The
instinct
of decadence; it is the exhausted and the dis inherited who take their revenge in this way and play the masters.
Nietzsche - Works - v14 - Will to Power - a
?
.
.
.
to
as a
a
to
of
to
to
in" of
to
of
is, in
a to
of
of
to
of
to
of a
to
i
? 312
THE WILL TO POWER.
D. A Criticism of the Words :
Improving, Perfecting, Elevating.
39 I.
The standard according to which the value o moral valuations is to be determined.
The fundamental fact that has been overlooked The contradiction between "becoming mor
moral" and the elevation and the strengthening of the type man.
Homo natura : The "will to power. "
392.
Moral values regarded as values of appearanc and compared with physiological values.
393.
Reflecting upon generalities is always retrograde
the ultimate "desiderata" concerning men, fo instance, have never been regarded as problem:
by philosophers. They always postulate "improvement" of man, quite guilelessly, as
though by means of some intuition they had beer helped over the note of interrogation following the question, why necessarily "improve"? To what extent is it desirable that man should be more virtuous, or more intelligent, or happieri
Granting that nobody yet knows the "wherefore? ' of mankind, all such desiderata have no sense whatever; and if one aspires to one of them--
? the
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
3I3
who knows? --perhaps one is frustrating the
other. Is an increase of virtue compatible with an increase of intelligence and insight? Dubito:
only too often shall I have occasion to show that
the reverse is true. Has virtue, as an end, in the
strict sense of the word, not always been opposed
to happiness hitherto? And again, does it not require misfortune, abstinence, and self-castigation
as a necessary means? And if the aim were to arrive at the highest insight, would it not therefore
be necessary to renounce all hope of an increase in happiness, and to choose danger, adventure,
mistrust, and seduction as a road to enlighten
ment? . . . And suppose one will have happiness;
maybe one should join the ranks of the "poor in spirit. "
394.
The wholesale deception and fraud of so-called moral improvement.
We do not believe that one man can be another
if he is not that other already--that is to say, if
he is not, as often happens, an accretion of person
alities or at least of parts of persons. In this
case it is possible to draw another set of actions
from him into the foreground, and to drive back
"the older man. " . . . The man's aspect is altered, but not his actual nature. . . . It is but the
merest factum brutum that any one should cease from performing certain actions, and the fact allows of the most varied interpretations. Neither
does it always follow therefrom that the habit of performing a certain action is entirely arrested,
? ? ? ? 314
THE WILL TO POWER.
nor that the reasons for that action are dissipated
He whose destiny and abilities make him a
criminal never unlearns anything, but is con tinually adding to his store of knowledge: and
long
talent. . . . Certainly, as far as society is con cerned, the only interesting fact is that some one
has ceased from performing certain actions; and
to this end society will often raise a man out of
those circumstances which make him able to per
form those actions: this is obviously a wiser course
than that of trying to break his destiny and his particular nature. The Church,--which has done
nothing except to take the place of, and to
appropriate, the philosophic treasures of antiquity,
--starting out from another standpoint and wishing
to secure a "soul" or the "salvation" of a soul,
believes in the expiatory power of punishment, as
also in the obliterating power of forgiveness: both
of which supposed processes are deceptions due to
religious prejudice--punishment expiates nothing,
forgiveness obliterates nothing; what is done can
not be undone. Because some one forgets some thing it by no means proves that something has
been wiped out. . . . An action leads to certain consequences, both in a man and outside him, and
it matters not whether it has met with punishment or whether it has been "expiated," "forgiven,'
or "obliterated," it matters not even if the Church
abstinence acts as a sort of tonic on his
? meanwhile canonises the man who
The Church believes things that do not
exist, believes "Souls"; believes "influences" that do not exist--in divine in
performed
? ? it. it
in
in it
in
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
3I 5
fluences; it believes in states that do not exist, in sin, redemption, and spiritual salvation: in all
things it stops at the surface and is satisfied with
signs, attitudes, words,
arbitrary interpretation. It possesses a method
of counterfeit psychology which is thought out quite systematically.
395.
"Illness makes men better," this famous
assumption which is to be met with in all ages,
and in the mouth of the wizard quite as often as
in the mouth and jaws of the people, really makes one ponder. In view of discovering
whether there is any truth in one might be
allowed ask whether there not perhaps
fundamental relationship between morality and
illness? Regarded whole, could not the
"improvement mankind"--that say, the unquestionable softening, humanising, and taming
which the European has undergone within the last two centuries--be regarded the result
long course secret and ghastly suffering, failure,
abstinence, and grief? Has illness made "Euro peans" "better"? Or, put into other words,
wherever history shows "man" state particular glory and power, his type always dangerous, impetuous, and boisterous, and cares
to which it lends an
? not our modern soft-hearted
which could be likened that the Chinese, perhaps expression physiological deteriora tion cannot be denied, for instance, that
European morality,
? ? is a of
is to
us
of a to
? . . .
an
to
It
of
of
of in
as
is it,
of
isa a
as
? 316
THE WILL TO POWER.
little for humanity; and perhaps, in those cases in which it seems otherwise, all that was required was the courage or subtlety to see sufficiently below the surface in psychological matters, in
order even in them to discover the general pro position: "the more healthy, strong, rich, fruitful and enterprising a man may feel, the more
immoral he will be as well. " A terrible thought, to
which one should on no account give way. Pro.
vided, however, that one take a few steps forward
with this thought, how wondrous does the future
then appear! What will then be paid for more dearly on earth, than precisely this very thing
which we are all trying to promote, by all means in our power--the humanising, the improving and the increased "civilisation" of man? Noth
ing would then be more expensive than virtue:
for by means of it the world would ultimately be
turned into a hospital : and the last conclusion of wisdom would be, "everybody must be everybody
else's nurse. " Then we should certainly have attained to the "Peace on earth," so long desired But how little "joy we should find in each other's company"! How little beauty, wanton spirits, daring, and danger | So few "actions"
mained fresh the memory men, and which have not been destroyed by time, been immoral
the deepest sense the word?
