Further, since the Sutra
attributes
an arising to the
after having been non-existent.
after having been non-existent.
AbhidharmakosabhasyamVol-4VasubandhuPoussinPruden1991
You do not admit these conclusions; then your explanation is worthless.
Fire is not different from fuel (p. 1315, line 18), because, in this hypothesis, fuel would not be hot.
What does "hot" mean? If "hot" is defined as being the tangible "heat" (namely fire), as has been done above, then fuel will not be hot (since fuel is the object on fire, without the tangible element "heat"). If "hot" is that which is associated with heat (i. e. , if one admits that fuel is termed hot by reason of its association with heat), then this means that different things (of "heat") are called "hot": the one tangible "heat" is designated by "fire" and all that is associated with this tangible is designated by the name "hot. " To think thus is to confess that fuel is termed hot although
20
it is different from fire or from the tangible "heat. " Vatslputriyas are thus justified in saying that "fire is not different from fuel since fuel is hot. "
[The Vatslputriyas:] Wood on fire is called fuel; it is also called fire.
Explain then the meaning that you attribute to the expression "fire in relation to fuel"! The pudgala (the active data of relation, of the updddya) will be identical to the skandhas (passive data of the said "relation"): no reasoning can establish the non-identity (of these two). The thesis of the Vatslputriyas, that the pudgala exists in relation to the skandhas as fire exists in relation to fuel, cannot be rationally established in any hypothesis.
***
Refutation of the pudgala 1317
The
? 1318 Chapter Nine
The pudgala is ineffable in that which concerns its relation-
ship--its identity or non-identity--with the skandhas. How can
they distinguish "five categories of things susceptible of being
21
and future things; 4. unconditioned, or non-caused things, and 5.
known":
the ineffable (or pudgala)* }
1-3. conditioned things, in other words, past, present,
1
The pudgala, in fact, should also be ineffable from this point of view: if it is ineffable, one cannot say either that it is a fifth
22 category, nor that this is not a fifth category.
***
Let us examine what this word "pudgala" depends on. If it depends on the skandhas, then the pudgala exists solely as a designation, as the expression pudgala depends on the skandhas and not on a real pudgala. If it depends on a real pudgala, why did the Vatslputrlyas say that the designation "pudgala' is "in relation to the skandhas'^ Then would have had to say "in relation to the pudgala. " But, in faa, they do not maintain that the pudgala is established in relation to a pudgala. Moreover the expression pudgala is a simple designation of skandhas.
[The Vatslputrlyas:] Given the skandhas, the pudgala is
But color is perceived when diverse causes are present, the eye, light, etc. ; may we thereby conclude that the designation "color" is "with relation to these diverse causes"?
***
Another point. By which of the six consciousnesses--cons- ciousnesses of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, or mental consciousness--is the pudgala perceived?
23
"with relation to the skandhas. "
perceived:
that is why we say that the designation "pudgala' is
? [The Vatslputriyas:] It is perceived by all six consciousnesses. When the eye consciousness recognizes physical matter (=a body), it indirectly discerns the pudgala? ^ and then we can say that the pudgala is known by the eye consciousness. But the relationship of the pudgala with physical matter, be it identical or different, is inexpressible. The same for the other consciousnesses: when the mental consciousness recognizes the dharmas (mind and mental states), it indirectly discerns the pudgala; it is then known by the mental consciousness, but its relationship with these states is inexpressible.
It follows from this explanation too that the pudgala exists solely as a designation exactly like milk. When the eye conscious- ness recognizes the color of milk, it indirectly discerns the milk: the milk is then known by the eye consciousness and one cannot say that the milk is the same thing as its color or is different from its color. The same for ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousness: the body consciousness recognizes tangibles; from whence there is the consciousness of milk; the milk is then known by the body consciousness without which one could only say that the milk is identical to the tangible, or different from the tangible. In fact milk is not fourfold: then it is not color, smell, taste, tangible; but furthermore, one cannot say that the milk is not made of these four. The conclusion is that one metaphorically designates a complex of elements by "pudgala" the same as the designation "milk" is understood as a coming together of color, smell, etc. They are merely names without reality.
What meaning do you therefore attach to the phrase, "When the eye consciousness recognizes physical matter, it indirectly discerns the pudgala"} Do you want to say that physical matter is the cause of the perception of the pudgala, or that the perception of physical matter and the pudgala takes place at the same time?
If the Vatslputriyas answer that physical matter is the cause of the perception of the pudgala but that, nevertheless, one cannot say that the pudgala is different from physical matter, then the condition and the causes of the perception of physical matter--eye,
Refutation of the pudgala 1319
? 1320 Chapter Nine
light, an act of attention--would not be different from physical matter.
If the Vatslputriyas answer that one perceives the pudgala at
25
the same time as one perceives physical matter,
question whether one perceives the pudgala by the same operation which perceives physical matter, or by a different operation.
In the first hypothesis, the pudgala is only physical matter and the designation "pudgala" applies only to physical matter. It is then impossible to distinguish 'This is physical matter; that is pudgala" Without this distinction, how can one prove that there is physical matter and that there is a pudgala} The existence of the pudgala cannot be proven by this distinction.
In the second hypothesis, since the time of the two perceptions is different, the pudgala will be as different from color and shape as yellow is from blue, as former is from latter.
The same reasoning follows for the other skandhas.
[The Vatslputriyas:] As one cannot say that the pudgala is the same thing as color and shape, nor that it is different from color and shape, likewise the perception of the pudgala is not the same as the perception of the color and shape, nor different from this perception.
This point of view obliges you to say that the perception of the pudgala, being ineffable, is not made part of the category of "conditioned things": but now you do not admit this thesis, since, for you, all perception is "conditioned".
***
If the pudgala is an entity that one cannot define as being
we would
? matter (the ? ? ? ? skandha,) nor as being non-matter (the four non-material skandhas, vedand skandha, etc. ), why did the Blessed One say that "matter and the other skandhas are not self? 26
***
The pudgala, you say, is attained by the eye consciousness. Is this consciousness generated by color and shape, or by the pudgala, or both? In the first hypothesis, one cannot maintain that this eye consciousness perceives the pudgala, because the pudgala is not the object of this consciousness, as neither is sound. In fact, all consciousnesses that are produced having as their condition a certain thing, has this same thing as an "object as condition": now the pudgala, not being a condition of the eye consciousness, cannot be its object. Thus the visual consciousness does not perceive the pudgala.
The other two hypothesis contradict the Sutra which says that the eye consciousness is generated by reason of two things,27 namely, by the eye and by physical matter and shape. The Sutra says"Oh Bhiksus, eye consciousness is generated having the eye as its cause (hetu) and physical matter as its condition (pratyaya= alambanapratyaya). All eye consciousness is by reason of the eye and physical matter. "28
If the pudgala is the cause of the eye consciousness, it will be impermanent, because the Sutra says, "All causes and all conditions that produce consciousnesses are impermanent. "
[The Vatslputriyas:] We admit then that the pudgala is not an object as condition {alambana) of consciousness.
[Very well; but then it is not discernible (vijneya), an object of vijnana\ if it is not discernible, it is not cognizable (jneya), the object of jnana\ if it is not cognizable, how can one prove that it exists? If one cannot prove that it exists, your system collapses. ]
Refutation of the pudgala 1321
? 1322 Chapter Nine
You have said that the pudgala is discerned by the six
29
consciousnesses.
will be, like physical matter and shape, different from sound; if it is discerned by the ear consciousness, it will be, like sound, different from physical matter and shape. And thus for those (conscious- nesses) that follow.
Moreover, your thesis is in contradiction to the Sutra. The
Sutra says, "Oh Brahmin, the five organs (of sight, hearing, smell,
taste, touch) have distinct spheres (gocara) and objects {visaya).
30
Each one of them perceives its own sphere and its own object, and does not perceive the sphere or the object of the others. And the mental organ perceives the spheres and the objects of the first
31
But, if it is discerned by the eye consciousness, it
five organs, and they have the mental organ as their refuge. " rather would you say, in agreement with the Sutra, that the pudgala is not the object (of the five organs)? In this case, it would not be discerned (by the five organs), and you put yourself in
32
***
[The Vatslputrlyas:] (You affirm, according to the Sutra, that each of the five organs has its own object, and you thus conclude that the pudgala is not the object of eye consciousness). But, according to the Sutra, the mental organ also has its own object
33
contradiction to your own system.
(and this is in contradiction to your system).
In fact, the
Satpranakopama-sutra says, "Each of these six organs has its own
object and its own sphere; each seeks after its object and its
34
sphere. "
This Sutra does not intend to speak of the six organs, because the five material organs and the five consciousnesses which are dependent on them do not possess the desire to see, to hear, etc.
Or
? This Sutra understands, by organ of the eye, etc. , the mental
35
consciousness which is induced and dominated by the eye, etc.
this fact, the mental consciousness which is isolated--that is to say, which is not induced and dominated by one of the five material organs, but solely by the mental organ--does not have any desire with regard to the spheres and objects of the five organs, but solely with regard to the dharmdyatana. Thus the Satpranakopama-sutra does not contradict the Sutra previously quoted.
#**
The Blessed One has said, "Oh Bhiksus, I declare to you all the dharmas that should be penetrated (abhijneya) and known (parijneya), namely: the eyes, physical matter, eye consciousness, eye contact, the sensation which is produced having as a cause eye contact, painful, pleasant, and neither painful nor pleasant sensation. . . . And thus following to: "the sensation which is produced having as its cause contact with the mental organ: these
36
are what should be penetrated and known. "
This text teaches us
that the dharmas to be penetrated and comprehended are only
those enumerated. The pudgala does not figure in this list: then it
is not susceptible of being discerned {vijneya). In fact, the
speculative consciousness (prajna) by which one penetrates or
comprehends, has the same sphere (visaya) as does ordinary
1 consciousness (vijnana)?
###
The masters who maintain that the eye sees the pudgala should learn that the eye sees only that which is real in the pudgala (namely physical matter: the same for the other five organs). They fall into the abyss of harmful views in saying that it sees a soul in
38 what is not a soul.
