The point of support of the five consciousnesses is also simultane- ous with them: that is, it is both earlier than, and
simultaneous
to the consciousness.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-1-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
] The visual consciousness does not arise with respea to obscured visible matter; not arising with respea to them, it does not see them.
But why does it not arise with respea to these visible things? For us, the Vaibhasikas, who attribute seeing to the organ and who admit that the organ, being sapratigha or capable of being arrested, does not exercise its aaivity with respea to obscured visible matter, we could easily explain how the visual consciousness does not arise with respea to obscured visible matter: the consciousness, in faa, exercises its aaivity on the same objea that its point of support does. But if you believe that the consciousness sees, how would you explain the faa that it does not arise with respea to obscured visible matter?
2. The author takes into consideration the opinion of the Vijnana- vadin and responds to the last reply of the Vaibhasika.
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Do you maintain that an organ of sight sees its object by entering into a close relationship with its object, in the manner in which the organ of touch feels a tangible object (i. 43c-d)? In this hypothesis I would understand that the organ of sight, being capable of being arrested, does not see obscured visible matter. But you maintain that the organ of sight sees at a distance: you do not then have the right to say that, being capable of being arrested, it does not see obscured visible matter. Moreover, one sees obscured visible matter through a glass, a cloud, a crystal and water: how would you explain this fact? I would say then that the visual consciousness sees, it arises with respea to obscured visible matter when the screen does not form an obstacle
174 to light; it does not arise in the contrary case.
3. The Vaibhasikas make an appeal to Scripture. The Sutra says,
175
"Having seen visible matter through the organ of sight. " Thus the
organ sees, not the visual consciousness.
We would reply that the Sutra intends to say, "Having seen visible
matter by means of the organ of sight as point of support. " In fact, the same Sutra says, "Having discerned the dharmas through the mental organ": now this organ, being past (i. 17), does not discern; it is through the mental consciousness that one discerns; therefore, if the text says "through the mental organ," it means "by supporting itself on the mental organ, the point of support of mental consciousness. " The same for sight and the organ of sight.
One can also admit that the Sutra attributes to the point of support, to the organ, the action which belongs to that which grasps this point of support, that is to say, to the consciousness. It is said in the world "the benches cry out," whereas the benches are actually the persons seated on the benches.
This way of speaking is common to Scripture. We read that "agreeable and disagreeable visible matter is discerned by the organ of sight. " Now you do not maintain that the organ of sight discerns. You attribute discernment to the consciousness of which organ of sight is the point of support.
The Sutra (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 64al0) also says "The organ of sight, Oh Brahmin, is the gate of the sight of visible matter. " This text
? proves that the visual consciousness sees by this gate which is the organ of sight. You would not maintain that "gate" signifies "sight," for it would be absurd to say "The organ of sight is the sight of the sight of visible matter. "
4. [Objection of the Vaibhasikas. ] If the visual consciousness sees, what it is that discerns (i. 48a)?
What is the difference between the two functions of seeing and discerning which would account for a single dhanna not seeing and discerning at one and the same time? Is it not admitted that a certain
176
type of prajna (darsandtmika, vii. l) sees and comprehends? In this
same way a certain consciousness, the visual consciousness, sees and discerns. There is here only a single function designated by two names. 5. [Certain followers of the thesis "The visual consciousness sees," namely the Vatsiputriyas, object:] If the organ of sight sees, what is then the separately existing action of seeing that you attribute to this
organ, the agent of this action?
The objection cannot be made. In the same way that you would
have it that the consciousness discerns, without admitting any differ- ence between the agent and the action, in that same way we hold that an organ sees.
6. According to another opinion, [that of the Dharmaguptakas,] it is the visual consciousness which sees; but, as the organ of sight is the point of support of this consciousness, one says that it sees, the same way one says that the bell rings, because it is the point of support of the sound.
But, according to this principle, one should also say that the organ of sight discerns, for it is the point of support of the visual consciousness.
No. For in the world one agrees to give the name of "seeing" to the visual consciousness; in fact, when this consciousness is produced, one says "The color is seen;" one does not say that the color is discerned. And the Vibhasd (TD 27, p. 489cl9) confirms: "One terms 'seen' that which is attained by the organ of sight, that which falls within its line of vision and is perceived by the visual consciousness. " One says then in the world that the organ of sight sees, because it is the point of
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support of the visual consciousness which sees; one does not say that it discerns, because the function attributed to the visual consciousness is seeing and not discernment. On the other hand, when one says that consciousness discerns, one does not mean that it discerns to the extent that it would be the point of support of a certain discernment, as one understands that the organ of sight sees because it is the point of support of the visual consciousness. One means that the consciousness discerns by itself, that it is in and of itself discernment, in the same way
177 that one says that the sun creates the day.
7. Opinion of the Sautrantikas. What an empty discussion! The Sutra teaches: "By reason of the organ of sight and of visible matter there arises the visual consciousness": there is not there either an organ that sees, or visible matter that is seen; there is not there any action of seeing, nor any agent that sees; this is only a play of cause and effect. In the light of practice, one speaks, metaphorically, of this process: "The eye sees, and the consciousness discerns/' But one should not cling to these metaphors. The Blessed One has said that one should not take them in the manner of popular speech, that one should
178 not seriously grasp an expression in use in the world.
8. According to the system of the Vaibhasikas of Kasmlr, the organ of sight sees, the organ of hearing hears, the organ of smell smells, the organ of taste tastes, the organ of touch touches, and the mental organ discerns.
***
Is visible matter seen by one eye or by both eyes?
43a-b. Visible matter is seen by the two eyes also, as the clarity
179 of sight demonstrates.
[There is no fixed rule: one sees by one eye; one also sees by two eyes. ]
The Abhidharmikas say: "Seen also by the two eyes; the two eyes
180
being open, sight is clearer. " Furthermore, when one eye is covered
and the other half closed, one perceives two moons; but not when one
? completely closes or half closes that which was open, or when one opens or completely closes that which has been half closed.
One should not conclude that the visual consciousness is twofold from the fact that its point of support is twofold, for the consciousness is not material like r&pa\ not having a mass it is not situated in a place.
***
We have said that the organ of sight sees, that the organs of hearing, smell, taste, and touch each perceive their objects; and that the mental organ discerns. Do these organs attain their object, [do they enter into a close physical relationship with their object]?
43c. The organ of sight, the organ of hearing, and the mental
181 organ know their object without attaining it.
i. l. The organ of sight sees visible matter at a distance: it does not see the eye-salve placed on the eye; the organ of hearing hears distant sounds.
The mental organ, being non-material, does not enter into a close physical relationship with its object.
2. If the organs of sight and hearing must necessarily enter into a close relationship with their object, then ascetics in dhyana would not attain divine sight or divine hearing, in the same way that they do not attain a divine sense of smell (vii. 42).
[Objection. ] If the organ of sight sees an object with which it is not
in a close relationship, why does it not see visible matter which is too
182 distant or obscured?