? which would make life on earth worth
Ah! and no longer any "deeds"! But have not the great things and deeds which have re
living
? ? in
all
in of
. . .
of
--
-
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
396.
317
? The priests--and with them the half-priests or
philosophers of all ages--have always called that
doctrine true, the educating influence of which was a benevolent one or at least seemed so--
that is to say, tended to "improve. " In this way they resemble an ingenuous plebeian empiric and
miracle-worker who, because he had tried a
certain poison as a cure, declared it to be no
poison. "By their fruits ye shall know them. "--
that is to say, "by our truths. " This has been the reasoning of priests until this day. They
have squandered their sagacity, with results that have been sufficiently fatal, in order to make the "proof of power" (or the proof "by the fruits")
pre-eminent and even supreme arbiter over all
other forms of proof. "That which makes good
must be good; that which is good cannot lie"-- these are their inexorable conclusions--"that
which bears good fruit must consequently be
true;
false step, a vice can refute. . . . This indecent form of opposition, which comes from below and
behind--the doglike kind of attack, has not died out either. Priests, as psychologists, never dis
covered anything more interesting than spying out
the secret vices of their adversaries--they prove their Christianity by looking about for the world's
? there is no other criterion of truth. " . . . But to the extent to which "improving" acts as an argument, deteriorating must also act as a refuta tion. The error can be shown to be an error, by examining the lives of those who represent it: a
? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER.
filth. They apply this principle more particu larly to the greatest on earth, to the geniuses readers will remember how Goethe has bee.
attacked on every conceivable occasion in Ger many (Klopstock and Herder were among th first to give a "good example" in this respect--
birds of a feather flock together).
397.
One must be very immoral in order to mak people moral by deeds. The moralist's means
deeds may be for anything else, but not the duties of moralist.
Morality bars may
318
the most terrible that have ever been
who has not the courage be an immoralist
the creatures
there are animal-tamers about who do not shrin
the use red-hot iron. This terrible
specie: struggle with the wild anima
an iron cage errors, man; he sick, emaciated ill-disposed towards himself, filled with loathin
the impulses life, filled with
all that beautiful and happy
he wandering monument
shall we ever succeed vindicating this phen
used;
? menagerie;
more useful than freedom, even
imprisons; also assumes tha from terrible means, and who are acquainted wit
which enters into called "priests. "
Man, incarcerated become caricature
assumes that iro
mistrust
life--in fac misery. Ho
? ? in
of in
sk
is a
of in
is
is
of
it a fit
of
is a
of
a
a
a
of ha
it
to it
beis a
fo
fo i h ar.
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
319
menon--this artificial, arbitrary, and recent mis
carriage--the sinner--which the priests have bred on their territory?
In order to think fairly of morality, we must put two biological notions in its place: the taming of the wild beasts, and the rearing of a particular species.
* The priests of all ages have always pretended
that they wished to "improve. " . . . But we, of
another persuasion, would laugh if a lion-tamer
ever wished to speak to us of his "improved"
animals. As a rule, the taming of a beast is only
achieved by deteriorating it: even the moral man
is not a better man; he is rather a weaker
member of his species. But he is less harm ful. . . .
398.
What I want to make clear, with all the means in my power, is:
(a) That there is no worse confusion than that
which confounds rearing and taming: and these
two things have always been confused. . . .
Rearing, as I understand means hus banding the enormous powers humanity
such way that whole generations may build
upon the foundations laid by their progenitors-- not only outwardly, but inwardly, organically,
developing from the already existing stem and growing stronger.
.
? exceptional danger believing that mankind whole developing
(b) That there
? ? an as
a
it, is
is
of a of
. is .
in
in
a
? THE WILL TO POWER.
and growing stronger, if individuals are seen to
grow more feeble and more equally mediocre. Humanity--mankind--is an abstract thing: the
object of rearing, even in regard to the most
individual cases, can only be the strong man (the man who has no breeding is weak, dissipated,
and unstable).
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS CONCERNING THE CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
399.
These are the things I demand of you--how ever badly they may sound in your ears: that
320
? you subject
moral valuations themselves to
criticism. That you should put a stop to your
instinctive moral impulse--which in this case demands submission and not criticism--with the
question: "why precisely
submission? " That
this yearning for a "why? "--for a criticism of morality should not only be your present form of
morality, but the sublimest of all moralities, and
an honour to yourselves and to the age you live in. That your honesty, your will, may give an
account of itself, and not deceive you: "why not? "--Before what tribunal P
4OO.
The three postulates --
All that is ignoble is high (the protest of the "vulgar man").
All that is contrary to Nature is high (the protest of the physiologically botched).
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
32I
All that is of average worth is high (the pro
test of the herd, of the "mediocre").
Thus in the history of morality a will to power
finds expression, by means of which, either the slaves, the oppressed, the bungled and the botched,
phenomenon Morality is of a highly suspicious nature. Up to the present, morality has developed
at the cost of: the ruling classes and their specific |
those that suffer from themselves, or the mediocre, A/ attempt to make those valuations prevail which
favour their existence.
From a biological standpoint, therefore, the
i
instincts,
natures, the independent and privileged classes in all respects.
Morality, then, is a sort of counter-movement
opposing Nature's endeavours to arrive at a higher type. Its effects are: mistrust of life in general (in so far as tendencies are felt be immoral), --hostility towards the senses (inasmuch the
highest values are felt opposed the
the well - constituted and beautiful
? higher instincts)--Degeneration
tion "higher natures," because precisely them that the conflict becomes conscious.
4OI.
Which values have been paramount hitherto Morality the leading value all phases
philosophy (even with the Sceptics). Result: this
world no good, "true world" must exist somewhere.
What that here determines the highest VOL.
and self-destruc
? ? I.
it
is
as
of
its
is
a X
to be
| of \|ttit
in
it is
to
?
to as in
? THE WILL TO POWER.