Furthermore, the Buddha explained that the ^NOtA pudgala
Refutation of the pudgala 1323
By
? 1324 Chapter Nine
59
designates the skandhas. In the Sutra of Man, he said, "Supported
by the eye, having physical matter for its object and condition, the visual consciousness arises: by reason of the coming together of these three, contact arises; at the same time there arises sensation,
40
thought, the act of attention, etc. " The last four terms--vijndna,
vedand, samjna, cetana--are non-material skandhas: the eye and
physical matter are the rilpa skandhas. Here is then all that one
speaks of when one says "man. " In order to express various
nuances, one inserts various words, such as sattva, being, nara,
nourished, fiva, vital principle, jantu, he who is born, pudgala, person. One says to oneself, "My eye sees physical matter," and according to current usage, "This venerable one is of such a name, of such a family, of such a gotta, of such food, of such happiness and of such suffering, of such length of life; he lasts a time; he
42
terminates his life in such a manner.
these are only manners of speaking, words, expressions conform- ing to the usage of the world, because there are only impermanent things in the pudgala, conditioned things, born of causes and conditions, created through deeds/'
***
The Blessed One declares that the Sutras of explicit meanings
are the authority. The Sutras that we have quoted are of explicit
43 meaning; one cannot draw a divergent explanation from them.
Moreover, 1. The Blessed One said to a Brahmin, "When I say that all exists, I mean that there are twelve sources of conscious-
44 45
ness {ayatana, i. 20a). " Then if the pudgala is not included in the
twelve ayatanas, it does not exist; and if it is included one cannot say that it is ineffable.
2. The Vatslputriyas read a Sutra which says, "All that is of the eye, all physical matter. . . the Tathagata, Oh Bhiksus, embraces this group (namely the twelve dyatanas), terms them 'all/ establishes that 'all* exists, so many dharmas in themselves. " Now, there is no
man, manuja, born of Manu, manava, young man, posa, he who is 41
Oh Bhiksus, know that
? pudgala there: how can one say that the pudgala is a real entity?
3. The Bimbisara-sutra says, "A stupid, ignorant Prthagjana
becomes attached to words, and he imagines that there is a self; but
there is no self nor things pertaining to self, but only past, present
46 and future painful dharmas*
47
4. The worthy {arhatt) Sila said to Mara, "You fall into wrong
views by wrongly maintaining that there is a being in the group of conditions {samskdras) which is empty: the wise understand that such a being does not exist. As the name 'chariot* is given to a group of parts, the world uses the word 'being': one should know that this is a group of skandhas. "
48
5. In the Ksudrakdgama, the Buddha said to the Brahmin
50
49
themselves from all fetters: through the mind (there is) defile-
Daridra,
"Daridra, those who understand the Truths can deliver
ment, and also purification through the mind.
The self, in fact,
does not have the nature of a soul; it is through error that one
thinks that a soul exists; there is no being (sattva), no soul, but
only dharmas produced through causes: skandhas, sources-of-cons-
ciousness (ayatana), dhatus, that constitute the twelve limbs of
existence; examined in depth, there is found to be no pudgala
there. Seeing that the interior is empty, see that externals are
empty;
51 52 and there is no ascetic who meditates on emptiness. "
53
6. The Sutra
a soul: one creates a theory of the soul, of a being, of a vital principal; one is not distinguished from heterodox teachers; one takes a road which is not the Way; his mind does not enter into emptiness, his faith does not satisfy him, he is not established in it to his satisfaction, there is no propensity (for liberation); the Aryan qualities are not purified in him. "
***
Refutation of the pudgala 1325
says, "Five calamities proceed from the belief in
[The Vatslputriyas:] These texts are not authoritative, because
? 1326 Chapter Nine
they are not read in our tradition.
What then is the authority in your system, your tradition or the words of the Buddha? If it is your tradition, then the Buddha is not your teacher, and you are not a child of the Sakyan. If it is the word of the Buddha, why do you not recognize the authority of all the words of the Buddha?
[The Vatslputriyas:] The texts you have quoted are not the
54 authentic word of the Buddha,
them.
That is not a good reason.
Why is this?
since our tradition does not read
55
Because all the other traditions read these texts,
these texts do not contradict any other Sutras, nor philosophic
56
truths.
by saying, "They are not authentic because we do not read them," this is only pure impudence contrary to all good sense.
***
The position of the Vatslputriyas is moreover more inadmissa-
ble since their sect reads a Sutra which says, "The dharmas are not 57
[The Vatslputriyas:] Without doubt we read this Sutra. But the pudgala is neither the dharmas which serve as its support, nor is it different from these dharmas; that is why it says that "no dharma is a soul. "
Very well; but it is taught that the pudgala cannot be discerned
by the mental consciousness, since the Sutra establishes clearly that
the mental consciousness is produced by reason of two condi-
58
tions,
the mental organ (manas) and the dharmas. Besides how
Also, when you embolden yourself to brutally reject them
soul and do not contain a soul. "
would you explain the Sutra which says, "To recognize a soul in
what is not soul is a mistake of ideas, of mind, and of view"?
59
and because
? [The Vatslputriyas:] This Sutra says that it is a mistake to recognize a soul in that which is not a soul; it does not say that it is a mistake to recognize a soul in what is a soul.
What is understood by "that which is not a soul"? Would you
say that it concerns the skandhas, ayatanas and dhatusl This
contradicts your theory that the pudgala is not identical to physical
matter, etc.
60 61
Further, a Sutra says, "Oh Bhiksus, know that all
the Brahmins and monks that contemplate a soul, contemplate
only the five skandhas-of-ztt&chment. " Then this (contemplation)
is not a soul, because the self that one recognizes as a soul is solely
the dharmas that are not a soul but which one falsely imagines to
attachment. " Then there is no pudgala in any of this.
[The Vatslputriyas:] But the same Sutra says, "In the past, I
64
This declaration is for the purpose of indicating that the saint
capable of recollecting his past lives remembers the variety of
characteristics of his series of these existences. But the Buddha
does not mean that he sees a real pudgala possessing, in a past life,
such physical matter, etc. : for to think such is to fall into
satkayadrsti. Or rather, if such is the meaning of this sentence,
65
62 63 be a soul. Another Sutra
says, "All those that have remembered, do remember, or shall remember their various past existences-- their remembrance is solely with regard to the five skandha$-oi-
was handsome (literally: I possessed physical matter)/'
then its sole purpose is to reject it as non-authentic.
that the Sutra, insofar as it attributes the possession of physical matter, etc. , to a soul, has in view "a self of designation", as one speaks of a pile which, being only an accumulation, has no unity; or of a current of water which being only an accumulation, has no unity; or of a current of water which, being only a succession (of
66
***
waters), has no permanence.
[The Vatslputriyas:
67
] The Blessed One would then not be
Refutation of the pudgala 1327
We conclude
? 1328 Chapter Nine
omniscient, since the mind and mental states are not capable of knowing all the dharmas, seeing that mind and mental states change, arising and perishing from moment to moment. Omnis- cience can belong only to a soul, a pudgala.
We would reply that the pudgala would be eternal if it does not
perish when the mind perishes: a thesis which contradicts your
theory of a pudgala about which one can only say that it is eternal
or non-eternal. We do not say (as do the Mahasamghikas) that the
Buddha is omniscient in the sense that he knows all the dharmas at 68
one and the same time: "Buddha** designates a certain series: to
this series there belongs this unique ability that, by a single act of
modulating his mind, he immediately produces an exact conscious-
ness of the object relative to which a desire for knowing has arisen:
one then calls this series "Omniscient. '* One moment of thought is
not capable of knowing everything. On this point, there is a verse:
"As fire, by the capacity of its series, burns all, so too does the
Omniscient One--but not by a universal, simultaneous knowl-
69 edge. "
[The Vatslputrlyas:] How do you prove that (the word "Omniscient"should be understood as a series, and not as a particular self of universal knowledge)?
It is spoken of in the Scriptures, on the subject of the Buddhas of the past, present and future. For example the verse: "Buddhas of the past, Buddhas of the future, and Buddhas of the present destroy
70
the sorrows of many. '* But, in your system, the skandhas of
existence belong to the three periods of time, but not the pudgala. ***
[The Vatslputrlyas:] If the term pudgala only designates the
five skandhas-oi-btt&chment, how can the Blessed One say, "Oh
Bhiksus, I shall explain to you the burden, the taking up of the
burden, the laying down of the burden, and the bearer of the
71 burden. "
? Why may it not be explained in these terms?
[The Vatslputrlyas:] Because, if the pudgala is only a name
given to the skandhas, it cannot be the bearer of a burden. Why not?
Simply because it is unheard of.
Do not speak then of an ineffable pudgala. No one has ever ascertained the existence of an ineffable thing. And moreover you will have to account for the other statements of the Sutra that thirst (or desire) is the taking up of the burden: as thirst is a skandha, the "burden" (is too), and it is unheard of that a burden takes itself up. The "taking up of the burden" is included within the skandhasy and so too the bearer of the burden. These are the skandhas that the Blessed One designated by the name of ''pudgala, the bearer of the burden," as one sees in the explanation given a little farther on in the same Sutra.
After having said that the burden is the five skandhas-oi-2? -
tachment, that the taking up of the burden is thirst, and that the
laying down of the burden is the abandoning of thirst, it is said that
the bearer of the burden is the pudgala; but fearing that one
understands the pudgala inexactly, as an eternal, ineffable, real
entity, he explains, "(It is only to conform to the use of this world
that one says:) This venerable one, of such a name, of such a
gotra," and the rest (as in the Sutra on Man, above), in order that
one might well know that the pudgala is effable, impermanent,
72
and without a unique nature.
The five j^W^y-of-attachment
are painful in their nature: they receive then the name of
"burden"; each of the former moments of the series attract each of
the latter moments: it receives then the name of "bearer of the
73
burden. "
The pudgala is then not an entity.
***
[The Vatslputrlyas:] The pudgala exists [as an entity,] as the
Refutation of the pudgala 1329
? 1330 Chapter Nine
Sutra says, ' T o say that apparitional beings
75 view. "
Who denies the existence of apparitional beings? We admit the existence of these beings in the sense that the Blessed One understands them. For him, "apparitional beings" designates a series of skandhas (the series of five skandhas of an intermediary being), susceptible of going to another world without the intervention of a womb, an egg, or of moisture forms of birth. To negate the existence of an apparitional being so defined, is a false view, because this type of series of skandhas truly exists.
If you maintain that the negation of the pudgala is false, you wil have to say how this false view is given up. It cannot be given up by Seeing, nor by Meditation, for on the one hand, the pudgala is not included within the Truths, and, on the other hand, false
76 views are not given up by Meditation but by Seeing.
