No More Learning

In sly allusion to this metaphor, Wilber-
force compared the seven directors and eight assistant directors to
seven physicians and eight apothecaries come to put the patient to
death secundum artem.
The commissioners nominated were Lord Fitzwilliam, F. Mon-
tagưe, Sir Henry Fletcher, R. Gregory, Colonel North, Viscount
Lewisham and Sir Gilbert Elliot. Professor Holland Rose declares
that all these were partisans of Fox or North. “If Fox and North”,
he says, “had chosen the seven commissioners fairly from among all
three parties, the mouth of gainsayers would have been stopped. ” 5
This seems inherently reasonable and probable, but it would not
appear from the parliamentary debates that this particular point was
made by any one of the opponents of the bill. In his final speech Fox
answered his critics and ended by declaring :
I risk my all upon the excellence of this Bill; I risk upon it whatever is
most dear to me, whatever men most value, the character of integrity, of
talents, of honour, of present reputation and future fame; these, and whatever
else is precious to me, I stake upon the constitutional safety, the enlarged policy,
the equity and the wisdom of this measure. 6
The words proved true in a sense perhaps other than he had intended.
He had indeed risked—and lost-almost the whole of his future career
upon his ill-fated measure.
The bill was passed in the Commons by 208 to 108, but was
1 Idem, p. 1279.
2 Idem, XXIV, 411.
3 Idem, XXIII, 1238.
4 Idem. 1247. 5 G. Holland Rose, Life of William Pitt, Part 1, p. 146.
6 Parliamentary History, XXII, 1433.


## p. 200 (#228) ############################################

200
THE COMPANY AND THE STATE, 1772-86
defeated in the Lords by nineteen votes through the daring inter-
vention of George III, who was determined to stick at nothing in his
efforts to free himself from the hated control of the Coalition. He
had consulted Lord Temple and commissioned him to show to the
peers a letter in which he stated that he would regard anyone who
voted for the bill as "not only not his friend, but his enemy”. The
ministry was dismissed on 18 December.
Pitt came into office and brought in his India bill, January, 1784.
It was treated contemptuously by the opposition, who still had a large
majority in the Commons. But Fox made his terrible tactical mistake
of opposing a dissolution; his only chance was to appeal to the country
as soon as possible in the hope that popular disapproval of the king's
unconstitutional action might counteract the unpopularity of the
Coalition. Instead of this he resisted every suggestion of such a
course, and so enabled Pitt to display to the world his wonderful skill
and adroitness in holding his enemies at bay. At the right moment
Pitt dissolved parliament, came back with a triumphant majority,
reintroduced his bill with some slight modifications and passed it in
August, 1784. The act established six "Commissioners for the Affairs
of India" popularly known as the Board of Control. They were to
consist of the chancellor of the exchequer, a secretary of state and
four privy councillors appointed by the king and holding office during
pleasure. They were unpaid, for Pitt hoped that "there could be
found persons enough who held offices of large emolument, but nu
great employment, whose leisure would amply allow of their under-
taking the duty in question”. ! The secretary of state was to preside;
failing him the chancellor of the exchequer, and failing him the
senior of the four privy councillors. Urgent or secret orders of the
commissioners might be transmitted to India through a secret com-
mittee of directors, and the court of proprietors was deprived of any
right to annul or suspend any resolution of the directors approved by
the board. The government of India was placed in the hands of a
governor-general and council of three, and the subordinate presi-
dencies were made definitely subject to Bengal in all questions of
war, revenue and diplomacy. Only covenanted servants were in
future to be appointed members of council. The experiment of ap-
pointing outsiders had been too calamitous.
It is interesting to note how largely Pitt had profited both by the
experience under the Regulating Act and by the criticism directed
against Fox's India bills. In his introductory speech 'he compares
his own bill with that of his rival, as
affording as vigorous a system of control, with less possibility of influence,-
securing the possessions of the East to the public, without confiscating the pro-
perty of the Company; and beneficially changing the nature of this defective
government without entrenching on the chartered rights of men. 2
i Parliamentary History, XXIV,
1093.
2 Idem, pp. 319-20.