322
value P What, in sooth, is morality?
The instinct of decadence; it is the exhausted and the dis inherited who take their revenge in this way and play the masters. . . .
Historical proof: philosophers have always been
decadents and always in the pay of Nihilistic religions.
The instinct of decadence appears as the will to power. The introduction of its system of means: its means are absolutely immoral.
General aspect: the values that have been
highest hitherto have been a special instance of the will to power; morality itself is a particular
instance of immorality.
sk
Why the Antagonistic Values always succumbed.
1. How was this actually possible? Question: why did life and physiological well-constitutedness
succumb everywhere? Why was there no affirma tive philosophy, no affirmative religion?
The historical signs of such movements: the pagan religion. Dionysos versus the Christ. The Renaissance. Art.
2. The strong and the weak: the healthy and the sick; the exception and the rule. There is no doubt as to who is the stronger. . . .
General view of history: Is man an exception in
the history of life on this account? --An objection to Darwinism. The means wherewith the weak suc
ceed in ruling have become: instincts, "humanity," "institutions. " . . .
3. The proof of this rule on the part of the
? ? ? -
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
* 323
weak is to be found in our political instincts, in our social values, in our arts, and in our science.
sk
The instincts of decadence have become master of the instincts of ascending life. . . . The will to nonentity has prevailed over the will to life!
Is this true? is there not perhaps a stronger guarantee of life and of the species in this victory
of the weak and the mediocre ? --is it not perhaps
only a means in the collective movement of life, a mere slackening of the pace, a protective measure
against something even more dangerous?
Suppose the strong were masters in all respects,
even in valuing: let us try and think what their attitude would be towards illness, suffering, and sacrifice! Self-contempt on the part of the weak would be the result: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate their kind. And
would this be desirable? --should we really like a world in which the subtlety, the consideration, the intellectuality, the plasticity--in fact, the whole
/\
influence of the weak--was lacking? " . . . sk
*TRANSLATOR's NOTE. --Werealise here the great differ
ence between Nietzsche and those who draw premature con clusions from Darwinism. There is no brutal solution of
modern problems in Nietzsche's philosophy. He did not // advocate anything so ridiculous as the total suppression of
the weak and the degenerate. What he wished to resist and
to overthrow was their supremacy, their excessive power. He
felt that there was a desirable and stronger type which was in need of having hopes, aspirations, and instincts upheld
defiance of Christian values.
------------" "
? ? ? ? in
its
? 324
THE WILL TO POWER.
We have seen two "wills to power" at war (in this special case we had a principle: that of agree
ing with the one that has hitherto succumbed, and of disagreeing with the one that has hitherto triumphed): we have recognised the "real world"
as a "world of lies," and morality as a form of immorality. We do not say "the stronger is wrong. "
We have understood what it is that has deter
mined the highest values hitherto, and why the
latter should have prevailed over the opposite value: it was numerically the stronger.
If we now purify the opposite value of the in fection, the half-heartedness, and the degeneration,
with which we identify we restore Nature the throne, free from moralic acid.
4O2.
Morality, useful error; or, more clearly still, necessary and expedient lie according the
? greatest and most impartial
4O3.
One ought be able
supporters.
acknowledge the truth sufficiently elevated
up that point where one
no longer require the disciplinary school moral
error. --When one judges life morally, One.
Neither should false personalities
one should not say, for instance, "Nature
disgusts
invented; cruel. "
precisely when one perceives that there
? ? It is
a
is
be
it
of is
to
no
to
to
to
to
a
is
of its
to
it,
-- -----
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
2
-
- **, *,
? such central controlling and responsible force that one is relieved /
Evolution of man. A. He tried to attain to a certain power over Nature and over himself. (Morality was necessary in
order to make man triumph in his struggle with Nature and the "wild animal. ")
B. Ifpower over Nature has been attained, this power can be used as a help in our development: Will to Power as a self-enhancing and self-strengthening principle.
4O4.
Morality may be regarded as the illusion of
a species, fostered with the view of urging the individual to sacrifice himself to the future, and seemingly granting him such a very great value,
that with that self-consciousness he may tyrannise over, and constrain, other sides of his nature, and
find it difficult to be pleased with himself.
We ought to be most profoundly thankful for what morality has done hitherto: but now it is
no more than a burden which may prove fatal. Morality itself in the form of honesty urges us to deny morality.
4O5.
To what extent is the self-destruction of morality still a sign of its own strength? We Europeans
have within us the blood of those who were ready to die for their faith; we have taken morality
*- - -
? ? ? ? 326
THE WILL TO POWER.
frightfully seriously, and there is nothing which we have not, at one time, sacrificed to On the
other hand, our intellectual subtlety has been reached essentially through the vivisection our consciences. We do not yet know the "whither" towards which we are urging our steps, now that we have departed from the soil our forebears. But was this very soil that we acquired the strength which now driving
search adventure, and
strength that we are now
from our homes thanks that
by untried possibilities and things undiscovered-- we can no longer choose, we must conquerors, now that we have no land which we feel at home and which we would fain "survive. " A concealed "yea" driving forward, and stronger than all our "nays. " Even our strength
no longer bears with the old swampy land: we venture out into the open, we attempt the task. The world still rich and undiscovered, and even
mid-sea, surrounded
? perish
poisonous men. Our very strength itself urges
were better than half-men
take the sea; there where all suns have hitherto sunk we know of new world.
? ? a
us in
. . .
be
to
of
it.
us to
to
in
it
to
is
in
of is
on
to be
us
in
or
is
it is
of
in
it us is
? III.
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
I. GENERAL REMARKS.
4O6.
LET us rid ourselves of a few
? superstitions
among
Philosophers are prejudiced against appearance,
change, pain, death, the things of the body, the
senses, fate, bondage, and all that which has no purpose.
In the first place, they believe in: absolute knowledge, (2) in knowledge for own sake,
(3) virtue and happiness necessarily related,
(4) the recognisability men's acts. They are
led by instinctive determinations values, which former cultures are reflected (more danger ous cultures too).
