Second, Taylor's Principles high- lights the limitations to the exercise of disciplinary power by attesting that disciplinary
practices
bound up with the application of scientific management are deeply contested.
Foucault-Key-Concepts
), then your choices can be explained by a "juridico-discursive" account: a prohibi- tory, discursive law specified what you could or could not wear.
Within those rules, on that view, your choices were presumably made without external interference.
But when we look more closely, this view is not correct: a number of other, "capillary" (your friends) and "macro" (fashion) as well as extra-legal power relations have almost certainly shaped your choices of what to wear.
Foucault's own theory of power is meant to replace these "juridico-discursive" accounts:
It is this image that we must break free of, that is, of the theoreti- cal privilege of law and sovereignty, if we wish to analyze power within the concrete and historical framework of its operation. We must construct an analytics of power that no longer takes law as a model and a code. (Ibid. : 90)
A Foucauldian view of power
It is time now for us to turn to this constructive task, and begin to articulate Foucault's own positive understanding of power. Foucault's self-described task is to use empirical analyses to discover a new theory
18
FOU CAULT'S THEORY O F POWER
of power, which will in turn provide a new framework for (and the hypotheses to be tested in) subsequent historical analyses (Foucault 1990a: 90-91). He begins:
It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as [1] the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as [2] the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confron- tations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as [3] the sup- port which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and con- tradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as [4] the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies.
(Ibid. : 92-3 , my numerals)
There is much to unpack in this sentence. The bracketed numbers indicate four principal aspects of Foucault's initial definition. We have a set of "force relations", processes by which these relations are trans- formed, systems or disjunctions that are constituted by the interplay of these force relations, and larger strategies (or "terminal forms") with general and institutional characteristics that emerge from these rela- tions, processes and systems. He begins at the micro-level, looking at local relations of force rather than at the macro-level of hegemonies and states, which can only be fully understood as functions of the local relations. In other words, Foucault begins with individuals' behaviours and interactions ("local relations" like academic transcripts, or choices of what to wear), to see how larger patterns, and eventually national norms or regulations, grow out of them.
First, then, power must be understood at the micro-level as relations of force. Foucault is unambiguous on this point: "It is in this sphere of force relations that we must try to analyze the mechanisms of power" (ibid. : 97). But what are these "force relations" at the basis of power? With this term, Foucault makes an explicit analogy to physics; he refers on numerous occasions, for example, to the "micro-physics of power" (1979: 26; 1990a: 16). 6 Force relations seem to be the basic unit, the undefined or given, in this approach to power. Very broadly, force rela- tions consist of whatever in one's social interactions that pushes, urges or compels one to do something.
We can use the analogy to help us understand this notion of force relations as the basic unit of power. In Newtonian physics, force is
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MICHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
defined as mass times acceleration. Force is thus the extent to which a body will be put into motion: larger objects (greater mass) will require a greater force to begin moving; a greater force will also be necessary to make an object move more quickly (greater acceleration). The impor- tant point here is that "force" is whatever serves to put an object into motion, regardless of the origin or source of that force. Force may be introduced by gravity, magnetism, or some other means. Its action thus can be described independently of any particular agent or object as the "creator" of that force. Analogously, Foucault speaks of power relations in terms of force relations without reference to a source or agent. This suggests that Foucault does not mean to imply that individuals cannot act as agents within power relations, but rather to draw our attention, especially for methodological reasons, to the force relations as such rather than to agents or actors. Closer examination of the characteristics of these force relations should help to make this clearer.
To recall, Foucault began with the claim that "power must be under- stood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization" (1990a: 92). Three features of these force relations are thus delineated, as follows.
First, that there is a multiplicity means that we will find many dif- ferent relations of force, intersecting and overlapping, in our social interactions. What is more, this multiplicity suggests that these force relations will not all be of the same quality or kind: there will be mul- tiple sorts of force relations, which may have different particular char- acteristics or impacts. To draw on the analogy to physics again, we could say that different forces will be present in the same field, as are gravity and magnetism, and that some of these forces will be stronger than others, and some stronger in certain contexts but not in others. To make this more concrete, recall (or imagine) yourself as a high school student, and consider what you chose to wear to school each day. You probably considered a number of different perspectives - or relations of force: what will my best friends say? Will a certain special someone think I look "cool" or "geeky" if she or he sees me in this? (Indeed, what constitutes "cool" or "geeky" is defined through mul- tiple overlapping relations. ) What "group" (the "popular" set, jocks, brains, punks, skaters, etc. ) does dressing like this put me in? Is it fash- ionable? What will my parents and teachers think? Is it in accord with the school's official dress code ? Most or all of these questions probably influenced your choice - whether you aimed to please or annoy any particular one of these groups - and they represent the very different, but intersecting relations within which you decide what to wear.
20
FOU CAULT'S THEORY O F POWER
What sort of presence do these relations have then? The second fea- ture delineated in this description is that force relations are "immanent in the sphere in which they operate". That these relations are "immanent" means that they exist only within a certain domain or discourse. In other words, they are not concrete, like bodies, but incorporeal, like the laws of physics. They are nevertheless genuinely present - and, like laws, their presence can be felt in very concrete ways. The analogy to physics is again useful here. As physical bodies interact, they exert relations of gravity, magnetism and so on upon each other. Similarly, social interac- tions are constantly permeated by these relations of force, power rela- tions. Foucault thus describes force relations as a "substrate" : "it is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable" (ibid. : 93 ) . He notes in the 1976 College de France course that "power is never anything more than a relationship that can, and must, be studied only by looking at the interplay of the terms of the relation- ship" (2006a: 168). 7 This means that power relations are not outside but rather "immanent in" other kinds (economic, knowledge, sexual) of rela- tionships (1990a: 94). So "power is not an institution [or] a structure", nor an individual capacity, but rather a complex arrangement of forces in society (ibid. : 93). Excepting an explicit dress code, none of the ques- tions we asked above about what to wear could be answered institution- ally, but they all have a significant impact on your status in school. And we are all quite aware of them, at least implicitly. Your choices of what to wear thus reveal "a complex strategical situation [how you want to be perceived by various groups] in a particular society [your school] " . And so your self-presentation has been shaped by power relations. This has an important corollary: power is omnipresent (as discussed above) "because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere" (ibid. : 93 ) . It even shapes our choices of how to dress on a daily basis.
So there is a multiplicity of force relations, which are immanent in social interactions. The third feature in this initial characterization is that these force relations "constitute their own organization". On the one hand, these force relations "are the immediate effects of the divi- sions, inequalities, and disequilibriums which occur in [other types of relationships] " (ibid. : 94) . But on the other hand,
If in fact [force relations] are intelligible, this is not because they are the effect of another instance that "explains" them, but rather because they are imbued, through and through, with calculation:
? 21
M I CHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives. (Ibid. : 94-5)
Each school has its own distribution of social groups or cliques, with inequalities and occasionally shifting alliances. These calculations, these aims and objectives, which Foucault will refer to as tactics and strategy, constitute the internal organization of power relations.
Several other propositions also emerge from this core understand- ing of power. Foucault delineates five. First, since power emerges in relationships and interactions, power is not possessed, but exercised. "It is not the 'privilege,' acquired or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions" (ibid. : 26). At stake here are two competing models of power: one based on a contract (pos- session), the other based on perpetual battle (strategies or war). As he notes in Discipline and Punish, his analysis of power "presupposes that the power exercised on the body is conceived not as a property, but as a strategy . . . that one should take as its model a perpetual battle rather than a contract regulating a transaction or the conquest of a territory" (1979: 26). Second, reiterating the point about immanence, power relations are not exterior to other relations.
Third, "power comes from below; that is, there is no binary and all- encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations and serving as a general matrix" (1990a: 94). So power is not reducible to a binary relationship (we cannot reduce all sorts of power to one model); furthermore, power comes from below (as discussed above, a multiplicity of power relations exist; power emerges from a variety of overlapping and intertwined relationships rather than from a sovereign individual).
That power comes from below means we cannot best understand power by looking at monarchies or states, at the top of any chain of command. Rather, we must look at the complex webs of interwoven relationships : what Foucault calls the "microphysics" of power (1979 : 26). Power develops in the first instance in specific, local, individual choices, behaviours and interactions. These combine in myriad ways to constitute larger social patterns, and eventually yield macroforms, which one typically thinks of when one thinks about "power" (socie- ties, states, kings) - just as everyday objects are constituted by atoms and molecules. We thus have a micro-level of individuals (disciplinary techniques of the body) and a macro-level of populations (biopolitics).
Fourth of the five propositions that emerge from Foucault's concep- tion of power is that "power relations are both intentional and nonsub- jective" (1990a: 94). This juxtaposition is, frankly, puzzling, and this
22
FOU CAULT'S THEORY O F POWER
claim has led to a fair amount of misunderstanding about Foucault's analysis. First, power is intentional: power relations are "imbued, through and through, with calculation: there is no power that is exer- cised without a series of aims and objectives" (ibid. : 95). What you wear says much about you, and your status at school - not to mention your broader socioeconomic status (not everyone can afford designer labels) -and you have intentionally chosen to communicate a number of mes- sages with your clothing. Foucault refers to these aims and objectives as "tactics" and "strategies", and notes that these are what constitute its "rationality". But power, he insists here, is also nonsubjective: "But this does not mean that it results from the choice or decision of an individual subject" (ibid. : 95). Nor, he continues, can it be located in groups such as economic decision makers, governing castes or the state apparatus. No one student, or social caste, or administrator can control what will be "cool" or "loser". Indeed, what is "cool" today could be "out" tomor- row, and an out-group can rise in prestige (or vice versa).
