Now, Diodorus Siculus informs us, that it was after Olynthus
was taken that the Athenians declared war against Philip in form; and
we find, that immediately on this, he attacked them and their tributary
states with such fury that they were soon glad to sue for peace.
was taken that the Athenians declared war against Philip in form; and
we find, that immediately on this, he attacked them and their tributary
states with such fury that they were soon glad to sue for peace.
Demosthenes - Leland - Orations
But in the end it appeared that these were by
no means so many effective men. There were great abatements to be
made from the numbers promised ; and we find besides, from this oration,
that these foreigners were not paid at all, or ill paid; so that these grand
armies were nowhere complete but in the letters written to demand them
on one part and to promise them on the other. If I am not mistaken,
this is what Demosthenes calls Swafitis tmcroXifiaiovs--armies which
exist only in letters.
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? 46
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
leave to warn you of an error which hath often proved
injurious to you. Think not that your preparations
never can be too magnificent; great and terrible in
your decrees, in execution weak and contemptible.
Let your preparations, let your supplies at first be
moderate, and add to these if you find them not suf
ficient. I say, then, that the whole body of infantry
should be two thousand; of these, that five hundred
should be Athenians of such an age as you shall think
proper, and with a stated time for service, not long
but such as that others may have their turn of duty.
Let the rest be formed of foreigners. To these you
are to add two hundred horse, fifty of them at least
Athenians, to serve in the same manner as the foot.
For these you are to provide transports. And now
what further preparations ? Ten light galleys; for as
he hath a naval power,1 we must be provided with
light vessels, that our troops may have a secure
convoy.
But whence are these forces to be subsisted ? This -
I shall explain when I have first given my reasons
why I think such numbers sufficient, and why I have
advised that we should serve in person. As to the
numbers, Athenians, my reason is this: it is not at
present in our power to provide a force able to meet
him in the open field, but we must harass him by
depredations: thus the war must be carried on at first
We therefore cannot think of raising a prodigious
army (for such we have neither pay nor provisions),
nor must our forces be absolutely mean. And I have
proposed that citizens should join in the service, and
help to man our fleet, because 1 am informed that
some time since the state maintained a body of aux-
iliaries at Corinth,2 which Polystratus commanded,3
1 As be bath a naval power. ]--In consequence of his engagements
with the Thessalians, he commanded their ports and ships.
2 At Corinth. ]--This was in the same war which he alludes to in the
beginning of the oration Corinth was appointed as the place of general
rendezvous for the OreeKS who confederated against Sparta.
3 Which Polystratus commanded. ]--Instead of Polystratus, which )?
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? PHILIPPIC #HE FIRST.
47
and Iphicrates, and Chabriaa, and some others; that
you yourselves served with them; and that the united
efforts of these auxiliary and domestic forces gained
a considerable victory over the Lacedaemonians. But
ever since our armies have been formed of foreigners
alone, their victories have been over our allies and
confederates, while our enemies have risen to an ex-
travagance of power. And these armies, with scarcely
the slightest attention to the service of the state, sail
orf to fight for Artabazus,1 or any other person, and
their general follows them. Nor should we wonder
at it; for he cannot command who cannot pay his
soldiers. What, then, do I recommend? That you
should take away all pretences, both from generals
and from soldiers, by a regular payment of the army,
and by incorporating domestic forces with the aux-
iliaries, to be, as it were, inspectors into the conduct
of the commanders; for at present our manner of
acting is even ridiculous. If a man should ask, "Are
you at peace, Athenians 1" the answer would imme-
diately be, " By no means; we are at war with
Philic2 Have not we chosen the usual generals and
I name little known in history, Monsieur Tourreil proposes to read Cal-
listratus, who, according to Xenophon and Diodorus, was colleague to
Iphicrates and Chabrias in the war of Corcyra. But, as Mr. Mounteney
has observed, Polystratus is again mentioned by Demosthenes, together
with Iphicrates, in the oration on the immunities ; so that it is probable
this is the true reading.
I To fight for Artabazus. ]--He here alludes to an affair which had
happened some time before, and had occasioned great commotion. The
Athenians had sent Chares at the head of a powerful force to reduce
Byzantium, Cos, and Chios, which had revolted from them. But this
general, when he had a prospect of success in that enterprise, suffered
himself to be corrupted by Artabazus, a rebellious satrap of Asia, and
assisted him against an army of seventy thousand men. Chares
received a reward proportioned to the service; but this action raised the
indignation of the Athenians, as he had not only deserted the cause of the
republic, but also incensed the King of Persia. Demosthenes, however,
here shifts the blame from Chares to his soldiers, who refused to obey
him, or rather to the people, who took no care to provide for their pay. --
Tourreil.
2 We are at war with Philip. ]--So the orator affects to speak; though
I apprehend it does not appear from history that they were at that time
directly at war with him. They had, indeed, joined with the Phnciana,
and Philip was at the head of the opposite confederacy Thus far they
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? 48 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
officers1 both of horse and foot ? " And of what use
are all these, except the single person whom you
send to the field? The rest attend your priests in
their processions. So that, as if you formed so many
men of clay, you make your officers for show, and
not for service. My countrymen! should not all
these generals have been chosen from your own body,
all these several officers from your own body, that
our force might be really Athenian ? And yet, for an
expedition in favour of Lemnos,2 the general must be
a citizen, while troops engaged in defence of our own
territories are commanded by Menelaus ! 3 I say not
this to detract from his merit; but to whomsoever
this command had been intrusted, surely he should
have derived it from your voices. 4
Perhaps you are fully5 sensible of these truths, but
were engaged against each other, though neither of them as principals in
the quarrel. The Athenians, indeed, might have made some attempts to
tecover Amphipolis; they certainly made some^ineffeclual preparations
to relieve Potidaea and Methone; and after Philip's attempt on Ther-
mopylae, did station some forces on their frontiers'to oppose him in case
he renewed his attack. But still the war was not declared in form. But
of this I shall speak more hereafter.
1 The usual generals and officers. ]--In the text they are mentioned
particularly. Ten taxiarchs (arparriyot, or generals) and phylarchs, and
two hipparchs. Each of the ten tribes chose a new general every year,
and each of these (originally, when all went to the field) had the com-
mand for one day in his turn. Philip was very pleasant on this number
of commanders. " I never," said he, " could find but one general," mean-
ing Parmenio; "but the Athenians can get ten every year. " Anciently,
the people on extraordinary occasions chose a polemarch, to determine
when the opinions of the generals were equally divided. The taxiarch
commanded the infantry, the phylarch the cavalry of his tribe. The
whole body of horse was divided into two corps, each of which was
commanded by a general of horse, or hipparch. --Tourreil.
2 In favour of Lemnos. ]--When in the social war the revolters invaded
it with a fleet of a hundred sail. --Tourreil.
3 By Menelaus! ]--Monsieur Tourreil says that this Menelaus was
the brother of Philip by another marriage. But though Philip and hi*
brother were not on good terms, yet it is not likely that the Athenians
would have trusted one so nearly allied to their enemy. --Olivet.
4 From your voices. ]--The regular method of choosing all officers.
However, the choice was sometimes left to the commander-in-chief. --
Tourreil.
5 Perhaps you are fully, dec. ]--It is not impossible hut that the people
might have been struck with the freedom and candour of the orator, and
given some marks of their approbation.
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.
49
would rather hear me on another point,--that of the
supplies; what we are to raise, and from what funds.