[Reply. ] Why does a magnet not attract all iron? Moreover, the same difficulty remains even if you suppose that the organ enters into a close relationship with the object: why does the organ of sight not see the eye salve, the brush, and all the objects with which it is in close relationship? Or else, let us say that the same rule applies to the organ of sight and to the organs of smell and taste: the organ of smell senses only the smell with which it is in close relationship, but it does not sense the odor which constitutes the organ itself; in the same way, the
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organ of sight sees only certain distant visible matter, but it does not see all distant visible matter.
According to certain masters, from the fact that one hears noise
from the interior of the ear, one can conclude that the organ of hearing
hears the sound with which it is in close relationship, as it also hears
183 distant sound.
3. The other three organs, smell, taste, touch, perceive an objea
with which they are in close relationship. For smell, this results from
184 the fact that in-breathing is necessary to the perception of the smell.
43d. For the other three organs, the opposite.
ii. What should one understand by the expression "to attain" (to enter into a close relationship)? What does one mean when one says that the nose "attains" its object, knows its object "after having attained it? "
To attain is "to arise in nirantaratva" in a state of non- 185
separation. The objea, which renews itself from moment to moment (iv. 2c-d), is found to be arisen in nirantaratva with the organ and vice versa.
[What does nirantaratva mean? According to the Bhadanta, immediate juxtaposition, absence of interval; according to the Vaibha-
186 sikas, immediate vicinity, absence of an interposed body].
iii. The question is therefore posed whether the atoms do or do not touch one another.
1. The Vaibhasikas of Kasmir {Vibhasa TD 27, p. 683a24) say that atoms do not touch one another; (1) if atoms touch one another in their totality, things, that is to say, the different atoms, would "mix with one another," that is, they would only occupy one place; and (2) if atoms touched each other in one spot, they would thus have parts: and
187
atoms do not have any parts.
But, if there is no contact among the atoms, how is sound
produced?
For the very reason that there is no contaa, sound is possible: if
atoms were to touch one another, a hand in collision with a hand would dissolve into it, a rock in collision with another rock would
? dissolve into it, as gum dissolves into gum. And sound would not be produced.
But if atoms do not touch one another, why does an agglomeration of atoms not fall to pieces when it is struck?
Because the wind element holds it together. A certain wind element has dispersion for its function, for example the wind of the period of the destruction of the world; a certain wind element has concentration for its function, for example the wind at the period of
189 creation (iii. 91,100).
2. [The Vaibhasikas continue the presentation of their doctrine].
One says that three organs attain their object, because their object is in a state of non-seperation from them. What does non-seperation consist of?
It consists of the fact that there is nothing which is in the interval between the two. This is also what is meant by "to attain. "
Furthermore, as agglomerations have parts, there is no difficulty in agglomerations touching one another. And, from this point of view the definitions of the Vibhasa (TD 27, p. 684all; see also p. 380al9) are justified: "Does a thing-in-contact arise having for its cause a thing-in- contact, or does it arise having for its cause a thing-outside-of-contact? " Same question with respect to a thing-outside-of-contact.
"One cannot reply in an absolute manner. Sometimes a thing- outside-of-contact arises from a thing-in-contact, as when a thing-in- contact falls to pieces. Sometimes a thing-in-contact arises from a thing-outside-of-contact, as when a thing-outside-of-contact comes together. Sometimes a thing-in-contact arises from a thing-outside-of- contact, as when agglomerations come together. And sometimes a thing-outside-of-contact arises from a thing-outside-of-contact, for example the particles of dust suspended in the void of a window. "
The Bhadanta Vasumitra says: "If atoms touched one another, they
189 would therefore endure two moments. "
iv. Opinions of Vasubandhu. 1. The Bhadanta says: "There is not, in reality, any contact One says, metaphorically, that atoms touch one another when they are juxtaposed without interval. " (Quoted in Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 684a2; see note 189, end).
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190
This opinion is the correct one. In fact, if atoms were to allow an
interval between themselves, since this interval would be empty, what
would hinder the progress of atoms into this interval? For it is
191 admitted that atoms are impenetrable.
2. Agglomerations are not anything other than atoms. They are the same atoms which, in a state of aggregation, are a "thing-in- contact," in the same way that they are rupa (i. 13). It is thus absurd to deny that atoms touch one another, and yet to admit that agglomera- tions touch one another.
3. If you admit spatial division to the atom, then an atom certainly
has parts, whether it enters into contact or not. If you deny it, why
192 would the atom, even if it enters into contact, have parts?
Should we think that the organs solely grasp an objea of their dimension,--if one believes that one sees suddenly extended objects, a mountain for example, it is through illusion, it is because one rapidly sees parts of a mountain: it is evidently thus when one sees the circle of fire delineated by an ember;--or else do the organs indifferently grasp an objea of their dimension and of a different dimension?
44a-b. The three organs of which the organ of smell is the first,
193 grasp an objea of their dimension.
A given number of atoms of an organ, attaining the same number of atoms of an objea, produce consciousness. This also holds for smell, taste, and touch.
But there is no rule for seeing and hearing. Sometimes the objea is smaller than the organ, as when one sees the end of a hair; sometimes equal to the organ, as when one sees a grape; and sometimes larger than the organ, when, the eye being hardly open, one sees a mountain. The same for sound; one hears the buzzing of a mosquito, the noise of thunder, etc.
The question does not arise for the mental organ which is non-material.
? (Here are some problems relating to the organs. )
i. How are atoms of the different organs arranged?
The atoms of the organ of sight are arranged on the pupil like the
flower of the cumin, that is to say, on the surface; they are covered
again by a membrane, of translucent color, which prevents them from
dispersing. According to another opinion, they are arranged in depth,
like a pill; being translucent, like crystal, they do not obscure one
194 another.
The atoms of the organ of hearing are arranged in the interior of the bhurja, that type of birch leaf which is found within the ear.
The atoms of the organ of smell are arranged within the interior of the nostril.
195
The atoms of the organ of taste are arranged on the upper surface of the tongue in the form of a half-moon. In the middle of the tongue a space the dimension of the end of a hair is not occupied by the atoms
196 of the organ. Such is the opinion expressed in Scripture.
The atoms of the organ of touch have the shape of the body.
The atoms of the female organ are like a drum. The atoms of the male organ are like a thumb.
***
ii. The atoms of the organ of sight can be sabhdga (i. 39) in their totality; tatsabhdga in their totality; some sabhaga, others tatsabhdga. The same for the organs of hearing, smell and taste. But, it does not occur that the atoms of the organ of touch are all sabhaga; even when the body is enveloped in the flames of Pratapana hell (iii. 59), an infinite number of atoms are tatsabhdga', for, says the School, the body would fall to pieces if all the atoms of touch were to work at the same time.
These first three organs from a garland
iii. It does not occur that consciousness is produced by one atom of
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organ, or by one atom of object. In fact the five categories of consciousness have agglomerations for their support and their object.