The problem here, the apparent paradox, is that according to Foucault's description, power has to be exercised by someone or some- thing, but if it is nonsubjective, there cannot be a "someone" exercising that power. Foucault seems to be erasing agency ? individuals' capacity to choose and act for themselves ? or rather, locating this capacity to act in a noncorporeal "power" rather than in individuals and institutions. It is as if "power", not you, decides what you are wearing today. I think this problem can be resolved with two observations. First, part of his point here is that the effects of the exercise of power reach beyond any individual's (or group's) intentions or control. As we have already seen, Foucault is arguing against the view that "the state" acts as a monolith, and he is arguing for the importance of micro-events, with their rip- ples and interactions, in order to understand macro-phenomena. This means that local actions often have unintended macro-consequences, and that one's control of macro-processes will always be limited and incomplete. Macro-phenomena result from the concatenation of many micro-events, but they are not the direct result of any particular individual action or choice. This is, then, an argument for a system- level, rather than individual-level, understanding of power relations. Foucault's distinction between tactics and strategy parallels this micro/ macro distinction. Tactics are local, micro (individual choices about what to wear today); and strategies are macro, systemic (school- or culture-wide understandings of "cool" and "uncool").
The second observation to be made here is a logical one. To under- stand subjectivity as constituted (in part) through power relations is not to deny that subjects can act intentionally. You still choose what you'll
? 23
MICHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
wear each day, even if those choices are conditioned and limited by the "strategical situation" in which you find yourself. Given this problem, the status of subjectivity will become a focal point of Foucault's investi- gations in later years. It is an important point, because one of the funda- mental questions for ethical action has to do with the individual's ability to make decisions that are not "merely" determined by the relations of power in which they emerge - in other words, a question of freedom.
This question may in fact lie at the heart of readers' varied reactions to Foucault's analyses. Those who understand the claim that individuals are constituted by power relations to constitute a denial of freedom find his vision to be bleak. Those of us, on the other hand, who find in his analyses the tools with which to increase our self-awareness, and hence our own freedom, hear wellsprings of hope in his discussion of the con- tinuous transformations of power through history. (Understanding how "cool" comes to be defined and how certain groups are "cooler" than others, one can - perhaps even through one's choice of clothes - begin to break free of or even redefine these categories and groups. ) At a mini- mum, on the latter view, if power relations are in fact best understood as a necessarily ongoing battle, then the battle is never utterly lost.
Indeed, Foucault seems to anticipate this objection, this worry about freedom, in the fifth of five propositions that he discusses here. Power is always accompanied by resistance; resistance is in fact a fundamental structural feature of power: "Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power" (1990a: 95). Without resistance, without two bodies (or minds) pushing or pulling against each other, there is no power relation. And through resistance, power relations can always be altered.
This fifth point encapsulates each of the preceding four. Power is exercised (first proposition) in the very interplay of force and resistance; this interplay is present in all social interactions (second proposition); force and resistance are manifest even in micro-interactions between individuals as well as states (third proposition); and while each person may choose to apply force or resist, the ultimate outcome of the relation cannot be controlled by one party (power is intentional and nonsubjec- tive - fourth proposition).
On the role of resistance in constituting power, Foucault's position will not change. In a 1984 interview, for example, Foucault reiterates that "in the relations of power, there is necessarily the possibility of resistance, for if there were no possibility of resistance - of violent resistance, of escape, of ruse, of strategies that reverse the situation - there would be no relations of power" (1994: 12). He adds that "there
24
FOU CAULT'S THEORY O F POWER
cannot be relations of power unless the subjects are free . . . [I]f there are relations of power throughout every social field it is because there is freedom everywhere" (ibid. : 12) .
Let us stop for a moment and recall where we are in the discussion. We began this section with a long quotation, in which Foucault identi- fied four principal aspects of power. 8 Our discussion so far has focused on explicating only the first of these, that power consists of multiple force relations. (We have covered a good deal of ground along the way. Indeed, we have implicitly addressed the other three aspects of power. )
The second aspect that Foucault identifies here is that these force relations are processes, not static, and are constantly being transformed. These transformations take the form of ceaseless struggles and con- frontations - between the original force and its accompanying resist- ance - and sometimes strengthen the power relations, but sometimes weaken or reverse it. These processes also produce a number of interre- lationships and systems, as various power relations reinforce or under- mine each other (third aspect). Here Foucault introduces a distinction between tactics and strategy: tactics are the local rationalities of power in particular cases; strategies, on the other hand, are the larger systemic or global patterns of power. And (fourth aspect) these strategies are built out of combinations and concatenations of those local tactics.
[T]he rationality of power is characterized by tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted level where they are inscribed . . . tactics which, becoming connected to one another, attracting and propagating one another, but finding their base of support and their condition elsewhere, end by forming comprehensive systems. (1990a: 95)
These comprehensive systems, or strategies, constitute "institutional crystallizations" out of the interaction and combination of locally fluid power relations, and become recognizable terminal forms like the state and the other types he enumerated.
The movement of Foucault's analysis here is from the micro-level to the macro, from the molecular to the everyday - from (1) specific, individual force relations through (2) their processes of transforma- tion and (3) the networks or systems that their interplay produces, to (4) their larger, strategic manifestations in the state, the law and other hegemonies, such as ownership of the means of production. In the end-forms that Foucault identifies here, we should recognize the three traditions of analysis that Foucault earlier criticized as partial and inade- quate(liberalism,psychoanalysis,Marxism). Eventhougheachofthese
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MICHEL FOU CAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
strategies may be one-dimensional, the networks of power taken in sum are multi-dimensional and cannot be reduced to only one strategic mode, "juridico-discursive" or otherwise. Foucault's point is that while they may have adequately described some particular strategy (or termi- nal form) of power, each approach fails to grasp the fundamental form or operation of power at the molecular level. But as Foucault reminds us again, analysis of power must begin not with these end-forms, but with "the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power" (ibid. : 93). Observing power in its local and peripheral effects provides a new viewpoint from which to begin a study of power, and will thus entail a new methodo- logical approach: the theory of power that we have just outlined.
An ongoing project
To review, we have unpacked a dozen or so dense pages at the heart of La Valonte de Savoir. What we have discussed provides only a basic framework: a set of theoretical presuppositions that constitutes the heart of Foucault's theory of power. There are important elements of this theory that we have not discussed, and many aspects of Foucault's analysis of power would continue to evolve over the next decade, as Foucault's ongoing self-critique continued. This basic framework, how- ever, is consistent throughout the theory's subsequent development and elaboration.
Notes
1. Special thanks to David Cylkowski, Stacy Klingler and Dianna Taylor for their very thoughtful responses to earlier versions of this essay.
2. The French original is at Foucault (1976: 120): "en se dormant une autre theorie du pouvoir".
3. These are not necessarily the same relationships.
4. Lynch ( 1 9 9 8 ) gives a fuller discussion of Foucault's view of the omnipresence
of power.
5. For more on this shift, see Lynch (2009).
6. Wemustbecarefulnottomaketoomuchoftheanalogytophysics;Idonot
think, for example, that Foucault means that analysis of social relations should be reduced to equations of force relations. Given this caution, however, we can note certain implications of the analogy.
7. In this passage, Foucault is making an observation about Henri de Boulainvil- liers' eighteenth-century history of France. But his point here, in fact, speaks to Foucault's own methodology.
8. On page 19, above.
26
TWO
Disciplinary power
Marcelo Hoffman
Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish: The Birth ofthe Prison, pub- lished in 1975, contains his most famous and elaborate exposition of disciplinary power. A bird's-eye view of his preceding and succeed- ing analyses reveals, however, that this concept arose in overlapping stages and served a variety of purposes. From roughly 1973 to 1976, in analyses of punishment, proto-psychiatry, criminology and race war, Foucault attempted to articulate disciplinary power in contradistinction to sovereign power. From about 1976 to 1979, he used disciplinary power as a springboard for delineating modalities of power concerned with population, namely, biopolitics, security and governmentality. Finally, in the early 19 8 0 s disciplinary power figured more as an implicit background to his analyses of subjectivity in Greco-Roman antiquity and early Christianity. The long shadow cast by this concept renders it absolutely crucial to understanding the trajectory of Foucault's thought.
Using a composite account of disciplinary power drawn from Foucault's seminal presentation in Discipline and Punish as well as his College de France course for the academic year 1973-74, Psychiatric Power, I will provide an overview of disciplinary power and then exem- plify the exercise of this power through Frederick Winslow Taylor's The Principles ofScientific Management, published in 1911. Taylor's Principles, which influenced American and European industrialists as well as Lenin and Antonio Gramsci, enriches our understanding of disciplinary power in two ways. First, the presentation of scientific management at the core of Principles reflects nothing short of a full- fledged disciplinary programme. Indeed, it is hard to read a page of Principles without noticing that Taylor suffuses his presentation with
? 27
MICHEL FOU CAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
a thoroughly disciplinary aspiration.
Second, Taylor's Principles high- lights the limitations to the exercise of disciplinary power by attesting that disciplinary practices bound up with the application of scientific management are deeply contested. Taylor thus de-naturalizes this form of power even as he seeks to extend its reach not only within factories, but also within "all social activities", including the management of homes, farms, businesses, churches, charities, universities and govern- mental agencies (F. W Taylor 1967: 8).
Subjected individuals
The concept of disciplinary power concerns individuals. As Foucault notes with reference to what he takes to be the ideal exercise of this power, "We are never dealing with a mass, with a group, or even, to tell the truth, with a multiplicity: we are only ever dealing with individuals" (2006a: 75, emphasis added). However, in opposition to political theories which take the individual as a given for the purpose of constructing sovereignty, as in the notable case of Thomas Hobbes's version of the social contract, Foucault sets about showing that the individual first and foremost amounts to a construction of disciplinary power. The individual is an effect of this form of power rather than the raw material upon which it impinges. Foucault writes, "Discipline 'makes' individuals; it is the specific techniques of a power that regards individuals as objects and as instruments of its exercise" (1979 : 170). As a first approximation, we can therefore say that disciplinary power produces individuals as its objects, objectives and instruments.
