No More Learning

Such were Stanley's* reproduction of Diogenes Laertius, and Bruclcer's works. 4 Only with time do we find critical discernment in use of the sources (Buhle,b Fiilleborn6), a more unprejudiced apprehension of the historical significance of individual doctrines ( Tiedemann," Degerando 8), and systematic criticism of these upon the basis of the new standpoint (Tennemann,* Fries,1" and Schleiermacher11). u
It was, however, through Hegel that the history of philosophy was first made an independent science, for he discovered the essential point that the
1 E. g. in the beginning of the Metaphysics.
I More in detail on these below.
8 Th. Stanley, The History of Philosophy. Lond. 1685. ,
4 J. J. Brucker, Historia Critica Philosop h ice. 6 vols. Leipe. 1742 ff. Insti-
tutiones Historia; Philosophic. Leips. 1747.
* J. G. Buhle, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie. 8 vols. Gottingen,
1796 ff.
• G. G. FUUeborn, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie. 12 Studien.
Zlillichau, 1791 ff.
7 D. Tiedemann, Geist der Speculatioen Philosophie. 7 vols. Marburg,
1791 ff.
■De Gerando, Histoire Compar&e des Systemes de Philosophie. 2d ed. in
4 vols. Paris, 1822 f.
9 W. G. Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie. 11 vols. Leips. 1798 ff.
Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie fur den akademischen Leips. 1812. [Eng. trans. 1833 and 1852. ]
Unterricht.
10 J. Fr. Fries, Geschichte der Philosophie. 2 vols. Halle, 1837 ff.
II Fr. Schleiermacher, Geschichte der Philosophie, from his literary remains in the Coll. Works. III. Abth. , 4 Bd. , 1 Th. Berlin, 1839.
12 Cf. the introductions of the Phanomenologie des Geistes, of the lectures on the Philosophy of History, and those on the History of Philosophy. Ges. Werke, Bd. II. pp. 62 ff. ; IX. pp. 11 ff. ; XIII. pp. 11-134. In Hegel's works the Geschichte der Philosophie, edited from his lectures by Michelet, occupies Vols. XIII. —XV. Berlin, 1833-36. [Lectures on the History of Philosophy, by G. W. Hegel. Trans, by E. S. HaJdane in 3 vols. Vol. I. Lond. 1892. ] On his standpoint
$2. ] The History of Philosophy. 11
history of philosophy can set forth neither a motley collection of opinions of various learned gentleman "de omnibus rebus et de quibusdam aliis," nor a constantly widening and perfecting elaboration of the same subject-matter, but rather only the limited process in which the " categories" of reason have suc cessively attained distinct consciousness and reached the form of conceptions.
This valuable insight was, however, obscured and injured in the case of Hegel by an additional asumption, since he was convinced that the chronological order in which the above "categories" have presented themselves in the historical systems of philosophy must necessarily correspond with the logical and syste matic order in which these same categories should appear as "elements of truth " in the logical construction of the final system of philosophy (i. e. in Hegel's view, his own). The fundamental thought, right in itself, thus led to the mistake of a construction of the history of philosophy under the control of a philosophical system, and so to a frequent violation of historical fact. This error, which the development of a scientific history of philosophy in the nine teenth century has set aside in favour of historical accuracy and exactness, arose from the wrong idea (though an idea in logical consistence with the principles of Hegel's philosophy) that the historical progress of philosophical thought is due
solely, or at least essentially, to an ideal necessity with which one " category " poshes forward another in the dialectical movement. In truth, the picture of the historical movement of philosophy is quite a different one. It depenas not solely upon the thinking of "humanity " or even of the " Weltgeist," but just as truly upon the reflections, the needs of mind and heart, the presaging thought and sudden flashes of insight, of philosophising individuals.
3. The history of philosophy, considered as such a sum-total, in which the fundamental conceptions of man's views of the world and judgments of life have been embodied, is the product of a great variety of single movements of thought. And as the actual motives of these movements, various factors are to be distinguished, both in the setting of the problems and in the attempts at their logical solution.
