The commentary on the Ndmasamgiti quotes an
Abhidharma
treatise which enumerates the six anuiayas: mdnadrgvicikitsdi ca rdgapratigh- amUdhayah.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-3-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991-PDF-Search-Engine
10: "Those who are called Vibhajyavadins are now the Prajnaptivadins (shuo chia pu WiWfiS* ).
"
According to the Samayabhedoparacanacakra (tsung lun ^|jfe ): "Two hundred years later there emerged a school from out of the Mahasamghikas called the Prajnaptivadins" (see Wassiliev page 251, and the note where we see that, in this version of the Samayabheda, one of the two Chinese translators here reads Vibhajyavadins). A commentator remarks: "According to these two explanations, the Vibhajyavadins form but a single school [with the Prajnaptivadins]. But the Vibhdsd, 23. 5 says: "The Mahasamghi- kas, etc. , are called Vibhajyavadins. " So too the Arthapradipa (? i-teng^^St )? "Either the Vibhajyavadins are certain masters of the Great Vehicle, or all the schools of the Small Vehicle are called Vibhajyavadins: these latter are not a definite school. Also, in the Samgraha (? she-lun Jlffe ), the Vibhajyavadins are strictly defined as being the MahiSasakas: in the Vibhdsd, they are strictly defined as being the Sammitiyas" (Note of Saeki ad xix. 9a9).
Note the classic references to the Vibhajyavadins, Commentary on the Kathdvatthu, Vasumitra, etc. , in Kern, Wassilief, Waters, etc. See v. 25.
39. "Seeing" (pafyati) designates the consciousness obtained through dnantaryamdrga; "knowing" (jdndti), the consciousness obtained through vimuktimdrga (vi. 28).
40. The Blessed One said:. . . srutavata dryasrdvakasya smrtisampramosd utpadyante / atha ca punah ksipram evdstam pariksyam parydddnam ca gacchanti.
41. According to the Tibetan: "Others say:. . . "According to the the Japanese editor: "Here theauthorcriticizestheVaibhasikas . . . "
42. The Tibetan only gives the first line of the stanza, but quoted completely by Hsiian-tsang. This is Samyutta, i. 188; Theragdthd, 1223; Visuddhimagga, page 37-38. Cf. Suttanipdta, 340. According to the Vydkhyd: kdmardgdbhibhutatvdc cittam me paridahyate / anga me gautama bh&mi sdntim (? ) tvam anukampayd // viparydsena samjndndm cittam te paridahyate / nimittam varjyatdm tasmdc chubham rdgopasaihhitam // Vagina was a Srotaapanna, and consequently freed from all the anuiayas that one abandons through the Seeing of the Truths.
43. According to the Vydkhyd: "As the doctrine of the other school, nikdydntariiya, (note 38 above) is contradicted by the Vaibhasikas by means of a text of Scripture, and as the doctrine of the Vaibhasjkas is similarly contradicted by the other school, as a consequence some other
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masters, constituting a third party, took the words and resolved the problem of the contradiction of the Sutras. "
According to Hsuan-tsang: "Other masters say. . . "TheJapanese editor believes that the author is now presenting the opinion of the Sautrantikas.
44. One can also explain that the expression of this Sutra: "to see and to know the Truth: this is Suffering," does not refer to only darianamdrga, the Path of Seeing the Truths, which Vagisa possesses, but also to bhdvandmdrga, the Path of Meditation [which, when it is pure (andsrava) bears on the Truths, vi. l]: and VaglSa does not possess this second Path.
45. Manasamyojana, Prakaranapdda, TD 26, p. 693a29; Vibhanga, 353; Dhammasangani, 1116, trans. 298; Comm. page 372 (Expositor, page 478); Anguttara, ii. 430. Ahimkdrama- mimkdramdna in Majjhima, I486 and elsewhere.
46. The Aryan is a person who has seen the Truths and who has expelled the anusayas, satkdyadrsti, etc. , which are expelled through Seeing (darsana); but he has not necessarily expelled the anusayas whose expulsion requires bhdvand (Meditation, or repeated seeing of the Truths, etc. ). However these non-expelled anusayas do not become active within him.
47. Tathd is translated as et cetera, according to the commentary; the simplest meaning is "in the same manner;" see Kosa v. lb. for an interpretation of the same word.
48. According to the rule: yeyaddarsanaheydlambands te taddarsanaheydh / avasistd bhdvandheydh. See above page and v. 60-61.
49. Dtgha iii. 216 distinguishes kdmatanhd, bhavatanhd, vibhavatanhd and rupatanhd, arupatanhd, nirodhatanha.
On vibhavatrsna, see Visuddhimagga, 568, 594, and Madhyamakavrtti, 530 note 4.
Vibhdsd,TD27,pl38b9:Therearethreetrsnds,kdmatrsnd,bhavatrsnd, vibhavatrsna. . . There are some masters, namely the Vibhajyavadins, who say that vibhavatrsna that the Sutra mentions is abandoned by Seeing and by Meditation. It was in order to refute this opinion and to show that the vibhavatrsna mentioned in the Sutra is abandoned by Seeing alone, that this treatise was composed (tso ssu lun fp^Ulfe ): Should we say that vibhavatrsna is abandoned through Seeing or Meditation? Answer: We should say that it is abandoned through Meditation. Vibhava is the anityatd (impermanence = non-existence, destruction) of the nikdyasabhdba (ii. 4l); the trsnd which has this anityatd for its object is called vibhavatrsna; thus it is solely abandoned through Meditation, for nikdyasabhdga is abandoned through Meditation. There are some masters who say that vibhavatrsna is abandoned either through Seeing or through Meditation. When is it abandoned through Seeing? When it is attachment (rdga) to the vibhava of the dharmas abandoned through Seeing. When is it abandoned through Meditation? When it is attachment to the vibhava of the dharmas abandoned through Meditation.