Disciplinary power yields such effects by targeting bodies. The tar- geting of bodies may not seem terribly unique, especially in light of Foucault's sweeping assertion that "what is essential in all power is that ultimately its point of application is always the body" (2006a: 14, emphasis added). It seems even less singular in light of his sugges- tion that pastoral power treats the body as an object of care (2007: 126-8) and that even sovereign power sets its sights on the body as an object of violence or honour (2006a: 44-5). However, what dis- tinguishes disciplinary power from these other modalities of power is its endeavour to meticulously, exhaustively and continuously control the activities of bodies so as to constitute them as bearers of a highly particular relationship between utility and docility, whereby increases in utility correspond to increases in docility and vice versa. In Foucault's words, disciplinary power strives to make the body "more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely" (1979: 138). This increase
28
DIS CIPLINARY POWER
entails the augmentation of the skills and aptitudes of bodies without at the same time allowing these skills and aptitudes to serve as a source of resistance to disciplinary power. This form of power thereby attempts to resolve the problem of the resistances aroused from its own incessant investments in the body. Disciplinary power controls the body to effec- tuate this result through the production not only of an individual but also of individuality, the amalgam of qualities that render an individual distinct from others (Arendt 1985: 454). This individuality consists of cellular, organic, genetic and combinatory traits. Let us now outline the production of these traits.
Foucault insists that disciplinary power creates a cellular form of individuality by ordering individuals in space. He calls this ordering "the art of distributions". Cellular individuality rests on the division of individuals from others. The art of distributions produces this individu- ality by first of all enclosing a space different from all others through the use of walls or gates, as in the case of barracks and factories (Foucault 1979: 141-3). It partitions this space into individual cells in order to break up collective activities that deter from the goal of utility, such as desertion or vagabondage. The art of distributions also codes a space with specific functions to make it as useful as possible (ibid. : 143-5). As an example of this coding, Foucault refers to the production of printed fabrics at the Oberkampf manufactory atJouy. The workshops at the manufactory were divided into operations "for the printers, the handlers, the colourists, the women who touched up the design, the engravers, the dyers" (ibid. : 145 ) . Each worker occupied a space defined by his or her specific function within the overall production process. Lastly, the art of distributions creates a cellular individuality by ascrib- ing the unit of rank to individuals. As an example of rank, Foucault discusses the seating of pupils in a classroom according to their age, grade and behaviour (ibid. : 146-7).
Within this enclosed space, disciplinary power produces an organic individuality by exerting a control over bodily activities. This individu- ality is "organic" in so far as it lends itself to disciplinary practices all on its own, as if spontaneously and naturally (ibid. : 155--6). The control of bodily activities realizes this organic individuality first of all through a temporal enclosure afforded by the use of timetables, which prevent idleness by partitioning activities into minutes and seconds (ibid. : 15 0- 51) . The control of activities also breaks down movements of the body into an ever-greater number of acts and indexes these acts to temporal imperatives. Foucault identifies the prescription of the duration and length of the steps of marching soldiers as an example of this temporal elaboration of the act (ibid. : 151-2). The control of activities further
? ? ? 29
MICHEL FOU CAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
implies a relationship between the general position of the body and its gestures. In this regard, Foucault mentions the example of the upright posture of pupils and the correct positioning of their elbows, chins, hands, legs, fingers and stomachs as the conditions for good handwrit- ing (ibid. ). The control of activities goes even further, correlating the gestures of the body to the parts of the object used by it, as in the case of manifold gestures employed by a soldier to manipulate the barrel, butt, trigger-guard, notch, moulding, lock, screw and hammer of a rifle (ibid. : 15 3 ) . Finally, rather than merely preventing idleness, the control of activities forges an organic individuality by exhaustively using time.
With the activities of the body controlled, disciplinary power pro- ceeds to constitute a genetic form of individuality by subjecting the body to the demand for a perpetual progress towards an optimal end. Foucaultdubsthisdemandthe"organizationofgeneses". Drawingfrom the example of the military, he submits that perpetual progress towards an end yields a genetic individuality in the following ways : first, through the division of time into distinct segments, such as periods of practice and training; second, through the organization of these segments into a plan proceeding from the simplest elements, such as the positioning of the fingers in military exercise; third, through the ascription of an end to these segments in the form of an exam; and, finally, through the production of a series that assigns exercises to each individual according to rank (ibid. : 157-9).
Finally, disciplinary power establishes a combinatory form of indi- viduality characterized by articulations with other bodies to obtain a level of efficiency greater than that realized by the mere sum of the activities of these bodies (ibid. : 167). Foucault calls this process the composition of forces. This composition gives rise to a combinatory individuality by first treating individual bodies as mobile elements to be connected to other individual bodies as well as the totality of bodies; second, by coordinating the time of each of these bodies to maximize the extraction of their forces and to combine them with others for the optimal results; and, lastly, by commands that may be transmitted through signs and that therefore need not be verbalized, much less explained (ibid. : 164-7).
We now know how disciplinary power works and what it produces. It works by distributing individuals, controlling activities, organizing geneses and composing forces, and these functions correspond to the production ofcellular, organic, genetic and combinatory individualities, respectively. Yet, at the risk of drawing too fine a distinction, Foucault goes further in his analysis to impart a sharp sense of how disciplinary power gets going and keepsgoing. He attributes the success of this power
30
DISCIPL I N ARY POWER
to several basic techniques: hierarchical observation, normalizing judge- ment and the examination.
If architecture figures within the art of distributions as a means of ordering multiplicities into cellular individuals, it plays the role within hierarchical observation of rendering individuals visible with the overall effect of structuring their behaviour. In making individuals seeable, architecture serves, as Foucault writes, "to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them" (ibid. : 172). Still, he suggests that outside of any ideal schema, architecture alone falls short of making visibility constant. What makes this visibility perpetual is the implementation of a hierarchical network within the group of individuals who occupy a particular architectural space. Foucault offers many examples of these networks. While we will not dwell on them here (we have an opportunity to gauge their presence in Taylor's Prin- ciples), it is instructive to mention briefly one particularly rich example. Foucault suggests that surveillance operated in the asylum in the early nineteenth century not only through a doctor but also through super- visors who reported on patients, and servants who feigned servitude to patients while gathering and transmitting information about them to the doctor (2006a: 4-6). This example clearly demonstrates the communication of the gaze from the top to the bottom, its manifestly "hierarchical" character. Yet, Foucault is keen to remind us that the gaze may operate in a more multi-directional manner to the point of bearing on the supervisors themselves.
Although surveillance rests on individuals, its functioning is that of a network of relations from top to bottom, but also to a certain extent from bottom to top and laterally; this network "holds" the whole together and traverses it in its entirety with effects of power that derive from one another: supervisors, perpetually supervised. (1979: 176-7)
Such a dense network of vigilant and multi-directional gazes no doubt causes disciplinary power to appear ubiquitous, but the sheer simplicity of its mechanism also makes it seem rather inconspicuous (ibid. : 177).
In a disciplinary world, however, it is not enough to see bodies so as to yield from them specific effects. One must be able to judge them as well. This modality of power therefore depends on normalizing judgement for its continued exercise. Foucault indicates that this form of judgement consists of features that make it look quite different from judgement in, for example, criminal courts. These features are summed
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M I CHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
up in terms of the following forms of punishment: first, even minute departures from correct behaviour are punished; second, failure to adhere to rules established on the basis of regularities observed over time is punished; third, exercise is used specifically as a corrective punishment; fourth, gratification is used in addition to punishment for the purposes of establishing a hierarchy of good and bad subjects; and, finally, rank understood as the place occupied in this hierarchy is used as a form punishment or reward (ibid. : 177-8 3 ) . What ultimately stands out here for Foucault is the concept of the norm. Disciplinary power judges according to the norm. By "norm", however, it should be obvious that Foucault has in mind something other than a strictly legal concept. He depicts the norm as a standard of behaviour that allows for the measurement of forms of behaviour as "normal" or "abnormal". In his words, "the norm introduces, as a useful imperative and as a result of measurement, all the shading of individual differences". The norm thus establishes the figure of the "normal" as a "principle of coercion" for the figure of the "abnormal" (ibid. : 184).
The examination combines the techniques of hierarchical observa- tion and normalizing judgement in "a normalizing gaze" to lend further sustenance to the exercise of disciplinary power (ibid. ). This gaze, as Foucault points out in a splendidly economical formula, "manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectifi- cation of those who are subjected" (ibid. : 184-5). Put differently, the examination binds the exercise of disciplinary power to the formation of a disciplinary knowledge. It does so in several ways. First of all, the examination facilitates the exercise of disciplinary power by objectifying subjects through observation. As Foucault posits, "Disciplinary power manifests its potency, essentially, by arranging objects. The examination is, as it were, the ceremony of this objectification" (ibid. : 187). In this regard, he mentions the first military review of Louis XIV as a form of examination yielding the objectification of subjects. This review subjected 18,000 soldiers to the gaze of a barely visible sovereign who commanded their exercises (ibid. : 188). Second, the examination con- stitutes individuality through an administrative form of writing that leaves behind a dense layer of documents, as in the examples of medical records and student records. This writing makes it possible to describe individuals as objects and track their development, or lack thereof, as well as to monitor through comparison phenomena within the larger aggregate of population (ibid. : 189-91). Finally, the accumulation of documents through the examination forges the individual as a case defined in terms of a status bound up with all of the "measurements", "gaps" and '"marks"' characteristic of disciplinary power (ibid. : 192).