The logical, pragmatic factor is no doubt sufficiently important. For the problems of philosophy are in the main given, and this is
shown by the fact that they are constantly recurring in the histor ical movement of thought as the "primeval enigma of existence," and are ever anew demanding imperiously the solution which has nerer completely succeeded. They are given, however, by the inadequacy and internal contradictions of the material which con sciousness presents for philosophical consideration. 1 But just for
<tand G. O. Marbach, Lehrbuch der Qeschichte Philosophic (2. Abth. Leips. IKS* fl\). C. Hermann, (iesehiehte der Philosophie in pragmatischer Behandlung 'Letps. 1867), and in part also the survey of the entire history of philosophy which J. Braniss has published as the first (only) volume of a Geschichte der Plilnmpkie seit Kant (Breslan, 1842). In France this line is represented by V. roosin, Introdurtion a I'llistoire de la Philosophie (Paris, 1828 ; 7th ed. 1872) ; HiMioire Ginerale de la Philosophie (12th ed. , Paris, 1884).
1 More precisely, this inadequacy, which cannot here be more exactly devel oped, and which can be fully brought out only in a system of epistemology, oomusts in the circumstance that that which is given in experience never meets ("TOpletely the conceptional demands which, in elaborating the same according ui u> inner nature of the reason, we set up, at first naively and immediately, tad later with reflective consciousness. This antinomism (or failure to meet the laws of thought) can be escaped by ordinary life, or even by experiential
12
Introduction.
this reason this material contains the real presuppositions and the logical constraining forces for all rational reflection upon it, and because from the nature of the case these are always asserting themselves anew in the same way, it follows that not only the chief problems in the history of philosophy, but also the chief lines along which a solution is attempted, are repeated. Just this constancy in all change, which, regarded from without, makes the impression that philosophy is striving fruitlessly in ever-repeated circles for a goal that is never attained, proves only this, — that the problems of philosophy are tasks which the human mind cannot escape. 1 And so we understand how the same logical necessity in repeated instances causes one doctrine to give birth to another. Hence prog ress in the history of philosophy during certain periods, to be understood entirely pragmatically," i. e. through the internal necessity of the thoughts and through the logic of things. "
The mistake of Hegel's mentioned above, consists, then, only in his wishing to make of factor which effective within certain limits, the only, or at least the principal, factor. It would be the opposite error to deny absolutely the " reason in history," and to see in the successive doctrines of philosophy only confused chance- thoughts of individuals. It rather true that the total content of the history of philosophy can be explained only through the fact that the necessities existing in the nature of things assert themselves over and over in the thinking of individuals, however accidental the special conditions of this latter may be. On these relations rest the attempts made to classify all philo sophical doctrines under certain types, and to establish sort of rhythmical repetition in their historical development. On this basis V. Cousin3 brought forward his theory of the four systems, Idealism, Sensualism, Scepticism, Mys ticism so too August Comte his of the three stages, the theological, the meta physical, and the positive. An interesting and in many ways instructive grouping of philosophical doctrines about the particular main problems is afforded by A. Renouvier in his Esquisse cTune Classification Systematique des Doctrines Philosophiques vols. , Paris, 1886 f. ). A school-book which arranges the philosophical doctrines according to problems and schools has been issued by Paul Janet and Seailles Histoire de la Philosophic les problemes et Its icoles (Paris, 1887).
But the pragmatic thread very ofteri breaks off in the history of philosophy. The historical order in particular, in which prob lems have presented themselves, shows almost complete absence
science, by working with auxiliary conceptions, which indeed remain problem atical in themselves, but which, within certain bounds, suffice for an elaboration of the material of experience that meets our practical needs. But just in these auxiliary conceptions that the problems of philosophy inhere.
In this way the results of Kant's investigations on "The Antinomy of Pure Reason " Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Dialectic, second sec. ) might be historically and systematically extended cf. W. Windelband, Geschichte dtr neueren Philosophic, II. 96
Cf. Note 12, p. 10.
