No More Learning

O terre san- guinaire, / Non pas terre, mais cendre," resonated long after Henri IV finally brought it to an end with his famous Parisian mass. 37 In the eigh- teenth century, the wars inspired a virtual cult of Henri IV, and obsessed the philosophes. Voltaire, for instance, made the events the subject of his most ambitious epic, La Henriade, which dwelt at length on the grisly hor- rors (blood steaming in the streets of Paris, children dashed to their deaths against flagstones). He returned to them in many other works as well. 38 Diderot wrote memorably of "one half of the nation bathing itself, out of piety, in the blood of the other half. "39 The wars also provided subject ma- terial for some of the most explosive stage dramas of the eighteenth cen- tury, notably Marie-Joseph Che? nier's Charles IX. 40 Political pamphleteers routinely evoked the days when "the patrie's own children tore open its en- trails," and royal ministers especially dreaded any return to the days in which two successive monarchs fell victim to assassins' knives. 41 The re- former Turgot sternly instructed the young Louis XVI about the sixteenth century's terrible spirit, "which put daggers in the hands of kings to butcher the people, and in the hands of the people to butcher kings. Here, Sire, is a great subject for reflection which princes should have constantly present in their thoughts. "42 Even in 1789, Camille Desmoulins roused the crowds at the Palais-Royal by warning about a Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre of patriots. 43 In short, just as the memory of the French Revolu- tion dominated and helped structure French politics for long after 1789, so these wars remained perhaps the most basic political reference point dur- ing the last two centuries of the old regime.
The National and the Sacred 31
? From the start, French writers and statesmen drew one basic lesson from the wars: if religious passions were not excluded from all but certain care- fully delineated spheres of human activity, suicidal strife would follow. As Voltaire would later put it: "C'est la religion dont le ze`le inhumain / Met a` tous les Franc? ais les armes a` la main. "44 From Michel de l'Ho^pital in the sixteenth century to Andre? -Hercule de Fleury and Henri-Franc? ois d'Aguesseau in the eighteenth, royal officials struggled to contain such excess zeal and lived in terror of its divisive effects. 45 And as early as the six- teenth century itself, figures like de l'Ho^pital (an influential lord chancel- lor) argued that the solution to confessional strife might lie in strengthen- ing devotion to a common patrie. The period of the wars thus saw a flourishing of patriotic language in France (including the invention of the word "patriote" itself in the 1560s), accompanied by fierce denunciations of foreign enemies, especially on the part of the moderate, royalist Catholic faction known as the politiques. 46
This early enthusiasm for the patrie, however, remained limited in com- parison with the broader conceptual shift of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Indeed, when the politiques and Henri IV emerged victorious from the wars, the notion of the patrie lost something of its ne- cessity. Religious warfare no longer threatened to rip the country apart, and the French now had a popular--and Catholic--king who not only served as a focal point for allegiance in his own right, but could stand as the great link between the terrestrial and heavenly cities, binding them to- gether into what was still conceived of as one grand hierarchy. For the royal ministers of the seventeenth century, the solution to the problem of pre- venting religious warfare lay not in patriotic enthusiasm, but in conceding absolute, uncontested authority to the monarchical state as the guarantor of justice and order and the source of harmonious, polite human relations. In their view, as Reinhart Koselleck has argued, the state and the king were the axes around which the community should revolve. 47
As the wars retreated in time, many writers came to see the state itself as part of the problem. 48 Voltaire, Diderot, and Che? nier, for instance, equated religious strife less with anarchy than with fanaticism and the violation of private conscience and rejected unquestioning obedience to authority in favor of the institution of toleration. Indeed, they condemned royal power as fanaticism's handmaiden, citing such events as King Charles IX's com- plicity in the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre and, more recently, King Louis XIV's revocation of toleration for Protestants. In the same vein, late- eighteenth-century stage plays like Mercier's La destruction de la ligue, and
32 The Cult of the Nation in France
? still more, Che? nier's ferocious Charles IX, directly attacked the monarchy for encouraging religious violence. By 1789, the popular poet Ecouchard Lebrun could write fiercely of Charles IX: "O Charles! Il est temps que le crime s'expie / De ce tombeau royal, sors, sors, cadavre impie! "49 To those who remembered the Wars of Religion in this manner, it now followed that the state could not provide the basic framework of terrestrial order any more than organized religion could. And so there then arose, in this con- text as well, a need for the new conceptual tools.
The Realm of Material Organization
In the sort of historical writing that seeks to understand the evolution of concepts like "nation," "society," and "civilization," explanations that in- voke social and economic factors are presently almost entirely out of fash- ion. Yet until quite recently most scholars treated the formation of national consciousness as an almost literal process of construction, involving bricks and mortar, iron track and copper wire. Uniting men and women scattered across a large territory, it was argued, demands a high degree of communi- cations and mobility, combined with a cohesive state and economy. Na- tions need roads, canals, and eventually railroads; postal services and even- tually the telegraph; widespread publishing and eventually newspapers; public schools and perhaps conscription. 50 This point of view particularly appealed to French writers, who also tended to give the story a hero: the state, maker of the nation.
The current generation of cultural and intellectual historians tends to view these accounts with deep suspicion. First, they quite correctly scold, it is a fallacy to assume any direct, automatic, relation between social and technological change and changes in consciousness. The languages in which we attribute meanings to things have their own histories and their own dynamics. These languages do not simply respond, passively, to "deeper" structural changes, like so many loose stones on the slopes of a volcano. As for the more specifically French fixation on the state as the maker of the nation, critics have pointed out that it anachronistically proj- ects the attitudes of post-revolutionary officials overtly concerned with na- tion-building back into a very different monarchical past, making of "the state" an eternal, unchanging presence in French life. 51 It has been convinc- ingly demonstrated that old regime policies supposedly aimed at forging "national" unity had more to do with concern for the majesty of the king
The National and the Sacred 33
? and the efficiency of the royal administration. 52 While the French state, in the revolutionary period, became an instrument of nation-building, it is a mistake to imagine the state as an impersonal force that has striven since the Middle Ages to forge a nation around itself.