To this I now proceed. The sum, therefore, neces-
sary for the maintenance of these forces, that the sol-
diers may be supplied with grain, is somewhat above
ninety talentsto the ten galleys forty talents, that
each vessel may have a monthly allowance of twenty
minae; to the two thousand foot the same sum, that
each soldier may receive ten drachmae a month for
corn to the two hundred horse, for a monthly allow-
ance of thirty drachmas each, twelve talents. And
let it not be thought a small convenience that the sol-
diers are supplied with grain; for I am clearly satis-
fied, that if such a provision be made, the war itself
will supply them with every thing else, so as to com-
plete their appointment, and this without any injury
to the Greeks or allies; and I myself am ready to sail
with them, and to answer for the consequence with
my life should it prove otherwise. From what funds
the sum which I propose may be supplied shall now
be explained. * * * *
[Here the secretary of the assembly reads a scheme for raismg fne sup-
plies, and proposes it to the people in form in the name of the orator. ]
These are the supplies,2 Athenians, in our power to
1 Ninety talents. ]--The Attic talent is computed by Tourreil equal to
167(. 10>>. ; by Prideaux, to 1887. <<s. ; by Arbuthnot, to 193Z. 15s. It con-
tained sixty mine, and each mina one hundred drachmae. By the com-
putation of the orator, it appears that the provisions he recomnlends to
be supplied were to last one year. --Mounteney.
2 These are the supplies, &c. i-- Dionysius of Halicarnassus gives us
the rest of this oration as a sixth Philippic, pronounced in the archonship
of Themistoeles. But it appears to me. as well as to the other inter-
preters, a natural conclusion of the first Philippic; and therefore I could
Dotprevail on myself to separate them. --Tourreil.
The scholiast is of the same opinion, and flatly accuses Dionysius of a
mistake. Mr. Mounteney has expressed greater deference for this critic.
He supposes that this second part is not that which Dionysius quotes,
but that there was another oration, since lost, which began with fha
same words; for he observes, that the former part is plainly imperfect ot
itself, and the two parts are joined in all the copies and manuscripts, and
that naturally and consistently.
T must confess, with all submission to these authorities, that although
I could not presume to separate them, yet I am not quite satisfied that
these two parts are one oration. In the first place, J cannot think that
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? 60 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
raise. And when you come to give your voices, de
termine on some effectual provision,1 that you may
oppose Philip, not by decrees and letters only, but by
actions; and, in my opinion, your plan of operation
and every tiling relating to your armament will be
much more happily adjusted if the situation of the
country which is to be the scene of action be taken
into the account; and if you reflect that the winds and
seasons have greatly contributed to the rapidity of
Philip's conquests, that he watches the blowing of
the Etesians2 and the severity of the winter, and forms
the first Philippic would end abruptly if this second part was away; for
we find in the first part all that the orator proposes to speak to in the
beginning; and it concludes, not unlike a speech in parliament, with a
motion in form, for such and such subsidies to be raised for the mainte-
nance of such and sucn forces. And as to the manner in which the second
part begins, supposing it a distinct oration, we cannot object to that, as
Dionysius quotes an oration beginning exactly in the same manner (see
his letter to Ammius). It might also be observed, that in the beginning
of the oration, having for some time exhorted the Athenians to change
their conduct and act with vigour, Demosthenes says expressly that he
intends to speak no more on that subject, and yet this second part is en
tirely taken up with it; and lastly, there are some passages in the second
part which, I suspect, do not agree to the particular time when the first
oration against Philip was pronounced; and I imagine that some editors
were sensible of this by their placing the Olynthiac orations before this,
which is called the first Philippic. These passages I shall take notice
of as they occur.
As to any similitude between the two parts, I apprehend that is no
more than what runs through all these orations, and may be accounted
for from the similitude of the subject, without joining them. But if this
second part be really a distinct oration, spoken after the destruction of
Olynthus (for this city was taken the y sar before the archonship of The-
mistocles), how comes it that this event is not mentioned in it? It had
just then thrown the Athenians into the greatest consternation; and as
it was the orator's business to encourage them, possibly he might have
kept it out of view on purpose; though, perhaps, he does bint at it ob-
scurely, and as far as was consistent with prudence, as I shall observe
by-and-by.
1 Effectual provision. ]--In the Greek it is & av bitiv apcaicft x^porofn-
care, choose those things which may be agreeable to you. I own I do
not see how their entering into the resolution they liked best would of
consequence enable them to opposo Philip effectually. Perhaps it might
be of disservice, for in other places the orator is ever cautioning them
against following the bent of their inclinations. If we should make a
very small alteration in the text, and for apcoKii read apiece-^, those things
which may be si{fficient for your purposes, I apprehend the sense would
be better and more agreeable to Demosthenes. I have taken the liberty
to translate after this reading.
2 of the Etesians. ]--Winds which blew regularly every year at Uw
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.
51
his sieges when it is impossible for us to bring up our
forces,--it is your part then to consider this, and not
to carry on the war by occasional detachments (they
will ever arrive too late), but by a regular army con-
stantly kept up. And for winter-quarters you may
command Lemnos, and Thassus, and Sciathus, and
the adjacent islands, in which there are ports, and pro-
visions, and all things necessary for the soldiery in
abundance. As to the season of the year in which we
may land our forces with the greatest ease, and be in
no danger from the winds, either on the coast to which
we are bound, or at the entrance of those harbours
where we may put in for provisions, this will be easily
discovered. In what manner and at what time our
forces are to act their general will determine, accord-
ing to the j unctures of affairs. What you are to per-
form on your part is contained in the decree I have
now proposed. And if you, will be persuaded, Athe-
nians, first, to raise these supplies which I have recom-
mended ! then, to proceed to your other preparations,
your infantry, navy, and cavalry; and lastly, to con-
fine your forces by a law to that service which is
appointed to them, reserving the care and distribution
of their money to yourselves, and strictly examining
into the conduct of the general;--then your time will
be no longer wasted in continual debates on the same
subject, and scarcely to any purpose; then you will
deprive him of the most considerable of his revenues,
for his arms are now supported by seizing and making
prizes of those who pass the seas. But is this all ?
No. - You shall also be secure from his attempts;
not a. when some time since1 he fell on Lemnos and
rising of the dog-star, wh^n the Greeks were obliged to retire from action
on accc '*nt of the excessive heats, and which, as they biew from the
north, of consequence opposed any attempt of invading Macedon, or send-
ing any forces to those pans which were the seat of Philip's wars at
(tret.
I Not as when some time since, &c. ]--If this be really a part of the
fh*. t Philippic, these hostilities must have preceded the attempt on Ther-
mopylae, else the orator could not have dis'ingnished them into thost
which happened some time ago, and that ornmitted lately. Now, I can-
Vol. I -- E
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? 62
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
Imbrus, and carried away your citizens in chains; not
as when he surprised your vessels at Gerastus, and
spoiled them of an unspeakable quantity of riches;
not as when lately he made a descent on the coast of
Marathon, and carried off our sacred galleywhile
you could neither oppose these insults, nor detach
your forces at such junctures as were thought con-
venient.
And now, Athenians, what is the reason, think ye,
that the public festivals2 in honour of Minerva and of
Bacchus are always celebrated at the appointed time,
whether the direction of them falls to the lot of men
of eminence or of persons less distinguished--festi-
vals which cost more treasure than is usually ex-
pended on a whole navy, and more numbers and
greater preparations than any one, perhaps, ever cost,
--while your expeditions have been all too late, as
that to Methone, that to Pegasse, that to Potidaea ?
The reason is this: every thing relating to the former
is ascertained by law, and every one of you knows
not tell how to reconcile such open acts of hostility with the other parts
of Philip's conduct at that time. There was a peace subsisting between
him and the Athenians which he affected to observe; and so far does he
appear from making any open and professed attack on them, that in the
taking ofPotidaea and Pydna he would not act as principal, but as ally to
the Olynthians, and, when these cities were taken, dismissed the Athe
Mian garrisons with all imaginable respect and honour; and on all occa
sions courted and cajoled the Athenians. This, then, is one of those
passages which I suspect do not agree to the particular time when the
first Philippic was spoken. But if we suppose that this, which I call the
second part, is really the oration which Dionysius quotes, and which was
spoken to engage the Athenians to defend the islanders and the cities of
the Hellespont against the attempts of Philip, then all the difficulty van
ishes. The hostilities here mentioned agree very well to a time of open
war.