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DISCIPLINARY POWER
In historical terms, Foucault sketches the shift from a society (prior to the sixteenth century) in which disciplinary power played a marginal but critical and innovative role from within the confines of religious communities to a society (beginning in the eighteenth century) in which it played a preponderant role from a myriad of institutions. In this sketch, disciplinary power spread initially through several "points of support" (2006a: 66) with religious underpinnings, such as the educa- tion of youth inspired by the ascetic ideal embraced by the Brethren of the Common Life with its focus on progressive stages of education, rules of seclusion, submission to a guide and military organization; coloniza- tion as practised by the Jesuits in the Guarani republic of Paraguay with its emphasis on the full employment of time, permanent supervision and the cellular constitution of families; and, lastly, the confinement of marginal elements of the population under the management of religious orders. From these peripheral positions, disciplinary power began to cover more spheres of society without any religious backing, appearing in the army by the end of the seventeenth century and working class by the eighteenth century (ibid. : 66-71).
Foucault maintains that this formidable extension of disciplinary power across the surface of society reflected a deeper ensemble oftrans- formations. First, disciplinary power began to function as a technique more for the constitution of useful individuals than for the prevention of desertion, idleness, theft and other problems. Second, disciplinary mechanisms began to extend beyond their institutional parameters to yield lateral effects. In this regard, Foucault mentions the quite fascinat- ing example of schools using information gathered from students to monitor parental behaviour. Lastly, disciplinary power began to bear on society as a whole through the organization of a police apparatus concerned with intricacies of individual behaviour (1979: 210-16).
These transformations were bound up in their turn with broad his- torical processes in economic, juridical and scientific domains. The gen- eralization of disciplinary power took place against the background of the eighteenth-century problem of indexing the rapid growth in popula- tion to the rapid growth in production apparatuses (ibid. : 218-20). It attempted to resolve this problem by offering a means of administering the growth in the number of human beings and making them useful. The generalization of disciplinary power also entailed consequences for the juridical system, introducing asymmetries that vitiated the egalitar- ian juridical framework forged in the eighteenth century. As Foucault explains, disciplinary power established relationships of constraint between individuals rather than relationships of contractual obligation, and it defined individuals hierarchically rather than universally. The
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play of such asymmetries within the time and space proper to the exer- cise of disciplinary power effectively suspended the law (ibid. : 222-3 ) . Lastly, the generalization o f disciplinary power implied a tightening of relations between power and knowledge to the point of their mutual constitution by the eighteenth century. The objectification of individuals became the means for their subjection and the subjection of individu- als became the means for their objectification (ibid. : 224). Through the diffusion of psychology and psychiatry, the examination became incarnated in "tests, interviews, interrogations and consultations" that reproduced mutually constitutive power-knowledge relations within disciplinary institutions (ibid. : 226-7).
Foucault finds the "formula" for the generalization of the exercise of disciplinary power in Jeremy Bentham's architectural plan for the model prison, Panopticon, published in 1791 (Foucault 2006a: 41). Foucault relates that Bentham depicts the Panopticon as an annular building with an internal periphery consisting of cells containing iron grate doors opening to the interior and windows opening to the exte- rior as well as a multi-floored central tower containing wide windows with blinds and partitions. Foucault considers this building the per- fect expression of disciplinary power for a host of reasons. First, with each of the cells designed to be occupied by only one inmate at a time the building produces individualizing effects at its periphery. Second, venetian blinds and partitions on the tower conceal whether anyone actually occupies it, guaranteeing anonymity at the centre. Third, the artificial light from the central tower as well as the natural light entering through the cell windows assure the visibility of inmates in the cells. Finally, this visibility allows for the perpetual writing about inmates and, consequently, the constitution of an administrative knowledge about them (ibid. : 75-8 ) .
These features render the Panopticon a magnificent machine not only for subjection but also for self? subjection. By inducing in inmates an awareness of their own constant visibility, the Panopticon compels them to structure their own behaviour in accordance with its power mechanism (Foucault 1979: 201). Notably missing from this ideal process is any reliance on violence or ostentatious displays of force. Remarkably, the play of visibility facilitated by spatial arrangements and lighting suffices to make inmates the very conduits of the power mechanism embodied in the Panopticon.
Though Bentham conceived of the Panopticon as an ideal prison for the resolution of the vexing problem of pauperism (Polanyi 2001: 111-13), Foucault does not tire of reminding us that Bentham con- sidered it applicable to a broad array of settings besides the prison. As
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DISCIPLINARY POWER
Foucault explains on Bentham's behalf, "Whenever one is dealing with a multiplicity of individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behavior must be imposed, the panoptic schema may be used" (1979: 205). Moreover, lest we think that the Panopticon simply remained a product of Bentham's imagination, Foucault points out that, "In the 183 0s, the Panopticon became the architectural program of most prison projects" (ibid. : 249) and that institutions apart from the prison adopted its architectural dispositions for a wide variety of purposes. As an exam- ple of this adoption, Foucault details all of the Panoptic features of the architecture of the asylum in the early nineteenth century, demonstrat- ing that the panoptic architecture of the asylum building was construed as the very cure to madness (2006a: 102-7). This cross-institutional takeover of Panoptic architectural dispositions intensified the spread of disciplinary power.
For all of the reasons elaborated above, namely, the diffusion of disciplinary power from one institution to another as well as its various transformations into an ever more productive and pervasive modal- ity of power culminating in the extension of Panoptic architectural features, Foucault finds warrant in speaking somewhat grandiosely about the advent of a "disciplinary society". Yet his employment of this expression is not without qualification. Foucault clearly wants us to take away from the phrase "disciplinary society" an understanding of a society in which disciplinary power is pervasive enough to inter- act with and alter other modalities of power rather than one in which it simply effaces these other modalities (1979: 216). Such complex articulations derive precisely from the incompleteness of the exercise of disciplinary power even in the context of a "disciplinary society". This incompleteness will become abundantly evident as we turn to Taylor's Principles.
Taylor's Principles as a disciplinary programme
At its core, scientific management as propounded by Taylor in his Prin- ciples attempts to increase the efficiency of workers by divesting them of any roles in planning and controlling their own work, and by placing these roles squarely in the hands of the management. Scientific manage- ment is manifestly disciplinary in this overall goal of increasing effi- ciency. However, Taylor devotes the bulk of his Principles to illustrating the efficacy and superiority of scientific management with reference to concrete examples drawn from a range of industrial activities, and it is within the inglorious intricacies of these examples that his espousal of
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a disciplinary perspective becomes altogether striking. Let us turn to a couple of his most pertinent illustrations.
Taylor's first illustration comes from his experience of attempting to increase the amount of pig iron loaded at the Bethlehem Steel Company from 12. 5 tons to 47 tons per worker per day. Taylor recounts that he sought this nearly fourfold increase from workers without at the same time provoking their resistance. In his words, "It was further our duty to see that this work was done without bringing on a strike among men" (F. W Taylor 1967: 43). Taylor addresses here the disciplinary problem of maximizing the utility as well as docility of individual bodies. He goes on to explain that he set about resolving this problem by, first of all, selecting out of the 75 workers at Bethlehem Steel four workers capable of loading 47 tons of pig iron per day. This selection took place on the basis of the deployment of a veritable myriad of disciplinary practices, which Taylor describes in the following passage:
In dealing with workmen under this type of management, it is an inflexible rule to talk to and deal with only one man at a time, since each workman has his own special abilities and limitations, and since we are not dealing with men in masses, but are trying to develop each individual man to his highest state of efficiency and prosperity. Our first step was therefore to find a proper work- man to begin with. We therefore carefully watched and studied these 75 men for three or four days, at the end of which time we had picked out four men who appeared to be physically able to handle pig iron at the rate of 47 tons per day. A careful study was then made of each of these men. We looked up their history as far back as practicable and thorough inquiries were made as to the character, habits and the ambition of each of them. Finally we selected one from among the four as the most likely man to start with. (Ibid. )
One of the most obvious disciplinary effects in this passage is indi- vidualization. Taylor informs us of the importance of having treated workers individually rather than collectively, thereby reminding us of Foucault's discussion of the constitution of a "cellular" individuality. However, he proceeds to indicate that the individualizing effects sought in the selection process rested on the observation of the mass of work- ers, and that this observation and the knowledge obtained from it facili- tated a judgement about the most able-bodied workers. Lastly, Taylor tells us that he made the selection of the most able-bodied worker at Bethlehem Steel on the basis of an enquiry into the identities of the
36
DIS CIPLINARY POWER
four most able-bodied workers. Individualization, observation and the constitution of an administrative identity on the basis of knowledge obtained through observation all figure centrally in Taylor's account of the selection of the appropriate worker to load 47 tons of pig iron per day.
This worker turned out to be "a little Pennsylvania Dutchman" dubbed Schmidt (ibid. ). Taylor explains that his team selected Schmidt as the first worker to try out the increase in pig iron loading because it had learned through its enquiries that Schmidt placed an unusually high premium on his earnings. It was on the basis on this knowledge about Schmidt that Taylor's team approached him, first to entice him with the monetary incentive of a pay of $1. 85 rather than standard $1. 15 a day and then to inform him that the increase in pay would presuppose a strict obedience (ibid. : 44-5). 'Taylor relates that Schmidt was told the following in particular:
Well, if you are a high-priced man, you will do exactly as this man tells you to-morrow, from morning 'til night. When he tells you to pick up a pig and walk, you pick it up and you walk, and when he tells you to sit down and rest, you sit down. You do that right straight through the day. And what's more, no back talk. Now a high-priced man does just what he's told to do, and no back talk. Do you understand that? When this man tells you to walk, you walk; when he tells you to sit down, you sit down, and you don't talk back at him. (Ibid. : 45-6)
As in the case of the previous passage, several disciplinary practices leap out at us from this excerpt of "rough talk" to Schmidt (ibid. : 46). The first o f these practices i s the exhaustive regularity o f the movements of the body. The person in charge of Schmidt would command him not only how to work but also when and how to rest so as to work all the more efficiently. Moreover, this person would insist that Schmidt follow his orders without any "back talk", once again illustrating the discipli- nary relationship between increased utility and increased obedience.
