The meaning that you
attribute to the expression "in relation to" has not yet been
17
explained.
attribute to the expression "in relation to" has not yet been
17
explained.
AbhidharmakosabhasyamVol-4VasubandhuPoussinPruden1991
3, Samantapdsddikd, i.
184, Koia, vii.
p.
1145.
The Arhat prolongs his life in order to prolong the Law, Kosa, ii. English trans, p. 165. The Law is protected by humans and gods, Samyukta, TD 2, p. 177b22. Levi and Chavannes, "Les seize Arhats protecteurs de la Loi," /. As. , 1916, ii. 9; J. Przyluski, AQoka, Chap. VII. Development of eschatological ideas relative to the Law, and also 207, 336, 399,452.
b. Cullavagga, x. 1. 6: "If women had not been admitted, this brahmacariya would last a long time, it would last one thousand years; but as they have been admitted, this brahmacariya will not last for a long time: the Saddharma will last five hundred years. " No mention of years in the Bhiksuntkarmavdcand (Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, 1920, p. 125). , nor in Rockhili, Life, p. 60.
Same doctrine in the Pi-ni-mu ching (TD 24, p. 818c5), where the explanation is given by Kas*yapa (Przyluski, A$oka, p. 173); see also Madhyama, TD 1, p. 607b8 (quoted by Saeki). Saeki also quotes the Vinaya of the Mahisdsakas (TD 22, p. 186al4) "If the Bhiksunis observe the eight gurudharmas, the Law will last one thousand years. "
But, in the Vinaya of the Sarvdstivddins ("judgment of Ananda"), the duration of the Law is limited to one thousand years because women have beens admitted. Same doctrine in the other texts relative to the First Council (Przyluski, ibid. ).
Aiokdvaddna, and many other texts, have one thousand years; the Mahdmdydsutra, TD 12, p. 1013b21 - 10l4a2, has fifteen hundred years (Przyluski, p. 161-173); see also the [Fo lin nieh-p'an chi] Fa-chu ching, TD 12, p. 1113a2-clO.
I-ching (Takakusu, 106) quotes the Vinaya: "As long as there is a karmdcdrya (? "the Upholders of rules"), my Law will not be destroyed. When there will be no person who "upholds and supports" the karman, my Law will end," and again: "As long as my precepts exist, I shall live. " Sum. Vil. i. ll.
? Five successive disappearances: adhigama, patipatti, pariyatti, linga, and dhdtu, in Manorathapurani, i. 87, Andgatavamsa (Minayev, JPTS. 1886 and Warren, 481).
Three disapearances, adhigama, patipatti, and linga, in Milinda, \? ? .
"Disappearance of the shadow of the Buddha . . . and how many Arhats do we have who can preserve the Good Law? It is said in a Treatise: The Great Lion has closed his eyes and his witnesses have disappeared one after the other . . . ," I-ching, Takakusu, p. 106 [compare above p. 1282].
The Vajracchedikdtikd, Mdo, xvi. fol. 234a, explaining Vajracchedikd, p. 22: pascime kale paicime samaye pahimdydm paficasatydm saddharmavipralopakdle vartamdne: "It is well known (prasiddha) that the teaching of the Bhagavat lasts five times five hundred years; this is why the text specifies: during the last period of five hundred years, for it is then that the five kasdyas (iii. 4c, 93a) increase. "
Nanjo (in Max Mtiller, SBE. 49, p. 116) mentions the Mahdsamnipdtasutra (TD 13, p. 363a29): In the first five hundred years, the Bhiksus and others will be "strong in deliberation" (will obtain satydbhisamaya? ); in the second period of five hundred years, they will be strong in meditation (samddhi, dhydna); in the third, in Scripture (s*ruta)\ in the fourth, the building of monasteries; and in the fifth, in quarrels and slander. The White Law will become invisible.
Footnotes 1309
? 1310 Chapter Eight
d. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 226c6: In the Period when the Saddarma of KaSyapa began to perish, a pratirupaka Dharma arose; when this has arisen, the Saddharma will have perished. " Saddharmapundarikd, 67. 7: "The Saddharma of Padmaprabha will last thirty-two antarakalpas; when it is destroyed, the saddharmapratirupaka will last the same number of kalpas"; 377: "The Saddharma of Jitasvararaja was destroyed, and in the period when the saddharmapratirupala was disappearing, this religion (sasana) was overrun by Bhiksus who attributed to themselves spiritual gifts which they did not possess
220. According to Hsuan-tsang. According to Paramartha: I have presented in this treatise the Abhidharma of the Buddha Bhagavat. Have I presented it according to the school of the Sautrantikas or as it is presented in the Vibhasd}
According to the Vydkhya: Is the Abhidharma that I have taught here, namely the Abhidharmakosa, the Abhidharma of the canonical Treatises, the Abhidharma of the Jndnaprasthdna, etc. ?
221. Vydkhya: ? ? 'yam itivistarah /? ? 'yam ihdbhidharmakosalaksano 'bhidharma uktah kim esa eva sdstrdbhidharmo jndnaprasthanddhilaksano desito'ta idam ucyate / kdsmiravaibhd- sikanitisiddha iti vistarah / kasmire bhavdh kdsmirdh / vibhdsayd divyanti vaibhdsikd iti vydkhydtam etat / santi kdsmird na vaibhdsikd ye vinayacintddayah sautrdntikd ity bhadantddayah / santi vaibhdsikd na kdsmird ye bahirdesakd ity ubhayavisesanam // tesdm nitydyah siddho 'bhidharmah sa prayeneha mayd desitah / arthdd uktam bhavati / anyanitisiddho'pi desita iti // ? ad durgrhitam kdsmiravaibhdsikanayendnyanayena vd tad ihavacane 'smaddgo 'smadaparddhah // kim kdranam ity aha / saddharmanitau munayah pramdnam iti/ saddharmasydgamddhigamalaksanasya nitau varnane munayobuddhd bhagavanto buddhaputrds cdryasdradvatiputrddayah pramdnam sarvdkdrasarvadharmdva- bodha dptd ity arthah.
222. a. Hsuan-tsang: "The discussion of the Abhidharma of the Vaibhasikas of KaSmir [=the Five Hundred Arhats, according to Saeki] is correctly established. [There is perhaps a mistake here with respect to the sense of siddha. ] It is by depending on them that I have, in general, presented the Abhidharma. That which is false is my fault. The authority for judging the Dharma is only the Buddhas and the Mahasravakas. "
b. Samghabhadra (in his Nydydnusdra, TD29, p. 775? 8): ". . . It is by depending on them that I have, in general, presented the Abhidharma. Here the Sautrantika [= Vasubandhu] presents his fundamental thought, saying: Depending on the Mahdvibhasd, discussing the principles of the Abhidharma of the Saugatas of this land, and making an effort to correctly understand to the end that the Good Law will last a long time for the salvation of beings, I have composed this treatise. The great bulk of this book presents the system [of the Vibhasd]; a smaller part follows other paths, for example with respect to physical matter as shape (samsthdnarupa, iv. English trans, p. 557), with respect to the past and future (v. 27), etc. But the nature of the dharmas is very profound, and my intelligence is weak: I am not capable of diligently searching out (ch'in-ch'iu JJ^c ) the Preacher of Truth (yathdbhutavddin) (? ). Consequently, in the interpretation (niti) presented in this long treatise, if one small part is poorly supported (durgrhita = pien-liang ^ i = of contestable authority; the meaning is perhaps "If I have, sometimes, reproduced some incorrect doctrines . . . "), it is my fault. The Buddhas, having accumulated the provisions of knowledge (jn dnasambhdra) know any object of consciousness. The Pratyekabuddhas cannot judge the characteristics of the dharmas; even less the &ravakas, for the Dharma that they realize depends on a teaching. Thus, in order to judge the dharmas, there are only the true great Munis. By this we know that the Abhidharma is truly the word of the Buddha. One should accept it with faith, practice-meditate on it correctly, and diligently search out deliverance. "
? Paramartha {TD 29, p. 304a5): The Vaibhasikas of Kasmir possess the two cheng1 ~ ? ? ? This Abhidharma--the Abhidharmakosa--has been presented by me, in
? general, conforming to their doctrine. If there is here anything that is badly grasped, it is my fault. In lieu of cheng capable of correctly judging the Good Law, only the Buddhas Bhagavats are the supreme measure (pramdna). Why? Because they immediately see all the dharmas. Apart from Scripture (dgama) and the Path (mdrga), the Aryasravakas of the Buddha are not even a mediocre measure in correctly judging the Good Law.
1. What is this twofold cheng (- sdksin, pratibhu, etc. )? Perhaps persons who possess the dgama and the adhigama (as explained viii. 39a), in other words the dgama and the mdrga.
