent
things: because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 6), the objects of
understanding, wisdom and knowledge are not contingent, but necessary
things.

Objection 2: Further, as stated in Phys. iv, 12, "what sometimes is and
sometimes is not, is measured by time. " Now the intellect abstracts
from time, and from other material conditions. Therefore, as it is
proper to a contingent thing sometime to be and sometime not to be, it
seems that contingent things are not known by the intellect.

On the contrary, All knowledge is in the intellect. But some sciences
are of the contingent things, as the moral sciences, the objects of
which are human actions subject to free-will; and again, the natural
sciences in as far as they relate to things generated and corruptible.
Therefore the intellect knows contingent things.

I answer that, Contingent things can be considered in two ways; either
as contingent, or as containing some element of necessity, since every
contingent thing has in it something necessary: for example, that
Socrates runs, is in itself contingent; but the relation of running to
motion is necessary, for it is necessary that Socrates move if he runs.
Now contingency arises from matter, for contingency is a potentiality
to be or not to be, and potentiality belongs to matter; whereas
necessity results from form, because whatever is consequent on form is
of necessity in the subject. But matter is the individualizing
principle: whereas the universal comes from the abstraction of the form
from the particular matter. Moreover it was laid down above [698](A[1])
that the intellect of itself and directly has the universal for its
object; while the object of sense is the singular, which in a certain
way is the indirect object of the intellect, as we have said above
[699](A[1]). Therefore the contingent, considered as such, is known
directly by sense and indirectly by the intellect; while the universal
and necessary principles of contingent things are known only by the
intellect. Hence if we consider the objects of science in their
universal principles, then all science is of necessary things. But if
we consider the things themselves, thus some sciences are of necessary
things, some of contingent things.

From which the replies to the objections are clear.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether our intellect can know the future?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows the future. For our
intellect knows by means of intelligible species abstracted from the
"here" and "now," and related indifferently to all time. But it can
know the present. Therefore it can know the future.

Objection 2: Further, man, while his senses are in suspense, can know
some future things, as in sleep, and in frenzy. But the intellect is
freer and more vigorous when removed from sense. Therefore the
intellect of its own nature can know the future.

Objection 3: The intellectual knowledge of man is superior to any
knowledge of brutes. But some animals know the future; thus crows by
their frequent cawing foretell rain. Therefore much more can the
intellect know the future.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 8:6,7), "There is a great
affliction for man, because he is ignorant of things past; and things
to come he cannot know by any messenger. "

I answer that, We must apply the same distinction to future things, as
we applied above [700](A[3]) to contingent things. For future things
considered as subject to time are singular, and the human intellect
knows them by reflection only, as stated above [701](A[1]). But the
principles of future things may be universal; and thus they may enter
the domain of the intellect and become the objects of science.

Speaking, however, of the knowledge of the future in a general way, we
must observe that the future may be known in two ways: either in
itself, or in its cause. The future cannot be known in itself save by
God alone; to Whom even that is present which in the course of events
is future, forasmuch as from eternity His glance embraces the whole
course of time, as we have said above when treating of God's knowledge
([702]Q[14], A[13]). But forasmuch as it exists in its cause, the
future can be known by us also. And if, indeed, the cause be such as to
have a necessary connection with its future result, then the future is
known with scientific certitude, just as the astronomer foresees the
future eclipse. If, however, the cause be such as to produce a certain
result more frequently than not, then can the future be known more or
less conjecturally, according as its cause is more or less inclined to
produce the effect.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers that knowledge which is
drawn from universal causal principles; from these the future may be
known, according to the order of the effects to the cause.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Confess. xii [*Gen. ad lit.
xii. 13]), the soul has a certain power of forecasting, so that by its
very nature it can know the future; hence when withdrawn from corporeal
sense, and, as it were, concentrated on itself, it shares in the
knowledge of the future. Such an opinion would be reasonable if we were
to admit that the soul receives knowledge by participating the ideas as
the Platonists maintained, because in that case the soul by its nature
would know the universal causes of all effects, and would only be
impeded in its knowledge by the body, and hence when withdrawn from the
corporeal senses it would know the future.