## p. 201 (#229) ############################################

THE BOARD OF CONTROL
201
The Board of Control obviously represented Fox's seven commis-
sioners, but there is a fundamental difference. They do not stand
apart as an independent executive body, they are linked up with the
government of the day, for the two most important members at least
change with each ministry. Further, they had no patronage, and did
not appoint or dismiss the Company's servants in India. In other
respects, though their power was veiled, it was nearly as extensive as
that of Fox's commissioners, for they had access to all the Company's
papers and their approval was required for all dispatches relating to
other than commercial business. In case of emergency they could
send their own drafts to the secret committee of the directors, to be
signed and sent out in the name of the Company. This secret com-
mittee was a curious device by which the court of directors kept a
show of independence though liable to the complete control of the
board. According to the act, it was to consist of not more than three
directors. In practice, it nearly always consisted of two, the chairman
and the deputy chairman of the court. Clearly the ultimate direction
had passed to the cabinet, and when Pitt was pressed to the point,
he frankly and openly acknowledged it, the public control of India
"could not, with safety or propriety, be placed in any other hands
than those of the genuine and legitimate executive power of the
constitution". 1 The directors were mainly satisfied, because they
were left with the patronage and the right of dismissing their servants.
They had recognised that something would have to be sacrificed,
and they might well be satisfied with what they had been allowed to
retain. For, though Fox declared that "if ever a charter was com-
pletely and totally annulled, it was the charter of the East India
Company by the present bill”,? and that "it worked upon the Com-
pany's rights by slow and gradual sap”,9 yet, besides the patronage,
the directors were left with considerable powers of revision and
initiation. As Mill says:
The power is considerable which appears to remain in the hands of the directors
whenever there is not a strong motive to interfere with business of detail,
there is always a strong motive to let it alone. There yet has never been any
great motive to the Board of Control to interfere. Of the power which the
directors retain, much is inseparable from the management of detail. 4
In any case Pitt had taken the wise precaution of neutralising, as far
as possible, opposition from the Company.
"In proposing", he said, a new system of government and regulation, he
did not disdain to consult with those, who, having the greatest stake in the
matter to be new-modelled, were likely to be the best capable of giving him
advice. He acknowledged the enormous transgressions of acting with their con-
sent, rather than by violence; He had not dared to digest a bill without
consultation. ” 5
1 Idem, p. 322.
2 Idem, p. 1124.
3 Idem, pp. 1127-8.
Mill, History of India, iv, 396. 5 Parliamentary History, XXIV, 318-19.
1


## p. 202 (#230) ############################################

202
THE COMPANY AND THE STATE, 1772-86
In January he had a conference with representatives from Leadenhall
Street. The act in the end was based on resolutions which were
drawn up and accepted by a General Court. Pitt was therefore able
to claim that the bill came forward "fortified and recommended by
the consent of the Company”. 1
The act was drafted with great skill. Burke admitted that it was
"as able and skilful a performance for its own purposes, as ever issued
from the wit of man”. ? Pitt, as Sir Courtney Ilbert has pointed out,
had done two things; he had avoided the charge of conferring
patronage on the crown, and also the appearance of radically altering
the constitution of the Company. He himself declared "that to give
the Crown the power of guiding the politics of India with as little
means of corrupt influence as possible, is the true plan for India, and
is the true spirit of this Bill”. He had linked up the East India
Company and the imperial government. “Sir”, he said in the House,
"I do wish the persons who shall rule India to maintain always a
good understanding with administration”. Fox had compared the
powers of the Board of Control to those of a new secretary of state,
and had lamented that such an office should be created. "I accept
of his comparison", said Pitt, "and I say that the power of govern-
ment over India ought to be in the nature of that of a Secretary of
State”. Fox's bill, he averred, only ensured a permanency of men,
his own act meant a permanency of system. *
The most questionable and ineffective clauses in the act were
those requiring the Company's servants to declare on oath the amount
of property they had brought back from India, and establishing a
special court, consisting of three judges, four peers and six members
of the House of Commons for trial of offences committed in India.
The greatest opposition was raised to this clause. "The tribunal”,
"
said Fox, "might fairly be called a bed of justice, for justice would
sleep upon it. ” 5 It was attacked as inquisitorial and as violating the
Englishman's right of trial by jury.
On the whole we may admit that it was a great bill. It did in
spite of all defects answer the main questions as propounded by
Erskine in the House of Commons in 1783 : "Was it fit that private
subjects should rule over the territories of the state without being
under its controlling powers? " Pitt never pretended that his solu-
tion was a perfect one.
“Any plan”, he said, "which he or any man could suggest for the govern-
ment of territories so extensive and so remote, must be inadequate; nature and
fate had ordained in unalterable degrees, that governments to be maintained
at such a distance, must be inadequate to their end. ” 7
Scott, Hastings's agent in London, believed that the passing of the
1 Parliamentary History, XXIV, 412. 2 Idem, XXV, 206. 3 Idem, XXIV, 408.
4 Idem, pp. 409-10.
5 Idem, p. 1135.
6 Idem, xxm, 1293.
7 Idem, XXIV, 321.