223. The first stanza is quoted in l-ching, Takakusu, p. 106.
Vydkhyd: nimilite sdstari lokacaksusiti / parinirvrte bhagavati lokasya caksurbhute
mdrgdmdrgasamdar/ake / anendndhabhutatdm lokasya darsayati // ksayam gate sdksijane ca bhilyaseti / sdksdd drastari sdksi/ mdrgdmdrgajno bhagavan itiye'dhigatatattvd bhagavatah sdksijanah sahdyabhutah / tasmin parinitvanejzsine / avidyandhddrstatattvair niravagrahair nirankusaih svayamdrstikatayd kutarkdpannair bhavadhir bhagavatah idsanam granthatas cdrthata? cdkulam krtam // gate hi sdntim paramdm svayambhuvityddi purvaHokoktasydrthasya heturupo'yam dvittyah sloka upanyasyate / buddhahuddhaputresu hi parinirvrtesv andthajagati sdsanantardhanahetubhir drstyddibhir malair dosair nirankusaih svayam yatheccham iha loke'dye samprati caryate / bhdvasddhanam etat // tatas caivam kanthagataprdnam ivety art hah / tad viditvd / balakdkam ca mdldndm dosdndm na pramddyam mumuksubhir iti bhdvasddhanam iti.
Footnotes 1311
? ?
Refutation of the pudgala
m. Homage to the Buddha.
Is there any liberation outside of Buddhism? 1 No, there is not.
What is the reason for this?
CHAPTER NINE
There is no liberation outside of this teaching, because other doctrines are corrupted by a false conception of a soul. The word as other doctrines conceive it is not a metaphoric expression for a series of skandhas. By the power of their belief in this soul as a substantial entity, there arises clinging to the soul, the defilements are generated,2 and liberation is impossible.
How do we know that the word "soul" is only a designation for a series of skandhas, and that no soul exists in and of itself? 3
We know this because no proof establishes the existence of a soul apart from the skandhas, no proof by direa perception, nor any proof from inference. 4 If the soul were a real entity, separate like other entities,5 it would be attained (i. e. , known) either by direct perception as are the objeas of the five sense consciousnesses and the objea of mental consciousness,6 or by inference, as are the five indriyas.
In faa, the five organs are known through inference. In the world, despite the presence of general causes, a result is not produced if certain specific causes are absent: for a sprout to be generated, one needs not only water, earth, and human effort, but also a seed. In the same way, even though general causes -- the presence of an external
? 1314 Chapter Nine
object, attention, etc. ,--are present, the blind and the deaf do not see and hear to the extent that the non-blind and the non-deaf see and hear. The first are lacking, whereas the second have the specific causes for visual and auditory consciousness: these are the organs, material organs that are made of an invisible and
7
There is neither direct perception nor inference of a soul independent of the skandhas. We know then that a real soul does not exist.
***
intangible matter, and which is known only through inference.
The Vatslputriyas admit a pudgala which is neither identical to 8
the skandhas nor different from them. We should examine
whether this pudgala exists as an entity or as designation of a
nominal existence. If it has a separate existence, like physical
matter, then the pudgala exists as an entity. If it is only a collection,
9
[The Vatslputriyas:] What is wrong with admitting the first or the second hypothesis?
If the pudgala is an entity, it will be different from the skandhas', because its nature is separate, as the skandhas are different one from another (or it will be produced by causes and then it will not be eternal as you say), and you will have to name its causes; or it will be unconditioned: and this is a non-Buddhist
10
like milk, then it exists as a designation.
opinion; and if it is unconditioned, the pudgala will be useless.
is thus false to believe that the pudgala is an entity. )But if you admit that the pudgala exists only as a title of designation, you will abandon your doctrine and you will be placed within our doctrines.
[The Vatslputriyas:] We do not say that it is an entity, and we
do not say that it exists only as a designation of the skandhas: for
us the designation pudgala occurs in necessary relationship to
11 present, internal skandhas (skandhan upadaya).
(It
? A blind response, containing little to enlighten us! What does the expression "in relation to" mean? If you explain skandhdn upddaya as skandhdnarh laksate (characterized by the skandhas), you must then say "The designation pudgala occurs by taking the elements as an object": this is to recognize that pudgala is a word designating the skandhas, the same as the designation "milk" occurs taking as its object the constituents of milk--color, etc. If you explain skandhdn upddaya as skandhdn pratttya "conditioned by the skandhas" the same conclusion follows. You admit, in fact, that it is the skandhas which are the cause of the designation pudgala.
[The Vatslputrlyas:] This is not the way that we conceive of the pudgala and its relationship with the skandhas, but rather as the world conceives of fire and its relationship with fuel.
How does it conceive of fire and its relationship with fuel?
The world conceives of fire "in relation to fuel": they do not conceive of fire independent of fuel; they believe that fire is not identical with fuel nor different from fuel. If fire were different from fuel, fuel would not be hot; if fire were the same as fuel the consumed would be the consumer. In the same way we do not conceive of the pudgala as independent of the skandhas; we hold that the pudgala is neither identical to the skandhas nor different from the skandhas: if it were different from the skandhas, it would be eternal and thus unconditioned; but if it were identical to the skandhas, it would then be susceptible of annihilation.
***
Define the terms "fire" and "fuel," so that I can better understand what the expression "fire in relation to fuel" signifies.
[The Vatslputrlyas:] What shall we say to you? The consumed is the fuel, the consumer is fire.
But that is precisely what I want to know with precision: what
Refutation of the pudgala 1315
? 1316 Chapter Nine
is the thing consumed, and what is the thing that is the consumer?
[The Vatslputriyas:] In the world, a thing to be burned, not on
fire, wood, is called the combustible matter (i. e. , fuel), the
12
consumed; the thing that exercises the action of burning, bright,
very hot, in flames, is called the consumer or fire. The series that
constitutes the fuel, is ignited by the fire, and it is reduced to
13
ashes; by means of fire, each moment of existence of the series of
fuel is made different from the preceeding moment. The fire and
14
fuel are both made up of eight substances; consequently, fire is
generated by reason of the fuel, as milk ferments and vinegar is created by reason of milk and wine. This is why the world agrees in saying that fire exists "in relation to fuel/'
If this were the case, fire is different from the fuel, as their time-periods are different: there is first fuel, and then fire. If your pudgala exists in relation to the skandhas, as fire exists in relation to fuel, you then have to admit that, since it is produced by reason of the skandhas, it is different from the skandhas, and that it is, moreover, transitory.
15 [The Vatslputriyas:] In the thing set on fire, wood, etc. , one
of the substances, namely a tangible object which is heat, is the fire; the other substances are the fuels. Then your remark on the priority in time of the fuel does not hold.
But fire and fuel, generated at the same time, are "separate/'
16
since their characteristics are distinct.
The meaning that you
attribute to the expression "in relation to" has not yet been
17
explained. Since fire and fuel are generated at the same time, how
can one say that fire exists in relation to fuel? Fire, which is one of
the substances of the object on fire, does not have fuel for a cause,
which is the other substances of the said object, since all these
substances were generated at the same time, each from its own,
separate cause. One can say no more than that the term "fire" had
for a cause (or object) fuel, since this term is applied to the tangible
18 "heat. "
[The Vatslputriyas:] The expression "fire in relation to fuel"
? means that the fire has fuel as its basis, or that the fire coexists
19 with fuel.
This means that the pudgala coexists with the skandhas or that it depends on the skandhas: this then admits that it differs from the skandhas. And logic demands also that, as fire does not exist when fuel is absent, likewise the pudgala does not exist without skandhas. You do not admit these conclusions; then your explanation is worthless.
Fire is not different from fuel (p. 1315, line 18), because, in this hypothesis, fuel would not be hot.
What does "hot" mean? If "hot" is defined as being the tangible "heat" (namely fire), as has been done above, then fuel will not be hot (since fuel is the object on fire, without the tangible element "heat"). If "hot" is that which is associated with heat (i. e. , if one admits that fuel is termed hot by reason of its association with heat), then this means that different things (of "heat") are called "hot": the one tangible "heat" is designated by "fire" and all that is associated with this tangible is designated by the name "hot. " To think thus is to confess that fuel is termed hot although
20
it is different from fire or from the tangible "heat. " Vatslputriyas are thus justified in saying that "fire is not different from fuel since fuel is hot. "
[The Vatslputriyas:] Wood on fire is called fuel; it is also called fire.
Explain then the meaning that you attribute to the expression "fire in relation to fuel"! The pudgala (the active data of relation, of the updddya) will be identical to the skandhas (passive data of the said "relation"): no reasoning can establish the non-identity (of these two). The thesis of the Vatslputriyas, that the pudgala exists in relation to the skandhas as fire exists in relation to fuel, cannot be rationally established in any hypothesis.
***
Refutation of the pudgala 1317
The
? 1318 Chapter Nine
The pudgala is ineffable in that which concerns its relation-
ship--its identity or non-identity--with the skandhas. How can
they distinguish "five categories of things susceptible of being
21
and future things; 4. unconditioned, or non-caused things, and 5.
known":
the ineffable (or pudgala)* }
1-3. conditioned things, in other words, past, present,
1
The pudgala, in fact, should also be ineffable from this point of view: if it is ineffable, one cannot say either that it is a fifth
22 category, nor that this is not a fifth category.
***
Let us examine what this word "pudgala" depends on. If it depends on the skandhas, then the pudgala exists solely as a designation, as the expression pudgala depends on the skandhas and not on a real pudgala. If it depends on a real pudgala, why did the Vatslputrlyas say that the designation "pudgala' is "in relation to the skandhas'^ Then would have had to say "in relation to the pudgala. " But, in faa, they do not maintain that the pudgala is established in relation to a pudgala. Moreover the expression pudgala is a simple designation of skandhas.