A. Comte, Cours de Philosophic Positive with which Vols. V. and VI. are to be compared as the carrying out of the scheme. Similar thoughts are also found in D'Alembert's Discours Priliminaire in the Encyclopedic.
I. 9,
is
»»1
f.
' (2
;
is,
4. (a
it is
a
a
;
;
;
is
fi] The History of Philosophy. 18
of such an immanent
mother factor asserts itself which may best be designated as the
logical necessity. Here, on the contrary,
factor contributed by the history of civilisation. For philosophy receives both its problems and the materials for their solution from the ideas of the general consciousness of the time, and from the seeds of society. The great conquests and the newly emerging questions of the special sciences, the movements of the religious consciousness, the intuitions of art, the revolutions in social and political life, — all these give philosophy new impulses at irregular intervals, and condition the directions of the interest which forces, now these, now those, problems into the foreground, and crowds others for the time being aside ; and no less do they condition also the changes which questions and answers experience in course of nae. Where this dependence shows itself with especial clearness, we have under certain circumstances a philosophical system appear ing that represents exactly the knowledge which a definite age has of itself ; or we may have the oppositions in the general culture of d* age finding their expression in the strife of philosophical sys tems. And so besides the constant dependence upon the essential character of the subject-matter — the pragmatic factor — there pre- tuIs also a necessity growing out of the history of civilisation, or current state of culture, which warrants a historical right of exist ence to structures of thought in themselves untenable.
This relation also was first brought to notice in a greater degree than before k? Brffl, although the "relative truth" which he ascribes to the particular «? sttius has with him at the same time a systematic meaning, owing to his slahninl fundamental thought On the other hand, the element due to the aaaery of civilisation has been best formulated among his successors by Kuno Richer. 1 who has also availed himself of it in most brilliant manner in his expo- ■sue of the subject. He regards philosophy in its historical unfolding as the nragreasive self-knowledge of the human mind, and makes its development
appear a* constantly conditioned by the development of the object which in it ■ "~>rtlng aelf-knowledge. Although this applies to a number of the most important systems, it is yet but one of the factors involved.
TVr influences from the history of civilisation which condition the statement u4 aotation of philosophic problems, afford an explanation in most cases of an •Enrnety interesting phenomenon which is of great importance for understand- 2* la* historical development ; viz. the complication or interwearing of prob- >mt For when interest is directed chiefly on certain lines of thought, it is arotabi*. according to psychological laws, that associations will be formed fatvtn different bodies of thought, — associations which are not based on the «a»)act-niatt*r, — and so, that questions which in themselves have nothing to do »a» tacb other become blended and made to depend upon each other in their •msuosl An extremely important and very often recurring example of this is t*t nacnoincUng of ethical and asathetic interests in the treatment of theoretical fAiam. The well-known fact of daily life that men's views are determined *J Mr wisbea, hopes, fears, and inclinations, that their theoretical are condi-
anno Fischer, Oeschichte der neuertn Philosophic, I. 1, Einleitung I. -V. [mm. by J. P. Gordy, Descartes and his School, N. Y. 1887].
14 Introduction.
tioned by their ethical and aesthetic judgments ( Urtheile durch ihre Beurthci- lungen), — this fact is repeated on a larger scale iu their views of the universe, and has even been able to rise so high in philosophy that what had been pre viously involuntarily practised, was proclaimed (by Kant) an epistemological postulate.
5. Meanwhile the historical process we are tracing owes all its variety and multiplicity of forms to the circumstance that the de velopment of ideas and the formulation of general beliefs into abstract conceptions are accomplished only through the thinking of individual personalities, who, though rooted ever so deeply with their thought in the logical connection and prevalent ideas of a historical period, always add a particular element by their own individuality and conduct of life. This individual factor in the development of the history of philosophy deserves so great atten tion for the reason that those who have borne the leading part in the movement have shown themselves to be marked, independent personalities, whose peculiar nature has been a determining in fluence, not merely for the selection and combination of problems, but also for working out the conceptions to furnish solutions, both in their own doctrines and in those of their successors. That history is the kingdom of individualities, of details which are not to be repeated and which have value in themselves, is shown also in the history of philosophy : here, too, great personalities have exercised far-reaching and not exclusively beneficial influences.