It results from this that atoms are not perceived; they are thus "imperceptible". (Compare i. 20a-b, iv. 4).
***
The object of the first five consciousnesses is simultaneous with them; the object of the sixth consciousness is either earlier than it, simultaneous with it, or later than it; in other words, it is past, present, or future (i. 23). Does the same hold for the point of support of the consciousness?
No, it does not. Why is this?
44c. Relative to consciousness, the point of support of the sixth consciousness is past.
The sole point of support of the mental consciousness is the mental organ, this is, the consciousness which has just perished (i. 17).
44d. The point of support of the first five is also simultaneous.
The point of support of the five consciousnesses is also simultane- ous with them: that is, it is both earlier than, and simultaneous to the consciousness. In fact, the point of support of these consciousnesses is twofold: 1. the sense organ, organ of sight, etc. , which is simultaneous with consciousness; and 2. the mental organ, which is past at the moment when the consciousness arises.
The five consciousnesses thus have two points of support.
One poses the question: Is that which is the point of support of the visual consciousness at the same time the "immediately antecedent and parallel cause" (samanantarapratyaya, ii. 62) of this consciousness? Four cases: 1. the organ of sight, which is solely a point of support; 2. the totality of mental states, sensation, etc. (ii. 24) which have just perished: they are solely the immediately antecedent cause; 3. the
? consciousness which has just perished, or mental organ, which is at one and the same time a point of support and an immediately antecedent cause; and 4. the other dharmas are neither one nor the other.
The same for the consciousness of hearing, smell, taste and touch.
With respect to mental consciousness, one replies by speaking of the first term of the question: that which is the point of support of mental consciousness is always the parallel and immediately ante- cedent cause of this consciousness, but items that have perished are not its point of support.
***
Visual consciousness depends on the organ of sight and on visible matter. Why is the organ considered as the point of support of consciousness, to the exclusion of the objea?
45a-b. The point of support of a consciousness is its organ, for
consciousness changes according to the modality of the
197 organ.
When the organ of sight is the objea of attention (employment of eye salve, etc. ); when it is injured by dust, etc. ; when it is alert; when it is sluggish and weak, consciousness reproduces modality: it is accom- panied by pleasure or by pain, it is alert or weak. The objea, on the contrary, has no influence on the modality of consciousness. Con- sequently, it is the organ, and not the objea, which is the point of support of consciousness (ii. 2a-b).
***
Consciousness knows the object. Why is it designated by the name of its organ "eye consciousness" . . . "manas consciousness" . . . "dharma consciousness? "
45c-d. For this reason, and also because it is "its own," it is the organ which gives its name to the consciousness.
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The consciousness takes the name of an organ because the organ is its point of support.
Because the organ is "its own:" the organ of a certain person is the point of support of the visual consciousness of this person alone. Visible matter, on the contrary, is general, for a certain visible thing is perceived by both the visual consciousness and the mental conscious- ness, by one person and by another person. The same observation holds for the organs of hearing, smell, taste, and touch, and for their objects, sounds, smells, tastes, and tangibles.
We conclude that the consciousness is named according to its organ because the organ is its point of support, and because the organ is its own thing. But the same does not hold for its object. One says in the world "sound of the drum," and not "sound of the stick;" "sprout of the wheat," and not "sprout of the field"
***
A being is born in a certain stage of the world, in Kamadhatu, in the First Dhyana, etc. ; he is of this stage, and his body is also of this stage, and he sees, by the organ of sight, visible matter. Do the body, the organ of sight, visible matter and consciousness belong to the same stage or to different stages?
All can belong to different stages.
i. When a being born in Kamadhatu sees, by means of an organ of sight of his stage, visible matter of his stage, then body, organ, visible matter and consciousness are in the same stage.
When this being sees visible matter of his stage, by means of an organ of sight of the First Dhyana, then the body and visible matter are of Kamadhatu, but his organ and consciousness are of the First Dhyana; if he sees visible matter of the First Dhyana by means of the same organ, then only the body is in Kamadhatu; the other three are of the First Dhyana.
When this being sees visible matter of Kamadhatu by means of an organ of sight of the Second Dhyana, then the body and visible matter are in Kamadhatu, the organ is in the Second Dhyana, and conscious-
? ness is in the First Dhyana; if he sees, by the same organ, visible matter of the Second Dhyana, then the body is in Kamadhatu, the organ and visible matter are in the Second Dhyana, and consciousness is in the First Dhyana. (viii. l3a-c).
One would explain in the same way these cases where a being born in Kamadhatu sees, by the organ of sight of the Third or Fourth Dhyana, visible matter of these same stages or of a lower stage.
ii. When a being in the First Dhyana sees visible matter of his stage by means of an organ of sight of his stage, then body, organ, visible matter and consciousness are of the same stage; if he sees visible matter of a lower stage by the same organ, then the body, organ, and consciousness are of his stage, the First Dhyana.
When this being sees visible matter of his stage by means of an organ of sight of the Second Dhyana, then three are of his stage (First Dhyana), but the organ is in the Second Dhyana; if he sees, by the same organ, visible matter of Kamadhatu, then the body and con- sciousness are of his stage (First Dhyana), visible matter is in a lower stage, and the organ is in the Second Dhyana; if he sees visible matter of the Second Dhyana by the same organ, then the body and consciousness are of his stage (First Dhyana), but the organ and the visible matter are in the Second Dhyana.
One would explain in the same way these cases where a being in the First Dhyana sees, by means of an organ of sight of the Third or the Fourth Dhyana, visible matter of these stages or of a lower stage.
iii. According to these same principles, we can explain those cases where a being in the Second, Third or Fourth Dhyana, sees, by means of an organ of sight of his stage or of a different stage, visible matter of his stage or of a different stage.
The rule is the following:
46a. The organ of sight is not inferior to the body.
The body, the organ of sight, and visible matter can belong to five stages: Kamadhatu, and the Four Dhyanas.
The consciousness of sight is of two stages only: Kamadhatu and the First Dhyana (viii. l3a-c).
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Thus stated, the organs of sight which a certain being uses can be of the stage to which the body of this being belongs, that is, of the stage where this being has arisen; it can be of a higher stage; but it can never be lower.
Visible matter and consciousness, through relationship to the organ, is either of the same stage or lower, but never of a higher stage.
46b. Visible matter is not higher than the organ.
Visible matter of a higher stage cannot be seen by an organ of sight of a lower stage.
46c. Nor consciousness.
A visual consciousness of a higher stage cannot arise from an organ of a lower stage.
46d. Visible matter, in relation to consciousness, and visible matter as well as consciousness, through relation to the body, is of all types.
Visible matter, through relationship with the visual consciousness, is either equal, or higher, or lower.
Visible matter and the visual consciousness, through relationship to the body, are as visible matter is through relationship to the consciousness, this is to say, equal, higher, or lower.
47a. The same holds for the organ of hearing.