[The Vatslputrlyas:] Given the skandhas, the pudgala is
But color is perceived when diverse causes are present, the eye, light, etc. ; may we thereby conclude that the designation "color" is "with relation to these diverse causes"?
***
Another point. By which of the six consciousnesses--cons- ciousnesses of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, or mental consciousness--is the pudgala perceived?
23
"with relation to the skandhas. "
perceived:
that is why we say that the designation "pudgala' is
? [The Vatslputriyas:] It is perceived by all six consciousnesses. When the eye consciousness recognizes physical matter (=a body), it indirectly discerns the pudgala? ^ and then we can say that the pudgala is known by the eye consciousness. But the relationship of the pudgala with physical matter, be it identical or different, is inexpressible. The same for the other consciousnesses: when the mental consciousness recognizes the dharmas (mind and mental states), it indirectly discerns the pudgala; it is then known by the mental consciousness, but its relationship with these states is inexpressible.
It follows from this explanation too that the pudgala exists solely as a designation exactly like milk. When the eye conscious- ness recognizes the color of milk, it indirectly discerns the milk: the milk is then known by the eye consciousness and one cannot say that the milk is the same thing as its color or is different from its color. The same for ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousness: the body consciousness recognizes tangibles; from whence there is the consciousness of milk; the milk is then known by the body consciousness without which one could only say that the milk is identical to the tangible, or different from the tangible. In fact milk is not fourfold: then it is not color, smell, taste, tangible; but furthermore, one cannot say that the milk is not made of these four. The conclusion is that one metaphorically designates a complex of elements by "pudgala" the same as the designation "milk" is understood as a coming together of color, smell, etc. They are merely names without reality.
What meaning do you therefore attach to the phrase, "When the eye consciousness recognizes physical matter, it indirectly discerns the pudgala"} Do you want to say that physical matter is the cause of the perception of the pudgala, or that the perception of physical matter and the pudgala takes place at the same time?
If the Vatslputriyas answer that physical matter is the cause of the perception of the pudgala but that, nevertheless, one cannot say that the pudgala is different from physical matter, then the condition and the causes of the perception of physical matter--eye,
Refutation of the pudgala 1319
? 1320 Chapter Nine
light, an act of attention--would not be different from physical matter.
If the Vatslputriyas answer that one perceives the pudgala at
25
the same time as one perceives physical matter,
question whether one perceives the pudgala by the same operation which perceives physical matter, or by a different operation.
In the first hypothesis, the pudgala is only physical matter and the designation "pudgala" applies only to physical matter. It is then impossible to distinguish 'This is physical matter; that is pudgala" Without this distinction, how can one prove that there is physical matter and that there is a pudgala} The existence of the pudgala cannot be proven by this distinction.
In the second hypothesis, since the time of the two perceptions is different, the pudgala will be as different from color and shape as yellow is from blue, as former is from latter.
The same reasoning follows for the other skandhas.
[The Vatslputriyas:] As one cannot say that the pudgala is the same thing as color and shape, nor that it is different from color and shape, likewise the perception of the pudgala is not the same as the perception of the color and shape, nor different from this perception.
This point of view obliges you to say that the perception of the pudgala, being ineffable, is not made part of the category of "conditioned things": but now you do not admit this thesis, since, for you, all perception is "conditioned".
***
If the pudgala is an entity that one cannot define as being
we would
? matter (the ? ? ? ? skandha,) nor as being non-matter (the four non-material skandhas, vedand skandha, etc. ), why did the Blessed One say that "matter and the other skandhas are not self? 26
***
The pudgala, you say, is attained by the eye consciousness. Is this consciousness generated by color and shape, or by the pudgala, or both? In the first hypothesis, one cannot maintain that this eye consciousness perceives the pudgala, because the pudgala is not the object of this consciousness, as neither is sound. In fact, all consciousnesses that are produced having as their condition a certain thing, has this same thing as an "object as condition": now the pudgala, not being a condition of the eye consciousness, cannot be its object. Thus the visual consciousness does not perceive the pudgala.
The other two hypothesis contradict the Sutra which says that the eye consciousness is generated by reason of two things,27 namely, by the eye and by physical matter and shape. The Sutra says"Oh Bhiksus, eye consciousness is generated having the eye as its cause (hetu) and physical matter as its condition (pratyaya= alambanapratyaya). All eye consciousness is by reason of the eye and physical matter. "28
If the pudgala is the cause of the eye consciousness, it will be impermanent, because the Sutra says, "All causes and all conditions that produce consciousnesses are impermanent. "
[The Vatslputriyas:] We admit then that the pudgala is not an object as condition {alambana) of consciousness.
[Very well; but then it is not discernible (vijneya), an object of vijnana\ if it is not discernible, it is not cognizable (jneya), the object of jnana\ if it is not cognizable, how can one prove that it exists? If one cannot prove that it exists, your system collapses. ]
Refutation of the pudgala 1321
? 1322 Chapter Nine
You have said that the pudgala is discerned by the six
29
consciousnesses.
will be, like physical matter and shape, different from sound; if it is discerned by the ear consciousness, it will be, like sound, different from physical matter and shape. And thus for those (conscious- nesses) that follow.
Moreover, your thesis is in contradiction to the Sutra. The
Sutra says, "Oh Brahmin, the five organs (of sight, hearing, smell,
taste, touch) have distinct spheres (gocara) and objects {visaya).
30
Each one of them perceives its own sphere and its own object, and does not perceive the sphere or the object of the others. And the mental organ perceives the spheres and the objects of the first
31
But, if it is discerned by the eye consciousness, it
five organs, and they have the mental organ as their refuge. " rather would you say, in agreement with the Sutra, that the pudgala is not the object (of the five organs)? In this case, it would not be discerned (by the five organs), and you put yourself in
32
***
[The Vatslputrlyas:] (You affirm, according to the Sutra, that each of the five organs has its own object, and you thus conclude that the pudgala is not the object of eye consciousness). But, according to the Sutra, the mental organ also has its own object
33
contradiction to your own system.
(and this is in contradiction to your system).
In fact, the
Satpranakopama-sutra says, "Each of these six organs has its own
object and its own sphere; each seeks after its object and its
34
sphere. "
This Sutra does not intend to speak of the six organs, because the five material organs and the five consciousnesses which are dependent on them do not possess the desire to see, to hear, etc.
Or
? This Sutra understands, by organ of the eye, etc. , the mental
35
consciousness which is induced and dominated by the eye, etc.
this fact, the mental consciousness which is isolated--that is to say, which is not induced and dominated by one of the five material organs, but solely by the mental organ--does not have any desire with regard to the spheres and objects of the five organs, but solely with regard to the dharmdyatana. Thus the Satpranakopama-sutra does not contradict the Sutra previously quoted.
#**
The Blessed One has said, "Oh Bhiksus, I declare to you all the dharmas that should be penetrated (abhijneya) and known (parijneya), namely: the eyes, physical matter, eye consciousness, eye contact, the sensation which is produced having as a cause eye contact, painful, pleasant, and neither painful nor pleasant sensation. . . . And thus following to: "the sensation which is produced having as its cause contact with the mental organ: these
36
are what should be penetrated and known. "
This text teaches us
that the dharmas to be penetrated and comprehended are only
those enumerated. The pudgala does not figure in this list: then it
is not susceptible of being discerned {vijneya). In fact, the
speculative consciousness (prajna) by which one penetrates or
comprehends, has the same sphere (visaya) as does ordinary
1 consciousness (vijnana)?
###
The masters who maintain that the eye sees the pudgala should learn that the eye sees only that which is real in the pudgala (namely physical matter: the same for the other five organs). They fall into the abyss of harmful views in saying that it sees a soul in
38 what is not a soul.
Furthermore, the Buddha explained that the ^NOtA pudgala
Refutation of the pudgala 1323
By
? 1324 Chapter Nine
59
designates the skandhas. In the Sutra of Man, he said, "Supported
by the eye, having physical matter for its object and condition, the visual consciousness arises: by reason of the coming together of these three, contact arises; at the same time there arises sensation,
40
thought, the act of attention, etc. " The last four terms--vijndna,
vedand, samjna, cetana--are non-material skandhas: the eye and
physical matter are the rilpa skandhas. Here is then all that one
speaks of when one says "man. " In order to express various
nuances, one inserts various words, such as sattva, being, nara,
nourished, fiva, vital principle, jantu, he who is born, pudgala, person. One says to oneself, "My eye sees physical matter," and according to current usage, "This venerable one is of such a name, of such a family, of such a gotta, of such food, of such happiness and of such suffering, of such length of life; he lasts a time; he
42
terminates his life in such a manner.
these are only manners of speaking, words, expressions conform- ing to the usage of the world, because there are only impermanent things in the pudgala, conditioned things, born of causes and conditions, created through deeds/'
***
The Blessed One declares that the Sutras of explicit meanings
are the authority. The Sutras that we have quoted are of explicit
43 meaning; one cannot draw a divergent explanation from them.