It is clear that the above-mentioned complication of problems is brought about by the subjective relations in which individual philosophers stand, in a much greater degree than by the occasions presented in the general conscious ness of a time, of a people, etc. There is no philosophical system that is free from this influence of the personality of its founder. Hence all philosophical systems are creations of individuality, presenting in this respect a certain re semblance with works of art, and as such are to be understood from the point of view of the personality of their founder. The elements of every philosopher's
Weltanschauung grow out of the problems of reality which are ever the same, and out of the reason as it is directed to their solution, but besides this out of the views and ideals of his people and his time ; the form and arrangement, however, the connection and valuation which they find in the system, are condi tioned by his birth and education, his activity and lot in life, his character and his experience. Here, accordingly, the universality which belongs to the other two factors is often wanting. In the case of these purely individual creations, aesthetic charm must take the place of the worth of abiding knowledge, and the impressiveness of many phenomena of the history of philosophy rests, in fact, only upon the magic of their "poetry of ideas" (Begriffsdichtunn).
In addition, then, to the complication of problems and to the ideas determined by fancy and feeling, which are already enough to lead the general conscious ness astray, there are in the case of individuals similar, but purely personal, processes to lend to the formation and solution of problems still more the char acter of artificiality. We cannot fail to recognise that philosophers have often gone about struggling with questions which have no basis in reality, so that all thought expended upon them was in vain, and that, on the other hand, even in connection with the solution of real problems, unfortunate attempts in the a
priori construction of conceptions have slipped in, which have been hindrances rather than helps toward the issue of the matter.
S 2. ] The History of Philosophy. v 16
The wonderful feature in the history of philosophy remains just this, that out of such a multitude of individual and general complications there has yet been on the whole laid down that outline of universally valid conceptions for viewing the world and judging life, which presents the scientific significance of this development.
6.
Investigation in the history of philosophy has accordingly the following tasks to accomplish: (1) To establish with precision what
may be derived from the available sources as to the circumstances in life, the mental development, and the doctrines of individual philosophers ; (2) from these facts to reconstruct the genetic pro cess in such a way that in the case of every philosopher we may understand how his doctrines depend in part upon those of his predecessors, in part upon the general ideas of his time, and in part
upon his own nature and the course of his education ; (3) from the consideration of the whole to estimate what value for the total result of the history of philosophy belongs to the theories thus established and explained as regards their origin.
With reference to the first two points, the history of philosophy is a philologico-historical, with reference to the third element it is a critico-philosophical science.
(a) To establish its facts the history of philosophy must proceed to a careful and comprehensive examination of the sources. These sources, however, vary greatly at different times in their transparency and fulness.
The main sources for investigation in the history of philosophy are of course the vvrks of the philosophers themselves. For the modern period we stand here upon a relatively safe footing. Since the discovery of the art of printing, literary tradition has become so well established and clear that it offers in gen eral no difficulties of any kind. The writings which philosophers have pub lished since the Renaissance are throughout accessible for the research of today. The cases in which questions of genuineness, of the time of origina
tion, etc. , give rise to controversies are extremely seldom ; a philological criti cism has here but a narrow field for activity, and where it can enter (as is the cane in part in reference to the different editions of Kant's works), it concerns •oleljr subordinate, and in the last instance indifferent, points. Here, too, we are tolerably sure of the completeness of the material ; that anything of weight is host, or still to be expected from later publication, is scarcely to be assumed ; if the sharpened philological attentiveness of the last decades has brought us new material for Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Maine de Biran, the philosophical outcome has been only vanishing in comparison with the value of what was already known. At most it has concerned the question of supplementing our knowl-
edjre, and this must continue to be its province. The importance of occasional »rpr**si«ns in letters has been specially felt here, for these are adapted to shed more light on the individual factor in the historical development of philosophy.