Still, acknowledging these points should not imply relegating all that brick, wire, and track, not to mention newspapers and administrative circulars, to history's dustbin. The progress of transport and communica- tion, of administrative and commercial practices, and the dissemination of printed matter may not by themselves have led ineluctably to the develop- ment of new conceptual means of discerning and ordering the world, in- cluding the redefined concepts of "nation" and patrie. They did, however, lead contemporaries to pose questions, demand explanations, and reexam- ine concepts that were already in flux. Changes in this realm of material or- ganization had "cultural origins" of their own, of course, yet they were not simply derivative of these origins. They had their own internal dynamics and a relationship to a host of unpredictable and extraneous factors, in- cluding especially the vicissitudes of European warfare.
In the realm of material organization, the decades around the year 1700, again, proved especially significant, across a spectrum of activities that ranged from government administration to journalism to forms of volun- tary association. To begin with, by the end of the seventeenth century King Louis XIV had achieved a greater control over the use of violent force in his kingdom than did any of his predecessors. His administration, while far from the model of authoritarian efficiency described by Alexis de Tocque- ville, had nonetheless become the most powerful in French history, as shown by its success in raising unprecedentedly large armies and tax reve- nues. 53 Powerful nobles and discontented peasants no longer had the ca- pacity to throw the entire kingdom into turmoil through rebellion. At the same time, foreign warfare was beginning to take a less horrific toll on the French population, civilian and military alike. 54 The cost of warfare, how- ever, was spiraling relentlessly upwards, placing extraordinary new fiscal pressures on the monarchy. Louis may have seen himself, quite tradition- ally, as the first gentleman of the realm, but these pressures forced him to adopt new forms of taxation that overrode privilege and placed rulers and ruled into a new relationship. One historian describes the crucial cap- itation of 1695 and dixie`me of 1710 as follows: "Extending, in principle, from city to city, from southern provinces to northern ones, and from peasants to princes, these two taxes were designed to traverse the bound-
34 The Cult of the Nation in France
? aries of privilege that divided the geographic, social and legal landscape of France. "55
Even as Louis's officials carried out these innovations, they also strove for newly systematic ways of observing and measuring France, and re- ducing its complexities to a set of general propositions. In 1663 Colbert ordered royal officials to carry out a general survey of French territory, and soon afterwards he charged the new Academy of Sciences with the first comprehensive mapping of France. Somewhat later Vauban, an ad- vocate of the new forms of taxation, pioneered the collection of national economic and demographic statistics. By the late 1690s, Bishop Fe? nelon could instruct Louis XIV's heir on the knowledge needed by a model mod- ern monarch in these terms: "Do you know the number of men who com- pose your nation; how many women, how many workers, how many mer- chants . . . ? A king must know [his subjects'] principal customs, their liberties, their commerce . . . A king ignorant of these things is but half a king. "56 In response, the administration carried out an even more ambi- tious overview of the French provinces than Colbert's: the so-called Etat de la France. Critics of the state seized on the same new concepts and tech- niques. 57
While officials, driven by the ever-desperate need for increased revenues, subjected France to this new sort of gaze, changes in the circulation of printed matter were bringing the country's educated elites into closer con- tact with each other than ever before. In the 1680s, French-language news- papers from the Netherlands began to circulate in France, providing read- ers with an alternative to the official, court-centered Gazette de France. The same readers soon also had access to official periodicals devoted to the arts and the sciences, and, after 1727, to the wildly successful Jansenist under- ground paper, the Nouvelles eccle? siastiques. While the real flowering of the periodical press in France took place later, already by 1730 readers could find far more regular and varied sources of news and information than fifty years before. 58
Finally, the years around 1700 marked three milestones in the rise of what Ju? rgen Habermas, in analyzing forms of communication and associa- tion, has termed the "bourgeois public sphere. "59 In the 1690s, the first cof- fee houses opened in Paris. The 1720s saw the founding of the first French Masonic lodges. And in the same period Mme. de Tencin and the Marquise de Lambert led the way in transforming salons, which had previously func- tioned principally as schools of aristocratic manners, into serious intellec- tual forums. 60 Each of these establishments provided a place for educated,
The National and the Sacred 35
? well-off individuals to gather and exchange opinions outside the tradi- tional structures of estates and corporate bodies. Together with the period- icals, they facilitated the emergence of a new public sphere which stretched across the boundaries of privilege and even geography (lodges belonged to an international network; coffee houses aimed to provide the same urbane atmosphere regardless of location). Habermas and his commentators have argued that the development of this sphere, which lay outside the tradi- tional circuits of authority, allowed "private" individuals to subject all forms of authority to critical reason. 61
Taken individually, none of these developments in the realm of material organization deserves the description "revolutionary. " Together, however, they amounted to a striking shift in the way France's educated elites dealt with and perceived themselves and their government. The extent of this shift is particularly apparent from the perspective of provincial cities. Rob- ert Schneider's exemplary study of Toulouse shows that in the late seven- teenth and early eighteenth centuries, the concerns of the city's educated elites underwent a striking change in polarity. First, they had to sacrifice their municipal autonomy to the central state. At the same time, their own cultural interests "turned away from local concerns . . . and were focused instead on language, manners, the ways of Paris. "62 Toulousains began reading national newspapers, attending Jesuit-sponsored plays that ex- tolled the progress of French arms, and participating in Parisian-style academies. Poetry in the local Occitan dialect, which had flourished as late as the mid-seventeenth century, withered. Schneider has interpreted this shift primarily in terms of the growing rift between municipal elites and the poor. Yet the new orientation of Toulouse's elites toward national cul- tural and administrative networks is just as significant. It marks the con- solidation of France's diverse provinces, at least from the point of view of their most literate, well-off citizens, into a newly uniform and homoge- neous space. More broadly, it suggests that the traditional vocabulary of es- tates and orders, sanctioned by the king and ultimately modeled on the ce- lestial hierarchy, was becoming less and less relevant to their terrestrial experience.