Now, Diodorus Siculus informs us, that it was after Olynthus
was taken that the Athenians declared war against Philip in form; and
we find, that immediately on this, he attacked them and their tributary
states with such fury that they were soon glad to sue for peace.
1 Our sacred galley. ]--There were two of these appropriated to reli
gious ceremonies, and all extraordinary emergencies and occasions of
the state,--the Paralian and the Salaminian. Harpocration understands
here the Paralian. --Toiirreil.
2 Festivals, &c. ]--For the Panathensea and Dionysla (as these fesM
vals are called in the original) I refer the reader to Potter, and othe;
writers on the antiquities of Greece.
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.
53
long before who is to conduct1 the several entertain-
ments in each tribe, what he is to receive, when, and
from whom, and what to perform. Not one of these
things is left uncertain, not one undetermined. But
in affairs of war and warlike preparations, there is no
order, no certainty, no regulation. So that, when
any accident alarms us, first we appoint our trier-
archs,2 then we allow them the exchange, then the
supplies are considered. These points once settled,
we resolve to man our fleet with strangers3 and for-
eigners, then find it necessary to supply their place
ourselves. In the midst of these delays, what we are
sailing to defend the enemy is already master of; for
the time of action we spend in preparing, and the
junctures of affairs will not wait our slow and irreso-
lute measures. These forces, too, which we think
may be depended on until the new levies are raised,
when put to the proof plainly discover their insuffi-
ciency. By these means hath he arrived to such a
pitch of-insolence, as to send a letter to the Euboeans4
conceived in such terms as these.
1 To conduct, &. C. ]--In the original it is who is the choraigus, that is,
the citizen who provided the music, of which each tribe had a band; ana
the gymnasiarch, he w ho presided over the wrestlers, and provided what
was necessary for that entertainment.
2 We appoint our trierarchs. ]--The rich citizens who were obliged, not
only to command, but to equip a vessel of war at their own expense,
either severally or jointly, for the service of the public. As this was an
office of great expense, it was allowed to anyone who was nominated to
point out some citizen richer than himself, and to desire he might be
substituted in his place, provided he was willing to exchange fortunes
-with that citizen, and then to take on him the office of trierarch. This
is what Demosthenes calls allowing the exchange, which in its nature
must have occasioned confusion and delay.
For a fuller accountof these trierarchs, &c. Irefer the reader to Potter's
Archaeol.
3 We resolve to man our fleet with strang"is, &c. ]--Mtroixoi- which
I translate strangers, were those foreigners-who were permitted to so-
journ at Athens on certain conditions.
This whole passage is an exact description of the proceedings of the
Athenians in defence of Olynthus, and of the event. I had it in view
when I observed that possibly we might find some obscure allusions to
that affair.
4 A letterto the Eubceans, <fcc. l--This letter has not descended to us.
It is probable, from the context, that he expressed in it a contempt for
the Athenian power, and insisted how little dependence the Eubceans
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? 54
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
[The letter is read. ]
What hath now been read is for the most part true,
Athenians--too true! but perhaps not very agreeable
in the recital. But if by suppressing things ungrate-
ful to the ear the things themselves could be pre-
vented, then the sole concern of a public speaker
should be to please. If, on the contrary, these un-
seasonably pleasing speeches be really injurious, it
is shameful, Athenians, to deceive yourselves, and,
by deferring the consideration of every thing dis-
agreeable, never once to move until it be too late, and
not to apprehend that they who conduct a war with
prudence are not to follow, but to direct events--to
direct them with the same absolute authority with
which a general leads on his forces; that the course
of affairs may be determined by them, and not deter-
mine their measures. But you, Athenians, although
possessed of the greatest power1 of all kinds--ships,
infantry, cavalry, and treasure,--yet to this day have
never employed any of them seasonably, but are ever
last in the field. Just as barbarians2 engage at box-
ing, so you make war with Philip; for when one of
these receives a blow, that blow engages him; if
struck in another part, to that part his hands are
shifted; but to ward off the blow, or to watch his
could have on that state. And if this he so, it confirms an observation
which I made before (see a preceding lote), via. that the Athenians had
as yet given Philip no remarkable opposition in Euboea. The letter must
have been written when Philip began to raise commotions in that island
in order to make himself master of it. I am induced to think, both from
history and Demosthenes, that he did not make any attempts of this
kind so early as the first Philippic, and, therefore, that this is no part of
that oration.
1 Possessed of the greatest power, . fee]--They could then command
three hundred ships of war, and those capable of engaging a navy of
double that number. Tbey had twenty thousand foot and two thousand
eight hundred horse; and their revenue amounted to above twelve hun-
dred talents. --Tourreil and Mounteney.
2 As barbarians, &c. ]--The learned reader will find a beautiful pas-
sage in Aulus Gellius (I. iii. c. 27), where, on the contrary, a man of true
prudence who engages in the business and dangers of the world is com-
pared to a skilful boxer who is ever attentive to defend himself and annoy
his adversary. --Tourreil.
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.
55
antagonist, for this he hath neither skill nor spirit.
Even so, if you hear that Philip is in the Chersonesus,
you resolve to send forces thither; if in Thermopylae,
thither; if in any other place, you hurry up and
down, you follow his standard. But no useful scheme
for carrying on the war, no wise provisions' are ever
thought of, until you hear of some enterprise in exe-
cution, or already crowned with success. This might
formerly have been pardonable, but now is the very
critical moment when it can by no means be ad-
mitted.
It seems to me, Athenians, that some divinity, who,
from a regard to Athens, looks down on our conduct
with indignation, hath inspired Philip with this rest-
less ambition; for were he to sit down in the quiet
enjoyment of his conquests and acquisitions without
proceeding to any new attempts, there are men among
you who, I think, would be unmoved at those transac-
tions2 which have branded our state with the odious
marks of infamy, cowardice, and all that is base. But
as he still pursues his conquests--as he is still ex-
tending his ambitious views,--possibly he may at last
call you forth, unless you have renounced the name
of Athenians. To me it is astonishing that none of
you look back to the beginning3 of this war, and con-
1 No wise provisions, Ace]--I have followed the reading which Mr.
Mounteney adopts--ricpt tgiv irpayuaiwv, &c. , instead of xoquartitv.
2 At those transactions, &c. ]--The taking of Pydna, and Potidaa, and
Amphipolis may warrant what the orator here says. Yet I should
choose to apply it to their suffering Olynthus by their misconduct to full
under the power of Philip.
3 Look back to the beginning, &c. j--I shall trouble the reader but
with one argument more in favour of my suspicion that this is no part
of the first Philippic. The passage I now quote I cannot think is applica
ble'to the transactions of the Athenians and Philip before his attempt on
Thermopylae, when, from the time of Argeus's death, they acted against
eacb other only indirectly; and, instead of punishing Philip, the Athe-
nians could not even prevail on themselves to defend those dominions
which they claimed as their own. But it is a very exact description of
what happened after their declaration of war against Philip, which suc-
ceeded the taking of Olynthus; for this declaration was made from a
sense of the dang3r of Philip's growing power, a resentment of his in-
fractions, and a resolution to reduce him; and yet they were quickly
obliged to defend themselves against farther attempts
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? 86
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
sider that we engaged in it to chastise the insolence
of Philip, but that now it is become a defensive war
to secure us from his attempts; and ibat he will ever
be repeating these attempts is manifest, unless some
power rises to oppose him. But if we wait in expecta-
tion of this,--if we send out armaments composed of
empty galleys, and those hopes with wbvh some
speaker may have flattered you,--can you the- think
your interests well secured ? Shall we not embark ?
shall we not sail with at least a part of our domestic
force now, since we have not hitherto 1--But '"here
shall we make our descent ? Let us but engage in
the enterprise, and the war itself, Athenians, will show
us where he is weakest. But if we sit at home listen-
ing to the mutual invectives and accusations of out
orators, we cannot expect--no, not the least success
in any one particular. Wherever a part of our city
is detached, although the whole' be not present, the
favour of the gods and the kindness of fortune attend
to fight on our side ; but when we send out a general,
and an insignificant decree, and the hopes of our
speakers, misfortune and disappointment must ensue.