With the sources of the Mediaeval Philosophy the case stands less favourably. These have in part (a small part, to be sure) still only a manuscript existence.
V. C*rtL*in and his school have rendered valuable service in publishing the texts, and in general we may be convinced that for this period also we possess material, which has indeed gaps, but is on the whole adequate for our purpose. *»n the other hand, our knowledge of the Arabian and Jewish philosophy of the Mkidle Aires, and so of the influence of those systems on the course of Western Tbaafrhi. is still very problematical in details ; and this is perhaps the gap most sorely felt in our investigation of the sources for the history of philosophy.
MqcIi worse still is the situation as regards the direct sources for Ancient P\it/]»oj. hf. Of the original works, we have preserved, to be sure, the most
Introduction.
16
important : the fundamental portion of the works of Plato and Aristotle, though even these are often doubtful in form. Besides these we have only the writing! of later time, such as those of Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, the Church Fathers, and the Neo-Platonists. By far the greater part of the philosophical writing* of antiquity is lost. In their stead we must content ourselves with the frag ments which the accident of an incidental mention in the writings of extant authors has kept for us, here too often in a questionable form. 1
If, nevertheless, success has been attained in gaining a view of the develop ment of the ancient philosophy, clearer than that of the mediaeval, presenting a picture whose accuracy extends even to details and is scientifically assured, this is due not only to the unremitting pains of philologists and philosophers in working through their material, but also to the circumstance that beside the remains of the original works of the philosophers there are preserved also, as secondary sources, remains of historical records made in antiquity. The best, indeed, of these also is lost : namely, the historical works which arose from the learned collection made by the Peripatetic and Stoic schools at the end of the fourth and in the third century b. c. These works passed later through many hands before they were preserved for us in the extant compilations prepared in the Roman period, as in the Placita Philosophorum,2 going by the name of Plutarch, in the writings of Sextus Empiricus," in the Deipnosophistoe of Athe- nseus,4 in the treatise of Diogenes Laertius, repl filar Sayitdru! * xal iro0eyiiirur tiSx (v 0iXoero0/p ivSoKi)ni<7diiTuv,f' in the collections of the Church Fathers, and in the notes of the Commentators of the latest period, such as Alexander Aphro- disias, Themistius, and Simplicius. H. Diels has given an excellent and thor ough treatment of these secondary sources of ancient philosophy, Doxographi
Gmci (Berlin, 1879).
Where the condition of the sources is so doubtful as is the case over the
entire field of ancient philosophy, critical ascertainment of the facts must go hand in hand with examination of the pragmatic and genetic connection. For where the transmission of the material is itself doubtful we can reach a decision only by taking a view of the connection that shall accord with reason and psychological experience. In these cases it becomes the task of the history of philosophy as of all history, after establishing a base of operations in that which is assured by the sources, to proceed to ascertain its position in those regions with which tradition finds itself no longer directly and surely in touch. The historical study of philosophy in the nineteenth century may boast that it has fulfilled this task, to which it was stimulated by Schleiermacher, by the labours of H. Ritter, — whose Geschichte der Philosophic (12 vols. , Hamburg, 1829-63) is now, to be sure, antiquated, — Brandis and Zeller for the ancient philosophy ; and of J. E. Erdmann and Kuno Fischer for the modern. Among the many complete expositions of the history of philosophy by far the most trustworthy in these respects is J. E. Erdmann's Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophic, 2 vols. (3d ed. ), Berlin, 1878 ; [Erdmann's History of Philosophy, trans, ed. by W. S. Hough, Lond. and N. Y. , 1890].