## p. 203 (#231) ############################################

HASTINGS ON THE INDIA ACT
208
bill heralded a change for the better in his patron's fortunes. He tells
Hastings that Dundas had now become his friend, that Lord Thurlow
is anxious to make him an English peer by the title of Lord Dayles-
ford, that Burke and Francis are entirely discredited. He only
regrets that the lack of opposition in the Lords prevented Lord
Thurlow from "giving Mr. Francis a precious trimming”. A little
later he writes that, though Pitt has pronounced Hastings to be a
very great, and indeed a wonderful man who has done very essential
service to the state, "and has a claim upon us for everything he can
ask”, yet the resolutions of the House of Commons, standing upon the
Journals, are at present a bar to the granting of an honour "until the
sting of those resolutions is done away by a vote of thanks for Mr.
Hastings's great services”. ? But Hastings himself, writing and watch-
ing with anxiety and expectancy in the East, came to a very different
conclusion. He read the bill and the speeches in the debates with
the deepest disgust.
“I have received and studied Mr. Pitt's bill”, he wrote, “and receive it as
so unequivocal a demonstration that my resignation of the service is expected
and desired, that I shall lose no time in preparing for the voyage. ” 3
He was perhaps too apt to regard all the attacks upon the Indian
system as directed against himself personally :
It has destroyed all my hopes, both here and at home. What devil has
Mr. Pitt dressed for his exemplar, and clothed with such damnable attributes
of ambition, spirit of conquest, thirst of blood, propensity to expense and trou-
bles, extravagance and improvidence disobedience of orders, rapacity,
plunder, extortion. And am I this character? Assuredly not; but most
assuredly was it the declaimer's intention to fix it upon me. 4
The logical supplement to Pitt's act was contained in three short
measures passed in 1786. The first repealed the provisions requiring
the Company's servants to disclose on oath the amount of property
they brought home from India. The special court to try in England
offences committed in India was remodelled, but it was in fact never
constituted. The second act made the approval of the crown for the
choice of the governor-general unnecessary, though the king of course
had still the power of recall. The third empowered the governor-
general in special cases to override the majority of his council—the
dissentient councillors having the privilege of recording written
protests—and enabled the governor-general to hold also in emergen-
cies the office of commander-in-chief. Lord Cornwallis had made this
measure a condition of his acceptance of the post of governor-general.
The bill was fiercely opposed by Burke, who declared that the
principle of it was
to introduce an arbitrary and despotic government in India . . . the preamble
.
1 Gleig, op. cit. III, 107, 170, 172.
3 Idem, p. 217.
2 Idem, p. 174.
4 Idem, pp. 224, 226.


## p. 204 (#232) ############################################

204
THE COMPANY AND THE STATE, 1772-86
of the clause which laid it down . . . that arbitrary power was necessary to
give vigour and dispatch, was a libel on the liberties of the people of England,
and a libel on the British constitution. 1
Pitt argued that the bill was only the logical development of the act
of 1784. He always thought that the power of the governor-general
ought to be put on a different footing :
in the former Bill, therefore, his powers had been enlarged by diminishing the
number of the Council, and in the present Bill the same principle was still
adhered to and farther followed up. 2
1 Parliamentary History, XXV, 1274.
2 Idem, 1290.