The organ of hearing is not lower than the body, sound is not higher than the organ of hearing, nor is auditory consciousness; sound, through relationship to this latter, and sound and consciousness through relationship to the body, can be of all types.
47a-b. Three organs belong to their own stage.
With respect to the organs of smell, taste, and touch, the body, organ, object and consciousness belong exclusively to the stage where the being is born.
After having formulated this general rule, the author mentions one exception.
? 47c-d. The consciousness of touch is of its own stage or of a lower stage.
The body, the organ of touch and tangibles are always of the stage where the being is born. But the consciousness of touch (1) is of this stage, in the case of a being born in Kamadhatu or in the First Dhyana; or (2) is of a lower stage (First Dhyana) in the case of a being born in the Second Dhyana or above.
47d There is no restriction with respect to the mental organ.
Sometimes the mental organ is of the same stage as the body, the dharmadhdtu and the mental consciousness; sometimes it is lower or higher. If a body belongs to the first five stages--Kamadhatu and the Four Dhyanas--, then the mental organ, the dharmadhatu, and the mental consciousness can be, in absorption or at conception, of any stage, all the stages not being moreover the same in each case. This will be explained in the Eighth Chapter which treats of the absorp- tions (viii. l9c-d). We shall not speak here of this for the sake of brevity, the profit being small and the pains great.
There are eighteen dhatus and six consciousness. Which dhatu is discerned by which consciousness?
48a. Five external dhatus are discerned by two types of consciousness.
Visible matter, sounds, odors, tastes and tangibles are known respectively, by the consciousness of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. They are all discerned by the mental consciousness. Each of these external dhatus is thus discerned by two consciousness.
The thirteen other dhatus, not being of the sphere of the sense consciousness, are discerned by a single mental consciousness.
***
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Chapter One
How many of the dhdtus are eternal? No dhdtu is totally eternal. But
198 48b. Unconditioned things are eternal.
Unconditioned things (i. 5b) form part of the dharmadhatu (i. l5c). Thus one part of the dharmadhatu is eternal.
***
How many of the dhdtus are indriyas, that is to say, predominate (2. 1)?
48c-d. The twelve internal dhatus and one part of the dharma- m
dhatuare indriyas. 200
A Sutra enumerates twenty-two indriyas: 1. organ of sight, 2. organ of hearing, 3. organ of smell, 4. organ of taste, 5. organ of touch, 6. mental organ, 7. male organ, 8. female organ, 9. vital organ, 10. faculty of sensation of pleasure, or sensation of pleasure, 11. faculty of sensation of displeasure, or sensation of displeasure, 12. faculty of sensation of satisfaction, or sensation of satisfaction (saumanasyen- driya), 13. faculty of sensation of dissatisfaaion, or sensation of dissatisfaction, 14. faculty of sensation of indifference, or sensation of indifference, 15. faculty of faith, 18. faculty of energy, 17. faculty of memory, 18. faculty of absorption, 19. faculty of discernment of dharmas, or faculty of prajnd, 20. andjndtamdjndsydmmdriya, 21. ajnendriya, and 22. djnatdvindriya.
The Abhidharmikas (Prakaranapdda, fol. 31b) do not count the
group that forms the six organs of consciousness (the dyatanas), i. e. ,
the organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, and the mental organ.
They do not place the mental organ after the organ of touch, but after
the vital organ, for the reason that the mental organ, the same as the
organs of sensation (10-14), also have an dlambana (i. 29b-d) and not 201
solely a visaya as do the organs of sense consciousness (1-5).
Among the twenty-two indriyas, eleven--namely the vital organ
(9), the five faculties of sensation (10-14), the five moral faculties
? (15-19)--and one part of the last three, form part of the
202 dharmadhdtu.
The twelve internal dhdtus are (1) the five organs of sense consciousness which form five dhdtus and five indriyas (1-5); (2) the mental organ (i. l6c), that is to say, the sixth indriya, which make up seven dhdtus; and (3) one part of the last three indriyas.
The five remaining dhdtus and one part of the dhannadhdtu are not indriyas.
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1. The authors of the Vinayavibhasdsay: (1) there is a Buddha who is not a Bhagavat, namely the Pratyekabuddha, because he is svayambhu, that is because he has obtained Bodhi by himself, because he has not fulfilled the task of ddnaparamstd, etc (vii. 34); (2) there is a Bhagavat who is not a Buddha, namely the Bodhisattva in his last existence; (3) there is a Buddha Bhagavat; and (4) there are persons who are neither Buddha, nor Bhagavat (Vydkhyd, 3. 12). One can also say that the 3ravakas, or Disciples, are Buddhas (Aryadeva, Sataka, 270), for they have acquired Bodhi (vi. 67).
2. Sariputra did not know the five pure skandhas (the precepts, etc. ) of the Tathagata.
3. Maudgalyayana did not see that his mother was reborn in Maricilokadhatu.
Sariputra did not discover the roots-of-good of a candidate for the state of Bhiksu (see vii. 30);
but the Buddha declares:
moksabijam aham hy asya susUksmatn upaksaye /
dhdtupdsdnavivare nilinam iva kdncanath / / Compare Huber, SutrdJamkara, p. 286.
4. As the stanza says:
sarvdkdram kdranam ekasya mayuracandrakasydpi ndsarvajnairjfieyath sarvajrlajndna- balam hi tat.
5. The Pratyekabuddhas and the &ravakas have also abandoned (prahina) non-defiled ignorance (aklispam ajndnam), in exactly the same way as they have abandoned the organ of sight, etc, that is, by abandoning all desire (chandardga) with respect to it. But this non-defiled ignorance remains active within them (samuddcarati) even though it is abandoned, exactly like the organ of sight
Such is not the case for the Buddha: this is why the author says that he has destroyed (hata) obscurity in such a manner that it will not arise again.
6. "As much as possible," yathdbhavyam. This holds for oneself, as when one says, "He gives food for the Brahmins to eat. "
7. We have the plural because the persons to be saved are numerous.
8. Expression of Aryadeva, Sataka, 265.
9. First explanation: through the power of rddhi (vii. 48), like Visnu; through the power of giving, like Mahesvara. Second explanation: through rddhi, through giving, and through its prabhdva (vii. 34).
It is true that the Buddhas perform miracles (fddhiprdtihdrya) in order to draw believers to themselves (dvarjanamdtrd)\ but it is through the miracle of the teaching (anusdsant) that they save the world by destroying its defilements (vii. 47a-b).
10. The dharmas are mixed, like flowers; one discerns them and places them in bouquets: these are pure, those are impure, etc
In this operation, a certain dharma associated with the mind (caitta, caitasika, ii. 23), which is called prajtid, plays a primary role. As a consequence prajtid is defined as "discernment of the dharmas. "
11. mala, stain, is a synonym for dsrava, vice. We translate andsrava by "pure. " The asravas are defined v. 35. See below i. 4.