Question: Who maintains this opinion? Answer: The Vibhajyavadins. They say that vibhava is the anityatd of the Three Dhatus, that vibhavatrsna is the trsnd relative to this anityatd, that, anityatd being abandoned through Seeing and Meditation, the same holds true for the trsnd relative to it. . . Certain masters say: If one follows the Sutra (sutrdrtha), vibhavatrsna is abandoned solely through Meditation; but according to the Truth (tattvdrtha) it is abandoned through both Seeing and Meditation. How is this? The Sutra says: "It is as if someone overwhelmed by fear and by suffering thinks: May I, after death, be annihilated, disappear, no longer exist! " In this Sutra one should understand vibhava as the anityatd subsequent to nikdyasabhdga: this vibhava is abandoned through Meditation, and so vibhavatrsna is not abandoned through Seeing. Here the Master (lun-chu) presents the meaning of the Sutra . . . When one is attached to the truth, one should say as the Vibhajyavadins above: "Vibhava is the name of the anityatd of the Three Dhatus . . . "
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 138c26: Why does the Srotaapanna not produce vibhavatrsna? Answer: Because he sees the nature of things (dharmata); that is, seeing that the nature of things is a series of causes and effect, he ,does not desire annihilation (uccheda). In the
? second place, because he believes in the result of action; that is, believing that action and its effect are the successive parts of one series, he does not desire annihilation. Again, because heunderstandsemptiness,theSrotaapannaobtainssUnyatavimoksamukha (viii. 24);he knows that there is no present existence, nor subsequent non-existence of the "self" and "things pertaining to self;" consequently he does not produce trsnd, the desire for annihilation, or subsequent destruction. Furthermore, vibhavatrsnd is nourished (upacita) by vibhavadrsti (v. 7), and vibhavadrsti manifests itself following it; now the Srotaapanna has already abandoned vibhavadrsti, so he does not produce vibhavatrsnd.
50. In order to demonstrate that one can "love impermanence," YaSomitra quotes the Sutra:
ydvad ayam dtmdjivati tisphati dhriyate ydpayati tdvat sarogah sagandah sasalyah sajvarah sapriddhakah / yatas cdyam dtmd ucchidyate vina/yati na bhavati / iyatdyam dtmd samyaksamucchinno bhavati /
51. asmitd = asmimana.
52. Hsiian-tsang reads bhagnaprsthatvdt, "their back being burned. " The Tibetan has rkan,
marrow.
53. Independent or aveniki avidyd, is the avidyd which does not accompany other anusayas, rdga, etc.
On the universals, ii. 54a-b.
54. That is: they bear, in their Dhatu, on the five categories (nikdyas, ii. 52b), which are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, etc. According to another explanation, they are called universals because they are the cause of amis'ayas belonging to all five categories.
55. According to Hsiian-tsang, "superior" refers to the higher Dhatus or bhumis. These anusayas are not in the lower ones. On the sarvatragas and the bhumis, see v. 18.
56. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 93a5. Some say that, not having any object, avidyd does not have any pure dharmas for its object; in fact, it is not jndna by nature; rather, it forms an obstacle to the knowledge of things . . . (Samghabhadra TD 29, p. 6l3bl0). See iii. 28c, v. 38d.
57. See Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 94al2.
58. Hsiian-tsang adds: "which are abandoned through the Seeing of andsrava," according to
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 93al5, which Vasubandhu summarizes in Karika 16.
59. According to other authorities, kusaladharmacchanda is sraddha (ii. 25) or again the
universal mental state of adhimukti (ii. 24). Kathdvatthu, ix. 2.
60. One prides himself solely on gross and mobile things which provoke satisfaction in the
lower bhumis.
61. Our texts interpert anuhte, or anusayana, in the sense oipustim labhate, "to undertake
growth," and pratisphdm labhate, "to begin, to become active;" see i. English trans, page 59 f
and v. 39. The Tibetan version anusete = rgyas gyur - to become great. The Chinese sui-tseng H t ^ has the same meaning.
In certain cases an anus ay a grows by the fact that it becomes active in the object; in other cases it grows by the fact of the sensations, etc. , which favor its growth.
On the two types of anusayana, see Samyuktahrdaya, TD 28, p. 901b6ff, Samghabhadra, TD 29, p. 898cll, Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 257a26, and p. 442b24 to 452bl9 (Saeki also refers to Vibhdsd 32. 1 and 16. 1). Saeki quotes the Vibhdsd, p. 110a20: Certain masters say that the anusayas do not constitute anusayana in the dharmas associated with the mind. The DarstSntikas say: T o affirm that the anus ay a constitutes the object of anuiayana is to admit that it grows by the fact of the pure dharmas or the dharmas of a higher sphere, when it has for its object similar dharmas [and this contradicts the thesis v. l8a-b]; to affirm that it
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constitutes anuiayana in associated dhannas is to admit that the anuiaya [for example, attachment] will never be cut off, or that even if it is cut off, it will always be anuiayana, for one cannot definitively disjoin the mind from associated dharmas [, for example, from agreeable sensation which nourishes attachment. ]. " See below note 62.