## p. 205 (#233) ############################################

CHAPTER XI
THE EARLY REFORMS OF WARREN HASTINGS
IN BENGAL
IN 1772 Warren Hastings was appointed governor of Bengal. He
had already been twenty-two years in India. Born at Churchill in
Oxfordshire on 6 December, 1732, he had been educated at West-
minster School and reached Calcutta in 1750 as a writer, the lowest
grade in the Company's service. In the troubles in Bengal, 1756-7,
he was imprisoned at Murshidabad by Siraj-ud-daula, but was soon
released. After Clive's reconquest of Calcutta he was made Resident
at Murshidabad. In the revolutions in the Muhammadan govern-
ment in 1760 and 1763 he seems to have played an entirely honourable
part. Burke is wrong and unjust when he says: "He was co-existent
with all the acts and monuments of that revolution, and had no small
share in all the abuses of that abusive period". 1 Lord North declared
more truly that at this period Hastings “though of flesh and blood,
had resisted the greatest temptations”. ?
Hastings returned to England in 1764. His hands were clean, but
it is unnecessary to speak of his conduct as a miracle of self-denial.
He did indeed bring home an amount of wealth honourably moderate
in comparison with that of some of his contemporaries, and every
credit should be given to him for it; yet at the age of thirty-two he
had acquired by legitimate means in fourteen years a competence of
£30,000—a rather striking commentary on the normal emoluments
at this time of an Indian career. Of this sum he soon lost £25,000
in an unwise and thoroughly characteristic investment, for he was
incurably imprudent in the conduct of his own money matters.
In 1766 the directors were impressed by the ability with which
he gave evidence before a committee of the Commons, and in 1769 he
was sent back to India to be second of council at Madras. There he
won further favour by the skill with which, as export warehouse-
keeper, he improved the plan for the Company's investments. At
the end of 1771 he was appointed governor of Bengal, “a station",
as he said himself, "of more éclat, but of more trouble and difficulty":
We cannot wonder that Hastings felt no undue elation at his prospects.
He would have a council of twelve or thirteen members, and all
questions would be decided by a majority of votes. The governor's
chance of controlling his colleagues depended on his own personality,
on his being the sole executive official when council was not actually
1 Burke's Works, V, 55.
2 M. E. Monckton Jones, Warren Hastings in Bengal, Pa 194.
8 Gleig, op. cit. 1, 225.


## p. 206 (#234) ############################################

206
EARLY REFORMS OF HASTINGS IN BENGAL
1
1
sitting, and on an undefined but traditional influence over the exercise
of patronage. He had in fact, as he himself declared, “no other pre-
eminence beside that of a greater responsibility". 1 Hastings, how. .
ever, almost dominated his council. The truth is that as long as a
majority of votes could decide all questions, the governor-general was
more secure against unreasonable opposition in a large, than in a
small, council, for in the former there was more chance of finding a
certain number of men of good will, and a wider sphere within which
his personal powers might exert themselves. In the smaller council
the governor-general's position was insecure till the state in 1786
reluctantly consented to grant him in the last resort the power to
override a hostile majority. We must add that Hastings's control over
foreign relations was strengthened by the fact that they were managed
by a select committee of himself and two others. It is evident that
down till October, 1774, he was allowed almost unhampered control.
What was the exact position of the British in Bengal in 1772? The
British dominions consisted of a curious conglomeration of territories,
held by a curious variety of titles. We may divide them into three
classes. The first class consisted of Burdwan, Midnapur, Chittagong,
acquired in 1760, which were held free of all revenue tax. The second
class was made up of Calcutta itself, won in 1698, and the 24-Parganas,
acquired in 1757. The Company held these territories on a zamindari
title paying an annual revenue to the nawab. But by a curious
legal fiction the 24-Parganas would after 1785 pass into the first class.
This came about as follows: The revenue paid for them by the
Company was assigned by the Moghul emperor in 1759 to Lord Clive
as a jagir. The directors stopped payment of it to him in 1763, but
in 1765, wishing to make use of his services again, they made an
agreement with him by which he or his representatives were to enjoy
the revenue of the jagir for ten years, after which time it would lapse
to the Company. When, however, he returned home in 1766, they
granted to him or to his representatives another period extending to
1785. In the third class we must place Bengal, Bihar and Orissa,
over which provinces the Company held the diwanni, or right to
collect and administer the revenue, which had been granted to them
in 1765. They paid at this time twenty-six lakhs of rupees to the
emperor for the right to administer the diwanni, and thirty-two lakhs
to the nawab of Bengal for the expenses of government, retaining
the surplus for themselves.
From 1765 to 1772 the actual administration was in the hands of
two Indian officials known as naib diwans, or deputy finance ministers
-the Company itself being the actual diwan-Muhammad Reza
Khan in Bengal and Shitab Rai in Bihar. Their activities were to
a limited extent regulated by British supervisors who were to have
"a controlling though not an immediate, active power over the
1 Monckton Jones, Warren Hastings in Bengal, p. 200.