***
[The Vatslputrlyas:] But a Sutra says, "A pudgala arises
Now this does not refer to the five
Such is not the meaning of the Sutra that only metaphorically
designates as a unit that which exists only as a complex; as the
world speaks of a grain of hemp, or a grain of rice, or of a heap, or
[The Vatslputrlyas:] When it refers to the pudgala, the word
"to arise" does not have the same meaning as when one speaks of
the skandhas arising. For the skandhas, to arise means to exist
77 skandhas\ but to an entity.
(utpadyate) in this world. . . "
78
pudgala, it is therefore conditioned {samskrta).
a word.
Further, since the Sutra attributes an arising to the
after having been non-existent. One says that the pudgala arises 19
because, at that moment, it takes on different skandhas (for example the manas of a human instead of the manas of an animal). As one says in the world, when a certain person acquires a certain knowledge, that a sacrificer, or a grammarian is born; when a
74
do not exist is a false
? layman takes on certain characteristics, one says that a bhiksu, a monk of a certain sect is born: one does not mean by these expressions that there has really been a birth of a sacrificer, or a monk. And again in the same way, through the acquisition of a certain trait, one says: an old man is born, a sick person comes into being.
This explanation of the phrase, "A pudgala arises in this
world" has been condemned by the Blessed One. In the Paramar-
thasiinyata-siitraTM the Blessed One said, "There is action; there is 81
result; but, besides the causal production of the dharmas (which
give the impression of a permanent agent), one does not maintain
the existence of an agent which abandons these skandhas and 82
which takes up other skandhas" And in the Phalguna-sutra: "I 83
do not say that there has been one who takes. " There is then no pudgala that gives up or takes up the skandhas.
Nevertheless, let us examine your examples: "A sacrificer is born/' What is the nature of that which became a sacrificer? Would you say that a "soul" became a sacrificer? But you have to precisely prove the existence of a "soul. " Would you say that it is a series of minds and mental states? But minds and mental states
84 appear from instant to instant after having been non-existent
and they are not capable of abandoning and grasping. Would you
say that it is the body (the organ of sense)? The same difficulty
holds. Notice then that the knowledge the acquisition of which by
a so-called person makes him a sacrificer, differs from this person:
it would be then, by a legitimate comparison, that the skandhas
acquired by a pudgala differ from the pudgala; and this goes
against your definition of a pudgala. As for the example of an old
man and a sick person, there is a succession of different bodies: to
hold that an old man is the transformation of a young man is the
refuted. Then your examples are without value. And if you say that the skandhas arise, but that the pudgala does not arise, it follows that the latter differs from the skandhas and is eternal. You maintain again that the skandhas are five in number, but that the pudgala is one: this is to again recognize that the pudgala
Samkhya thesis of transformation (parindma), a thesis already 85
Refutation of the pudgala 1331
? 1332 Chapter Nine
differs from the skandhas.
[The Vatslputrlyas:] Your position is totally parallel (to ours), since you say that the primary elements, earth, etc. , are four; but that secondary matter (updddyarupa)--color, for example--is one; but that, nevertheless, secondary matter does not differ from the
86
primary elements.
This objection does not go against us, but only against the
87
teachers who say that secondary matter is the four elements.
to adopt the opinion that you wrongly attribute to us, we say that in the manner that secondary matter is made up of the four elements, in that way the five skandhas constitute the pudgala.
***
[The Vatslputrlyas:] If the pudgala is only a word serving to designate the five skandhas, why did the Buddha not declare that
88 the vital principal (jiva) is the body?
Because the Buddha takes into consideration the intention (asaya) of whomever asks him questions. The person who asks this question of the Buddha understood by jiva, not a being, a simple designation of the skandhas, but a person, a real living entity; and he was thinking of this person when he asked if the jiva is identical to the body or different from the body. Now this jiva does not absolutely exist; and so the Buddha only maintained that it is neither identical to nor different from the body, and then the Blessed One condemned the two answers. In like manner one
89 cannot say that the hairs of a tortoise are hard or soft.
The ancient masters have already explained this difficulty. There was once a venerable one named Nagasena, possessor of the three knowledges (vidyas), the six higher knowledges (abhijnas), and the eight liberations (vimoksas). At that time, the King of
Kalinga went up to him and said, "I have come with the intention
of clearing up my doubts. But monks are verbose:
90
shall we agree
But,
? that you answer plainly to the questions that I ask? " Nagasena accepted his request and the King asked, "Is the vital principal identical to the body or different from the body? " "To this question/' said Nagasena, "there are no grounds for answer. " "Haven't we agreed that you shall answer plainly? Why speak off the point and not answer? " "I wish to ask the King concerning a doubt. But kings are verbose: shall we agree that the King answers plainly to the question that I shall ask? " The King consented and Nagasena asked, "Do the mangos in the King's palace give sweet fruit or bitter fruit? " And the King answered him, "There are no mango trees within my palace. " Nagasena protested as the King had protested, saying, "Haven't we made an agreement? Why speak off the point and not answer? " "But," said the King, "as there are no mangos in my palace, how could there be any sweet or bitter fruits? " "In the same way, Oh King, the vital principal does not exist: one cannot then answer your question and say that it is
91 identical to the body or different from the body. "
[The Vatslputrlyas:] But, if the pudgala does not exist, why didn't the Blessed One answer that the jtva absolutely does not exist?
Because he took into consideration the intention of the questioner, that questioning on the jtva may be with the idea that the jtva is a series of skandhas. If the Blessed One answered that thejtva absolutely does not exist, the questioner would have fallen into false views. Furthermore, as the questioner was not capable of understanding "dependent origination" (pratityasamutpada), he was not a fit receptacle for the Good Law: the Blessed One then did not tell him that the jtva exists except by way of designation.
The explanation that we have given here is the same that the Blessed One formulated: "Ananda, the wandering monk Vatsago- tra came to me to ask a question thusly: Is there, or is there not a soul (atmari\Y I did not answer him. In fact, to answer that there is a soul is to contradict the truth of things, because no dharma is a soul nor has any relationship with a soul; and if I had answered that there is no soul, I would have increased the folly of Vatsagotra,
Refutation of the pudgala 1333
? 1334 Chapter Nine
for he would have thought: 1 had a soul, but this soul does not now
92
exist/
of a soul, this second folly is graver. Whoever believes in the soul falls into the extreme view of eternity; whoever believes that the soul does not exist falls into the extreme view of annihilation.
For, in comparison to the folly of the belief in the existence
Thoughtless error, heavy error
93 94 . . . ", and so on. It has been said:
1. Taking into consideration the injury that heresy does and,
also, the falling off of good deeds, the Buddhas teach the Law in the
95 manner in which a tigress carries its young.
2. Those who believe in the reality of the soul are torn by the teeth of heresy; those who do not recognize the conventional self
96
1. Since a real jiva does not exist, the Buddha does not say that
the jiva is identical or non-identical; he does not say any more than
that the jiva does not really exist, fearing that one would only 91
2. Series of skandhas, actions, and the results of actions are what are termed jiva: if the Buddha were to negate the jtva, he would negate actions and their results.
3. And if the Buddha does not say that the so-called jtva is in the skandhas, it is because he sees that the questioner is not capable of tolerating the teaching of emptiness.
4. It is then because of the state of mind of Vatsa that the
Buddha, asked if there was a soul, yes or no, did not answer. But if
the soul were to exist, why wouldn't he have answered that it
98
exists?
The Buddha did not answer four questions relative to the
99
eternity of the world (loka): again this is because he took into
consideration the intention of the questioner. If such a person understands loka to be a soul (dtman), the four alternatives are incorrect, since the soul does not absolutely exist. If he understands loka to be transmigration or samsdra, the four alternatives are
let their good actions fall away, and perish. And again:
negate the conventional jtva.
? incorrect: if transmigration is eternal, no one could obtain Nirvana; if it is not eternal, all would obtain Nirvana by spontaneous annihilation, and not through effort: if it is both eternal and non-eternal, some would never obtain Nirvana, whereas others would obtain it spontaneously; finally, to say that loka, in the sense of samsdra, is neither eternal nor non-eternal, is to say that beings both would and would not obtain Nirvana: a contradiction in terms. In fact, Nirvana is possible through the Way; then no categorical response is acceptable. In the same way the Buddha did not answer the Nirgranthasravaka who held a bird
100 in his hand and asked if this bird was dead or sdive.
The four questions as to whether the world is infinite, namely if it has an end or not, has the same sense as the questions relative
101
to the eternity of the world,
How do we know that "the infinity of the world" should be
102
understood in this sense? The wandering monk Uktika,
having asked the Buddha about infinity, resorted to a ruse in order to repeat his question and asked, "Does the whole world obtain
103
deliverance through the Way, or only a part of the world? "
elder Ananda then said to him, "You have already posed this question, Uktika. Why do you repeat it by changing the terms? "
If the Blessed One did not explain concerning the four questions relative to the existence of the Tathagata after death, this is again because he took into account the intentions of the questioner. Such a person understood the Tathagata to be a "soul" liberated from the defilements.
We ask in our turn those who hold to a "soul:" The Blessed One, according to you, declared that the pudgala exists, indescriba- ble: why did he not declare that the Tathagata exists after death?
If [the Vatslputriyas] answer that the Buddha kept silent on this point because he feared that the disciple, by admitting the survival of a pudgala named Tathagata, would fall into the view of eternity, we would then ask why the Blessed One predicted to Maitreya, "In the ages to come, you will be a Tathagata, an Arhat, a
. Refutation of the pudgala 1335
and present the same defect.
after
The
? 1336 Chapter Nine
104
and speaking of one of his deceased 105
Samyaksambuddha;"
disciples, he said, "He is at present reborn in such a place. " Are not these discourses defiled by the opinion of permanence?
If [the Vatsiputrlyas] answer that the Blessed One does not say anything concerning the deceased Tathagata because, seeing at first the pudgala, he now no longer sees the pudgala once it has attained Nirvana; it is then through ignorance that the Tathagata does not make any declaration concerning the deceased Tathagata, and to speak thus is to deny the omniscience of the Master. Rather one should believe that if the Blessed One abstains from all declarations, it is because the "soul" that the questioner alluded to in speaking of the Tathagata does not absolutely exist. If [the Vatsiputrlyas] say that the Blessed One sees the pudgala, which is in Nirvana, but that he still does not make a statement on this subject; and that the pudgala exists but is not, at the same time, an object of a statement of the Blessed One, we then conclude that [the Vatsiputrlyas] admit that the pudgala is permanent.