God on Earth
The changes in the material and spiritual realms suggest why the French of the eighteenth century found it so attractive to describe the world around them using the new or newly redefined foundational concepts of socie? te? ,
36 The Cult of the Nation in France
? civilization, patrie, nation, and public. Each allowed them to imagine an arena of harmonious human coexistence whose principles did not ulti- mately derive from the dictates of an (increasingly absent) God--a God, moreover, whose worship had led, in recent memory, to desperately trau- matic strife. Contemporary observers perceived this turn from God quite clearly. The radical journalist Jean-Franc? ois Sobry, whose controversial 1786 book Le mode franc? ois was suppressed by the royal ministry, wrote with particular sharpness that "societies of men are founded on one of two principles: love of the patrie or attachment to an exclusive religion," and saw France moving from the latter to the former. 63 Rousseau, famously, also defined patriotism as distinct from and perhaps wholly opposed to re- ligious devotion. Defenders of the old religious order perceived the shift too, as in this comment from the Jesuit Dictionnaire de Tre? voux: "Some modern moralists dare to suggest that all man's duties emanate from the principle of society, which is to say that if we lived apart from society, we would have no duties. What a detestable doctrine. "64 In addition to remov- ing religious dependence, each of the foundational concepts referred to a form of human community free from symbolic subjection to a king who was increasingly perceived as having abetted persecution and perpetuated strife. Finally, each concept helped officials and educated elites make sense of the new administrative practices and the new forms of communication and sociability that were cutting across the traditional boundaries between estates, orders, and provinces.
These concepts were central to an even broader shift in the vocabulary of human relations, involving changing ideas of politeness, moeurs, police, and commerce. As early modern writers often suggested, following codes of polite conduct, having good moeurs, being properly "policed," and en- gaging in mutually profitable commerce all offered men and women means of avoiding destructive civil strife without resorting to a morality dependent on divine revelation. 65 In this sense, these concepts resembled the "foundational" ones just discussed. They were different, however, inso- far as they referred to the forms of human interaction and did not invoke the same sense of physical space and collectivity. Furthermore, in France, at least until the last decades of the old regime, police and politeness in par- ticular remained heavily dependent on the figure of the divine-right mon- arch, who stood as the ultimate arbiter of proper behavior.
Conversely, the foundational concepts just discussed helped lead to new concepts of citizenship which defined the condition of individual mem-
The National and the Sacred 37
? bership--especially in the nation. As Peter Sahlins has shown, it was in the 1760s that a French monarchy, consciously attempting to render the king- dom better "policed," began to create clear distinctions between French na- tionals and foreigners, even as men of letters and jurists were revivifying classical ideas of participatory citizenship. 66 In this sense, the concepts not only gave French elites new ways of understanding the world around them, but also helped them imagine new roles for themselves in it: as active agents, rather than passive subjects of divine or monarchical will. At the same time, the shift opened the way for far-reaching controversies (which, for the most part, must remain outside the scope of this book) over the limits of inclusion in such entities as the nation, the patrie, or the public.
It is tempting to interpret the emergence of these new ways of discerning and ordering the world as a process of de-Christianization--tempting, but also misleading. First of all, neither a perception of God's distance from the world nor an insistence on purely terrestrial forms of order implies any- thing about the existence of God or the continuing duty of people to wor- ship him. Historians have found evidence for the decline of formal reli- gious observance in the eighteenth century, but they have not managed to establish any corresponding decline in belief as such or a commensurate rise in atheism. 67 It seems more likely that there occurred what Bernard Groethuysen long ago called a "shrinkage or contraction of faith": a loss of belief in miracles and other manifestations of Divine Providence in the world, permitting the Christian "to confine himself in his everyday life to altogether secular attitudes . . . looking exclusively to the rules of prudence and good sense to regulate the details of his life. "68 In other words, the shift in language reflects not so much secularization as what might be called the interiorization of religious belief--its relegation to the private consciences of individual believers. 69 Rousseau evoked precisely this idea in The Social Contract, in his contrast of the "religion of man" to the "religion of the citi- zen. " He noted that the "religion of man," which he identified with the "holy, sublime and true religion" of the Gospel, had "no particular connec- tion with the body politic, leaves the laws only the force they themselves possess, adding nothing to them; and hence one of the chief bonds holding any particular society together is lacking. " Rousseau concluded, "I know nothing more contrary to the social spirit. " The passage, while purporting to describe an ancient, pristine Christianity, perfectly captured the changes in the religious sphere taking place in Rousseau's own day, and pointed to the direction in which Christianity would henceforth evolve. 70
38 The Cult of the Nation in France
? If the new and redefined concepts represented purely terrestrial ways of ordering the world, they nonetheless retained crucial similarities to their religious counterparts. The very sense of harmony they evoked inescapably recalled earlier visions of the heavenly city. Furthermore, each not only de- scribed something which supposedly existed prior to politics and to orga- nized religion, and which could be taken for a fundamental ground of human existence, but also something beyond all possible criticism and therefore, in an important sense, something sacred. It has been shown that eighteenth-century discussions of how individuals came together in socie? te? rarely failed to invoke religion, even if the theorists increasingly demoted religion to a mere adjunct and aid to supposedly natural human sociabil- ity. 71 Indeed, these writers, in praising socie? te? , frequently adopted the sort of metaphorical religious language long employed for describing France's divinely ordained kings. To give just one example, the Encyclope? die article entitled "Philosophe" declared that "socie? te? civile is, so to speak, a divinity on earth. "72
This same sense of sacrality was invested with even greater strength in the concept of patrie. The Latin noun patria had strong religious connota- tions from the start, and after the fall of Rome, it survived mostly in reli- gious usage: the Christian's true patria lay in the Kingdom of Heaven. In the high Middle Ages, secular rulers began to adopt the word for their own purposes, but "the main contents of the veneration of patria were derived from a world of thought which was religious in a broad sense. " The secu- lar kingdom was imagined on the model of the corpus mysticum of the Church, headed by Jesus. 73 French writers continued to employ the analogy in the era of Henri IV, when both the politique Lord Chancellor De Thou and the ultra-Catholic Guillaume Des Autelz could call the patrie "a sec- ond divinity" or "a second deity. "74 As for the eighteenth century, descrip- tions of the patrie as a "God," "divinity," or something "sacred," and of pa- triotism as "a vast chain linked to Divinity" or a "sacred love," were utterly commonplace. 75 During the Revolution, the 1792 Petition of Agitators to the Legislative Assembly declared that "the image of the patrie is the sole divinity it is permissible to worship. "76