It is this image that we must break free of, that is, of the theoreti- cal privilege of law and sovereignty, if we wish to analyze power within the concrete and historical framework of its operation. We must construct an analytics of power that no longer takes law as a model and a code. (Ibid. : 90)
A Foucauldian view of power
It is time now for us to turn to this constructive task, and begin to articulate Foucault's own positive understanding of power. Foucault's self-described task is to use empirical analyses to discover a new theory
18
FOU CAULT'S THEORY O F POWER
of power, which will in turn provide a new framework for (and the hypotheses to be tested in) subsequent historical analyses (Foucault 1990a: 90-91). He begins:
It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as [1] the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as [2] the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confron- tations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as [3] the sup- port which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and con- tradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as [4] the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies.
(Ibid. : 92-3 , my numerals)
There is much to unpack in this sentence. The bracketed numbers indicate four principal aspects of Foucault's initial definition. We have a set of "force relations", processes by which these relations are trans- formed, systems or disjunctions that are constituted by the interplay of these force relations, and larger strategies (or "terminal forms") with general and institutional characteristics that emerge from these rela- tions, processes and systems. He begins at the micro-level, looking at local relations of force rather than at the macro-level of hegemonies and states, which can only be fully understood as functions of the local relations. In other words, Foucault begins with individuals' behaviours and interactions ("local relations" like academic transcripts, or choices of what to wear), to see how larger patterns, and eventually national norms or regulations, grow out of them.
First, then, power must be understood at the micro-level as relations of force. Foucault is unambiguous on this point: "It is in this sphere of force relations that we must try to analyze the mechanisms of power" (ibid. : 97). But what are these "force relations" at the basis of power? With this term, Foucault makes an explicit analogy to physics; he refers on numerous occasions, for example, to the "micro-physics of power" (1979: 26; 1990a: 16). 6 Force relations seem to be the basic unit, the undefined or given, in this approach to power. Very broadly, force rela- tions consist of whatever in one's social interactions that pushes, urges or compels one to do something.
We can use the analogy to help us understand this notion of force relations as the basic unit of power. In Newtonian physics, force is
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defined as mass times acceleration. Force is thus the extent to which a body will be put into motion: larger objects (greater mass) will require a greater force to begin moving; a greater force will also be necessary to make an object move more quickly (greater acceleration). The impor- tant point here is that "force" is whatever serves to put an object into motion, regardless of the origin or source of that force. Force may be introduced by gravity, magnetism, or some other means. Its action thus can be described independently of any particular agent or object as the "creator" of that force. Analogously, Foucault speaks of power relations in terms of force relations without reference to a source or agent. This suggests that Foucault does not mean to imply that individuals cannot act as agents within power relations, but rather to draw our attention, especially for methodological reasons, to the force relations as such rather than to agents or actors. Closer examination of the characteristics of these force relations should help to make this clearer.
To recall, Foucault began with the claim that "power must be under- stood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization" (1990a: 92). Three features of these force relations are thus delineated, as follows.
First, that there is a multiplicity means that we will find many dif- ferent relations of force, intersecting and overlapping, in our social interactions. What is more, this multiplicity suggests that these force relations will not all be of the same quality or kind: there will be mul- tiple sorts of force relations, which may have different particular char- acteristics or impacts. To draw on the analogy to physics again, we could say that different forces will be present in the same field, as are gravity and magnetism, and that some of these forces will be stronger than others, and some stronger in certain contexts but not in others. To make this more concrete, recall (or imagine) yourself as a high school student, and consider what you chose to wear to school each day. You probably considered a number of different perspectives - or relations of force: what will my best friends say? Will a certain special someone think I look "cool" or "geeky" if she or he sees me in this? (Indeed, what constitutes "cool" or "geeky" is defined through mul- tiple overlapping relations. ) What "group" (the "popular" set, jocks, brains, punks, skaters, etc. ) does dressing like this put me in? Is it fash- ionable? What will my parents and teachers think? Is it in accord with the school's official dress code ? Most or all of these questions probably influenced your choice - whether you aimed to please or annoy any particular one of these groups - and they represent the very different, but intersecting relations within which you decide what to wear.
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FOU CAULT'S THEORY O F POWER
What sort of presence do these relations have then? The second fea- ture delineated in this description is that force relations are "immanent in the sphere in which they operate". That these relations are "immanent" means that they exist only within a certain domain or discourse. In other words, they are not concrete, like bodies, but incorporeal, like the laws of physics. They are nevertheless genuinely present - and, like laws, their presence can be felt in very concrete ways. The analogy to physics is again useful here. As physical bodies interact, they exert relations of gravity, magnetism and so on upon each other. Similarly, social interac- tions are constantly permeated by these relations of force, power rela- tions. Foucault thus describes force relations as a "substrate" : "it is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable" (ibid. : 93 ) . He notes in the 1976 College de France course that "power is never anything more than a relationship that can, and must, be studied only by looking at the interplay of the terms of the relation- ship" (2006a: 168). 7 This means that power relations are not outside but rather "immanent in" other kinds (economic, knowledge, sexual) of rela- tionships (1990a: 94). So "power is not an institution [or] a structure", nor an individual capacity, but rather a complex arrangement of forces in society (ibid. : 93). Excepting an explicit dress code, none of the ques- tions we asked above about what to wear could be answered institution- ally, but they all have a significant impact on your status in school. And we are all quite aware of them, at least implicitly. Your choices of what to wear thus reveal "a complex strategical situation [how you want to be perceived by various groups] in a particular society [your school] " . And so your self-presentation has been shaped by power relations. This has an important corollary: power is omnipresent (as discussed above) "because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere" (ibid. : 93 ) . It even shapes our choices of how to dress on a daily basis.
So there is a multiplicity of force relations, which are immanent in social interactions. The third feature in this initial characterization is that these force relations "constitute their own organization". On the one hand, these force relations "are the immediate effects of the divi- sions, inequalities, and disequilibriums which occur in [other types of relationships] " (ibid. : 94) . But on the other hand,
If in fact [force relations] are intelligible, this is not because they are the effect of another instance that "explains" them, but rather because they are imbued, through and through, with calculation:
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M I CHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and objectives. (Ibid. : 94-5)
Each school has its own distribution of social groups or cliques, with inequalities and occasionally shifting alliances. These calculations, these aims and objectives, which Foucault will refer to as tactics and strategy, constitute the internal organization of power relations.
Several other propositions also emerge from this core understand- ing of power. Foucault delineates five. First, since power emerges in relationships and interactions, power is not possessed, but exercised. "It is not the 'privilege,' acquired or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions" (ibid. : 26). At stake here are two competing models of power: one based on a contract (pos- session), the other based on perpetual battle (strategies or war). As he notes in Discipline and Punish, his analysis of power "presupposes that the power exercised on the body is conceived not as a property, but as a strategy . . . that one should take as its model a perpetual battle rather than a contract regulating a transaction or the conquest of a territory" (1979: 26). Second, reiterating the point about immanence, power relations are not exterior to other relations.
Third, "power comes from below; that is, there is no binary and all- encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations and serving as a general matrix" (1990a: 94). So power is not reducible to a binary relationship (we cannot reduce all sorts of power to one model); furthermore, power comes from below (as discussed above, a multiplicity of power relations exist; power emerges from a variety of overlapping and intertwined relationships rather than from a sovereign individual).
That power comes from below means we cannot best understand power by looking at monarchies or states, at the top of any chain of command. Rather, we must look at the complex webs of interwoven relationships : what Foucault calls the "microphysics" of power (1979 : 26). Power develops in the first instance in specific, local, individual choices, behaviours and interactions. These combine in myriad ways to constitute larger social patterns, and eventually yield macroforms, which one typically thinks of when one thinks about "power" (socie- ties, states, kings) - just as everyday objects are constituted by atoms and molecules. We thus have a micro-level of individuals (disciplinary techniques of the body) and a macro-level of populations (biopolitics).
Fourth of the five propositions that emerge from Foucault's concep- tion of power is that "power relations are both intentional and nonsub- jective" (1990a: 94). This juxtaposition is, frankly, puzzling, and this
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FOU CAULT'S THEORY O F POWER
claim has led to a fair amount of misunderstanding about Foucault's analysis. First, power is intentional: power relations are "imbued, through and through, with calculation: there is no power that is exer- cised without a series of aims and objectives" (ibid. : 95). What you wear says much about you, and your status at school - not to mention your broader socioeconomic status (not everyone can afford designer labels) -and you have intentionally chosen to communicate a number of mes- sages with your clothing. Foucault refers to these aims and objectives as "tactics" and "strategies", and notes that these are what constitute its "rationality". But power, he insists here, is also nonsubjective: "But this does not mean that it results from the choice or decision of an individual subject" (ibid. : 95). Nor, he continues, can it be located in groups such as economic decision makers, governing castes or the state apparatus. No one student, or social caste, or administrator can control what will be "cool" or "loser". Indeed, what is "cool" today could be "out" tomor- row, and an out-group can rise in prestige (or vice versa).