If [the Vatsiputrlyas] say that "whether the Blessed One does
1
or does not see the pudgala is indescribable, they then proceed to
say that all is indescribable, and that one can only say that the Blessed One is omniscient or non-omniscient.
***
[The Vatsiputrlyas:] The pudgala really exists, as it is said, that 106
"To say that I really, truly do not have an atman is an incorrect opinion. "
This is not a proof, for it is also said that it is an incorrect
101
opinion to affirm the existence of an atman. Scholars of the
Abhidharma think that a belief in the existence of an atman and a belief in its non-existence are two extreme opinions, as they identify them with the two branches of "the opinion that consists in believing in extremes/' This doctrine is certain, as it is formulated in the Vatsagotra-sutra, "Ananda, those who affirm a
? soul fall into the extreme of the belief in permanence; those who
108
[The Vatsiputrlyas]: If the pudgala does not exist, what is it
that wanders in samsdra? In fact, one can only allow that samsdra
itself wanders. Further the Blessed One has said, "Beings misled by
ignorance, bound by thirst, wander here and there, either among
deny a soul fall into the extreme of the belief in annihilation. . . "
***
beings in hell, among animals, among pretas, humans, or the gods; 109
thus for a long time they experience all suffering. "
How does the pudgala wander in samsdra? Would you say that this wandering consists in abandoning old skandhas and in taking up new skandhas? But we have shown that this explanation is inadmissable. A good explanation is simple: one says that when a flame burns a field it travels, although they be only moments of flame, because it constitutes a series; in the same way the harmony of the skandhas which is constantly repeated receives, metaphori- cally, the name of being; supported by thirst, the series of skandhas travels in samsdra.
***
[The Vatsiputrlyas]: If only the skandhas exist, we do not see how one can explain these words of the Blessed One, "In the past, I
110
was the teacher Sunetra. "
existence of the individual skandhas metaphorically termed "soul," past skandhas are not the same as present skandhas, and so the Blessed One cannot express himself in this manner.
But what is the thing that the Blessed One calls "soul"? The pudgala, you would say: then, since the "soul" is permanent, a past "soul" is identical with a present "soul". For us, when the Blessed One said, "I was the teacher Sunetra/' he teaches us that the skandhas that constitute his present "soul" formed part of the
Refutation of the pudgala 1337
In fact, in the hypothesis of the
? 1338 Chapter Nine
same series as the skandhas that constituted Sunetra. In the same way one says, "This fire has been burning here/'
***
You affirm the existence of a real soul: we hold that only the Buddhas, Tathagatas would see it (because it is subtle). But if the Buddhas see a soul, they would produce a firm belief in a soul; from this belief in a soul there would be produced among them a belief in things pertaining to a soul; from these two beliefs there would be produced among them affection for the soul and for things pertaining to a soul. The Blessed One said in fact that "whosoever believes in a soul, believes in things pertaining to a soul; believing in things pertaining to a soul, they become attached to the skandhas as they form a soul and things pertaining to a soul/' There would be then satkayadrsti among the Buddhas; they would be bound by affection for a soul and for things pertaining to a soul; and they would be very far from liberation.
[The Vatslputrlyas]: Affection is not produced with regard to a soul. We explain: when one recognizes a soul in what is not the soul, as do the non-Buddhists, one feels affection for this pretended soul; but, when one sees the soul in that which is truly the soul, namely the ineffable pudgala, as do the Buddhas, no affection is produced with regard to the soul.
This statement has no support. The Vatslputrlyas, without any
shadow of reason, introduce the sickness of heresy into the
teachings of the Master. Whereas there are those who admit an
111 ineffable pudgala, others deny the existence of all the dharmas;
non-Buddhists imagine a soul apart from all other substances. All these doctrines are wrong and present the same flaw in that they do not lead to liberation.
***
? Refutation of the pudgala 1339 112
If the soul does not absolutely exist, how can a mind--which perishes as soon as it is generated--be capable of remembering an object perceived a long time before? How is it able to recognize an object similar to what it has formerly perceived?
Memory and recognition are generated immediately, in a series, from a certain type of mind, when this type of mind arises from the idea of object already perceived and which one calls "object of the memory. "
[Now then, let us first examine memory. ]
What is the type of mind from whence memory immediately shoots up?
We answer: It's a certain mind (citta-visesa), bent towards the object of memory, a mind in which one finds ideas related to that thing or resembling that thing, or even "resolutions" of a certain nature, etc. ; with the condition however that the power that this mind possesses to produce memory is not paralysed by a psycho- somatic change arising from sickness, from grief, from mental
113 trouble, or the disturbing influence of magic formulas, etc.
1. It is necessary that a bending of the mind be produced, an act of attention, towards the object; 2. it is necessary that the mind involves an idea resembling the object, in the case where one remembers by reason of resemblance (for example, I remember fire perceived a long time ago because the idea of fire is placed in my mind by the sight of present fire); 3. or it is necessary that the mind involves an idea in relation to the object, in the case where one remembers without there being resemblance (for example, I remember fire because the idea of smoke is placed in my mind by the sight of smoke); 4. or it is necessary that the mind involves a pranidhdna, or resolution, an abhydsa, or habit (for example, the resolution has been placed in the mental series, "I shall remember this at such a time"); 5. also when it is of this nature--that is to say, when it presents the characteristic 1. and one of the characteristics 2 - 4--if the thought does not proceed from the idea of the object of memory--that is to say, if the mind so envisaged is
? 1340 Chapter Nine
not produced in a series where the idea of a certain object has been placed by perception, if this mind does not proceed from this idea--the mind cannot produce memory; 6. when it is not of this nature, even though it proceeds from an idea of the object of memory, it cannot produce memory.
[The Vatsiputrlyas:] How can one mind see and another mind remember? It is contrary that Yajnadatta remembers an object that Devadatta has seen.
That is right. There is no connection between Devadatta and Yajnadatta: Their minds are not in the relationship of cause and effect, as is the case for minds which form series. Indeed, we do not say that one mind sees an object and that another mind remembers this object, because these two minds belong to the same series. We say that one past mind, bearing a certain object, brings about the existence of another mind, the present mind, capable of remem- bering this object. In other words, a mind of memory is generated from a mind of seeing, as fruit is generated from the seed through the force of the last stage of the transformation of the series. This point has been clarified. Memory is generated after recognition.
114
[The Vatsiputrlyas:] In the absence of a soul, who remembers? [Vasubandhu:] What do you understand by "to remember"? [The Vatsiputrlyas:] To grasp an object by the memory. [Vasubandhu:] Does "to grasp" differ from memory? [The
115
[Vasubandhu:] We have explained what is the agent of this action: it is the cause of memory, namely a certain type of mind.
[The Vatsiputrlyas:] But, if it is only a certain type of mind that is the cause of memory, how can one say that Caitra remembers?
[Vasubandhu:] One gives the name Caitra to a series; a mind of memory is generated, in this series, from a mind of seeing, and by reason of this fact one says that Caitra remembers.
Vatsiputrlyas:] Memory is the agent of the action "to grasp. "
[The Vatsiputrlyas:] In the absence of a soul, whose is the
? memory?
[Vasubandhu:] What is the sense of the genitive "whose"? [The Vatsiputriyas:] This genitive designates its master.
[Vasubandhu:] Explain by an example how you understand that someone is the master of memory. [The Vatsiputriyas:] As Caitra is the master of the cow.
[Vasubandhu:] In what is Caitra the master of the cow?
[The Vatsiputriyas:] In that he directs and employs the cow as he pleases.
[Vasubandhu:] To what then is the memory directed and employed by a master, for whom you search with great pains.
[The Vatsiputriyas:] It is directed and employed on the object that one wants to remember (that is to say, it is employed on remembering).
[Vasubandhu:] To what purpose?
[The Vatsiputriyas:] For the purpose of memory.
[Vasubandhu:] What idle talk! I direct and employ a certain thing with a view to the same thing! Explain to me then how memory is employed: do you want to say that one transmits it to a certain place? Do you want to say that one causes it to be produced?
[The Vatsiputriyas:] Memory does not die out; it is then not transmitted. One causes it to be produced.
[Vasubandhu:] What you call "master" is then simply the cause, and what you call "subject" is simply the result. In fact the cause, by its command, operates the result; it is then "master"; and the result, in that it is subordinate to the cause at the moment of its arising, is called "subject. " Since the cause suffices as master, why require a self to which you could attribute memory? Memory belongs to whatever causes memory. Complexes of samskdras, or the five skandhas forming a homogeneous series, are called
Refutation of the pudgala 1341
? 1342 Chapter Nine
"Caitra" and "cow. " One says that the Caitra-series possesses the cow-series, because the Caitra-series is the cause of the geographic displacement and the various changes of the cow-series. There is not there any one, real entity "Caitra," nor another entity called "cow;" there is not, for the Caitra-series, any quality of owner or master outside of its quality of cause.
[As with memory, so too with recognition. ]
We would answer, mutatis mutandis, to the questions: "Who knows? To whom do we attribute consciousness? " and to other similar questions, "What feels, what makes ideas? " as we have responded to the questions, "What remembers? To whom do we attribute memory and recognition? "
***
116
Certain scholars
(bhava) depends on an existing being (bhavitar), as the walking of Devadatta depends on Devadatta. Walking is an action, and Devadatta is the active being. In the same way consciousness {vijnana) and all action depends on a "base of support" {asraya), "one who knows {vijnatar)** the agent.
say that the soul (dtman) exists, as existence
We would ask what it is that they understand by "Devadatta. " If they regard Devadatta as a real individual, we have discussed and refuted this theory. Devadatta is an imaginary individual and not an individual entity; Devadatta is only the name that one gives to the series of samskaras. In the sense that one could say that such a Devadatta walks, in the same sense we can say that Devadatta knows.
How does Devadatta walk? "Devadatta" is only a homogene- ous series of samskaras, moments of existence replaced without interruption and roughly similar one to another. The foolish see within this series an entity which would be the cause of the action that this series generates in a different place, the cause by the efficacy of which the successive moments of the existence of the
? body of Devadatta is produced in different places. In fact, the walking of Devadatta is simply the act of the generation of the series which is the body in different locations; the cause of this action--that is to say, the previous moment of the series--receives the name of "walker. "
It is in this sense that we say that Devadatta walks, in order to designate a walk totally similar to that of fire or sound: the fire walks, the sound walks, that is to say, the fire-series and the
117
sound-series go being generated from one place to another.