62. See v. 39.
63. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 444c21: "Is a locus of anuiaya also a locus of anuiayana? [That is: is the object on which an anuiaya can bear--the thing relative to which one takes up attachment, hatred, doubt, false view, etc. --always favorable to the development ipuspt) and the installation (pratisthalabha) of the anuiaya? ]Pute (andsrava) things (Nirvana and the Path) are loci of anuiaya but not loci of anuiayana. Vasumitra says: When one produces anuiaya having impure {sdsrava) things for their object, the anuiayas progressively increase {sui-tseng) [that is, they grow by the fact of these things taken as object], in the same way that the organ of sight of a person who looks at the moon develops {tseng-ch'ang t^JI
); when one produces anuiayas having pure things for their object, the anuiayas diminish, like the organ of sight of a person who looks at the sun. "
64. As long as rdga is not abandoned, it will continue to develop from the fact of the agreeable sensation which is associated with the mind.
65. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 259c8.
66. See note 27, and also BodhisattvabhUmi, Muse on, 1906, 224.
67. According to the Japanese editor, the Sautrantikas.
68. This refers to the doctrine of Kapila and the Vaisesikas, of the philosophical proponents of an atman.
69. On the roots of evil, iv. 8c-d.
The commentary on the Ndmasamgiti quotes an Abhidharma treatise which enumerates the six anuiayas: mdnadrgvicikitsdi ca rdgapratigh- amUdhayah.
70. The word "all" signifies "of the five categories," abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, etc. (ii. 52b).
71. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 259c8-260a9: Some (= the Darstantikas) say that all kleias are bad (akuiala); others, that the kleias of Kamadhatu are bad, whereas the kleias of the other Dhatus are neutral; a third hold that, among the three bonds (samyojana) of Kamadhatu, one bond is neutral, namely satkdyadrspi. . . Why is satkdyadrspi neutral? It is not bad because it does not absolutely destroy the diaya (see above, iv. 80d) and it does not destroy the diaya because it is not associated with non-shame and non-respect . . . it is neutral because it does not have retribution (vipdka). Vasumitra says: "because it does not produce gross actions of the body and voice" (compare iv. l2d, p. 580 of the English translation).
72. On morally neutral things, see ii. 66, iv. 9d.
73. Koia, ii. 57,71b.
74. Trsnd with respect to the dhydnas and the drupyas ("nonmaterial" absorptions) which are "tasteable" (viii. 6), at the moment of its arising with respect to the heavenly dwellings, is, in the higher spheres, neutral. All avidyd of the higher spheres, and the two views of satkaya and antagrdha in Kamadhatu, are neutral. Prajfid in Kamadhatu (1) associated with these two views, or (2) associated with minds arisen from retribution, etc. , is neutral, like all prajfid of the higher spheres associated with the kleias, or which is also associated with the minds arisen from retribution, etc. (The content of "etc. " varies according to the spheres, see ii. 72
? 75. Hsiian-tsang translates Aparintakas as "masters of foreign countries. " The term dhydyin is taken in a pejorative sense, see Aryadeva, Catuhiatika, 176 (Mem. As. Soc. Bengal, iii. 8,1914, p. 473): kateid dhydyi cittavibhramam anuprdptah kapdlam mama Urasi lagnam hi. . . Bad dhydna, Majjhima, iii. 14.
76. A tfsnottaradhydyin is a "meditator" who cultivates the "tasteable" dhydna (dsvddanasamprayuktadhydna, viii. 6): a dfspyuttaradhydyin produces a drspi of eternity, etc. ; a mdnottaradhydyin thinks: "I possess this dhydna, others do not possess it. " One who cultivates dhydna with excessive trsnd (tfsnottaram, trsnoparikam), or who is dominated by trsnd (tfsnottarah, tfsnddhikah, is called a tfsnottaradhydyin. The other two names are explained in the same way.
These are all different modes of klefa within those who enter into meditation; they are the root, the cause of neutral dharmas.
According to Hsiian-tsang: Why do the Aparantakas create these four neutral roots? Because the mahdpurusas cultivate the superior absorptions without passing beyond the point of departure which is made up of trsnd, drspi and mdna . . .
77. Samyutta, 32. 1, 34. 12; Ekottara, TD 2, p. 784b2. See De la Valle'e Poussin's Nirvana (1924).
78. See Mahdvyutpatti, 86, according to Taisho no. 1536; Digha, iii. 229, Anguttara, i. 197, ii. 46, Milinda, 144; Childers sub. voc. patiho. 'Five types of very different questions, Atthasdlini, p. 55, Sumangalavildsini, 68.
For ekamsikd dhammd, anekamsikd, see Digha, i. 191. 79. The Tibetan has "This person;" see page 801.
80. Hsiian-tsang takes up the above paragraph immediately before explaining the Abhidharmikas.
81. According to Hsiian-tsang: One should answer (vydkarana) by distinguishing this question. A general answer is not suitable, for even though the questioner knows in general that all does not arise, the problem has not been explained (na vydkhydtam).
82. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 75b20. The Vydkhyd explains: sappdddbhidharmapdphin.
83. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 75b29-c2: Why should one answer these questions categorically? These questions lead to great advantages, lead to good dharmas, are favorable to brahmacarya, produce bodhi, and cause one to attain nirvdna. This is why one should respond to them in a categorical manner. Compare Digha, i. 191.