12. The name "Abhidharma" signifies not only the pure consciousness which discerns the nature of things, but also all of the pure elements of the psychological moment in which this consciousness is produced: sensation, etc (i.
But why does it not arise with respea to these visible things? For us, the Vaibhasikas, who attribute seeing to the organ and who admit that the organ, being sapratigha or capable of being arrested, does not exercise its aaivity with respea to obscured visible matter, we could easily explain how the visual consciousness does not arise with respea to obscured visible matter: the consciousness, in faa, exercises its aaivity on the same objea that its point of support does. But if you believe that the consciousness sees, how would you explain the faa that it does not arise with respea to obscured visible matter?
2. The author takes into consideration the opinion of the Vijnana- vadin and responds to the last reply of the Vaibhasika.
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Do you maintain that an organ of sight sees its object by entering into a close relationship with its object, in the manner in which the organ of touch feels a tangible object (i. 43c-d)? In this hypothesis I would understand that the organ of sight, being capable of being arrested, does not see obscured visible matter. But you maintain that the organ of sight sees at a distance: you do not then have the right to say that, being capable of being arrested, it does not see obscured visible matter. Moreover, one sees obscured visible matter through a glass, a cloud, a crystal and water: how would you explain this fact? I would say then that the visual consciousness sees, it arises with respea to obscured visible matter when the screen does not form an obstacle
174 to light; it does not arise in the contrary case.
3. The Vaibhasikas make an appeal to Scripture. The Sutra says,
175
"Having seen visible matter through the organ of sight. " Thus the
organ sees, not the visual consciousness.
We would reply that the Sutra intends to say, "Having seen visible
matter by means of the organ of sight as point of support. " In fact, the same Sutra says, "Having discerned the dharmas through the mental organ": now this organ, being past (i. 17), does not discern; it is through the mental consciousness that one discerns; therefore, if the text says "through the mental organ," it means "by supporting itself on the mental organ, the point of support of mental consciousness. " The same for sight and the organ of sight.
One can also admit that the Sutra attributes to the point of support, to the organ, the action which belongs to that which grasps this point of support, that is to say, to the consciousness. It is said in the world "the benches cry out," whereas the benches are actually the persons seated on the benches.
This way of speaking is common to Scripture. We read that "agreeable and disagreeable visible matter is discerned by the organ of sight. " Now you do not maintain that the organ of sight discerns. You attribute discernment to the consciousness of which organ of sight is the point of support.
The Sutra (Samyukta, TD 2, p. 64al0) also says "The organ of sight, Oh Brahmin, is the gate of the sight of visible matter. " This text
? proves that the visual consciousness sees by this gate which is the organ of sight. You would not maintain that "gate" signifies "sight," for it would be absurd to say "The organ of sight is the sight of the sight of visible matter. "
4. [Objection of the Vaibhasikas. ] If the visual consciousness sees, what it is that discerns (i. 48a)?
What is the difference between the two functions of seeing and discerning which would account for a single dhanna not seeing and discerning at one and the same time? Is it not admitted that a certain
176
type of prajna (darsandtmika, vii. l) sees and comprehends? In this
same way a certain consciousness, the visual consciousness, sees and discerns. There is here only a single function designated by two names. 5. [Certain followers of the thesis "The visual consciousness sees," namely the Vatsiputriyas, object:] If the organ of sight sees, what is then the separately existing action of seeing that you attribute to this
organ, the agent of this action?
The objection cannot be made. In the same way that you would
have it that the consciousness discerns, without admitting any differ- ence between the agent and the action, in that same way we hold that an organ sees.
6. According to another opinion, [that of the Dharmaguptakas,] it is the visual consciousness which sees; but, as the organ of sight is the point of support of this consciousness, one says that it sees, the same way one says that the bell rings, because it is the point of support of the sound.
But, according to this principle, one should also say that the organ of sight discerns, for it is the point of support of the visual consciousness.
No. For in the world one agrees to give the name of "seeing" to the visual consciousness; in fact, when this consciousness is produced, one says "The color is seen;" one does not say that the color is discerned. And the Vibhasd (TD 27, p. 489cl9) confirms: "One terms 'seen' that which is attained by the organ of sight, that which falls within its line of vision and is perceived by the visual consciousness. " One says then in the world that the organ of sight sees, because it is the point of
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support of the visual consciousness which sees; one does not say that it discerns, because the function attributed to the visual consciousness is seeing and not discernment. On the other hand, when one says that consciousness discerns, one does not mean that it discerns to the extent that it would be the point of support of a certain discernment, as one understands that the organ of sight sees because it is the point of support of the visual consciousness. One means that the consciousness discerns by itself, that it is in and of itself discernment, in the same way
177 that one says that the sun creates the day.
7. Opinion of the Sautrantikas. What an empty discussion! The Sutra teaches: "By reason of the organ of sight and of visible matter there arises the visual consciousness": there is not there either an organ that sees, or visible matter that is seen; there is not there any action of seeing, nor any agent that sees; this is only a play of cause and effect. In the light of practice, one speaks, metaphorically, of this process: "The eye sees, and the consciousness discerns/' But one should not cling to these metaphors. The Blessed One has said that one should not take them in the manner of popular speech, that one should
178 not seriously grasp an expression in use in the world.
8. According to the system of the Vaibhasikas of Kasmlr, the organ of sight sees, the organ of hearing hears, the organ of smell smells, the organ of taste tastes, the organ of touch touches, and the mental organ discerns.
***
Is visible matter seen by one eye or by both eyes?
43a-b. Visible matter is seen by the two eyes also, as the clarity
179 of sight demonstrates.
[There is no fixed rule: one sees by one eye; one also sees by two eyes. ]
The Abhidharmikas say: "Seen also by the two eyes; the two eyes
180
being open, sight is clearer. " Furthermore, when one eye is covered
and the other half closed, one perceives two moons; but not when one
? completely closes or half closes that which was open, or when one opens or completely closes that which has been half closed.
One should not conclude that the visual consciousness is twofold from the fact that its point of support is twofold, for the consciousness is not material like r&pa\ not having a mass it is not situated in a place.
***
We have said that the organ of sight sees, that the organs of hearing, smell, taste, and touch each perceive their objects; and that the mental organ discerns. Do these organs attain their object, [do they enter into a close physical relationship with their object]?
43c. The organ of sight, the organ of hearing, and the mental
181 organ know their object without attaining it.
i. l. The organ of sight sees visible matter at a distance: it does not see the eye-salve placed on the eye; the organ of hearing hears distant sounds.
The mental organ, being non-material, does not enter into a close physical relationship with its object.
2. If the organs of sight and hearing must necessarily enter into a close relationship with their object, then ascetics in dhyana would not attain divine sight or divine hearing, in the same way that they do not attain a divine sense of smell (vii. 42).
[Objection. ] If the organ of sight sees an object with which it is not
in a close relationship, why does it not see visible matter which is too
182 distant or obscured?