But since it is connatural to our intellect to know things, not thus,
but by receiving its knowledge from the senses; it is not natural for
the soul to know the future when withdrawn from the senses: rather does
it know the future by the impression of superior spiritual and
corporeal causes; of spiritual causes, when by Divine power the human
intellect is enlightened through the ministry of angels, and the
phantasms are directed to the knowledge of future events; or, by the
influence of demons, when the imagination is moved regarding the future
known to the demons, as explained above ([703]Q[57], A[3]). The soul is
naturally more inclined to receive these impressions of spiritual
causes when it is withdrawn from the senses, as it is then nearer to
the spiritual world, and freer from external distractions. The same may
also come from superior corporeal causes. For it is clear that superior
bodies influence inferior bodies. Hence, in consequence of the
sensitive faculties being acts of corporeal organs, the influence of
the heavenly bodies causes the imagination to be affected, and so, as
the heavenly bodies cause many future events, the imagination receives
certain images of some such events. These images are perceived more at
night and while we sleep than in the daytime and while we are awake,
because, as stated in De Somn. et Vigil. ii [*De Divinat. per somn.
ii. ], "impressions made by day are evanescent. The night air is calmer,
when silence reigns, hence bodily impressions are made in sleep, when
slight internal movements are felt more than in wakefulness, and such
movements produce in the imagination images from which the future may
be foreseen. "

Reply to Objection 3: Brute animals have no power above the imagination
wherewith to regulate it, as man has his reason, and therefore their
imagination follows entirely the influence of the heavenly bodies. Thus
from such animals' movements some future things, such as rain and the
like, may be known rather from human movements directed by reason.
Hence the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vig. ), that "some who are most
imprudent are most far-seeing; for their intelligence is not burdened
with cares, but is as it were barren and bare of all anxiety moving at
the caprice of whatever is brought to bear on it. "
__________________________________________________________________

HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider how the intellectual soul knows itself and all
within itself. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the soul knows itself by its own essence?

(2) Whether it knows its own habits?

(3) How does the intellect know its own act?

(4) How does it know the act of the will?
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Whether the intellectual soul knows itself by its essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul knows itself by
its own essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), that "the mind
knows itself, because it is incorporeal. "

Objection 2: Further, both angels and human souls belong to the genus
of intellectual substance. But an angel understands itself by its own
essence. Therefore likewise does the human soul.

Objection 3: Further, "in things void of matter, the intellect and that
which is understood are the same" (De Anima iii, 4). But the human mind
is void of matter, not being the act of a body as stated above
([704]Q[76], A[1]). Therefore the intellect and its object are the same
in the human mind; and therefore the human mind understands itself by
its own essence.

On the contrary, It is said (De Anima iii, 4) that "the intellect
understands itself in the same way as it understands other things. " But
it understands other things, not by their essence, but by their
similitudes. Therefore it does not understand itself by its own
essence.

I answer that, Everything is knowable so far as it is in act, and not,
so far as it is in potentiality (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 9): for a thing
is a being, and is true, and therefore knowable, according as it is
actual. This is quite clear as regards sensible things, for the eye
does not see what is potentially, but what is actually colored. In like
manner it is clear that the intellect, so far as it knows material
things, does not know save what is in act: and hence it does not know
primary matter except as proportionate to form, as is stated Phys. i,
7. Consequently immaterial substances are intelligible by their own
essence according as each one is actual by its own essence.

Therefore it is that the Essence of God, the pure and perfect act, is
simply and perfectly in itself intelligible; and hence God by His own
Essence knows Himself, and all other things also. The angelic essence
belongs, indeed, to the genus of intelligible things as "act," but not
as a "pure act," nor as a "complete act," and hence the angel's act of
intelligence is not completed by his essence. For although an angel
understands himself by his own essence, still he cannot understand all
other things by his own essence; for he knows things other than himself
by their likenesses. Now the human intellect is only a potentiality in
the genus of intelligible beings, just as primary matter is a
potentiality as regards sensible beings; and hence it is called
"possible" [*Possibilis---elsewhere in this translation rendered
"passive"---Ed. ]. Therefore in its essence the human mind is
potentially understanding. Hence it has in itself the power to
understand, but not to be understood, except as it is made actual. For
even the Platonists asserted than an order of intelligible beings
existed above the order of intellects, forasmuch as the intellect
understands only by participation of the intelligible; for they said
that the participator is below what it participates. If, therefore, the
human intellect, as the Platonists held, became actual by participating
separate intelligible forms, it would understand itself by such
participation of incorporeal beings. But as in this life our intellect
has material and sensible things for its proper natural object, as
stated above ([705]Q[84], A[7]), it understands itself according as it
is made actual by the species abstracted from sensible things, through
the light of the active intellect, which not only actuates the
intelligible things themselves, but also, by their instrumentality,
actuates the passive intellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself
not by its essence, but by its act. This happens in two ways: In the
first place, singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he
has an intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands. In
the second place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the
human mind from knowledge of the intellectual act. It is true, however,
that the judgment and force of this knowledge, whereby we know the
nature of the soul, comes to us according to the derivation of our
intellectual light from the Divine Truth which contains the types of
all things as above stated ([706]Q[84], A[5]). Hence Augustine says (De
Trin. ix, 6): "We gaze on the inviolable truth whence we can as
perfectly as possible define, not what each man's mind is, but what it
ought to be in the light of the eternal types. " There is, however, a
difference between these two kinds of knowledge, and it consists in
this, that the mere presence of the mind suffices for the first; the
mind itself being the principle of action whereby it perceives itself,
and hence it is said to know itself by its own presence. But as regards
the second kind of knowledge, the mere presence of the mind does not
suffice, and there is further required a careful and subtle inquiry.
Hence many are ignorant of the soul's nature, and many have erred about
it. So Augustine says (De Trin. x, 9), concerning such mental inquiry:
"Let the mind strive not to see itself as if it were absent, but to
discern itself as present"---i. e. to know how it differs from other
things; which is to know its essence and nature.

