lb), an action
distinct
from volition, and rupa in its nature.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-2-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
Volition: that through which the deed is achieved. Intention: to
project the thought, "I shall do this or that to them; then I shall do this
531 or that. "
It happens that an action can be grave only by reason of its consecutive action, for example, when this confers on the retribution the character of necessity.
? It happens that an action can be grave by reason that, if the field is the same, a certain adhisphana renders an action grave while another adhisphana makes it light: for example, to kill one's father and mother is a grave action but to steal from one's father and mother, to lie to them, etc. , is not grave by comparison. One can explain in this same way the
532 gravity resulting from the preparation, etc.
When all these causes are great, the action is very grave; when they are small, the action is very light.
***
Action "done" (krta) is distinguished from "accumulated" (upacita)
533 action.
action?
By reason of its intentional character:Action done voluntarily or
535
intentionally is accumulated action; action done involuntarily or
536
unconsciously, and action not done in haste, even if it is voluntary, is
action that is "done. "
"By reason of its completion:" Some go to painful realms of rebirth
through misdeeds; some by two; some by three (bodily, vocal, and mentalmisdeeds); some through one deed, through two, through three . . . through ten. Since it is a rule that a person goes to a painful realm of rebirth through a certain quantity of actions, if this measure is not completed, the action is done, but not accumulated; but when this
537 measure is completed, it is accumulated
"By reason of the absence of regret and opposition:" When remorse
What are the charaaeristics and conditions of accumulated
120. Action is termed "accumulated" by reason of its intentional
character, by its completion, by the absence of regret and
534 opposition, by its accompaniments, and by its retribution.
(vipratisara, anutapa, ii. 28) is absent, or when opposition,--confession, 538
etc,--is absent, action is then termed "accumulated. "
"By reason of its accompaniments:" When an action is bad and has a
bad escort: [or when one rejoices at having committed it,] it is "accumulated. "
"By reason of its retribution:" Action is accumulated which necessarily gives forth retribution (vipakadane niyatam, iv. 50).
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The same for good actioa
Action which does not present these characteristics is done, but is not accumulated
***
We have seen (iv. H4a) that a gift made to a Caitya by a person not detached from desire is a gift of benefit for him who made it. But no one enjoys the thing given: how can this gift be meritorious?
The merits of the gift are of two types: 1. merit produced by
abandoning, that is, the merit which results from the sole fact of
539
abandoning; 2. merit produced by its enjoyment, the merit which
results in joy in the object given, by the person who receives.
121a. The merit of a gift to a Caitya is merit produced by
540 abandoning.
How can the gift produce merit when no one receives it?
We would answer this objection by asking why would the gift produce merit when someone receives it, and why it would not produce merit when no one receives it?
Because, in the second case, no one is satisfied, or favored by the gift.
If the satisfaction of a person who receives is a condition for merit, you then deny that the Immeasurable Mediations (Mediations of Compassion, etc, viii. 29) and the Meditation of Right View are meritorious. The gift to a Caitya thus produces merit,
121b. Even though no one receives it, as is the case with compassion, etc
In the case of the Meditation on Compassion, no one receives, no one is satisfied, and yet merit arises for the compassionate person, through the very force of his thoughts of compassion. In the same way, even though the Excellent Being has passed away, a gift to a Caitya made with devotion to him is meritorious by reason of the thought of the believer himself.
Should we conclude then that material offerings and worship are superfluous?
No, for the devotion which produces these actions very much
? outweighs the devotion of a person who worships and who gives in mind only. When a person who has the intention of killing his enemy, continues his bodily and vocal actions on the dead body of his enemy which this intention provokes, thinking, 'This is my enemy," that is to say, he thinks, 'This enemy is not yet dead," he obtains demerit very
541 much greater than he would have through merely the intention; in
the same way, even though the Master has passed away, the person who does aaions of giving and worship inspired through devotion obtains a much greater merit than he would have only through devotioa
If a seed given to a good field bears an agreeable result, should we think that it bears a disagreeable result if given to a bad field?
121c-d Even seeded into a bad field, the gift bears agreeable results, for there is never opposition between the result and the
542
seed
543
From the seed of the vine, there arises solely the sweet fruit of the
vine; from the seed of the nimba (Azadirachta Indica) there arises only the sour fruit of the nimba: even seeded into a bad field, the seed bears the result which is appropriate to it. In the same way, this seed which is the gift of a person who has the intention of being useful to another, even if placed into a bad field, can only produce an agreeable result. But, through the evil of the field, the result will be small or almost oil
We have explained meritorious work which consists of Giving, together with its related questions.