An excellent bibliography of the entire history of philosophy, assembling the literature in exhaustive completeness and good arrangement, is to be found in Ueberweg's Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophic, 4 vols. , 8th ed. , ed. by M. Heinze (Berlin, 1894-98). [Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, trans, from the 4th ed. by G. S. Morris (N. Y. 1871), contains additions, but of course does not
/
i The collections of fragments of particular authors are mentioned under the notices of the individual philosophers. It would be desirable if they were all as excellent as Usener's Epicurea. Of the fragments of the Pre-Socratics W. F. A. Mullach has published a careful collection, which, however, is no longer adequate in the present condition of research (Fragmenta Philosophorum Grascorum).
3 Plut. Moralia, ed. DUbner, Paris, 1841 ; Diels, Dox. , pp. 272 ff. ; [Plutarch's Morals, Miscellanies, and Essays, ed. by Goodwin, Boston, 1870 ; trans, also in
the* Bohn Lib. ].
Ed. Bekker, Berlin, 1847.
* G. Kaibel, Leips. 1888-90. 6 Ed. Cobet, Paris, 1860.
Jt] The History of Philosophy. 17
pi* (he bibliography of recent works. ] Under the general literature may also
b» mentioned, R. Eucken, Die Lebcnsanschauungen der grosstn Denker (Leips,
m).
i) Explanation of facts in the history of philosophy is either pragmatic (logi
cal . or baaed on the history of civilisation, or psychological, corresponding to tin ine factors which we have set forth above as determining the movement ot limtht. Which of these three modes of explanation is to be applied in individ. ul cases depends solely upon the state of the facts with regard to the trans- bsboo of material. It is then incorrect to make either one the sole pri-. ciple & treatment. The pragmatic method of explanation is dominant with those »*> we in the entire history of philosophy the preparation for a definite system •( philosophy ; so with Hegel and his disciples (see above, p. 10 f. ); so from a Botanian standpoint with Chr. A. Thilo, Kurze pragmatische Geschichte der MaKfAit (2 pts. ; Coethen, 1876-80). Kuno Fischer and W. Windelband ute emphasised in their interpretation of modern philosophy, the importance <i considering the history of civilisation and the problems of the individual
The purely biographical treatment which deals only with successive person alia* ■ quite inadequate as a scientific exposition of the history of philosophy. Tla mode of treatment is represented in recent time by the treatise of G. H. Lews*, The History of Philosophy from Thales to the Present Day (2 vols. , tfled 1871), a book destitute of all historical apprehension, and at the same him > party composition in the spirit of the Positivism of Comte. The works ^ the French historians (Damiron, Ferraz) are inclined to take this form of » teparate essay-like treatment of individual philosophers, not losing from sight, ac»em. the course of development of the whole. l
'f ) The most difficult task is to establish the principles according to which the craeal philosophical estimate of the individual doctrines must be made up. The kustory of philosophy, like all history, is a critical science ; its duty is not •aiy to record and explain, but also to estimate what is to ccunt as progress ari fruit in the historical movement, when we have succeeded in knowing and
ladenunding this. There is no history without this critical point of view, and ■•**mdence of a historian's maturity is that he is clearly conscious of this point <4new ai criticism ; for where this is not the case he proceeds in the selection •4 ha material and in his characterisation of details only instinctively and *nhmi a clear standard. 3
h ■ understood, of course, that the standard of critical judgment must not be i pmaie theory of the historian, nor even his philosophic conviction ; at least '■*»employment of such a standard deprives the criticism exercised in accord- net wtth it of the value of scientific universality. He who is given to the heaef that he possesses the sole philosophical truth, or who comes to this field atari with the customs of the special sciences in which, no doubt, a sure result aakts it a very simple * matter to estimate the attempts which have led to it, — ■sea a one may well be tempted to stretch all forms that pass before him upon *■*»Procrustes-bed of his system ; but he who contemplates the work of thought a tatnry, with an open historical vision, will be restrained by a respectful ""mace from reprimanding the heroes of philosophy for their ignorance of the *■»«■ of an epigone. *
A WeU-r. lluinry »f Philosophy, is to be recommended as a good text-book '** French ed_ Paris, 1891). [Eng. tr. by Thilly, N. Y. 1896. ]
:Thia applies in every domain of history, in the history of politics and of •stasnre, at well as in that of philosophy.