408.
What have philosophers lacked (1) sense history, (2) knowledge physiology, (3)
which heretofore have been fashionable philosophers!
4O7.
? ? of
a
of
?
of
as
of A
its
a in
in in
? THE WILL TO POWER.
goal in the future. --The ability to criticise without irony or moral condemnation.
4O9.
have had (1) from times im memorial a wonderful capacity for the contradictio in adjecto, (2) they have always trusted concepts
as unconditionally as they have mistrusted the senses: it never seems to have occurred to them
that notions and words are our inheritance of past ages in which thinking was neither very clear nor very exact.
What seems to dawn upon philosophers last of all: that they must no longer allow themselves to be presented with concepts already conceived, nor must they merely purify and polish up those con
cepts; but they must first make them, create them,
themselves, and then present them and get people
to accept them. Up to the present, people have
trusted their concepts generally, as if they had
been a wonderful dowry from some kind of
wonderland: but they constitute the inheritance
of our most remote, most foolish, and most intelli
gent forefathers. This piety towards that which
already exists in us is perhaps related to the moral element in science. What we needed above all is
absolute scepticism towards all traditional concepts (like that which a certain philosopher may already have possessed--and he was Plato, of course: for he taught the reverse).
328
Philosophers
? ? ? ? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY,
329
4 I. O.
Profoundly mistrustful towards the dogmas of the theory of knowledge, I liked to look now out of this window, now out of that, though I took good care not to become finally fixed anywhere, indeed I should have thought it dangerous to have done so--though finally: is it within the range of probabilities for an instrument to criticise its own fitness? What I noticed more particu larly was, that no scientific scepticism or dog
matism has ever arisen quite free from all arrie`res pense? es--that it has only a secondary value as
soon as the motive lying immediately behind it is discovered.
Fundamental aspect: Kant's, Hegel's, Schopen
hauer's, the sceptical and epochistical, the histori
fying and the pessimistic attitudes--all have a moral origin. I have found no one who has
dared to criticise the moral valuations, and I soon turned my back upon the meagre attempts that have been made to describe the evolution of these
feelings (by English and German Darwinians). How can Spinoza's position, his denial and repudiation of the moral values, be explained ?
(It was the result of his Theodicy I)
4 II.
Morality regarded as the highest form of
must be in the highest degree perfect (Leibnitz's
? protection. --Our
world is either the work and expression (the modus) of God, in which case it
? ? ? 330
THE WILL TO POWER.
conclusion . . . ),--and no one doubted that he
knew what perfection must be like,--and then all evil can only be apparent (Spinoza is more radical,
he says this of good and evil), or it must be a part of God's high purpose (a consequence of a particu
larly great mark of favour on God's part, who thus
allows man to choose between good and evil: the privilege of being no automaton; "freedom," with
the ever-present danger of making a mistake and of choosing wrongly. . . . See Simplicius, for instance, in the commentary to Epictetus).
Or our world is imperfect; evil and guilt are real, determined, and are absolutely inherent to
its being; in that case it cannot be the real world: consequently knowledge can only be a
way of denying the world, for the latter is error
which may be recognised as such. This is Schopenhauer's opinion, based upon Kantian
first principles. Pascal was still more desperate: he thought that even knowledge must be corrupt
and false--that revelation is a necessity if only
in order to recognise that the world should be denied. . . .
4 I 2.
Owing to our habit of believing in uncondi tional authorities, we have grown to feel a profound need for them: indeed, this feeling is
so strong that, even in an age of criticism such as Kant's was, it showed itself to be superior to the need for criticism, and, in a certain sense, was able to subject the whole work of critical acumen,
? and to convert it to own use.
proved
? ? its
It its
? 33 I
superiority once more in the generation which followed, and which, owing to its historical
instincts, naturally felt itself drawn to a relative
view of all authority, when it converted even the Hegelian philosophy of evolution (history re
christened and called philosophy) to own use, and represented history being the self-revela
tion and self-surpassing moral ideas. Since
Plato, philosophy has lain under the dominion morality. Even Plato's predecessors, moral
interpretations play most important ro^le (Anaxi
mander declares that all things are made perish punishment for their departure from pure
being; Heraclitus thinks that the regularity phenomena proof the morally correct
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
? character evolution
general).
The progress philosophy has been hindered
most seriously hitherto through the influence moral arrie`res-pense? es.
I4.
all ages, "fine feelings" have been regarded
arguments, "heaving
bellows godliness, convictions have been the
"criteria" truth, and the need opposition
has been the note interrogation affixed
wisdom. This falseness and fraud permeates the whole history philosophy. But for few
respected sceptics,
uprightness found anywhere. Finally,
breasts" have been the
no instinct for intellectual
? ? is to be
of of
of is
of
of
a of
a in
a
to
to
of of of
of
its
as
as a
In
4 4I3.
in of
of as
? THE WILL TO POWER.
332
Kant guilelessly sought to make this thinker's corruption scientific by means of his concept, "practical reason. " He expressly invented a reason which, in certain cases, would allow one
not to bother about reason--that is to say, in cases where the heart's desire, morality, or "duty" are
the motive power.
4 I5.
Hegel : his popular side, the doctrine of war
and of great men. Right is on the side of the
victorious: he (the victorious man) stands for the
progress of mankind. His is an attempt at
proving the dominion of morality by means of history.
Kant: a kingdom of moral values withdrawn from us, invisible, real.
Hegel: a demonstrable process of evolution,
the actualisation of the kingdom of morality.
We shall not allow ourselves to be deceived
either in Kant's or Hegel's way:--We no longer believe, as they did, in morality, and therefore have
no philosophies to found with the view of justify ing morality. Criticism and history have no
charm for us in this respect: what is their charm, then P
416.