## p. 207 (#235) ############################################

HASTINGS'S POSITION
207
collections”,1 first appointed in 1769. The holders of this office must
of course be distinguished from the three eminent ex-servants of the
Company, also called supervisors, who were sent out this same year
with almost autocratic powers to reform the whole administration
of the Company, but whose ship after leaving the Cape sank some-
where in mid-ocean.
This system of Indian executive officers under
a vague British control was the famous dual system. It was now
in ill repute, for while the Company itself was in serious financial
straits, its servants were returning to England with great fortunes.
For its failure in India we have to go no further than the admissions
of some of the Company's servants who were endeavouring to
administer it.
"It must give pain to an Englishman", wrote Becher, Resident at Murshi-
dabad in 1769, "to have reason to think, that since the accession of the Com-
pany to the Diwani, the condition of the people of this country has been worse
than it was before; and yet I am afraid the fact is undoubted. . . . This fine
country, which flourished under the most despotic and arbitrary government,
is. verging towards its ruin, while the English have really so great a share in
the administration. "2
And again :
I well remember this country when Trade was free and the flourishing
state it was then in; with concern I now see its present ruinous condition. . . . 3
Furthermore, the directors strongly suspected that the naib diwans
were intercepting a great part of the revenue that ought to have
reached the Company's exchequer.
Such was the state of things which Hastings was called upon
to deal. He was definitely appointed to put an end to the dual
system. He was, in fact, selected to take the place of the three super-
visors, Scrafton, Forde and Vansittart, to whose tragic end we have
just referred. "We now arm you with our full powers”, wrote the
Company, "to make a complete reformation. ” 4 The responsibility
therefore was very great. Though he was given definite instructions
on most points, it is to a certain extent true, as Lord Thurlow says,
that he was ordered “to destroy the whole fabric of the double
government . . . he was to form a system for the government of
Bengal, under instructions so general, that I may fairly say the whole
plan was left to his judgment and discretion”. 5 So, too, Hastings
claimed for himself: "The first acts of the government of Bengal,
when I presided over it, were well known at the time to have been of
my formation, or formed on principles which I was allowed to
dictate". For good or ill, then, the internal reforms in Bengal prior
.
1. Idem, p. 89. Idem, p. 85. 3 Idem, p. 83. 4 Idem, p. 145.
5 Debates of the House of Lords, on the evidence delivered in the trial of
Warren Hastings. London, 1797, p. 132.
6 Selections from the State. Papers of the Governor-General Warren
Hastings, Ed. Horrest, II, 63.