Such expeditions are to our enemies a sport, but strike
our allies with deadly apprehensions; for it is not--
it is not possible for any one man to perform every
thing you desire. He may promise, and harangue,
and accuse this or that person; but to such proceed-
ings we owe the ruin of our affairs. For when a
general who commanded a wretched collection of
unpaid foreigners hath been defeated,--when there
are persons here who, in arraigning his conduct, dare
to advance falsehoods,--and when you lightly engage
in any determination just from their suggestions,--
what must be the consequence 1 How, then, shall
these abuses be removed ? By offering yourselves,
Athenians, to execute the commands of your general,
to be witnesses of his conduct in the field, and his
judges at your return; so as not only to hear how
Vour affairs are transacted, but to inspect them. Bu
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.
57
now, so shamefully are we degenerated, that each of
onr commanders is twice or thrice called before you
to answer for his life, though not one of them dared
to hazard that life by once engaging his enemy. No;
they choose the death of robbers and pilferers rather
than to fall as becomes them. Such malefactors
should die by the sentence of the law. Generals
should meet their fate bravely in the field.
Then as to your own conduct: some wander about,
crying, Philip hath joined with the Lacedaemonians,
and they are concerting the destruction of Thebes,
and the dissolution1 of some free states; others assure
us he hath sent an embassy to the king;2 others,
that he is fortifying places in Illyria. 3 Thus we all
go about framing our several tales. I do believe,
indeed, Athenians, he is intoxicated with his great-
ness, and does entertain his imagination with many
such visionary prospects, as he sees no power rising
to oppose him, and is elated with his success. But I
cannot be persuaded that he hath so taken his mea-
sures, that the weakest among us know what he is
next to do; for it is the weakest among us who spread
these rumours. Let us disregard them. Let us be
persuaded of this,--that he is our enemy; that he
hath spoiled us of our dominions; that we have long
been subject to his insolence; that whatever we
expected to be done for us by others hath proved
against us; that all the resource left is in ourselves;
that if we are not inclined to carry our arms abroad,
we may be forced to engage here;--let us be per-
suaded of this, and then we shall come to a proper
determination--then shall we be freed from those idle
1 The dissolution, &c. ]--Wherever the Lacedaemonians had power
they were always for establishing oligarchies, as has been observed in
the preface to these orations.
2 To the king. ]--So the King of Persia was called. The intent of this
embassy was supposed to be to make such demands as must produce
war with the Persian, which Isocrates had exhorted him to very early.
3 He is fortifying places in Illyria. ]--Possibly, these rumours were
spread by Philip's friends, to persuade the Athenians that his views and
schemes were removed to a great distance from Athens
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? 58 ORATIONS OP DEMOSTHENES.
tales. For we are not to be solicitous to know what
particular events will happen; we need but be con-
vinced nothing good can happen unless you grant the
due attention to affairs, and be ready to act as becomes
Athenians.
I, on my part, have never on any occasion chosen
to court your favour by speaking any thing but what
I was convinced would serve you; and on this occa-
sion I have freely declared my sentiments, without
art and without reserve. It would have pleased me,
indeed, that as it is for your advantage to have your
true interest laid before you, so I might be assured
that he who layeth it before you would share the ad-
vantage, for then I had spoken with greater alacrity.
However, uncertain as is the consequence with re-
spect to me, I yet determined to speak, because I
was convinced that these measures, if pursued, must
have their use; and of all those opinions which are
offered to your acceptance, may that be chosen which
will best advance the general weal!
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? THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC ORATION:
AtONOUNCED FOUR TEARS AFTER THE FIRST PHILIPPIC, IN TH1 AR-
CHONSH1P OF CALLIMACHUS, THE FOURTH YEAR OF THE HUNDRED
AND SEVENTH OLYMPIAD, AND THE TWELFTH OF PHILIP'S REIGN.
INTRODUCTION.
The former oration does not appear to have had any considerable
effect. Philip had his creatures in the Athenian assembly, who proba-
bly recommended less vigorous measures, and were but too favourably
heard. In the mean time, this prince pursued his ambitious designs.
When he round himself shut out of Greece, he turned his arms to such
remote parts as he might reduce without alarming the states of Greece:
and, at the same time, he revenged himself on the Athenians, by making
himself master of some places which they laid claim to. At length his
success imboldened him to declare those intentions which he had long
entertained secretly against the Olynthians.
Olynthus (a city of Thrace, possessed by Greeks originally from
Chalcis, a town of Eobcea, and colony of Athens) commanded a large
tract called the Chalcidian region, in which there were thirty-two cities.
It had risen by degrees to such a pitch of grandeur, as to have frequent
and remarkable contests both with Athens and Lacedsemon. Nor did
the Olynthians show great regard to the friendship of Philip when he
first came to the throne, and was taking all measures to secure the
possession of it; for they did not scruple to receive two of his brothers
by another marriage, who had fled to avoid the effects of his jealousy;
and endeavoured to conclude an alliance with Athens against him,
which he, by secret practices, found means to defeat. But as he was yet
scarcely secure on bis throne, instead of expressing his resentment, he
courted, or rather purchased, ihe alliance of the Olynthians, by the cession
of Anthemus, a city which the kings of Macedon had long disputed with
them, and afterward by that of Pydna and Potidaea, which their joint
forces had besieged and taken from the Athenians. But the Olynthians
could not be influenced by gratitude towards such a benefactor. The
rapid progress of his arms and his glaring acts of perfidy alarmed them
exceedingly. He had already made some inroads on their territories,
and now began to act against them with less reserve. They therefore
despatched ambassadors to Athens, to propose an alliance, and request
assistance against a power which they were equally concerned to
oppose.
Philip affected the highest resentment at this step; alleged their
mutual engagements to adhere to each other in war and peace; in-
veighed against their harbouring his brothers, whom he called the con-
spirators; and, under pretence of punishing their infractions, pursued
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? 00
INTRODUCTION.
his hostilities with double vigour, made himself master of some of their
cities, and threatened the capital with a siege.
In the mean time, the Olynthians pressed the Athenians for imme-
diate succours. Their ambassadors opened their commission in an
assembly of the people, who had the right either to agree to or to reject
their demand. As the importance of the occasion increased the
number of speakers, the elder orators had debated the affair before De-
mosthenes arose. In the following oration, therefore, he speaks as to
a people already informed; urges the necessity of joining with the
Olynthians, and confirms his opinion by powerful arguments; lays
open the designs and practices of Philip, and labours to remove their
dreadful apprehensions of his power. He concludes with recommend-
ing to them to reform abuses, to restore ancient discipline, and to put
h end to all domestic dissensions
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? OLYNTHIAC THE FIRST. 1
In many instances, Athenians, have the gods, in my
opinion, manifestly declared their favour to this
state ; nor is it least observable in this present junc-
ture. For that an enemy should arise against Philip
on the very confines of his kingdom, of no inconsider-
able power, and, what is of most importance, so de-
termined on the war that they consider any accom-
modation with him, first, as insidious; next, as the
downfa,". of their country: this seems no less than
the gracious interposition of heaven itself. It must
therefore be our care, Athenians, that we ourselves
may not frustrate this goodness; for it must reflect
disgrace, nay, the foulest infamy on us, if we appear
to have thrown away, not those states and territories
only which we once commanded, but those alliances
and favourable incidents which fortune hath provided
for us.
no means so many effective men. There were great abatements to be
made from the numbers promised ; and we find besides, from this oration,
that these foreigners were not paid at all, or ill paid; so that these grand
armies were nowhere complete but in the letters written to demand them
on one part and to promise them on the other. If I am not mistaken,
this is what Demosthenes calls Swafitis tmcroXifiaiovs--armies which
exist only in letters.