[Reply. ] Why does a magnet not attract all iron? Moreover, the same difficulty remains even if you suppose that the organ enters into a close relationship with the object: why does the organ of sight not see the eye salve, the brush, and all the objects with which it is in close relationship? Or else, let us say that the same rule applies to the organ of sight and to the organs of smell and taste: the organ of smell senses only the smell with which it is in close relationship, but it does not sense the odor which constitutes the organ itself; in the same way, the
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organ of sight sees only certain distant visible matter, but it does not see all distant visible matter.
According to certain masters, from the fact that one hears noise
from the interior of the ear, one can conclude that the organ of hearing
hears the sound with which it is in close relationship, as it also hears
183 distant sound.
3. The other three organs, smell, taste, touch, perceive an objea
with which they are in close relationship. For smell, this results from
184 the fact that in-breathing is necessary to the perception of the smell.
43d. For the other three organs, the opposite.
ii. What should one understand by the expression "to attain" (to enter into a close relationship)? What does one mean when one says that the nose "attains" its object, knows its object "after having attained it? "
To attain is "to arise in nirantaratva" in a state of non- 185
separation. The objea, which renews itself from moment to moment (iv. 2c-d), is found to be arisen in nirantaratva with the organ and vice versa.
[What does nirantaratva mean? According to the Bhadanta, immediate juxtaposition, absence of interval; according to the Vaibha-
186 sikas, immediate vicinity, absence of an interposed body].
iii. The question is therefore posed whether the atoms do or do not touch one another.
1. The Vaibhasikas of Kasmir {Vibhasa TD 27, p. 683a24) say that atoms do not touch one another; (1) if atoms touch one another in their totality, things, that is to say, the different atoms, would "mix with one another," that is, they would only occupy one place; and (2) if atoms touched each other in one spot, they would thus have parts: and
187
atoms do not have any parts.
But, if there is no contact among the atoms, how is sound
produced?
For the very reason that there is no contaa, sound is possible: if
atoms were to touch one another, a hand in collision with a hand would dissolve into it, a rock in collision with another rock would
? dissolve into it, as gum dissolves into gum. And sound would not be produced.
But if atoms do not touch one another, why does an agglomeration of atoms not fall to pieces when it is struck?
Because the wind element holds it together. A certain wind element has dispersion for its function, for example the wind of the period of the destruction of the world; a certain wind element has concentration for its function, for example the wind at the period of
189 creation (iii. 91,100).
2. [The Vaibhasikas continue the presentation of their doctrine].
One says that three organs attain their object, because their object is in a state of non-seperation from them. What does non-seperation consist of?
It consists of the fact that there is nothing which is in the interval between the two. This is also what is meant by "to attain. "
Furthermore, as agglomerations have parts, there is no difficulty in agglomerations touching one another. And, from this point of view the definitions of the Vibhasa (TD 27, p. 684all; see also p. 380al9) are justified: "Does a thing-in-contact arise having for its cause a thing-in- contact, or does it arise having for its cause a thing-outside-of-contact? " Same question with respect to a thing-outside-of-contact.
"One cannot reply in an absolute manner. Sometimes a thing- outside-of-contact arises from a thing-in-contact, as when a thing-in- contact falls to pieces. Sometimes a thing-in-contact arises from a thing-outside-of-contact, as when a thing-outside-of-contact comes together. Sometimes a thing-in-contact arises from a thing-outside-of- contact, as when agglomerations come together. And sometimes a thing-outside-of-contact arises from a thing-outside-of-contact, for example the particles of dust suspended in the void of a window. "
The Bhadanta Vasumitra says: "If atoms touched one another, they
189 would therefore endure two moments. "
iv. Opinions of Vasubandhu. 1. The Bhadanta says: "There is not, in reality, any contact One says, metaphorically, that atoms touch one another when they are juxtaposed without interval. " (Quoted in Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 684a2; see note 189, end).
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190
This opinion is the correct one. In fact, if atoms were to allow an
interval between themselves, since this interval would be empty, what
would hinder the progress of atoms into this interval? For it is
191 admitted that atoms are impenetrable.
2. Agglomerations are not anything other than atoms. They are the same atoms which, in a state of aggregation, are a "thing-in- contact," in the same way that they are rupa (i. 13). It is thus absurd to deny that atoms touch one another, and yet to admit that agglomera- tions touch one another.
3. If you admit spatial division to the atom, then an atom certainly
has parts, whether it enters into contact or not. If you deny it, why
192 would the atom, even if it enters into contact, have parts?
Should we think that the organs solely grasp an objea of their dimension,--if one believes that one sees suddenly extended objects, a mountain for example, it is through illusion, it is because one rapidly sees parts of a mountain: it is evidently thus when one sees the circle of fire delineated by an ember;--or else do the organs indifferently grasp an objea of their dimension and of a different dimension?
44a-b. The three organs of which the organ of smell is the first,
193 grasp an objea of their dimension.
A given number of atoms of an organ, attaining the same number of atoms of an objea, produce consciousness. This also holds for smell, taste, and touch.
But there is no rule for seeing and hearing. Sometimes the objea is smaller than the organ, as when one sees the end of a hair; sometimes equal to the organ, as when one sees a grape; and sometimes larger than the organ, when, the eye being hardly open, one sees a mountain. The same for sound; one hears the buzzing of a mosquito, the noise of thunder, etc.
The question does not arise for the mental organ which is non-material.
? (Here are some problems relating to the organs. )
i. How are atoms of the different organs arranged?
The atoms of the organ of sight are arranged on the pupil like the
flower of the cumin, that is to say, on the surface; they are covered
again by a membrane, of translucent color, which prevents them from
dispersing. According to another opinion, they are arranged in depth,
like a pill; being translucent, like crystal, they do not obscure one
194 another.
The atoms of the organ of hearing are arranged in the interior of the bhurja, that type of birch leaf which is found within the ear.
The atoms of the organ of smell are arranged within the interior of the nostril.
195
The atoms of the organ of taste are arranged on the upper surface of the tongue in the form of a half-moon. In the middle of the tongue a space the dimension of the end of a hair is not occupied by the atoms
196 of the organ. Such is the opinion expressed in Scripture.
The atoms of the organ of touch have the shape of the body.
The atoms of the female organ are like a drum. The atoms of the male organ are like a thumb.
***
ii. The atoms of the organ of sight can be sabhdga (i. 39) in their totality; tatsabhdga in their totality; some sabhaga, others tatsabhdga. The same for the organs of hearing, smell and taste. But, it does not occur that the atoms of the organ of touch are all sabhaga; even when the body is enveloped in the flames of Pratapana hell (iii. 59), an infinite number of atoms are tatsabhdga', for, says the School, the body would fall to pieces if all the atoms of touch were to work at the same time.
These first three organs from a garland
iii. It does not occur that consciousness is produced by one atom of
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organ, or by one atom of object. In fact the five categories of consciousness have agglomerations for their support and their object.
It results from this that atoms are not perceived; they are thus "imperceptible". (Compare i. 20a-b, iv. 4).