It was the Calvinist, Geneva-born Rousseau who, even while exploring the consequences of the world's "disenchantment," speculated most pro- foundly upon the continuing place of the sacred in the foundation of hu- man communities. (It is tempting to conclude that Calvinism, and the sense of distance between the heavenly and terrestrial cities it instilled, may
The National and the Sacred 39
? have helped Rousseau, and later Rabaut, to imagine secular counterparts to the bonds religion instills between believers. ) Thus in The Social Contract Rousseau insisted that a properly constituted polity requires not merely the consent and participation of the people, but a Lawgiver who invokes divine authority for his laws and a "civil religion" which inspires people to love their duties. 77 He returned to the theme even more powerfully in his 1772 Considerations on the Government of Poland, in a section which turned both Jewish and Roman histories on their heads. First, he took the historical sense of national purpose and unity that the Jews themselves at- tributed to their covenant with God, and removed it from the religious context entirely. Moses "formed and executed," he wrote,
the astonishing enterprise of shaping into a national Body a swarm of unhappy fugitives, bereft of arts, weapons, talents, virtues and courage, and who, not having a single square inch of land for their own, passed for a foreign band on all the face of the earth. Moses dared turn this wander- ing and servile band into a political Body, a free people; and while it wan- dered in the wilderness without even a stone to rest on, he gave it this durable form, resistant to time, fate and conquerors, which five thou- sand years have not been able to destroy or even alter, and which even today retains all its strength, although the national Body itself no longer exists. 78
As for Rome, Rousseau argued that its real founder was not Romulus, who had merely "assembled brigands," but his successor Numa, the codifier of Roman paganism. Numa made the Romans into an "indissoluble body by transforming them into Citizens, less by laws, which their rustic poverty hardly needed yet, than by gentle institutions which attached them to each other, and to their land, by making their city sacred to them through these apparently frivolous and superstitious rites. "79
These remarkable passages, which for perhaps the first time in history clearly articulated the idea of the nation as a political construction, illus- trate better than any other text the way that nationalism arose both out of and against a religious system of belief. In his treatment of the Jews Rous- seau jarringly rewrote sacred history as a secular story of nation-building, something only conceivable in an at least partially "disenchanted" world. He replaced a transcendent vision in which human existence derived its structure and purpose from external, supernatural forces with a political vision in which this structure and purpose arose out of humanity itself. In
40 The Cult of the Nation in France
? the Roman case he injected the sacred back into a story conventionally seen as secular, emphasizing the dependence of nation-building on reli- gion--but a civil religion that oriented citizens toward the terrestrial city, not a transcendent one that turned them away from it. Rousseau therefore showed that nationalism borrows from religious practices but also funda- mentally transforms them; it is not, so to speak, communion wine poured into a new bottle.
Boundaries and Time
The emergence of these new ways of discerning and ordering the world represents only the starting point for understanding the cultural and reli- gious framework of French nationalism. Foundational concepts like patrie, nation, and socie? te? had crucial roles to play in the great constitutional and intellectual movements and conflicts of eighteenth-century France, and were themselves significantly transformed in the process. The following chapters will explore these transformations and their consequences for the emergence of nationalism itself at the time of the Revolution. First, how- ever, it is important to sketch out some of the differences and contradic- tions that existed within the new semantic field throughout the eighteenth century.
The most important distinction is that between the concepts of patrie and civilisation. To be sure, neither had a fixed and uniform meaning. 80 Voltaire himself called patrie a variable and contradictory term. Yet Vol- taire was a self-professed enemy of patriotism ("the philosophe belongs to no country") who ridiculed Joan of Arc and called his own country a "land of monkeys and tigers. "81 He had every reason to deny any fixed, intrinsic meaning to patrie. Yet for most eighteenth-century French writers, even before Rousseau seized on the word and made it central to the great debate he provoked over human progress, patrie did have one very clear set of as- sociations: with the ancient Greek and Roman republics. French writers throughout the century may have argued bitterly over the place the patrie should hold in the modern world. Many expended vast mental effort and even more ink to prove love of patrie compatible with monarchy, and from the 1750s it is possible to talk of a concerted program of "royal patrio- tism. " Yet their almost pathetic eagerness on this score itself underlined the patrie's fundamental association with a different form of government. It was Montesquieu who expressed the traditional point of view when he
The National and the Sacred 41
? identified love of the patrie with republican virtue and stated that in mon- archies the state could exist without it. 82
Insofar as it retained this association with the classical republics, patrie had two particularly distinctive characteristics within the semantic field that emerged in the early eighteenth century.
First, it denoted a community that was essentially closed. Citizens belonged to the patrie, literally the land of their fathers, by birth, and owed their exclusive allegiance to it. Those outside the magic circle were excluded, deserving indifference at best and perhaps suspicion or outright hostility. Secondly, the term implied a par- ticular vision of the passage of time: a patrie did not progress but declined. It possessed a pristine past but faced a perilous future, filled with the dan- gers of corruption, of decay, of the insidious poison of self-interest leech- ing away the precious fluid of republican virtue and leaving the commu- nity vulnerable to conquest and destruction. 83 If the future of the patrie held any promise at all, it lay in the possibility of a return to its original state (at least in this sense, the patrie was considered a political construc- tion from the very beginning).
The neologism civilisation, by contrast, had almost precisely the oppo- site characteristics, which is why Rousseau's opponents embraced it so readily. 84 Civilization was, by definition, open and inclusive, ready to wel- come any "civilized" person. It stretched across many different countries, but did not necessarily include everyone within those countries. Further- more, it implied a vision of historical progress in which mankind evolved (unequally, it is true) toward civilization from earlier stages, labeled "sav- age" or "barbarian. " If the future of the patrie held innumerable perils, the future of civilization held great promise, as expressed most memorably in Condorcet's vision of steady, rational historical progress. "We have seen human reason slowly shape itself," he wrote, "through the natural progress of civilization. "85 The radical republicanism which arose at the end of the old regime and enjoyed its apotheosis in 1793-94 expressed an adoration of the patrie and an abhorrence of civilisation.