#*#
We must now explain meritorious work which consists of the Precepts.
122a-b. Immorality is bad rupa. Morality is the renouncing of 544
Bad r&pa is called immorality. The renouncing of immorality, which is morality, is
immorality.
Karma 703
? 122b. Of two types.
Renouncing is vijfiapti, the action by which one renounces, and avijnapti, the fact of abstaining (see above, pp. 560, 562, 583).
Morality is not solely the renouncing of immorality.
122c. It is, further, the renouncing of that which is prohibited by the Buddha.
To renounce that which is prohibited by the Buddha, the Blessed One,--without being in and of itself immoral, for example renouncing meals at forbidden times,--is also morality. This renouncing is also vijnapti and avijnapti. He who has undertaken to observe the rules and who then violates them, commits immorality.
The morality that we have just described, in short, is
122d Pure, when it is endowed with the four qualities.
Morality endowed with the four qualities is pure; it is impure in the contrary case.
123a-b. Not troubled by immorality, by the causes of im- morality; it takes as its support the opposite of immorality and <<t >>>>
peace.
"Not troubled by immorality" we have described; "not troubled by
the causes of immorality," that is, by the kleias and upaklesas (v. 41), "it takes as its support the opposites of immorality," because it relies on the four smrtyupasthanas (vi. 14); and it relies on "peace," not on rebirth in celestial realms, because it is directed to Nirvana.
According to another opinion, five causes make morality pure: 1. the purity of the deed itself [the renouncing of bad deeds]; 2. the purity of their attendants [renouncing the preparation or the means of killing, etc. ]; 3. the absence of disturbance from the vitarkas [kama, vyapada, and vihimsavitarka]; 4. its supervision through mindfulness [Buddha, Dharma, Sahghanusmrti--which includes the renouncing of undefined
545 actions]; and 5. its application to Nirvana.
According to another opinion, morality is of four types: 1. the morality of fear, which one observes from the fear of the loss of the resources necessary to life, from fear of a bad reputation, from fear of
? 546
chastisement, from fear of bad realms of rebirth; 2. mercenary
morality, which one observes from attachment to agreeable realms of existence, to pleasures, to honors; 3. a morality suitable to the parts of Bodhi, which persons who possess Right View possess, with a view to their deliverance; and 4. pure morality, which, being free from stains, is free from vices.
We have explained morality.
***
123c-& "Good absorption" or good in absorption, is bhavana, 547
meditation, soaking in, or impregnation.
What do we understand by samahita, absorbed? That which is absorption (samadhi, ii. 24, viii. 1) by its nature, and that which coexists with what is absorption by nature.
Why does "good absorption" receive the name of bhdvana? 123d. Because it perfumes, impregnates the mind.
Good absorption impregnates the mind to an extreme degree, because it (i. e. , the mind) grasps the qualities of this good, in the same way as sesame seeds are impregnated by flowers in their grasping the odor of these flowers.
***
We have said (iv. H3d) that the result of giving consists of joys. What result does one obtain from the precepts and from meditation?
124a-b. Essentially, the precepts have heaven for their result;
548 meditation has disconnection for its result.
Giving also has heaven for its result, but the precepts are the principle, normative cause of it. Disconnection, or Nirvana, (ii. trans, p. 280) has meditation for its cause, which, in the path of abandoning (prahdnamdrga, vi. 60c-d) immediately produces disconnection from the defilements; but the precepts contribute to it, since stilling (samatha) and insight (vipasyand) presuppose the precepts.
Karma 705
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***
The Sutra says that four persons produce "Brahmin" merit, 549
brahmapunya. What is this merit?
According to the Vaibhasikas (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 425cl3), this is
the merit which has been defined above in order that we might know
the measure of the action which has the marks of the Bodhisattva for its
550 result (iv. 110).
551
The ancient masters said:
124c-d Four possess Brahmin merit, because they are happy in
552 the heavens for a kalpa.
The merit of such a measure that one is happy in heaven for a kalpa is the Brahmin merit, for the lifespan of the Brahmapurohitas is a kalpa
553
(iii. 80d). And in another Canon, one reads, "He engenders Brahmin
merit, he is happy in the heavens for a kalpa" *##
554 We have studied material giving.
125a-b. The gift of the Dharmas is the correct teaching, not
555
The gift of the Dharma is to teach, correctly and with a mind not defiled, the Sutra and the other parts of Scripture. Consequently, those who teach the Dharma either falsely, or with a defiled mind, through a
556
desire for gain, for respea, and for reputation, destroy the great merit
which would otherwise fall to them.