Fire is not different from fuel (p. 1315, line 18), because, in this hypothesis, fuel would not be hot.
What does "hot" mean? If "hot" is defined as being the tangible "heat" (namely fire), as has been done above, then fuel will not be hot (since fuel is the object on fire, without the tangible element "heat"). If "hot" is that which is associated with heat (i. e. , if one admits that fuel is termed hot by reason of its association with heat), then this means that different things (of "heat") are called "hot": the one tangible "heat" is designated by "fire" and all that is associated with this tangible is designated by the name "hot. " To think thus is to confess that fuel is termed hot although
20
it is different from fire or from the tangible "heat. " Vatslputriyas are thus justified in saying that "fire is not different from fuel since fuel is hot. "
[The Vatslputriyas:] Wood on fire is called fuel; it is also called fire.
Explain then the meaning that you attribute to the expression "fire in relation to fuel"! The pudgala (the active data of relation, of the updddya) will be identical to the skandhas (passive data of the said "relation"): no reasoning can establish the non-identity (of these two). The thesis of the Vatslputriyas, that the pudgala exists in relation to the skandhas as fire exists in relation to fuel, cannot be rationally established in any hypothesis.
***
Refutation of the pudgala 1317
The
? 1318 Chapter Nine
The pudgala is ineffable in that which concerns its relation-
ship--its identity or non-identity--with the skandhas. How can
they distinguish "five categories of things susceptible of being
21
and future things; 4. unconditioned, or non-caused things, and 5.
known":
the ineffable (or pudgala)* }
1-3. conditioned things, in other words, past, present,
1
The pudgala, in fact, should also be ineffable from this point of view: if it is ineffable, one cannot say either that it is a fifth
22 category, nor that this is not a fifth category.
***
Let us examine what this word "pudgala" depends on. If it depends on the skandhas, then the pudgala exists solely as a designation, as the expression pudgala depends on the skandhas and not on a real pudgala. If it depends on a real pudgala, why did the Vatslputrlyas say that the designation "pudgala' is "in relation to the skandhas'^ Then would have had to say "in relation to the pudgala. " But, in faa, they do not maintain that the pudgala is established in relation to a pudgala. Moreover the expression pudgala is a simple designation of skandhas.
[The Vatslputrlyas:] Given the skandhas, the pudgala is
But color is perceived when diverse causes are present, the eye, light, etc. ; may we thereby conclude that the designation "color" is "with relation to these diverse causes"?
***
Another point. By which of the six consciousnesses--cons- ciousnesses of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, or mental consciousness--is the pudgala perceived?
23
"with relation to the skandhas. "
perceived:
that is why we say that the designation "pudgala' is
? [The Vatslputriyas:] It is perceived by all six consciousnesses. When the eye consciousness recognizes physical matter (=a body), it indirectly discerns the pudgala? ^ and then we can say that the pudgala is known by the eye consciousness. But the relationship of the pudgala with physical matter, be it identical or different, is inexpressible. The same for the other consciousnesses: when the mental consciousness recognizes the dharmas (mind and mental states), it indirectly discerns the pudgala; it is then known by the mental consciousness, but its relationship with these states is inexpressible.
It follows from this explanation too that the pudgala exists solely as a designation exactly like milk. When the eye conscious- ness recognizes the color of milk, it indirectly discerns the milk: the milk is then known by the eye consciousness and one cannot say that the milk is the same thing as its color or is different from its color. The same for ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousness: the body consciousness recognizes tangibles; from whence there is the consciousness of milk; the milk is then known by the body consciousness without which one could only say that the milk is identical to the tangible, or different from the tangible. In fact milk is not fourfold: then it is not color, smell, taste, tangible; but furthermore, one cannot say that the milk is not made of these four. The conclusion is that one metaphorically designates a complex of elements by "pudgala" the same as the designation "milk" is understood as a coming together of color, smell, etc. They are merely names without reality.
What meaning do you therefore attach to the phrase, "When the eye consciousness recognizes physical matter, it indirectly discerns the pudgala"} Do you want to say that physical matter is the cause of the perception of the pudgala, or that the perception of physical matter and the pudgala takes place at the same time?
If the Vatslputriyas answer that physical matter is the cause of the perception of the pudgala but that, nevertheless, one cannot say that the pudgala is different from physical matter, then the condition and the causes of the perception of physical matter--eye,
Refutation of the pudgala 1319
? 1320 Chapter Nine
light, an act of attention--would not be different from physical matter.
If the Vatslputriyas answer that one perceives the pudgala at
25
the same time as one perceives physical matter,
question whether one perceives the pudgala by the same operation which perceives physical matter, or by a different operation.
In the first hypothesis, the pudgala is only physical matter and the designation "pudgala" applies only to physical matter. It is then impossible to distinguish 'This is physical matter; that is pudgala" Without this distinction, how can one prove that there is physical matter and that there is a pudgala} The existence of the pudgala cannot be proven by this distinction.
In the second hypothesis, since the time of the two perceptions is different, the pudgala will be as different from color and shape as yellow is from blue, as former is from latter.
The same reasoning follows for the other skandhas.
[The Vatslputriyas:] As one cannot say that the pudgala is the same thing as color and shape, nor that it is different from color and shape, likewise the perception of the pudgala is not the same as the perception of the color and shape, nor different from this perception.
This point of view obliges you to say that the perception of the pudgala, being ineffable, is not made part of the category of "conditioned things": but now you do not admit this thesis, since, for you, all perception is "conditioned".
***
If the pudgala is an entity that one cannot define as being
we would
? matter (the ? ? ? ? skandha,) nor as being non-matter (the four non-material skandhas, vedand skandha, etc. ), why did the Blessed One say that "matter and the other skandhas are not self? 26
***
The pudgala, you say, is attained by the eye consciousness. Is this consciousness generated by color and shape, or by the pudgala, or both? In the first hypothesis, one cannot maintain that this eye consciousness perceives the pudgala, because the pudgala is not the object of this consciousness, as neither is sound. In fact, all consciousnesses that are produced having as their condition a certain thing, has this same thing as an "object as condition": now the pudgala, not being a condition of the eye consciousness, cannot be its object. Thus the visual consciousness does not perceive the pudgala.
The other two hypothesis contradict the Sutra which says that the eye consciousness is generated by reason of two things,27 namely, by the eye and by physical matter and shape. The Sutra says"Oh Bhiksus, eye consciousness is generated having the eye as its cause (hetu) and physical matter as its condition (pratyaya= alambanapratyaya). All eye consciousness is by reason of the eye and physical matter. "28
If the pudgala is the cause of the eye consciousness, it will be impermanent, because the Sutra says, "All causes and all conditions that produce consciousnesses are impermanent. "
[The Vatslputriyas:] We admit then that the pudgala is not an object as condition {alambana) of consciousness.
[Very well; but then it is not discernible (vijneya), an object of vijnana\ if it is not discernible, it is not cognizable (jneya), the object of jnana\ if it is not cognizable, how can one prove that it exists? If one cannot prove that it exists, your system collapses. ]
Refutation of the pudgala 1321
? 1322 Chapter Nine
You have said that the pudgala is discerned by the six
29
consciousnesses.
will be, like physical matter and shape, different from sound; if it is discerned by the ear consciousness, it will be, like sound, different from physical matter and shape. And thus for those (conscious- nesses) that follow.
Moreover, your thesis is in contradiction to the Sutra. The
Sutra says, "Oh Brahmin, the five organs (of sight, hearing, smell,
taste, touch) have distinct spheres (gocara) and objects {visaya).
30
Each one of them perceives its own sphere and its own object, and does not perceive the sphere or the object of the others. And the mental organ perceives the spheres and the objects of the first
31
But, if it is discerned by the eye consciousness, it
five organs, and they have the mental organ as their refuge. " rather would you say, in agreement with the Sutra, that the pudgala is not the object (of the five organs)? In this case, it would not be discerned (by the five organs), and you put yourself in
32
***
[The Vatslputrlyas:] (You affirm, according to the Sutra, that each of the five organs has its own object, and you thus conclude that the pudgala is not the object of eye consciousness). But, according to the Sutra, the mental organ also has its own object
33
contradiction to your own system.
(and this is in contradiction to your system).
In fact, the
Satpranakopama-sutra says, "Each of these six organs has its own
object and its own sphere; each seeks after its object and its
34
sphere. "
This Sutra does not intend to speak of the six organs, because the five material organs and the five consciousnesses which are dependent on them do not possess the desire to see, to hear, etc.
Or
? This Sutra understands, by organ of the eye, etc. , the mental
35
consciousness which is induced and dominated by the eye, etc.
this fact, the mental consciousness which is isolated--that is to say, which is not induced and dominated by one of the five material organs, but solely by the mental organ--does not have any desire with regard to the spheres and objects of the five organs, but solely with regard to the dharmdyatana. Thus the Satpranakopama-sutra does not contradict the Sutra previously quoted.
#**
The Blessed One has said, "Oh Bhiksus, I declare to you all the dharmas that should be penetrated (abhijneya) and known (parijneya), namely: the eyes, physical matter, eye consciousness, eye contact, the sensation which is produced having as a cause eye contact, painful, pleasant, and neither painful nor pleasant sensation. . . . And thus following to: "the sensation which is produced having as its cause contact with the mental organ: these
36
are what should be penetrated and known. "
This text teaches us
that the dharmas to be penetrated and comprehended are only
those enumerated. The pudgala does not figure in this list: then it
is not susceptible of being discerned {vijneya). In fact, the
speculative consciousness (prajna) by which one penetrates or
comprehends, has the same sphere (visaya) as does ordinary
1 consciousness (vijnana)?
###
The masters who maintain that the eye sees the pudgala should learn that the eye sees only that which is real in the pudgala (namely physical matter: the same for the other five organs). They fall into the abyss of harmful views in saying that it sees a soul in
38 what is not a soul.