Moreover, 1. The Blessed One said to a Brahmin, "When I say that all exists, I mean that there are twelve sources of conscious-
44 45
ness {ayatana, i. 20a). " Then if the pudgala is not included in the
twelve ayatanas, it does not exist; and if it is included one cannot say that it is ineffable.
2. The Vatslputriyas read a Sutra which says, "All that is of the eye, all physical matter. . . the Tathagata, Oh Bhiksus, embraces this group (namely the twelve dyatanas), terms them 'all/ establishes that 'all* exists, so many dharmas in themselves. " Now, there is no
man, manuja, born of Manu, manava, young man, posa, he who is 41
Oh Bhiksus, know that
? pudgala there: how can one say that the pudgala is a real entity?
3. The Bimbisara-sutra says, "A stupid, ignorant Prthagjana
becomes attached to words, and he imagines that there is a self; but
there is no self nor things pertaining to self, but only past, present
46 and future painful dharmas*
47
4. The worthy {arhatt) Sila said to Mara, "You fall into wrong
views by wrongly maintaining that there is a being in the group of conditions {samskdras) which is empty: the wise understand that such a being does not exist. As the name 'chariot* is given to a group of parts, the world uses the word 'being': one should know that this is a group of skandhas. "
48
5. In the Ksudrakdgama, the Buddha said to the Brahmin
50
49
themselves from all fetters: through the mind (there is) defile-
Daridra,
"Daridra, those who understand the Truths can deliver
ment, and also purification through the mind.
The self, in fact,
does not have the nature of a soul; it is through error that one
thinks that a soul exists; there is no being (sattva), no soul, but
only dharmas produced through causes: skandhas, sources-of-cons-
ciousness (ayatana), dhatus, that constitute the twelve limbs of
existence; examined in depth, there is found to be no pudgala
there. Seeing that the interior is empty, see that externals are
empty;
51 52 and there is no ascetic who meditates on emptiness. "
53
6. The Sutra
a soul: one creates a theory of the soul, of a being, of a vital principal; one is not distinguished from heterodox teachers; one takes a road which is not the Way; his mind does not enter into emptiness, his faith does not satisfy him, he is not established in it to his satisfaction, there is no propensity (for liberation); the Aryan qualities are not purified in him. "
***
Refutation of the pudgala 1325
says, "Five calamities proceed from the belief in
[The Vatslputriyas:] These texts are not authoritative, because
? 1326 Chapter Nine
they are not read in our tradition.
What then is the authority in your system, your tradition or the words of the Buddha? If it is your tradition, then the Buddha is not your teacher, and you are not a child of the Sakyan. If it is the word of the Buddha, why do you not recognize the authority of all the words of the Buddha?
[The Vatslputriyas:] The texts you have quoted are not the
54 authentic word of the Buddha,
them.
That is not a good reason.
Why is this?
since our tradition does not read
55
Because all the other traditions read these texts,
these texts do not contradict any other Sutras, nor philosophic
56
truths.
by saying, "They are not authentic because we do not read them," this is only pure impudence contrary to all good sense.
***
The position of the Vatslputriyas is moreover more inadmissa-
ble since their sect reads a Sutra which says, "The dharmas are not 57
[The Vatslputriyas:] Without doubt we read this Sutra. But the pudgala is neither the dharmas which serve as its support, nor is it different from these dharmas; that is why it says that "no dharma is a soul. "
Very well; but it is taught that the pudgala cannot be discerned
by the mental consciousness, since the Sutra establishes clearly that
the mental consciousness is produced by reason of two condi-
58
tions,
the mental organ (manas) and the dharmas. Besides how
Also, when you embolden yourself to brutally reject them
soul and do not contain a soul. "
would you explain the Sutra which says, "To recognize a soul in
what is not soul is a mistake of ideas, of mind, and of view"?
59
and because
? [The Vatslputriyas:] This Sutra says that it is a mistake to recognize a soul in that which is not a soul; it does not say that it is a mistake to recognize a soul in what is a soul.
What is understood by "that which is not a soul"? Would you
say that it concerns the skandhas, ayatanas and dhatusl This
contradicts your theory that the pudgala is not identical to physical
matter, etc.
60 61
Further, a Sutra says, "Oh Bhiksus, know that all
the Brahmins and monks that contemplate a soul, contemplate
only the five skandhas-of-ztt&chment. " Then this (contemplation)
is not a soul, because the self that one recognizes as a soul is solely
the dharmas that are not a soul but which one falsely imagines to
attachment. " Then there is no pudgala in any of this.
[The Vatslputriyas:] But the same Sutra says, "In the past, I
64
This declaration is for the purpose of indicating that the saint
capable of recollecting his past lives remembers the variety of
characteristics of his series of these existences. But the Buddha
does not mean that he sees a real pudgala possessing, in a past life,
such physical matter, etc. : for to think such is to fall into
satkayadrsti. Or rather, if such is the meaning of this sentence,
65
62 63 be a soul. Another Sutra
says, "All those that have remembered, do remember, or shall remember their various past existences-- their remembrance is solely with regard to the five skandha$-oi-
was handsome (literally: I possessed physical matter)/'
then its sole purpose is to reject it as non-authentic.
that the Sutra, insofar as it attributes the possession of physical matter, etc. , to a soul, has in view "a self of designation", as one speaks of a pile which, being only an accumulation, has no unity; or of a current of water which being only an accumulation, has no unity; or of a current of water which, being only a succession (of
66
***
waters), has no permanence.
[The Vatslputriyas:
67
] The Blessed One would then not be
Refutation of the pudgala 1327
We conclude
? 1328 Chapter Nine
omniscient, since the mind and mental states are not capable of knowing all the dharmas, seeing that mind and mental states change, arising and perishing from moment to moment. Omnis- cience can belong only to a soul, a pudgala.
We would reply that the pudgala would be eternal if it does not
perish when the mind perishes: a thesis which contradicts your
theory of a pudgala about which one can only say that it is eternal
or non-eternal. We do not say (as do the Mahasamghikas) that the
Buddha is omniscient in the sense that he knows all the dharmas at 68
one and the same time: "Buddha** designates a certain series: to
this series there belongs this unique ability that, by a single act of
modulating his mind, he immediately produces an exact conscious-
ness of the object relative to which a desire for knowing has arisen:
one then calls this series "Omniscient. '* One moment of thought is
not capable of knowing everything. On this point, there is a verse:
"As fire, by the capacity of its series, burns all, so too does the
Omniscient One--but not by a universal, simultaneous knowl-
69 edge. "
[The Vatslputrlyas:] How do you prove that (the word "Omniscient"should be understood as a series, and not as a particular self of universal knowledge)?
It is spoken of in the Scriptures, on the subject of the Buddhas of the past, present and future. For example the verse: "Buddhas of the past, Buddhas of the future, and Buddhas of the present destroy
70
the sorrows of many. '* But, in your system, the skandhas of
existence belong to the three periods of time, but not the pudgala. ***
[The Vatslputrlyas:] If the term pudgala only designates the
five skandhas-oi-btt&chment, how can the Blessed One say, "Oh
Bhiksus, I shall explain to you the burden, the taking up of the
burden, the laying down of the burden, and the bearer of the
71 burden. "
? Why may it not be explained in these terms?
[The Vatslputrlyas:] Because, if the pudgala is only a name
given to the skandhas, it cannot be the bearer of a burden. Why not?
Simply because it is unheard of.
Do not speak then of an ineffable pudgala. No one has ever ascertained the existence of an ineffable thing. And moreover you will have to account for the other statements of the Sutra that thirst (or desire) is the taking up of the burden: as thirst is a skandha, the "burden" (is too), and it is unheard of that a burden takes itself up. The "taking up of the burden" is included within the skandhasy and so too the bearer of the burden. These are the skandhas that the Blessed One designated by the name of ''pudgala, the bearer of the burden," as one sees in the explanation given a little farther on in the same Sutra.
After having said that the burden is the five skandhas-oi-2? -
tachment, that the taking up of the burden is thirst, and that the
laying down of the burden is the abandoning of thirst, it is said that
the bearer of the burden is the pudgala; but fearing that one
understands the pudgala inexactly, as an eternal, ineffable, real
entity, he explains, "(It is only to conform to the use of this world
that one says:) This venerable one, of such a name, of such a
gotra," and the rest (as in the Sutra on Man, above), in order that
one might well know that the pudgala is effable, impermanent,
72
and without a unique nature.
The five j^W^y-of-attachment
are painful in their nature: they receive then the name of
"burden"; each of the former moments of the series attract each of
the latter moments: it receives then the name of "bearer of the
73
burden. "
The pudgala is then not an entity.
***
[The Vatslputrlyas:] The pudgala exists [as an entity,] as the
Refutation of the pudgala 1329
? 1330 Chapter Nine
Sutra says, ' T o say that apparitional beings
75 view. "
Who denies the existence of apparitional beings? We admit the existence of these beings in the sense that the Blessed One understands them. For him, "apparitional beings" designates a series of skandhas (the series of five skandhas of an intermediary being), susceptible of going to another world without the intervention of a womb, an egg, or of moisture forms of birth. To negate the existence of an apparitional being so defined, is a false view, because this type of series of skandhas truly exists.