84. The Tibetan has: can mi smra ba am / bdag nid lun ston du bzhug ces bya ba'i tha thsig go-
85. Missing in the Tibetan.
86. According to Hsiian-tsang: When someone asks if purusa-samjnd is identical or not identical to the dtman, one should ask: "What atman are you refering to in asking this question? ,"andifheanswers"Iamreferingtothegrossself . . . "
87. The Tibetan has de bzhin ons pa. The usual reading is de bzhin gsegs pa.
88. Svalaksanaklesa - kiefa bearing on a determinate object; the object of rdga and mdna is
always agreeable; the object of pratigha is always disagreeable.
89. Karikas 25-27 continue the presentation and the criticism of the sarvdstivdda, "the doctrine of universal existence," as understood by the Sarvastivadin-Vibhasikas. This problem is studied in the Introduction. Our text has been translated by Th. Stcherbatsky,
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Central Conception of Buddhism, 1923, Appendix, p. 76-91.
De la Valle'e Poussin translated the Chapter of DevaSarman's Vijnanakaya which treats
of the existence of the past and future in an anniversary volume of the E cole franchise d'Extreme-Orient.
See Kosa, i. 7c-d, 34d, iv. 35a-b, v. 62; trans, i. page 70.
Kathdvatthu, i. 7-8, note of Shwe Zan Aung, p. 375, 392 of the translation; ix. 6-7; Milinda, 50-54; Visuddhimagga, 686 (If one abandons present, past, and future defilements; comp. Kathdvatthu, xix. l).
Aryadeva, Catuhsatikd, 256-8 {Memoirs As. Soc. Bengal, iii. 8, 1914, p. 491); Bodhicarydvatdrapanjikd, 579-580 (Traikalyavadin); Madhyamaka, xvii. 14, xxii. ll, xxxv. 5; Wassilieff (on the Prasangikas), 363 (=331).
Remarks of A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, 163-5. See also the bibliography below note 94.
90. The Chinese versions give: "The three time periods (literally
'worlds,' loka) exist;" but according to the Tibetan: "The Vaibhasikas do not maintain that conditioned things (samskrtas), which have the characteristics of conditioned things, are eternal; but these masters maintain that they exist in all of the time periods" (dus mains kun tuyodpar ni gsal bar dam 'cha'o).
91. Samyuktakdgama, TD 2, p. 20all: rupam anityam atitam anagatam / kah punar vddam pratyutpannasya / evamdarit srutavdn dryasravako'tite rupe'nape- kso bhavati / anagatam rupam ndbhinandati / pratyutpannasya rupasya nirvide virdgdya nirodhdya pratipanno bhavati / atitam ced bhtksavo rupam ndbhavisyan na srutavdn dryasrdvako . . .
Compare the quotation from the same Sutra, Madhyamakavrtti, xxii. l 1; Majjhima, iii. 188.
92. Samyutta ii. 72, etc. ; Kosa, iii. 32.
93. Paramartha: "If a person says that all exists,--past, present, future, space, pratisamkhydnirodha (=Nirvana), and apratisamkhydnirodha,--it is said that this person is of the Sarvastivadin school. There are other persons who say, 'Present dharmas exist; past actions, if they have not produced their result, exist; but when they have produced their result, they no longer exist, as do neither future dharmas which are the results [of a past or present action]. ' Persons who say that the three time periods exist but who make these distinctions, are not Sarvastivadins, but Vibhajyavadins.
Vasumitra, on the KaSyapiyas (Wassiliev, 283, fol 176b): "The action whose retribution has ripened, does not exist; the action whose retribution has not ripened, exists; the samskdras arise from past causes and not from future causes. " This is the thesis of the Kassapikas, Kathdvatthu, i. 8.
On the Vibhajyavadins, above note 38.
94. The Vydkhyd gives the terms bhavanyathika, laksanayathika, avasthdnyathika, anyathanyathika.
Bhavanyathika = "one who maintains that the time periods differ (anyatha) through the fact of bhava"K\xt anyathanyathika is translated into Tibetangzhan dan gzhan du gyur pa pa; and we have the gloss purvdparam apeksydnyonya ucyate: "the time period is called reciprocally distinct (anyonya) by reason of what follows and precedes. " gzhan dan gzhan = anyonya. The Chinese sources translate
the name of the fourth master "who affirms that the difference of the time
y periods is related to their relationship (apeksd)!
See Rockhill, Life of the Buddha, p. 196 (translation of the work of Bhavya on the sects); Watters, Yuan Chwang, i. 274. The author of the Yogasutras, iii. 13, iv. 12, etc. , relies on Sarvastivadin sources, see "Notes bouddhiques," Bull. Acad, de Belgique, 1922, p. 522.
? characteristic, but it is not devoid of other characteristics, for in this hypothesis a certain future dharma could not later be this same present and past dharma.
96. The two commentators on Hsiian-tsang differ. According to Fa-pao (TD 41, p. 704all, al9-23), the future is posited relative (apeksa) to the past and the present; the past, relative to the present and the future; the present, relative the past and the future. This is also the opinion of Samghabhadra. According to P'u-kuang (TD 41, p. 311a6-8, a26-28), the future is posited relative to former things; the past, relative to later things; and the present relative to both: this is the system of the Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 396bl8-23.
97. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 396al0: "The Sarvaastivadins have four great masters who differently establish the differences of the three time periods . . . 1. Vasumitra who says that they differ through their state (avasthd); 2. Buddhadeva who says that they differ through their point of view (apeksa); 3. the follower of difference with respect to bhdva, who says: a dharma, changing its time period, differs through its bhdva, not through its nature . . . ; a dharma, passing from the future into the present, abandons its future bhdva and acquires its present bhdva, yet neither loses nor acquires its nature. . . ; and 4. the follower of difference with respect to its laksana.