Furthermore, the Buddha explained that the ^NOtA pudgala
Refutation of the pudgala 1323
By
? 1324 Chapter Nine
59
designates the skandhas. In the Sutra of Man, he said, "Supported
by the eye, having physical matter for its object and condition, the visual consciousness arises: by reason of the coming together of these three, contact arises; at the same time there arises sensation,
40
thought, the act of attention, etc. " The last four terms--vijndna,
vedand, samjna, cetana--are non-material skandhas: the eye and
physical matter are the rilpa skandhas. Here is then all that one
speaks of when one says "man. " In order to express various
nuances, one inserts various words, such as sattva, being, nara,
nourished, fiva, vital principle, jantu, he who is born, pudgala, person. One says to oneself, "My eye sees physical matter," and according to current usage, "This venerable one is of such a name, of such a family, of such a gotta, of such food, of such happiness and of such suffering, of such length of life; he lasts a time; he
42
terminates his life in such a manner.
these are only manners of speaking, words, expressions conform- ing to the usage of the world, because there are only impermanent things in the pudgala, conditioned things, born of causes and conditions, created through deeds/'
***
The Blessed One declares that the Sutras of explicit meanings
are the authority. The Sutras that we have quoted are of explicit
43 meaning; one cannot draw a divergent explanation from them.
Moreover, 1. The Blessed One said to a Brahmin, "When I say that all exists, I mean that there are twelve sources of conscious-
44 45
ness {ayatana, i. 20a). " Then if the pudgala is not included in the
twelve ayatanas, it does not exist; and if it is included one cannot say that it is ineffable.
2. The Vatslputriyas read a Sutra which says, "All that is of the eye, all physical matter. . . the Tathagata, Oh Bhiksus, embraces this group (namely the twelve dyatanas), terms them 'all/ establishes that 'all* exists, so many dharmas in themselves. " Now, there is no
man, manuja, born of Manu, manava, young man, posa, he who is 41
Oh Bhiksus, know that
? pudgala there: how can one say that the pudgala is a real entity?
3. The Bimbisara-sutra says, "A stupid, ignorant Prthagjana
becomes attached to words, and he imagines that there is a self; but
there is no self nor things pertaining to self, but only past, present
46 and future painful dharmas*
47
4. The worthy {arhatt) Sila said to Mara, "You fall into wrong
views by wrongly maintaining that there is a being in the group of conditions {samskdras) which is empty: the wise understand that such a being does not exist. As the name 'chariot* is given to a group of parts, the world uses the word 'being': one should know that this is a group of skandhas. "
48
5. In the Ksudrakdgama, the Buddha said to the Brahmin
50
49
themselves from all fetters: through the mind (there is) defile-
Daridra,
"Daridra, those who understand the Truths can deliver
ment, and also purification through the mind.
The self, in fact,
does not have the nature of a soul; it is through error that one
thinks that a soul exists; there is no being (sattva), no soul, but
only dharmas produced through causes: skandhas, sources-of-cons-
ciousness (ayatana), dhatus, that constitute the twelve limbs of
existence; examined in depth, there is found to be no pudgala
there. Seeing that the interior is empty, see that externals are
empty;
51 52 and there is no ascetic who meditates on emptiness. "
53
6. The Sutra
a soul: one creates a theory of the soul, of a being, of a vital principal; one is not distinguished from heterodox teachers; one takes a road which is not the Way; his mind does not enter into emptiness, his faith does not satisfy him, he is not established in it to his satisfaction, there is no propensity (for liberation); the Aryan qualities are not purified in him. "
***
Refutation of the pudgala 1325
says, "Five calamities proceed from the belief in
[The Vatslputriyas:] These texts are not authoritative, because
? 1326 Chapter Nine
they are not read in our tradition.
What then is the authority in your system, your tradition or the words of the Buddha? If it is your tradition, then the Buddha is not your teacher, and you are not a child of the Sakyan. If it is the word of the Buddha, why do you not recognize the authority of all the words of the Buddha?
[The Vatslputriyas:] The texts you have quoted are not the
54 authentic word of the Buddha,
them.
That is not a good reason.
Why is this?
since our tradition does not read
55
Because all the other traditions read these texts,
these texts do not contradict any other Sutras, nor philosophic
56
truths.
by saying, "They are not authentic because we do not read them," this is only pure impudence contrary to all good sense.
***
The position of the Vatslputriyas is moreover more inadmissa-
ble since their sect reads a Sutra which says, "The dharmas are not 57
[The Vatslputriyas:] Without doubt we read this Sutra. But the pudgala is neither the dharmas which serve as its support, nor is it different from these dharmas; that is why it says that "no dharma is a soul. "
Very well; but it is taught that the pudgala cannot be discerned
by the mental consciousness, since the Sutra establishes clearly that
the mental consciousness is produced by reason of two condi-
58
tions,
the mental organ (manas) and the dharmas. Besides how
Also, when you embolden yourself to brutally reject them
soul and do not contain a soul. "
would you explain the Sutra which says, "To recognize a soul in
what is not soul is a mistake of ideas, of mind, and of view"?
59
and because
? [The Vatslputriyas:] This Sutra says that it is a mistake to recognize a soul in that which is not a soul; it does not say that it is a mistake to recognize a soul in what is a soul.
What is understood by "that which is not a soul"? Would you
say that it concerns the skandhas, ayatanas and dhatusl This
contradicts your theory that the pudgala is not identical to physical
matter, etc.
60 61
Further, a Sutra says, "Oh Bhiksus, know that all
the Brahmins and monks that contemplate a soul, contemplate
only the five skandhas-of-ztt&chment. " Then this (contemplation)
is not a soul, because the self that one recognizes as a soul is solely
the dharmas that are not a soul but which one falsely imagines to
attachment. " Then there is no pudgala in any of this.
[The Vatslputriyas:] But the same Sutra says, "In the past, I
64
This declaration is for the purpose of indicating that the saint
capable of recollecting his past lives remembers the variety of
characteristics of his series of these existences. But the Buddha
does not mean that he sees a real pudgala possessing, in a past life,
such physical matter, etc. : for to think such is to fall into
satkayadrsti. Or rather, if such is the meaning of this sentence,
65
62 63 be a soul. Another Sutra
says, "All those that have remembered, do remember, or shall remember their various past existences-- their remembrance is solely with regard to the five skandha$-oi-
was handsome (literally: I possessed physical matter)/'
then its sole purpose is to reject it as non-authentic.
that the Sutra, insofar as it attributes the possession of physical matter, etc. , to a soul, has in view "a self of designation", as one speaks of a pile which, being only an accumulation, has no unity; or of a current of water which being only an accumulation, has no unity; or of a current of water which, being only a succession (of
66
***
waters), has no permanence.
[The Vatslputriyas:
67
] The Blessed One would then not be
Refutation of the pudgala 1327
We conclude
? 1328 Chapter Nine
omniscient, since the mind and mental states are not capable of knowing all the dharmas, seeing that mind and mental states change, arising and perishing from moment to moment. Omnis- cience can belong only to a soul, a pudgala.
We would reply that the pudgala would be eternal if it does not
perish when the mind perishes: a thesis which contradicts your
theory of a pudgala about which one can only say that it is eternal
or non-eternal. We do not say (as do the Mahasamghikas) that the
Buddha is omniscient in the sense that he knows all the dharmas at 68
one and the same time: "Buddha** designates a certain series: to
this series there belongs this unique ability that, by a single act of
modulating his mind, he immediately produces an exact conscious-
ness of the object relative to which a desire for knowing has arisen:
one then calls this series "Omniscient. '* One moment of thought is
not capable of knowing everything. On this point, there is a verse:
"As fire, by the capacity of its series, burns all, so too does the
Omniscient One--but not by a universal, simultaneous knowl-
69 edge. "
[The Vatslputrlyas:] How do you prove that (the word "Omniscient"should be understood as a series, and not as a particular self of universal knowledge)?
It is spoken of in the Scriptures, on the subject of the Buddhas of the past, present and future. For example the verse: "Buddhas of the past, Buddhas of the future, and Buddhas of the present destroy
70
the sorrows of many. '* But, in your system, the skandhas of
existence belong to the three periods of time, but not the pudgala. ***
[The Vatslputrlyas:] If the term pudgala only designates the
five skandhas-oi-btt&chment, how can the Blessed One say, "Oh
Bhiksus, I shall explain to you the burden, the taking up of the
burden, the laying down of the burden, and the bearer of the
71 burden. "
? Why may it not be explained in these terms?
[The Vatslputrlyas:] Because, if the pudgala is only a name
given to the skandhas, it cannot be the bearer of a burden. Why not?
Simply because it is unheard of.
Do not speak then of an ineffable pudgala. No one has ever ascertained the existence of an ineffable thing. And moreover you will have to account for the other statements of the Sutra that thirst (or desire) is the taking up of the burden: as thirst is a skandha, the "burden" (is too), and it is unheard of that a burden takes itself up. The "taking up of the burden" is included within the skandhasy and so too the bearer of the burden. These are the skandhas that the Blessed One designated by the name of ''pudgala, the bearer of the burden," as one sees in the explanation given a little farther on in the same Sutra.
After having said that the burden is the five skandhas-oi-2? -
tachment, that the taking up of the burden is thirst, and that the
laying down of the burden is the abandoning of thirst, it is said that
the bearer of the burden is the pudgala; but fearing that one
understands the pudgala inexactly, as an eternal, ineffable, real
entity, he explains, "(It is only to conform to the use of this world
that one says:) This venerable one, of such a name, of such a
gotra," and the rest (as in the Sutra on Man, above), in order that
one might well know that the pudgala is effable, impermanent,
72
and without a unique nature.
The five j^W^y-of-attachment
are painful in their nature: they receive then the name of
"burden"; each of the former moments of the series attract each of
the latter moments: it receives then the name of "bearer of the
73
burden. "
The pudgala is then not an entity.
***
[The Vatslputrlyas:] The pudgala exists [as an entity,] as the
Refutation of the pudgala 1329
? 1330 Chapter Nine
Sutra says, ' T o say that apparitional beings
75 view. "
Who denies the existence of apparitional beings? We admit the existence of these beings in the sense that the Blessed One understands them. For him, "apparitional beings" designates a series of skandhas (the series of five skandhas of an intermediary being), susceptible of going to another world without the intervention of a womb, an egg, or of moisture forms of birth. To negate the existence of an apparitional being so defined, is a false view, because this type of series of skandhas truly exists.
If you maintain that the negation of the pudgala is false, you wil have to say how this false view is given up. It cannot be given up by Seeing, nor by Meditation, for on the one hand, the pudgala is not included within the Truths, and, on the other hand, false
76 views are not given up by Meditation but by Seeing.