The other new and redefined concepts did not fall so easily at one end or another of the axis defined by these two, but French writers deployed them in the same debates. Thus for Voltaire and d'Holbach, the term socie? te? im- plied something that, like civilisation, stretched across political boundaries and carried with it a sense of historical progress. Other writers, however, used socie? te? as a virtual synonym for patrie, complete with its resonances of decline. 86 Similarly, for Voltaire, especially in his great historical essays,
42 The Cult of the Nation in France
? moeurs developed slowly over the centuries, turning increasingly "gentle" and refined (at least in the proper conditions). For Rousseau, however, moeurs sprang fully developed from the hands of the all-powerful Legisla- tors who founded properly constituted states, and thereafter could rot and decay as easily as the most delicate blossom.
The concept of "nation" presents the most complicated case. Like patrie, it referred to an essentially closed community, one defined by common origins (even if the occasional foreigner might join it, thereby "naturaliz- ing"--literally changing his or her nature--in the process). 87 In the eigh- teenth century, however, the word lacked the resonances of intense belong- ing and fatality associated with patrie, not to mention the exaltation of place and ethnicity and "the mystique of the language, people and com- mon origin" characteristic of nineteenth-century nationalism. 88 Nor did nation have a particular association with classical republics (dictionary and encyclopedia articles on patrie almost always invoked Greece and Rome, articles on nation hardly ever did). 89 Yet if writers did not assume that na- tions necessarily fell into decay, nonetheless, as we will see in the next chap- ter, three important groups of French writers--parlementaire, physiocratic, and republican--agreed that the French nation in particular had fallen into decay, and urgently required "regeneration. "
It was the Marquis de Mirabeau, one of the strangest and least remem- bered of major eighteenth-century French thinkers, who best expressed the tension that ran between the concepts of patrie and civilisation. 90 Mirabeau's unconventional, ungainly prose earned him derision from the gatekeepers of French prose "clarity," but also allowed him unusual free- dom to experiment with language. He adored neologisms, and among the words to which he gave currency in his masterpiece, L'ami des hommes, were both "civilization" and "regeneration," that future centerpiece of re- publican patriotic rhetoric. 91 In fact, Mirabeau's entire, large, lumbering work can be read as an attempt to reconcile classical republicanism with the ideas of civilization and historical progress, particularly in the realm of political economy. Thus he devoted a long section to love of patrie and ex- alted it in republican language worthy of Rousseau (although he argued for the compatibility of patriotism and monarchy). Yet he also defended the progress of the arts and sciences. 92 Mirabeau ultimately attempted to bring decline and progress together by devising a cyclical interpretation of history, in which "regeneration" provided a bridge between one cycle of growth and decay and the next. 93 His work's great vogue in the 1750s and
The National and the Sacred 43
? 1760s indicates that readers found his attempts at conciliation intriguing, although ultimately less convincing than Rousseau's argument that patrio- tism brooked no compromise with other loyalties.
Overall, then, not only did the use of "nation" and "patrie" develop as part of a larger shift in the language that the French used to describe forms of human coexistence; it also occupied a distinctive place within this lan- guage, pointing to a more sharply bounded type of community and a more pessimistic view of the passage of time. It is necessary to keep in mind, however, that this shift in language took place against a very significant backdrop. Whatever the continuing, overwhelming presence of classical antiquity in early modern Europe, which led a young Rousseau to gorge himself on Plutarch and a generation of Revolutionaries to read Polybius and Tacitus as user's manuals for democratic politics, France of course re- mained a deeply Catholic country. Formal education remained largely in the hands of the clergy, and the Church preserved the power to censor and condemn irreligious writings. Furthermore, whatever the changes within the religious sphere that took place in France in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the practices and opinions of the Church hardly be- came irrelevant but continued to exert an enormous influence on the man- ner in which discussions of the nation developed. The sense of sacrality in- vested in the concept of the patrie only enhanced the Church's influence, for the French approached this terrestrial object of adoration in what can only be called a deeply Catholic manner. The extent to which this was the case can be shown most easily in a brief comparison between Catholic France and Protestant England.