According to the Samayabhedoparacanacakra (tsung lun ^|jfe ): "Two hundred years later there emerged a school from out of the Mahasamghikas called the Prajnaptivadins" (see Wassiliev page 251, and the note where we see that, in this version of the Samayabheda, one of the two Chinese translators here reads Vibhajyavadins). A commentator remarks: "According to these two explanations, the Vibhajyavadins form but a single school [with the Prajnaptivadins]. But the Vibhdsd, 23. 5 says: "The Mahasamghi- kas, etc. , are called Vibhajyavadins. " So too the Arthapradipa (? i-teng^^St )? "Either the Vibhajyavadins are certain masters of the Great Vehicle, or all the schools of the Small Vehicle are called Vibhajyavadins: these latter are not a definite school. Also, in the Samgraha (? she-lun Jlffe ), the Vibhajyavadins are strictly defined as being the MahiSasakas: in the Vibhdsd, they are strictly defined as being the Sammitiyas" (Note of Saeki ad xix. 9a9).
Note the classic references to the Vibhajyavadins, Commentary on the Kathdvatthu, Vasumitra, etc. , in Kern, Wassilief, Waters, etc. See v. 25.
39. "Seeing" (pafyati) designates the consciousness obtained through dnantaryamdrga; "knowing" (jdndti), the consciousness obtained through vimuktimdrga (vi. 28).
40. The Blessed One said:. . . srutavata dryasrdvakasya smrtisampramosd utpadyante / atha ca punah ksipram evdstam pariksyam parydddnam ca gacchanti.
41. According to the Tibetan: "Others say:. . . "According to the the Japanese editor: "Here theauthorcriticizestheVaibhasikas . . . "
42. The Tibetan only gives the first line of the stanza, but quoted completely by Hsiian-tsang. This is Samyutta, i. 188; Theragdthd, 1223; Visuddhimagga, page 37-38. Cf. Suttanipdta, 340. According to the Vydkhyd: kdmardgdbhibhutatvdc cittam me paridahyate / anga me gautama bh&mi sdntim (? ) tvam anukampayd // viparydsena samjndndm cittam te paridahyate / nimittam varjyatdm tasmdc chubham rdgopasaihhitam // Vagina was a Srotaapanna, and consequently freed from all the anuiayas that one abandons through the Seeing of the Truths.
43. According to the Vydkhyd: "As the doctrine of the other school, nikdydntariiya, (note 38 above) is contradicted by the Vaibhasikas by means of a text of Scripture, and as the doctrine of the Vaibhasjkas is similarly contradicted by the other school, as a consequence some other
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masters, constituting a third party, took the words and resolved the problem of the contradiction of the Sutras. "
According to Hsuan-tsang: "Other masters say. . . "TheJapanese editor believes that the author is now presenting the opinion of the Sautrantikas.
44. One can also explain that the expression of this Sutra: "to see and to know the Truth: this is Suffering," does not refer to only darianamdrga, the Path of Seeing the Truths, which Vagisa possesses, but also to bhdvandmdrga, the Path of Meditation [which, when it is pure (andsrava) bears on the Truths, vi. l]: and VaglSa does not possess this second Path.
45. Manasamyojana, Prakaranapdda, TD 26, p. 693a29; Vibhanga, 353; Dhammasangani, 1116, trans. 298; Comm. page 372 (Expositor, page 478); Anguttara, ii. 430. Ahimkdrama- mimkdramdna in Majjhima, I486 and elsewhere.
46. The Aryan is a person who has seen the Truths and who has expelled the anusayas, satkdyadrsti, etc. , which are expelled through Seeing (darsana); but he has not necessarily expelled the anusayas whose expulsion requires bhdvand (Meditation, or repeated seeing of the Truths, etc. ). However these non-expelled anusayas do not become active within him.
47. Tathd is translated as et cetera, according to the commentary; the simplest meaning is "in the same manner;" see Kosa v. lb. for an interpretation of the same word.
48. According to the rule: yeyaddarsanaheydlambands te taddarsanaheydh / avasistd bhdvandheydh. See above page and v. 60-61.
49. Dtgha iii. 216 distinguishes kdmatanhd, bhavatanhd, vibhavatanhd and rupatanhd, arupatanhd, nirodhatanha.
On vibhavatrsna, see Visuddhimagga, 568, 594, and Madhyamakavrtti, 530 note 4.
Vibhdsd,TD27,pl38b9:Therearethreetrsnds,kdmatrsnd,bhavatrsnd, vibhavatrsna. . . There are some masters, namely the Vibhajyavadins, who say that vibhavatrsna that the Sutra mentions is abandoned by Seeing and by Meditation. It was in order to refute this opinion and to show that the vibhavatrsna mentioned in the Sutra is abandoned by Seeing alone, that this treatise was composed (tso ssu lun fp^Ulfe ): Should we say that vibhavatrsna is abandoned through Seeing or Meditation? Answer: We should say that it is abandoned through Meditation. Vibhava is the anityatd (impermanence = non-existence, destruction) of the nikdyasabhdba (ii. 4l); the trsnd which has this anityatd for its object is called vibhavatrsna; thus it is solely abandoned through Meditation, for nikdyasabhdga is abandoned through Meditation. There are some masters who say that vibhavatrsna is abandoned either through Seeing or through Meditation. When is it abandoned through Seeing? When it is attachment (rdga) to the vibhava of the dharmas abandoned through Seeing. When is it abandoned through Meditation? When it is attachment to the vibhava of the dharmas abandoned through Meditation.