If you maintain that the negation of the pudgala is false, you wil have to say how this false view is given up. It cannot be given up by Seeing, nor by Meditation, for on the one hand, the pudgala is not included within the Truths, and, on the other hand, false
76 views are not given up by Meditation but by Seeing.
The Arhat prolongs his life in order to prolong the Law, Kosa, ii. English trans, p. 165. The Law is protected by humans and gods, Samyukta, TD 2, p. 177b22. Levi and Chavannes, "Les seize Arhats protecteurs de la Loi," /. As. , 1916, ii. 9; J. Przyluski, AQoka, Chap. VII. Development of eschatological ideas relative to the Law, and also 207, 336, 399,452.
b. Cullavagga, x. 1. 6: "If women had not been admitted, this brahmacariya would last a long time, it would last one thousand years; but as they have been admitted, this brahmacariya will not last for a long time: the Saddharma will last five hundred years. " No mention of years in the Bhiksuntkarmavdcand (Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, 1920, p. 125). , nor in Rockhili, Life, p. 60.
Same doctrine in the Pi-ni-mu ching (TD 24, p. 818c5), where the explanation is given by Kas*yapa (Przyluski, A$oka, p. 173); see also Madhyama, TD 1, p. 607b8 (quoted by Saeki). Saeki also quotes the Vinaya of the Mahisdsakas (TD 22, p. 186al4) "If the Bhiksunis observe the eight gurudharmas, the Law will last one thousand years. "
But, in the Vinaya of the Sarvdstivddins ("judgment of Ananda"), the duration of the Law is limited to one thousand years because women have beens admitted. Same doctrine in the other texts relative to the First Council (Przyluski, ibid. ).
Aiokdvaddna, and many other texts, have one thousand years; the Mahdmdydsutra, TD 12, p. 1013b21 - 10l4a2, has fifteen hundred years (Przyluski, p. 161-173); see also the [Fo lin nieh-p'an chi] Fa-chu ching, TD 12, p. 1113a2-clO.
I-ching (Takakusu, 106) quotes the Vinaya: "As long as there is a karmdcdrya (? "the Upholders of rules"), my Law will not be destroyed. When there will be no person who "upholds and supports" the karman, my Law will end," and again: "As long as my precepts exist, I shall live. " Sum. Vil. i. ll.
? Five successive disappearances: adhigama, patipatti, pariyatti, linga, and dhdtu, in Manorathapurani, i. 87, Andgatavamsa (Minayev, JPTS. 1886 and Warren, 481).
Three disapearances, adhigama, patipatti, and linga, in Milinda, \? ? .
"Disappearance of the shadow of the Buddha . . . and how many Arhats do we have who can preserve the Good Law? It is said in a Treatise: The Great Lion has closed his eyes and his witnesses have disappeared one after the other . . . ," I-ching, Takakusu, p. 106 [compare above p. 1282].
The Vajracchedikdtikd, Mdo, xvi. fol. 234a, explaining Vajracchedikd, p. 22: pascime kale paicime samaye pahimdydm paficasatydm saddharmavipralopakdle vartamdne: "It is well known (prasiddha) that the teaching of the Bhagavat lasts five times five hundred years; this is why the text specifies: during the last period of five hundred years, for it is then that the five kasdyas (iii. 4c, 93a) increase. "
Nanjo (in Max Mtiller, SBE. 49, p. 116) mentions the Mahdsamnipdtasutra (TD 13, p. 363a29): In the first five hundred years, the Bhiksus and others will be "strong in deliberation" (will obtain satydbhisamaya? ); in the second period of five hundred years, they will be strong in meditation (samddhi, dhydna); in the third, in Scripture (s*ruta)\ in the fourth, the building of monasteries; and in the fifth, in quarrels and slander. The White Law will become invisible.
Footnotes 1309
? 1310 Chapter Eight
d. Samyukta, TD 2, p. 226c6: In the Period when the Saddarma of KaSyapa began to perish, a pratirupaka Dharma arose; when this has arisen, the Saddharma will have perished. " Saddharmapundarikd, 67. 7: "The Saddharma of Padmaprabha will last thirty-two antarakalpas; when it is destroyed, the saddharmapratirupaka will last the same number of kalpas"; 377: "The Saddharma of Jitasvararaja was destroyed, and in the period when the saddharmapratirupala was disappearing, this religion (sasana) was overrun by Bhiksus who attributed to themselves spiritual gifts which they did not possess
220. According to Hsuan-tsang. According to Paramartha: I have presented in this treatise the Abhidharma of the Buddha Bhagavat. Have I presented it according to the school of the Sautrantikas or as it is presented in the Vibhasd}
According to the Vydkhya: Is the Abhidharma that I have taught here, namely the Abhidharmakosa, the Abhidharma of the canonical Treatises, the Abhidharma of the Jndnaprasthdna, etc. ?
221. Vydkhya: ? ? 'yam itivistarah /? ? 'yam ihdbhidharmakosalaksano 'bhidharma uktah kim esa eva sdstrdbhidharmo jndnaprasthanddhilaksano desito'ta idam ucyate / kdsmiravaibhd- sikanitisiddha iti vistarah / kasmire bhavdh kdsmirdh / vibhdsayd divyanti vaibhdsikd iti vydkhydtam etat / santi kdsmird na vaibhdsikd ye vinayacintddayah sautrdntikd ity bhadantddayah / santi vaibhdsikd na kdsmird ye bahirdesakd ity ubhayavisesanam // tesdm nitydyah siddho 'bhidharmah sa prayeneha mayd desitah / arthdd uktam bhavati / anyanitisiddho'pi desita iti // ? ad durgrhitam kdsmiravaibhdsikanayendnyanayena vd tad ihavacane 'smaddgo 'smadaparddhah // kim kdranam ity aha / saddharmanitau munayah pramdnam iti/ saddharmasydgamddhigamalaksanasya nitau varnane munayobuddhd bhagavanto buddhaputrds cdryasdradvatiputrddayah pramdnam sarvdkdrasarvadharmdva- bodha dptd ity arthah.
222. a. Hsuan-tsang: "The discussion of the Abhidharma of the Vaibhasikas of KaSmir [=the Five Hundred Arhats, according to Saeki] is correctly established. [There is perhaps a mistake here with respect to the sense of siddha. ] It is by depending on them that I have, in general, presented the Abhidharma. That which is false is my fault. The authority for judging the Dharma is only the Buddhas and the Mahasravakas. "
b. Samghabhadra (in his Nydydnusdra, TD29, p. 775? 8): ". . . It is by depending on them that I have, in general, presented the Abhidharma. Here the Sautrantika [= Vasubandhu] presents his fundamental thought, saying: Depending on the Mahdvibhasd, discussing the principles of the Abhidharma of the Saugatas of this land, and making an effort to correctly understand to the end that the Good Law will last a long time for the salvation of beings, I have composed this treatise. The great bulk of this book presents the system [of the Vibhasd]; a smaller part follows other paths, for example with respect to physical matter as shape (samsthdnarupa, iv. English trans, p. 557), with respect to the past and future (v. 27), etc. But the nature of the dharmas is very profound, and my intelligence is weak: I am not capable of diligently searching out (ch'in-ch'iu JJ^c ) the Preacher of Truth (yathdbhutavddin) (? ). Consequently, in the interpretation (niti) presented in this long treatise, if one small part is poorly supported (durgrhita = pien-liang ^ i = of contestable authority; the meaning is perhaps "If I have, sometimes, reproduced some incorrect doctrines . . . "), it is my fault. The Buddhas, having accumulated the provisions of knowledge (jn dnasambhdra) know any object of consciousness. The Pratyekabuddhas cannot judge the characteristics of the dharmas; even less the &ravakas, for the Dharma that they realize depends on a teaching. Thus, in order to judge the dharmas, there are only the true great Munis. By this we know that the Abhidharma is truly the word of the Buddha. One should accept it with faith, practice-meditate on it correctly, and diligently search out deliverance. "
? Paramartha {TD 29, p. 304a5): The Vaibhasikas of Kasmir possess the two cheng1 ~ ? ? ? This Abhidharma--the Abhidharmakosa--has been presented by me, in
? general, conforming to their doctrine. If there is here anything that is badly grasped, it is my fault. In lieu of cheng capable of correctly judging the Good Law, only the Buddhas Bhagavats are the supreme measure (pramdna). Why? Because they immediately see all the dharmas. Apart from Scripture (dgama) and the Path (mdrga), the Aryasravakas of the Buddha are not even a mediocre measure in correctly judging the Good Law.
1. What is this twofold cheng (- sdksin, pratibhu, etc. )? Perhaps persons who possess the dgama and the adhigama (as explained viii. 39a), in other words the dgama and the mdrga.