The importance of German philosophy (Hegel),
the thinking out of a kind of pantheism which would not reckon evil, error, and suffering as
arguments against godliness. This grand initia tive was misused by the powers that were (State,
?
to
as a
a
to
of
to
to
in" of
to
of
is, in
a to
of
of
to
of
to
of a
to
i
? 312
THE WILL TO POWER.
D. A Criticism of the Words :
Improving, Perfecting, Elevating.
39 I.
The standard according to which the value o moral valuations is to be determined.
The fundamental fact that has been overlooked The contradiction between "becoming mor
moral" and the elevation and the strengthening of the type man.
Homo natura : The "will to power. "
392.
Moral values regarded as values of appearanc and compared with physiological values.
393.
Reflecting upon generalities is always retrograde
the ultimate "desiderata" concerning men, fo instance, have never been regarded as problem:
by philosophers. They always postulate "improvement" of man, quite guilelessly, as
though by means of some intuition they had beer helped over the note of interrogation following the question, why necessarily "improve"? To what extent is it desirable that man should be more virtuous, or more intelligent, or happieri
Granting that nobody yet knows the "wherefore? ' of mankind, all such desiderata have no sense whatever; and if one aspires to one of them--
? the
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
3I3
who knows? --perhaps one is frustrating the
other. Is an increase of virtue compatible with an increase of intelligence and insight? Dubito:
only too often shall I have occasion to show that
the reverse is true. Has virtue, as an end, in the
strict sense of the word, not always been opposed
to happiness hitherto? And again, does it not require misfortune, abstinence, and self-castigation
as a necessary means? And if the aim were to arrive at the highest insight, would it not therefore
be necessary to renounce all hope of an increase in happiness, and to choose danger, adventure,
mistrust, and seduction as a road to enlighten
ment? . . . And suppose one will have happiness;
maybe one should join the ranks of the "poor in spirit. "
394.
The wholesale deception and fraud of so-called moral improvement.
We do not believe that one man can be another
if he is not that other already--that is to say, if
he is not, as often happens, an accretion of person
alities or at least of parts of persons. In this
case it is possible to draw another set of actions
from him into the foreground, and to drive back
"the older man. " . . . The man's aspect is altered, but not his actual nature. . . . It is but the
merest factum brutum that any one should cease from performing certain actions, and the fact allows of the most varied interpretations. Neither
does it always follow therefrom that the habit of performing a certain action is entirely arrested,
? ? ? ? 314
THE WILL TO POWER.
nor that the reasons for that action are dissipated
He whose destiny and abilities make him a
criminal never unlearns anything, but is con tinually adding to his store of knowledge: and
long
talent. . . . Certainly, as far as society is con cerned, the only interesting fact is that some one
has ceased from performing certain actions; and
to this end society will often raise a man out of
those circumstances which make him able to per
form those actions: this is obviously a wiser course
than that of trying to break his destiny and his particular nature. The Church,--which has done
nothing except to take the place of, and to
appropriate, the philosophic treasures of antiquity,
--starting out from another standpoint and wishing
to secure a "soul" or the "salvation" of a soul,
believes in the expiatory power of punishment, as
also in the obliterating power of forgiveness: both
of which supposed processes are deceptions due to
religious prejudice--punishment expiates nothing,
forgiveness obliterates nothing; what is done can
not be undone. Because some one forgets some thing it by no means proves that something has
been wiped out. . . . An action leads to certain consequences, both in a man and outside him, and
it matters not whether it has met with punishment or whether it has been "expiated," "forgiven,'
or "obliterated," it matters not even if the Church
abstinence acts as a sort of tonic on his
? meanwhile canonises the man who
The Church believes things that do not
exist, believes "Souls"; believes "influences" that do not exist--in divine in
performed
? ? it. it
in
in it
in
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
3I 5
fluences; it believes in states that do not exist, in sin, redemption, and spiritual salvation: in all
things it stops at the surface and is satisfied with
signs, attitudes, words,
arbitrary interpretation. It possesses a method
of counterfeit psychology which is thought out quite systematically.
395.
"Illness makes men better," this famous
assumption which is to be met with in all ages,
and in the mouth of the wizard quite as often as
in the mouth and jaws of the people, really makes one ponder. In view of discovering
whether there is any truth in one might be
allowed ask whether there not perhaps
fundamental relationship between morality and
illness? Regarded whole, could not the
"improvement mankind"--that say, the unquestionable softening, humanising, and taming
which the European has undergone within the last two centuries--be regarded the result
long course secret and ghastly suffering, failure,
abstinence, and grief? Has illness made "Euro peans" "better"? Or, put into other words,
wherever history shows "man" state particular glory and power, his type always dangerous, impetuous, and boisterous, and cares
to which it lends an
? not our modern soft-hearted
which could be likened that the Chinese, perhaps expression physiological deteriora tion cannot be denied, for instance, that
European morality,
? ? is a of
is to
us
of a to
? . . .
an
to
It
of
of
of in
as
is it,
of
isa a
as
? 316
THE WILL TO POWER.
little for humanity; and perhaps, in those cases in which it seems otherwise, all that was required was the courage or subtlety to see sufficiently below the surface in psychological matters, in
order even in them to discover the general pro position: "the more healthy, strong, rich, fruitful and enterprising a man may feel, the more
immoral he will be as well. " A terrible thought, to
which one should on no account give way. Pro.
vided, however, that one take a few steps forward
with this thought, how wondrous does the future
then appear! What will then be paid for more dearly on earth, than precisely this very thing
which we are all trying to promote, by all means in our power--the humanising, the improving and the increased "civilisation" of man? Noth
ing would then be more expensive than virtue:
for by means of it the world would ultimately be
turned into a hospital : and the last conclusion of wisdom would be, "everybody must be everybody
else's nurse. " Then we should certainly have attained to the "Peace on earth," so long desired But how little "joy we should find in each other's company"! How little beauty, wanton spirits, daring, and danger | So few "actions"
mained fresh the memory men, and which have not been destroyed by time, been immoral
the deepest sense the word?