The problem here, the apparent paradox, is that according to Foucault's description, power has to be exercised by someone or some- thing, but if it is nonsubjective, there cannot be a "someone" exercising that power. Foucault seems to be erasing agency ? individuals' capacity to choose and act for themselves ? or rather, locating this capacity to act in a noncorporeal "power" rather than in individuals and institutions. It is as if "power", not you, decides what you are wearing today. I think this problem can be resolved with two observations. First, part of his point here is that the effects of the exercise of power reach beyond any individual's (or group's) intentions or control. As we have already seen, Foucault is arguing against the view that "the state" acts as a monolith, and he is arguing for the importance of micro-events, with their rip- ples and interactions, in order to understand macro-phenomena. This means that local actions often have unintended macro-consequences, and that one's control of macro-processes will always be limited and incomplete. Macro-phenomena result from the concatenation of many micro-events, but they are not the direct result of any particular individual action or choice. This is, then, an argument for a system- level, rather than individual-level, understanding of power relations. Foucault's distinction between tactics and strategy parallels this micro/ macro distinction. Tactics are local, micro (individual choices about what to wear today); and strategies are macro, systemic (school- or culture-wide understandings of "cool" and "uncool").
The second observation to be made here is a logical one. To under- stand subjectivity as constituted (in part) through power relations is not to deny that subjects can act intentionally. You still choose what you'll
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wear each day, even if those choices are conditioned and limited by the "strategical situation" in which you find yourself. Given this problem, the status of subjectivity will become a focal point of Foucault's investi- gations in later years. It is an important point, because one of the funda- mental questions for ethical action has to do with the individual's ability to make decisions that are not "merely" determined by the relations of power in which they emerge - in other words, a question of freedom.
This question may in fact lie at the heart of readers' varied reactions to Foucault's analyses. Those who understand the claim that individuals are constituted by power relations to constitute a denial of freedom find his vision to be bleak. Those of us, on the other hand, who find in his analyses the tools with which to increase our self-awareness, and hence our own freedom, hear wellsprings of hope in his discussion of the con- tinuous transformations of power through history. (Understanding how "cool" comes to be defined and how certain groups are "cooler" than others, one can - perhaps even through one's choice of clothes - begin to break free of or even redefine these categories and groups. ) At a mini- mum, on the latter view, if power relations are in fact best understood as a necessarily ongoing battle, then the battle is never utterly lost.
Indeed, Foucault seems to anticipate this objection, this worry about freedom, in the fifth of five propositions that he discusses here. Power is always accompanied by resistance; resistance is in fact a fundamental structural feature of power: "Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power" (1990a: 95). Without resistance, without two bodies (or minds) pushing or pulling against each other, there is no power relation. And through resistance, power relations can always be altered.
This fifth point encapsulates each of the preceding four. Power is exercised (first proposition) in the very interplay of force and resistance; this interplay is present in all social interactions (second proposition); force and resistance are manifest even in micro-interactions between individuals as well as states (third proposition); and while each person may choose to apply force or resist, the ultimate outcome of the relation cannot be controlled by one party (power is intentional and nonsubjec- tive - fourth proposition).
On the role of resistance in constituting power, Foucault's position will not change. In a 1984 interview, for example, Foucault reiterates that "in the relations of power, there is necessarily the possibility of resistance, for if there were no possibility of resistance - of violent resistance, of escape, of ruse, of strategies that reverse the situation - there would be no relations of power" (1994: 12). He adds that "there
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FOU CAULT'S THEORY O F POWER
cannot be relations of power unless the subjects are free . . . [I]f there are relations of power throughout every social field it is because there is freedom everywhere" (ibid. : 12) .
Let us stop for a moment and recall where we are in the discussion. We began this section with a long quotation, in which Foucault identi- fied four principal aspects of power. 8 Our discussion so far has focused on explicating only the first of these, that power consists of multiple force relations. (We have covered a good deal of ground along the way. Indeed, we have implicitly addressed the other three aspects of power. )
The second aspect that Foucault identifies here is that these force relations are processes, not static, and are constantly being transformed. These transformations take the form of ceaseless struggles and con- frontations - between the original force and its accompanying resist- ance - and sometimes strengthen the power relations, but sometimes weaken or reverse it. These processes also produce a number of interre- lationships and systems, as various power relations reinforce or under- mine each other (third aspect). Here Foucault introduces a distinction between tactics and strategy: tactics are the local rationalities of power in particular cases; strategies, on the other hand, are the larger systemic or global patterns of power. And (fourth aspect) these strategies are built out of combinations and concatenations of those local tactics.
[T]he rationality of power is characterized by tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted level where they are inscribed . . . tactics which, becoming connected to one another, attracting and propagating one another, but finding their base of support and their condition elsewhere, end by forming comprehensive systems. (1990a: 95)
These comprehensive systems, or strategies, constitute "institutional crystallizations" out of the interaction and combination of locally fluid power relations, and become recognizable terminal forms like the state and the other types he enumerated.
The movement of Foucault's analysis here is from the micro-level to the macro, from the molecular to the everyday - from (1) specific, individual force relations through (2) their processes of transforma- tion and (3) the networks or systems that their interplay produces, to (4) their larger, strategic manifestations in the state, the law and other hegemonies, such as ownership of the means of production. In the end-forms that Foucault identifies here, we should recognize the three traditions of analysis that Foucault earlier criticized as partial and inade- quate(liberalism,psychoanalysis,Marxism). Eventhougheachofthese
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strategies may be one-dimensional, the networks of power taken in sum are multi-dimensional and cannot be reduced to only one strategic mode, "juridico-discursive" or otherwise. Foucault's point is that while they may have adequately described some particular strategy (or termi- nal form) of power, each approach fails to grasp the fundamental form or operation of power at the molecular level. But as Foucault reminds us again, analysis of power must begin not with these end-forms, but with "the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power" (ibid. : 93). Observing power in its local and peripheral effects provides a new viewpoint from which to begin a study of power, and will thus entail a new methodo- logical approach: the theory of power that we have just outlined.
An ongoing project
To review, we have unpacked a dozen or so dense pages at the heart of La Valonte de Savoir. What we have discussed provides only a basic framework: a set of theoretical presuppositions that constitutes the heart of Foucault's theory of power. There are important elements of this theory that we have not discussed, and many aspects of Foucault's analysis of power would continue to evolve over the next decade, as Foucault's ongoing self-critique continued. This basic framework, how- ever, is consistent throughout the theory's subsequent development and elaboration.
Notes
1. Special thanks to David Cylkowski, Stacy Klingler and Dianna Taylor for their very thoughtful responses to earlier versions of this essay.
2. The French original is at Foucault (1976: 120): "en se dormant une autre theorie du pouvoir".
3. These are not necessarily the same relationships.
4. Lynch ( 1 9 9 8 ) gives a fuller discussion of Foucault's view of the omnipresence
of power.
5. For more on this shift, see Lynch (2009).
6. Wemustbecarefulnottomaketoomuchoftheanalogytophysics;Idonot
think, for example, that Foucault means that analysis of social relations should be reduced to equations of force relations. Given this caution, however, we can note certain implications of the analogy.
7. In this passage, Foucault is making an observation about Henri de Boulainvil- liers' eighteenth-century history of France. But his point here, in fact, speaks to Foucault's own methodology.
8. On page 19, above.
26
TWO
Disciplinary power
Marcelo Hoffman
Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish: The Birth ofthe Prison, pub- lished in 1975, contains his most famous and elaborate exposition of disciplinary power. A bird's-eye view of his preceding and succeed- ing analyses reveals, however, that this concept arose in overlapping stages and served a variety of purposes. From roughly 1973 to 1976, in analyses of punishment, proto-psychiatry, criminology and race war, Foucault attempted to articulate disciplinary power in contradistinction to sovereign power. From about 1976 to 1979, he used disciplinary power as a springboard for delineating modalities of power concerned with population, namely, biopolitics, security and governmentality. Finally, in the early 19 8 0 s disciplinary power figured more as an implicit background to his analyses of subjectivity in Greco-Roman antiquity and early Christianity. The long shadow cast by this concept renders it absolutely crucial to understanding the trajectory of Foucault's thought.
Using a composite account of disciplinary power drawn from Foucault's seminal presentation in Discipline and Punish as well as his College de France course for the academic year 1973-74, Psychiatric Power, I will provide an overview of disciplinary power and then exem- plify the exercise of this power through Frederick Winslow Taylor's The Principles ofScientific Management, published in 1911. Taylor's Principles, which influenced American and European industrialists as well as Lenin and Antonio Gramsci, enriches our understanding of disciplinary power in two ways. First, the presentation of scientific management at the core of Principles reflects nothing short of a full- fledged disciplinary programme. Indeed, it is hard to read a page of Principles without noticing that Taylor suffuses his presentation with
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MICHEL FOU CAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
a thoroughly disciplinary aspiration.
Second, Taylor's Principles high- lights the limitations to the exercise of disciplinary power by attesting that disciplinary practices bound up with the application of scientific management are deeply contested. Taylor thus de-naturalizes this form of power even as he seeks to extend its reach not only within factories, but also within "all social activities", including the management of homes, farms, businesses, churches, charities, universities and govern- mental agencies (F. W Taylor 1967: 8).
Subjected individuals
The concept of disciplinary power concerns individuals. As Foucault notes with reference to what he takes to be the ideal exercise of this power, "We are never dealing with a mass, with a group, or even, to tell the truth, with a multiplicity: we are only ever dealing with individuals" (2006a: 75, emphasis added). However, in opposition to political theories which take the individual as a given for the purpose of constructing sovereignty, as in the notable case of Thomas Hobbes's version of the social contract, Foucault sets about showing that the individual first and foremost amounts to a construction of disciplinary power. The individual is an effect of this form of power rather than the raw material upon which it impinges. Foucault writes, "Discipline 'makes' individuals; it is the specific techniques of a power that regards individuals as objects and as instruments of its exercise" (1979 : 170). As a first approximation, we can therefore say that disciplinary power produces individuals as its objects, objectives and instruments.