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? 46
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
leave to warn you of an error which hath often proved
injurious to you. Think not that your preparations
never can be too magnificent; great and terrible in
your decrees, in execution weak and contemptible.
Let your preparations, let your supplies at first be
moderate, and add to these if you find them not suf
ficient. I say, then, that the whole body of infantry
should be two thousand; of these, that five hundred
should be Athenians of such an age as you shall think
proper, and with a stated time for service, not long
but such as that others may have their turn of duty.
Let the rest be formed of foreigners. To these you
are to add two hundred horse, fifty of them at least
Athenians, to serve in the same manner as the foot.
For these you are to provide transports. And now
what further preparations ? Ten light galleys; for as
he hath a naval power,1 we must be provided with
light vessels, that our troops may have a secure
convoy.
But whence are these forces to be subsisted ? This -
I shall explain when I have first given my reasons
why I think such numbers sufficient, and why I have
advised that we should serve in person. As to the
numbers, Athenians, my reason is this: it is not at
present in our power to provide a force able to meet
him in the open field, but we must harass him by
depredations: thus the war must be carried on at first
We therefore cannot think of raising a prodigious
army (for such we have neither pay nor provisions),
nor must our forces be absolutely mean. And I have
proposed that citizens should join in the service, and
help to man our fleet, because 1 am informed that
some time since the state maintained a body of aux-
iliaries at Corinth,2 which Polystratus commanded,3
1 As be bath a naval power. ]--In consequence of his engagements
with the Thessalians, he commanded their ports and ships.
2 At Corinth. ]--This was in the same war which he alludes to in the
beginning of the oration Corinth was appointed as the place of general
rendezvous for the OreeKS who confederated against Sparta.
3 Which Polystratus commanded. ]--Instead of Polystratus, which )?
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? PHILIPPIC #HE FIRST.
47
and Iphicrates, and Chabriaa, and some others; that
you yourselves served with them; and that the united
efforts of these auxiliary and domestic forces gained
a considerable victory over the Lacedaemonians. But
ever since our armies have been formed of foreigners
alone, their victories have been over our allies and
confederates, while our enemies have risen to an ex-
travagance of power. And these armies, with scarcely
the slightest attention to the service of the state, sail
orf to fight for Artabazus,1 or any other person, and
their general follows them. Nor should we wonder
at it; for he cannot command who cannot pay his
soldiers. What, then, do I recommend? That you
should take away all pretences, both from generals
and from soldiers, by a regular payment of the army,
and by incorporating domestic forces with the aux-
iliaries, to be, as it were, inspectors into the conduct
of the commanders; for at present our manner of
acting is even ridiculous. If a man should ask, "Are
you at peace, Athenians 1" the answer would imme-
diately be, " By no means; we are at war with
Philic2 Have not we chosen the usual generals and
I name little known in history, Monsieur Tourreil proposes to read Cal-
listratus, who, according to Xenophon and Diodorus, was colleague to
Iphicrates and Chabrias in the war of Corcyra. But, as Mr. Mounteney
has observed, Polystratus is again mentioned by Demosthenes, together
with Iphicrates, in the oration on the immunities ; so that it is probable
this is the true reading.
I To fight for Artabazus. ]--He here alludes to an affair which had
happened some time before, and had occasioned great commotion. The
Athenians had sent Chares at the head of a powerful force to reduce
Byzantium, Cos, and Chios, which had revolted from them. But this
general, when he had a prospect of success in that enterprise, suffered
himself to be corrupted by Artabazus, a rebellious satrap of Asia, and
assisted him against an army of seventy thousand men. Chares
received a reward proportioned to the service; but this action raised the
indignation of the Athenians, as he had not only deserted the cause of the
republic, but also incensed the King of Persia. Demosthenes, however,
here shifts the blame from Chares to his soldiers, who refused to obey
him, or rather to the people, who took no care to provide for their pay. --
Tourreil.
2 We are at war with Philip. ]--So the orator affects to speak; though
I apprehend it does not appear from history that they were at that time
directly at war with him. They had, indeed, joined with the Phnciana,
and Philip was at the head of the opposite confederacy Thus far they
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? 48 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
officers1 both of horse and foot ? " And of what use
are all these, except the single person whom you
send to the field? The rest attend your priests in
their processions. So that, as if you formed so many
men of clay, you make your officers for show, and
not for service. My countrymen! should not all
these generals have been chosen from your own body,
all these several officers from your own body, that
our force might be really Athenian ? And yet, for an
expedition in favour of Lemnos,2 the general must be
a citizen, while troops engaged in defence of our own
territories are commanded by Menelaus ! 3 I say not
this to detract from his merit; but to whomsoever
this command had been intrusted, surely he should
have derived it from your voices. 4
Perhaps you are fully5 sensible of these truths, but
were engaged against each other, though neither of them as principals in
the quarrel. The Athenians, indeed, might have made some attempts to
tecover Amphipolis; they certainly made some^ineffeclual preparations
to relieve Potidaea and Methone; and after Philip's attempt on Ther-
mopylae, did station some forces on their frontiers'to oppose him in case
he renewed his attack. But still the war was not declared in form. But
of this I shall speak more hereafter.
1 The usual generals and officers. ]--In the text they are mentioned
particularly. Ten taxiarchs (arparriyot, or generals) and phylarchs, and
two hipparchs. Each of the ten tribes chose a new general every year,
and each of these (originally, when all went to the field) had the com-
mand for one day in his turn. Philip was very pleasant on this number
of commanders. " I never," said he, " could find but one general," mean-
ing Parmenio; "but the Athenians can get ten every year. " Anciently,
the people on extraordinary occasions chose a polemarch, to determine
when the opinions of the generals were equally divided. The taxiarch
commanded the infantry, the phylarch the cavalry of his tribe. The
whole body of horse was divided into two corps, each of which was
commanded by a general of horse, or hipparch. --Tourreil.
2 In favour of Lemnos. ]--When in the social war the revolters invaded
it with a fleet of a hundred sail. --Tourreil.
3 By Menelaus! ]--Monsieur Tourreil says that this Menelaus was
the brother of Philip by another marriage. But though Philip and hi*
brother were not on good terms, yet it is not likely that the Athenians
would have trusted one so nearly allied to their enemy. --Olivet.
4 From your voices. ]--The regular method of choosing all officers.
However, the choice was sometimes left to the commander-in-chief. --
Tourreil.
5 Perhaps you are fully, dec. ]--It is not impossible hut that the people
might have been struck with the freedom and candour of the orator, and
given some marks of their approbation.
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.
49
would rather hear me on another point,--that of the
supplies; what we are to raise, and from what funds.