? which would make life on earth worth
Ah! and no longer any "deeds"! But have not the great things and deeds which have re
living
? ? in
all
in of
. . .
of
--
-
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
396.
317
? The priests--and with them the half-priests or
philosophers of all ages--have always called that
doctrine true, the educating influence of which was a benevolent one or at least seemed so--
that is to say, tended to "improve. " In this way they resemble an ingenuous plebeian empiric and
miracle-worker who, because he had tried a
certain poison as a cure, declared it to be no
poison. "By their fruits ye shall know them. "--
that is to say, "by our truths. " This has been the reasoning of priests until this day. They
have squandered their sagacity, with results that have been sufficiently fatal, in order to make the "proof of power" (or the proof "by the fruits")
pre-eminent and even supreme arbiter over all
other forms of proof. "That which makes good
must be good; that which is good cannot lie"-- these are their inexorable conclusions--"that
which bears good fruit must consequently be
true;
false step, a vice can refute. . . . This indecent form of opposition, which comes from below and
behind--the doglike kind of attack, has not died out either. Priests, as psychologists, never dis
covered anything more interesting than spying out
the secret vices of their adversaries--they prove their Christianity by looking about for the world's
? there is no other criterion of truth. " . . . But to the extent to which "improving" acts as an argument, deteriorating must also act as a refuta tion. The error can be shown to be an error, by examining the lives of those who represent it: a
? ? ? THE WILL TO POWER.
filth. They apply this principle more particu larly to the greatest on earth, to the geniuses readers will remember how Goethe has bee.
attacked on every conceivable occasion in Ger many (Klopstock and Herder were among th first to give a "good example" in this respect--
birds of a feather flock together).
397.
One must be very immoral in order to mak people moral by deeds. The moralist's means
deeds may be for anything else, but not the duties of moralist.
Morality bars may
318
the most terrible that have ever been
who has not the courage be an immoralist
the creatures
there are animal-tamers about who do not shrin
the use red-hot iron. This terrible
specie: struggle with the wild anima
an iron cage errors, man; he sick, emaciated ill-disposed towards himself, filled with loathin
the impulses life, filled with
all that beautiful and happy
he wandering monument
shall we ever succeed vindicating this phen
used;
? menagerie;
more useful than freedom, even
imprisons; also assumes tha from terrible means, and who are acquainted wit
which enters into called "priests. "
Man, incarcerated become caricature
assumes that iro
mistrust
life--in fac misery. Ho
? ? in
of in
sk
is a
of in
is
is
of
it a fit
of
is a
of
a
a
a
of ha
it
to it
beis a
fo
fo i h ar.
? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
319
menon--this artificial, arbitrary, and recent mis
carriage--the sinner--which the priests have bred on their territory?
In order to think fairly of morality, we must put two biological notions in its place: the taming of the wild beasts, and the rearing of a particular species.
* The priests of all ages have always pretended
that they wished to "improve. " . . . But we, of
another persuasion, would laugh if a lion-tamer
ever wished to speak to us of his "improved"
animals. As a rule, the taming of a beast is only
achieved by deteriorating it: even the moral man
is not a better man; he is rather a weaker
member of his species. But he is less harm ful. . . .
398.
What I want to make clear, with all the means in my power, is:
(a) That there is no worse confusion than that
which confounds rearing and taming: and these
two things have always been confused. . . .
Rearing, as I understand means hus banding the enormous powers humanity
such way that whole generations may build
upon the foundations laid by their progenitors-- not only outwardly, but inwardly, organically,
developing from the already existing stem and growing stronger.
.
? exceptional danger believing that mankind whole developing
(b) That there
? ? an as
a
it, is
is
of a of
. is .
in
in
a
? THE WILL TO POWER.
and growing stronger, if individuals are seen to
grow more feeble and more equally mediocre. Humanity--mankind--is an abstract thing: the
object of rearing, even in regard to the most
individual cases, can only be the strong man (the man who has no breeding is weak, dissipated,
and unstable).
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS CONCERNING THE CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
399.
These are the things I demand of you--how ever badly they may sound in your ears: that
320
? you subject
moral valuations themselves to
criticism. That you should put a stop to your
instinctive moral impulse--which in this case demands submission and not criticism--with the
question: "why precisely
submission? " That
this yearning for a "why? "--for a criticism of morality should not only be your present form of
morality, but the sublimest of all moralities, and
an honour to yourselves and to the age you live in. That your honesty, your will, may give an
account of itself, and not deceive you: "why not? "--Before what tribunal P
4OO.
The three postulates --
All that is ignoble is high (the protest of the "vulgar man").
All that is contrary to Nature is high (the protest of the physiologically botched).
? ? ? A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
32I
All that is of average worth is high (the pro
test of the herd, of the "mediocre").
Thus in the history of morality a will to power
finds expression, by means of which, either the slaves, the oppressed, the bungled and the botched,
phenomenon Morality is of a highly suspicious nature. Up to the present, morality has developed
at the cost of: the ruling classes and their specific |
those that suffer from themselves, or the mediocre, A/ attempt to make those valuations prevail which
favour their existence.
From a biological standpoint, therefore, the
i
instincts,
natures, the independent and privileged classes in all respects.
Morality, then, is a sort of counter-movement
opposing Nature's endeavours to arrive at a higher type. Its effects are: mistrust of life in general (in so far as tendencies are felt be immoral), --hostility towards the senses (inasmuch the
highest values are felt opposed the
the well - constituted and beautiful
? higher instincts)--Degeneration
tion "higher natures," because precisely them that the conflict becomes conscious.
4OI.
Which values have been paramount hitherto Morality the leading value all phases
philosophy (even with the Sceptics). Result: this
world no good, "true world" must exist somewhere.
What that here determines the highest VOL.
and self-destruc
? ? I.
it
is
as
of
its
is
a X
to be
| of \|ttit
in
it is
to
?
to as in
? THE WILL TO POWER.
322
value P What, in sooth, is morality?