Disciplinary power yields such effects by targeting bodies. The tar- geting of bodies may not seem terribly unique, especially in light of Foucault's sweeping assertion that "what is essential in all power is that ultimately its point of application is always the body" (2006a: 14, emphasis added). It seems even less singular in light of his sugges- tion that pastoral power treats the body as an object of care (2007: 126-8) and that even sovereign power sets its sights on the body as an object of violence or honour (2006a: 44-5). However, what dis- tinguishes disciplinary power from these other modalities of power is its endeavour to meticulously, exhaustively and continuously control the activities of bodies so as to constitute them as bearers of a highly particular relationship between utility and docility, whereby increases in utility correspond to increases in docility and vice versa. In Foucault's words, disciplinary power strives to make the body "more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely" (1979: 138). This increase
28
DIS CIPLINARY POWER
entails the augmentation of the skills and aptitudes of bodies without at the same time allowing these skills and aptitudes to serve as a source of resistance to disciplinary power. This form of power thereby attempts to resolve the problem of the resistances aroused from its own incessant investments in the body. Disciplinary power controls the body to effec- tuate this result through the production not only of an individual but also of individuality, the amalgam of qualities that render an individual distinct from others (Arendt 1985: 454). This individuality consists of cellular, organic, genetic and combinatory traits. Let us now outline the production of these traits.
Foucault insists that disciplinary power creates a cellular form of individuality by ordering individuals in space. He calls this ordering "the art of distributions". Cellular individuality rests on the division of individuals from others. The art of distributions produces this individu- ality by first of all enclosing a space different from all others through the use of walls or gates, as in the case of barracks and factories (Foucault 1979: 141-3). It partitions this space into individual cells in order to break up collective activities that deter from the goal of utility, such as desertion or vagabondage. The art of distributions also codes a space with specific functions to make it as useful as possible (ibid. : 143-5). As an example of this coding, Foucault refers to the production of printed fabrics at the Oberkampf manufactory atJouy. The workshops at the manufactory were divided into operations "for the printers, the handlers, the colourists, the women who touched up the design, the engravers, the dyers" (ibid. : 145 ) . Each worker occupied a space defined by his or her specific function within the overall production process. Lastly, the art of distributions creates a cellular individuality by ascrib- ing the unit of rank to individuals. As an example of rank, Foucault discusses the seating of pupils in a classroom according to their age, grade and behaviour (ibid. : 146-7).
Within this enclosed space, disciplinary power produces an organic individuality by exerting a control over bodily activities. This individu- ality is "organic" in so far as it lends itself to disciplinary practices all on its own, as if spontaneously and naturally (ibid. : 155--6). The control of bodily activities realizes this organic individuality first of all through a temporal enclosure afforded by the use of timetables, which prevent idleness by partitioning activities into minutes and seconds (ibid. : 15 0- 51) . The control of activities also breaks down movements of the body into an ever-greater number of acts and indexes these acts to temporal imperatives. Foucault identifies the prescription of the duration and length of the steps of marching soldiers as an example of this temporal elaboration of the act (ibid. : 151-2). The control of activities further
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MICHEL FOU CAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
implies a relationship between the general position of the body and its gestures. In this regard, Foucault mentions the example of the upright posture of pupils and the correct positioning of their elbows, chins, hands, legs, fingers and stomachs as the conditions for good handwrit- ing (ibid. ). The control of activities goes even further, correlating the gestures of the body to the parts of the object used by it, as in the case of manifold gestures employed by a soldier to manipulate the barrel, butt, trigger-guard, notch, moulding, lock, screw and hammer of a rifle (ibid. : 15 3 ) . Finally, rather than merely preventing idleness, the control of activities forges an organic individuality by exhaustively using time.
With the activities of the body controlled, disciplinary power pro- ceeds to constitute a genetic form of individuality by subjecting the body to the demand for a perpetual progress towards an optimal end. Foucaultdubsthisdemandthe"organizationofgeneses". Drawingfrom the example of the military, he submits that perpetual progress towards an end yields a genetic individuality in the following ways : first, through the division of time into distinct segments, such as periods of practice and training; second, through the organization of these segments into a plan proceeding from the simplest elements, such as the positioning of the fingers in military exercise; third, through the ascription of an end to these segments in the form of an exam; and, finally, through the production of a series that assigns exercises to each individual according to rank (ibid. : 157-9).
Finally, disciplinary power establishes a combinatory form of indi- viduality characterized by articulations with other bodies to obtain a level of efficiency greater than that realized by the mere sum of the activities of these bodies (ibid. : 167). Foucault calls this process the composition of forces. This composition gives rise to a combinatory individuality by first treating individual bodies as mobile elements to be connected to other individual bodies as well as the totality of bodies; second, by coordinating the time of each of these bodies to maximize the extraction of their forces and to combine them with others for the optimal results; and, lastly, by commands that may be transmitted through signs and that therefore need not be verbalized, much less explained (ibid. : 164-7).
We now know how disciplinary power works and what it produces. It works by distributing individuals, controlling activities, organizing geneses and composing forces, and these functions correspond to the production ofcellular, organic, genetic and combinatory individualities, respectively. Yet, at the risk of drawing too fine a distinction, Foucault goes further in his analysis to impart a sharp sense of how disciplinary power gets going and keepsgoing. He attributes the success of this power
30
DISCIPL I N ARY POWER
to several basic techniques: hierarchical observation, normalizing judge- ment and the examination.
If architecture figures within the art of distributions as a means of ordering multiplicities into cellular individuals, it plays the role within hierarchical observation of rendering individuals visible with the overall effect of structuring their behaviour. In making individuals seeable, architecture serves, as Foucault writes, "to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them" (ibid. : 172). Still, he suggests that outside of any ideal schema, architecture alone falls short of making visibility constant. What makes this visibility perpetual is the implementation of a hierarchical network within the group of individuals who occupy a particular architectural space. Foucault offers many examples of these networks. While we will not dwell on them here (we have an opportunity to gauge their presence in Taylor's Prin- ciples), it is instructive to mention briefly one particularly rich example. Foucault suggests that surveillance operated in the asylum in the early nineteenth century not only through a doctor but also through super- visors who reported on patients, and servants who feigned servitude to patients while gathering and transmitting information about them to the doctor (2006a: 4-6). This example clearly demonstrates the communication of the gaze from the top to the bottom, its manifestly "hierarchical" character. Yet, Foucault is keen to remind us that the gaze may operate in a more multi-directional manner to the point of bearing on the supervisors themselves.
Although surveillance rests on individuals, its functioning is that of a network of relations from top to bottom, but also to a certain extent from bottom to top and laterally; this network "holds" the whole together and traverses it in its entirety with effects of power that derive from one another: supervisors, perpetually supervised. (1979: 176-7)
Such a dense network of vigilant and multi-directional gazes no doubt causes disciplinary power to appear ubiquitous, but the sheer simplicity of its mechanism also makes it seem rather inconspicuous (ibid. : 177).
In a disciplinary world, however, it is not enough to see bodies so as to yield from them specific effects. One must be able to judge them as well. This modality of power therefore depends on normalizing judgement for its continued exercise. Foucault indicates that this form of judgement consists of features that make it look quite different from judgement in, for example, criminal courts. These features are summed
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M I CHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
up in terms of the following forms of punishment: first, even minute departures from correct behaviour are punished; second, failure to adhere to rules established on the basis of regularities observed over time is punished; third, exercise is used specifically as a corrective punishment; fourth, gratification is used in addition to punishment for the purposes of establishing a hierarchy of good and bad subjects; and, finally, rank understood as the place occupied in this hierarchy is used as a form punishment or reward (ibid. : 177-8 3 ) . What ultimately stands out here for Foucault is the concept of the norm. Disciplinary power judges according to the norm. By "norm", however, it should be obvious that Foucault has in mind something other than a strictly legal concept. He depicts the norm as a standard of behaviour that allows for the measurement of forms of behaviour as "normal" or "abnormal". In his words, "the norm introduces, as a useful imperative and as a result of measurement, all the shading of individual differences". The norm thus establishes the figure of the "normal" as a "principle of coercion" for the figure of the "abnormal" (ibid. : 184).
The examination combines the techniques of hierarchical observa- tion and normalizing judgement in "a normalizing gaze" to lend further sustenance to the exercise of disciplinary power (ibid. ). This gaze, as Foucault points out in a splendidly economical formula, "manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectifi- cation of those who are subjected" (ibid. : 184-5). Put differently, the examination binds the exercise of disciplinary power to the formation of a disciplinary knowledge. It does so in several ways. First of all, the examination facilitates the exercise of disciplinary power by objectifying subjects through observation. As Foucault posits, "Disciplinary power manifests its potency, essentially, by arranging objects. The examination is, as it were, the ceremony of this objectification" (ibid. : 187). In this regard, he mentions the first military review of Louis XIV as a form of examination yielding the objectification of subjects. This review subjected 18,000 soldiers to the gaze of a barely visible sovereign who commanded their exercises (ibid. : 188). Second, the examination con- stitutes individuality through an administrative form of writing that leaves behind a dense layer of documents, as in the examples of medical records and student records. This writing makes it possible to describe individuals as objects and track their development, or lack thereof, as well as to monitor through comparison phenomena within the larger aggregate of population (ibid. : 189-91). Finally, the accumulation of documents through the examination forges the individual as a case defined in terms of a status bound up with all of the "measurements", "gaps" and '"marks"' characteristic of disciplinary power (ibid. : 192).
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DISCIPLINARY POWER
In historical terms, Foucault sketches the shift from a society (prior to the sixteenth century) in which disciplinary power played a marginal but critical and innovative role from within the confines of religious communities to a society (beginning in the eighteenth century) in which it played a preponderant role from a myriad of institutions. In this sketch, disciplinary power spread initially through several "points of support" (2006a: 66) with religious underpinnings, such as the educa- tion of youth inspired by the ascetic ideal embraced by the Brethren of the Common Life with its focus on progressive stages of education, rules of seclusion, submission to a guide and military organization; coloniza- tion as practised by the Jesuits in the Guarani republic of Paraguay with its emphasis on the full employment of time, permanent supervision and the cellular constitution of families; and, lastly, the confinement of marginal elements of the population under the management of religious orders. From these peripheral positions, disciplinary power began to cover more spheres of society without any religious backing, appearing in the army by the end of the seventeenth century and working class by the eighteenth century (ibid. : 66-71).