***
The object of the first five consciousnesses is simultaneous with them; the object of the sixth consciousness is either earlier than it, simultaneous with it, or later than it; in other words, it is past, present, or future (i. 23). Does the same hold for the point of support of the consciousness?
No, it does not. Why is this?
44c. Relative to consciousness, the point of support of the sixth consciousness is past.
The sole point of support of the mental consciousness is the mental organ, this is, the consciousness which has just perished (i. 17).
44d. The point of support of the first five is also simultaneous.
The point of support of the five consciousnesses is also simultane- ous with them: that is, it is both earlier than, and simultaneous to the consciousness. In fact, the point of support of these consciousnesses is twofold: 1. the sense organ, organ of sight, etc. , which is simultaneous with consciousness; and 2. the mental organ, which is past at the moment when the consciousness arises.
The five consciousnesses thus have two points of support.
One poses the question: Is that which is the point of support of the visual consciousness at the same time the "immediately antecedent and parallel cause" (samanantarapratyaya, ii. 62) of this consciousness? Four cases: 1. the organ of sight, which is solely a point of support; 2. the totality of mental states, sensation, etc. (ii. 24) which have just perished: they are solely the immediately antecedent cause; 3. the
? consciousness which has just perished, or mental organ, which is at one and the same time a point of support and an immediately antecedent cause; and 4. the other dharmas are neither one nor the other.
The same for the consciousness of hearing, smell, taste and touch.
With respect to mental consciousness, one replies by speaking of the first term of the question: that which is the point of support of mental consciousness is always the parallel and immediately ante- cedent cause of this consciousness, but items that have perished are not its point of support.
***
Visual consciousness depends on the organ of sight and on visible matter. Why is the organ considered as the point of support of consciousness, to the exclusion of the objea?
45a-b. The point of support of a consciousness is its organ, for
consciousness changes according to the modality of the
197 organ.
When the organ of sight is the objea of attention (employment of eye salve, etc. ); when it is injured by dust, etc. ; when it is alert; when it is sluggish and weak, consciousness reproduces modality: it is accom- panied by pleasure or by pain, it is alert or weak. The objea, on the contrary, has no influence on the modality of consciousness. Con- sequently, it is the organ, and not the objea, which is the point of support of consciousness (ii. 2a-b).
***
Consciousness knows the object. Why is it designated by the name of its organ "eye consciousness" . . . "manas consciousness" . . . "dharma consciousness? "
45c-d. For this reason, and also because it is "its own," it is the organ which gives its name to the consciousness.
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The consciousness takes the name of an organ because the organ is its point of support.
Because the organ is "its own:" the organ of a certain person is the point of support of the visual consciousness of this person alone. Visible matter, on the contrary, is general, for a certain visible thing is perceived by both the visual consciousness and the mental conscious- ness, by one person and by another person. The same observation holds for the organs of hearing, smell, taste, and touch, and for their objects, sounds, smells, tastes, and tangibles.
We conclude that the consciousness is named according to its organ because the organ is its point of support, and because the organ is its own thing. But the same does not hold for its object. One says in the world "sound of the drum," and not "sound of the stick;" "sprout of the wheat," and not "sprout of the field"
***
A being is born in a certain stage of the world, in Kamadhatu, in the First Dhyana, etc. ; he is of this stage, and his body is also of this stage, and he sees, by the organ of sight, visible matter. Do the body, the organ of sight, visible matter and consciousness belong to the same stage or to different stages?
All can belong to different stages.
i. When a being born in Kamadhatu sees, by means of an organ of sight of his stage, visible matter of his stage, then body, organ, visible matter and consciousness are in the same stage.
When this being sees visible matter of his stage, by means of an organ of sight of the First Dhyana, then the body and visible matter are of Kamadhatu, but his organ and consciousness are of the First Dhyana; if he sees visible matter of the First Dhyana by means of the same organ, then only the body is in Kamadhatu; the other three are of the First Dhyana.
When this being sees visible matter of Kamadhatu by means of an organ of sight of the Second Dhyana, then the body and visible matter are in Kamadhatu, the organ is in the Second Dhyana, and conscious-
? ness is in the First Dhyana; if he sees, by the same organ, visible matter of the Second Dhyana, then the body is in Kamadhatu, the organ and visible matter are in the Second Dhyana, and consciousness is in the First Dhyana. (viii. l3a-c).
One would explain in the same way these cases where a being born in Kamadhatu sees, by the organ of sight of the Third or Fourth Dhyana, visible matter of these same stages or of a lower stage.
ii. When a being in the First Dhyana sees visible matter of his stage by means of an organ of sight of his stage, then body, organ, visible matter and consciousness are of the same stage; if he sees visible matter of a lower stage by the same organ, then the body, organ, and consciousness are of his stage, the First Dhyana.
When this being sees visible matter of his stage by means of an organ of sight of the Second Dhyana, then three are of his stage (First Dhyana), but the organ is in the Second Dhyana; if he sees, by the same organ, visible matter of Kamadhatu, then the body and con- sciousness are of his stage (First Dhyana), visible matter is in a lower stage, and the organ is in the Second Dhyana; if he sees visible matter of the Second Dhyana by the same organ, then the body and consciousness are of his stage (First Dhyana), but the organ and the visible matter are in the Second Dhyana.
One would explain in the same way these cases where a being in the First Dhyana sees, by means of an organ of sight of the Third or the Fourth Dhyana, visible matter of these stages or of a lower stage.
iii. According to these same principles, we can explain those cases where a being in the Second, Third or Fourth Dhyana, sees, by means of an organ of sight of his stage or of a different stage, visible matter of his stage or of a different stage.
The rule is the following:
46a. The organ of sight is not inferior to the body.
The body, the organ of sight, and visible matter can belong to five stages: Kamadhatu, and the Four Dhyanas.
The consciousness of sight is of two stages only: Kamadhatu and the First Dhyana (viii. l3a-c).
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Thus stated, the organs of sight which a certain being uses can be of the stage to which the body of this being belongs, that is, of the stage where this being has arisen; it can be of a higher stage; but it can never be lower.
Visible matter and consciousness, through relationship to the organ, is either of the same stage or lower, but never of a higher stage.
46b. Visible matter is not higher than the organ.
Visible matter of a higher stage cannot be seen by an organ of sight of a lower stage.
46c. Nor consciousness.
A visual consciousness of a higher stage cannot arise from an organ of a lower stage.
46d. Visible matter, in relation to consciousness, and visible matter as well as consciousness, through relation to the body, is of all types.
Visible matter, through relationship with the visual consciousness, is either equal, or higher, or lower.
Visible matter and the visual consciousness, through relationship to the body, are as visible matter is through relationship to the consciousness, this is to say, equal, higher, or lower.
47a. The same holds for the organ of hearing.
The organ of hearing is not lower than the body, sound is not higher than the organ of hearing, nor is auditory consciousness; sound, through relationship to this latter, and sound and consciousness through relationship to the body, can be of all types.