The instinct of decadence; it is the exhausted and the dis inherited who take their revenge in this way and play the masters. . . .
Historical proof: philosophers have always been
decadents and always in the pay of Nihilistic religions.
The instinct of decadence appears as the will to power. The introduction of its system of means: its means are absolutely immoral.
General aspect: the values that have been
highest hitherto have been a special instance of the will to power; morality itself is a particular
instance of immorality.
sk
Why the Antagonistic Values always succumbed.
1. How was this actually possible? Question: why did life and physiological well-constitutedness
succumb everywhere? Why was there no affirma tive philosophy, no affirmative religion?
The historical signs of such movements: the pagan religion. Dionysos versus the Christ. The Renaissance. Art.
2. The strong and the weak: the healthy and the sick; the exception and the rule. There is no doubt as to who is the stronger. . . .
General view of history: Is man an exception in
the history of life on this account? --An objection to Darwinism. The means wherewith the weak suc
ceed in ruling have become: instincts, "humanity," "institutions. " . . .
3. The proof of this rule on the part of the
? ? ? -
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
* 323
weak is to be found in our political instincts, in our social values, in our arts, and in our science.
sk
The instincts of decadence have become master of the instincts of ascending life. . . . The will to nonentity has prevailed over the will to life!
Is this true? is there not perhaps a stronger guarantee of life and of the species in this victory
of the weak and the mediocre ? --is it not perhaps
only a means in the collective movement of life, a mere slackening of the pace, a protective measure
against something even more dangerous?
Suppose the strong were masters in all respects,
even in valuing: let us try and think what their attitude would be towards illness, suffering, and sacrifice! Self-contempt on the part of the weak would be the result: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate their kind. And
would this be desirable? --should we really like a world in which the subtlety, the consideration, the intellectuality, the plasticity--in fact, the whole
/\
influence of the weak--was lacking? " . . . sk
*TRANSLATOR's NOTE. --Werealise here the great differ
ence between Nietzsche and those who draw premature con clusions from Darwinism. There is no brutal solution of
modern problems in Nietzsche's philosophy. He did not // advocate anything so ridiculous as the total suppression of
the weak and the degenerate. What he wished to resist and
to overthrow was their supremacy, their excessive power. He
felt that there was a desirable and stronger type which was in need of having hopes, aspirations, and instincts upheld
defiance of Christian values.
------------" "
? ? ? ? in
its
? 324
THE WILL TO POWER.
We have seen two "wills to power" at war (in this special case we had a principle: that of agree
ing with the one that has hitherto succumbed, and of disagreeing with the one that has hitherto triumphed): we have recognised the "real world"
as a "world of lies," and morality as a form of immorality. We do not say "the stronger is wrong. "
We have understood what it is that has deter
mined the highest values hitherto, and why the
latter should have prevailed over the opposite value: it was numerically the stronger.
If we now purify the opposite value of the in fection, the half-heartedness, and the degeneration,
with which we identify we restore Nature the throne, free from moralic acid.
4O2.
Morality, useful error; or, more clearly still, necessary and expedient lie according the
? greatest and most impartial
4O3.
One ought be able
supporters.
acknowledge the truth sufficiently elevated
up that point where one
no longer require the disciplinary school moral
error. --When one judges life morally, One.
Neither should false personalities
one should not say, for instance, "Nature
disgusts
invented; cruel. "
precisely when one perceives that there
? ? It is
a
is
be
it
of is
to
no
to
to
to
to
a
is
of its
to
it,
-- -----
A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
2
-
- **, *,
? such central controlling and responsible force that one is relieved /
Evolution of man. A. He tried to attain to a certain power over Nature and over himself. (Morality was necessary in
order to make man triumph in his struggle with Nature and the "wild animal. ")
B. Ifpower over Nature has been attained, this power can be used as a help in our development: Will to Power as a self-enhancing and self-strengthening principle.
4O4.
Morality may be regarded as the illusion of
a species, fostered with the view of urging the individual to sacrifice himself to the future, and seemingly granting him such a very great value,
that with that self-consciousness he may tyrannise over, and constrain, other sides of his nature, and
find it difficult to be pleased with himself.
We ought to be most profoundly thankful for what morality has done hitherto: but now it is
no more than a burden which may prove fatal. Morality itself in the form of honesty urges us to deny morality.
4O5.
To what extent is the self-destruction of morality still a sign of its own strength? We Europeans
have within us the blood of those who were ready to die for their faith; we have taken morality
*- - -
? ? ? ? 326
THE WILL TO POWER.
frightfully seriously, and there is nothing which we have not, at one time, sacrificed to On the
other hand, our intellectual subtlety has been reached essentially through the vivisection our consciences. We do not yet know the "whither" towards which we are urging our steps, now that we have departed from the soil our forebears. But was this very soil that we acquired the strength which now driving
search adventure, and
strength that we are now
from our homes thanks that
by untried possibilities and things undiscovered-- we can no longer choose, we must conquerors, now that we have no land which we feel at home and which we would fain "survive. " A concealed "yea" driving forward, and stronger than all our "nays. " Even our strength
no longer bears with the old swampy land: we venture out into the open, we attempt the task. The world still rich and undiscovered, and even
mid-sea, surrounded
? perish
poisonous men. Our very strength itself urges
were better than half-men
take the sea; there where all suns have hitherto sunk we know of new world.
? ? a
us in
. . .
be
to
of
it.
us to
to
in
it
to
is
in
of is
on
to be
us
in
or
is
it is
of
in
it us is
? III.
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
I. GENERAL REMARKS.
4O6.
LET us rid ourselves of a few
? superstitions
among
Philosophers are prejudiced against appearance,
change, pain, death, the things of the body, the
senses, fate, bondage, and all that which has no purpose.
In the first place, they believe in: absolute knowledge, (2) in knowledge for own sake,
(3) virtue and happiness necessarily related,
(4) the recognisability men's acts. They are
led by instinctive determinations values, which former cultures are reflected (more danger ous cultures too).