223. The first stanza is quoted in l-ching, Takakusu, p. 106.
Vydkhyd: nimilite sdstari lokacaksusiti / parinirvrte bhagavati lokasya caksurbhute
mdrgdmdrgasamdar/ake / anendndhabhutatdm lokasya darsayati // ksayam gate sdksijane ca bhilyaseti / sdksdd drastari sdksi/ mdrgdmdrgajno bhagavan itiye'dhigatatattvd bhagavatah sdksijanah sahdyabhutah / tasmin parinitvanejzsine / avidyandhddrstatattvair niravagrahair nirankusaih svayamdrstikatayd kutarkdpannair bhavadhir bhagavatah idsanam granthatas cdrthata? cdkulam krtam // gate hi sdntim paramdm svayambhuvityddi purvaHokoktasydrthasya heturupo'yam dvittyah sloka upanyasyate / buddhahuddhaputresu hi parinirvrtesv andthajagati sdsanantardhanahetubhir drstyddibhir malair dosair nirankusaih svayam yatheccham iha loke'dye samprati caryate / bhdvasddhanam etat // tatas caivam kanthagataprdnam ivety art hah / tad viditvd / balakdkam ca mdldndm dosdndm na pramddyam mumuksubhir iti bhdvasddhanam iti.
Footnotes 1311
? ?
Refutation of the pudgala
m. Homage to the Buddha.
Is there any liberation outside of Buddhism? 1 No, there is not.
What is the reason for this?
CHAPTER NINE
There is no liberation outside of this teaching, because other doctrines are corrupted by a false conception of a soul. The word as other doctrines conceive it is not a metaphoric expression for a series of skandhas. By the power of their belief in this soul as a substantial entity, there arises clinging to the soul, the defilements are generated,2 and liberation is impossible.
How do we know that the word "soul" is only a designation for a series of skandhas, and that no soul exists in and of itself? 3
We know this because no proof establishes the existence of a soul apart from the skandhas, no proof by direa perception, nor any proof from inference. 4 If the soul were a real entity, separate like other entities,5 it would be attained (i. e. , known) either by direct perception as are the objeas of the five sense consciousnesses and the objea of mental consciousness,6 or by inference, as are the five indriyas.
In faa, the five organs are known through inference. In the world, despite the presence of general causes, a result is not produced if certain specific causes are absent: for a sprout to be generated, one needs not only water, earth, and human effort, but also a seed. In the same way, even though general causes -- the presence of an external
? 1314 Chapter Nine
object, attention, etc. ,--are present, the blind and the deaf do not see and hear to the extent that the non-blind and the non-deaf see and hear. The first are lacking, whereas the second have the specific causes for visual and auditory consciousness: these are the organs, material organs that are made of an invisible and
7
There is neither direct perception nor inference of a soul independent of the skandhas. We know then that a real soul does not exist.
***
intangible matter, and which is known only through inference.
The Vatslputriyas admit a pudgala which is neither identical to 8
the skandhas nor different from them. We should examine
whether this pudgala exists as an entity or as designation of a
nominal existence. If it has a separate existence, like physical
matter, then the pudgala exists as an entity. If it is only a collection,
9
[The Vatslputriyas:] What is wrong with admitting the first or the second hypothesis?
If the pudgala is an entity, it will be different from the skandhas', because its nature is separate, as the skandhas are different one from another (or it will be produced by causes and then it will not be eternal as you say), and you will have to name its causes; or it will be unconditioned: and this is a non-Buddhist
10
like milk, then it exists as a designation.
opinion; and if it is unconditioned, the pudgala will be useless.
is thus false to believe that the pudgala is an entity. )But if you admit that the pudgala exists only as a title of designation, you will abandon your doctrine and you will be placed within our doctrines.
[The Vatslputriyas:] We do not say that it is an entity, and we
do not say that it exists only as a designation of the skandhas: for
us the designation pudgala occurs in necessary relationship to
11 present, internal skandhas (skandhan upadaya).
(It
? A blind response, containing little to enlighten us! What does the expression "in relation to" mean? If you explain skandhdn upddaya as skandhdnarh laksate (characterized by the skandhas), you must then say "The designation pudgala occurs by taking the elements as an object": this is to recognize that pudgala is a word designating the skandhas, the same as the designation "milk" occurs taking as its object the constituents of milk--color, etc. If you explain skandhdn upddaya as skandhdn pratttya "conditioned by the skandhas" the same conclusion follows. You admit, in fact, that it is the skandhas which are the cause of the designation pudgala.
[The Vatslputrlyas:] This is not the way that we conceive of the pudgala and its relationship with the skandhas, but rather as the world conceives of fire and its relationship with fuel.
How does it conceive of fire and its relationship with fuel?
The world conceives of fire "in relation to fuel": they do not conceive of fire independent of fuel; they believe that fire is not identical with fuel nor different from fuel. If fire were different from fuel, fuel would not be hot; if fire were the same as fuel the consumed would be the consumer. In the same way we do not conceive of the pudgala as independent of the skandhas; we hold that the pudgala is neither identical to the skandhas nor different from the skandhas: if it were different from the skandhas, it would be eternal and thus unconditioned; but if it were identical to the skandhas, it would then be susceptible of annihilation.
***
Define the terms "fire" and "fuel," so that I can better understand what the expression "fire in relation to fuel" signifies.
[The Vatslputrlyas:] What shall we say to you? The consumed is the fuel, the consumer is fire.
But that is precisely what I want to know with precision: what
Refutation of the pudgala 1315
? 1316 Chapter Nine
is the thing consumed, and what is the thing that is the consumer?
[The Vatslputriyas:] In the world, a thing to be burned, not on
fire, wood, is called the combustible matter (i. e. , fuel), the
12
consumed; the thing that exercises the action of burning, bright,
very hot, in flames, is called the consumer or fire. The series that
constitutes the fuel, is ignited by the fire, and it is reduced to
13
ashes; by means of fire, each moment of existence of the series of
fuel is made different from the preceeding moment. The fire and
14
fuel are both made up of eight substances; consequently, fire is
generated by reason of the fuel, as milk ferments and vinegar is created by reason of milk and wine. This is why the world agrees in saying that fire exists "in relation to fuel/'
If this were the case, fire is different from the fuel, as their time-periods are different: there is first fuel, and then fire. If your pudgala exists in relation to the skandhas, as fire exists in relation to fuel, you then have to admit that, since it is produced by reason of the skandhas, it is different from the skandhas, and that it is, moreover, transitory.
15 [The Vatslputriyas:] In the thing set on fire, wood, etc. , one
of the substances, namely a tangible object which is heat, is the fire; the other substances are the fuels. Then your remark on the priority in time of the fuel does not hold.
But fire and fuel, generated at the same time, are "separate/'
16
since their characteristics are distinct.
The meaning that you
attribute to the expression "in relation to" has not yet been
17
explained. Since fire and fuel are generated at the same time, how
can one say that fire exists in relation to fuel? Fire, which is one of
the substances of the object on fire, does not have fuel for a cause,
which is the other substances of the said object, since all these
substances were generated at the same time, each from its own,
separate cause. One can say no more than that the term "fire" had
for a cause (or object) fuel, since this term is applied to the tangible
18 "heat. "
[The Vatslputriyas:] The expression "fire in relation to fuel"
? means that the fire has fuel as its basis, or that the fire coexists
19 with fuel.
This means that the pudgala coexists with the skandhas or that it depends on the skandhas: this then admits that it differs from the skandhas. And logic demands also that, as fire does not exist when fuel is absent, likewise the pudgala does not exist without skandhas. You do not admit these conclusions; then your explanation is worthless.
Fire is not different from fuel (p. 1315, line 18), because, in this hypothesis, fuel would not be hot.
What does "hot" mean? If "hot" is defined as being the tangible "heat" (namely fire), as has been done above, then fuel will not be hot (since fuel is the object on fire, without the tangible element "heat"). If "hot" is that which is associated with heat (i. e. , if one admits that fuel is termed hot by reason of its association with heat), then this means that different things (of "heat") are called "hot": the one tangible "heat" is designated by "fire" and all that is associated with this tangible is designated by the name "hot. " To think thus is to confess that fuel is termed hot although
20
it is different from fire or from the tangible "heat. " Vatslputriyas are thus justified in saying that "fire is not different from fuel since fuel is hot. "
[The Vatslputriyas:] Wood on fire is called fuel; it is also called fire.
Explain then the meaning that you attribute to the expression "fire in relation to fuel"! The pudgala (the active data of relation, of the updddya) will be identical to the skandhas (passive data of the said "relation"): no reasoning can establish the non-identity (of these two). The thesis of the Vatslputriyas, that the pudgala exists in relation to the skandhas as fire exists in relation to fuel, cannot be rationally established in any hypothesis.
***
Refutation of the pudgala 1317
The
? 1318 Chapter Nine
The pudgala is ineffable in that which concerns its relation-
ship--its identity or non-identity--with the skandhas. How can
they distinguish "five categories of things susceptible of being
21
and future things; 4. unconditioned, or non-caused things, and 5.
known":
the ineffable (or pudgala)* }
1-3. conditioned things, in other words, past, present,
1
The pudgala, in fact, should also be ineffable from this point of view: if it is ineffable, one cannot say either that it is a fifth
22 category, nor that this is not a fifth category.
***
Let us examine what this word "pudgala" depends on. If it depends on the skandhas, then the pudgala exists solely as a designation, as the expression pudgala depends on the skandhas and not on a real pudgala. If it depends on a real pudgala, why did the Vatslputrlyas say that the designation "pudgala' is "in relation to the skandhas'^ Then would have had to say "in relation to the pudgala. " But, in faa, they do not maintain that the pudgala is established in relation to a pudgala. Moreover the expression pudgala is a simple designation of skandhas.