***
[The Vatslputrlyas:] But a Sutra says, "A pudgala arises
Now this does not refer to the five
Such is not the meaning of the Sutra that only metaphorically
designates as a unit that which exists only as a complex; as the
world speaks of a grain of hemp, or a grain of rice, or of a heap, or
[The Vatslputrlyas:] When it refers to the pudgala, the word
"to arise" does not have the same meaning as when one speaks of
the skandhas arising. For the skandhas, to arise means to exist
77 skandhas\ but to an entity.
(utpadyate) in this world. . . "
78
pudgala, it is therefore conditioned {samskrta).
a word.
Further, since the Sutra attributes an arising to the
after having been non-existent. One says that the pudgala arises 19
because, at that moment, it takes on different skandhas (for example the manas of a human instead of the manas of an animal). As one says in the world, when a certain person acquires a certain knowledge, that a sacrificer, or a grammarian is born; when a
74
do not exist is a false
? layman takes on certain characteristics, one says that a bhiksu, a monk of a certain sect is born: one does not mean by these expressions that there has really been a birth of a sacrificer, or a monk. And again in the same way, through the acquisition of a certain trait, one says: an old man is born, a sick person comes into being.
This explanation of the phrase, "A pudgala arises in this
world" has been condemned by the Blessed One. In the Paramar-
thasiinyata-siitraTM the Blessed One said, "There is action; there is 81
result; but, besides the causal production of the dharmas (which
give the impression of a permanent agent), one does not maintain
the existence of an agent which abandons these skandhas and 82
which takes up other skandhas" And in the Phalguna-sutra: "I 83
do not say that there has been one who takes. " There is then no pudgala that gives up or takes up the skandhas.
Nevertheless, let us examine your examples: "A sacrificer is born/' What is the nature of that which became a sacrificer? Would you say that a "soul" became a sacrificer? But you have to precisely prove the existence of a "soul. " Would you say that it is a series of minds and mental states? But minds and mental states
84 appear from instant to instant after having been non-existent
and they are not capable of abandoning and grasping. Would you
say that it is the body (the organ of sense)? The same difficulty
holds. Notice then that the knowledge the acquisition of which by
a so-called person makes him a sacrificer, differs from this person:
it would be then, by a legitimate comparison, that the skandhas
acquired by a pudgala differ from the pudgala; and this goes
against your definition of a pudgala. As for the example of an old
man and a sick person, there is a succession of different bodies: to
hold that an old man is the transformation of a young man is the
refuted. Then your examples are without value. And if you say that the skandhas arise, but that the pudgala does not arise, it follows that the latter differs from the skandhas and is eternal. You maintain again that the skandhas are five in number, but that the pudgala is one: this is to again recognize that the pudgala
Samkhya thesis of transformation (parindma), a thesis already 85
Refutation of the pudgala 1331
? 1332 Chapter Nine
differs from the skandhas.
[The Vatslputrlyas:] Your position is totally parallel (to ours), since you say that the primary elements, earth, etc. , are four; but that secondary matter (updddyarupa)--color, for example--is one; but that, nevertheless, secondary matter does not differ from the
86
primary elements.
This objection does not go against us, but only against the
87
teachers who say that secondary matter is the four elements.
to adopt the opinion that you wrongly attribute to us, we say that in the manner that secondary matter is made up of the four elements, in that way the five skandhas constitute the pudgala.
***
[The Vatslputrlyas:] If the pudgala is only a word serving to designate the five skandhas, why did the Buddha not declare that
88 the vital principal (jiva) is the body?
Because the Buddha takes into consideration the intention (asaya) of whomever asks him questions. The person who asks this question of the Buddha understood by jiva, not a being, a simple designation of the skandhas, but a person, a real living entity; and he was thinking of this person when he asked if the jiva is identical to the body or different from the body. Now this jiva does not absolutely exist; and so the Buddha only maintained that it is neither identical to nor different from the body, and then the Blessed One condemned the two answers. In like manner one
89 cannot say that the hairs of a tortoise are hard or soft.
The ancient masters have already explained this difficulty. There was once a venerable one named Nagasena, possessor of the three knowledges (vidyas), the six higher knowledges (abhijnas), and the eight liberations (vimoksas). At that time, the King of
Kalinga went up to him and said, "I have come with the intention
of clearing up my doubts. But monks are verbose:
90
shall we agree
But,
? that you answer plainly to the questions that I ask? " Nagasena accepted his request and the King asked, "Is the vital principal identical to the body or different from the body? " "To this question/' said Nagasena, "there are no grounds for answer. " "Haven't we agreed that you shall answer plainly? Why speak off the point and not answer? " "I wish to ask the King concerning a doubt. But kings are verbose: shall we agree that the King answers plainly to the question that I shall ask? " The King consented and Nagasena asked, "Do the mangos in the King's palace give sweet fruit or bitter fruit? " And the King answered him, "There are no mango trees within my palace. " Nagasena protested as the King had protested, saying, "Haven't we made an agreement? Why speak off the point and not answer? " "But," said the King, "as there are no mangos in my palace, how could there be any sweet or bitter fruits? " "In the same way, Oh King, the vital principal does not exist: one cannot then answer your question and say that it is
91 identical to the body or different from the body. "
[The Vatslputrlyas:] But, if the pudgala does not exist, why didn't the Blessed One answer that the jtva absolutely does not exist?
Because he took into consideration the intention of the questioner, that questioning on the jtva may be with the idea that the jtva is a series of skandhas. If the Blessed One answered that thejtva absolutely does not exist, the questioner would have fallen into false views. Furthermore, as the questioner was not capable of understanding "dependent origination" (pratityasamutpada), he was not a fit receptacle for the Good Law: the Blessed One then did not tell him that the jtva exists except by way of designation.
The explanation that we have given here is the same that the Blessed One formulated: "Ananda, the wandering monk Vatsago- tra came to me to ask a question thusly: Is there, or is there not a soul (atmari\Y I did not answer him. In fact, to answer that there is a soul is to contradict the truth of things, because no dharma is a soul nor has any relationship with a soul; and if I had answered that there is no soul, I would have increased the folly of Vatsagotra,
Refutation of the pudgala 1333
? 1334 Chapter Nine
for he would have thought: 1 had a soul, but this soul does not now
92
exist/
of a soul, this second folly is graver. Whoever believes in the soul falls into the extreme view of eternity; whoever believes that the soul does not exist falls into the extreme view of annihilation.
For, in comparison to the folly of the belief in the existence
Thoughtless error, heavy error
93 94 . . . ", and so on. It has been said:
1. Taking into consideration the injury that heresy does and,
also, the falling off of good deeds, the Buddhas teach the Law in the
95 manner in which a tigress carries its young.
2. Those who believe in the reality of the soul are torn by the teeth of heresy; those who do not recognize the conventional self
96
1. Since a real jiva does not exist, the Buddha does not say that
the jiva is identical or non-identical; he does not say any more than
that the jiva does not really exist, fearing that one would only 91
2. Series of skandhas, actions, and the results of actions are what are termed jiva: if the Buddha were to negate the jtva, he would negate actions and their results.
3. And if the Buddha does not say that the so-called jtva is in the skandhas, it is because he sees that the questioner is not capable of tolerating the teaching of emptiness.
4. It is then because of the state of mind of Vatsa that the
Buddha, asked if there was a soul, yes or no, did not answer. But if
the soul were to exist, why wouldn't he have answered that it
98
exists?
The Buddha did not answer four questions relative to the
99
eternity of the world (loka): again this is because he took into
consideration the intention of the questioner. If such a person understands loka to be a soul (dtman), the four alternatives are incorrect, since the soul does not absolutely exist. If he understands loka to be transmigration or samsdra, the four alternatives are
let their good actions fall away, and perish. And again:
negate the conventional jtva.
? incorrect: if transmigration is eternal, no one could obtain Nirvana; if it is not eternal, all would obtain Nirvana by spontaneous annihilation, and not through effort: if it is both eternal and non-eternal, some would never obtain Nirvana, whereas others would obtain it spontaneously; finally, to say that loka, in the sense of samsdra, is neither eternal nor non-eternal, is to say that beings both would and would not obtain Nirvana: a contradiction in terms. In fact, Nirvana is possible through the Way; then no categorical response is acceptable. In the same way the Buddha did not answer the Nirgranthasravaka who held a bird
100 in his hand and asked if this bird was dead or sdive.
The four questions as to whether the world is infinite, namely if it has an end or not, has the same sense as the questions relative
101
to the eternity of the world,
How do we know that "the infinity of the world" should be
102
understood in this sense? The wandering monk Uktika,
having asked the Buddha about infinity, resorted to a ruse in order to repeat his question and asked, "Does the whole world obtain
103
deliverance through the Way, or only a part of the world? "
elder Ananda then said to him, "You have already posed this question, Uktika. Why do you repeat it by changing the terms? "
If the Blessed One did not explain concerning the four questions relative to the existence of the Tathagata after death, this is again because he took into account the intentions of the questioner. Such a person understood the Tathagata to be a "soul" liberated from the defilements.
We ask in our turn those who hold to a "soul:" The Blessed One, according to you, declared that the pudgala exists, indescriba- ble: why did he not declare that the Tathagata exists after death?
If [the Vatslputriyas] answer that the Buddha kept silent on this point because he feared that the disciple, by admitting the survival of a pudgala named Tathagata, would fall into the view of eternity, we would then ask why the Blessed One predicted to Maitreya, "In the ages to come, you will be a Tathagata, an Arhat, a
. Refutation of the pudgala 1335
and present the same defect.
after
The
? 1336 Chapter Nine
104
and speaking of one of his deceased 105
Samyaksambuddha;"
disciples, he said, "He is at present reborn in such a place. " Are not these discourses defiled by the opinion of permanence?
If [the Vatsiputrlyas] answer that the Blessed One does not say anything concerning the deceased Tathagata because, seeing at first the pudgala, he now no longer sees the pudgala once it has attained Nirvana; it is then through ignorance that the Tathagata does not make any declaration concerning the deceased Tathagata, and to speak thus is to deny the omniscience of the Master. Rather one should believe that if the Blessed One abstains from all declarations, it is because the "soul" that the questioner alluded to in speaking of the Tathagata does not absolutely exist. If [the Vatsiputrlyas] say that the Blessed One sees the pudgala, which is in Nirvana, but that he still does not make a statement on this subject; and that the pudgala exists but is not, at the same time, an object of a statement of the Blessed One, we then conclude that [the Vatsiputrlyas] admit that the pudgala is permanent.