To this I now proceed. The sum, therefore, neces-
sary for the maintenance of these forces, that the sol-
diers may be supplied with grain, is somewhat above
ninety talentsto the ten galleys forty talents, that
each vessel may have a monthly allowance of twenty
minae; to the two thousand foot the same sum, that
each soldier may receive ten drachmae a month for
corn to the two hundred horse, for a monthly allow-
ance of thirty drachmas each, twelve talents. And
let it not be thought a small convenience that the sol-
diers are supplied with grain; for I am clearly satis-
fied, that if such a provision be made, the war itself
will supply them with every thing else, so as to com-
plete their appointment, and this without any injury
to the Greeks or allies; and I myself am ready to sail
with them, and to answer for the consequence with
my life should it prove otherwise. From what funds
the sum which I propose may be supplied shall now
be explained. * * * *
[Here the secretary of the assembly reads a scheme for raismg fne sup-
plies, and proposes it to the people in form in the name of the orator. ]
These are the supplies,2 Athenians, in our power to
1 Ninety talents. ]--The Attic talent is computed by Tourreil equal to
167(. 10>>. ; by Prideaux, to 1887. <<s. ; by Arbuthnot, to 193Z. 15s. It con-
tained sixty mine, and each mina one hundred drachmae. By the com-
putation of the orator, it appears that the provisions he recomnlends to
be supplied were to last one year. --Mounteney.
2 These are the supplies, &c. i-- Dionysius of Halicarnassus gives us
the rest of this oration as a sixth Philippic, pronounced in the archonship
of Themistoeles. But it appears to me. as well as to the other inter-
preters, a natural conclusion of the first Philippic; and therefore I could
Dotprevail on myself to separate them. --Tourreil.
The scholiast is of the same opinion, and flatly accuses Dionysius of a
mistake. Mr. Mounteney has expressed greater deference for this critic.
He supposes that this second part is not that which Dionysius quotes,
but that there was another oration, since lost, which began with fha
same words; for he observes, that the former part is plainly imperfect ot
itself, and the two parts are joined in all the copies and manuscripts, and
that naturally and consistently.
T must confess, with all submission to these authorities, that although
I could not presume to separate them, yet I am not quite satisfied that
these two parts are one oration. In the first place, J cannot think that
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? 60 ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
raise. And when you come to give your voices, de
termine on some effectual provision,1 that you may
oppose Philip, not by decrees and letters only, but by
actions; and, in my opinion, your plan of operation
and every tiling relating to your armament will be
much more happily adjusted if the situation of the
country which is to be the scene of action be taken
into the account; and if you reflect that the winds and
seasons have greatly contributed to the rapidity of
Philip's conquests, that he watches the blowing of
the Etesians2 and the severity of the winter, and forms
the first Philippic would end abruptly if this second part was away; for
we find in the first part all that the orator proposes to speak to in the
beginning; and it concludes, not unlike a speech in parliament, with a
motion in form, for such and such subsidies to be raised for the mainte-
nance of such and sucn forces. And as to the manner in which the second
part begins, supposing it a distinct oration, we cannot object to that, as
Dionysius quotes an oration beginning exactly in the same manner (see
his letter to Ammius). It might also be observed, that in the beginning
of the oration, having for some time exhorted the Athenians to change
their conduct and act with vigour, Demosthenes says expressly that he
intends to speak no more on that subject, and yet this second part is en
tirely taken up with it; and lastly, there are some passages in the second
part which, I suspect, do not agree to the particular time when the first
oration against Philip was pronounced; and I imagine that some editors
were sensible of this by their placing the Olynthiac orations before this,
which is called the first Philippic. These passages I shall take notice
of as they occur.
As to any similitude between the two parts, I apprehend that is no
more than what runs through all these orations, and may be accounted
for from the similitude of the subject, without joining them. But if this
second part be really a distinct oration, spoken after the destruction of
Olynthus (for this city was taken the y sar before the archonship of The-
mistocles), how comes it that this event is not mentioned in it? It had
just then thrown the Athenians into the greatest consternation; and as
it was the orator's business to encourage them, possibly he might have
kept it out of view on purpose; though, perhaps, he does bint at it ob-
scurely, and as far as was consistent with prudence, as I shall observe
by-and-by.
1 Effectual provision. ]--In the Greek it is & av bitiv apcaicft x^porofn-
care, choose those things which may be agreeable to you. I own I do
not see how their entering into the resolution they liked best would of
consequence enable them to opposo Philip effectually. Perhaps it might
be of disservice, for in other places the orator is ever cautioning them
against following the bent of their inclinations. If we should make a
very small alteration in the text, and for apcoKii read apiece-^, those things
which may be si{fficient for your purposes, I apprehend the sense would
be better and more agreeable to Demosthenes. I have taken the liberty
to translate after this reading.
2 of the Etesians. ]--Winds which blew regularly every year at Uw
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.
51
his sieges when it is impossible for us to bring up our
forces,--it is your part then to consider this, and not
to carry on the war by occasional detachments (they
will ever arrive too late), but by a regular army con-
stantly kept up. And for winter-quarters you may
command Lemnos, and Thassus, and Sciathus, and
the adjacent islands, in which there are ports, and pro-
visions, and all things necessary for the soldiery in
abundance. As to the season of the year in which we
may land our forces with the greatest ease, and be in
no danger from the winds, either on the coast to which
we are bound, or at the entrance of those harbours
where we may put in for provisions, this will be easily
discovered. In what manner and at what time our
forces are to act their general will determine, accord-
ing to the j unctures of affairs. What you are to per-
form on your part is contained in the decree I have
now proposed. And if you, will be persuaded, Athe-
nians, first, to raise these supplies which I have recom-
mended ! then, to proceed to your other preparations,
your infantry, navy, and cavalry; and lastly, to con-
fine your forces by a law to that service which is
appointed to them, reserving the care and distribution
of their money to yourselves, and strictly examining
into the conduct of the general;--then your time will
be no longer wasted in continual debates on the same
subject, and scarcely to any purpose; then you will
deprive him of the most considerable of his revenues,
for his arms are now supported by seizing and making
prizes of those who pass the seas. But is this all ?
No. - You shall also be secure from his attempts;
not a. when some time since1 he fell on Lemnos and
rising of the dog-star, wh^n the Greeks were obliged to retire from action
on accc '*nt of the excessive heats, and which, as they biew from the
north, of consequence opposed any attempt of invading Macedon, or send-
ing any forces to those pans which were the seat of Philip's wars at
(tret.
I Not as when some time since, &c. ]--If this be really a part of the
fh*. t Philippic, these hostilities must have preceded the attempt on Ther-
mopylae, else the orator could not have dis'ingnished them into thost
which happened some time ago, and that ornmitted lately. Now, I can-
Vol. I -- E
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? 62
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
Imbrus, and carried away your citizens in chains; not
as when he surprised your vessels at Gerastus, and
spoiled them of an unspeakable quantity of riches;
not as when lately he made a descent on the coast of
Marathon, and carried off our sacred galleywhile
you could neither oppose these insults, nor detach
your forces at such junctures as were thought con-
venient.
And now, Athenians, what is the reason, think ye,
that the public festivals2 in honour of Minerva and of
Bacchus are always celebrated at the appointed time,
whether the direction of them falls to the lot of men
of eminence or of persons less distinguished--festi-
vals which cost more treasure than is usually ex-
pended on a whole navy, and more numbers and
greater preparations than any one, perhaps, ever cost,
--while your expeditions have been all too late, as
that to Methone, that to Pegasse, that to Potidaea ?
The reason is this: every thing relating to the former
is ascertained by law, and every one of you knows
not tell how to reconcile such open acts of hostility with the other parts
of Philip's conduct at that time. There was a peace subsisting between
him and the Athenians which he affected to observe; and so far does he
appear from making any open and professed attack on them, that in the
taking ofPotidaea and Pydna he would not act as principal, but as ally to
the Olynthians, and, when these cities were taken, dismissed the Athe
Mian garrisons with all imaginable respect and honour; and on all occa
sions courted and cajoled the Athenians. This, then, is one of those
passages which I suspect do not agree to the particular time when the
first Philippic was spoken. But if we suppose that this, which I call the
second part, is really the oration which Dionysius quotes, and which was
spoken to engage the Athenians to defend the islanders and the cities of
the Hellespont against the attempts of Philip, then all the difficulty van
ishes. The hostilities here mentioned agree very well to a time of open
war.