Question: Who maintains this opinion? Answer: The Vibhajyavadins. They say that vibhava is the anityatd of the Three Dhatus, that vibhavatrsna is the trsnd relative to this anityatd, that, anityatd being abandoned through Seeing and Meditation, the same holds true for the trsnd relative to it. . . Certain masters say: If one follows the Sutra (sutrdrtha), vibhavatrsna is abandoned solely through Meditation; but according to the Truth (tattvdrtha) it is abandoned through both Seeing and Meditation. How is this? The Sutra says: "It is as if someone overwhelmed by fear and by suffering thinks: May I, after death, be annihilated, disappear, no longer exist! " In this Sutra one should understand vibhava as the anityatd subsequent to nikdyasabhdga: this vibhava is abandoned through Meditation, and so vibhavatrsna is not abandoned through Seeing. Here the Master (lun-chu) presents the meaning of the Sutra . . . When one is attached to the truth, one should say as the Vibhajyavadins above: "Vibhava is the name of the anityatd of the Three Dhatus . . . "
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 138c26: Why does the Srotaapanna not produce vibhavatrsna? Answer: Because he sees the nature of things (dharmata); that is, seeing that the nature of things is a series of causes and effect, he ,does not desire annihilation (uccheda). In the
? second place, because he believes in the result of action; that is, believing that action and its effect are the successive parts of one series, he does not desire annihilation. Again, because heunderstandsemptiness,theSrotaapannaobtainssUnyatavimoksamukha (viii. 24);he knows that there is no present existence, nor subsequent non-existence of the "self" and "things pertaining to self;" consequently he does not produce trsnd, the desire for annihilation, or subsequent destruction. Furthermore, vibhavatrsnd is nourished (upacita) by vibhavadrsti (v. 7), and vibhavadrsti manifests itself following it; now the Srotaapanna has already abandoned vibhavadrsti, so he does not produce vibhavatrsnd.
50. In order to demonstrate that one can "love impermanence," YaSomitra quotes the Sutra:
ydvad ayam dtmdjivati tisphati dhriyate ydpayati tdvat sarogah sagandah sasalyah sajvarah sapriddhakah / yatas cdyam dtmd ucchidyate vina/yati na bhavati / iyatdyam dtmd samyaksamucchinno bhavati /
51. asmitd = asmimana.
52. Hsiian-tsang reads bhagnaprsthatvdt, "their back being burned. " The Tibetan has rkan,
marrow.
53. Independent or aveniki avidyd, is the avidyd which does not accompany other anusayas, rdga, etc.
On the universals, ii. 54a-b.
54. That is: they bear, in their Dhatu, on the five categories (nikdyas, ii. 52b), which are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, etc. According to another explanation, they are called universals because they are the cause of amis'ayas belonging to all five categories.
55. According to Hsiian-tsang, "superior" refers to the higher Dhatus or bhumis. These anusayas are not in the lower ones. On the sarvatragas and the bhumis, see v. 18.
56. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 93a5. Some say that, not having any object, avidyd does not have any pure dharmas for its object; in fact, it is not jndna by nature; rather, it forms an obstacle to the knowledge of things . . . (Samghabhadra TD 29, p. 6l3bl0). See iii. 28c, v. 38d.
57. See Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 94al2.
58. Hsiian-tsang adds: "which are abandoned through the Seeing of andsrava," according to
Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 93al5, which Vasubandhu summarizes in Karika 16.
59. According to other authorities, kusaladharmacchanda is sraddha (ii. 25) or again the
universal mental state of adhimukti (ii. 24). Kathdvatthu, ix. 2.
60. One prides himself solely on gross and mobile things which provoke satisfaction in the
lower bhumis.
61. Our texts interpert anuhte, or anusayana, in the sense oipustim labhate, "to undertake
growth," and pratisphdm labhate, "to begin, to become active;" see i. English trans, page 59 f
and v. 39. The Tibetan version anusete = rgyas gyur - to become great. The Chinese sui-tseng H t ^ has the same meaning.
In certain cases an anus ay a grows by the fact that it becomes active in the object; in other cases it grows by the fact of the sensations, etc. , which favor its growth.
On the two types of anusayana, see Samyuktahrdaya, TD 28, p. 901b6ff, Samghabhadra, TD 29, p. 898cll, Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 257a26, and p. 442b24 to 452bl9 (Saeki also refers to Vibhdsd 32. 1 and 16. 1). Saeki quotes the Vibhdsd, p. 110a20: Certain masters say that the anusayas do not constitute anusayana in the dharmas associated with the mind. The DarstSntikas say: T o affirm that the anus ay a constitutes the object of anuiayana is to admit that it grows by the fact of the pure dharmas or the dharmas of a higher sphere, when it has for its object similar dharmas [and this contradicts the thesis v. l8a-b]; to affirm that it
Footnots 877
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constitutes anuiayana in associated dhannas is to admit that the anuiaya [for example, attachment] will never be cut off, or that even if it is cut off, it will always be anuiayana, for one cannot definitively disjoin the mind from associated dharmas [, for example, from agreeable sensation which nourishes attachment. ]. " See below note 62.