Catholics and Protestants, French and English
In 1759, at the height of the Seven Years' War, Robert-Martin Lesuire pub- lished a ferocious novel about the English with the expressive title of Les sauvages de l'Europe. It is the story of a nai? ve young couple who travel to England thinking it the land of advanced philosophy, only to receive a se- ries of rude shocks worthy of Candide at the hands of the frightful inhabit- ants, including first-hand experiences of English riots, highways, hangings, kidnappings, prisons, and insane asylums, not to mention the dreadful cuisine ("English fierceness comes from the still-bloody flesh they de- vour"). 94 What seemed to bother Lesuire most about these savages, how- ever, was their lack of respect for France. Wherever his heroes turn, they
44 The Cult of the Nation in France
? stumble upon the crudest xenophobia. Passers-by exclaim "Goddamn! " on hearing French spoken, while dramatists and theatrical audiences seem to do little other than mock things Gallic. The couple see a man executed for "having shown humanity to two Frenchmen," and indeed meet only one Englishman who "heard the word French pronounced without going into convulsions. "95
Such amazed horror at the Francophobia and excessive patriotism of the English was a leitmotif in French writing about that country in the eigh- teenth century. Few portraits of the English failed to mention their "ex- cessive principles of patriotic honor," "inveterate hatred of the French," "silly idea of their own excellence," and "puerile relentlessness in mocking our fashions," not to mention their alleged tendency to label all foreigners "French dog," regardless of nationality. "They hate us and will always hate us," the Parisian lawyer Edmond Barbier wrote in his diary. 96
It would be easy to write these opinions off as mere hypocrisy, as if the French had never stooped to vilify perfidious Albion in their turn. Yet they actually point to a significant difference between French and English vari- eties of patriotic and national sentiment. In fact, vilification of national enemies and assertions of France's superiority had very narrow applica- tions under the old regime--far narrower than in the Revolution or the nineteenth century. The French did not define themselves primarily by "othering" foreigners. Attempting any precise measurement of xenophobia of course makes little sense, given the state of the evidence: except in a very few cases, we do not know how widely any particular text circulated, let alone how readers responded to it. But several studies of French attitudes towards England have concluded that hostility and admiration balanced each other, indeed that the two existed in a sort of symbiotic relationship. 97 Nor did xenophobic writings necessarily reflect widespread opinions. The mass of Anglophobic works printed during the wars of 1756-1763 and 1778-1783 owed their existence to concerted propaganda campaigns on the part of France's foreign ministry. 98
Even overtly patriotic writing was usually quite compatible with the sort of cosmopolitan (indeed Anglophilic) literature most famously repre- sented by Voltaire's Philosophical Letters and Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws. 99 Writers who exalted patriotism in one sentence frequently used the next to denounce "national hatreds and odious rivalries," "fatal preju- dices," "atrocious insults," and other examples of xenophobia that only an "overexcited populace" or "true fools" could believe. 100 The abbe? Mably in
The National and the Sacred 45
? the Entretiens sur Phocion, the Chevalier de Jaucourt in the article "Patrie" for the Encyclope? die, and Montesquieu in his Cahiers, all stressed that love of country and love of humanity were not mutually exclusive. 101 In fact, the great mass of overtly patriotic writing did not mention foreign countries at all but equated love of the patrie simply with concern for the common good. To quote a typical definition, written by Jean-Franc? ois Sobry in 1786, "he who loves his patrie takes pleasure in being a good father, good son, good husband, good master, good servant, good friend, good coun- selor, in a word, a good citizen. " Sobry called love of patrie the "first social principle. "102 Others called it "the continuous practice of political virtues," the "secret spring which maintains constant order in the State," and the "bond without which every Society decomposes," while claiming that it "shapes the heart" and filled a "void in the soul. "103
Even the works of literature that historians most often held up as ex- amples of eighteenth-century French nationalism and Anglophobia can prove, on close examination, surprisingly sympathetic toward foreigners. Pierre Buirette de Belloy's phenomenally popular Le sie`ge de Calais, a 1765 melodrama about the Hundred Years' War, contained favorable English characters, called the English "rivals more than enemies," and praised "the fraternal bond between all humans. "104 The play's villain, England's Edward III, himself acknowledged the error of his ways at the end of the play, as did the truculent protagonist of Charles-Simon Favart's successful 1765 com- edy, L'Anglois a` Bordeaux, usually described as an exemplary piece of An- glophobia. 105 Even Lesuire's Les sauvages de l'Europe included favorable English characters (not to mention an admirable Chinese sage), and it con- cluded that the savage islanders might yet redeem themselves. 106 Most sig- nificant of all, Anglophobic works in the eighteenth century almost never invoked the religious differences between the two countries, despite the hostility toward Protestantism that still permeated French society, particu- larly in the south. If pamphleteers of the sixteenth century had excoriated the English as heretics ruled by a modern Jezebel, their eighteenth-century successors resolutely refrained from such inflammatory tactics. 107
National and patriotic sentiment in England did have some similarities to the French variety, reflecting the countries' common classical heritage and their close intellectual ties. In England, too, a current of writing flour- ished that equated patriotism with love of the common good. Its single most important example, Bolingbroke's Idea of a Patriot King, came close enough in spirit to its French counterparts to become something of a best-
46 The Cult of the Nation in France
? seller in French translation. 108 England boasted its own small tribe of self- proclaimed cosmopolitans, and they were just as susceptible as the rest of Western Europe to a French cultural influence then reaching its zenith. 109
Nonetheless, recent work has made clear that this cosmopolitanism and Francophilia paled before what Linda Colley calls "a vast superstructure of prejudice throughout eighteenth-century Britain" directed particularly at the French and at Catholics, with origins that can be traced back at least to the Reformation. 110 These studies confirm not only the (admittedly partial) complaints of the French themselves, but also the more even-handed judg- ments of third parties, as to the astonishing strength of xenophobia in eighteenth-century English culture (in the words of a Swiss writer, for example, "no people on earth hates another as much as the English hate the French"). 111 Printmakers from William Hogarth on down mocked the French as lecherous, cowardly, filthy, ruthless, and untrustworthy, in an iconographic tradition which had no French counterpart at all until the Revolution. Novelists, dramatists, and moralists railed against insidious, effeminate French influences, and organizations such as the Laudable As- sociation of Anti-Gallicans, founded in 1745, even urged consumers to boycott French goods. British victories in the field over France touched off spontaneous, nationwide celebrations. 112 A recent comparison of British and French colonial policies in North America, which shows that an ex- clusionary Britain set up much stricter boundaries than France did be- tween white settlers and Indians and made it far more difficult for Indians to integrate into colonial society, adds further substance to the picture. 113 Religious prejudice formed an integral element of the British national id- iom in a way that had no French equivalent. Almanacs, holidays like Guy Fawkes Day, and pious works like John Foxe's gruesome martyrology kept the memory of Catholic atrocities vivid. Preachers railed against "papists," and poets celebrated England as a second Israel, a chosen people. 114
This view of the outside world both spurred, and drew strength from, a virtual cultural revolution aimed at "rediscovering" a native English tradi- tion and cleansing it of impure foreign accretions. A mere thirty-year pe- riod, 1750-1780, saw the chartering of the Society of Antiquaries, the preparation of Johnson's Dictionary, the Biographia Britannica and the En- cyclopedia Britannica, the opening of the British Museum, and the publica- tion of the first histories of English painting, music, and poetry. The for- mation of an English literary canon took place in the same period, as did the rise of a nationalist historiography. Furthermore, this quest to uncover
The National and the Sacred 47
? a national essence proceeded under the aegis of what Gerald Newman calls "rampant racialism," based on the exaltation of the native "Teutonic" stock. 115 While France also experienced something of a "medievalist" re- vival in this period, it lacked both the institutional strength and the racial emphasis of its English equivalent. 116
These French and English examples show just how differently the con- cept of patrie could function in practice. 117 In France, an important current of writing tended to minimize the connotations of exclusivity and fatality that had been associated with the concept of patrie from antiquity, and to make it more compatible with the new concept of civilisation. Hence the lesser importance in French culture of fears of foreign corruption, and the writers' tendency to describe even the worst enemies as "savages" who might yet eventually improve themselves enough to join a civilized world community. Not all writers subscribed to these beliefs, and enormous de- bate took place among those who did. Still, the comparison with England is instructive. In England, the eighteenth century saw the logic of exclusiv- ity and fatality associated with the concept of "love of country" taken to an extreme. 118 The calls to recover native traditions and cleanse the country of foreign influence, and the strong emphasis on England's racial distinctive- ness, all bespoke an anxious desire to keep the national community as ex- clusive as possible. The ubiquitous warnings against corruption, associated with the adoption of foreign ways, echoed the classical lament that all poli- ties eventually fall prey to the weak flesh and spirit of their citizens. Again, these concepts did not prevail to the exclusion of all others, and remained subject to lively debate. Yet the contours of the debate in the two countries remained strikingly different.