***
We have explained the three types of good according to the distinction of the three items of meritorious work. Furthermore,
125c-d Good is threefold, merit, Nirvana and penetration.
Good merit, or good "favorable to merit" is the good which leads to
557 an agreeable retribution.
defiled, of the Sutras etc
? 558
The good which is deliverance is the good which, when it arises,
559
becomes a dharma of ParinirvSna. It is recognized that whoever,
understanding the sermons concerning the defects of Samsara, the
non-self, and the qualities of Nirvana, has his hairs stand on end and 560
who pours forth tears, possesses the moksabhdgrya root of good; in 561
this same way, one knows that there was a seed in the khalabila, when, in the rain, one sees a plant put forth shoots.
The good of penetration is fourfold, usmagatas, etc; it will be 562
***
What is the nature of what is popularly called writing, carving (mudrd), eloquence, poetry (kdvya), and calculation?
126. An industrious aaion, of the body, of the voice or of the
mind, with that which gives rise to it, are such things as writing,
563 carving, eloquence, poetry, and calculation.
"Industrious," that is, due to a certain technique.
"Threefold action" is bodily, vocal, and mental action.
"Writing and carving" are bodily actions, industrious, together with
what gives rise to this aaion, namely the colieaion of the mind and its mental states.
"Eloquence and poetry" are vocal actions,
Consequently, writing, carving, eloquence, and poetry, are by their nature, the five skandhas.
"Calculation" is mental aaion: this refers to the mental enumera- tion of the dharmas. TM
***
Now let us explain some synonyms:
127a-b. Defiled dharmas are savadya, nivrta, and hina.
Some synonyms of "defiled" are: savadya, associated with avadya, or bad; nivrta, that is, "covered" by the defilements: and the defilements themselves are covered by other defilements; hina, or ignoble, because
explained later (vi. 17).
Karma 707
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they are low or abandoned by the Aryans.
127b-c Good and pure dharmas are prantta.
Pranita, "excellent," is a synonym for subha, that is, kusala, good, and of amala, immaculate or andsrava.
The dharmas which are neither ignoble nor excellent, are thus
565 median (madhya).
127c-d Good conditioned dharmas are sevya.
Sevya, "to be cultivated" is synonymous with "good" and "con- ditioned. "
It then follows that other dharmas, some unconditioned, others conditioned but defiled or non-defiled-neutral, are not to be cultivated In fact, unconditioned dharmas are not susceptible of being produced, or cultivated, since the unconditioned has no result: now, it is with a view to a result that one cultivates.
###
566 All the other dharmas are inferior.
127d Deliverance is the highest.
These is nothing which outweighs Nirvana. Nirvana, being eternal and good, outweighs all.
? 1. Ariguttara iii. 415: cetandham bhikkbave kammarh vaddmi, cetayitva kammarh karoti kayena vdcdya manasd. Compare Atthasdlini p. 88; Kathavatthu, p. 393; Madhyamaka, xvii. 2 and 3: cetand cetayitva ca karmoktam paramarsind /. . . tatrayac cetanety uktarh karma tan mdnasam smrtam / cetayitva cayat t&ktam tat tu kdyikavdcikam //Madhyamakdvatara, vi. 89, quoted in Bodhicaryd- vatdrapanfikd (v. 3, ix. 73), p. 472.
2. Vocal action is "voice," vdg eva karma. However kdyakarma is defined as kayena kdyasya vd karma.
3. On cetand, see ii. 24. Mrs. Rhys Davids {Psychology, p. 8), translates this as "thinking"; Aung {Compendium, p. 16) translates it as "volition. " "Volition" is only slightly satisfying, for we shall see (belowj>. 565) that action includes a subsequent cetand, "I have killed"
For theJains, mental action is only semi-action (addbakamma), Majjbima, L372 {Kofa, iv. 105), Uvdsakadasdo, il App. 2, p. 18; SBE. xiv, pp. 83,165,179,242,315. Koto, iv. 73a-b.
4. Vydkbyd: Cetayitd ceti / evam cedam karisydmUi. Madhyamakavrtti, 397. 1: evam caivam ca kdyavdgbhydm pravartisya ity evam cetasd samcintyayat kriyate tat cetayitva karmety ucyate.