62. See v. 39.
63. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 444c21: "Is a locus of anuiaya also a locus of anuiayana? [That is: is the object on which an anuiaya can bear--the thing relative to which one takes up attachment, hatred, doubt, false view, etc. --always favorable to the development ipuspt) and the installation (pratisthalabha) of the anuiaya? ]Pute (andsrava) things (Nirvana and the Path) are loci of anuiaya but not loci of anuiayana. Vasumitra says: When one produces anuiaya having impure {sdsrava) things for their object, the anuiayas progressively increase {sui-tseng) [that is, they grow by the fact of these things taken as object], in the same way that the organ of sight of a person who looks at the moon develops {tseng-ch'ang t^JI
); when one produces anuiayas having pure things for their object, the anuiayas diminish, like the organ of sight of a person who looks at the sun. "
64. As long as rdga is not abandoned, it will continue to develop from the fact of the agreeable sensation which is associated with the mind.
65. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 259c8.
66. See note 27, and also BodhisattvabhUmi, Muse on, 1906, 224.
67. According to the Japanese editor, the Sautrantikas.
68. This refers to the doctrine of Kapila and the Vaisesikas, of the philosophical proponents of an atman.
69. On the roots of evil, iv. 8c-d.
The commentary on the Ndmasamgiti quotes an Abhidharma treatise which enumerates the six anuiayas: mdnadrgvicikitsdi ca rdgapratigh- amUdhayah.
70. The word "all" signifies "of the five categories," abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, etc. (ii. 52b).
71. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 259c8-260a9: Some (= the Darstantikas) say that all kleias are bad (akuiala); others, that the kleias of Kamadhatu are bad, whereas the kleias of the other Dhatus are neutral; a third hold that, among the three bonds (samyojana) of Kamadhatu, one bond is neutral, namely satkdyadrspi. . . Why is satkdyadrspi neutral? It is not bad because it does not absolutely destroy the diaya (see above, iv. 80d) and it does not destroy the diaya because it is not associated with non-shame and non-respect . . . it is neutral because it does not have retribution (vipdka). Vasumitra says: "because it does not produce gross actions of the body and voice" (compare iv. l2d, p. 580 of the English translation).
72. On morally neutral things, see ii. 66, iv. 9d.
73. Koia, ii. 57,71b.
74. Trsnd with respect to the dhydnas and the drupyas ("nonmaterial" absorptions) which are "tasteable" (viii. 6), at the moment of its arising with respect to the heavenly dwellings, is, in the higher spheres, neutral. All avidyd of the higher spheres, and the two views of satkaya and antagrdha in Kamadhatu, are neutral. Prajfid in Kamadhatu (1) associated with these two views, or (2) associated with minds arisen from retribution, etc. , is neutral, like all prajfid of the higher spheres associated with the kleias, or which is also associated with the minds arisen from retribution, etc. (The content of "etc. " varies according to the spheres, see ii. 72
? 75. Hsiian-tsang translates Aparintakas as "masters of foreign countries. " The term dhydyin is taken in a pejorative sense, see Aryadeva, Catuhiatika, 176 (Mem. As. Soc. Bengal, iii. 8,1914, p. 473): kateid dhydyi cittavibhramam anuprdptah kapdlam mama Urasi lagnam hi. . . Bad dhydna, Majjhima, iii. 14.
76. A tfsnottaradhydyin is a "meditator" who cultivates the "tasteable" dhydna (dsvddanasamprayuktadhydna, viii. 6): a dfspyuttaradhydyin produces a drspi of eternity, etc. ; a mdnottaradhydyin thinks: "I possess this dhydna, others do not possess it. " One who cultivates dhydna with excessive trsnd (tfsnottaram, trsnoparikam), or who is dominated by trsnd (tfsnottarah, tfsnddhikah, is called a tfsnottaradhydyin. The other two names are explained in the same way.
These are all different modes of klefa within those who enter into meditation; they are the root, the cause of neutral dharmas.
According to Hsiian-tsang: Why do the Aparantakas create these four neutral roots? Because the mahdpurusas cultivate the superior absorptions without passing beyond the point of departure which is made up of trsnd, drspi and mdna . . .
77. Samyutta, 32. 1, 34. 12; Ekottara, TD 2, p. 784b2. See De la Valle'e Poussin's Nirvana (1924).
78. See Mahdvyutpatti, 86, according to Taisho no. 1536; Digha, iii. 229, Anguttara, i. 197, ii. 46, Milinda, 144; Childers sub. voc. patiho. 'Five types of very different questions, Atthasdlini, p. 55, Sumangalavildsini, 68.
For ekamsikd dhammd, anekamsikd, see Digha, i. 191. 79. The Tibetan has "This person;" see page 801.
80. Hsiian-tsang takes up the above paragraph immediately before explaining the Abhidharmikas.
81. According to Hsiian-tsang: One should answer (vydkarana) by distinguishing this question. A general answer is not suitable, for even though the questioner knows in general that all does not arise, the problem has not been explained (na vydkhydtam).
82. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 75b20. The Vydkhyd explains: sappdddbhidharmapdphin.
83. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 75b29-c2: Why should one answer these questions categorically? These questions lead to great advantages, lead to good dharmas, are favorable to brahmacarya, produce bodhi, and cause one to attain nirvdna. This is why one should respond to them in a categorical manner. Compare Digha, i. 191.
84. The Tibetan has: can mi smra ba am / bdag nid lun ston du bzhug ces bya ba'i tha thsig go-
85. Missing in the Tibetan.
86. According to Hsiian-tsang: When someone asks if purusa-samjnd is identical or not identical to the dtman, one should ask: "What atman are you refering to in asking this question? ,"andifheanswers"Iamreferingtothegrossself . . . "
87. The Tibetan has de bzhin ons pa. The usual reading is de bzhin gsegs pa.
88. Svalaksanaklesa - kiefa bearing on a determinate object; the object of rdga and mdna is
always agreeable; the object of pratigha is always disagreeable.