408.
What have philosophers lacked (1) sense history, (2) knowledge physiology, (3)
which heretofore have been fashionable philosophers!
4O7.
? ? of
a
of
?
of
as
of A
its
a in
in in
? THE WILL TO POWER.
goal in the future. --The ability to criticise without irony or moral condemnation.
4O9.
have had (1) from times im memorial a wonderful capacity for the contradictio in adjecto, (2) they have always trusted concepts
as unconditionally as they have mistrusted the senses: it never seems to have occurred to them
that notions and words are our inheritance of past ages in which thinking was neither very clear nor very exact.
What seems to dawn upon philosophers last of all: that they must no longer allow themselves to be presented with concepts already conceived, nor must they merely purify and polish up those con
cepts; but they must first make them, create them,
themselves, and then present them and get people
to accept them. Up to the present, people have
trusted their concepts generally, as if they had
been a wonderful dowry from some kind of
wonderland: but they constitute the inheritance
of our most remote, most foolish, and most intelli
gent forefathers. This piety towards that which
already exists in us is perhaps related to the moral element in science. What we needed above all is
absolute scepticism towards all traditional concepts (like that which a certain philosopher may already have possessed--and he was Plato, of course: for he taught the reverse).
328
Philosophers
? ? ? ? CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY,
329
4 I. O.
Profoundly mistrustful towards the dogmas of the theory of knowledge, I liked to look now out of this window, now out of that, though I took good care not to become finally fixed anywhere, indeed I should have thought it dangerous to have done so--though finally: is it within the range of probabilities for an instrument to criticise its own fitness? What I noticed more particu larly was, that no scientific scepticism or dog
matism has ever arisen quite free from all arrie`res pense? es--that it has only a secondary value as
soon as the motive lying immediately behind it is discovered.
Fundamental aspect: Kant's, Hegel's, Schopen
hauer's, the sceptical and epochistical, the histori
fying and the pessimistic attitudes--all have a moral origin. I have found no one who has
dared to criticise the moral valuations, and I soon turned my back upon the meagre attempts that have been made to describe the evolution of these
feelings (by English and German Darwinians). How can Spinoza's position, his denial and repudiation of the moral values, be explained ?
(It was the result of his Theodicy I)
4 II.
Morality regarded as the highest form of
must be in the highest degree perfect (Leibnitz's
? protection. --Our
world is either the work and expression (the modus) of God, in which case it
? ? ? 330
THE WILL TO POWER.
conclusion . . . ),--and no one doubted that he
knew what perfection must be like,--and then all evil can only be apparent (Spinoza is more radical,
he says this of good and evil), or it must be a part of God's high purpose (a consequence of a particu
larly great mark of favour on God's part, who thus
allows man to choose between good and evil: the privilege of being no automaton; "freedom," with
the ever-present danger of making a mistake and of choosing wrongly. . . . See Simplicius, for instance, in the commentary to Epictetus).
Or our world is imperfect; evil and guilt are real, determined, and are absolutely inherent to
its being; in that case it cannot be the real world: consequently knowledge can only be a
way of denying the world, for the latter is error
which may be recognised as such. This is Schopenhauer's opinion, based upon Kantian
first principles. Pascal was still more desperate: he thought that even knowledge must be corrupt
and false--that revelation is a necessity if only
in order to recognise that the world should be denied. . . .
4 I 2.
Owing to our habit of believing in uncondi tional authorities, we have grown to feel a profound need for them: indeed, this feeling is
so strong that, even in an age of criticism such as Kant's was, it showed itself to be superior to the need for criticism, and, in a certain sense, was able to subject the whole work of critical acumen,
? and to convert it to own use.
proved
? ? its
It its
? 33 I
superiority once more in the generation which followed, and which, owing to its historical
instincts, naturally felt itself drawn to a relative
view of all authority, when it converted even the Hegelian philosophy of evolution (history re
christened and called philosophy) to own use, and represented history being the self-revela
tion and self-surpassing moral ideas. Since
Plato, philosophy has lain under the dominion morality. Even Plato's predecessors, moral
interpretations play most important ro^le (Anaxi
mander declares that all things are made perish punishment for their departure from pure
being; Heraclitus thinks that the regularity phenomena proof the morally correct
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
? character evolution
general).
The progress philosophy has been hindered
most seriously hitherto through the influence moral arrie`res-pense? es.
I4.
all ages, "fine feelings" have been regarded
arguments, "heaving
bellows godliness, convictions have been the
"criteria" truth, and the need opposition
has been the note interrogation affixed
wisdom. This falseness and fraud permeates the whole history philosophy. But for few
respected sceptics,
uprightness found anywhere. Finally,
breasts" have been the
no instinct for intellectual
? ? is to be
of of
of is
of
of
a of
a in
a
to
to
of of of
of
its
as
as a
In
4 4I3.
in of
of as
? THE WILL TO POWER.
332
Kant guilelessly sought to make this thinker's corruption scientific by means of his concept, "practical reason. " He expressly invented a reason which, in certain cases, would allow one
not to bother about reason--that is to say, in cases where the heart's desire, morality, or "duty" are
the motive power.
4 I5.
Hegel : his popular side, the doctrine of war
and of great men. Right is on the side of the
victorious: he (the victorious man) stands for the
progress of mankind. His is an attempt at
proving the dominion of morality by means of history.
Kant: a kingdom of moral values withdrawn from us, invisible, real.
Hegel: a demonstrable process of evolution,
the actualisation of the kingdom of morality.
We shall not allow ourselves to be deceived
either in Kant's or Hegel's way:--We no longer believe, as they did, in morality, and therefore have
no philosophies to found with the view of justify ing morality. Criticism and history have no
charm for us in this respect: what is their charm, then P
416.
The importance of German philosophy (Hegel),
the thinking out of a kind of pantheism which would not reckon evil, error, and suffering as
arguments against godliness. This grand initia tive was misused by the powers that were (State,
?