1 Ai aa example of this it may be noticed that the deserving author of an *dlent History of the Principles of Mechanics, Ed. DUhring, has developed - ta Kritisckc Geschichte der Philosophic (3d ed. , Berlin, 1878) all the caprice
Me-«ided judgment. The like true of the confessional criticism passed a- Stockl. Lthrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophic vols. , 3d ed. , Mainz,
a Impoasible to protest enough against the youthful conceit with which "a far time the fashion in Germany to look down with ridicule or insult tnathe "achievements of the present " upon the great men of Greek and Ger-
*' *J'•*
* a
It
(2
is
18 Introduction.
In contrast with this external method of pronouncing sentence, the scientific history of philosophy must place itself upon the standpoint of immanent criti cism, the principles of which are two : formal logical consistency and intellectual fruitfulness.
Every philosopher grows into a certain set of ideas, and to these his thinking remains bound, and is subjected in its development to psychological necessity. Critical investigation has to settle how far it has been possible for him to bring the different elements of his thinking into agreement with each other. The contradiction is almost never actually present in so direct a form that the same thing is expressly maintained and also denied, but always in such a way that various positions are put forward which, only by virtue of their logical conse quences, lead to direct contradiction and really irreconcilable results. The dis covery of these discrepancies is formal criticism ; it frequently coincides with pragmatic explanation, for this formal criticism has been performed in history itself by the successors of the philosopher in question, and has thus determined for them their problems.
Yet this point of view alone is not sufficient. As purely formal it applies without exception to all attested views of a philosopher, but it gives no criterion for decision on the question, in what the philosophical significance of a doctrine really consists. For it is often the case that philosophy has done its work just in conceptions which must by no means be regarded as in themselves perfect or free from contradiction ; while a multitude of individual convictions, which there is no occasion to oppose, must remain unnoticed in a corner, so far as our historical survey is concerned. In the history of philosophy great errors are weightier than small truths.
For before all else the decisive question is : what has yielded a contribution to the development of man's conception of the universe and estimate of life ? In the history of philosophy those structures of thought are the objects of study which have maintained themselves permanent and living as forms of apprehen sion and norms of judgment, and in which the abiding inner structure of the human mind has thus come to clear recognition.
This is then the standard, according to which alone we can decide also which among the doctrines of the philosophers — concerning, as they often do, so many various things — are to be regarded as properly philosophical, and which, on the other hand, are to be excluded from the history of philosophy. Investi gation of the sources has of course the duty of gathering carefully and com pletely all the doctrines of philosophers, and so of affording all the material for explaining their genesis, whether from their logical content, or from the history of civilisation, or from psychological grounds ; but the purpose of this laborious work is yet only this, that the philosophically indifferent may be ultimately recognised as such, and the ballast then thrown overboard.
It is especially true that this point of view must essentially determine selec tion and presentation of material in a text-book, which is not to give the investi gation itself, but to gather up its results.
§ 3. Division of Philosophy and of its History.
It cannot be our purpose here to propose a systematic division of philosophy, for this could in no case possess universal validity his torically. The differences which prevail in the course of the histori cal development, in determining the conception, the task, and the subject-matter of philosophy, involve so necessarily and obviously a change also in the divisions, that this needs no especial illustration. The oldest philosophy knew no division at all. In later antiquity
man philosophy ; this was mainly the haughtiness of an ignorance which had no suspicion that it was ultimately living only by the thoughts of those whom it was abusing and despising.
§1] Division of Philosophy and of it* History. 19
i division of philosophy into logic, physics, and ethics was cur rent. In the Middle Ages, and still more in modern times, the im two of these subjects were often comprised under the title, theoretical philosophy, and set over against practical
philosophy. >:ace Kant a new threefold division into logical, ethical, and
tsxhetical philosophy is beginning to make its way, yet these various divisions are too much dependent upon the actual course of philosophy itself to make it worth our while to recount them i*re in detail.