Needless to say, no single factor can explain this contrast. Any really thorough explanation would have to consider everything from the heritage of Roman imperialism in England and France to the persistence of serious threats to internal security (far worse in Britain, which Bonnie Prince Charlie came so close to conquering in 1745). Still, the different religious backgrounds have particular importance. I would argue that despite the tendency of many eighteenth-century French writers to contrast patriotic and religious devotion, their efforts to minimize the classical connotations of patrie--to make patriotism compatible not merely with monarchy but with love of humanity and human progress--nonetheless reflected the Catholic commitment to a universal human community, and the Catholic belief in the freedom of all sinners to achieve salvation. Even if these writ-
48 The Cult of the Nation in France
? ers believed patriotism and the nation should inherit the role religious dogma had once held in maintaining terrestrial order, their vision of this order retained a strongly Catholic sensibility.
In Protestant England, by contrast, the choice between God and father- land presented itself much less starkly, and religious universalism had far less resonance. The Church was a state church headed by the English king, not a foreign pope. Furthermore, preachers in England, like those in New England, the Netherlands, South Africa, and many other Protestant com- munities, tended to identify the cause of their people with the cause of God, through the Old Testament metaphor of England or Britain as a "sec- ond Israel. "119 This metaphor needs to be read with care, for the preachers did not equate the population of England with God's elect (even Israel had its share of sinners), and the more Calvinistic among them in particular had a strong commitment to Protestantism as an international movement. Foxe's martyrs were not all English, and his book actually says little about England itself. 120 Yet Protestantism and the classical republican concept of patria nonetheless reinforced each other in powerful ways. Both the Protestant promise of a return to a primitive and pristine form of Chris- tianity and the ubiquitous Protestant image of an erring Israel succumbing to temptation paralleled the classical theme of the inevitable erosion of re- publican virtue. The Protestant (and particularly the Calvinist) sense of a terrible and impassable boundary between the elect and the damned paral- leled the classical republican theme of the radical difference between citi- zens and foreigners. This all made it easy for the Protestants to borrow from the language of classical patriotism in describing God's elect, and to borrow from the language of divine election in describing their fatherland. The consequence, from the sixteenth century onward, was the facilitation of a powerful, exclusionary, and xenophobic patriotic tradition that had no real parallel in France. 121 Montesquieu recognized something of this dynamic when he wrote "that the Catholic religion better suits a monarchy and that the Protestant religion is better adapted to a republic. "122
The influence of Catholicism in France was not so great as to flatten out all distinctions and to produce a single, uniform, static view of the nation. In reality, it left room for enormous disagreement and debate. While a line can certainly be traced from the philosophes and pamphleteers of the mid- century to Rabaut Saint-Etienne and his injunction to follow the example of the priesthood, it was an exceptionally tortuous one. In fact, as the next chapter will begin to explore, nothing divided the French so much as their membership in a common nation and patrie.
The National and the Sacred 49
? The comparison of Britain with France also shows that for all the differ- ences and debates, these developments can be shown to form part of a broad European movement. It was not just in France that, by the early eighteenth century, the concepts of "nation" and patrie acquired such a fundamental sense of authority that participants in the great political and cultural movements and conflicts of the day instinctively reached for them to support their points of view. The processes of "disenchantment" and material change sketched out above went far beyond France's borders, and so did the cult of nation and country. Dour French magistrates and radical British pamphleteers, Francophilic British ministers and Catholic French priests decrying blasphemy, propagandists in the service of Europe's for- eign ministries and philosophes of all nationalities, the virtuous and the scoundrels: all were patriots now, in the first and last resort. All would soon be nationalists as well.
? The Cult of the Nation in France
The Politics of Patriotism
CHAPTER 2
The Politics of Patriotism and National Sentiment
L'e? tat et le monarque, a` nos yeux confondus N'ont jamais divise? nos voeux et nos tribus. De la` cet amour et cette ido^latrie
Qui dans le souverain adore la patrie.
[The state and the monarch, mixed together in our eyes, have never divided our wishes and our tribes.
Thence this love and this idolatry,
Which, in the sovereign, worships the patrie. ]
--pierre buirette de belloy, le sie`ge de calais (1765)
There is no patrie where there are courtiers and eaters of pensions, no patrie where there are Bastilles, no patrie where there are prelates and parlements.
--pierre-nicolas chantreau, dictionnaire national et anecdotique (1790)
? The ceremony that took place on November 15, 1715, in the Palace of Jus- tice in Paris, was anything but revolutionary. The noble magistrates of the highest court in the kingdom, the Parlement of Paris, marched in proces- sion, accompanied by solemn music and swathed in heavy robes whose bright scarlet symbolized the undying royal majesty of which they partook, into a courtroom chamber sparkling with gold fleur-de-lis. Here, seated so that each man's position in the ensemble spelled out his location within the greater hierarchy of the kingdom, the Society of Orders incarnate, they listened to a series of invocations and orations reminding them of their duties and preparing them for the coming term of dispensing the king's justice. Everything about the ceremony expressed veneration for tradition, for authority both divine and terrestrial, for order and hierarchy, and for the institutions of the French state.