Reply to Objection 1: The mind knows itself by means of itself, because
at length it acquires knowledge of itself, though led thereto by its
own act: because it is itself that it knows since it loves itself, as
he says in the same passage. For a thing can be called self-evident in
two ways, either because we can know it by nothing else except itself,
as first principles are called self-evident; or because it is not
accidentally knowable, as color is visible of itself, whereas substance
is visible by its accident.

Reply to Objection 2: The essence of an angel is an act in the genus of
intelligible things, and therefore it is both intellect and the thing
understood. Hence an angel apprehends his own essence through itself:
not so the human mind, which is either altogether in potentiality to
intelligible things---as is the passive intellect---or is the act of
intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms---as is the active
intellect.

Reply to Objection 3: This saying of the Philosopher is universally
true in every kind of intellect. For as sense in act is the sensible in
act, by reason of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in
act, so likewise the intellect in act is the object understood in act,
by reason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of
the intellect in act. So the human intellect, which becomes actual by
the species of the object understood, is itself understood by the same
species as by its own form. Now to say that in "things without matter
the intellect and what is understood are the same," is equal to saying
that "as regards things actually understood the intellect and what is
understood are the same. " For a thing is actually understood in that it
is immaterial. But a distinction must be drawn: since the essences of
some things are immaterial---as the separate substances called angels,
each of which is understood and understands, whereas there are other
things whose essences are not wholly immaterial, but only the abstract
likenesses thereof. Hence the Commentator says (De Anima iii) that the
proposition quoted is true only of separate substances; because in a
sense it is verified in their regard, and not in regard of other
substances, as already stated (Reply OBJ 2).
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Whether our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows the habits of the
soul by their essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 1): "Faith is
not seen in the heart wherein it abides, as the soul of a man may be
seen by another from the movement of the body; but we know most
certainly that it is there, and conscience proclaims its existence";
and the same principle applies to the other habits of the soul.
Therefore the habits of the soul are not known by their acts, but by
themselves.

Objection 2: Further, material things outside the soul are known by
their likeness being present in the soul, and are said therefore to be
known by their likenesses. But the soul's habits are present by their
essence in the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are known by
their essence.

Objection 3: Further, "whatever is the cause of a thing being such is
still more so. " But habits and intelligible species cause things to be
known by the soul. Therefore they are still more known by the soul in
themselves.

On the contrary, Habits like powers are the principles of acts. But as
is said (De Anima ii, 4), "acts and operations are logically prior to
powers. " Therefore in the same way they are prior to habits; and thus
habits, like the powers, are known by their acts.

I answer that, A habit is a kind of medium between mere power and mere
act. Now, it has been said [707](A[1]) that nothing is known but as it
is actual: therefore so far as a habit fails in being a perfect act, it
falls short in being of itself knowable, and can be known only by its
act; thus, for example, anyone knows he has a habit from the fact that
he can produce the act proper to that habit; or he may inquire into the
nature and idea of the habit by considering the act. The first kind of
knowledge of the habit arises from its being present, for the very fact
of its presence causes the act whereby it is known. The second kind of
knowledge of the habit arises from a careful inquiry, as is explained
above of the mind [708](A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: Although faith is not known by external movement
of the body, it is perceived by the subject wherein it resides, by the
interior act of the heart. For no one knows that he has faith unless he
knows that he believes.

Reply to Objection 2: Habits are present in our intellect, not as its
object since, in the present state of life, our intellect's object is
the nature of a material thing as stated above ([709]Q[84], A[7]), but
as that by which it understands.

Reply to Objection 3: The axiom, "whatever is the cause of a thing
being such, is still more so," is true of things that are of the same
order, for instance, of the same kind of cause; for example, we may say
that health is desirable on account of life, and therefore life is more
desirable still. But if we take things of different orders the axiom is
not true: for we may say that health is caused by medicine, but it does
not follow that medicine is more desirable than health, for health
belongs to the order of final causes, whereas medicine belongs to the
order of efficient causes. So of two things belonging essentially to
the order of the objects of knowledge, the one which is the cause of
the other being known, is the more known, as principles are more known
than conclusions. But habit as such does not belong to the order of
objects of knowledge; nor are things known on account of the habit, as
on account of an object known, but as on account of a disposition or
form whereby the subject knows: and therefore the argument does not
prove.
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Whether our intellect knows its own act?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not know its own
act. For what is known is the object of the knowing faculty. But the
act differs from the object. Therefore the intellect does not know its
own act.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is known is known by some act. If, then,
the intellect knows its own act, it knows it by some act, and again it
knows that act by some other act; this is to proceed indefinitely,
which seems impossible.