47a-b. Three organs belong to their own stage.
With respect to the organs of smell, taste, and touch, the body, organ, object and consciousness belong exclusively to the stage where the being is born.
After having formulated this general rule, the author mentions one exception.
? 47c-d. The consciousness of touch is of its own stage or of a lower stage.
The body, the organ of touch and tangibles are always of the stage where the being is born. But the consciousness of touch (1) is of this stage, in the case of a being born in Kamadhatu or in the First Dhyana; or (2) is of a lower stage (First Dhyana) in the case of a being born in the Second Dhyana or above.
47d There is no restriction with respect to the mental organ.
Sometimes the mental organ is of the same stage as the body, the dharmadhdtu and the mental consciousness; sometimes it is lower or higher. If a body belongs to the first five stages--Kamadhatu and the Four Dhyanas--, then the mental organ, the dharmadhatu, and the mental consciousness can be, in absorption or at conception, of any stage, all the stages not being moreover the same in each case. This will be explained in the Eighth Chapter which treats of the absorp- tions (viii. l9c-d). We shall not speak here of this for the sake of brevity, the profit being small and the pains great.
There are eighteen dhatus and six consciousness. Which dhatu is discerned by which consciousness?
48a. Five external dhatus are discerned by two types of consciousness.
Visible matter, sounds, odors, tastes and tangibles are known respectively, by the consciousness of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. They are all discerned by the mental consciousness. Each of these external dhatus is thus discerned by two consciousness.
The thirteen other dhatus, not being of the sphere of the sense consciousness, are discerned by a single mental consciousness.
***
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How many of the dhdtus are eternal? No dhdtu is totally eternal. But
198 48b. Unconditioned things are eternal.
Unconditioned things (i. 5b) form part of the dharmadhatu (i. l5c). Thus one part of the dharmadhatu is eternal.
***
How many of the dhdtus are indriyas, that is to say, predominate (2. 1)?
48c-d. The twelve internal dhatus and one part of the dharma- m
dhatuare indriyas. 200
A Sutra enumerates twenty-two indriyas: 1. organ of sight, 2. organ of hearing, 3. organ of smell, 4. organ of taste, 5. organ of touch, 6. mental organ, 7. male organ, 8. female organ, 9. vital organ, 10. faculty of sensation of pleasure, or sensation of pleasure, 11. faculty of sensation of displeasure, or sensation of displeasure, 12. faculty of sensation of satisfaction, or sensation of satisfaction (saumanasyen- driya), 13. faculty of sensation of dissatisfaaion, or sensation of dissatisfaction, 14. faculty of sensation of indifference, or sensation of indifference, 15. faculty of faith, 18. faculty of energy, 17. faculty of memory, 18. faculty of absorption, 19. faculty of discernment of dharmas, or faculty of prajnd, 20. andjndtamdjndsydmmdriya, 21. ajnendriya, and 22. djnatdvindriya.
The Abhidharmikas (Prakaranapdda, fol. 31b) do not count the
group that forms the six organs of consciousness (the dyatanas), i. e. ,
the organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, and the mental organ.
They do not place the mental organ after the organ of touch, but after
the vital organ, for the reason that the mental organ, the same as the
organs of sensation (10-14), also have an dlambana (i. 29b-d) and not 201
solely a visaya as do the organs of sense consciousness (1-5).
Among the twenty-two indriyas, eleven--namely the vital organ
(9), the five faculties of sensation (10-14), the five moral faculties
? (15-19)--and one part of the last three, form part of the
202 dharmadhdtu.
The twelve internal dhdtus are (1) the five organs of sense consciousness which form five dhdtus and five indriyas (1-5); (2) the mental organ (i. l6c), that is to say, the sixth indriya, which make up seven dhdtus; and (3) one part of the last three indriyas.
The five remaining dhdtus and one part of the dhannadhdtu are not indriyas.
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? 132 Chapter One
1. The authors of the Vinayavibhasdsay: (1) there is a Buddha who is not a Bhagavat, namely the Pratyekabuddha, because he is svayambhu, that is because he has obtained Bodhi by himself, because he has not fulfilled the task of ddnaparamstd, etc (vii. 34); (2) there is a Bhagavat who is not a Buddha, namely the Bodhisattva in his last existence; (3) there is a Buddha Bhagavat; and (4) there are persons who are neither Buddha, nor Bhagavat (Vydkhyd, 3. 12). One can also say that the 3ravakas, or Disciples, are Buddhas (Aryadeva, Sataka, 270), for they have acquired Bodhi (vi. 67).
2. Sariputra did not know the five pure skandhas (the precepts, etc. ) of the Tathagata.
3. Maudgalyayana did not see that his mother was reborn in Maricilokadhatu.
Sariputra did not discover the roots-of-good of a candidate for the state of Bhiksu (see vii. 30);
but the Buddha declares:
moksabijam aham hy asya susUksmatn upaksaye /
dhdtupdsdnavivare nilinam iva kdncanath / / Compare Huber, SutrdJamkara, p. 286.
4. As the stanza says:
sarvdkdram kdranam ekasya mayuracandrakasydpi ndsarvajnairjfieyath sarvajrlajndna- balam hi tat.
5. The Pratyekabuddhas and the &ravakas have also abandoned (prahina) non-defiled ignorance (aklispam ajndnam), in exactly the same way as they have abandoned the organ of sight, etc, that is, by abandoning all desire (chandardga) with respect to it. But this non-defiled ignorance remains active within them (samuddcarati) even though it is abandoned, exactly like the organ of sight
Such is not the case for the Buddha: this is why the author says that he has destroyed (hata) obscurity in such a manner that it will not arise again.
6. "As much as possible," yathdbhavyam. This holds for oneself, as when one says, "He gives food for the Brahmins to eat. "
7. We have the plural because the persons to be saved are numerous.
8. Expression of Aryadeva, Sataka, 265.
9. First explanation: through the power of rddhi (vii. 48), like Visnu; through the power of giving, like Mahesvara. Second explanation: through rddhi, through giving, and through its prabhdva (vii. 34).
It is true that the Buddhas perform miracles (fddhiprdtihdrya) in order to draw believers to themselves (dvarjanamdtrd)\ but it is through the miracle of the teaching (anusdsant) that they save the world by destroying its defilements (vii. 47a-b).
10. The dharmas are mixed, like flowers; one discerns them and places them in bouquets: these are pure, those are impure, etc
In this operation, a certain dharma associated with the mind (caitta, caitasika, ii. 23), which is called prajtid, plays a primary role. As a consequence prajtid is defined as "discernment of the dharmas. "
11. mala, stain, is a synonym for dsrava, vice. We translate andsrava by "pure. " The asravas are defined v. 35. See below i. 4.
12. The name "Abhidharma" signifies not only the pure consciousness which discerns the nature of things, but also all of the pure elements of the psychological moment in which this consciousness is produced: sensation, etc (i.