50
The Politics of Patriotism 51
? Yet one of the orations delivered on this occasion, by Lord Chancellor Henri-Franc? ois d'Aguesseau, on the theme of "love of country" ("amour de la patrie"), appears with hindsight to have clashed mightily with the set- ting. D'Aguesseau spoke not of subjects and parlements but of "citizens" and "senates. " He obliquely criticized the newly-deceased Louis XIV and even praised the republican form of government. In republics, he declared, "every Citizen, from the earliest age, practically from birth, grows used to seeing the fate of the State as his own. This perfect equality, and this sort of civil fraternity, which makes all Citizens like a single family, interests them all equally in the fortunes and misfortunes of the Patrie. " In monarchical soil, by contrast, love of country was "like a strange plant. "1 Alphonse Aulard, late nineteenth-century official historian of the French Revolution, found d'Aguesseau's language to be "not just of 1789, but of a patriot of the Year II [i. e. the height of the Terror]. "2
In some ways, Aulard's enthusiasm got the better of him: D'Aguesseau was no forerunner of Robespierre. 3 Throughout his long career, the chan- cellor maintained a deep and abiding loyalty to France's absolute monar- chy, and acted firmly to squelch dissenting murmurs within the world of the law. 4 In the oration itself, the criticism of Louis XIV was muted and discreet. 5 As for the words "citizen" and "senate," and the admiration for the moral life of the ancient republics, these things were utterly common- place among early modern French judges and lawyers, who considered themselves latter-day colleagues of Demosthenes and Cicero--and not so unusual in the broader culture, either, drenched as it was in the Greek and Roman classics. The oration expressed a resolutely moralistic, but nonetheless thoroughly depoliticized republicanism: a call for men to act as if they were Roman citizens while living under a Christian absolute monarchy.
All the same, d'Aguesseau's oration did represent something new in French political life. Unlike earlier authors, who had simply invoked the patrie in a sentence or two, he turned it into a subject of systematic re- flection. Furthermore, he presented it both as a fundamental category of political life and as an object of allegiance and affection distinct from the king. 6 The patrie, for d'Aguesseau, was the body of "citizens" who ideally enjoyed "perfect equality" and "civil fraternity. "7 Love of the patrie meant love of the common good, not love of the monarch, and the strength of that love constituted the ultimate measure of a political community's worth. "What a strange spectacle for the zeal of the public man," d'Agues-
52 The Cult of the Nation in France
? seau mused, in an obvious, pointed criticism of France in 1715. "A great kingdom, but no patrie; a numerous people, but hardly any more citi- zens. "8 Such language had some precedents in Renaissance Italy and seven- teenth-century England, where classical republican ideas had flourished, but not in monarchical France. 9
The fact that a prominent French political figure departed from tradi- tion in this manner in 1715 is significant. By this date, the processes of "disenchantment" and material change discussed above had gone far. On the one hand, the sense that God had withdrawn from the world, leaving it to function according to its own knowable laws, and on the other, the growing cohesion of the French state, coupled with dramatic advance- ments in forms of communication and association, were leading the French to develop a new conceptual framework with which to discern and maintain terrestrial order. More immediately, the death of Louis XIV ear- lier in the year, after a reign of more than seven decades, had produced a startling sense of disorientation. Precisely because of the strengthening of the state in previous decades, the yawning chaos and violence that had characterized every other royal succession since 1560 did not take place. But the brief regency of Duke Philippe d'Orle? ans (1715-1722) during Louis XV's childhood quickly turned into a period of unprecedented ex- perimentation in peaceful, contestatory public politics. Within three years, the duke had briefly put much of France's formidable government ma- chinery under the control of the high aristocracy, restored the parlements to their traditional, obstructionist political role (Louis XIV had succeeded in muzzling them), and presided over drastic reforms in the state finances. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie justly calls the regency "a quite stunning politi- cal phase. "10 In short, conditions were ripe for the French to experiment with new visions of the polity in which the figures of the patrie and the na- tion occupied central positions, inspiring forms of adoration akin to reli- gious devotion.
D'Aguesseau himself, not coincidentally, stood in the forefront of all these changes: religious, material, and political. His religious sympathies lay with Jansenism, which had gone to unprecedented lengths in its stress on the radical separation of God from a corrupt, concupiscent humanity, and whose adherents had undergone severe persecution as a result. 11 In this sense d'Aguesseau was close to the more openly Jansenist Jean Soanen, one of the few other figures of the period to take the patrie as his central theme. Meanwhile, as the son of an intendant (the chief official of a prov-
The Politics of Patriotism 53
? ince) and a high servant of the monarchy himself, d'Aguesseau had partici- pated in the construction of a more powerful, cohesive state, and was also keenly aware of the power of printed words and the power of the public which read them. 12 He would later write in a private note, provoked by the publication and wide distribution of an inflammatory legal brief: "The king does not rule over the opinions of men: he judges individuals, and the public judges him . . . There is no power whose principal instrument is not some sort of persuasion. "13 Finally, d'Aguesseau belonged to the milieu of the parlements, which traditionally considered themselves an indispens- able restraint on royal authority. In his 1715 oration, he defined the parlementaire magistrate as nothing less than the "voice of the patrie," and "akin to the depository of public interests. " Referring obliquely to the re- gent's restoration of the parlements' full "right of remonstrance" (the de- vice which allowed them to obstruct, although not to veto, royal legisla- tion) he said it had created "something akin to a new patrie, which seems to bear on its forehead the certain foreshadowing of public happiness. "14
For these reasons, d'Aguesseau's oration signaled the beginning of a new era in French political culture and cultural politics: an era of increasingly open, public debate, taking place in a relatively stable, peaceful, and cohe- sive national framework, aided by a rapidly expanding market for the printed word, in which the basic organizing concepts were the "founda- tional" ones discussed above. That is to say, the French increasingly defined themselves not as Catholics, or subjects, but as members of a socie? te?