5. (a) Vijtiapti is "that which informs" {vijfiapayati), the manifestation of a mind either by means of the body, or by means of the voice. It is bodily in the first case, vocal in the second: kdyavijfiapti, information through the body, which we call an action, fariracespd, or vispanda {Madhyamakavrtti, p. 307), the kdyavipphandana or "bodily suffusion" of Mrs. Rhys Davids {DhammasaHgani, 636, Atthasdlmi, p. 323); vdgvijfiapH is information through the voice or words {Kofa, iv. 3d).
The School holds {Ko/a, iv. 2b-3b) that kdyavijtiapti is not an action, a movement of the body, but a disposition, a "shape" of the body. The Sautrantikas deny that shape exists in and of itself (iv. 3c).
But should vijtiapti be considered as being, in its nature, action? This is the opinion of the Vaibhasikas and the heretics of the Kathdvatthu, viii. 9, x. 10 (the Mahirhsasakas, Sammitiyas, and Mahasamghikas) who believe that "action" and words constitute "action after having been willed" of which the Blessed One speaks (iv.
lb), an action distinct from volition, and rupa in its nature. But for the Theravadins {Atthasdlini, p. 88, 96, 323, Anguttara, ii. 157, Samyutta, ii. 39) and for the Sautrantikas (below p-559|) action is volition {cetand); "bodily action" does not mean "information by the body," but a kdyasamcetand, a volition relative to the body and which leads the body. (The versionofAung,PointsofControversy,p. 225,isnottotallycorrect. )(b)Avijfiapti(ill,iv. 4)isan action "which does not inform anything to another"\avijfiapti is rupa, but does not form part of the rupdyatana: it is classed within the dharmdyatana and is only known by the mental consciousness.
In order to make all this easier to comprehend, the person who commits a murder or takes the vows of a Bhiksu produces after his volition {cetand) a bodily or vocal "information"--an action or a word--and, at the same time, an invisible action, nevertheless material and made up of the primary elements, which continues to exist in him and to increase, by reason of which he is either a murderer or a BhiksiL This invisible action, created by certain visible or audible actions and which "informs," is called avijnapti, "non-information"; it is considered to be either bodily or vocal accordingly as it is created by an action or by a word.
When a person gives orders to an assassin, he does not accomplish the action by which the murder is committed; the order that he gives is solely a preparation for murder; he is then not guilty of "the bodily information of murder. " But, at the moment when the person assassinated is murdered, a "non-information" of murder arises in him: he is, by this fact, guilty of murder.
When a person enters into a Dhyana--which supposes detachment from the defilements of Kamadhatu--he does not pronounce the vows by which one renounces killing, etc He does not produce "vocal information" by which the monk produces this "non-information" which constitutes his monkhood and which is called discipline {samvara, iv. 13). But in a Dhyana, the mind is strong enough to create, by itself and without intervention of "vocal information," the action of "non-information," or discipline.
6. The text has apare, "according to others. " The Vydkbyd holds that the "others" are the Vatslputriyas. The gloss of the Japanese editor, Saeki, mentions the Sammitiyas.
Footnotes 709
? 710 Chapter Four
7. According to the Dbammasangani, bodily vijfiapti is "to advance, withdraw, to fix the gaze, to look at all sides, to advance the arms, to withdraw them, etc"
8. Hsiian-tsang: 'Tor when the body moves, it moves by reason of action. "
9. The Vyakhya adds: "or rather a ksana is the minimum length of time" (iil85d). See ii. 46a-b. 10. Hsiian-tsang: "since it perishes later. "
ll. I&tinction does not have a cause, see JCo^^
8,222,413. The ^addarianasamuccaya (ed Suali, 46) quotes a Sutra of the Sautrantikas: paficemam bhiksavah samjttm&rampratijttm&ram samvrtimdtram vyavabdramdtram / katamampaHca / atUo'dhva andgato'dhva sahetuko vindiah dkafam pudgcda iti / VeddntasMra ii. 2, 23; Nya-
yavdrttikatatparyafikd (Viz. S. S. ), 383.
12. According to the Vydkhyd: Sthavkavasubandhuprabhrtibhir ayam hetur uktah. According to
the gloss of Saeki, "According to the School of the Sthaviras. "
13. Ksana eva ksane means ksane ksana eva which isfarthergiossedbytasminn eva ksane. lt arises by reason of merit, and immediately perishes by reason of demerit; reborn by reason of merit. . . Or it arises by reason of demerit, perishes by reason of merit. . . Or rather ksana eva ksane signifies mukhye ksane'naupacdrike ksane.