## p. 208 (#236) ############################################

208
EARLY REFORMS OF HASTINGS IN BENGAL
"
1
1
to 1774 are mainly in their details at any rate the work of Warreu
Hastings and bear the stamp of his personality.
He had great difficulties to confront. Something like an Indian
Empire had grown up, but it had no administrative framework.
"The new government of the Company consists of a confused heap
of undigested materials, as wild as the chaos itself. " i "Our consti-
“
tution is nowhere to be traced but in ancient charters, which were
framed for the jurisdiction of your trading settlements, the sales of
your exports, and the provision of your annual investment. " 2 "I
found this government in possession of a great and rich dominion,
and a wide political system which has been since greatly extended,
without one rule of government, but what descended to it from its
ancient commercial institutions. " 3
He had to attack strong vested interests, and, what is more, he
had to try to strengthen an overweakened central government against
a too-powerful exterior ring of provincial powers. The political centre
of gravity had got seriously displaced. The government of the coun-
try, he wrote, consisted of the supervisors, the boards of revenue at
Murshidabad and Patna, the governor and council at Calcutta. Hast-
ings is, of course, naming these powers in exactly the reverse of their
theoretical position in the hierarchy of administration, but, as he
says, "the order in which I have named them is not accidental, but
consonant to the degree of trust, power and emolument which they
severally possess”. 4 In the government of Bengal "all trust, power
and profit are in the hands of its deputies, and the degree of each
proportionate to their want of rank in the service”. : He tells us else-
where that “every man capable of business runs away to the col-
lectorships or other lucrative stations. . . . . At the Presidency, where
the best assistance is required, the worst only can be had. . . ".
The reforms themselves fall under three heads, first the commer-
cial reforms, secondly, the reform of the judicature and the settlement
of land revenue, dealt with elsewhere, and thirdly, all those measures
which followed on the abolition of the dual government in pursuance
of the Company's professed intention "to stand forth as Diwan".
Hastings's commercial reforms involved the following changes.
He abolished in March, 1775, the fraudulent use of the dystuck or
free pass under which the goods of the Company's servants or their
agents were exempted from dues. Thus the old problem which had
haunted so disastrously the administrations of Vansittart and Verelst
was at last settled. He suppressed the custom-houses (or chokeys)
in the zamindaris, which were a great impediment to the free circu-
lation of goods. Only five central custom-houses were henceforth
maintained, at Calcutta, Hugli, Murshidabad, Patna and Dacca. Lastly,
he carried out a uniform lowering of the duties to 242 per cent. on ail
1 Gleig, op. cit. I, 317.
? Idem, p. 368.
3 Idem, d, 148.
4 Monckton Jones, Warren Hastings in Bengal, p. 148.
5 Idem, p. 146.
Gleig, op. cit. I, 300.
6


## p. 209 (#237) ############################################

MUHAMMAD REZA KHAN
209
2
goods, except the monopolies of salt, betel-nut and tobacco, to be
paid by all Europeans and Indians alike. These reforms were entirely
beneficial. It is true they were all ordered by the court of directors,
but Hastings entirely assented, carried out the details with expert
knowledge and adroitness, and smoothed away all opposition by his
tactful methods. They did much to revive the decaying internal trade
of Bengal. Hastings could with some justice boast that “goods pass
unmolested to the extremities of the province”. 1
Hastings's modification of the land revenue system and the reform
of the judicature will be dealt with elsewhere. But something must
be said of the abolition of the dual government. Formally it meant
no more than that the Company should henceforth collect the revenues
through the agency of its own servants. But in reality, and in the
peculiar political and economic position of Bengal, it meant becoming
responsible for the whole civil administration. Hastings hardly
exaggerated when he described it as “implanting the authority of
the Company, and the sovereignty of Great Britain, in the constitu-
tion of this country”. The first step was the abolition of the offices
of naib diwan of Bengal and Behar, and the prosecution of Muham-
mad Reza Khan and Shitab Rai for peculation. After undergoing a
long trial and being kept in custody for rather more than a year they
were both acquitted. Shitab Rai was entirely cleared, and Hastings
declared he scarce knew why he was called to account. He was
reappointed to high office in Patna as rai-raian of Bihar, but died soon
afterwards, largely it was supposed from illness brought on by the
anxieties and discredit of his imprisonment. Hastings recorded his
epitaph and revealed his own regret for the whole proceeding when
he wrote:
He ever served the Company with a fidelity, integrity and ability which
they can hardly expect to experience in any future officer of government, whom
they may choose from the same class of people. 2
Muhammad Reza Khan was also acquitted, but Grant held that he
had for years intercepted much of the revenue due to the Company.
Hastings believed that he was culpable but that it was impossible in
view of his wide connections and past precautions to bring him to
account. The whole incident is a curious one and not very easy to
understand. The least reputable feature of it was the expedient of
using "the abilities, observation and active malignity of Maharaja
Nandakumar" to attack Muhammad Reza Khan, but the responsi-
bility for that lies with the court of directors and not with Hastings.
It is clear that the latter looked upon the whole business with the
greatest distaste. “These retrospections and examinations”, he wrote,
"are death to my views”. 4 He was eager to get on with his work of
reformation, and he could foresee clearly enough that he would not
1 Gleig, op. cit. I, 304.
2 Idem, II, p. 30.
3 Monckton Jones, Warren Hastings in Bengal, p. 199.
4 Gleig, op. cit. , I, 283.
14