On the other hand, it does commend itself to preface the historical exposition with at least a brief survey of the entire circuit of those problems which have always formed the subject of philosophy, how- er*r varied the extent to which they have been studied or the value tail has been attached to them, — a survey, therefore, for which no r'^im is made to validity from a systematic point of view, but which
j determined only by the purpose of preliminary orientation.
L Theoretical problems. Such we call those which refer, in part to car knowledge of the actual world, in part to an investigation of the
knowing process itself. In dealing with the former class, however, ti* general questions which concern the actual taken as a whole are distinguished from those which deal with single provinces of the srtuaL The former, viz. the highest principles for explaining the tmverse, and the general view of the universe based on these prin ciples, form the problem of metaphysics, called by Aristotle first, i. e.
fundamental, science, and designated by the name now usual, only on iceount of the position which it had in the ancient collection of the Aristotelian works — " after physics. " On account of his monothe istic view of the world, Aristotle also called this branch of knowl edge theology. Later writers have also treated rational or natural tLeUogy as a branch of metaphysics.
The special provinces of the actual are Nature and History. In
tie former, external
Tie problems presented to knowledge by external nature are called afmUogieal, or, specially, problems of natural philosophy, or perhaps fkymrnL The investigation of internal nature, i. e. of consciousness »>d its states and activities, is the business of psychology. The phil- '*oj&ical consideration of history remains within the borders of tksmUiiil philosophy only if it be limited to the investigation of '•** laws that prevail in the historical life of peoples ; since, how- em. history is the realm of man's purposeful actions, the questions
the philosophy of history, so far as this deals with the end of the aorement of history viewed as whole, and with the fulfilment of ! *• end, fall under the head of practical problems.
and internal nature are to be distinguished.
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20 Introduction.
Investigation directed upon knowledge itself is called logic (in the general sense of the word), and also sometimes noetic. If we are occupied with the question how knowledge actually arises, this
If, on the other hand, we set up norms or standards according to which our ideas are estimated as regards their worth for truth, we call
psycho-genetic consideration falls in the province of psychology.
these logical laws, and designate investigation directed upon them as logic in the narrower sense. The application of these laws gives rise to methodology, which develops the prescriptions for a systematic ordering of scientific activity with reference to the various ends of knowledge. The problems, finally, which arise from the questions concerning the range and limit of man's knowing faculty and its relation to the reality to be known, form the subject-matter of epistemology or theory of knowledge.
H. Siebeck, Oeschichte der Psychologie, Vol. I. , in two parts (Gotha, 1880-84), incomplete, extending into the scholastic period.
K. Prantl, Oeschichte der Logik im Abendlande, 4 vols. (Leips. 1866-70), brought down only to the Renaissance.
Fr. Harms, Die Philosophie in ihrer (feschichte. I. "Psychologie"; II. "Logik" (Berlin, 1877 and 1881).
[R. Adamsou, The History of Psychology (in prep. ). ]
2. Practical problems are, in general, those which grow out of the investigation of man's activity, so far as it is determined by ends. Here, too, a psycho-genetic treatment is possible, which falls under psychology. That discipline, on the other hand, which considers man's action from the point of view of the ethical norm or stand ard, is ethics or moral philosophy. By morals (Moral) in the narrower sense is usually understood the proposal and grounding of ethical precepts. Since, however, all ethical action has reference to the community, there are attached to morals or ethics, in the narrower sense, the philosophy of society (for which the unfortunate name sociology seems likely to become permanent), and the philosophy of law or right. Further, in so far as the ideal of human society con stitutes the ultimate meaning of history, the philosophy of history appears also in this connection, as already mentioned.
To practical problems, in the broadest sense of the word, belong also those which relate to art and religion. To designate philosoph ical investigation of the nature of the beautiful and of art, the name ossthetics has been introduced since the end of last century. If phi losophy takes the religious life for its object, not in the sense of itself intending to give a science of the nature of the deity, but in the sense of an investigation with regard to man's religious behaviour, we call this discipline philosophy of religion.