14. Vyakhya: Sakyai caisa kdranaparikalpa iti vistarak / dharmdd adharmavmasa Hi kdranapari- kalpa iti sarvatra samskrte dvyanukadau amtyesu rupddisu karmani ca iakyate kartum ato na vaktavyam etad agnisamyqgat kdsphddindm vmdfa ity evamddi.
15. According to Saeki, the Sammitlyas.
16. Compare Asanga, Sitralamkara, xviii. 82.
17. Hsiian-tsang, who is translated above, departs from the original:". . . this is to simply repeat your affirmation, since the existence of similar atoms is not proved If it were proved, then these atoms could be joined together; but the self nature of the parts of a shape is not proved as is the case
for the parts of a thing of color (na ca samsthanavayavandrh varnddivat svabhavah siddhah) that is to say, the parts of a "long" thing are not "long," etc: how can these parts, by their coming together, bring about a determined shape?
18. One sees an army without seeing its soldiers; but this does not prove that an army exists apart from its soldiers. In the same Way one sees shape without distinguishing its color.
19. According to Hsiian-tsang. The Tibetan has: First there is produced a certain resolution (samkaJpa). When one has thus willed a volition is produced whose function or action it is to set into motion (vartayati), and which is "the action after having been willed"
20. For avyflapti of the sphere of Kamadhatu depends on vijriapti, bodily and vocal action, or rupa; it does not accompany the mind as does the avijfiapti of Rupadhatu. But see iv. 75c-d
21. The RBpasamgrahasmra. Compare Digha, iii. 217; Vibbanga, pp. 13,64.
22. The Vyakhya here quotes a part of the discourse of the Buddha to Cunda on the two types of meritorious works (see Minayev, Recherches, p. 185-186, and below iv. H7a-b), an extract of the story of Ghosila in the Vinaya ofthe Sarvdstivddins, see E. Huber, Sources du Divydvadana, BEFEO. 1906, p. 18.
Upadhi means the thing (drama, vihdra, etc) given to a monk or to the Samgha; the merit that proceeds (tadbhava) from this upadhi is called aupadhika.
MahacundasUtra (Madhyama, TD 1, p. 427c29): saptemdni Cunda aupadhikani punya- kriyavastuni mahaphalamyavan mahavaistdrikamyaih samanvdgatasya irdddhasya ktdaputrasya va kuladuhitur va carato va tisphato vd svapato vajagrato va satatasamitam abhivardbata eva punyamupajayataevapunyam/ katamdnisapta/ ihaCundairaddhahkulaputrov&kuladuhitava cSturdiiaya bbiksusamgbaydrumam pratipddayati / idarh Cunda prathamam. . .
? The non-material meritorious works do not include offerings: they essentially consist of the joy that the believer experiences from the nearness, from the presence, from drawing near to the Tathagata or a Sravaka. The seventh includes the taking of the Refuges and the undertaking of the prohibitions.
lha Cunda irdddhah kulaputro va kuladuhitd va Srnoti tathdgatam va tathagatairdvaham va amukam grdmaksetram upaniiritya viharatUi frutvd ca punar adhigacchati pruipfdmodyam uddram kuialam naiskramyopasamhitam / idath Cunda prathamam mraupadhikam punyakriyd- vastu.
See Siksasamuccaya, p. 137 {Ratnardfisutra). Madhyamakavpti, p. 309 and the sources quoted in the notes.
Pali sources: Anguttara, ii. 50, 54; and the discussion in the Kathdvatthu, vii. 5: pari- bhogamayam puHndm vaddhati and x. 9: samdddnahetukam silam vaddhati. The Kathdvatthu touches on some other points relative to the doctrine of avijftapti, viil9, x. 8,11-12.
23. The Kathdvatthu denies that samvara is kamma (xill).
24. Compare Sumangalavildsini, 305, the third type of virati, proper to the Aryans and not susceptible of being cut off, or setughdtavirati; Atthasdlini, p. 103, has samucchedavirati; below v. 33a-b.
The Dhammasangani, 299, defines right speech {sammSvdcd): catuhi vadduccaritehi droit virati. . . anatikkamo setughato. According to Buddhaghosa {Atthasdlini, p. 219) setum hanatiti setughato: right speech is the destruction {ghata) of the dike through which the transgressbns of the voice pass. The translator {Psychology, 87) adopts this interpretation and refers to Anguttara L220,261, ii. 145. But, in these passages setughdta = setubandha - setu = a dike, obstacle: "The Blessed One has declared that maithuna is a setughato. " 'Thus, monks, there is a setughdta with respect to laughing. " "The Nigantha teaches that one destroys former actions through penitence and that one dikes them up {setughdta) by abstention {akarana). " The Mahdvyutpatti, 255. 9, has sdmpardyikdndm setusamudghdtdya; Tibetan version: "with a view to arresting the defilments by means of a dike"; Chinese version: "with a view to arresting the defilements like a torrent. " See also Madhyamakavpti, p. 525 the definition of NirvanajalapravdnirodhabhMasetusthdmyah.