If [the Vatsiputrlyas] say that "whether the Blessed One does
1
or does not see the pudgala is indescribable, they then proceed to
say that all is indescribable, and that one can only say that the Blessed One is omniscient or non-omniscient.
***
[The Vatsiputrlyas:] The pudgala really exists, as it is said, that 106
"To say that I really, truly do not have an atman is an incorrect opinion. "
This is not a proof, for it is also said that it is an incorrect
101
opinion to affirm the existence of an atman. Scholars of the
Abhidharma think that a belief in the existence of an atman and a belief in its non-existence are two extreme opinions, as they identify them with the two branches of "the opinion that consists in believing in extremes/' This doctrine is certain, as it is formulated in the Vatsagotra-sutra, "Ananda, those who affirm a
? soul fall into the extreme of the belief in permanence; those who
108
[The Vatsiputrlyas]: If the pudgala does not exist, what is it
that wanders in samsdra? In fact, one can only allow that samsdra
itself wanders. Further the Blessed One has said, "Beings misled by
ignorance, bound by thirst, wander here and there, either among
deny a soul fall into the extreme of the belief in annihilation. . . "
***
beings in hell, among animals, among pretas, humans, or the gods; 109
thus for a long time they experience all suffering. "
How does the pudgala wander in samsdra? Would you say that this wandering consists in abandoning old skandhas and in taking up new skandhas? But we have shown that this explanation is inadmissable. A good explanation is simple: one says that when a flame burns a field it travels, although they be only moments of flame, because it constitutes a series; in the same way the harmony of the skandhas which is constantly repeated receives, metaphori- cally, the name of being; supported by thirst, the series of skandhas travels in samsdra.
***
[The Vatsiputrlyas]: If only the skandhas exist, we do not see how one can explain these words of the Blessed One, "In the past, I
110
was the teacher Sunetra. "
existence of the individual skandhas metaphorically termed "soul," past skandhas are not the same as present skandhas, and so the Blessed One cannot express himself in this manner.
But what is the thing that the Blessed One calls "soul"? The pudgala, you would say: then, since the "soul" is permanent, a past "soul" is identical with a present "soul". For us, when the Blessed One said, "I was the teacher Sunetra/' he teaches us that the skandhas that constitute his present "soul" formed part of the
Refutation of the pudgala 1337
In fact, in the hypothesis of the
? 1338 Chapter Nine
same series as the skandhas that constituted Sunetra. In the same way one says, "This fire has been burning here/'
***
You affirm the existence of a real soul: we hold that only the Buddhas, Tathagatas would see it (because it is subtle). But if the Buddhas see a soul, they would produce a firm belief in a soul; from this belief in a soul there would be produced among them a belief in things pertaining to a soul; from these two beliefs there would be produced among them affection for the soul and for things pertaining to a soul. The Blessed One said in fact that "whosoever believes in a soul, believes in things pertaining to a soul; believing in things pertaining to a soul, they become attached to the skandhas as they form a soul and things pertaining to a soul/' There would be then satkayadrsti among the Buddhas; they would be bound by affection for a soul and for things pertaining to a soul; and they would be very far from liberation.
[The Vatslputrlyas]: Affection is not produced with regard to a soul. We explain: when one recognizes a soul in what is not the soul, as do the non-Buddhists, one feels affection for this pretended soul; but, when one sees the soul in that which is truly the soul, namely the ineffable pudgala, as do the Buddhas, no affection is produced with regard to the soul.
This statement has no support. The Vatslputrlyas, without any
shadow of reason, introduce the sickness of heresy into the
teachings of the Master. Whereas there are those who admit an
111 ineffable pudgala, others deny the existence of all the dharmas;
non-Buddhists imagine a soul apart from all other substances. All these doctrines are wrong and present the same flaw in that they do not lead to liberation.
***
? Refutation of the pudgala 1339 112
If the soul does not absolutely exist, how can a mind--which perishes as soon as it is generated--be capable of remembering an object perceived a long time before? How is it able to recognize an object similar to what it has formerly perceived?
Memory and recognition are generated immediately, in a series, from a certain type of mind, when this type of mind arises from the idea of object already perceived and which one calls "object of the memory. "
[Now then, let us first examine memory. ]
What is the type of mind from whence memory immediately shoots up?
We answer: It's a certain mind (citta-visesa), bent towards the object of memory, a mind in which one finds ideas related to that thing or resembling that thing, or even "resolutions" of a certain nature, etc. ; with the condition however that the power that this mind possesses to produce memory is not paralysed by a psycho- somatic change arising from sickness, from grief, from mental
113 trouble, or the disturbing influence of magic formulas, etc.
1. It is necessary that a bending of the mind be produced, an act of attention, towards the object; 2. it is necessary that the mind involves an idea resembling the object, in the case where one remembers by reason of resemblance (for example, I remember fire perceived a long time ago because the idea of fire is placed in my mind by the sight of present fire); 3. or it is necessary that the mind involves an idea in relation to the object, in the case where one remembers without there being resemblance (for example, I remember fire because the idea of smoke is placed in my mind by the sight of smoke); 4. or it is necessary that the mind involves a pranidhdna, or resolution, an abhydsa, or habit (for example, the resolution has been placed in the mental series, "I shall remember this at such a time"); 5. also when it is of this nature--that is to say, when it presents the characteristic 1. and one of the characteristics 2 - 4--if the thought does not proceed from the idea of the object of memory--that is to say, if the mind so envisaged is
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not produced in a series where the idea of a certain object has been placed by perception, if this mind does not proceed from this idea--the mind cannot produce memory; 6. when it is not of this nature, even though it proceeds from an idea of the object of memory, it cannot produce memory.
[The Vatsiputrlyas:] How can one mind see and another mind remember? It is contrary that Yajnadatta remembers an object that Devadatta has seen.
That is right. There is no connection between Devadatta and Yajnadatta: Their minds are not in the relationship of cause and effect, as is the case for minds which form series. Indeed, we do not say that one mind sees an object and that another mind remembers this object, because these two minds belong to the same series. We say that one past mind, bearing a certain object, brings about the existence of another mind, the present mind, capable of remem- bering this object. In other words, a mind of memory is generated from a mind of seeing, as fruit is generated from the seed through the force of the last stage of the transformation of the series. This point has been clarified. Memory is generated after recognition.
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[The Vatsiputrlyas:] In the absence of a soul, who remembers? [Vasubandhu:] What do you understand by "to remember"? [The Vatsiputrlyas:] To grasp an object by the memory. [Vasubandhu:] Does "to grasp" differ from memory? [The
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[Vasubandhu:] We have explained what is the agent of this action: it is the cause of memory, namely a certain type of mind.
[The Vatsiputrlyas:] But, if it is only a certain type of mind that is the cause of memory, how can one say that Caitra remembers?
[Vasubandhu:] One gives the name Caitra to a series; a mind of memory is generated, in this series, from a mind of seeing, and by reason of this fact one says that Caitra remembers.
Vatsiputrlyas:] Memory is the agent of the action "to grasp. "
[The Vatsiputrlyas:] In the absence of a soul, whose is the
? memory?
[Vasubandhu:] What is the sense of the genitive "whose"? [The Vatsiputriyas:] This genitive designates its master.
[Vasubandhu:] Explain by an example how you understand that someone is the master of memory. [The Vatsiputriyas:] As Caitra is the master of the cow.
[Vasubandhu:] In what is Caitra the master of the cow?
[The Vatsiputriyas:] In that he directs and employs the cow as he pleases.
[Vasubandhu:] To what then is the memory directed and employed by a master, for whom you search with great pains.
[The Vatsiputriyas:] It is directed and employed on the object that one wants to remember (that is to say, it is employed on remembering).
[Vasubandhu:] To what purpose?
[The Vatsiputriyas:] For the purpose of memory.
[Vasubandhu:] What idle talk! I direct and employ a certain thing with a view to the same thing! Explain to me then how memory is employed: do you want to say that one transmits it to a certain place? Do you want to say that one causes it to be produced?
[The Vatsiputriyas:] Memory does not die out; it is then not transmitted. One causes it to be produced.
[Vasubandhu:] What you call "master" is then simply the cause, and what you call "subject" is simply the result. In fact the cause, by its command, operates the result; it is then "master"; and the result, in that it is subordinate to the cause at the moment of its arising, is called "subject. " Since the cause suffices as master, why require a self to which you could attribute memory? Memory belongs to whatever causes memory. Complexes of samskdras, or the five skandhas forming a homogeneous series, are called
Refutation of the pudgala 1341
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"Caitra" and "cow. " One says that the Caitra-series possesses the cow-series, because the Caitra-series is the cause of the geographic displacement and the various changes of the cow-series. There is not there any one, real entity "Caitra," nor another entity called "cow;" there is not, for the Caitra-series, any quality of owner or master outside of its quality of cause.
[As with memory, so too with recognition. ]
We would answer, mutatis mutandis, to the questions: "Who knows? To whom do we attribute consciousness? " and to other similar questions, "What feels, what makes ideas? " as we have responded to the questions, "What remembers? To whom do we attribute memory and recognition? "
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Certain scholars
(bhava) depends on an existing being (bhavitar), as the walking of Devadatta depends on Devadatta. Walking is an action, and Devadatta is the active being. In the same way consciousness {vijnana) and all action depends on a "base of support" {asraya), "one who knows {vijnatar)** the agent.
say that the soul (dtman) exists, as existence
We would ask what it is that they understand by "Devadatta. " If they regard Devadatta as a real individual, we have discussed and refuted this theory. Devadatta is an imaginary individual and not an individual entity; Devadatta is only the name that one gives to the series of samskaras. In the sense that one could say that such a Devadatta walks, in the same sense we can say that Devadatta knows.
How does Devadatta walk? "Devadatta" is only a homogene- ous series of samskaras, moments of existence replaced without interruption and roughly similar one to another. The foolish see within this series an entity which would be the cause of the action that this series generates in a different place, the cause by the efficacy of which the successive moments of the existence of the
? body of Devadatta is produced in different places. In fact, the walking of Devadatta is simply the act of the generation of the series which is the body in different locations; the cause of this action--that is to say, the previous moment of the series--receives the name of "walker. "
It is in this sense that we say that Devadatta walks, in order to designate a walk totally similar to that of fire or sound: the fire walks, the sound walks, that is to say, the fire-series and the
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sound-series go being generated from one place to another.