[The Vatslputrlyas:] Given the skandhas, the pudgala is
But color is perceived when diverse causes are present, the eye, light, etc. ; may we thereby conclude that the designation "color" is "with relation to these diverse causes"?
***
Another point. By which of the six consciousnesses--cons- ciousnesses of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, or mental consciousness--is the pudgala perceived?
23
"with relation to the skandhas. "
perceived:
that is why we say that the designation "pudgala' is
? [The Vatslputriyas:] It is perceived by all six consciousnesses. When the eye consciousness recognizes physical matter (=a body), it indirectly discerns the pudgala? ^ and then we can say that the pudgala is known by the eye consciousness. But the relationship of the pudgala with physical matter, be it identical or different, is inexpressible. The same for the other consciousnesses: when the mental consciousness recognizes the dharmas (mind and mental states), it indirectly discerns the pudgala; it is then known by the mental consciousness, but its relationship with these states is inexpressible.
It follows from this explanation too that the pudgala exists solely as a designation exactly like milk. When the eye conscious- ness recognizes the color of milk, it indirectly discerns the milk: the milk is then known by the eye consciousness and one cannot say that the milk is the same thing as its color or is different from its color. The same for ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousness: the body consciousness recognizes tangibles; from whence there is the consciousness of milk; the milk is then known by the body consciousness without which one could only say that the milk is identical to the tangible, or different from the tangible. In fact milk is not fourfold: then it is not color, smell, taste, tangible; but furthermore, one cannot say that the milk is not made of these four. The conclusion is that one metaphorically designates a complex of elements by "pudgala" the same as the designation "milk" is understood as a coming together of color, smell, etc. They are merely names without reality.
What meaning do you therefore attach to the phrase, "When the eye consciousness recognizes physical matter, it indirectly discerns the pudgala"} Do you want to say that physical matter is the cause of the perception of the pudgala, or that the perception of physical matter and the pudgala takes place at the same time?
If the Vatslputriyas answer that physical matter is the cause of the perception of the pudgala but that, nevertheless, one cannot say that the pudgala is different from physical matter, then the condition and the causes of the perception of physical matter--eye,
Refutation of the pudgala 1319
? 1320 Chapter Nine
light, an act of attention--would not be different from physical matter.
If the Vatslputriyas answer that one perceives the pudgala at
25
the same time as one perceives physical matter,
question whether one perceives the pudgala by the same operation which perceives physical matter, or by a different operation.
In the first hypothesis, the pudgala is only physical matter and the designation "pudgala" applies only to physical matter. It is then impossible to distinguish 'This is physical matter; that is pudgala" Without this distinction, how can one prove that there is physical matter and that there is a pudgala} The existence of the pudgala cannot be proven by this distinction.
In the second hypothesis, since the time of the two perceptions is different, the pudgala will be as different from color and shape as yellow is from blue, as former is from latter.
The same reasoning follows for the other skandhas.
[The Vatslputriyas:] As one cannot say that the pudgala is the same thing as color and shape, nor that it is different from color and shape, likewise the perception of the pudgala is not the same as the perception of the color and shape, nor different from this perception.
This point of view obliges you to say that the perception of the pudgala, being ineffable, is not made part of the category of "conditioned things": but now you do not admit this thesis, since, for you, all perception is "conditioned".
***
If the pudgala is an entity that one cannot define as being
we would
? matter (the ? ? ? ? skandha,) nor as being non-matter (the four non-material skandhas, vedand skandha, etc. ), why did the Blessed One say that "matter and the other skandhas are not self? 26
***
The pudgala, you say, is attained by the eye consciousness. Is this consciousness generated by color and shape, or by the pudgala, or both? In the first hypothesis, one cannot maintain that this eye consciousness perceives the pudgala, because the pudgala is not the object of this consciousness, as neither is sound. In fact, all consciousnesses that are produced having as their condition a certain thing, has this same thing as an "object as condition": now the pudgala, not being a condition of the eye consciousness, cannot be its object. Thus the visual consciousness does not perceive the pudgala.
The other two hypothesis contradict the Sutra which says that the eye consciousness is generated by reason of two things,27 namely, by the eye and by physical matter and shape. The Sutra says"Oh Bhiksus, eye consciousness is generated having the eye as its cause (hetu) and physical matter as its condition (pratyaya= alambanapratyaya). All eye consciousness is by reason of the eye and physical matter. "28
If the pudgala is the cause of the eye consciousness, it will be impermanent, because the Sutra says, "All causes and all conditions that produce consciousnesses are impermanent. "
[The Vatslputriyas:] We admit then that the pudgala is not an object as condition {alambana) of consciousness.
[Very well; but then it is not discernible (vijneya), an object of vijnana\ if it is not discernible, it is not cognizable (jneya), the object of jnana\ if it is not cognizable, how can one prove that it exists? If one cannot prove that it exists, your system collapses. ]
Refutation of the pudgala 1321
? 1322 Chapter Nine
You have said that the pudgala is discerned by the six
29
consciousnesses.
will be, like physical matter and shape, different from sound; if it is discerned by the ear consciousness, it will be, like sound, different from physical matter and shape. And thus for those (conscious- nesses) that follow.
Moreover, your thesis is in contradiction to the Sutra. The
Sutra says, "Oh Brahmin, the five organs (of sight, hearing, smell,
taste, touch) have distinct spheres (gocara) and objects {visaya).
30
Each one of them perceives its own sphere and its own object, and does not perceive the sphere or the object of the others. And the mental organ perceives the spheres and the objects of the first
31
But, if it is discerned by the eye consciousness, it
five organs, and they have the mental organ as their refuge. " rather would you say, in agreement with the Sutra, that the pudgala is not the object (of the five organs)? In this case, it would not be discerned (by the five organs), and you put yourself in
32
***
[The Vatslputrlyas:] (You affirm, according to the Sutra, that each of the five organs has its own object, and you thus conclude that the pudgala is not the object of eye consciousness). But, according to the Sutra, the mental organ also has its own object
33
contradiction to your own system.
(and this is in contradiction to your system).
In fact, the
Satpranakopama-sutra says, "Each of these six organs has its own
object and its own sphere; each seeks after its object and its
34
sphere. "
This Sutra does not intend to speak of the six organs, because the five material organs and the five consciousnesses which are dependent on them do not possess the desire to see, to hear, etc.
Or
? This Sutra understands, by organ of the eye, etc. , the mental
35
consciousness which is induced and dominated by the eye, etc.
this fact, the mental consciousness which is isolated--that is to say, which is not induced and dominated by one of the five material organs, but solely by the mental organ--does not have any desire with regard to the spheres and objects of the five organs, but solely with regard to the dharmdyatana. Thus the Satpranakopama-sutra does not contradict the Sutra previously quoted.
#**
The Blessed One has said, "Oh Bhiksus, I declare to you all the dharmas that should be penetrated (abhijneya) and known (parijneya), namely: the eyes, physical matter, eye consciousness, eye contact, the sensation which is produced having as a cause eye contact, painful, pleasant, and neither painful nor pleasant sensation. . . . And thus following to: "the sensation which is produced having as its cause contact with the mental organ: these
36
are what should be penetrated and known. "
This text teaches us
that the dharmas to be penetrated and comprehended are only
those enumerated. The pudgala does not figure in this list: then it
is not susceptible of being discerned {vijneya). In fact, the
speculative consciousness (prajna) by which one penetrates or
comprehends, has the same sphere (visaya) as does ordinary
1 consciousness (vijnana)?
###
The masters who maintain that the eye sees the pudgala should learn that the eye sees only that which is real in the pudgala (namely physical matter: the same for the other five organs). They fall into the abyss of harmful views in saying that it sees a soul in
38 what is not a soul.
Furthermore, the Buddha explained that the ^NOtA pudgala
Refutation of the pudgala 1323
By
? 1324 Chapter Nine
59
designates the skandhas. In the Sutra of Man, he said, "Supported
by the eye, having physical matter for its object and condition, the visual consciousness arises: by reason of the coming together of these three, contact arises; at the same time there arises sensation,
40
thought, the act of attention, etc. " The last four terms--vijndna,
vedand, samjna, cetana--are non-material skandhas: the eye and
physical matter are the rilpa skandhas. Here is then all that one
speaks of when one says "man. " In order to express various
nuances, one inserts various words, such as sattva, being, nara,
nourished, fiva, vital principle, jantu, he who is born, pudgala, person. One says to oneself, "My eye sees physical matter," and according to current usage, "This venerable one is of such a name, of such a family, of such a gotta, of such food, of such happiness and of such suffering, of such length of life; he lasts a time; he
42
terminates his life in such a manner.
these are only manners of speaking, words, expressions conform- ing to the usage of the world, because there are only impermanent things in the pudgala, conditioned things, born of causes and conditions, created through deeds/'
***
The Blessed One declares that the Sutras of explicit meanings
are the authority. The Sutras that we have quoted are of explicit
43 meaning; one cannot draw a divergent explanation from them.
Moreover, 1. The Blessed One said to a Brahmin, "When I say that all exists, I mean that there are twelve sources of conscious-
44 45
ness {ayatana, i. 20a). " Then if the pudgala is not included in the
twelve ayatanas, it does not exist; and if it is included one cannot say that it is ineffable.