25. rnd 'byor spyod pa dag. Paramartha: The ancient masters of the Yogacara {hsien-chiu kuan-hsing shih 5fcltHfT$! i )? Hsiian-tsang:yU-chia shih ^(R)M%.
Saeki has a long note 7b-8a.
It follows from the Vvdkhyd that the term Yogacara does not here designate the follower of a certain philosophic school but simply an ascetic: "The Yogacarin who actualizes the Path {mdrgam sammukhikurvdnah) takes possession of a mental disposition {dfaya) and a psycho-physical substrate {dfraya), whereas he takes possession of pure morality (andsrava iUa) as he takes possession of right view: having acquired this pure morality, he abides in a natural morality {prakrtifilatd)! ' Or rather {atha va) the Masters maintain that, in this same pure absorption, there is a rupa of the same nature, that is to say pure (andsrave'pi samddhau tadevamvidham rupam ta dcdrya icchanti).
Siksasamuccaya, 138: yadi bhiksavo yukto yogdcdro mama fiksdydm pratipannah sarvasa- mskdresv anityadarsi. . .
On yogacara in the Mahavastu, L 120. 9, see the remarks of the editor, i. 469. The passage is obscure.
There follows some relevant references in the Abhidharmakoia:
i. 17. Vydkhyd: In the system {dar/ana) of the Yogacaras, the manodhdtu is distinct from the six vijndnas.
i. 41. The Vijnanavadins defend the thesis: vijnanam paiyati.
ii. 24. The Vydkhyd quotes the definition that xhtyogdcdracittas give rise to adhimukti (note 117 of our translation).
ii. 44e. The doctrine of the former masters of the samdpattis quoted by the Sautrantikas (p. 231 of our translation).
footnotes 711
? 712 Chapter Four
iii. l5c Definition of a Gandharva. Bhasya: "The former masters"; Vyakhya: Purvdcdrya yogacdrya Arydsangaprabhrtayah.
iil63a-b. Phases of the moon. Opinion of the former masters; but according to the Vyakhya, the Yogacarins.
iv. 75. Bhasya: "The former masters," but, according to the Vyakhya: In the system (? nayena) of the Yogacarins.
v. 8. Vyakhya: "According to the Yogacarins (? mati), there are one hundred and twenty-eight klefas.
v. 43b-c Definition of the avarabhdgtyas attributed to apare. These "other masters" as the Yogacarins (Vyakhya).
vilOa-b. The ascetics (yogacdrya) who practice afubhd are of three types, ddikarmika. *. 26. According to the gloss of Saeki On this point of doctrine, see 13Id and Vyakhya, p. 14.
27. The expression sdsava upddantya in Samyutta iii. 47, Anguttara iii. 248 (definition of the updddnaskandhas).
28. PaHca cetokhiia, Digha, iii. 237, q. v. ; Mahavyupatti, 10. 24; vydpddakhUadvesa.
29. Hsiian-tsang adds here: If one says "How do the qualities and the actions of a certain person produce a transformation in another person who is thinking of another thing? " This difficulty also presents itself in the theory of avijriapti: how do the qualities and the actions of a certain person cause a certain thing, the avijrtapti, to arise in another person?
30. Compare Anguttara, ii. 54 and the Ratnardfisutra, quoted in the Siksasamuccaya, p. 138. The phraseology of our Sutra differs from these two sources; Hsiian-tsang differs here from the Tibetan. He has: "An outflowing of merit moistens his series and a sukha without measure flows into his body. "
31. According to Pu-kuang, the Bhadanta is Dharmatrata (See L20a-b). See TD41, p. 108b6.
32. According to Hsiian-tsang: However whoever has this threefold volition while carrying out himself, without any error of person, the action of murder, is touched by the transgression of murder. If the Bhadanta refers to this case, then he is correct.
33. Vyakhya: Afayaf cdfrayafceti / of ayah pranatipatadyakaranafayah fraddhddydfayo va / dfraya dfrayapardvrttih.