Objection 3: Further, the intellect has the same relation to its act as
sense has to its act. But the proper sense does not feel its own act,
for this belongs to the common sense, as stated De Anima iii, 2.
Therefore neither does the intellect understand its own act.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I
understand. "

I answer that, As stated above ([710]AA[1],2) a thing is intelligible
according as it is in act. Now the ultimate perfection of the intellect
consists in its own operation: for this is not an act tending to
something else in which lies the perfection of the work accomplished,
as building is the perfection of the thing built; but it remains in the
agent as its perfection and act, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8.
Therefore the first thing understood of the intellect is its own act of
understanding. This occurs in different ways with different intellects.
For there is an intellect, namely, the Divine, which is Its own act of
intelligence, so that in God the understanding of His intelligence, and
the understanding of His Essence, are one and the same act, because His
Essence is His act of understanding. But there is another intellect,
the angelic, which is not its own act of understanding, as we have said
above ([711]Q[79], A[1]), and yet the first object of that act is the
angelic essence. Wherefore although there is a logical distinction
between the act whereby he understands that he understands, and that
whereby he understands his essence, yet he understands both by one and
the same act; because to understand his own essence is the proper
perfection of his essence, and by one and the same act is a thing,
together with its perfection, understood. And there is yet another,
namely, the human intellect, which neither is its own act of
understanding, nor is its own essence the first object of its act of
understanding, for this object is the nature of a material thing. And
therefore that which is first known by the human intellect is an object
of this kind, and that which is known secondarily is the act by which
that object is known; and through the act the intellect itself is
known, the perfection of which is this act of understanding. For this
reason did the Philosopher assert that objects are known before acts,
and acts before powers (De Anima ii, 4).

Reply to Objection 1: The object of the intellect is something
universal, namely, "being" and "the true," in which the act also of
understanding is comprised. Wherefore the intellect can understand its
own act. But not primarily, since the first object of our intellect, in
this state of life, is not every being and everything true, but "being"
and "true," as considered in material things, as we have said above
([712]Q[84], A[7]), from which it acquires knowledge of all other
things.

Reply to Objection 2: The intelligent act of the human intellect is not
the act and perfection of the material nature understood, as if the
nature of the material thing and intelligent act could be understood by
one act; just as a thing and its perfection are understood by one act.
Hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone is distinct
from the act whereby it understands that it understands a stone; and so
on. Nor is there any difficulty in the intellect being thus potentially
infinite, as explained above ([713]Q[86], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 3: The proper sense feels by reason of the
immutation in the material organ caused by the external sensible. A
material object, however, cannot immute itself; but one is immuted by
another, and therefore the act of the proper sense is perceived by the
common sense. The intellect, on the contrary, does not perform the act
of understanding by the material immutation of an organ; and so there
is no comparison.
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Whether the intellect understands the act of the will?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect does not understand the
act of the will. For nothing is known by the intellect, unless it be in
some way present in the intellect. But the act of the will is not in
the intellect; since the will and the intellect are distinct. Therefore
the act of the will is not known by the intellect.

Objection 2: Further, the act is specified by the object. But the
object of the will is not the same as the object of the intellect.
Therefore the act of the will is specifically distinct from the object
of the intellect, and therefore the act of the will is not known by the
intellect.

Objection 3: Augustine (Confess. x, 17) says of the soul's affections
that "they are known neither by images as bodies are known; nor by
their presence, like the arts; but by certain notions. " Now it does not
seem that there can be in the soul any other notions of things but
either the essences of things known or the likenesses thereof.
Therefore it seems impossible for the intellect to known such
affections of the soul as the acts of the will.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I
will. "

I answer that, As stated above ([714]Q[59], A[1]), the act of the will
is nothing but an inclination consequent on the form understood; just
as the natural appetite is an inclination consequent on the natural
form. Now the inclination of a thing resides in it according to its
mode of existence; and hence the natural inclination resides in a
natural thing naturally, and the inclination called the sensible
appetite is in the sensible thing sensibly; and likewise the
intelligible inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the
intelligent subject intelligibly as in its principle and proper
subject. Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus (De Anima iii,
9)---that "the will is in the reason. " Now whatever is intelligibly in
an intelligent subject, is understood by that subject. Therefore the
act of the will is understood by the intellect, both inasmuch as one
knows that one wills; and inasmuch as one knows the nature of this act,
and consequently, the nature of its principle which is the habit or
power.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument would hold good if the will and the
intellect were in different subjects, as they are distinct powers; for
then whatever was in the will would not be in the intellect.