2. The Vatslputriyas read a Sutra which says, "All that is of the eye, all physical matter. . . the Tathagata, Oh Bhiksus, embraces this group (namely the twelve dyatanas), terms them 'all/ establishes that 'all* exists, so many dharmas in themselves. " Now, there is no
man, manuja, born of Manu, manava, young man, posa, he who is 41
Oh Bhiksus, know that
? pudgala there: how can one say that the pudgala is a real entity?
3. The Bimbisara-sutra says, "A stupid, ignorant Prthagjana
becomes attached to words, and he imagines that there is a self; but
there is no self nor things pertaining to self, but only past, present
46 and future painful dharmas*
47
4. The worthy {arhatt) Sila said to Mara, "You fall into wrong
views by wrongly maintaining that there is a being in the group of conditions {samskdras) which is empty: the wise understand that such a being does not exist. As the name 'chariot* is given to a group of parts, the world uses the word 'being': one should know that this is a group of skandhas. "
48
5. In the Ksudrakdgama, the Buddha said to the Brahmin
50
49
themselves from all fetters: through the mind (there is) defile-
Daridra,
"Daridra, those who understand the Truths can deliver
ment, and also purification through the mind.
The self, in fact,
does not have the nature of a soul; it is through error that one
thinks that a soul exists; there is no being (sattva), no soul, but
only dharmas produced through causes: skandhas, sources-of-cons-
ciousness (ayatana), dhatus, that constitute the twelve limbs of
existence; examined in depth, there is found to be no pudgala
there. Seeing that the interior is empty, see that externals are
empty;
51 52 and there is no ascetic who meditates on emptiness. "
53
6. The Sutra
a soul: one creates a theory of the soul, of a being, of a vital principal; one is not distinguished from heterodox teachers; one takes a road which is not the Way; his mind does not enter into emptiness, his faith does not satisfy him, he is not established in it to his satisfaction, there is no propensity (for liberation); the Aryan qualities are not purified in him. "
***
Refutation of the pudgala 1325
says, "Five calamities proceed from the belief in
[The Vatslputriyas:] These texts are not authoritative, because
? 1326 Chapter Nine
they are not read in our tradition.
What then is the authority in your system, your tradition or the words of the Buddha? If it is your tradition, then the Buddha is not your teacher, and you are not a child of the Sakyan. If it is the word of the Buddha, why do you not recognize the authority of all the words of the Buddha?
[The Vatslputriyas:] The texts you have quoted are not the
54 authentic word of the Buddha,
them.
That is not a good reason.
Why is this?
since our tradition does not read
55
Because all the other traditions read these texts,
these texts do not contradict any other Sutras, nor philosophic
56
truths.
by saying, "They are not authentic because we do not read them," this is only pure impudence contrary to all good sense.
***
The position of the Vatslputriyas is moreover more inadmissa-
ble since their sect reads a Sutra which says, "The dharmas are not 57
[The Vatslputriyas:] Without doubt we read this Sutra. But the pudgala is neither the dharmas which serve as its support, nor is it different from these dharmas; that is why it says that "no dharma is a soul. "
Very well; but it is taught that the pudgala cannot be discerned
by the mental consciousness, since the Sutra establishes clearly that
the mental consciousness is produced by reason of two condi-
58
tions,
the mental organ (manas) and the dharmas. Besides how
Also, when you embolden yourself to brutally reject them
soul and do not contain a soul. "
would you explain the Sutra which says, "To recognize a soul in
what is not soul is a mistake of ideas, of mind, and of view"?
59
and because
? [The Vatslputriyas:] This Sutra says that it is a mistake to recognize a soul in that which is not a soul; it does not say that it is a mistake to recognize a soul in what is a soul.
What is understood by "that which is not a soul"? Would you
say that it concerns the skandhas, ayatanas and dhatusl This
contradicts your theory that the pudgala is not identical to physical
matter, etc.
60 61
Further, a Sutra says, "Oh Bhiksus, know that all
the Brahmins and monks that contemplate a soul, contemplate
only the five skandhas-of-ztt&chment. " Then this (contemplation)
is not a soul, because the self that one recognizes as a soul is solely
the dharmas that are not a soul but which one falsely imagines to
attachment. " Then there is no pudgala in any of this.
[The Vatslputriyas:] But the same Sutra says, "In the past, I
64
This declaration is for the purpose of indicating that the saint
capable of recollecting his past lives remembers the variety of
characteristics of his series of these existences. But the Buddha
does not mean that he sees a real pudgala possessing, in a past life,
such physical matter, etc. : for to think such is to fall into
satkayadrsti. Or rather, if such is the meaning of this sentence,
65
62 63 be a soul. Another Sutra
says, "All those that have remembered, do remember, or shall remember their various past existences-- their remembrance is solely with regard to the five skandha$-oi-
was handsome (literally: I possessed physical matter)/'
then its sole purpose is to reject it as non-authentic.
that the Sutra, insofar as it attributes the possession of physical matter, etc. , to a soul, has in view "a self of designation", as one speaks of a pile which, being only an accumulation, has no unity; or of a current of water which being only an accumulation, has no unity; or of a current of water which, being only a succession (of
66
***
waters), has no permanence.
[The Vatslputriyas:
67
] The Blessed One would then not be
Refutation of the pudgala 1327
We conclude
? 1328 Chapter Nine
omniscient, since the mind and mental states are not capable of knowing all the dharmas, seeing that mind and mental states change, arising and perishing from moment to moment. Omnis- cience can belong only to a soul, a pudgala.
We would reply that the pudgala would be eternal if it does not
perish when the mind perishes: a thesis which contradicts your
theory of a pudgala about which one can only say that it is eternal
or non-eternal. We do not say (as do the Mahasamghikas) that the
Buddha is omniscient in the sense that he knows all the dharmas at 68
one and the same time: "Buddha** designates a certain series: to
this series there belongs this unique ability that, by a single act of
modulating his mind, he immediately produces an exact conscious-
ness of the object relative to which a desire for knowing has arisen:
one then calls this series "Omniscient. '* One moment of thought is
not capable of knowing everything. On this point, there is a verse:
"As fire, by the capacity of its series, burns all, so too does the
Omniscient One--but not by a universal, simultaneous knowl-
69 edge. "
[The Vatslputrlyas:] How do you prove that (the word "Omniscient"should be understood as a series, and not as a particular self of universal knowledge)?
It is spoken of in the Scriptures, on the subject of the Buddhas of the past, present and future. For example the verse: "Buddhas of the past, Buddhas of the future, and Buddhas of the present destroy
70
the sorrows of many. '* But, in your system, the skandhas of
existence belong to the three periods of time, but not the pudgala. ***
[The Vatslputrlyas:] If the term pudgala only designates the
five skandhas-oi-btt&chment, how can the Blessed One say, "Oh
Bhiksus, I shall explain to you the burden, the taking up of the
burden, the laying down of the burden, and the bearer of the
71 burden. "
? Why may it not be explained in these terms?
[The Vatslputrlyas:] Because, if the pudgala is only a name
given to the skandhas, it cannot be the bearer of a burden. Why not?
Simply because it is unheard of.
Do not speak then of an ineffable pudgala. No one has ever ascertained the existence of an ineffable thing. And moreover you will have to account for the other statements of the Sutra that thirst (or desire) is the taking up of the burden: as thirst is a skandha, the "burden" (is too), and it is unheard of that a burden takes itself up. The "taking up of the burden" is included within the skandhasy and so too the bearer of the burden. These are the skandhas that the Blessed One designated by the name of ''pudgala, the bearer of the burden," as one sees in the explanation given a little farther on in the same Sutra.
After having said that the burden is the five skandhas-oi-2? -
tachment, that the taking up of the burden is thirst, and that the
laying down of the burden is the abandoning of thirst, it is said that
the bearer of the burden is the pudgala; but fearing that one
understands the pudgala inexactly, as an eternal, ineffable, real
entity, he explains, "(It is only to conform to the use of this world
that one says:) This venerable one, of such a name, of such a
gotra," and the rest (as in the Sutra on Man, above), in order that
one might well know that the pudgala is effable, impermanent,
72
and without a unique nature.
The five j^W^y-of-attachment
are painful in their nature: they receive then the name of
"burden"; each of the former moments of the series attract each of
the latter moments: it receives then the name of "bearer of the
73
burden. "
The pudgala is then not an entity.
***
[The Vatslputrlyas:] The pudgala exists [as an entity,] as the
Refutation of the pudgala 1329
? 1330 Chapter Nine
Sutra says, ' T o say that apparitional beings
75 view. "
Who denies the existence of apparitional beings? We admit the existence of these beings in the sense that the Blessed One understands them. For him, "apparitional beings" designates a series of skandhas (the series of five skandhas of an intermediary being), susceptible of going to another world without the intervention of a womb, an egg, or of moisture forms of birth. To negate the existence of an apparitional being so defined, is a false view, because this type of series of skandhas truly exists.
If you maintain that the negation of the pudgala is false, you wil have to say how this false view is given up. It cannot be given up by Seeing, nor by Meditation, for on the one hand, the pudgala is not included within the Truths, and, on the other hand, false
76 views are not given up by Meditation but by Seeing.