Now, Diodorus Siculus informs us, that it was after Olynthus
was taken that the Athenians declared war against Philip in form; and
we find, that immediately on this, he attacked them and their tributary
states with such fury that they were soon glad to sue for peace.
1 Our sacred galley. ]--There were two of these appropriated to reli
gious ceremonies, and all extraordinary emergencies and occasions of
the state,--the Paralian and the Salaminian. Harpocration understands
here the Paralian. --Toiirreil.
2 Festivals, &c. ]--For the Panathensea and Dionysla (as these fesM
vals are called in the original) I refer the reader to Potter, and othe;
writers on the antiquities of Greece.
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.
53
long before who is to conduct1 the several entertain-
ments in each tribe, what he is to receive, when, and
from whom, and what to perform. Not one of these
things is left uncertain, not one undetermined. But
in affairs of war and warlike preparations, there is no
order, no certainty, no regulation. So that, when
any accident alarms us, first we appoint our trier-
archs,2 then we allow them the exchange, then the
supplies are considered. These points once settled,
we resolve to man our fleet with strangers3 and for-
eigners, then find it necessary to supply their place
ourselves. In the midst of these delays, what we are
sailing to defend the enemy is already master of; for
the time of action we spend in preparing, and the
junctures of affairs will not wait our slow and irreso-
lute measures. These forces, too, which we think
may be depended on until the new levies are raised,
when put to the proof plainly discover their insuffi-
ciency. By these means hath he arrived to such a
pitch of-insolence, as to send a letter to the Euboeans4
conceived in such terms as these.
1 To conduct, &. C. ]--In the original it is who is the choraigus, that is,
the citizen who provided the music, of which each tribe had a band; ana
the gymnasiarch, he w ho presided over the wrestlers, and provided what
was necessary for that entertainment.
2 We appoint our trierarchs. ]--The rich citizens who were obliged, not
only to command, but to equip a vessel of war at their own expense,
either severally or jointly, for the service of the public. As this was an
office of great expense, it was allowed to anyone who was nominated to
point out some citizen richer than himself, and to desire he might be
substituted in his place, provided he was willing to exchange fortunes
-with that citizen, and then to take on him the office of trierarch. This
is what Demosthenes calls allowing the exchange, which in its nature
must have occasioned confusion and delay.
For a fuller accountof these trierarchs, &c. Irefer the reader to Potter's
Archaeol.
3 We resolve to man our fleet with strang"is, &c. ]--Mtroixoi- which
I translate strangers, were those foreigners-who were permitted to so-
journ at Athens on certain conditions.
This whole passage is an exact description of the proceedings of the
Athenians in defence of Olynthus, and of the event. I had it in view
when I observed that possibly we might find some obscure allusions to
that affair.
4 A letterto the Eubceans, <fcc. l--This letter has not descended to us.
It is probable, from the context, that he expressed in it a contempt for
the Athenian power, and insisted how little dependence the Eubceans
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? 54
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
[The letter is read. ]
What hath now been read is for the most part true,
Athenians--too true! but perhaps not very agreeable
in the recital. But if by suppressing things ungrate-
ful to the ear the things themselves could be pre-
vented, then the sole concern of a public speaker
should be to please. If, on the contrary, these un-
seasonably pleasing speeches be really injurious, it
is shameful, Athenians, to deceive yourselves, and,
by deferring the consideration of every thing dis-
agreeable, never once to move until it be too late, and
not to apprehend that they who conduct a war with
prudence are not to follow, but to direct events--to
direct them with the same absolute authority with
which a general leads on his forces; that the course
of affairs may be determined by them, and not deter-
mine their measures. But you, Athenians, although
possessed of the greatest power1 of all kinds--ships,
infantry, cavalry, and treasure,--yet to this day have
never employed any of them seasonably, but are ever
last in the field. Just as barbarians2 engage at box-
ing, so you make war with Philip; for when one of
these receives a blow, that blow engages him; if
struck in another part, to that part his hands are
shifted; but to ward off the blow, or to watch his
could have on that state. And if this he so, it confirms an observation
which I made before (see a preceding lote), via. that the Athenians had
as yet given Philip no remarkable opposition in Euboea. The letter must
have been written when Philip began to raise commotions in that island
in order to make himself master of it. I am induced to think, both from
history and Demosthenes, that he did not make any attempts of this
kind so early as the first Philippic, and, therefore, that this is no part of
that oration.
1 Possessed of the greatest power, . fee]--They could then command
three hundred ships of war, and those capable of engaging a navy of
double that number. Tbey had twenty thousand foot and two thousand
eight hundred horse; and their revenue amounted to above twelve hun-
dred talents. --Tourreil and Mounteney.
2 As barbarians, &c. ]--The learned reader will find a beautiful pas-
sage in Aulus Gellius (I. iii. c. 27), where, on the contrary, a man of true
prudence who engages in the business and dangers of the world is com-
pared to a skilful boxer who is ever attentive to defend himself and annoy
his adversary. --Tourreil.
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.
55
antagonist, for this he hath neither skill nor spirit.
Even so, if you hear that Philip is in the Chersonesus,
you resolve to send forces thither; if in Thermopylae,
thither; if in any other place, you hurry up and
down, you follow his standard. But no useful scheme
for carrying on the war, no wise provisions' are ever
thought of, until you hear of some enterprise in exe-
cution, or already crowned with success. This might
formerly have been pardonable, but now is the very
critical moment when it can by no means be ad-
mitted.
It seems to me, Athenians, that some divinity, who,
from a regard to Athens, looks down on our conduct
with indignation, hath inspired Philip with this rest-
less ambition; for were he to sit down in the quiet
enjoyment of his conquests and acquisitions without
proceeding to any new attempts, there are men among
you who, I think, would be unmoved at those transac-
tions2 which have branded our state with the odious
marks of infamy, cowardice, and all that is base. But
as he still pursues his conquests--as he is still ex-
tending his ambitious views,--possibly he may at last
call you forth, unless you have renounced the name
of Athenians. To me it is astonishing that none of
you look back to the beginning3 of this war, and con-
1 No wise provisions, Ace]--I have followed the reading which Mr.
Mounteney adopts--ricpt tgiv irpayuaiwv, &c. , instead of xoquartitv.
2 At those transactions, &c. ]--The taking of Pydna, and Potidaa, and
Amphipolis may warrant what the orator here says. Yet I should
choose to apply it to their suffering Olynthus by their misconduct to full
under the power of Philip.
3 Look back to the beginning, &c. j--I shall trouble the reader but
with one argument more in favour of my suspicion that this is no part
of the first Philippic. The passage I now quote I cannot think is applica
ble'to the transactions of the Athenians and Philip before his attempt on
Thermopylae, when, from the time of Argeus's death, they acted against
eacb other only indirectly; and, instead of punishing Philip, the Athe-
nians could not even prevail on themselves to defend those dominions
which they claimed as their own. But it is a very exact description of
what happened after their declaration of war against Philip, which suc-
ceeded the taking of Olynthus; for this declaration was made from a
sense of the dang3r of Philip's growing power, a resentment of his in-
fractions, and a resolution to reduce him; and yet they were quickly
obliged to defend themselves against farther attempts
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? 86
ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.
sider that we engaged in it to chastise the insolence
of Philip, but that now it is become a defensive war
to secure us from his attempts; and ibat he will ever
be repeating these attempts is manifest, unless some
power rises to oppose him. But if we wait in expecta-
tion of this,--if we send out armaments composed of
empty galleys, and those hopes with wbvh some
speaker may have flattered you,--can you the- think
your interests well secured ? Shall we not embark ?
shall we not sail with at least a part of our domestic
force now, since we have not hitherto 1--But '"here
shall we make our descent ? Let us but engage in
the enterprise, and the war itself, Athenians, will show
us where he is weakest. But if we sit at home listen-
ing to the mutual invectives and accusations of out
orators, we cannot expect--no, not the least success
in any one particular. Wherever a part of our city
is detached, although the whole' be not present, the
favour of the gods and the kindness of fortune attend
to fight on our side ; but when we send out a general,
and an insignificant decree, and the hopes of our
speakers, misfortune and disappointment must ensue.