89. Karikas 25-27 continue the presentation and the criticism of the sarvdstivdda, "the doctrine of universal existence," as understood by the Sarvastivadin-Vibhasikas. This problem is studied in the Introduction. Our text has been translated by Th. Stcherbatsky,
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Central Conception of Buddhism, 1923, Appendix, p. 76-91.
De la Valle'e Poussin translated the Chapter of DevaSarman's Vijnanakaya which treats
of the existence of the past and future in an anniversary volume of the E cole franchise d'Extreme-Orient.
See Kosa, i. 7c-d, 34d, iv. 35a-b, v. 62; trans, i. page 70.
Kathdvatthu, i. 7-8, note of Shwe Zan Aung, p. 375, 392 of the translation; ix. 6-7; Milinda, 50-54; Visuddhimagga, 686 (If one abandons present, past, and future defilements; comp. Kathdvatthu, xix. l).
Aryadeva, Catuhsatikd, 256-8 {Memoirs As. Soc. Bengal, iii. 8, 1914, p. 491); Bodhicarydvatdrapanjikd, 579-580 (Traikalyavadin); Madhyamaka, xvii. 14, xxii. ll, xxxv. 5; Wassilieff (on the Prasangikas), 363 (=331).
Remarks of A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, 163-5. See also the bibliography below note 94.
90. The Chinese versions give: "The three time periods (literally
'worlds,' loka) exist;" but according to the Tibetan: "The Vaibhasikas do not maintain that conditioned things (samskrtas), which have the characteristics of conditioned things, are eternal; but these masters maintain that they exist in all of the time periods" (dus mains kun tuyodpar ni gsal bar dam 'cha'o).
91. Samyuktakdgama, TD 2, p. 20all: rupam anityam atitam anagatam / kah punar vddam pratyutpannasya / evamdarit srutavdn dryasravako'tite rupe'nape- kso bhavati / anagatam rupam ndbhinandati / pratyutpannasya rupasya nirvide virdgdya nirodhdya pratipanno bhavati / atitam ced bhtksavo rupam ndbhavisyan na srutavdn dryasrdvako . . .
Compare the quotation from the same Sutra, Madhyamakavrtti, xxii. l 1; Majjhima, iii. 188.
92. Samyutta ii. 72, etc. ; Kosa, iii. 32.
93. Paramartha: "If a person says that all exists,--past, present, future, space, pratisamkhydnirodha (=Nirvana), and apratisamkhydnirodha,--it is said that this person is of the Sarvastivadin school. There are other persons who say, 'Present dharmas exist; past actions, if they have not produced their result, exist; but when they have produced their result, they no longer exist, as do neither future dharmas which are the results [of a past or present action]. ' Persons who say that the three time periods exist but who make these distinctions, are not Sarvastivadins, but Vibhajyavadins.
Vasumitra, on the KaSyapiyas (Wassiliev, 283, fol 176b): "The action whose retribution has ripened, does not exist; the action whose retribution has not ripened, exists; the samskdras arise from past causes and not from future causes. " This is the thesis of the Kassapikas, Kathdvatthu, i. 8.
On the Vibhajyavadins, above note 38.
94. The Vydkhyd gives the terms bhavanyathika, laksanayathika, avasthdnyathika, anyathanyathika.
Bhavanyathika = "one who maintains that the time periods differ (anyatha) through the fact of bhava"K\xt anyathanyathika is translated into Tibetangzhan dan gzhan du gyur pa pa; and we have the gloss purvdparam apeksydnyonya ucyate: "the time period is called reciprocally distinct (anyonya) by reason of what follows and precedes. " gzhan dan gzhan = anyonya. The Chinese sources translate
the name of the fourth master "who affirms that the difference of the time
y periods is related to their relationship (apeksd)!
See Rockhill, Life of the Buddha, p. 196 (translation of the work of Bhavya on the sects); Watters, Yuan Chwang, i. 274. The author of the Yogasutras, iii. 13, iv. 12, etc. , relies on Sarvastivadin sources, see "Notes bouddhiques," Bull. Acad, de Belgique, 1922, p. 522.
? characteristic, but it is not devoid of other characteristics, for in this hypothesis a certain future dharma could not later be this same present and past dharma.
96. The two commentators on Hsiian-tsang differ. According to Fa-pao (TD 41, p. 704all, al9-23), the future is posited relative (apeksa) to the past and the present; the past, relative to the present and the future; the present, relative the past and the future. This is also the opinion of Samghabhadra. According to P'u-kuang (TD 41, p. 311a6-8, a26-28), the future is posited relative to former things; the past, relative to later things; and the present relative to both: this is the system of the Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 396bl8-23.
97. Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 396al0: "The Sarvaastivadins have four great masters who differently establish the differences of the three time periods . . . 1. Vasumitra who says that they differ through their state (avasthd); 2. Buddhadeva who says that they differ through their point of view (apeksa); 3. the follower of difference with respect to bhdva, who says: a dharma, changing its time period, differs through its bhdva, not through its nature . . . ; a dharma, passing from the future into the present, abandons its future bhdva and acquires its present bhdva, yet neither loses nor acquires its nature. . . ; and 4. the follower of difference with respect to its laksana.