## p. 210 (#238) ############################################

210
EARLY REFORMS OF HASTINGS IN BENGAL
escape censure for having brought the trials “to so quiet and unim-
portant an issue". 1 In this he was not mistaken. Among the charges
afterwards brought against him by Nandakumar was one that the
two accused men had offered Hastings and himself enormous bribes
for an acquittal.
A third reform was the reduction from thirty-two to sixteen lakhs
of rupees of the sum paid to the nawab from the revenue of Bengal.
This was the third reduction of this tribute; originally in 1765 it had
been fifty-three lakhs, in 1766 it had been reduced to forty-one, and
in 1769 to thirty-two. As this change was carried out under direct
orders of the court of directors, neither credit nor discredit can fairly
be attributed to Hastings for the principle involved, but the skill
with which he so reformed the administration that the nawab actually
received more than before for his personal requirements, is all his
own.
Fourthly, we have a reform which in the eyes of Hastings was of
the greatest importance, namely, the removal of the treasury or
khalsa from Murshidabad to Calcutta. This was the method taken
by Hastings to rectify that displacement of the political gravity of
the British administration which has been already referred to.
“The Board of Revenue”, write Hastings, “at Murshidabad, though com-
posed of the junior servants of the Company, was superior before this alteration,
to the governor and council of the presidency. Calcutta is now the capital of
Bengal, and every office and trust of the province issues from it. ” 2
Again :
The seat of government [is] most effectually and visibly transferred from
Murshidabad to Calcutta, which I do not despair of seeing the first city in
Asia, if I live and am supported but a few years longer. 3
Fifthly, we come to an expedient which is much more difficult to
judge. In reorganising the household of the nawab of Bengal, who
was still in his minority, Hastings decided to appoint as his guardian
not only a princess, which considering the secluded position of women
in the East was itself unusual, but one who was not even the nearest
relative to the nawab. He passed over the prince's mother and he
appointed the widow of a former nawab, Mir Ja'far, who was known
as the Munni Begam. Rajah Gurdas, son of Nandakumar, was at the
same time appointed steward of the household. For these appoint-
ments Hastings was afterwards vehemently censured, and indeed
they do seem to require justification. The princess was said, appa-
rently with truth, to have been originally a dancing girl in the court.
Burke stigmatised Hastings's act as "violent, atrocious and corrupt”,
and one of Hastings's own justifications that the begam's “interest
must lead her to concur with all the designs of the Company, and to
solicit their patronage” 5—may itself be described as of a highly
1 Gleig, op. cit. I, 391.
2 Idem, p. 271. 3 Idem, p. 285.
4 Bond, Speeches in the Trial of Warren Hastings, I. 32.
5 Gleig, op. cit. I, 254.