Foucault maintains that this formidable extension of disciplinary power across the surface of society reflected a deeper ensemble oftrans- formations. First, disciplinary power began to function as a technique more for the constitution of useful individuals than for the prevention of desertion, idleness, theft and other problems. Second, disciplinary mechanisms began to extend beyond their institutional parameters to yield lateral effects. In this regard, Foucault mentions the quite fascinat- ing example of schools using information gathered from students to monitor parental behaviour. Lastly, disciplinary power began to bear on society as a whole through the organization of a police apparatus concerned with intricacies of individual behaviour (1979: 210-16).
These transformations were bound up in their turn with broad his- torical processes in economic, juridical and scientific domains. The gen- eralization of disciplinary power took place against the background of the eighteenth-century problem of indexing the rapid growth in popula- tion to the rapid growth in production apparatuses (ibid. : 218-20). It attempted to resolve this problem by offering a means of administering the growth in the number of human beings and making them useful. The generalization of disciplinary power also entailed consequences for the juridical system, introducing asymmetries that vitiated the egalitar- ian juridical framework forged in the eighteenth century. As Foucault explains, disciplinary power established relationships of constraint between individuals rather than relationships of contractual obligation, and it defined individuals hierarchically rather than universally. The
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MICHEL FOU CAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
play of such asymmetries within the time and space proper to the exer- cise of disciplinary power effectively suspended the law (ibid. : 222-3 ) . Lastly, the generalization o f disciplinary power implied a tightening of relations between power and knowledge to the point of their mutual constitution by the eighteenth century. The objectification of individuals became the means for their subjection and the subjection of individu- als became the means for their objectification (ibid. : 224). Through the diffusion of psychology and psychiatry, the examination became incarnated in "tests, interviews, interrogations and consultations" that reproduced mutually constitutive power-knowledge relations within disciplinary institutions (ibid. : 226-7).
Foucault finds the "formula" for the generalization of the exercise of disciplinary power in Jeremy Bentham's architectural plan for the model prison, Panopticon, published in 1791 (Foucault 2006a: 41). Foucault relates that Bentham depicts the Panopticon as an annular building with an internal periphery consisting of cells containing iron grate doors opening to the interior and windows opening to the exte- rior as well as a multi-floored central tower containing wide windows with blinds and partitions. Foucault considers this building the per- fect expression of disciplinary power for a host of reasons. First, with each of the cells designed to be occupied by only one inmate at a time the building produces individualizing effects at its periphery. Second, venetian blinds and partitions on the tower conceal whether anyone actually occupies it, guaranteeing anonymity at the centre. Third, the artificial light from the central tower as well as the natural light entering through the cell windows assure the visibility of inmates in the cells. Finally, this visibility allows for the perpetual writing about inmates and, consequently, the constitution of an administrative knowledge about them (ibid. : 75-8 ) .
These features render the Panopticon a magnificent machine not only for subjection but also for self? subjection. By inducing in inmates an awareness of their own constant visibility, the Panopticon compels them to structure their own behaviour in accordance with its power mechanism (Foucault 1979: 201). Notably missing from this ideal process is any reliance on violence or ostentatious displays of force. Remarkably, the play of visibility facilitated by spatial arrangements and lighting suffices to make inmates the very conduits of the power mechanism embodied in the Panopticon.
Though Bentham conceived of the Panopticon as an ideal prison for the resolution of the vexing problem of pauperism (Polanyi 2001: 111-13), Foucault does not tire of reminding us that Bentham con- sidered it applicable to a broad array of settings besides the prison. As
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DISCIPLINARY POWER
Foucault explains on Bentham's behalf, "Whenever one is dealing with a multiplicity of individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behavior must be imposed, the panoptic schema may be used" (1979: 205). Moreover, lest we think that the Panopticon simply remained a product of Bentham's imagination, Foucault points out that, "In the 183 0s, the Panopticon became the architectural program of most prison projects" (ibid. : 249) and that institutions apart from the prison adopted its architectural dispositions for a wide variety of purposes. As an exam- ple of this adoption, Foucault details all of the Panoptic features of the architecture of the asylum in the early nineteenth century, demonstrat- ing that the panoptic architecture of the asylum building was construed as the very cure to madness (2006a: 102-7). This cross-institutional takeover of Panoptic architectural dispositions intensified the spread of disciplinary power.
For all of the reasons elaborated above, namely, the diffusion of disciplinary power from one institution to another as well as its various transformations into an ever more productive and pervasive modal- ity of power culminating in the extension of Panoptic architectural features, Foucault finds warrant in speaking somewhat grandiosely about the advent of a "disciplinary society". Yet his employment of this expression is not without qualification. Foucault clearly wants us to take away from the phrase "disciplinary society" an understanding of a society in which disciplinary power is pervasive enough to inter- act with and alter other modalities of power rather than one in which it simply effaces these other modalities (1979: 216). Such complex articulations derive precisely from the incompleteness of the exercise of disciplinary power even in the context of a "disciplinary society". This incompleteness will become abundantly evident as we turn to Taylor's Principles.
Taylor's Principles as a disciplinary programme
At its core, scientific management as propounded by Taylor in his Prin- ciples attempts to increase the efficiency of workers by divesting them of any roles in planning and controlling their own work, and by placing these roles squarely in the hands of the management. Scientific manage- ment is manifestly disciplinary in this overall goal of increasing effi- ciency. However, Taylor devotes the bulk of his Principles to illustrating the efficacy and superiority of scientific management with reference to concrete examples drawn from a range of industrial activities, and it is within the inglorious intricacies of these examples that his espousal of
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MICHEL FOU C A ULT: KEY CONCEPTS
a disciplinary perspective becomes altogether striking. Let us turn to a couple of his most pertinent illustrations.
Taylor's first illustration comes from his experience of attempting to increase the amount of pig iron loaded at the Bethlehem Steel Company from 12. 5 tons to 47 tons per worker per day. Taylor recounts that he sought this nearly fourfold increase from workers without at the same time provoking their resistance. In his words, "It was further our duty to see that this work was done without bringing on a strike among men" (F. W Taylor 1967: 43). Taylor addresses here the disciplinary problem of maximizing the utility as well as docility of individual bodies. He goes on to explain that he set about resolving this problem by, first of all, selecting out of the 75 workers at Bethlehem Steel four workers capable of loading 47 tons of pig iron per day. This selection took place on the basis of the deployment of a veritable myriad of disciplinary practices, which Taylor describes in the following passage:
In dealing with workmen under this type of management, it is an inflexible rule to talk to and deal with only one man at a time, since each workman has his own special abilities and limitations, and since we are not dealing with men in masses, but are trying to develop each individual man to his highest state of efficiency and prosperity. Our first step was therefore to find a proper work- man to begin with. We therefore carefully watched and studied these 75 men for three or four days, at the end of which time we had picked out four men who appeared to be physically able to handle pig iron at the rate of 47 tons per day. A careful study was then made of each of these men. We looked up their history as far back as practicable and thorough inquiries were made as to the character, habits and the ambition of each of them. Finally we selected one from among the four as the most likely man to start with. (Ibid. )
One of the most obvious disciplinary effects in this passage is indi- vidualization. Taylor informs us of the importance of having treated workers individually rather than collectively, thereby reminding us of Foucault's discussion of the constitution of a "cellular" individuality. However, he proceeds to indicate that the individualizing effects sought in the selection process rested on the observation of the mass of work- ers, and that this observation and the knowledge obtained from it facili- tated a judgement about the most able-bodied workers. Lastly, Taylor tells us that he made the selection of the most able-bodied worker at Bethlehem Steel on the basis of an enquiry into the identities of the
36
DIS CIPLINARY POWER
four most able-bodied workers. Individualization, observation and the constitution of an administrative identity on the basis of knowledge obtained through observation all figure centrally in Taylor's account of the selection of the appropriate worker to load 47 tons of pig iron per day.
This worker turned out to be "a little Pennsylvania Dutchman" dubbed Schmidt (ibid. ). Taylor explains that his team selected Schmidt as the first worker to try out the increase in pig iron loading because it had learned through its enquiries that Schmidt placed an unusually high premium on his earnings. It was on the basis on this knowledge about Schmidt that Taylor's team approached him, first to entice him with the monetary incentive of a pay of $1. 85 rather than standard $1. 15 a day and then to inform him that the increase in pay would presuppose a strict obedience (ibid. : 44-5). 'Taylor relates that Schmidt was told the following in particular:
Well, if you are a high-priced man, you will do exactly as this man tells you to-morrow, from morning 'til night. When he tells you to pick up a pig and walk, you pick it up and you walk, and when he tells you to sit down and rest, you sit down. You do that right straight through the day. And what's more, no back talk. Now a high-priced man does just what he's told to do, and no back talk. Do you understand that? When this man tells you to walk, you walk; when he tells you to sit down, you sit down, and you don't talk back at him. (Ibid. : 45-6)
As in the case of the previous passage, several disciplinary practices leap out at us from this excerpt of "rough talk" to Schmidt (ibid. : 46). The first o f these practices i s the exhaustive regularity o f the movements of the body. The person in charge of Schmidt would command him not only how to work but also when and how to rest so as to work all the more efficiently. Moreover, this person would insist that Schmidt follow his orders without any "back talk", once again illustrating the discipli- nary relationship between increased utility and increased obedience.