Such expeditions are to our enemies a sport, but strike
our allies with deadly apprehensions; for it is not--
it is not possible for any one man to perform every
thing you desire. He may promise, and harangue,
and accuse this or that person; but to such proceed-
ings we owe the ruin of our affairs. For when a
general who commanded a wretched collection of
unpaid foreigners hath been defeated,--when there
are persons here who, in arraigning his conduct, dare
to advance falsehoods,--and when you lightly engage
in any determination just from their suggestions,--
what must be the consequence 1 How, then, shall
these abuses be removed ? By offering yourselves,
Athenians, to execute the commands of your general,
to be witnesses of his conduct in the field, and his
judges at your return; so as not only to hear how
Vour affairs are transacted, but to inspect them. Bu
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? PHILIPPIC THE FIRST.
57
now, so shamefully are we degenerated, that each of
onr commanders is twice or thrice called before you
to answer for his life, though not one of them dared
to hazard that life by once engaging his enemy. No;
they choose the death of robbers and pilferers rather
than to fall as becomes them. Such malefactors
should die by the sentence of the law. Generals
should meet their fate bravely in the field.
Then as to your own conduct: some wander about,
crying, Philip hath joined with the Lacedaemonians,
and they are concerting the destruction of Thebes,
and the dissolution1 of some free states; others assure
us he hath sent an embassy to the king;2 others,
that he is fortifying places in Illyria. 3 Thus we all
go about framing our several tales. I do believe,
indeed, Athenians, he is intoxicated with his great-
ness, and does entertain his imagination with many
such visionary prospects, as he sees no power rising
to oppose him, and is elated with his success. But I
cannot be persuaded that he hath so taken his mea-
sures, that the weakest among us know what he is
next to do; for it is the weakest among us who spread
these rumours. Let us disregard them. Let us be
persuaded of this,--that he is our enemy; that he
hath spoiled us of our dominions; that we have long
been subject to his insolence; that whatever we
expected to be done for us by others hath proved
against us; that all the resource left is in ourselves;
that if we are not inclined to carry our arms abroad,
we may be forced to engage here;--let us be per-
suaded of this, and then we shall come to a proper
determination--then shall we be freed from those idle
1 The dissolution, &c. ]--Wherever the Lacedaemonians had power
they were always for establishing oligarchies, as has been observed in
the preface to these orations.
2 To the king. ]--So the King of Persia was called. The intent of this
embassy was supposed to be to make such demands as must produce
war with the Persian, which Isocrates had exhorted him to very early.
3 He is fortifying places in Illyria. ]--Possibly, these rumours were
spread by Philip's friends, to persuade the Athenians that his views and
schemes were removed to a great distance from Athens
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? 58 ORATIONS OP DEMOSTHENES.
tales. For we are not to be solicitous to know what
particular events will happen; we need but be con-
vinced nothing good can happen unless you grant the
due attention to affairs, and be ready to act as becomes
Athenians.
I, on my part, have never on any occasion chosen
to court your favour by speaking any thing but what
I was convinced would serve you; and on this occa-
sion I have freely declared my sentiments, without
art and without reserve. It would have pleased me,
indeed, that as it is for your advantage to have your
true interest laid before you, so I might be assured
that he who layeth it before you would share the ad-
vantage, for then I had spoken with greater alacrity.
However, uncertain as is the consequence with re-
spect to me, I yet determined to speak, because I
was convinced that these measures, if pursued, must
have their use; and of all those opinions which are
offered to your acceptance, may that be chosen which
will best advance the general weal!
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? THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC ORATION:
AtONOUNCED FOUR TEARS AFTER THE FIRST PHILIPPIC, IN TH1 AR-
CHONSH1P OF CALLIMACHUS, THE FOURTH YEAR OF THE HUNDRED
AND SEVENTH OLYMPIAD, AND THE TWELFTH OF PHILIP'S REIGN.
INTRODUCTION.
The former oration does not appear to have had any considerable
effect. Philip had his creatures in the Athenian assembly, who proba-
bly recommended less vigorous measures, and were but too favourably
heard. In the mean time, this prince pursued his ambitious designs.
When he round himself shut out of Greece, he turned his arms to such
remote parts as he might reduce without alarming the states of Greece:
and, at the same time, he revenged himself on the Athenians, by making
himself master of some places which they laid claim to. At length his
success imboldened him to declare those intentions which he had long
entertained secretly against the Olynthians.
Olynthus (a city of Thrace, possessed by Greeks originally from
Chalcis, a town of Eobcea, and colony of Athens) commanded a large
tract called the Chalcidian region, in which there were thirty-two cities.
It had risen by degrees to such a pitch of grandeur, as to have frequent
and remarkable contests both with Athens and Lacedsemon. Nor did
the Olynthians show great regard to the friendship of Philip when he
first came to the throne, and was taking all measures to secure the
possession of it; for they did not scruple to receive two of his brothers
by another marriage, who had fled to avoid the effects of his jealousy;
and endeavoured to conclude an alliance with Athens against him,
which he, by secret practices, found means to defeat. But as he was yet
scarcely secure on bis throne, instead of expressing his resentment, he
courted, or rather purchased, ihe alliance of the Olynthians, by the cession
of Anthemus, a city which the kings of Macedon had long disputed with
them, and afterward by that of Pydna and Potidaea, which their joint
forces had besieged and taken from the Athenians. But the Olynthians
could not be influenced by gratitude towards such a benefactor. The
rapid progress of his arms and his glaring acts of perfidy alarmed them
exceedingly. He had already made some inroads on their territories,
and now began to act against them with less reserve. They therefore
despatched ambassadors to Athens, to propose an alliance, and request
assistance against a power which they were equally concerned to
oppose.
Philip affected the highest resentment at this step; alleged their
mutual engagements to adhere to each other in war and peace; in-
veighed against their harbouring his brothers, whom he called the con-
spirators; and, under pretence of punishing their infractions, pursued
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? 00
INTRODUCTION.
his hostilities with double vigour, made himself master of some of their
cities, and threatened the capital with a siege.
In the mean time, the Olynthians pressed the Athenians for imme-
diate succours. Their ambassadors opened their commission in an
assembly of the people, who had the right either to agree to or to reject
their demand. As the importance of the occasion increased the
number of speakers, the elder orators had debated the affair before De-
mosthenes arose. In the following oration, therefore, he speaks as to
a people already informed; urges the necessity of joining with the
Olynthians, and confirms his opinion by powerful arguments; lays
open the designs and practices of Philip, and labours to remove their
dreadful apprehensions of his power. He concludes with recommend-
ing to them to reform abuses, to restore ancient discipline, and to put
h end to all domestic dissensions
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? OLYNTHIAC THE FIRST. 1
In many instances, Athenians, have the gods, in my
opinion, manifestly declared their favour to this
state ; nor is it least observable in this present junc-
ture. For that an enemy should arise against Philip
on the very confines of his kingdom, of no inconsider-
able power, and, what is of most importance, so de-
termined on the war that they consider any accom-
modation with him, first, as insidious; next, as the
downfa,". of their country: this seems no less than
the gracious interposition of heaven itself. It must
therefore be our care, Athenians, that we ourselves
may not frustrate this goodness; for it must reflect
disgrace, nay, the foulest infamy on us, if we appear
to have thrown away, not those states and territories
only which we once commanded, but those alliances
and favourable incidents which fortune hath provided
for us.