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EXTENT OF REFORMS
211
questionable nature. Lord Thurlow afterwards protested against the
attacks on the princess :
“Whatever situation”, he said, “she may have filled in her very early life,
she held the rank of the first woman in Bengal for nearly forty years, the
wife of one prince, the mother of another and the guardian of two other
princes. ” 1
It may be said at any rate that Hastings's choice received the approval
of the court of directors. The evidence is conflicting as to the begam's
treatment of the young nawab. When in 1775 the majority of the
council divested the begam of her guardianship and appointed
Muhammad Reza Khan, the British officer who carried out the
change reported that the nawab was rejoiced to recover his freedom,
and complained that he had been stinted of his proper allowance,
and debarred from all opportunity of learning the work of adminis-
tration. The officer expressed his personal belief in the truth of these
statements, but the facts and the deductions from them were disputed
by the Resident at Murshidabad. 2
Before pronouncing a final verdict on the work of these two years,
1772-4, we may for a moment consider the question how far Hastings
secured for the future a real purification of the British administration
in Bengal-how far the moral of the Company's servants was raised
and improved. Undoubtedly he effected much. Recent writers have
maintained that, when Hastings returned to England in 1785, the
whole system of administration had been purified, clarified and
reorganised, and, to support this contention, we have on record an
early letter of Sir John Shore, then a junior servant of the Company,
written in 1782, in which he says:
The road to opulence grows daily narrower, and is more crowded with com-
petitors . . . . the court and directors are actuated with such a spirit of reforma-
tion and retrenchment, and so well seconded by Mr. Hastings, that it seems
the rescission of all our remaining emoluments will alone suffice it. The Com-
pany's service is in fact rendered an employ not very desirable,3
But we can only accept the theory that Hastings purified the ad-
ministration with considerable qualifications. In contrast to such
contention we must set the fact that the nearer we get back to
Hastings's own time, the less belief do we find in this theory of
the entire reformation of the Company's service. Sir John Malcolm
is probably much nearer the truth when he writes that Hastings's
“most strenuous advocates . . . while they defend his personal inte-
grity, are forced to acknowledge that the whole system of the govern-
1 Debates of the House of Lords in the Evidence. . . , p. 145.
2 Forrest, Selections from Letters, Despatches and other State Papers pre-
served in the Foreign Department of the Government of India, 1772-1785, I,
381, 385.
8 Lord Teignmouth, Memoirs of the Life and Correspondence of John Lord
Teianmouth,, I, 39


## p. 212 (#240) ############################################

212
EARLY REFORMS OF HASTINGS IN BENGAL
ment over which he presided was corrupt and full of abuses". 1 Had
there been a complete purification of the service, there would
surely have been nothing for Lord Cornwallis to do, when he came
to India in 1786, but we know that there was abundant material for
his reforming hand. The quotation from Sir John Shore proves, if
any proof were needed, that a vigorous attempt at reform was made,
but as regards results, it probably records the exaggerated apprehen-
sion of a junior servant of the Company, rather than an actual fact.
Certainly we may say that the effects anticipated by Shore did not
follow.
All this, however, is consistent with the assumption that Hastings
made a strenuous and loyal endeavour, as far as in him lay, to amend
and purify the service. Probably, short of staking his retention of
office upon the question, he did as much at first as was humanly
speaking possible. He may well have argued that to quarrel with the
court and to throw up his office, because more power was not allowed
him, would merely have ruined his own career without improving
the service. The trouble was that he got no consistent support from
home. One party among the directors were genuinely desirous of a
reform, but there was always another party from time to time in the
ascendant, who were prepared to connive at misconduct in their
servants, provided that the value of their own patronage was not
diminished. The plunder was to be had, and, as Cornwallis said, they
hoped in their struggle with Hastings to secure the greater part of
it. 2 Hastingsoin 1772 gives as one reason for abandoning his desire to
remove the collectors altogether, that,
there were amongst them so many sons, cousins, or élèves of Directors, and
intimates of the members of the Council, that it was better to let them remain
than provoke an army of opponents against every act of administration.
They continue, but their power is retrenched. 3
In the end, therefore, Hastings seems to have compromised to a
certain extent with evil, and to bind men to his interests, he freely
used the means of patronage at his disposal. To some extent he gave
up the struggle for reformation.
“I will neither be responsible", he wrote in 1772, "for the acts of others,
nor stand forth as the general reformer, and make every man whose friendship
and confidence are necessary for my support my inveterate enemy. ” 4
Again we find him writing of Wheler in 1781 : “I have made it a rule
to give him the first option in most vacant appointments, and have
provided handsomely for all his friends”. 5 It seems likely, too, that
having been obliged, if he wished to retain his power, in the days of
Francis's ascendancy in the council, to use questionable means to
1 Malcolm, Sketch of the Political History of India, ed. 1811, p. 40.
? Ross, Correspondence of Marquis Cornwallis, 1, 306.
3 Gleig, op. cit. 1, 269.
4 Idem, p. 319.
5 Idem, , 384.


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SALARIES AND ALLOWANCES
213
win support, his finer feelings became blunted. His carelessness in
money matters and his incapacity to keep any kind of accounts, or
to recognise the need of doing so, were proverbial, and amounted
to a grave fault.